sandoval notes constitutional law 2

8/12/2019 Sandoval notes Constitutional law 2

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A. THE INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE

Police Power

1. Define Police Power and clarify its scope.

Held: 1. Police power is an inherent attribute ofsovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested

by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain,and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonablelaws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties orwithout, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shalljudge to be for the good and welfare of thecommonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. Thepower is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive,

reaching and justifying measures for public health,public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.

It bears stressing that police power is lodgedprimarily in the ational !egislature. It cannot bee"ercised by any group or body of individuals notpossessing legislative power. The ational

!egislature, however, may delegate this power to thePresident and administrative boards as well as thelawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or localgovernment units. #nce delegated, the agents cane"ercise only such legislative powers as are conferredon them by the national lawmaking body.(Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., 328 !"A 83#, 8$3-8$$, March 2%, 2&&&, 'stDiv. )uno*+

$. The scope of police power has been held tobe so comprehensive as to encompass almost allmatters affecting the health, safety, peace, order,

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morals, comfort and convenience of the community.Police power is essentially regulatory in nature and thepower to issue licenses or grant business permits, if

e"ercised for a regulatory and not revenue%raisingpurpose, is within the ambit of this power.

& " "

'T(he issuance of usiness licenses andpermits by a municipality or city is essentially regulatory

in nature. The authority, which devolved upon localgovernment units to issue or grant such licenses orpermits, is essentially in the e"ercise of the policepower of the )tate within the contemplation of thegeneral welfare clause of the !ocal *overnment Code.(Aceeo ptical !ompany, Inc. v. !ourt o/Appeals, 320 !"A 3'$, March 3', 2&&&, 1n Banc

)urisima*+

2. Does Article 263(g) of the Labor Code (esting!pon the "ecretary of Labor the discretion todeter#ine what ind!stries are indispensable to thenational interest and thereafter$ ass!#e %!risdictionoer disp!tes in said ind!stries) iolate the wor&ers'constit!tional right to stri&e

Held: )aid article does not interfere with theworkers+ right to strike but merely regulates it, when inthe e"ercise of such right, national interests will beaffected. The rights granted by the Constitution are notabsolute. They are still subject to control and limitationto ensure that they are not e"ercised arbitrarily. Theinterests of both the employers and the employees areintended to be protected and not one of them is givenundue preference.

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The !abor Code vests upon the )ecretary of!abor the discretion to determine what industries areindispensable to national interest. Thus, upon the

determination of the )ecretary of !abor that suchindustry is indispensable to the national interest, it willassume jurisdiction over the labor dispute of saidindustry. The assumption of jurisdiction is in the natureof police power measure. This is done for thepromotion of the common good considering that aprolonged strike or lockout can be inimical to the

national economy. The )ecretary of !abor acts tomaintain industrial peace. Thus, his certification forcompulsory arbitration is not intended to impede theworkers+ right to strike but to obtain a speedysettlement of the dispute. ()hiltrea orers 4nion)54* v. !on/esor, 2#0 !"A 303, March '2,'00%+

3. ay solicitation for religio!s p!rposes be s!b%ect toproper reg!lation by the "tate in the e*ercise ofpolice power

Held: The constitutional inhibition of legislationon the subject of religion has a double aspect. #n theone hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of theacceptance of any creed or the practice of any form ofworship. reedom of conscience and freedom toadhere to such religious organi-ation or form ofworship as the individual may choose canno! eres!ric!ed " law. On !#e o!#er #and$ i! safe%uards!#e free e&ercise of !#e c#osen for' of reli%ion.Thus, the Constitution embraces two concepts, that is,freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first isabsolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannotbe. Conduct remains subject to regulation for theprotection of society. The freedom to act must haveappropriate definitions to preserve the enforcement of

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that protection. In every case, the power to regulatemust be so e"ercised, in attaining a permissible end, asnot to unduly infringe on the protected freedom.

hence, even the e"ercise of religion may beregulated, at some slight inconvenience, in order thatthe )tate may protect its citi-ens from injury. ithoutdoubt, a )tate may protect its citi-ens from fraudulentsolicitation by re(uirin% a s!ran%er in !#e co''uni!",before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any

purpose, !o es!alis# #is iden!i!" and #is au!#ori!"!o ac! for !#e cause w#ic# #e )ur)or!s !o re)resen!.The )tate is likewise free to regulate the time andmanner of solicitation generally, in the interest of publicsafety, peace, comfort, or convenience.

