sartre's existentialism

8/10/2019 Sartre's Existentialism

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Sartres Existentialism

The philosophical career of Jean Paul Sartre (1905-1980)

focuses, in its first phase, upon the construction of a philosophy of existence knon as

existentialis!" Sartre#s early orks are characteri$e% &y a %e'elop!ent of classic

pheno!enoloy,&ut his reflection %i'eres fro! usserl#s on !etho%oloy, the

conception of the self, an% an interest in ethics" These points of %i'erence are the

cornerstones of Sartre#s existential pheno!enoloy, hose purpose is to un%erstan%

hu!an existence rather than the orl% as such" *%optin an% a%aptin the !etho%s of

pheno!enoloy, Sartre sets out to %e'elop an ontoloical account of hat it is to &e

hu!an" The !ain features of this ontoloy are the roun%lessness an% ra%ical free%o!

hich characteri$e the hu!an con%ition" These are contraste% ith the unpro&le!atic

&ein of the orl% of thins" Sartre#s su&stantial literary output a%%s %ra!atic

expression to the alays unsta&le co-existence of facts an% free%o! in an in%ifferent

orl%"

Sartre#s ontoloy is explaine% in his philosophical !asterpiece,Being and

Nothingness, here he %efines to types of reality hich lie &eyon% our consciousexperience+ the &ein of the o&ect of consciousness an% that of consciousness itself"

The o&ect of consciousness exists as in-itself,. that is, in an in%epen%ent an% non-

relational ay" oe'er, consciousness is alays consciousness of so!ethin,. so it

is %efine% in relation to so!ethin else, an% it is not possi&le to rasp it ithin a

conscious experience+ it exists as for-itself". *n essential feature of consciousness is

its neati'e poer, &y hich e can experience nothinness". This poer is also at

ork ithin the self, here it creates an intrinsic lack of self-i%entity"So the unity of

the self is un%erstoo% as a task for the for-itself rather than as a i'en"

/n or%er to roun% itself, the self nee%s proects, hich can &e 'iee% as aspects of an

in%i'i%ual#s fun%a!ental proect an% !oti'ate% &y a %esire for &ein. lyin ithinthe in%i'i%ual#s consciousness" The source of this proect is a spontaneous oriinal

choice that %epen%s on the in%i'i%ual#s free%o!" oe'er, self#s choice !ay lea% to a

proect of self-%eception such as &a% faith, here one#s on real nature as for-itself is

%iscar%e% to a%opt that of the in-itself" ur only ay to escape self-%eception is

authenticity, that is, choosin in a ay hich re'eals the existence of the for-itself as

&oth factual an% transcen%ent" or Sartre, !y proper exercise of free%o! creates

'alues that any other hu!an &ein place% in !y situation coul% experience, therefore

each authentic proect expresses a uni'ersal %i!ension in the sinularity of a hu!an

life"

*fter a &rief su!!ary of Sartre#s life, this article looks at the !ain the!escharacteri$in Sartre#s early philosophical orks" The ontoloy %e'elope% in Sartre#s
http://www.iep.utm.edu/existent/http://www.iep.utm.edu/phenom/http://www.iep.utm.edu/phenom/http://www.iep.utm.edu/husserl/http://www.iep.utm.edu/identity/http://www.iep.utm.edu/identity/http://www.iep.utm.edu/existent/http://www.iep.utm.edu/phenom/http://www.iep.utm.edu/husserl/http://www.iep.utm.edu/identity/


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!ain existential ork,Being and Nothingness, ill then &e analyse%" inally, an

o'er'ie is pro'i%e% of the further %e'elop!ent of existentialist the!es in his later

orks"

Table of Contents

1" Sartre#s 2ife

3" 4arly orks

1" 6etho%oloy

3" The 4o

7" 4thics

" 4xistential Pheno!enoloy

7" The ntoloy ofBeing and Nothingness

1" The ein of the Pheno!enon an% :onsciousness

3" To Types of ein

7" ;othinness

" The or-/tself inBeing and Nothingness

1" * 2ack of Self-/%entity

3" The Proect of a% aith

7" The un%a!ental Proect

"


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i!aination as pu&lishe% in 197> an% his Theory of Emotionsto years later"

"

is stu%y of au%elaire as pu&lishe% in 19? an% that of the actor Jean Denet in1953" Throuhout the Thirties an% orties, Sartre also ha% an a&un%ant literary output

ith such no'els asNauseaan% plays likentimacy !The "all#$ The flies$ Huis Clos$

%es Mains &ales" /n 19>0, after three years orkin on it, Sartre pu&lishe% the

Critique of Dialectical Reason" /n the ifties an% Sixties, Sartre tra'elle% to the

ESS=, :u&a, an% as in'ol'e% in turn in pro!otin 6arxist i%eas, con%e!nin the

ESS=#s in'asion of unary an% :$echoslo'akia, an% speakin up aainst rance#s

policies in *leria" e as a hih profile fiure in the Peace 6o'e!ent" /n 19>, he

turne% %on the ;o&el pri$e for literature" e as acti'ely in'ol'e% in the 6ay 19>8

uprisin" is stu%y of lau&ert,%'diot de la (amille, as pu&lishe% in 19?1" /n 19??,

he clai!e% no loner to &e a 6arxist, &ut his political acti'ity continue% until his

%eath in 1980"

