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Saul Estrin, Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael Carney State capitalism, economic systems and the performance of state owned firms Article (Accepted version) (Refereed) Original citation: Estrin, Saul and Liang, Zhixiang and Shapiro, Daniel and Carney, Michael (2019) State capitalism, economic systems and the performance of state owned firms. Acta Oeconomica. ISSN 0001-6373 (In Press) © 2019 Akadémiai Kiadó Zrt. This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/91944 Available in LSE Research Online: January 2019 LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it.

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Page 1: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

Saul Estrin, Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael Carney

State capitalism, economic systems and the performance of state owned firms Article (Accepted version) (Refereed)

Original citation: Estrin, Saul and Liang, Zhixiang and Shapiro, Daniel and Carney, Michael (2019) State capitalism, economic systems and the performance of state owned firms. Acta Oeconomica. ISSN 0001-6373 (In Press) © 2019 Akadémiai Kiadó Zrt. This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/91944 Available in LSE Research Online: January 2019 LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it.

Page 2: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

1

Sta

te C

ap

itali

sm,

Econ

om

ic S

yst

em

s a

nd

th

e P

erfo

rm

an

ce

of

Sta

te O

wn

ed

Fir

ms

Sau

l E

stri

n*

Lon

don

Sch

ool

of

Eco

no

mic

s L

on

don

, U

nit

ed K

ingd

om

Zh

ixia

ng L

ian

g

Joh

n M

ols

on

Sch

ool

of

Bu

sin

ess

Con

cord

ia U

niv

ersi

ty

Mon

tréa

l, Q

uéb

ec,

Can

ada

D

anie

l S

hap

iro

B

eed

ie S

cho

ol

of

Bu

sin

ess

Sim

on

Fra

ser

Un

iver

sity

V

anco

uver

, B

riti

sh C

olu

mbia

, C

anad

a

Mic

hae

l C

arn

ey

Joh

n M

ols

on

Sch

ool

of

Bu

sin

ess

Con

cord

ia U

niv

ersi

ty

Mon

tréa

l, Q

uéb

ec,

Can

ada

mic

hae

l.ca

rney

@co

nco

rdia

.ca

*C

orr

esp

on

din

g a

uth

or.

Au

thor

ord

er d

oes

not

refl

ect

con

trib

uti

on

, w

hic

h h

as b

een

equ

al.

Page 3: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

2

Sta

te C

ap

ita

lism

, E

con

om

ic S

yst

ems

an

d t

he

Per

form

an

ce o

f S

tate

Ow

ned

Fir

ms

Ab

stra

ct

In

th

is p

aper

, w

e pu

rsu

e tw

o r

elat

ed r

esea

rch

qu

esti

on

s. F

irst

, w

e en

qu

ire

wh

eth

er s

tate

ow

ned

en

terp

rise

s (S

OE

s) p

erfo

rm

bet

ter

than

pri

vat

ely o

wn

ed f

irm

s in

a l

arg

e var

iety

of

emer

gin

g m

ark

ets.

To t

est

this

, w

e d

evel

op a

un

iqu

e d

atas

et u

sin

g f

irm

-lev

el

dat

a fr

om

th

e W

orl

d B

ank E

nte

rpri

se S

urv

ey (

WB

ES

), r

esu

ltin

g i

n a

sam

ple

of

over

50

,00

0 f

irm

s fr

om

57

un

der

stu

die

d c

ou

ntr

ies

incl

ud

ing e

mer

gin

g c

apit

alis

t, f

orm

er s

oci

alis

t an

d s

tate

cap

ital

ist

on

es.

Ou

r re

sult

s su

gges

t th

at S

OE

s d

o d

ispla

y p

rod

uct

ivit

y

adv

anta

ges

ov

er p

rivat

e fi

rms

in t

hes

e u

nd

erst

ud

ied

eco

no

mie

s. O

ur

seco

nd

res

earc

h q

ues

tion

ask

s w

het

her

th

e per

form

ance

of

stat

e-

ow

ned

fir

ms

in t

hes

e u

nd

erst

ud

ied

cou

ntr

ies

is c

on

tex

t sp

ecif

ic,

nam

ely w

het

her

per

form

ance

dep

end

s on

th

e in

stit

uti

on

al s

yst

em t

o

wh

ich

a c

ou

ntr

y i

s cl

assi

fied

. W

e re

fer

to t

hes

e sy

stem

s as

con

figu

rati

on

s. I

n p

arti

cula

r, w

e ar

e in

tere

sted

in

wh

eth

er s

tate

ow

ned

fir

ms

per

form

bet

ter

in “

stat

e ca

pit

alis

t” c

ou

ntr

ies

incl

ud

ing C

hin

a an

d V

ietn

am.