It does not follow, therefore, from the

constitutional guarantees of the free e"ercise of religionthat everything which may be so called can betolerated. It has been said that a law advancing alegitimate governmental interest is not necessarilyinvalid as one interfering with the /free e"ercise0 ofreligion merely because it also incidentally has adetrimental effect on the adherents of one or morereligion. Thus, the general regulation, in the publicinterest, of solicitation, which does not involve anyreligious test and does not unreasonably obstruct ordelay the collection of funds, is not open to anyconstitutional objection, even though the collection befor a religious purpose. )uch regulation would notconstitute a prohibited previous restraint on the freee"ercise of religion or interpose an inadmissibleobstacle to its e"ercise.

ven with numerous regulative laws ine"istence, it is surprising how many operations arecarried on by persons and associations who, secreting

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their activities under the guise of benevolent purposes,succeed in cheating and defrauding a generous public.It is in fact ama-ing how profitable the fraudulent

schemes and practices are to people who manipulatethem. The )tate has authority under the e"ercise of itspolice power to determine whether or not there shall berestrictions on soliciting by unscrupulous persons or forunworthy causes or for fraudulent purposes. Thatsolicitation of contributions under the guise ofcharitable and benevolent purposes is grossly abused

is a matter of common knowledge. Certainly thesolicitation of contributions in good faith for worthypurposes should not be denied, but somewhere shouldbe lodged the power to determine within reasonablelimits the worthy from the unworthy. The objectionablepractices of unscrupulous persons are prejudicial toworthy and proper charities which naturally suffer when

the confidence of the public in campaigns for theraising of money for charity is lessened or destroyed.)ome regulation of public solicitation is, therefore, inthe public interest.

To conclude$ solici!a!ion for reli%ious)ur)oses 'a" e su*ec! !o )ro)er re%ula!ion "!#e S!a!e in !#e e&ercise of )olice )ower. (!entenov. Villalon-)ornillos, 23# !"A '0%, ept. ', '00$"egalao*+

T#e Power of E'inen! +o'ain

+. ,hat is -#inent Do#ain

Held: 1. minent domain is the right or powerof a sovereign state to appropriate private property toparticular uses to promote public welfare. It is anindispensable attribute of sovereignty2 a power

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ah individual without his consent, the plainmeaning of the law should not be enlarged bydoubt'ful( interpretation. (4ensley .

o!ntainla&e ,ater Co.$ 13 Cal.$ 36 and casescited 3 A#. Dec.$ 56)

The statutory power of taking property from theowner without his consent is one of the most delicatee"ercise of governmental authority. It is to be watchedwith jealous scrutiny. Important as the power may be

to the government, the inviolable sanctity which all freeconstitutions attach to the right of property of theciti-ens, constrains the strict observance of thesubstantial provisions of the law which are prescribedas modes of the e"ercise of the power, and to protect itfrom abuse " " ".

The power of eminent domain is essentiallylegislative in nature. It is firmly settled, however, thatsuch power may be validly delegated to localgovernment units, other public entities and publicutilities, although the scope of this delegated legislativepower is necessarily narrower than that of thedelegating authority and may only be e"ercised in strictcompliance with the terms of the delegating law.(6eirs o/ Alerto uguitan v. !ity o/ Manaluyong,328 !"A '3%, '$$-'$#, March '$, 2&&&, 3r Div.7onaga-"eyes*+

$. minent domain is a fundamental )tatepower that is inseparable from sovereignty. It isgovernment+s right to appropriate, in the nature of acompulsory sale to the )tate, private property for publicuse or purpose. Inherently possessed by the nationallegislature, the power of eminent domain may bevalidly delegated to local governments, other publicentities and public utilities. or the taking of private

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property by the government to be valid, the taking mustbe for public purpose and there must be justcompensation. (Moay v. !ourt o/ Appeals, 2#8

!"A 98#, :eruary 2&, '00%+

5. "tate so#e li#itations on the e*ercise of the powerof -#inent Do#ain.

Held: The limitations on the power of eminent

domain are that the use must be public, compensation

must be made and due process of law must beobserved. The )upreme Court, taking cogni-ance ofsuch issues as the ade3uacy of compensation,necessity of the taking and the public use character orthe purpose of the taking, has ruled that the necessityof e"ercising eminent domain must be genuine and of apublic character. *overnment may not capriciously

choose what private property should be taken.(Moay v. !ourt o/ Appeals, 2#8 !"A 98#,:eruary 2&, '00%+

6. Disc!ss the e*panded notion of p!blic !se ine#inent do#ain proceedings.

Held: The City of 5anila, acting through itslegislative branch, has the e"press power to ac3uireprivate lands in the city and subdivide these lands intohome lots for sale to bona fide tenants or occupantsthereof, and to laborers and low%salaried employees ofthe city.