2. Early Works

Sartre#s early ork is characterise% &y pheno!enoloical analyses in'ol'in his on

interpretation of usserl#s !etho%" Sartre#s !etho%oloy is usserlian (as

%e!onstrate% in his paper /ntentionality+ a fun%a!ental i%eal of usserl#s

pheno!enoloy.) insofar as it is a for! of intentional an% ei%etic analysis" This

!eans that the acts &y hich consciousness assins !eanin to o&ects are hat is

analyse%, an% that hat is souht in the particular exa!ples un%er exa!ination is their

essential structure" *t the core of this !etho%oloy is a conception of consciousnessas intentional, that is, as Ba&out# so!ethin, a conception inherite% fro! rentano an%

usserl" Sartre puts his on !ark on this 'ie &y presentin consciousness as &ein

transparent, i"e" ha'in no Binsi%e#, &ut rather as &ein a Bfleein# toar%s the orl%"

The %istincti'eness of Sartre#s %e'elop!ent of usserl#s pheno!enoloy can &e

characterise% in ter!s of Sartre#s !etho%oloy, of his 'ie of the self an% of his

ulti!ate ethical interests"

a. Methodology

Sartre#s !etho%oloy %iffers fro! usserl#s in to essential ays" *lthouh he thinks

of his analyses as ei%etic, he has no real interest in usserl#s un%erstan%in of his

!etho% as unco'erin the 4ssence of thins" or usserl, ei%etic analysis is a

clarification hich &rins out the hiher le'el of the essence that is hi%%en in Bflui%

unclarity# (usserl, /%eas, /)" or Sartre, the task of an ei%etic analysis %oes not

%eli'er so!ethin fixe% i!!anent to the pheno!enon" /t still clai!s to unco'er that

hich is essential, &ut there&y reconi$es that pheno!enal experience is essentially

flui%"

/n &)etch for a Theory of the Emotions, Sartre replaces the tra%itional picture of the

passi'ity of our e!otional nature ith one of the su&ect#s acti'e participation in here!otional experiences" 4!otion oriinates in a %era%ation of consciousness face%


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ith a certain situation" The spontaneous conscious rasp of the situation hich

characteri$es an e!otion, in'ol'es hat Sartre %escri&es as a B!aical# transfor!ation

of the situation" ace% ith an o&ect hich poses an insur!ounta&le pro&le!, the

su&ect atte!pts to 'ie it %ifferently, as thouh it ere !aically transfor!e%" Thus

an i!!inent extre!e %aner !ay cause !e to faint so that the o&ect of !y fear is no

loner in !y conscious rasp" r, in the case of rath aainst an un!o'a&le o&stacle,/ !ay hit it as thouh the orl% ere such that this action coul% lea% to its re!o'al"

The essence of an e!otional state is thus not an i!!anent feature of the !ental

orl%, &ut rather a transfor!ation of the su&ect#s perspecti'e upon the orl%" /n The

Psychology of the magination, Sartre %e!onstrates his pheno!enoloical !etho% &y

usin it to take on the tra%itional 'ie that to i!aine so!ethin is to ha'e a picture

of it in !in%" Sartre#s account of i!ainin %oes aay ith representations an%

potentially allos for a %irect access to that hich is i!aine%F hen this o&ect %oes

not exist, there is still an intention (al&eit unsuccessful) to &eco!e conscious of it

throuh the i!aination" So there is no internal structure to the i!aination" /t is

rather a for! of %irecte%ness upon the i!aine% o&ect" /!ainin a heffalu!p is thus

of the sa!e nature as percei'in an elephant" oth are spontaneous intentional (or%irecte%) acts, each ith its on type of intentionality"

b. The Ego

Sartre#s 'ie also %i'eres fro! usserl#s on the i!portant issue of the eo" or

Sartre, usserl a%opte% the 'ie that the su&ect is a su&stance ith attri&utes, as a

result of his interpretation of Gant#s unity of apperception" usserl en%orse% the

Gantian clai! that the B/ think# !ust &e a&le to acco!pany any representation of

hich / a! conscious, &ut reifie% this B/# into a transcen%ental eo" Such a !o'e is not

arrante% for Sartre, as he explains in The Transcendence of the Ego" 6oreo'er, itlea%s to the folloin pro&le!s for our pheno!enoloical analysis of consciousness"

The eo oul% ha'e to feature as an o&ect in all states of consciousness" This oul%

result in its o&structin our conscious access to the orl%" ut this oul% conflict ith

the %irect nature of this conscious access" :orrelati'ely, consciousness oul% &e

%i'i%e% into consciousness of eo an% consciousness of the orl%" This oul%

hoe'er &e at o%%s ith the si!ple, an% thus un%i'i%e%, nature of our access to the

orl% throuh conscious experience" /n other or%s, hen / a! conscious of a tree, /

a! %irectly conscious of it, an% a! not !yself an o&ect of consciousness" Sartre

proposes therefore to 'ie the eo as a unity pro%uce% &y consciousness" /n other

or%s, he a%%s to the u!ean picture of the self as a &un%le of perceptions, anaccount of its unity" This unity of the eo is a pro%uct of conscious acti'ity" *s a

result, the tra%itional :artesian 'ie that self-consciousness is the consciousness the

eo has of itself no loner hol%s, since the eo is not i'en &ut create% &y

consciousness" hat !o%el %oes Sartre propose for our un%erstan%in of self-

consciousness an% the pro%uction of the eo throuh conscious acti'ityH The key to

anserin the first part of the Cuestion lies in Sartre#s intro%uction of a pre-reflecti'e

le'el, hile the secon% can then &e a%%resse% &y exa!inin conscious acti'ity at the

other le'el, i"e" that of reflection" *n exa!ple of pre-reflecti'e consciousness is the

seein of a house" This type of consciousness is %irecte% to a transcen%ent o&ect, &ut

this %oes not in'ol'e !y focussin upon it, i"e" it %oes not reCuire that an eo &e

in'ol'e% in a conscious relation to the o&ect" or Sartre, this pre-reflecti'econsciousness is thus i!personal+ there is no place for an B/# at this le'el" /!portantly,


