sampson-kindness to strangers

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Unconditional Kindness to

StrangersHuman Sociality and the Foundation for an EthicalPsychology

Edward E. SampsonCenter for Critical Studies, Berkeley

Abstract. Relational science has become an increasingly important para-digm in psychology. Its emphasis on the centrality of interpersonalrelationships to psychological processes and its insistence that such rela-tionships are the key to human survival and well-being appear to be theneeded antidote to the problems of the individualistic paradigm. Unfortu-nately, however, even while talking the language of relationships, rela-tional science continues to walk individualistically. Using Levinasphilosophy as the basis, I argue that this problem stems from adopting aconditional understanding of the interpersonal domain; this differs from

Levinass insistence on persons unconditional obligations to be respons-ible for others, especially the stranger. I further argue that these uncondi-tional obligations offer the only basis by which sociality can contribute tohuman survival and well-being. Four implications and a conclusion for anethical psychology complete the article.

Key Words: ethics, kindness, obligations, relationships, sociality, stranger

In the final scene of Tennessee Williams play A Streetcar Named Desire

(1951), Blanche Du Bois is being led away by the doctor who will escort her

to the asylum. She turns to him and utters one of the most well-known linesin all of theater: Whoever you areI have always depended on the

kindness of strangers (p. 142). In these few words, Blanche poignantlyexpresses a truth for all people: in one way or another, everyone relies on

others, including the kindness of strangers, for her or his own survival andwell-being. Without kindness receivedfrom strangers, no one could success-

fully manage their everyday lives, let alone hope to thrive.

In addition to requiring kindness from others, however, people are alsosaid to have obligations to others, both those near and familiar as well as

those distant and unfamiliar. In passage after passage, story upon story, the

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Bible, for example, does not simply remind people of their obligations toothers but commands them to fulfill those obligations. Simply consider the

Golden Rules admonition to treat others as one would wish to be treated by

them. The story of the Good Samaritan likewise illustrates the rule com-manding every person to help strangers, whether they be foreigners or

sojourners in need. The Bible is also filled with hospitality rules, includingthe dire consequences that follow should one fail to follow them: failure is

likely to call forth the wrath of God.Interpretations of several biblical stories, including the well-known fate of

Sodom and Gomorrah, for example, express these hospitality rules and the

biblical injunction to treat strangers in a kindly and hospitable manner, orelse. Although the interpretations of the Sodom story that have come down

through history emphasize the issue of sexuality, many current interpreta-

tions argue that Sodom is less a condemnation of homosexuality than theexpression of Gods wrath over the violation of well-known rules demand-

ing the kind treatment of the stranger, not the harsh treatment that thestrangers received in Sodom (e.g. Fone, 2000; Gomes, 1996; Helminiak,

1994; Jordon, 1997). The Bible also reminds everyone not to harm thestranger who may harm them. Vengeance is said to be Gods alone. Peoples

task is to be kind to their opponents, not to hurt them.

In these and many other passages the Bible recognizes the humanobligation to the stranger and enjoins everyone to show kindness and be

hospitable. It seems clear that this biblically ordained obligation towards thestranger is not based on any expectation of receiving a return kindness from

them. This command is not a contractual matter in which a kindness is given

as a return for a kindness received or anticipated. Rather, the Bible presentsa commandment to be unconditionally kind and hospitable to others, both

neighbor and stranger. The philosopher Emmanuel Levinas (1981, 1988,1993, 1998, 1999; see also Hand, 1989; Hendley, 2000; Oppenheim, 1997),

whose ideas will be examined later in more detail, bases his entire frame-

work on the primary commandment that obligates people to be uncondi-

tionally responsible for the other.According to Levinas, every encounter with the other opens each person

to her or his responsibility to that other. In agreement with the biblical

commandments, Levinas likewise sees this obligation to be non-contractual

and asymmetrical, not building on any principle of reciprocity: that is, noreturn is expected for a kindness given. For Levinas, these unconditional

obligations towards others, especially the stranger, define human socialityand serve as the very bedrock of human relations and morality. Indeed,

human life itself is made possible by human sociality, understood by

Levinas as peoples capacity to form, to sustain and to nourish interpersonalrelationships, and, in particular, to meet their unconditional obligations to

others.Although coming at this issue of the foundational quality of human

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sociality from a slightly different starting point, the anthropologist MichaelCarrithers (1992) arrives at much the same conclusion as Levinas. Carrithers

reminds us that people do not simply spend their lives in relationships, but

form and sustain relationships in order to live their lives. Although he doesnot directly endorse the biblical or Levinasian claim that sociality must build

upon unconditional obligations towards the other, I will later insist that onlyunconditional relationships can serve the vital purposes of sociality that he

does endorse.All of these accountsbiblical, Levinas, Carrithers and others we have

yet to considerconcur in insisting that the very foundation that makes

human life possible is tied to the ability to form, to sustain and to nourishunconditional relationships with others. All agree that human sociality is the

foundation for human life. These accounts thereby introduce the two themes

that will become central to this article. First, interpersonal relationships (i.e.sociality), including with the stranger, make human life possible. Second,

the key to socialitys foundational role lies in peoples unconditionalobligations to others. It is interesting to speculate about why these themes

were made the centerpiece of the Bible and of Levinas parallel account.Both the biblical account and Levinas selected the two most vulnerable

and problematic aspects of human sociality on which to center their

attention. The first, being kind to those nearest and dearest, is thought to beless problematical and thereby requiring less commentary than relationships

with strangers, those who are not members of ones home group of familiars.Although abuse and harmful behavior towards familiars and intimates is of

near epidemic proportions, on the larger world stage, it is those relationships

with the outsider that have resulted in even more substantial social instabil-ity and horror, as the literature on prejudice and intergroup relations testifies

(e.g. Brewer & Miller, 1996; Jones, 1997; Sampson, 1999).With respect to the second themeconditional vs unconditional

relationshipsit appears that both the Bible and Levinas consider con-

ditional relationships with others, based on reciprocity or some form of

contractual agreement, to be less of a key to human survival and well-beingthan the far more difficult task of establishing unconditional relationshipsthat obligate us to the other. In other words, when it comes to understanding

human sociality as the foundation for human life, the preceding accounts

draw a line separating conditional relationships, which play a useful but notdefining role, and unconditional relationships, which are considered the sine

qua non of human sociality.

Psychologys Relational Paradigm and Sociality

I will now expand the inquiry by introducing psychologys account of thefoundational quality of human sociality. We will find both similarities with

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and important differences from the preceding accounts. For present pur-poses, I will focus on psychologys account as it appears in the newly

emerging paradigm commonly referred to as relational science (see, e.g.

especially Berscheid, 1999; Reiss, Collins, & Berscheid, 2000).Even a cursory review of recent psychological literature makes it increas-

ingly apparent that a relational paradigm is slowly but surely overtaking theself-contained individualistic view that has heretofore dominated most

psychological inquiry and practice (see, e.g., Berscheid, 1999, and Reiss etal., 2000, for a general overview, and Bavelas, Coates, & Johnson, 2000;

Hubbard, Dodge, Cillessen, Coie, & Schwartz, 2001; Kenny, Mohr, &

Levesque, 2001, for more specific research examples). While the individual-istic paradigm hopes to explain human behavior by seeking stable structures

and processes that reside within the individual, the relational paradigm seeks

its explanatory principles within the relationship jointly created by personand other. The relational paradigm argues that the interpersonal relationship

is an emergent system that cannot be reduced to the operation of structuresor processes found within any of its constituent parts, making the more

individualistic forms of psychological inquiry at best an incomplete portrait,at worst, inaccurate and misleading. For my present purposes, however,

what is most important about the relational paradigm is its elevation of

human sociality to a foundational principle.