That only a few could actually benefit from thee"propriation of the property does not diminish itspublic character. It is simply not possible to provide allat once land and shelter for all who need them.

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Congress in accordance with the constitutionalprovision that /any such franchise or right granted " " "shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by

the Congress when the common good so re3uires.0(Art.


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performance by the grantee of some form of publicservice.

In the granting of the privilege to operatebroadcast stations and thereafter supervising radio andtelevision stations, the )tate spends considerablepublic funds in licensing and supervising such stations.It would be strange if it cannot even re3uire thelicensees to render public service by giving free airtime.

The claim that petitioner would be losingP9$,:;


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0. ay e#inent do#ain be barred by @res %!dicata@ or@law of the case@

Held: The principle of res %!dicata$which findsapplication in generally all cases and proceedings,cannot bar the right of the )tate or its agents toe"propriate private property. The very nature ofeminent domain, as an inherent power of the )tate,dictates that the right to e"ercise the power be absolute

and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res%!dicata. T#e sco)e of e'inen! do'ain is )lenar"and$ li-e )olice )ower$ can reac# e,er" for' of)ro)er!" w#ic# !#e S!a!e 'i%#! need for )ulicuse./ 6ll separate interests of individuals in propertyare held of the government under this tacit agreementor implied reservation. otwithstanding the grant to

individuals, the e#inent do#ain$the highest and moste"act idea of property, remains in the government, or inthe aggregate body of the people in their sovereigncapacity2 and they have the right to resume thepossession of the property whenever the public interestre3uires it.0 Thus, the )tate or its authori-ed agentcannot be forever barred from e"ercising said rightbyreason alone of previous non%compliance with anylegal re3uirement.

hile the principle of res %!dicata does notdenigrate the right of the )tate to e"ercise eminentdomain, it does apply to specific issues decided in aprevious case. or e"ample, a final judgmentdismissing an e"propriation suit on the ground thatthere was no prior offer precludes another suit raisingthe same issue2 i! canno!$ #owe,er$ ar !#e S!a!e ori!s a%en! fro' !#ereaf!er co')l"in% wi!# !#isre(uire'en!$ as )rescried " law$ andsuse(uen!l" e&ercisin% i!s )ower of e'inen!

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do'ain o,er !#e sa'e )ro)er!". (Municipality o/)arana=ue v. V.M. "ealty !orporation, 202 !"A#%8, ;uly 2&, '008 )anganian*+

/. Disc!ss how e*propriation #ay be initiated$ and thetwo stages in e*propriation.

Held: "propriation may be initiated by courtaction or by legislation. In both instances, justcompensation is determined by the courts (-PA .

D!lay$ 1+/ "C=A 35 1/0).

The e"propriation of lands consists of twostages. 6s e"plained in !nicipality of 4inan . Barcia(10 "C=A 56$ 50350+ 1/0/$ reiterated in ationalPower Corp. . Eocson$ 26 "C=A 52 1//2)F

The first is concerned with thedetermination of the authority of the plaintiff toe"ercise the power of eminent domain and thepropriety of its e"ercise in the conte"t of thefacts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, ifnot dismissal of the action, =of condemnationdeclaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right totake the property sought to be condemned, forthe public use or purpose declared in thecomplaint, upon the payment of justcompensation to be determined as of the date ofthe filing of the complaint= " " ".

The second phase of the eminent domainaction is concerned with the determination bythe court of =the just compensation for theproperty sought to be taken.= This is done bythe court with the assistance of not more thanthree >:? commissioners " " ".

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It is only upon the completion of these twostages that e"propriation is said to have beencompleted. 5oreover, it is only upon payment of just

compensation that title over the property passes to thegovernment. Therefore, until the action fore"propriation has been completed and terminated,ownership over the property being e"propriatedremains with the registered owner. Conse3uently, thelatter can e"ercise all rights pertaining to an owner,including the right to dispose of his property, subject to

the power of the )tate ultimately to ac3uire it throughe"propriation. ("epulic v. alem Investment!orporation, et. al., 7.". >o. '3%9#0, ;une 23, 2&&&,2nDiv. Menoa*+

1.Does the two (2) stages in e*propriation apply onlyto %!dicial$ and not to legislatie$ e*propriation