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Sartre insists that self-consciousness is in'ol'e% in any such state of consciousness+ it

is the consciousness this state has of itself" This accounts for the pheno!enoloy of

Bseein#, hich is such that the su&ect is clearly aare of her pre-reflecti'e

consciousness of the house" This aareness %oes not ha'e an eo as its o&ect, &ut it is

rather the aareness that there is an act of Bseein#" =eflecti'e consciousness is the

type of state of consciousness in'ol'e% in !y lookin at a house" or Sartre, thecoito e!eres as a result of consciousness#s &ein %irecte% upon the pre-reflecti'ely

conscious" /n so %oin, reflecti'e consciousness takes the pre-reflecti'ely conscious as

&ein !ine" /t thus re'eals an eo insofar as an B/# is &rouht into focus+ the pre-

reflecti'e consciousness hich is o&ectifie% is 'iee% as !ine" This B/# is the

correlate of the unity that / i!pose upon the pre-reflecti'e states of consciousness

throuh !y reflection upon the!" To account for the pre'alence of the :artesian

picture, Sartre arues that e are prone to the illusion that this B/# as in fact alrea%y

present prior to the reflecti'e conscious act, i"e" present at the pre-reflecti'e le'el" y

su&stitutin his !o%el of a to-tiere% consciousness for this tra%itional picture, Sartre

pro'i%es an account of self-consciousness that %oes not rely upon a pre-existin eo,

an% shos ho an eo is constructe% in reflection"

c. Ethics

*n i!portant feature of Sartre#s pheno!enoloical ork is that his ulti!ate interest in

carryin out pheno!enoloical analyses is an ethical one" Throuh the!, he opposes

the 'ie, hich is for instance that of the reu%ian theory of the unconscious, that

there are psycholoical factors that are &eyon% the rasp of our consciousness an%

thus are potential excuses for certain for!s of &eha'iour"

Startin ith Sartre#s account of the eo, this is characterise% &y the clai! that it ispro%uce% &y, rather than prior to consciousness" *s a result, accounts of aency

cannot appeal to a pre-existin eo to explain certain for!s of &eha'iour" =ather,

conscious acts are spontaneous, an% since all pre-reflecti'e consciousness is

transparent to itself, the aent is fully responsi&le for the! (an% a fortiori for his eo)"

/n Sartre#s analysis of e!otions, affecti'e consciousness is a for! of pre-reflecti'e

consciousness, an% is therefore spontaneous an% self-conscious" *ainst tra%itional

'ies of the e!otions as in'ol'in the su&ect#s passi'ity, Sartre can therefore clai!

that the aent is responsi&le for the pre-reflecti'e transfor!ation of his consciousness

throuh e!otion" /n the case of the i!ainary, the tra%itional 'ie of the poer of

fancy to o'erco!e rational thouht is replace% &y one of i!ainary consciousness as

a for! of pre-reflecti'e consciousness" *s such, it is therefore aain the result of thespontaneity of consciousness an% in'ol'es self-conscious states of !in%" *n

in%i'i%ual is therefore fully responsi&le for his i!ainations#s acti'ity" /n all three

cases, a key factor in Sartre#s account is his notion of the spontaneity of

consciousness" To %ispel the apparent counter-intuiti'eness of the clai!s that

e!otional states an% flihts of i!aination are acti'e, an% thus to pro'i%e an account

that %oes ustice to the pheno!enoloy of these states, spontaneity !ust &e clearly

%istinuishe% fro! a 'oluntary act" * 'oluntary act in'ol'es reflecti'e consciousness

that is connecte% ith the illF spontaneity is a feature of pre-reflecti'e

consciousness"

d. Existential henomenology


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/s there a co!!on threa% to these specific features of Sartre#s pheno!enoloical

approachH Sartre#s choice of topics for pheno!enoloical analysis suests an interest

in the pheno!enoloy of hat it is to &e hu!an, rather than in the orl% as such" This

pri'ilein of the hu!an %i!ension has parallels ith ei%eer#s focus upon


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a. The #eing of the henomenon and Conscio%sness

/nBeing and Time, ei%eer presents the pheno!enon as in'ol'in &oth a co'erin

an% a %isclosin of &ein" or Sartre, the pheno!enon re'eals, rather than conceals,

reality" hat is the status of this realityH Sartre consi%ers the pheno!enalist option of

'iein the orl% as a construct &ase% upon the series of appearances" e points outthat the &ein of the pheno!enon is not like its essence, i"e" is not so!ethin hich is

apprehen%e% on the &asis of this series" /n this ay, Sartre !o'es aay fro! usserl#s

conception of the essence as that hich un%erpins the unity of the appearances of an

o&ect, to a ei%eerian notion of the &ein of the pheno!enon as pro'i%in this

roun%in" Just as the &ein of the pheno!enon transcen%s the pheno!enon of &ein,

consciousness also transcen%s it" Sartre thus esta&lishes that if there is percei'in,

there !ust &e a consciousness %oin the percei'in"

o are these to transpheno!enal for!s of &ein relate%H *s oppose% to a

conceptualisin consciousness in a relation of knole%e to an o&ect, as in usserl

an% the episte!oloical tra%ition he inherits, Sartre intro%uces a relation of &ein+

consciousness (in a pre-reflecti'e for!) is %irectly relate% to the &ein of the

pheno!enon" This is Sartre#s 'ersion of ei%eer#s ontoloical relation of &ein-in-

the-orl%" /t %iffers fro! the latter in to essential respects" irst, it is not a practical

relation, an% thus %istinct fro! a relation to the rea%y-to-han%" =ather, it is si!ply

i'en &y consciousness" Secon%, it %oes not lea% to any further Cuestion of ein" or