Similarities: Sociality as the Foundation

Either by ignoring interpersonal relationships or reducing them to propertiesof the individuals involved, the individualistic paradigm in psychology has

failed to address that which is said to be most fundamental about, and,

indeed, the very foundation for, all human survival and flourishing, namelyhuman sociality. Berscheid (1999), for example, notes that our relationships

with others are both the foundation and the theme of the human condition(p. 261): because our entire lives are spent in relationships, no facet of

human psychology can ignore this feature without generating a misleadingunderstanding. Reiss et al. (2000) amplify these remarks, suggesting thatmost of the psychological structures and processes of interest to psychology

today have evolved to facilitate functioning with others and to maintain theongoing social world necessary for survival and well-being.

Sociality within the relational paradigm both emphasizes the evolutionary

value of those cognitive and affective skills that are essential for effectivegroup living and sees the interpersonal domain as the essential basis for all

facets of human life. In agreement with Carrithers (1992), whose ideas werepreviously noted, the relational paradigm argues that human survival is

rooted in human sociality, in maintaining the interpersonal relationships that

are the ground for human life in this world and have been so since itsbeginnings.



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Among advocates of the relational paradigm, there is general agreement

both about the fundamental importance of human sociality and about why

sociality has this foundational status. Reiss et al. (2000), for example, call

upon various works in evolutionary psychology in support of their conten-tions regarding the foundational role of the interpersonal domain. They

suggest that those who effectively form and sustain interpersonal relation-

ships gain a significant survival value over those lacking such abilities.

Baumeister and Leary (1995) develop their arguments around what they

refer to as the human need to belong, to form and maintain at least a

minimum quantity of lasting, positive and significant interpersonal relation-

ships (p. 497). Again, the clear message is that interpersonal relationships

allow people to survive and thrive. Bugentals (2000) arguments focus on

those special human skills that develop in domain-specific ways, including

what she refers to as skills requisite to function within the reciprocity

domain: learning the skills necessary to keep track of past benefits provided

by others and reciprocating those benefits at a later time (p. 199). Once

again, long-term survival benefits accrue to those who have developed the

interpersonal skills of sociality when compared with those who have not.

In emphasizing human sociality, the relational paradigm hopes to restore

the missing social (i.e. interpersonal) dimension to the study of psychology

and thereby to offer a more complete and accurate understanding of human

life. Advocates argue that in ignoring the foundational centrality of inter-

personal relationships, the individualistic paradigm offers not only an

incomplete portrait of humankind, but, as Reiss et al. (2000), among others,

have commented, an inaccurate portrait as well (also see, e.g., Douglas &

Ney, 1998). To this point, therefore, the relational paradigms emphasis on

socialitys foundational status shares a great deal with the biblical and

Levinasian accounts with which I opened this article.

Differences: Unconditional Kindness to the Stranger

On the other hand, one of the key differences between the relational

paradigm in psychology and both the biblical and Levinass account lies in

the theme to which I previously alluded: the Bible and Levinas share a deep

conviction that the key to understanding the role that sociality plays as the

foundation for human life resides in the unconditional obligation all people

have to others, especially the stranger. Where obligations to others appear

within the relational paradigm in psychology, they tend to be less an

unconditional commandment than a reaffirmation of the primarily egocentric

(i.e. conditional and self-interested) view that continues to dominate psycho-

logys understanding of human relations (see, e.g. Batson, 1990, on this

same point). I will argue that this commitment to a conditional view of

relationships proves to be the downfall of relational science. A conditional



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account cannot serve the foundational purposes for sociality that the rela-

tional model advocates. As Levinas argues, sociality works as a foundational

principle only when it operates unconditionally. This difference between

relational psychologys conditional version and Levinas unconditionalaccount is thus of major significance. This is the matter to which I now

direct my attention.

Two Different Accounts of Sociality

Although psychologys relational paradigm clearly considers human soci-

ality to be foundational, there is an important way in which its understanding

of sociality undermines the very claims that it makes about socialitysfoundational status. This failure is even noted by prominent advocates. Reiss

et al. (2000), for example, comment that even those for whom the relational

paradigm is central, somewhat ironically, have treated relationships indi-

vidualistically, making the lions share of relationship theory and research

. . . individualistic in nature (p. 846). I believe that this failure can be better

understood if we compare the relational view with the view proffered by

Levinas. In brief, while both relational science and Levinas concur in

making sociality the foundation of human life, they part company when it

comes to their understanding of the specific character of the relationships on

which this foundation is based. The key distinction hinges on relational

sciences conditional version of sociality and Levinas unconditional

account.

Conditional Sociality

Conditional interpersonal relationships tend to dominate relational psycho-

logys work, weakening the case for sociality. This failure occurs in part

because any conditional view of human relationships is less about relation-ships than all about the individual person or central protagonist. When

persons act towards others in anticipation of later receiving some return

benefit from them; when persons actions are a return for a prior benefit

received; when persons focus primarily on what can be gained or not lost by

virtue of behaving in a kindly manner towards others all of which describe

a conditional form of relationshipsociality gives way to an individualistic

account centering on the individual person. Somewhat this same point was

made over a decade ago by Batson (1990), who referred to what he termed

the social egoism of most psychological versions of human relations:

insofar as people calculate their own interests in every social encounter, they

may appear to act socially towards others, but it inevitably seems to come

back to looking out for Number One (p. 337).



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The altruismegoism debate. A helpful way to flesh out the social egoisminherent in all conditional forms of relationship, and thus the way in which

conditional accounts cannot successfully address sociality, is to consider the

debate published in the 1997 issue of theJournal of Personality and SocialPsychology involving Batson and his associates on one side (e.g. Batson,

1997; Batson et al., 1997) and Cialdini and his, on the other (e.g. Cialdini,Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg,1997; Neuberg et al., 1997). The debate

centers on the question of whether people can act altruistically, that is, solelyto benefit the other (i.e. the unconditional version), as Batson as his

associates maintain, or if all kindly acts are invariably coated with self-

interest (i.e. the conditional version), as Cialdini and his team suggest.In a series of complex studies, Batson believes his group has successfully

demonstrated unconditional acts of altruism, while in an equally complex

series of challenges, the Cialdini group has argued that each and everyapparent sign of pure altruism reveals the all too human underbelly of self-

interest and is thereby conditional. For example, if people help others whoare in distress, is this purely out of concern with the other or because the

help-giver suffers on seeing the others pain and so, in relieving the otherspain, is actually relieving her or his own pain? Or, to take another example,

do people help others in distress because they anticipate receiving some

personal reward, such as 15 minutes of fame for having done so, or is theirassistance provided purely with the other in mind?