Held: The @e la Aamas are mistaken in arguingthat the two stages of e"propriation " " " only apply tojudicial, and not to legislative, e"propriation. 6lthoughCongress has the power to determine what land totake, it can not do so arbitrarily. Budicial determinationof the propriety of the e"ercise of the power, forinstance, in view of allegations of partiality andprejudice by those adversely affected$ and the justcompensation for the subject property is provided inour constitutional system.

e see no point in distinguishing betweenjudicial and legislative e"propriation as far as the twostages mentioned above are concerned. oth involvethese stages and in both the process is not completeduntil payment of just compensation is made. The Courtof 6ppeals was correct in saying that .P. lg. :D< didnot effectively e"propriate the land of the @e la Aamas.

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domain is found in )ection 1$, ook III of the Aevised6dministrative Code, which provides4

/)C. 1$. Power of -#inent Do#ain GThe President shall determine when it isnecessary or advantageous to e"ercise thepower of eminent domain in behalf of theational *overnment, and direct the )olicitor*eneral, whenever he deems the actionadvisable, to institute e"propriation proceedings

in the proper court.0

The foregoing provision does not re3uire priorunsuccessful negotiation as a condition precedent forthe e"ercise of eminent domain. In ron and "teelA!thority . Co!rt of Appeals$ the President chose toprescribe this condition as an additional re3uirement

instead. In the instant case, however, no suchvoluntary restriction was imposed. (MI Development!orporation v. "epulic, 323 !"A 8#2, ;an. 28,2&&&, 3rDiv. )anganian*+

T#e Power of Ta&a!ion

12.Can ta*es be s!b%ect to offsetting or co#pensation

Held: Ta"es cannot be subject to compensationfor the simple reason that the government and theta"payer are not creditors and debtors of each other.There is a material distinction between a ta" and debt.@ebts are due to the *overnment in its corporatecapacity, while ta"es are due to the *overnment in itssovereign capacity. It must be noted that adistinguishing feature of a ta" is that it is compulsoryrather than a matter of bargain. Fence, a ta" does not

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depend upon the consent of the ta"payer. If anyta"payer can defer the payment of ta"es by raising thedefense that it still has a pending claim for refund or

credit, this would adversely affect the governmentrevenue system. 6 ta"payer cannot refuse to pay hista"es when they fall due simply because he has aclaim against the government or that the collection of ata" is contingent on the result of the lawsuit it filedagainst the government. ()hile? Mining !orporationv. !ommissioner o/ Internal "evenue, 20$ !"A

#8%, Aug. 28, '008 "omero*+

13.?nder Article H$ "ection 20$ paragraph 3 of the1/0 Constit!tion$ @Charitable instit!tions$ch!rches and parsonages or conents app!rtenantthereto$ #os8!es$ nonprofit ce#eteries$ and alllands$ b!ildings$ and i#proe#ents$ act!ally$

directly and e*cl!siely !sed for religio!s$charitable or ed!cational p!rposes shall be e*e#ptfro# ta*ation.@ ICA clai#s that the inco#eearned by its b!ilding leased to priate entities andthat of its par&ing space is li&ewise coered by saide*e#ption. =esole.

Held: The debates, interpellations ande"pressions of opinion of the framers of theConstitution reveal their intent that which, in turn, mayhave guided the people in ratifying the Charter. )uchintent must be effectuated.

6ccordingly, Bustice Filario *. @avide, Br., aformer constitutional commissioner, who is now amember of this Court, stressed during the Concomdebates that =" " " what is e"empted is not theinstitution itself " " "2 those e"empted from real estateta"es are lands, buildings and improvements actually,directly and e"clusively used for religious, charitable or

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educational purposes. ather Boa3uin *. ernas, aneminent authority on the Constitution and also amember of the Concom, adhered to the same view that

the e"emption created by said provision pertained onlyto property ta"es.