Sartre, all there is to &ein is i'en in the transpheno!enality of existin o&ects, an%

there is no further issue of the ein of all &eins as for ei%eer"

b. T&o Ty'es of #eing

*s e ha'e seen, &oth consciousness an% the &ein of the pheno!enon transcen% the

pheno!enon of &ein" *s a result, there are to types of &ein hich Sartre, usin

eel#s ter!inoloy, calls the for-itself (Bpour-soi#) an% the in-itself (Ben-soi#)"

Sartre presents the in-itself as existin ithout ustification in%epen%ently of the for-

itself, an% thus constitutin an a&solute Bplenitu%e#" /t exists in a fully %eter!inate an%

non-relational ay" This fully characteri$es its transcen%ence of the conscious

experience" /n contrast ith the in-itself, the for-itself is !ainly characterise% &y a

lack of i%entity ith itself" This is a conseCuence of the folloin" :onsciousness is

alays Bof so!ethin#, an% therefore %efine% in relation to so!ethin else" /t has no

nature &eyon% this an% is thus co!pletely translucent" /nsofar as the for-itself alaystranscen%s the particular conscious experience (&ecause of the spontaneity of

consciousness), any atte!pt to rasp it ithin a conscious experience is %oo!e% to

failure" /n%ee%, as e ha'e alrea%y seen in the %istinction &eteen pre-reflecti'e an%

reflecti'e consciousness, a conscious rasp of the first transfor!s it" This !eans that

it is not possi&le to i%entify the for-itself, since the !ost &asic for! of i%entification,

i"e" ith itself, fails" This picture is clearly one in hich the pro&le!atic reion of

&ein is that of the for-itself, an% that is hatBeing and Nothingnessill focus upon"

ut at the sa!e ti!e, another i!portant Cuestion arises" /n%ee%, insofar Sartre has

reecte% the notion of a roun%in of all &eins in ein, one !ay ask ho so!ethin

like a relation of &ein &eteen consciousness an% the orl% is possi&le" This issue

translates in ter!s of un%erstan%in the !eanin of the totality for!e% &y the for-itself an% the in-itself an% its %i'ision into these to reions of &ein" y a%%ressin


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this latter issue, Sartre fin%s the key concept that ena&les hi! to in'estiate the nature

of the for-itself"

c. $othingness

ne of the !ost oriinal contri&utions of Sartre#s !etaphysics lies in his analysis ofthe notion of nothinness an% the clai! that it plays a central role at the heart of &ein

(chapter 1, Part ne)"

Sartre (;, 9-10) %iscusses the exa!ple of enterin a caf@ to !eet Pierre an%

%isco'erin his a&sence fro! his usual place" Sartre talks of this a&sence as Bhauntin#

the caf@" /!portantly, this is not ust a psycholoical state, &ecause a Bnothinness# is

really experience%" The nothinness in Cuestion is also not si!ply the result of

applyin a loical operator, neation, to a proposition" or it is not the sa!e to say

that there is no rhinoceros in the caf@, an% to say that Pierre is not there" The first is a

purely loical construction that re'eals nothin a&out the orl%, hile the secon%

%oes" Sartre says it points to an o&ecti'e fact" oe'er, this o&ecti'e fact is not

si!ply i'en in%epen%ently of hu!an &eins" =ather, it is pro%uce% &y consciousness"

Thus Sartre consi%ers the pheno!enon of %estruction" hen an earthCuake &rins

a&out a lan%sli%e, it !o%ifies the terrain" /f, hoe'er, a ton is there&y annihilate%,

the earthCuake is 'iee% as ha'in %estroye% it" or Sartre, there is only %estruction

insofar as hu!ans ha'e i%entifie% the ton as Bfraile#" This !eans that it is the 'ery

neation in'ol'e% in characterisin so!ethin as %estructi&le hich !akes

%estruction possi&le" o is such a neation possi&leH The anser lies in the clai!

that the poer of neation is an intrinsic feature of the intentionality of consciousness"

To further i%entify this poer of neation, let us look at Sartre#s treat!ent of the

pheno!enon of Cuestionin" hen / Cuestion so!ethin, / posit the possi&ility of aneati'e reply" or Sartre, this !eans that / operate a nihilation of that hich is i'en+

the latter is thus Bfluctuatin &eteen &ein an% nothinness# (;, 37)" Sartre then

notes that this reCuires that the Cuestioner &e a&le to %etach hi!self fro! the causal

series of &ein" *n%, &y nihilatin the i'en, he %etaches hi!self fro! any

%eter!inistic constraints" *n% Sartre says that Bthe na!e (I) ofK this possi&ility

hich e'ery hu!an &ein has to secret a nothinness hich isolates it (I) is

free%o!# (;, 3-35)" ur poer to neate is thus the clue hich re'eals our nature

as free" elo, e shall return to the nature of Sartre#s notion of free%o!"