The most recent candidate supporting a conditional account, introducedby the Cialdini group and challenged in its turn by Batsons side, involves

the idea that either empathy or perspective taking blurs the boundaries

between person and other and thereby makes any kindly act one thatsimultaneously benefits the individual person (see, e.g., Aron, Aron, &

Smollan, 1992; Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Davis, Conklin, Smith,& Luce, 1996; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). Presumably, when the

boundaries between person and other become blurred through empathy or

perspective taking, the two once distinct selves overlap and become one.

And so, when people help another, they are actually helping the self.Needless to say, Batson has resisted this view, continuing to envision anunconditional empathy in which, without any conditions attached and

without any apparent merging involved, people are concerned about others

welfare and so help for no other motive than the desire to alleviate theothers suffering.

Implications of the debate. I have not introduced this debate in order to seek

a resolution: I do not think that one is likely. Rather, the debate illustrates

the nature of a conditional as contrasted with an unconditional account ofinterpersonal relationships. In my view, the issue is not whether people can

behave out of self interest (obviously they can and do), but rather, whetherself-interested, conditional accounts can serve the purposes of granting



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human sociality the foundational status that many increasingly have arguedsociality should have. Can human survival and well-being be founded on

any conditional account of the personother relationship, or must that

foundation be sought in something akin to Levinas unconditional view?But, prior to developing the case in support of this latter position, I will first

examine the unconditional account as presented by Levinas.

Levinas and Unconditional Sociality

Levinas (1981, 1988, 1993,1998, 1999; see also Hand, 1989; Hendley, 2000;Oppenheim. 1997) introduces a framework that shares relational psycho-

logys rejection of the individualistic paradigm while also emphasizing the

foundational status of human sociality. Furthermore, in agreement with

Meads (1934) earlier view and relational sciences current focus, Levinas isclear that the self exists only in and through interpersonal relationships andthat meaning and intelligibility likewise emerge only within the inter-

personal domain. At the same time, however, his understanding of the role

that interpersonal relationships play in the story of human sociality dramatic-ally departs from most of the ideas that psychology in general and relational

science in particular describe.There are a few noteworthy exceptions: for example, Batsons (1990) idea

that altruistic caring involves an unconditional concern for the others well-

being; Clark and Mills (1979) distinction between exchange and communalrelationships, in which only the latter but not the former is based on an

exclusive concern with the other. Overall, however, it is rare to find anyextant psychological analysis that joins these three key elements: consider-

ing human survival and well-being as humanitys dominant terminal values;

the idea that these values are the ground that makes sociality the centralconcern of all humankind; and the understanding, primarily from Levinas,

that human sociality is based on the primary commandment that un-conditionally obligates the person to be responsible for the stranger.

Advocate for the other. While all three elements change the focus from the

more familiar protagonist, the individual person, to the other person, Levinas

forcefully gives privilege to the other, or, as he states it, to the face of theother. In this move, Levinas not only shifts the focus from the individual

protagonist to the other, but also emphasizes the fundamental commandmentcentering on the protagonists irrecusable (the term is his) responsibility for

the other. Although I do not intend to develop Levinas framework in great

detail, I will focus on those ideas that ground sociality in an unconditionalrather than a conditional relationship with the other.

Every meeting with the other, says Levinas, is an occasion for acceptingones fundamental and ongoing obligations to the other: to nourish the other

with ones own fasting; to meet the others needs without regard for ones



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own projects; to let ones obligations to the other trump both ones owninterests and ones loyalties to those close and familiar; to exercise respons-

ibilities beyond any legal or contractual requirements; to be responsible even

to others who have done nothing for ones self; to have an ongoing andbottomless debt to the other that is not based on any loan received or

anticipated from the other. In short, Levinas focuses all of his attention onthe primary commandment, the unconditional obligation each person has to

the other. In passage after passage, he affirms that the most fundamentalinterpersonal requirement, the root basis for all human sociality, is to be

there for the other, unconditionally, without strings attached, without ex-

pectations of reciprocity or calculations based on contractual understandings.Plainly and simply, the primary commandment is to serve the other.

Levinas (1998) describes these unconditional obligations as asymmetrical:

the person is responsible to care for the other without any return sought orexpected: At the outset, I hardly care what the other is with respect to me,

that is his own business; for me, he is above all the one I am responsible for(p. 105). Levinas argues that these asymmetrical and unconditional respons-

ibilities for the other are unlimited, inalienable and hence irrecusable.The responsibilities are unlimited: people are never done with their

responsibilities to the other; the obligations are never completed; the

commandment is open-ended. No one can just sit back comfortably feelingsatisfied that they have finally completed their service to the other. As

Levinas states it, I am never finished with emptying myself of myself(quoted in Hand, 1989, p. 182).

The responsibilities are inalienable: people cannot simply hand off to

someone else the responsibilities that are uniquely theirs to fulfill. Aresponsibility that can be given to another to take care of, says Levinas, is no

responsibility at all. In recognition of the all too human experience of beingin a situation and not quite knowing what to do to exercise these respons-

ibilities, Levinas offers a suggestion: simply be there for the other; or in

more biblical terms, respond to the face of the other with the declaration,

Here I am.

Without deliberation. Levinas also argues that this unconditional command-

ment is not based on reasoned deliberation. Obligations do not issue from

the persons first perceiving the commandment to be responsible to theother, deliberating upon it, and then finally committing him- or herself to it.

Levinas considers these unconditional obligations to the other to precede anyconscious awareness even of self. The commandment, he argues, is the

foundation not only for human relationships but for self-consciousness as

well.To clarify this aspect of Levinas view, it will prove helpful to consider

Bubers (1958) conception of the IThou in contrast to the IIt relationship.Buber reserves the terms IIt to describe relationships in which the



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individual (as the I) meets the other (as the It) on a more rational, self-conscious and reflective basis: for example, the person contemplates the

other and in this act notes her or his unique features as one object among

many in the world. The individual can readily talk about the other personand describe her or his features. The IThou form of relationship, by

contrast, does not issue from standing back from the other as an object thatcan be known and described and talked about. Rather, this relationship is the

direct encounter with the other person as Thou. The encounter cannot beindependently represented without exiting the Thou and entering the world

of It.

When asked, for example, if he believed in God, here is Bubers answer:

If to believe in God means to be able to talk about him in the third person,

then I do notbelieve in God. But if to believe in him means to be able to

talkto him, then I do believe in God. . . . God cannot be expressed but only

addressed. (quoted in Friedman, 1996, p. 9)

It is clear that for Buber, to talk about God, or anything for that matter, is to

establish a mediated rather than an unmediated relationship with the other;the latter is the meeting itself.

Although Bubers and Levinas views differ in certain important ways, Ibelieve that Levinas arguments about the unconditional obligations that join

person with other are similar to the unmediated view that Buber employs to

describe the IThou relationship: the obligations that link person with other

are not representations of the idea of an obligation. People do not talk aboutfollowing the commandment to be unconditionally obligated to the other; inaddressing the other, they express this obligation. People do not step back so

that they may reflect upon the commandment and what it commits them to.

Rather, in the face of the other, people are committed unconditionally to theother.

In other words, both Levinas and Buber introduce the idea of a direct (i.e.unmediated) encounter with the other. They tell us that if people first think

about the other before relating to them, they step outside the direct meeting

with the other and enter into a different realm of relationship. Neitherconsiders this move to be improper, but only a different way of meeting the

other. And, at least in the case of Levinas, meetings that are reflected uponopen the door to conditional forms of relationship that undermine the

primary commandment and the human sociality that builds upon it.