In his treatise on ta"ation, 5r. Bustice Bose C.Hitug concurs, stating that ='t(he ta" e"emption coversproperty ta"es only.= (!ommissioner o/ Internal"evenue v. !A, 208 !"A 83, ct. '$, '008

)anganian*+

1+.?nder Article


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(!ommissioner o/ Internal "evenue v. !A, 208!"A 83, ct. '$, '008 )anganian*+

16.ay the PCBB alidly co##it to e*e#pt fro# allfor#s of ta*es the properties to be retained by thearcos heirs in a Co#pro#ise Agree#ent betweenthe for#er and the latter

Held: The power to ta" and to grant e"emptionsis vested in the Congress and, to a certain e"tent, in

the local legislative bodies. )ection $;>D?, 6rticle HI ofthe Constitution, specifically provides4 /o law grantingany ta" e"emption shall be passed without theconcurrence of a majority of all the members of theCongress.0 The PC** has absolutely no power togrant ta" e"emptions, even under the cover of itsauthority to compromise ill%gotten wealth cases.

ven granting that Congress enacts a lawe"empting the 5arcoses from paying ta"es on theirproperties, such law will definitely not pass the test ofthe e3ual protection clause under the ill of Aights.6ny special grant of ta" e"emption in favor only of the5arcos heirs will constitute class legislation. It will alsoviolate the constitutional rule that /!a&a!ion s#all eunifor' and e(ui!ale.@ (!have v. )!77, 200!"A %$$, Dec. 0, '008 )anganian*+

1.Disc!ss the p!rpose of ta* treaties

Held: The AP%8) Ta" Treaty is just one of anumber of bilateral treaties which the Philippines hasentered into for the avoidance of double ta"ation. Thepurpose of these international agreements is toreconcile the national fiscal legislations of thecontracting parties in order to help the ta"payer avoidsimultaneous ta"ation in two different jurisdictions.

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5ore precisely, the ta" conventions are drafted with aview towards the elimination of international %!ridicaldo!ble ta*ation " " ". (!ommissioner o/ Internal

"evenue v. .!. ;ohnson an on, Inc., 3&0 !"A8%, '&'-'&2, ;une 29, '000, 3r Div. 7onaga-"eyes*+

10.,hat is @international %!ridical do!ble ta*ation@

Held: It is defined as the imposition of

comparable ta"es in two or more states on the sameta"payer in respect of the same subject matter and foridentical periods. (!ommissioner o/ Internal"evenue v. .!. ;ohnson an on, Inc., 3&0 !"A8%, '&2, ;une 29, '000+

1/.,hat is the rationale for doing away with

international %!ridical do!ble ta*ation ,hat arethe #ethods resorted to by ta* treaties to eli#inatedo!ble ta*ation

Held: The apparent rationale for doing awaywith double ta"ation is to encourage the free flow ofgoods and services and the movement of capital,technology and persons between countries, conditionsdeemed vital in creating robust and dynamiceconomies. oreign investments will only thrive in afairly predictable and reasonable internationalinvestment climate and the protection against doubleta"ation is crucial in creating such a climate.

@ouble ta"ation usually takes place when aperson is resident of a contracting state and derivesincome from, or owns capital in, the other contractingstate and both states impose ta" on that income orcapital. In order to eliminate double ta"ation, a ta"treaty resorts to several methods. irst, it sets out the

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respective rights to ta" of the state of source or situsand of the state of residence with regard to certainclasses of income or capital. In some cases, an

e"clusive right to ta" is conferred on one of thecontracting states2 however, for other items of incomeor capital, both states are given the right to ta",although the amount of ta" that may be imposed by thestate of source is limited.

The second method for the elimination of double

ta"ation applies whenever the state of source is given afull or limited right to ta" together with the state ofresidence. In this case, the treaties make it incumbentupon the state of residence to allow relief in order toavoid double ta"ation. There are two methods of relief% the e"emption method and the credit method. In thee"emption method, the income or capital which is

ta"able in the state of source or situs is e"empted inthe state of residence, although in some instances itmay be taken into account in determining the rate ofta" applicable to the ta"payerJs remaining income orcapital. #n the other hand, in the credit method,although the income or capital which is ta"ed in thestate of source is still ta"able in the state of residence,the ta" paid in the former is credited against the ta"levied in the latter. The basic difference between thetwo methods is that in the e"emption method, the focusis on the income or capital itself, whereas the creditmethod focuses upon the ta". (!ommissioner o/Internal "evenue v. .!. ;ohnson an on, Inc.,3&0 !"A 8%, '&2-'&3, ;une 29, '000+

2.,hat is the rationale for red!cing the ta* rate innegotiating ta* treaties

Held: In negotiating ta" treaties, the underlyingrationale for reducing the ta" rate is that the Philippines

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will give up a part of the ta" in the e"pectation that theta" given up for this particular investment is not ta"edby the other country. (!ommissioner o/ Internal

"evenue v. .!. ;ohnson an on, Inc., 3&0 !"A8%, '&3, ;une 29, '000+

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sandoval notes constitutional law 2

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