(. The )or*+tself in #eing and $othingness

The structure an% characteristics of the for-itself are the !ain focal point of the

pheno!enoloical analyses ofBeing and Nothingness" ere, the the!e of

consciousness#s poer of neation is explore% in its %ifferent ra!ifications" These

&rin out the core clai!s of Sartre#s existential account of the hu!an con%ition"

a. , Lack of Self*+dentity

The analysis of nothinness pro'i%es the key to the pheno!enoloical un%erstan%in

of the for-itself (chapter 1, Part To)" or the neatin poer of consciousness is at

ork ithin the self (;, 85)" y applyin the account of this neatin poer to thecase of reflection, Sartre shos ho reflecti'e consciousness neates the pre-


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reflecti'e consciousness it takes as its o&ect" This creates an insta&ility ithin the self

hich e!eres in reflection+ it is torn &eteen &ein posite% as a unity an% &ein

reflexi'ely raspe% as a %uality" This lack of self-i%entity is i'en another tist &y

Sartre+ it is posite% as a task" That !eans that the unity of the self is a task for the for-

itself, a task hich a!ounts to the self#s seekin to roun% itself"

This %i!ension of task ushers in a te!poral co!ponent that is fully ustifie% &y

Sartre#s analysis of te!porality (;, 10?)" The lack of coinci%ence of the for-itself

ith itself is at the heart of hat it is to &e a for-itself" /n%ee%, the for-itself is not

i%entical ith its past nor its future" /t is alrea%y no loner hat it as, an% it is not

yet hat it ill &e" Thus, hen / !ake ho / a! the o&ect of !y reflection, / can

take that hich no lies in !y past as !y o&ect, hile / ha'e actually !o'e% &eyon%

this" Sartre says that / a! therefore no loner ho / a!" Si!ilarly ith the future+ /

ne'er coinci%e ith that hich / shall &e" Te!porality constitutes another aspect of

the ay in hich neation is at ork ithin the for-itself" These te!poral ecstases

also !ap onto fun%a!ental features of the for-itself" irst, the past correspon%s to the

facticity of a hu!an life that cannot choose hat is alrea%y i'en a&out itself" Secon%,the future opens up possi&ilities for the free%o! of the for-itself" The coor%ination of

free%o! an% facticity is hoe'er enerally incoherent, an% thus represents another

aspect of the essential insta&ility at the heart of the for-itself"

b. The ro-ect of #ad )aith

The ay in hich the incoherence of the %ichoto!y of facticity an% free%o! is

!anifeste%, is throuh the proect of &a% faith (chapter 3, Part ne)" 2et us first clarify

Sartre#s notion of proect" The fact that the self-i%entity of the for-itself is set as a task

for the for-itself, a!ounts to %efinin proects for the for-itself" /nsofar as theycontri&ute to this task, they can &e seen as aspects of the in%i'i%ual#s fun%a!ental

proect" This specifies the ay in hich the for-itself un%erstan%s itself an% %efines

herself as this, rather than another, in%i'i%ual" e shall return to the issue of the

fun%a!ental proect &elo"

*!on the %ifferent types of proect, that of &a% faith is of eneric i!portance for an

existential un%erstan%in of hat it is to &e hu!an" This i!portance %eri'es

ulti!ately fro! its ethical rele'ance" Sartre#s analysis of the proect of &a% faith is

roun%e% in 'i'i% exa!ples" Thus Sartre %escri&es the precise an% !annere%

!o'e!ents of a caf@ aiter (;, 59)" /n thus &eha'in, the aiter is i%entifyin

hi!self ith his role as aiter in the !o%e of &ein in-itself" /n other or%s, theaiter is %iscar%in his real nature as for-itself, i"e" as free facticity, to a%opt that of

the in-itself" e is thus %enyin his transcen%ence as for-itself in fa'our of the kin% of

transcen%ence characterisin the in-itself" /n this ay, the &ur%en of his free%o!, i"e"

the reCuire!ent to %eci%e for hi!self hat to %o, is lifte% fro! his shoul%ers since his

&eha'iour is as thouh set in stone &y the %efinition of the role he has a%opte%" The

!echanis! in'ol'e% in such a proect in'ol'es an inherent contra%iction" /n%ee%, the

'ery i%entification at the heart of &a% faith is only possi&le &ecause the aiter is a for-

itself, an% can in%ee% choose to a%opt such a proect" So the free%o! of the for-itself

is a pre-con%ition for the proect of &a% faith hich %enies it" The aent#s %efinin his

&ein as an in-itself is the result of the ay in hich he represents hi!self to hi!self"

This !isrepresentation is hoe'er one the aent is responsi&le for" Elti!ately,nothin is hi%%en, since consciousness is transparent an% therefore the proect of &a%


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faith is pursue% hile the aent is fully aare of ho thins are in pre-reflecti'e

consciousness" /nsofar as &a% faith is self-%eceit, it raises the pro&le! of accountin

for contra%ictory &eliefs" The exa!ples of &a% faith hich Sartre i'es, ser'e to

un%erline ho this conception of self-%eceit in fact in'ol'es a proect &ase% upon

ina%eCuate representations of hat one is" There is therefore no nee% to ha'e recourse

to a notion of unconscious to explain such pheno!ena" They can &e accounte% forusin the %ichoto!y for-itselfLin-itself, as proects freely a%opte% &y in%i'i%ual

aents" * first conseCuence is that this represents an alternati'e to psychoanalytical

accounts of self-%eceit" Sartre as particularly keen to pro'i%e alternati'es to reu%#s

theory of self-%eceit, ith its appeal to censorship !echanis!s accountin for

repression, all of hich are &eyon% the su&ect#s aareness as they are unconscious

(;, 5-55)" The reason is that reu%#s theory %i!inishes the aent#s responsi&ility"

n the contrary, an% this is the secon% conseCuence of Sartre#s account of &a% faith,