Concluding comments. I have not provided this brief overview of Levinas

account so that psychologists can now debate its empirical validity. Mypoint, rather, pertains to conceptual coherence and integrity. The self-

interested and conditional accounts are flawed, not because they are without

empirical supports, but because they cannot serve the foundational purposesrequired by human sociality. In other words, even if research discovered that

many or even most people act in terms of self-interest, this would not negate



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the essential role that unconditional relationships serve for human survival

and well-being.

In brief, if human sociality is the key to human survival and well-being,

then it cannot rest on a conditional relationship between person and other.Sociality must be based on an account of the relationship that rests, as

Levinas suggests, on a persons fundamental obligation to the stranger

without any strings attached. Those strings make any story egoistic; hardly

the basis for sociality.

Why Conditional Accounts Fail as a Basis for Sociality

I will now examine in more detail why I have argued that a conditionalaccount of interpersonal relationships can neither be the foundation for

human sociality nor contribute to its purported role in human survival and

well-being. The arguments that appear in the following section form around

two main themes and are based in part on some of Levinas ideas that I have

just reviewed. First, while purporting to describe an interpersonal relation-

ship, conditional accounts tend to so focus on the individual person or

protagonist that any hope for a truly relational account is lost, replaced by

the social egoism that Batson (1990) so aptly described and the in-

dividualized analyses to which Reiss et al. (2000) referred. Second, the

specific arguments on which most conditional accounts are based tend to

provide both a shaky and a short-term interpersonal bond, hardly a suitable

foundation for something of such monumental importance to human survival

and well-being as sociality.

Conditional Is Not Relational

One of the problems with any conditional form of relationship is that it turns

out to be primarily an account centered on the individual protagonist: that is,the focus is upon the benefits that accrue to that individual from being kind

to others. When the story begins and ends with the protagonist, the others

primary role is as an object to be used by the protagonist in the pursuit of her

or his own ends. We have moved into the relational world of dialogue,

where sociality truly lives, only when persons relate unconditionally to

others, without any strings attached, such that both the others unique

individuality and the person who is relating to them can follow the command

to be responsible for this particular other. In these instances, protagonists

neither merge with the other, including them within their own self, nor

employ the other as an instrument to complete their own projects. The other

remains a distinctive voice addressing this person, this protagonist. I will

both develop this argument more fully in the next section dealing with the



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implications of the model of unconditional sociality, and suggest what

changes psychology must make to redress this glaring failure.

Briefly for now, the current psychological discourse on interpersonal

relationships tends to create the very conditions that undermine the possibil-ity of dealing with relationships at all. This is not a helpful way to advocate

the centrality of sociality to human survival and well-being. Thus to speak of

sociality as central to human life while employing what sound like relational

concepts but turn out to be primarily individualistically centered on the

individual protagonist serves to undo socialitys claimed primacy. It is much

as Reiss et al. (2000) suggested, noting the paradoxical quality of even most

relational theorists, who remain more individualistic than the relational

paradigm advocates.

Conditional Arguments Form a Shaky Foundation

My second argument about why conditional accounts fail to address soci-

ality focuses on several of the central ideas that have been proposed to

support the conditional approach. For the most part, reciprocity, fame and

identity have been put forth as the essential conditions for smoothly working

interpersonal relationships. I will suggest that each of these offers both a

flimsy and a short-term basis for serving sociality.

Reciprocity. Of the various conditions said to be important to the inter-

personal domain, reciprocity stands out as one of the most significant.

Indeed, it is not too extreme to suggest that reciprocity has rewritten the

Golden Rule: Do unto others only what you can expect them to do in return

for you. Reciprocity insists that the person be kind to the other, for example,

either in return for a kindness previously shown by the other or in

anticipation of banking a future favor from them. Recall Bugentals (2000)

claims suggesting that one of the central cognitive abilities to be learned lies

within the reciprocity domain and involves keeping track of past benefitsprovided by others and reciprocating those benefits at a later time (p. 199).

Calculations involving reciprocity or the presumed social norm of reci-

procity proposed by Gouldner (1960) can clearly help smooth out potentially

bumpy places that crop up in many interpersonal relationships. On the other

hand, reciprocity can cause more grief than it provides help. When the other

fails to reciprocate, for example not returning a favor for a favor received,

the relationship itself may suffer as tensions build up, anger erupts and

distancing results. Similarly, becoming indebted to others may promote what

has been referred to as reactance (e.g. Brehm, 1966), leading less to a happy

situation than to one fraught with problems. When reciprocity works well, it

seems useful in cementing a relationship, at least for a short time. When

reciprocity fails, however, it undermines the likelihood that socialitys



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foundational role will be accomplished. The grounds for sociality must be

made of sterner stuff than reciprocity.

Even staunch relational theorists encounter similar problems in their

analyses of the importance of social support for both mental and physicalhealth (e.g. Reiss et al., 2000). How can support be effective, however, if the

person in need of such support is aware of its conditional quality? Indeed,

support given conditionally may contribute more to the stressful aspects of

human relations than to their healthful possibilities. On the other hand,

support that is given unconditionally, that clearly says, I will be there for

you no matter what, may very well be the key to the frequently found

positive correlation between social support and health.

It also seems likely that the conditionality of relationships may actually

thwart rather than facilitate the survival of human communities and in thelong run undo rather than achieve individual well-being. Contractual rela-

tionships tend to be built around issues of power and fear (e.g. benefits given

by the powerful to the less powerful may be withdrawn at any time) more

than trust, and so provide a flimsy basis for building human communities

and achieving individual well-being.

Identity and Fame. Much the same form of argument can be made for the

other two rationales presented in support of self-interested, conditional

accounts. Both those 15 minutes of fame people are promised and theblurring of selfother boundaries that make care for others really care for

self provide very shaky foundations for human sociality. Even if fame were

to last for 20 minutes or two years, it would still be too fleeting, hardly

suitable as the basis for something as important to human life as sociality.

And a boundary that is blurred today may tomorrow be sharpened suffi-

ciently to lead the individual to withdraw all caring, or perhaps even turn

caring into resentment and hostility: again, hardly a basis for human

sociality. Furthermore, if people are kind to others only insofar as they can

construe a strong similarity to those others, achieving overlapping selves

(e.g. Aron et al., 1991; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000) or a oneness of selves

(e.g. Cialdini et al., 1997), this may contribute less to happy interpersonal

relationships than to troubling relationships. As some psychological liter-

ature reveals, for example, all too often individuals achieve oneness by

remaking others into a copy of themselves, thereby denying others a

distinctive voice (see, e.g., Sampson, 1993a, 1993b; Tavris, 1992).

Studies of racism and other forms of prejudice have suggested how a

blurring of selfother boundaries may support rather than reduce the hold of

prejudice. Judd, Park, Ryan, Brauer and Kraus (1995), for example, found

that whites who were color-blind, seeing people of color as like themselves,

denied any unique individuality to these people, transforming a diversity of

voices into one white voice. These authors join others (e.g. Sampson, 1993a,



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1993b, 1999; Tavris, 1992) in suggesting that oneness may be the new formin which prejudice is packaged.