We

fin

d e

mpir

ical

sup

po

rt f

or

the

argu

men

t th

at t

he

“sta

te

led

” co

nfi

gu

rati

on

pro

vid

es b

ette

r in

stit

uti

on

al s

up

port

fo

r th

e ow

ner

ship

ad

van

tages

of

SO

Es

than

oth

ers.

Key

wo

rds:

co

mpar

ativ

e ec

on

om

ic s

yst

ems;

sta

te o

wn

ersh

ip;

Var

ieti

es o

f In

stit

uti

on

al S

yst

ems

(VIS

), f

irm

per

form

ance

JE

L C

od

es:

P5

, P

31

, L

44

Page 4: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

3

INT

RO

DU

CT

ION

Th

ere

was

a c

on

sen

sus

in g

lobal

eco

no

mic

poli

cy m

akin

g f

rom

th

e 1

98

0s

un

til

per

hap

s th

e m

id-1

99

0s

bas

ed a

rou

nd

th

e vie

w

that

pri

vat

izat

ion

, li

ber

aliz

atio

n,

and

mac

ro-s

tabil

ity w

ere

at t

he

core

of

eco

no

mic

su

cces

s. T

his

per

spec

tiv

e, t

he

Was

hin

gto

n

Con

sen

sus

(Wil

liam

son

, 1

99

0),

has

sin

ce b

een

wid

ely c

riti

cise

d (

Kolo

dk

o,

19

99

; S

tigli

tz, 2

00

2;

Rod

rik,

20

06

), b

ut

beh

ind

th

e

Con

sen

sus

was

a v

iew

ab

ou

t ec

on

om

ic s

yst

ems

wh

ich

to s

om

e ex

ten

t re

tain

s it

s in

tell

ectu

al h

old

in

man

y d

evel

oped

eco

no

mie

s,

nam

ely t

hat

fre

e m

ark

et c

apit

alis

m i

s th

e on

ly s

yst

em c

apab

le o

f gen

erat

ing

su

stai

ned

eco

no

mic

gro

wth

an

d e

ffic

ien

cy.

Wh

ile

capit

alis

m i

s u

sual

ly d

efin

ed r

egar

din

g p

rivat

e ow

ner

ship

of

the

mea

ns

of

pro

du

ctio

n a

nd

fre

e m

arket

s, a

ccord

ing t

o N

uti

(2

01

8),

an

esse

nti

al c

om

pon

ent

of

soci

alis

m i

s th

e d

om

inan

ce o

f pu

bli

c pro

per

ty a

nd

en

terp

rise

. F

or

von

Hay

ek (

19

44

)) a

nd

Fri

edm

an (

19

62

), t

he

mar

ket

eco

no

my p

rovid

es t

he

on

ly r

esou

rce

allo

cati

on

mec

han

ism

cap

able

of

gen

erat

ing e

con

om

ic e

ffic

ien

cy a

nd

gro

wth

. T

his

seem

ed t

o b

e b

orn

e ou

t in

pra

ctic

e as

th

e so

cial

ist

pla

nn

ing s

yst

ems

of

Cen

tral

an

d E

aste

rn E

uro

pe

coll

apse

d u

nd

er t

he

wei

gh

t of

thei

r

inte

rnal

con

trad

icti

on

s af

ter

19

89

. T

his

see

med

to

su

gges

t th

at t

he

noti

on

of

the

co-e

xis

ten

ce o

f eq

ual

ly e

ffic

ien

t al

tern

ativ

e ec

on

om

ic

syst

ems

was

fu

nd

amen

tall

y f

law

ed,

and

, as

arg

ued

by H

ayek

, th

ere

was

on

ly a

sin

gle

eco

no

mic

syst

em w

hic

h s

atis

fied

th

e cr

iter

ion

of

econ

om

ic e

ffic

ien

cy –

th

e m

arket

syst

em.

How

ever

, as

Kolo

dk

o (

20

02

) am

on

gst

oth

ers

has

poin

ted

ou

t, t

he

pro

cess

of

tran

siti

on

fro

m s

oci

alis

m t

o c

apit

alis

m i

n C

entr

al

and

Eas

tern

Eu

rope

does

not

pro

vid

e co

nvin

cin

g e

vid

ence

in

su

pp

ort

of

the

Was

hin

gto

n C

on

sen

sus

appro

ach

to p

oli

cy. F

urt

her

more

,

in r

ecen

t yea

rs, th

ere

is a

lso n

ew e

vid

ence

em

ergin

g w

hic

h b

rin

gs

into

th

e q

ues

tion

th

e id

ea t

hat

th

ere

is o

nly

on

e sy

stem

ic p

ath

to

go

od

eco

no

mic

per

form

ance

: th

e ra

pid

ris

e of

the

Ch

ines

e ec

on

om

y a

nd

oth

er e

mer

gin

g m

arket

s, n

on

e o

f w

hic

h c

on

form

to t

he

Page 5: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

4

trad

itio

nal

vie

w o

f a

free

mar

ket

eco

no

my.