Sartre#s theory !akes the in%i'i%ual responsi&le for hat is a i%esprea% for! of

&eha'iour, one that accounts for !any of the e'ils that Sartre souht to %escri&e in his

plays" To explain ho existential psychoanalysis orks reCuires that e first exa!ine

the notion of fun%a!ental proect (;, 5>1)"

c. The )%ndamental ro-ect

/f the proect of &a% faith in'ol'es a !isrepresentation of hat it is to &e a for-itself,

an% thus pro'i%es a poerful account of certain types of self-%eceit, e ha'e, as yet,

no account of the !oti'ation that lies &ehin% the a%option of such a proect"

*s e sa a&o'e, all proects can &e 'iee% as parts of the fun%a!ental proect, an%

e shall therefore focus upon the !oti'ation for the latter (chapter 3, Part our)" That

a for-itself is %efine% &y such a proect arises as a conseCuence of the for-itself#ssettin itself self-i%entity as a task" This in turn is the result of the for-itself#s

experiencin the clea'aes intro%uce% &y reflection an% te!porality as a!ountin to a

lack of self-i%entity" Sartre %escri&es this as %efinin the M%esire for &einN (;, 5>5)"

This %esire is uni'ersal, an% it can take on one of three for!s" irst, it !ay &e ai!e%

at a %irect transfor!ation of the for-itself into an in-itself" Secon%, the for-itself !ay

affir! its free%o! that %istinuishes it fro! an in-itself, so that it seeks throuh this to

&eco!e its on foun%ation (i"e" to &eco!e Do%)" The conunction of these to

!o!ents results, thir%, in the for-itself#s ai!in for another !o%e of &ein, the for-

itself-in-itself" ;one of the ai!s %escri&e% in these three !o!ents are realisa&le"

6oreo'er, the tria% of these three !o!ents is, unlike a eelian thesis-antithesis-

synthesis tria%, inherently insta&le+ if the for-itself atte!pts to achie'e one of the!, itill conflict ith the others" Since all hu!an li'es are characterise% &y such a %esire

(al&eit in %ifferent in%i'i%uate% for!s), Sartre has thus pro'i%e% a %escription of the

hu!an con%ition hich is %o!inate% &y the irrationality of particular proects" This

picture is in particular illustrate% inBeing and Nothingness&y an account of the

proects of lo'e, sa%is! an% !asochis!, an% in other orks, &y &ioraphical accounts

of the li'es of au%elaire, lau&ert an% Jean Denet" ith this notion of %esire for

&ein, the !oti'ation for the fun%a!ental proect is ulti!ately accounte% for in ter!s

of the !etaphysical nature of the for-itself" This !eans that the source of !oti'ation

for the fun%a!ental proect lies ithin consciousness" Thus, in particular, &a% faith, as

a type of proect, is !oti'ate% in this ay" The in%i'i%ual choice of fun%a!ental

proect is an oriinal choice (;, 5>)" :onseCuently, an un%erstan%in of hat it isto &e lau&ert for instance, !ust in'ol'e an atte!pt to %ecipher his oriinal choice"


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This her!eneutic exercise ai!s to re'eal hat !akes an in%i'i%ual a unity" This

pro'i%es existential psychoanalysis ith its principle" /ts !etho% in'ol'es an analysis

of all the e!pirical &eha'iour of the su&ect, ai!e% at raspin the nature of this unity"

d. esire

The fun%a!ental proect has &een presente% as !oti'ate% &y a %esire for &ein" o

%oes this ena&le Sartre to pro'i%e an account of %esires as in fact %irecte% toar%s

&ein althouh they are enerally thouht to &e rather ai!e% at ha'inH Sartre

%iscusses %esire in chapter / of Part ne an% then aain in chapter // of Part our,

after presentin the notion of fun%a!ental proect"

/n the first short %iscussion of %esire, Sartre presents it as seekin a coinci%ence ith

itself that is not possi&le (;, 8?, 307)" Thus, in thirst, there is a lack that seeks to &e

satisfie%" ut the satisfaction of thirst is not the suppression of thirst, &ut rather the

ai! of a plenitu%e of &ein in hich %esire an% satisfaction are unite% in an

i!possi&le synthesis" *s Sartre points out, hu!ans clin on to their %esires" 6ere

satisfaction throuh suppression of the %esire is in%ee% alays %isappointin" *nother

exa!ple of this structure of %esire (;, 7?9) is that of lo'e" or Sartre, the lo'er

seeks to possess the lo'e% one an% thus interate her into his &ein+ this is the

satisfaction of %esire" e si!ultaneously ishes the lo'e% one ne'ertheless re!ain

&eyon% his &ein as the other he %esires, i"e" he ishes to re!ain in the state of

%esirin" These are inco!pati&le aspects of %esire+ the &ein of %esire is therefore

inco!pati&le ith its satisfaction" /n the lenthier %iscussion on the topic ein an%

a'in,. Sartre %ifferentiates &eteen three relations to an o&ect that can &e

proecte% in %esirin" These are &ein, %oin an% ha'in" Sartre arues that relations

of %esire ai!e% at %oin are re%uci&le to one of the other to types" is exa!inationof these to types can &e su!!arise% as follos"


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/n chapter 1, Part Three, Sartre reconi$es there is a pro&le! of other !in%s+ ho /

can &e conscious of the other (; 331-333)H Sartre exa!ines !any existin

approaches to the pro&le! of other !in%s" 2ookin at realis!, Sartre clai!s that no

access to other !in%s is e'er possi&le, an% that for a realist approach the existence of

the other is a !ere hypothesis" *s for i%ealis!, it can only e'er 'ie the other in

ter!s of sets of appearances" ut the transpheno!enality of the other cannot &e%e%uce% fro! the!"