Concluding comments. Although I may have omitted some other rationalesoffered in support of the conditional accounts of interpersonal relationships,

the preceding should be sufficient to clarify why I contend that conditionalforms of relationship at best offer a rather shaky and short-term foundation

for socialitys serving as the ground for human survival and well-being. It isimportant to repeat that I am in no way denying that these or other

conditional or contractual bases of relationship exist or may even dominate

at any given point in a societys history. Nor am I denying that they mayfacilitate a positive relationship, at least for a short time and under limited

circumstances. I am simply suggesting that contracts between persons,

explicit or implied, that are designed to cement their relationship provide aless secure basis for that relationship than the Levinasian commandment. If

I am obligated to you, but only insofar as I can see something in it for me,then I can withdraw that obligation once I am made aware that perhaps I am

not getting out of the deal what I had hoped to receive. While this makessense in a world founded on so-called rational agreements, it does not work

well when considering human sociality as the foundation for human survival

and well-being.Most people have come to accept the conditional view as the normative

basis for sociality, as the best deal anyone can ever hope to achieve, whileforgetting that what is desired can only be found through unconditional

obligations to the other. Conditionality has become so much a part of the

taken-for-granted everyday background, at least in the current westernworld, that people hardly notice other possibilities or the risks involved in

basing so much of their life together on a conditional form of relationship.Indeed, perhaps cultural cynicism has led people neither to recognize nor to

grant much validity to the Levinasian unconditional account. And yet, I

submit that only such an account can fulfill the promises of human sociality.

The Bible, at least in this case, did have an important and valid message:kindness to the stranger is the very basis for human society and individualflourishing.

Implications for Psychology

What does it mean for psychological theory and practice to accept the idea

that human sociality is the foundation for human life and that this foundationcan rest securely only on unconditional relationships of responsibility to

others? In this final section, I will briefly introduce four major implications

that I believe follow from adopting this framework of unconditionalsociality.



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Developing a Genuinely Relational Psychology

Although I have already introduced aspects of this theme in discussing why

a conditional account is not a relational account and thereby not suited to

address human sociality, the implications of this critique warrant a separate

discussion. The Levinasian framework of unconditional sociality, when

applied to psychology, suggests that, in order to address issues of sociality,

psychology must shift its focus from the character who still dominates the

field, the self-contained, autonomous protagonist, to the other person. This

change in focus presents psychology with a challenge that is more difficult

than it may initially appear. Let me illustrate the nature of this challenge by

turning to two so-called relational approaches in psychology that are

trapped within the world of the individual person even while speaking as

though the other were also important. I will follow these examples with two

that offer a clearer picture of what it means to focus on the other.

Trapped within the world of the individual protagonist. In order to develop

the case in support of my contention that even well-intended relational

approaches tend to remain trapped in the world of the individual, I will focus

on two studies: Clark and Mills (1979); and Kenny, Mohr and Levesque

(2001).

Clark and Mills (1979). I previously made reference to Clark and Mills

(1979) distinction between two types of relationship: exchange and com-

munal. It is clear from their descriptions that the exchange form remains

firmly embedded in the world of the protagonists own needs and interests:

not only does that individual seek to maximize benefits and minimize costs

to the self, but she or he also acts to ensure that reciprocity is accomplished

in the exchange with the other. Communal relationships are said to differ in

that they move the focus from the protagonists self concerns to her or his

concern with the other persons welfare.

In spite of the claims Clark and Mills make on behalf of communal

relationships, however, even here their focus remains steadfastly on the

individual protagonist. The questions that Clark and Mills ask, for example,

reveal the extent to which the other is sloughed off while the protagonist

remains the centerpiece of interest: (a) Can people have both communal and

exchange relationships with the same other? (b) Do some people fail to

distinguish between the two types of relationship and so inappropriately treat

communal as exchange or vice versa? (c) Do some kinds of people prefer

one form of relationship over the other? If so, what kinds of personalities

dispose persons to one or the other preference? That these questions do not

appear peculiar to most psychologists but rather very reasonable contains the

key to the problem that keeps the field keenly focused on the individual

protagonist even while proclaiming otherwise.



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Let me reiterate my point. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with thesequestions. They are not unusual or idiosyncratic in the field of psychology.

They are very likely to motivate further research that will someday appear in

issues of one or another psychology journal and demonstrate the conditionsunder which people act or fail to act communally. The problem with such

questions, rather, is that relationships are reduced to some feature of theprotagonist while ignoring both the other person and the dynamics of the

relationship itself. In other words, in centering their inquiry on the individualprotagonist, not only do Clark and Mills lose the other person, who enters

primarily as a functionary in the protagonists world, but also, as previously

noted, the personother relationship is reduced to something about theindividual protagonist. Relationships, even those purported to be communal

and thus concerned with the other person, turn out to be simply another

chapter in the story of the individual protagonist. Batson (1990) made asimilar point when he commented on how the Clark and Mills work on

communal relationships presented merely another version of the socialegoism he felt infected almost all of psychology. Although Reiss et al.s

(2000) critique of the unfortunate individualizing tendencies of even mostrelational theorists did not specifically refer to Clark and Mills, they could

well have offered Clark and Mills work as one further illustration of their

argument.I have used this first example to illustrate the tendency for psychology to

abjure anything but the primacy of the individual protagonist. The veryquestions asked exemplify this deep proclivity to individualize psycho-

logical concerns, even while purporting to be discussing relationships. It

seems very difficult even for relational science to move from the individualsinvolved to the properties of the relationship itself (see, e.g., Batson, 1990;

Berscheid, 1999; Reiss et al., 2000).

Kenny, Mohr and Levesque (2001). The near intractability of the problem

also appears in the otherwise excellent program of theory and research

recently reported by Kenny et al. (2001). Their work offers a second

illustration of the failure of ostensibly relational approaches to deal with theother person. Their approach is to examine the three sources of variance thatcomprise the personother dyad: (1) the actor or individual protagonist;

(2) the situation: in this case, the protagonists partner or other person; and

(3) the interaction between person and other treated as an interaction effectin an analysis of variance. In order to undertake their investigation, Kenny et

al. developed what they referred to as a social relations model (SRM), whichallowed them to examine the relative contribution of each source of variance

to the behavior examined: that is, is it the protagonists dispositions, the

responses elicited from the partner, or the interaction between these two?While I will not go into the details of Kenny et al.s own research methods

or those they summarize from others investigations, one typical designinvolves what they refer to as a round robin encounter. In this design, for



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example, each person interacts with every other person; the behavior inquestion (e.g. nonverbal immediacy cues) is recorded on videotape and then

coded by independent observers. Although this is not the only design

employed, it is typical of the way in which dyadic interaction is studied sothat the sources of behavioral variance can be examined.

The initial impression of the SRM approach is that it both focuses on thepersonother relationship and provides data that include the other persons

contribution to the behavioral outcomes studied. At long last a serious focusis given to the other. Or is it? On closer examination, it appears that the

other, the partner, enters the SRM not as an individual in her or his own

right, but primarily as a figure whose role is defined in terms of theprotagonist. The following material led me to this conclusion.

Kenny et al. begin with the promise that their work will join the growing

body of literature that considers the impact of an interaction partner on anindividuals perceptions and behavior (p. 129). On reading this, I became

hopeful, expecting to find the transition from person to other clearly inevidence. My hopes were quickly dashed, however, as I read on. The

problem emerges when Kenny et al. use the SRM to argue that [i]t wouldseem reasonable that an individuals dispositional characteristics would

affect the behavior of individuals with whom he or she interacts (p. 130).