Th

us,

for

exam

ple

, C

hin

ese

GD

P r

ose

fro

m j

ust

ov

er $

20

0 b

illi

on

in

19

78

, w

hen

Den

g

Xia

opin

g c

ame

to p

ow

er,

to m

ore

th

an $

12

,25

0 b

illi

on

in

20

17

; su

rely

evid

ence

of

sust

ain

ed s

tron

g e

con

om

ic p

erfo

rman

ce.

Sim

ilar

gro

wth

pat

hs

hav

e b

een

su

stai

ned

, th

ou

gh

fo

r sh

ort

er p

erio

ds,

in

soci

alis

t ec

on

om

ies

lik

e V

ietn

am,

as w

ell

as i

n s

tate

led

cap

ital

ist

on

es l

ike

Kore

a an

d S

ing

apo

re (

Wad

e, 2

00

2).

Yet

Ch

ina

can

not

be

con

sid

ered

a p

ure

fre

e m

ark

et e

con

om

y a

nd

is

oft

en r

efer

red

to a

s

“sta

te c

apit

alis

t” (

Eco

no

mis

t, J

anu

ary 2

1st

, 20

12

) bec

ause

of

the

cen

tral

role

pla

yed

in

th

e ec

on

om

y b

y s

tate

ow

ned

fir

ms.

Th

us

ou

r

anal

ysi

s o

f th

e ef

fect

s of

econ

om

ic s

yst

ems

nee

ds

to b

e ex

ten

ded

ex

pli

citl

y t

o t

ake

into

acc

ou

nt

the

new

in

stit

uti

on

al s

yst

ems

that

are

gu

idin

g t

he

econ

om

ies

of

Asi

a, L

atin

Am

eric

a, a

nd A

fric

a.

Th

ere

is l

ittl

e d

ou

bt

that

on

e o

f th

e m

ost

im

port

ant

way

s in

wh

ich

Ch

ina

and

oth

er s

ucc

essf

ul

emer

gin

g m

ark

ets

dev

iate

fro

m

the

free

mar

ket

par

adig

m c

on

cern

s th

e ro

le o

f th

e st

ate

in e

con

om

ic d

evel

op

men

t (W

ade,

20

03

; M

usa

cch

io a

nd

Laz

zari

ni,

20

14

). T

his

pap

er f

ocu

ses

on

an

im

po

rtan

t as

pec

t of

that

by c

on

sid

erin

g t

he

per

form

ance

eff

ects

of

stat

e o

wn

ersh

ip a

t th

e en

terp

rise

lev

el.

Giv

en

the

succ

essf

ul

econ

om

ic p

erfo

rman

ce o

f so

me

stat

e ca

pit

alis

t ec

on

om

ies,

it

is n

o l

on

ger

ob

vio

us

that

th

is w

ill

auto

mat

ical

ly b

e in

feri

or

to t

he

per

form

ance

of

com

par

able

pri

vat

ely o

wn

ed f

irm

s. U

nsu

rpri

sin

gly

, th

e W

ash

ingto

n C

on

sen

sus

argu

ed c

on

sist

entl

y f

or

the

pri

vat

isat

ion

of

stat

e ow

ned

en

terp

rise

s bas

ed o

n p

osi

tiv

e ev

iden

ce a

bou

t th

e im

pac

t of

pri

vat

isat

ion

: th

us

Gal

al e

t al

. (1

99

4)

esti

mat

ed

net

wel

fare

gai

ns

of

26

per

cen

t o

f sa

les

in B

rita

in,

Ch

ile,

Mal

aysi

a, a

nd

Mex

ico.

Sim

ilar

ly,

La

Port

a an

d L

op

ez-d

e-S

ilan

es (

19

99

)

fou

nd

th

at p

riv

atiz

ed M

exic

an S

OE

s ra

pid

ly c

lose

d a

lar

ge

per

form

ance

gap

wit

h i

nd

ust

ry-m

atch

ed p

rivat

e fi

rms.