Sartre also looks at his pheno!enoloist pre%ecessors, usserl an% ei%eer"

usserl#s account is &ase% upon the perception of another &o%y fro! hich, &y

analoy, / can consi%er the other as a %istinct conscious perspecti'e upon the orl%"

ut the atte!pt to %eri'e the other#s su&ecti'ity fro! !y on ne'er really lea'es the

or&it of !y on transcen%ental eo, an% thus fails to co!e to ter!s ith the other as a

%istinct transcen%ental eo" Sartre praises ei%eer for un%erstan%in that the

relation to the other is a relation of &ein, not an episte!oloical one" oe'er,

ei%eer %oes not pro'i%e any roun%s for takin the co-existence of


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. ,%thenticity

/f the picture hich e!eres fro! Sartre#s exa!ination of hu!an relationships see!s

rather hopeless, it is &ecause &a% faith is o!nipresent an% inescapa&le" /n fact, Sartre#s

philosophy has a 'ery positi'e !essae hich is that e ha'e infinite free%o! an%

that this ena&les us to !ake authentic choices hich escape fro! the rip of &a% faith"

To un%erstan% Sartre#s notion of authenticity therefore reCuires that e first clarify his

notion of free%o!"

a. )reedom

or Sartre (chapter 1, Part our), each aent is en%oe% ith unli!ite% free%o!" This

state!ent !ay see! pu$$lin i'en the o&'ious li!itations on e'ery in%i'i%ual#s

free%o! of choice" :learly, physical an% social constraints cannot &e o'erlooke% in

the ay in hich e !ake choices" This is hoe'er a fact hich Sartre accepts

insofar as the for-itself is facticity" *n% this %oes not lea% to any contra%iction insofaras free%o! is not %efine% &y an a&ility to act" ree%o! is rather to &e un%erstoo% as

characteristic of the nature of consciousness, i"e" as spontaneity" ut there is !ore to

free%o!" or all that Pierre#s free%o! is expresse% in optin either for lookin after

his ailin ran%!other or oinin the rench =esistance, choices for hich there are

in%ee% no existin roun%s, the %ecision to opt for either of these courses of action is

a !eaninful one" That is, optin for the one of the other is not ust a spontaneous

%ecision, &ut has conseCuences for the for-itself" To express this, Sartre presents his

notion of free%o! as a!ountin to !akin choices, an% in%ee% not &ein a&le to

a'oi% !akin choices"

Sartre#s conception of choice can &est &e un%erstoo% &y reference to an in%i'i%ual#soriinal choice, as e sa a&o'e" Sartre 'ies the hole life of an in%i'i%ual as

expressin an oriinal proect that unfol%s throuhout ti!e" This is not a proect

hich the in%i'i%ual has proper knole%e of, &ut rather one hich she !ay interpret

(an interpretation constantly open to re'ision)" Specific choices are therefore alays

co!ponents in ti!e of this ti!e-spannin oriinal choice of proect"

b. ,%thenticity

ith this notion of free%o! as spontaneous choice, Sartre therefore has the ele!ents

reCuire% to %efine hat it is to &e an authentic hu!an &ein" This consists in choosin

in a ay hich reflects the nature of the for-itself as &oth transcen%ence an% facticity"

This notion of authenticity appears closely relate% to ei%eer#s, since it in'ol'es a

!o%e of &ein that exhi&its a reconition that one is a


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spontaneity" n the contrary, a reconition of ho our free%o! interacts ith our

facticity exhi&its the responsi&ility hich e ha'e to !ake proper choices" These are

choices hich are not trappe% in &a% faith"

c. ,n Ethical imension

Throuh the practical conseCuences presente% a&o'e, an existentialist ethics can &e

%iscerne%" e pointe% out that ran%o! expressions of one#s spontaneity are not hat

authenticity is a&out, an% Sartre e!phasises this point in Existentialism and

Humanism" There, he explicitly states that there is an ethical nor!ati'ity a&out

authenticity" /f one ouht to act authentically, is there any ay of further specifyin

hat this !eans for the nature of ethical choicesH There are in fact !any state!ents in

Being and Nothingnesshich e!phasise a uni'ersality criterion not entirely

%issi!ilar fro! Gant#s" This shoul% co!e as no surprise since &oth Sartre an% Gant#s

approaches are &ase% upon the ulti!ate 'alue of a stron notion of free%o!" *s Sartre

points out, &y choosin, an in%i'i%ual co!!its not only hi!self, &ut the hole of

hu!anity (;, 557)" *lthouh there are no a priori 'alues for Sartre, the aent#s

choice creates 'alues in the sa!e ay as the artist %oes in the aesthetic real!" The

'alues thus create% &y a proper exercise of !y free%o! ha'e a uni'ersal %i!ension, in

that any other hu!an &ein coul% !ake sense of the! ere he to &e place% in !y

situation" There is therefore a uni'ersality that is expresse% in particular for!s in each

authentic proect" This is a first !anifestation of hat Sartre later refers to as the