Yes, it is reasonable that the protagonists dispositions elicit responses fromthe partner: for example, that a friendly act is likely to elicit friendly

responses. But what does this mean for the so-called interaction effect onwhich the entire relational view depends?

The two factors that are said to interact are not in fact from two separate

variance sources, person and other, but rather from only one, namely theperson or protagonist. That is, the interaction is between the protagonists

dispositions and the behavior those dispositions elicit from the other person.The other person enters not as a fellow human being with her or his own

qualities and characteristics worthy of study, not as the true partner that

Kenny et al. claim, but rather only as an adjunct through which the

protagonists life plays itself out. In this, the other persons story remainsunderdeveloped and barely known as such. While talking about relation-ships, the relationship dissolves into more about the protagonist and very

little about the other person, her or his partner.

Once again, I am not arguing that there is anything intrinsically wrongwith the SRM approach. Nor am I arguing that the protagonists perceptions

of the situation or eliciting dispositions are unimportant. Nor am I evensuggesting that it is unreasonable to examine how the protagonists disposi-

tions affect her or his behavior and in turn elicit behavior from the other. So

much of this is simply part of psychologys everyday background that, ofcourse, it all seems reasonable and perhaps even beyond challenge. What I

am arguing, however, is that a relational model cannot be built entirelyaround the individual protagonists point of view and remain relational.



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When psychology wishes to call itself relational, it must give independent

weight to the situation itself: in this case, the other person or partner is the

situation that exists independently of the protagonists perceptions of her or

him or behavior towards her or him. The problem lies in talking relationallywhile walking individualistically, a problem that is not unique to the Kenny

et al. research, but which their approach highlights. The challenge is not to

tell the others story in terms defined by the protagonist, but rather to give

the other a voice of her or his own.

Changing the Focus from Person to Other. What specifically does it mean to

move our focus from person to other? In reviewing the literature in

psychology proper, I have found two instructive examples illustrating this

change in focus. The first comes from a study recently reported by Bavelas,Coates and Johnson (2000); the other from an earlier and generally forgotten

program of research in psychological ecology developed by Roger Barker

and his associates (e.g. Barker, 1965; Barker & Gump, 1964; Barker &

Wright, 1955).

Bavelas, Coates and Johnson (2000). Bavelas et al. (2000) contrasted two

models of the dyadic conversation: first, what they referred to as the

autonomous model, which is monologic and individually centered and

derives for the most part from the individualistic paradigm; second, what

they term a collaborative model, which is dialogic and follows the relationalparadigm (also see Fay, Garrod, & Carletta, 2000, who further develop this

distinction). According to the autonomous model, conversations are like

one-way streets: the conversation originates in one person, who is con-

sidered the transmitter, and then moves to the other person, who is the

receiver. In this view, the receiver is a kind of passive listener, a speaker in

waiting (Bavelas et al., 2000, p. 941), simply awaiting her or his turn in a

series of alternating monologues. Rather than involving the duet the col-

laborative model envisions, the autonomous view represents conversations

as a series of alternating solos.

According to the collaborative model proposed by Bavelas and her

colleagues, receivers are co-creators of the conversation: they add to the

transmitters story, modify it, illustrate it, and so forth. Their research

demonstrated that even though person as transmitter and other as receiver

were strangers, the receiver nevertheless was able to track the transmitters

story sufficiently to contribute specific and appropriate details (Bavelas et

al., 2000, p. 944) on an ever-shifting moment-by-moment basis. Their

examination of the microprocesses that occur during a typical conversation

revealed the extent to which conversations are joint productions of person

and other, transmitter and receiver, collaborative events in which both co-

create the story that is told. In short, conversations are joint activities that

belong to neither person nor other, but rather, as Bakhtin (1981, 1986)



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argued some years earlier, are co-productions of both together (also seeSampson, 1993a, especially ch. 9).

Bavelas et al.s (2000) research nicely illustrates both the distinction

between the individualistic paradigm and its relational challenger and howthe other can emerge as a unique person warranting separate attention: the

other is not merely an extension of the individual protagonist nor defined inher or his terms. The contrast between the Bavelas et al. approach and that of

Kenny et al. (2001) reveals how the former is genuinely and necessarilyinterested in the others contribution to the joint product, while the latter

retains its focus rather clearly on the individual protagonist. For Bavelas et

al., the other person is not merely a passive partner but rather is someonewho, to employ Levinas terminology, is a true interlocutor: one who does

not merely respond, but who has a unique co-creative role in the ongoing

encounter between person and other. Bavelas et al. provide a view of theother that points towards the change in focus of which I have spoken.

Barkers (1965) psychological ecology. The second example that I believeillustrates the needed shift in focus from person to other involves the rather

extensive research program undertaken by Barker (1965) and his colleagues(e.g. Barker & Gump, 1964; Barker & Wright, 1955). What sets Barkers

work apart from much of the cognitively centered or biologically rooted

work that dominates psychology today is its examination of how a situ-ations ecological requirements set the conditions for the behavior of the

persons acting within that situation. In Barkers hands, the situation becomesa living and breathing entity and not merely the passive backdrop against

which the individual protagonist acts.

One brief example will illustrate both Barkers approach and what I intendin citing it. One of the ways that Barker and his colleagues define the

properties of a situation (or what he refers to as a behavior setting) is interms of its population requirements: that is, the number of persons that are

required to staff all the various components of a given setting. A small high

school, for example, that has about as many behavior settings to staff as does

a larger high schoole.g. band, drama club, sports teams, classrooms in awide variety of subjects, etc.will create different pressures on its membersto be involved than will a larger high school. For example, suppose that

school A has 500 students and roughly 50 behavior settings, while B has

3000 students and approximately the same number of settings. There ismuch greater pressure on each individual to get involved and participate in

A when compared with B. Given the greater number of students relative tosettings, each individual in B is somewhat superfluous (see Barker & Gump,

1964).

What this illustrates is the way in which the situation-as-other has apresence of its own that cannot be reduced to something about the individual

protagonists perceptions or eliciting acts. The situation-as-other is a distinctentity with its own properties and causal status; it cannot meaningfully be



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grasped as a mere extension of the protagonist, as known only through them.Although it is true that Barker did not examine otherness defined in terms of

the dyadic interaction between people, as in the previously cited research, I

believe that the point of his work nevertheless offers us clues about what isotherwise missing in much of psychology. The situation as another person is

not merely a foil for the protagonists life to unfold, but rather is anindependent world with its own story to tell and its own consequential

effects to examine.

Concluding comments. My point in all of this has been to suggest that until

psychology takes the first step of granting the other a separate and equalstanding with the individual protagonist, we will have neither a truly

relational science nor a basis for advocating sociality as the foundation for

human survival and well-being. Without that separate focus on the other,psychology not only retains its exclusive focus on the individual protagon-

ists world, but, in so doing, also disrupts the truly relational framework onwhich socialitys beneficial consequences rest.