How

ever

, m

ore

rece

nt

wo

rk a

bou

t tr

ansi

tion

eco

nom

ies

and

dev

elopin

g e

con

om

ies

bri

ngs

that

con

clu

sion

in

to q

ues

tion

, w

ith

per

form

ance

eff

ects

bei

ng f

ou

nd

to b

e h

igh

ly c

on

tex

t sp

ecif

ic (

Jom

o,

20

08

; E

stri

n,

Han

ou

sek,

Koce

nd

a, S

vje

nar

, 2

00

9;

Est

rin

an

d P

elle

tier

, 2

01

8).

Page 6: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

5

We

are

also

con

cern

ed w

ith

th

e re

lati

on

ship

bet

wee

n t

he

econ

om

ic s

yst

em a

nd

fir

m p

erfo

rman

ce.

Ou

r an

alysi

s is

un

der

tak

en

pri

mar

ily i

n t

he

con

tex

t o

f em

ergin

g m

ark

ets,

an

d w

e co

nsi

der

an

arr

ay o

f u

nd

erst

ud

ied

eco

no

mie

s w

hic

h d

o n

ot

fit

com

fort

ably

wit

hin

th

e ca

teg

ori

sati

on

of

capit

alis

t o

r so

cial

ist.

As

a re

sult

, w

e n

eed

to r

evis

it t

he

noti

on

of

econ

om

ic s

yst

em, an

d i

n d

oin

g t

his

, w

e

dra

w o

n r

ecen

t w

ork

by i

nst

itu

tion

al e

con

om

ists

. T

hu

s, i

n t

he

Var

ieti

es o

f C

apit

alis

m (

VO

C)

per

spec

tive

(Hal

l &

Sosk

ice,

20

01

), i

t

was

arg

ued

th

at t

her

e w

ere

two f

un

dam

enta

l sy

stem

s w

ith

in t

he

mar

ket

eco

no

my;

Lib

eral

Mar

ket

(L

ME

) su

ch a

s th

e U

S a

nd

UK

an

d

Co

ord

inat

ed M

arket

(C

ME

) ec

on

om

ies

such

as

Ger

man

y o

r F

ran

ce. T

his

cla

ssif

icat

ion

of

syst

ems

is b

ased

aro

un

d i

nst

itu

tion

al

com

ple

men

tari

ties

wit

hin

cou

ntr

ies

that

co

-ev

olv

e w

ith

th

ose

of

oth

er c

ou

ntr

ies

to p

rod

uce

dis

tin

ct g

over

nan

ce c

on

figu

rati

on

s; u

nli

ke

the

soci

alis

t-ca

pit

alis

t d

isti

nct

ion

no s

ingle

in

stit

uti

on

al c

har

acte

rist

ic,

such

as

pri

vat

e ow

ner

ship

, is

su

ffic

ien

t to

def

ine

the

syst

em.

How

ever

, th

e V

OC

ap

pro

ach

rem

ain

s h

igh

ly E

uro

cen

tric

an

d h

as n

ot

bee

n s

yst

emat

ical

ly e

xte

nd

ed t

o c

on

sid

er t

he

un

der

stu

die

d

emer

gin

g e

con

om

ies

wh

ich

are

th

e su

bje

ct o

f th

is p

aper

.

It

is n

ot

ou

r pu

rpose

in

th

is p

aper

to c

reat

e a

new

cla

ssif

icat

ion

of

econ

om

ic s

yst

ems

into

wh

ich

th

e m

ajor

new

em

ergin

g

econ

om

ies

can

be

com

fort

ably

fit

ted.

Ou

r obje

ctiv

e is

rat

her

more

mod

est;

to i

sola

te t

he

impac

t o

f st

ate

ow

ner

ship

on

fir

m

per

form

ance

an

d t

o e

xplo

re w

het

her

th

is i

s se

nsi

tive

to t

he

inst

itu

tion

al c

on

tex

t. I

n p

arti

cula

r, w

e ar

e in

tere

sted

in

th

e id

ea t

hat

fir

m

per

form

ance

is

con

tin

gen

t on

th

e ec

on

om

ic s

yst

em,

so t

hat

fo

r ex

ample

sta

te o

wn

ed f

irm

s m

ay p

erfo

rm w

ell

wit

hin

syst

ems

wh

ich

pro

vid

e su

itab

le i

nst

itu

tion

al s

up

port

, th

ou

gh

th

ey m

ay p

erfo

rm l

ess

wel

l in

les

s sy

mpat

het

ic e

nvir

on

men

ts.