Bsinular uni'ersal#"

3. "ther Contrib%tions to Existential henomenology

/fBeing and Nothingnessrepresents the cul!ination of Sartre#s purely existentialistork, existentialis! per!eates later ritins, al&eit in a hy&ri% for!" e shall &riefly

in%icate ho these later ritins exten% an% transfor! his proect of existential

pheno!enoloy"

a. Criti4%e of ialectical 0eason

The experience of the ar an% the encounter ith 6erleau-Ponty contri&ute% to

aakenin Sartre#s interest in thepolitical %i!ensionof hu!an existence+ Sartre thus

further %e'elope% his existentialist un%erstan%in of hu!an &eins in a ay hich is

co!pati&le ith 6arxis!" * key notion for this phase of his philosophical

%e'elop!ent is the concept of praxis" This exten%s an% transfor!s that of proect+ !an

as a praxis is &oth so!ethin that pro%uces an% is pro%uce%" Social structures %efine a

startin point for each in%i'i%ual" ut the in%i'i%ual then sets his on ai!s an%

there&y oes &eyon% an% neates hat society ha% %efine% hi! as" The rane of

possi&ilities hich are a'aila&le for this expression of free%o! is hoe'er %epen%ent

upon the existin social structures" *n% it !ay &e the case that this rane is 'ery

li!ite%" /n this ay, the infinite free%o! of the earlier philosophy is no narroe%

%on &y the constraints of the political an% historical situation"

/n Critique of Dialectical Reason, Sartre analyses %ifferent %i!ensions of the praxis"

/n the first 'olu!e, a theory of practical ense!&les. exa!ines the ay in hich apraxis is no loner oppose% to an in-itself, &ut to institutions hich ha'e &eco!e
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rii%ifie% an% constitute hat Sartre calls the Bpractico-inert#" u!an &eins

interiorise the uni'ersal features of the situation in hich they are &orn, an% this

translates in ter!s of a particular ay of %e'elopin as a praxis" This is the sense

Sartre no i'es to the notion of the Bsinular uni'ersal#"

b. The roblem of Method

/n this &ook Sartre re%efines the focus of existentialis! as the in%i'i%ual un%erstoo%

as &elonin to a certain social situation, &ut not totally %eter!ine% &y it" or the

in%i'i%ual is alays oin &eyon% hat is i'en, ith his on ai!s an% proects" /n

this ay, Sartre %e'elops a Breressi'e-proressi'e !etho%# that 'ies in%i'i%ual

%e'elop!ent as explaine% in ter!s of a !o'e!ent fro! the uni'ersal expresse% in

historical %e'elop!ent, an% the particular expresse% in in%i'i%ual proects" Thus, &y

co!&inin a 6arxist un%erstan%in of history ith the !etho%s of existential

psychoanalysis hich are first presente% inBeing and Nothingness, Sartre proposes a

!etho% for un%erstan%in a hu!an life" This, he applies in particular to the case of an

analysis of lau&ert" /t is orth notin hoe'er that %e'elopin an account of the

intellii&ility of history, is a proect that Sartre tackle% in the secon% 'olu!e of the

Critique of Dialectical Reason, &ut hich re!aine% unfinishe%"

5. Concl%sion

Sartre#s existentialist un%erstan%in of hat it is to &e hu!an can &e su!!arise% in

his 'ie that the un%erlyin !oti'ation for action is to &e foun% in the nature of

consciousness hich is a %esire for &ein" /t is up to each aent to exercise his

free%o! in such a ay that he %oes not lose siht of his existence as a facticity, as

ell as a free hu!an &ein" /n so %oin, he ill co!e to un%erstan% !ore a&out theoriinal choice hich his hole life represents, an% thus a&out the 'alues that are

there&y proecte%" Such an un%erstan%in is only o&taine% throuh li'in this

particular life an% a'oi%in the pitfalls of strateies of self-%eceit such as &a% faith"

This authentic option for hu!an life represents the realisation of a uni'ersal in the

sinularity of a hu!an life"

6. 0eferences and )%rther 0eading

a. Sartres Works

/ntentionality+ a un%a!ental /%eal of usserl#s Pheno!enoloy. (19?0)

transl" J"P"ell,*ournal of the British &ociety for Phenomenology, 1 (3), -5"

Psychology of the magination(19?3) transl" ernar% recht!an, 6ethuen,

2on%on"

&)etch for a Theory of the Emotions (19?1) transl" Philip 6airet, 6ethuen,

2on%on"

The Transcendence of the Ego+ ,n Existentialist Theory of Consciousness

(195?) transl" an% e%" orrest illia!s an% =o&ert Girkpatrick, ;oon%ay, ;e

Oork"

Being and Nothingness+ ,n Essay on Phenomenological -ntology(1958)

transl" a$el 4" arnes, intr" 6ary arnock, 6ethuen, 2on%on (a&&re'iate% as

; a&o'e)"


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Existentialism and Humanism(19?7) transl" Philip 6airet, 6ethuen, 2on%on"

Critique of Dialectical Reason .+ Theory of Practical Ensembles(1983) transl"

*lan Sheri%an-S!ith, e%" Jonathan =@e, Aerso, 2on%on"

The Problem of Method(19>) transl" a$el 4" arnes, 6ethuen, 2on%on"

b. Commentaries

:as, P" (19?9) &artre, =outle%e an% Gean Paul, 2on%on"

sartre's existentialism

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