I have not presented these studies by Bavelas et al. and by Barker and hiscolleagues because they are perfect illustrations of the shift that I have

argued is needed; rather, they represent helpful directions that can serve as

antidotes to psychologys unfortunate rapture with the individual protagon-ist. Each attempts to portray an independent other rather than one entirely

defined in terms of something about the protagonist. Each treats the othernot as a mere adjunct to the protagonist but rather as a distinct interlocutor

whose own voice must be heard and whose own effects must be taken into

consideration.This turn to the other is precisely what Levinas has advocated, albeit using

different terms than those familiar to most psychologists, including these lasttwo more exemplary cases. Levinas commandment obligating person to

other is a fundamentally relational view. The other to whom Levinas refers

clearly is someone other than the individual protagonist; the other is an

independent voice calling out to the protagonist to which she or he mustrespond. For Levinas, the only way out of the egoism of always dwelling inthe protagonists world and considering others as mere adjuncts for the

protagonists use is to accept the unconditional obligations of responsibility

for the other. Only thus can sociality become the essential ground for humansurvival and well-being.

Guiding Metaphors: From the Marketplace to Caretaking

Metaphors are often useful tools that facilitate understanding and the

communication of complex ideas and that may also provide a basis forthinking itself (see, e.g., Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). One of the

metaphors that has been found especially useful in the social psychological



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approach to interpersonal relationships turns to the economic marketplace:for example, Clark and Mills (1979) concept of an exchange relationship;

Bugentals (2000) focus on the reciprocity domain; both Thibaut and

Kelleys (1959) and Homans (1961) analysis of groups. Thibaut and Kelley,for example, theorize that peoples decision whether to remain in a relation-

ship or exit and seek an alternative is based on their costbenefit comparisonbetween the current relationship and what is available elsewhere.

Another use of the marketplace metaphor appears in Walster, Walster andBerscheids (1978) equity theory of justice. Equity theory defines justice in

terms of the persons calculations comparing own inputs relative to out-

comes with the other persons inputoutcome ratio. Inequity is said to existwhen the result of such calculations reveals an imbalance: for example, if the

protagonist expends more time and effort in studying for an exam than

the other person (the inputs) and yet gets the same grade as the other (e.g.the outcome), both will experience a sense of injustice and in theory at least

will seek to restore equity.The preceding examples encourage both psychologists and the general

public to whom psychology is given away (e.g. Miller, 1969) to experienceinterpersonal relationships through the language of the economic market-

place. People define relationships in terms of exchange and reciprocity; they

evaluate relationships by calculating the bottom line. Thinking of inter-personal relationships in marketplace terms readily encourages the social

egoism (e.g. Whats in it for me?) to which Batson (1990) referred and theacceptance of conditional relationships (e.g. How are my projects benefited

by using you?) discussed by Levinas (1998).

How tempting it must be for family and couples therapists to adoptmarketplace concepts: to think of the troubled couple as being in an

exchange relationship whose accounting books are out of balance; to helpeach party conduct a costbenefit analysis of their relationship; to suggest

what needs to be changed in order to balance their interpersonal book-

keeping. Any hint of other standards is lost midst the seductive press of the

marketplace metaphor. People are encouraged to negotiate with their partnerin order to get a better deal, where the deal is defined in terms of themarketplace terms rather than ethics and morals.

Once again, I am not arguing that the marketplace metaphor paints an

inaccurate picture of interpersonal relationships. My point, rather, is that thismetaphor provides an understanding that undermines the claim that human

sociality is the basis for human survival and well-being. As I have previ-ously argued, the conditional sociality that the marketplace formulation

describes is incompatible with the vital purposes claimed for sociality. In

other words, although it is definitely possible to conceptualize humanrelationships in marketplace terms, doing so encourages the spread of

marketplace ideologies and helps create a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy:people who believe that the marketplace applies to their lives with others act



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in ways to facilitate the creation of lives formed in these terms. A currentlyaccurate snapshot, unfortunately, does not ensure well-being.

Psychologys analysis of relationships, directed by the marketplace

metaphor, limits peoples vision and ability to think of alternatives. Mostpeople find it difficult to envision the world portrayed by Levinas, a world in

which people eschew the conditional calculations of the marketplace andaccept their unconditional obligations to others. Indeed, many will find his

view nave and simplistic in a world harshly ruled by the marketplace.Giving to others without expectations of return must sound like a formula

for going broke, not for achieving a greater good. Is there a different

metaphor, however, that reflects Levinas position and that could helppeople envision what is currently so foreign to them? Although several

possibilities come to mind, I find the caretaking metaphor most apt: for

example, parentchild, teacherstudent, gardenergarden, and so forth.The basic thrust of the caretaking metaphor involves a relationship in

which the caretaker has obligations to be there for the other. Parents, forexample, have these obligations towards their children, typically never-

ending, life-long and, as Levinas notes, asymmetrical. Even teachers haveobligations to their students: to be there and to care for them, albeit in a

manner that differs in certain ways from parental obligations, but obligations

and responsibilities nevertheless. As the author Jerzy Kosinski (1970)recognized, gardens do not survive, let alone thrive, without careful tending

by the gardener: another example of the caretaking metaphor.In a world and era suffused with market calculations, there is no doubt

that those who wanted to could readily transform any of these examples of

caretaking into an exchange relationship. I am suggesting, however, thatthough this transformation can be done, it need not be, especially if people

hope to find an alternative to the market view of human relationships. I amalso suggesting, and here I necessarily repeat, that if psychology sees its

central role as to contribute to human survival and well-being and views

human sociality as the key to this achievement, then it surely must seek

guiding metaphors that allow sociality to bloom. Although the marketplacemay describe the interpersonal world, it tends to encourage both individual-ization and egocentrism, hardly sources for long-term sociality. The care-

taking metaphor suggests another way to consider how we not only can but

indeed must relate unconditionally to others in order to give truth to theclaims for sociality.

A Changed Perspective on Personal Control: From Mastery to

Appreciation

Levinas discussion of the primacy of the commandment to be uncondition-

ally obliged to the other introduces two essential corollary commandments:first, for people to follow the primary commandment, they must be willing to



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adopt an attitude of submission towards others rather than seeking masteryover them; and, second, this attitude is both developed and sustained only

with particular kinds of institutional context. These two corollaries further

increase the distance already apparent between Levinas and the majorthemes that dominate both modern western culture and the kind of psycho-

logy that culture has nourished. They ask people not only to defy thecalculations of the marketplace and accept unconditional over conditional

forms of relationship with others, but also to defy the cultural emphasis onmastery and control and submit themselves to others in order to appreciate

rather than control them.

One of the main settings within which either submission or mastery isnurtured, says Levinas, involves places of learning. Given his own back-

ground and experience, he suggests that talmudic study illustrates his point.

He uses such terms as deference, submission and veneration to describe thestudents approach to the texts they are to read and from which they are to

learn. Only through such an approach, suggests Levinas, will studentsencounter the texts own message rather than the message that meets their

current interests and projects.Paradoxically for todays educational climate, Levinas seems to be

arguing that when students and teachers collude by seeking to make lessons

relevant to the students current needs, the messages contained within thematerial tend to get lost. Only by submitting to rather than trying to master

and control the material will students encounter the texts own message.Although this example refers to a text, another person can be treated as a

text: insofar as people try to master and control others, transforming them

into objects relevant to students own interests, the message of the othernecessarily yields to the message of the self.