We,

ther

efore

, d

raw

on

a

pre

-ex

isti

ng c

lass

ific

atio

n o

f ec

on

om

ic s

yst

ems

for

emer

gin

g m

ark

ets,

dev

eloped

by F

ain

shm

idt,

Ju

dge,

Agu

iler

a, a

nd

Sm

ith

,

hen

cefo

rth

FJA

S (

20

16

). F

JAS

use

th

e in

stit

uti

on

al s

tru

ctu

res

in e

mer

gin

g e

con

om

ies

to d

evel

op a

cat

egori

sati

on

th

at t

hey

ter

m t

he

Page 7: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

6

Va

riet

ies

of

Inst

itu

tio

na

l Sys

tem

s (V

IS);

a t

axon

om

y c

om

pri

sin

g s

even

dis

tin

ct,

empir

ical

ly d

eriv

ed n

atio

nal

in

stit

uti

on

al s

yst

ems

call

ed c

onfi

gu

rati

ons.

We,

th

eref

ore

, pu

rsu

e tw

o r

elat

ed r

esea

rch

qu

esti

on

s. F

irst

, w

e en

qu

ire

wh

eth

er s

tate

ow

ned

en

terp

rise

s (S

OE

s) p

erfo

rm b

ette

r

than

pri

vat

ely o

wn

ed f

irm

s in

a l

arg

e var

iety

of

emer

gin

g m

arket

s. T

o t

est

this

, w

e d

evel

op a

un

iqu

e d

atas

et t

hat

co

mbin

es t

he

seven

FJA

S c

on

figu

rati

on

s w

ith

fir

m-l

evel

dat

a fr

om

th

e W

orl

d B

ank E

nte

rpri

se S

urv

ey (

WB

ES

), r

esu

ltin

g i

n a

sam

ple

of

over

50

,00

0 f

irm

s

from

57

un

der

stu

die

d c

ou

ntr

ies,

in

clu

din

g e

mer

gin

g c

apit

alis

t, f

orm

er s

oci

alis

t an

d s

tate

cap

ital

ist

on

es.

Ou

r re

sult

s su

gges

t th

at S

OE

s

do d

ispla

y p

rod

uct

ivit

y a

dvan

tages

over

pri

vat

e fi

rms

in t

hes

e u

nd

erst

ud

ied

eco

no

mie

s.

Ou

r se

con

d r

esea

rch

qu

esti

on

ask

s w

het

her

th

e per

form

ance

of

stat

e-ow

ned

fir

ms

in t

hes

e u

nd

erst

ud

ied

cou

ntr

ies

is c

on

tex

t

spec

ific

, n

amel

y w

het

her

per

form

ance

is

sen

siti

ve

to w

hic

h c

on

figu

rati

on

th

e co

un

try i

n w

hic

h t

he

stat

e ow

ned

fir

m i

s lo

cate

d b

elon

gs.

In p

arti

cula

r, w

e ar

e in

tere

sted

in

wh

eth

er s

tate

ow

ned

fir

ms

per

form

bet

ter

in t

he

con

figu

rati

on

, in

clu

din

g C

hin

a an

d V

ietn

am

, w

hic

h

is t

erm

ed

“sta

te c

apit

alis

t.”.

” W

e fi

nd

em

pir

ical

sup

port

fo

r th

e ar

gu

men

t th

at t

he

stat

e le

d c

on

figu

rati

on

pro

vid

es b

ette

r in

stit

uti

on

al

sup

port

fo

r th

e ow

ner

ship

ad

van

tages

of

SO

Es

than

all

th

e oth

ers.

Ou

r fi

nd

ings

also

in

dic

ate

that

th

e co

nfi

gu

rati

on

s ar

e im

port

ant

det

erm

inan

ts o

f b

oth

pri

vat

e an

d s

tate

-ow

ned

fir

m p

erfo

rman

ce.

In t

he

nex

t se

ctio

n,

we

con

sid

er t

he

lite

ratu

re o

n t

he

per

form

ance

of

stat

e o

wn

ed e

nte

rpri

ses

rela

tiv

e to

pri

vat

ely o

wn

ed o

nes

(PO

Es)

an

d d

iscu

ss t

he

rece

nt

evolu

tion

in

th

inkin

g a

bou

t ec

on

om

ic s

yst

ems

lead

ing t

o t

he

dev

elop

men

t of

the

FJA

S c

on

figu

rati

on

.

We

pre

sen

t th

e d

ata

and

met

hod

s in

th

e th

ird

sec

tion

an

d t

he

resu

lts

in t

he

fou

rth

. F

inal

ly,

we

dra

w o

ur

con

clu

sion

s.

Page 8: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

7

TH

E E

FF

EC

TS

OF

ST

AT

E O

WN

ER

SH

IP O

N E

NT

ER

PR

ISE

PE

RF

OR

MA

NC

E A

ND

TH

E M

OD

ER

AT

ING

RO

LE

OF

EC

ON

OM

IC S

YS

TE

MS

Th

is p

aper

ad

dre

sses

tw

o r

elat

ed e

mpir

ical

qu

esti

on

s. T

he

firs

t co

nce

rns

the

rela

tiv

e per

form

ance

of

SO

Es

and

PO

Es

in

emer

gin

g m

ark

ets.

Th

ere

is a

lrea

dy c

on

sid

erab

le e

vid

ence

on

th

is m

atte

r fo

r d

evel

oped

eco

no

mie

s w

hic

h l

argel

y s

up

port

th

e v

iew

th

at

SO

Es

are

less

eff

icie

nt

(Boar

dm

an a

nd

Vin

ing,

19

89

; M

eggin

son

an

d N

ette

r, 2

00

1).

How

ever

, th

ere

is m

uch

les

s ev

iden

ce f

or

dev

elopin

g e

con

om

ies,

an

d t

he

fin

din

gs

con

cern

ing t

he

asso

ciat

ed q

ues

tion

of

the

impac

t of

pri

vat

isat

ion

are

mo

re a

mbig

uou

s in

th

e

dev

elopin

g t

han

dev

elop

ed e

con

om

y c

on

tex

t (E

stri

n a

nd

Pel

leti

er, 2

01

8).

Th

is l

eads

us

to e

xplo

re t

he

rela

tive

per

form

ance

of

SO

Es

and

PO

Es

in e

mer

gin

g e

con

om

ies.

We

are

also

in

tere

sted

in

th

e co

nte

xtu

al s

pec

ific

ity o

f th

e re

lati

on

ship

bet

wee

n e

nte

rpri

se

per

form

ance

an

d o

wn

ersh

ip s

tru

ctu

res.

We

un

der

tak

e th

is a

nal

ysi

s fo

r em

ergin

g e

con

om

ies

wit

h t

he

FJA

S f

ram

ework

in

wh

ich

th

ey

iden

tify

a t

axon

om

y o

f se

ven

con

figu

rati

on

s of

nat

ion

al e

con

om

ic s

yst

ems.

In

th

is s

ecti

on

, w

e su

mm

aris

e th

e li

tera

ture

ab

ou

t th

e

per

form

ance

eff

ects

of

stat

e ow

ner

ship

, an

d a

bou

t th

e im

pac

t o

f th

e in

stit

uti

on

al s

yst

em,

wit

h a

par

ticu

lar

emph

asis

on

em

erg

ing

econ

om

ies.

Sch

ola

rs u

sual

ly a

rgu

e th

at P

OE

S w

ill

ou

tper

form

SO

Es.

To u

nd

erst

and

wh

y o

ne

mu

st c

om

par

e co

mpan

y o

bje

ctiv

es a

nd

corp

ora

te g

over

nan

ce u

nd

er s

tate

an

d p

riv

ate

ow

ner

ship

. A

co

mm

on

arg

um

ent

is t

hat

th

e fu

nd

amen

tal

dif

fere

nce

res

ts i

n t

hei

r

org

anis

atio

nal

obje

ctiv

es:

PO

Es

focu

s ex

clu

sivel

y o

n p

rofi

t, w

hic

h l

ead

s to

clo

se a

tten

tion

to c

ost

s an

d c

ust

om

er d

eman

ds.

SO

Es

may

be

inte

rest

ed i

n p

rofi

ts t

oo,

bu

t st

ate

ow

ner

s m

ay a

lso e

xpec

t m

anag

ers

to s

atis

fy o

ther

obje

ctiv

es a

s w

ell,

oft

en o

f a

soci

al o

r p

oli

tica

l

type.

Th

us,

th

e st

ate

may

see

k t

o c

reat

e jo

bs

in k

ey p

oli

tica

l re

gio

ns,

or

to h

old

dow

n t

he

pri

ces

of

go

od

s th

at h

ave

a si

gn

ific

ant

effe

ct

Page 9: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

8

on

th

e bu

dg

ets

of

poli

tica

l su

pp

ort

ers

and

man

ager

s m

ay e

xplo

it t

he

con

flic

t to

th

eir

pri

vat

e ben

efit

for

exam

ple

via

ren

t se

ekin

g.