I am reminded here of the attitudes said to characterize great writers andartists who claim that they do their best work when they let the material lead

them rather than trying to control it. Finding the message carried within the

material by submitting to that material, in whatever medium it may appear

e.g. writing, painting, music, sculpture, etc.rather than trying forcefully totake charge and thereby overwhelm the material with ones own interests,seems to parallel the attitude that Levinas hopes to imbue in students.

I am also reminded of some fascinating work reported on peaceful

societies, the small handful of cultures that seem, if not entirely devoid ofaggression, at least to minimize hostility both within the group and towards

outsiders (see, e.g., Bonta, 1997; Howell & Willis, 1989). One of the primeattitudes that these peaceful societies encourage is an attitude of submission

of the sort described by Levinas. Where mastery is encouraged, violence

tends to be manifested. Where submission is facilitated, peaceful inter-personal relations are likely to be found. Of course, to western ears,

encouraging submission seems to be an alien call, hardly a message onewould wish to encourage when socializing children, for example. Or is it?



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What do people hope that their lives with others will create? When

mastery over whatever is other leads either to transmuting otherness into

selfhood or casting the other aside; when mastery interferes with en-

countering the other in its terms rather than those needed by the self; whenmastery contributes more to hostility than peaceful relations with other

peoplewe may wish to take a second look at the unfortunate side of

mastery and the beneficial side of submission.

In order to conduct a genuine dialogue with others, whether text, situation

or person, people must abandon their hopes to be in full control of the

process. To be in charge, which is what most people are taught to consider

desirable, is not to give the other its due but rather to make the other

serviceable to a persons own projects. Only when people submit to the

dialogue itself, yielding to the other, can they appreciate what another has to

say to them.

Obviously, not only psychology but much of current western and western-

ized society is geared to mastery rather than appreciation. Again I repeat. If

our goals are to give sociality its foundational status, we must transform our

attitudes, ceding mastery to appreciation. And, insofar as this transformation

is developed and nurtured within particular institutional settings, we must re-

evaluate the ways in which both educational and therapeutic settings, for

example, participate in affirming mastery or encouraging appreciation.

Can people who teach create learning tasks that, rather than directing

students to master the material to be learned, facilitate an appreciative

approach to such material? What would assignments look like with appreci-

ation as the central goal? How can teachers help students listen to the

material speak to them rather than trying to speak to it?

Can therapists learn to listen to what their clients say to them, really listen

to them? How can therapists overcome their tendencies to make clients into

a mirror image of their own life and world, especially tempting when clients

come from very diverse backgrounds? Can therapists appreciate clients

whose realities dramatically differ from their own and so at long last hear

them speak?

The Face of the Enemy: From Exclusion to Inclusion

One of the most challenging implications of the Levinasian view of

unconditional sociality, and the most difficult to accomplish, involves an

issue with which both Levinas and Buber have had to wrestle. Briefly

considering their efforts will lead to a better appreciation of this challenge.

In an interview reported in one of his publications, Levinas (1998) was

asked if there were some persons, Nazi brutes, for example, who did not

have the kind of face to which unconditional kindness must be shown. In

other words, are there some forms of evil and persons who do evil who fall



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outside the commandment? Let me paraphrase Levinas response. While

recognizing the legitimacy of this question and the extreme challenge it

poses to anyone, but especially a Jew with memories of the Holocaust

indelibly engraved in his consciousness, Levinas nevertheless offers anunequivocal answer: even the brute has a face; as painful as it may be, we

are always obligated to the absolute commandment not to exclude anyone.

In short, Levinas accepts peoples fundamental obligations even towards the

human beasts of the world.

Buber was frequently challenged both by political friends and adversaries

with similar questions. Many of these challenges are reported in Friedmans

(1996) edited collection on Buber. Does the IThou relationship extend not

only to ones opponents but also to those who are evil? As did Levinas,

Buber responded affirmatively.For example, in the mid-1950s, when the Nazi atrocities were becoming

well known, Buber was not only willing to make conciliatory statements

towards Germany but also to accept prizes and honors bestowed on him by

Germany, even traveling there to accept these awards. This deeply upset

many of his supporters, who wondered how he could affirm such doers of

evil. Although it might have been difficult for Buber to follow the message

of IThou, he clearly felt he had no real choice without abandoning his lifes

project. He was similarly involved later with IsraeliPalestinian rapproche-

ment, something he favored when many of his colleagues sought the

annihilation or containment of the Palestinians. Once again, Bubers view of

IThou, while often troubling and difficult to follow, allows no other choice

without jettisoning the entire framework that has guided his lifes work.

Recognizing that people are not perfect in their willingness to follow any

commandment let alone what he considers as the primary commandment

linking person with other, Levinas suggests that, as painful as it might

sometimes be, the primary commandment is without meaning if it cannot be

applied to all others equally. Once we begin to make exceptions, formulating

what seem to be clear and convincing rationales as to why this or that person

or this or that group does not fall under the commandments requirements

(e.g. their race is different, their sexual orientation is different, etc.), we start

over again with the never-ending history of exclusionary and destructive

human relationships.

The face of the enemy is still a face to which people are unconditionally

obligated. One cannot refuse to fulfill these obligations by letting the

enemys past record of horrors interfere or by casting them from the human

core. Much as was noted in a discussion among psychologists interested in

the issue of moral inclusionexclusion (see Opotow, 1990), the real troubles

begin once people start to exclude certain others from the realm of the

human, removing their face as it were, and not extending moral concern to

them.



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Conclusion: Towards a Moral and Ethical Psychology

The implications of this article can best be summarized in terms of the main

theme it addresses: ethics and morality must return to a position of primacy

in the world today. This is especially relevant for psychology, a field whoseteachings have become of increasing societal importance. Following Levinas

and the ideas I have presented, a moral and ethical psychology must berooted in the commandment that unconditionally obligates person to other. If

psychology cannot lead people from themselves to the stranger, then what

ethical purpose can psychology serve for humankind?Unfortunately, psychologys collusion with societys general narcissism,

seen in its commitments to the individual protagonist, has led it in adirection away from the needed ethical stance. Psychology has helped teach

people to look inward, to remodel and to refurnish their personal houses, tosee the world outside primarily in their own terms. The alchemy of this kindof psychology has transmuted otherness into selfsameness. We can never

encounter an ethical stance by living entirely within our own privatehouses.

The wise Rabbi Hillel once observed that if we are not for ourselves, then

who will be; but if we are only for ourselves, then what does it really matter?For too long we have accepted the first part of his counsel while failing to

heed the ethical demands proposed by the second.

As Blanche Du Bois contemplates her fate, she reflects on how much herlife has been built upon the kindness of strangers. In a very different context,

war in Europe, Brecht (1947) contemplates the virtual impossibility forthose, such as himself, who are seeking to create a kindly world, to act with

kindness. Finally, Levinas, founding an ethics on unconditional kindness tothe stranger, asks us to be taken hostage by the face of the other, whoever he

or she may be. No conditions. No self.

Whom do we follow? Blanche, reflecting on her personal situation,trapped within the world experienced only in her own terms? Brecht, who

poignantly expresses his inability to act kindly towards those who haveharmed him? Levinas, who sees the face of the other, even the sworn enemy,

and yet reaches out to them?

Psychology, like much of the world it feeds and feeds off, has embracedBlanches narcissism and encouraged Brechts rationalizations that excuse

people from acting morally and ethically towards the stranger. When will wereach out to Levinas?

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