In

gen

eral

, co

nfl

icti

ng o

bje

ctiv

es m

ake

it h

ard

er f

or

the

ow

ner

s to

spec

ify t

arg

ets

and

to m

on

itor

per

form

ance

, an

d t

his

th

en p

rovid

es

leew

ay f

or

dec

isio

n m

aker

s to

pu

rsu

e th

eir

per

son

al g

ain

s. H

ence

in

effi

cien

cies

can

th

riv

e bec

ause

th

ey a

re n

ot

a ce

ntr

al c

on

cern

of

the

ow

ner

, an

d m

anag

ers

can

explo

it t

he

lack

of

clar

ity i

n c

om

pan

y o

bje

ctiv

es t

o e

nsu

re a

n e

asy l

ife

for

them

selv

es a

nd

em

plo

yee

s

(Sh

leif

er a

nd

Vis

hn

y,

19

94

).

T

his

pro

ble

m c

entr

es o

n t

he

asym

met

ry o

f in

form

atio

n h

eld

by m

anag

ers

and

ow

ner

s ab

ou

t th

e p

erfo

rman

ce o

f th

e fi

rm;

ou

tsid

e ow

ner

s – p

rivat

e or

stat

e – c

an n

ever

hav

e fu

ll a

cces

s to

su

ch i

nfo

rmat

ion

wh

ich

is

con

cen

trat

ed i

s in

th

e h

and

s of

man

ager

s.

Th

us,

it

is h

ard

fo

r th

em t

o e

stab

lish

wh

eth

er p

oor

resu

lts

are

a co

nse

qu

ence

of

un

fore

seen

cir

cum

stan

ces

or

man

ager

s ex

plo

itin

g f

irm

pro

fits

fo

r th

eir

pu

rpose

s.

Wh

enev

er o

wn

ersh

ip a

nd

con

trol

are

separ

ated

, p

rivat

e ben

efit

s (f

irm

-spec

ific

ren

ts)

can

be

siph

on

ed o

ut

of

the

com

pan

y b

y m

anag

ers.

H

ow

ever

, th

e n

orm

al a

rgu

men

t is

th

at,

rela

tive

to s

tate

ow

ner

ship

, a

pri

vat

e ow

ner

ship

syst

em p

lace

s m

ore

effe

ctiv

e li

mit

s on

th

is b

ehav

iou

r via

con

stra

ints

fro

m p

rod

uct

an

d c

apit

al m

arket

s. T

hes

e oper

ate

pri

mar

ily b

y p

rod

uct

mar

ket

com

pet

itio

n (

Vic

ker

s an

d Y

arro

w,

19

88

) an

d t

hro

ugh

th

e m

arket

s fo

r re

cru

itm

ent

of

man

ager

s an

d c

orp

ora

te c

on

trol

(Est

rin

an

d

Per

oti

n,

19

91

). T

he

key

con

stra

int

is s

een

to b

e th

e st

ock

mar

ket

s (M

eggin

son

, 2

00

5).

T

he

qu

alit

y o

f m

anag

eria

l d

ecis

ion

-mak

ing a

nd

the

exte

nt

of

man

ager

ial

dis

cret

ion

are

an

in

pu

t in

th

e ch

oic

es o

f tr

ader

s in

equ

ity m

ark

ets,

wh

ose

ju

dgem

ent

on

co

mpan

y p

erfo

rman

ce

is s

um

mar

ised

in

th

e sh

are

pri

ce.

If t

he

man

ager

ial

team

is

thou

gh

t to

be

inco

mpet

ent

or

inef

fici

ent,

th

e sh

are

pri

ces

wil

l be

red

uce

d,

pu

ttin

g p

ress

ure

on

man

ager

s to

im

pro

ve

thei

r per

form

ance

. A

per

sist

entl

y p

oor

show

ing b

y a

qu

ote

d c

om

pan

y m

ay a

lso g

ener

ate

Page 10: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

9

exte

rnal

pre

ssu

re b

y e

nco

ura

gin

g a

tak

e-o

ver

bid

. M

ore

over

, in

th

e m

anag

eria

l m

arket

, in

div

idu

al p

erfo

rman

ce a

nd

pay

are

lar

gel

y

asse

ssed

by s

har

e pri

ces.

It i

s n

orm

ally

arg

ued

(E

stri

n e

t al

., 2

00

9)

that

it

is h

ard

for

the

stat

e to

im

itat

e th

ese

mar

ket

-bas

ed c

on

stra

ints

. S

tate

ow

ned

firm

s ar

e u

sual

ly n

ot

subje

ct t

o c

apit

al m

ark

et d

isci

pli

nes

, so

nei

ther

th

e co

mpet

itiv

ely d

riven

in

form

atio

nal

str

uct

ure

nor

the

mar

ket

bas

ed g

over

nan

ce m

ech

anis

ms

can

op

erat

e. S

OE

s in

Eu

rop

e w

ere

trad

itio

nal

ly m

anag

ed b

y c

ivil

ser

van

ts a

nd

did

not

com

pet

e in

th

e

wid

er m

anag

eria

l m

ark

et. M

anag

ers

are

also

hel

d t

o a

soft

bu

dg

et c

on

stra

int

(Ko

rnai

, 1

99

0)

that

goes

wit

h t

he

poli

tica

l d

eter

min

atio

n

of

reso

urc

e al

loca

tion

was

als

o s

een

as

a fu

rth

er s

ou

rce

of

ince

nti

ve

pro

ble

ms

sin

ce m

anag

ers

did

not

hav

e to

bea

r th

e co

nse

qu

ence

s

for

thei

r ac

tion

s.

H

ow

ever

, ev

en t

his

bri

ef d

escr

ipti

on

mak

es c

lear

th

at t

he

mec

han

ism

s u

nd

erly

ing t

he

adv

anta

ges

of

PO

Es

com

par

ed w

ith

SO

Es

are

con

tex

t sp

ecif

ic a

nd

may

be

hig

hly

sen

siti

ve

to i

nst

itu

tion

al a

rran

gem

ents

. F

or

exam

ple

, th

e ex

iste

nce

of

an e

ffec

tiv

e m

arket

for

corp

ora

te c

on

trol

reli

es u

pon

a h

igh

lev

el o

f d

evel

opm

ent

and

soph

isti

cati

on

of

capit

al m

ark

ets.

In

man

y e

mer

gin

g e

con

om

ies,

capit

al m

arket

s, i

n p

arti

cula

r, a

re s

erio

usl

y u

nd

erd

evel

oped

, bei

ng r

elia

nt

on

oth

er c

riti

cal

inst

itu

tion

al c

har

acte

rist

ics

such

as

the

rule

of

law

an

d t

he

pro

tect

ion

of

pri

vat

e pro

per

ty r

igh

ts a

nd

th

e ev

iden

ce s

ug

ges

ts t

hat

th

is i

s fa

r fr

om

gu

aran

teed

(K

han

na

and

Pal

epu

,

20

10

; H

osk

isso

n,

Wri

gh

t, F

ilat

otc

hev

&

Pen

g,

20

13

; G

ugle

r, P

eev &

Seg

alla

, 2

01

3).

Th

us

the

pri

nci

pal

mec

han

ism

en

suri

ng

th

e

super

ior

per

form

ance

of

PO

Es

may

not

be

op

erat

ion

al i

n m

any e

mer

gin

g m

ark

ets

con

tex

ts.

In t

hat

cas

e, t

he

rela

tive

per

form

ance

of

SO

Es

and

PO

Es

dep

end

s up

on

det

aile

d g

over

nan

ce a

rran

gem

ents

, bu

t th

e fa

ct t

hat

sta

te o

wn

ersh

ip i

s h

igh

ly c

on

cen

trat

ed w

hil

e

pri

vat

e ow

ner

ship

may

not

pro

vid

e on

e li

ne

of

arg

um

ent

that

th

e b

alan

ce o

fad

van

tage

cou

ld s

om

etim

e re

st w

ith

SO

Es.

Page 11: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

10

In

th

is p

aper

, w

e fo

cus

on

th

e im

pac

t o

f n

atio

nal

in

stit

uti

on

al c

on

tex

t w

ith

ref

eren

ce t

o t

he

econ

om

ic s

yst

em –

th

e V

IS

con

figu

rati

on

s- r

ath

er t

han

con

cern

ing p

arti

cula

r in

stit

uti

on

s or

cou

ntr

ies.

Nat

ion

al i

nst

itu

tion

al s

yst

ems

pro

vid

e th

e fo

rmal

an

d

info

rmal

ru

les

of

the

gam

e to

wh

ich

dom

esti

c an

d f

ore

ign

fir

ms

mu

st a

dap

t th

eir

go

ver

nan

ce a

nd

ow

ner

ship

str

uct

ure

s (N

ort

h,

19

94).

How

ever

, w

hy s

hou

ld d

iffe

ren

ces

in i

nst

itu

tion

al s

yst

ems

expla

in f

irm

per

form

ance

(A

gu

iler

a &

Cre

spi-

Cla

der

a, 2

01

6)?

Th

e V

OC

lite

ratu

re (

Hal

l &

Sosk

ice,

20

01

) id

enti

fies

a s

oci

al d

emo

crat

ic e

con

om

ic m

od

el o

f ca

pit

alis

m i

n n

ort

h E

uro

pea

n c

ou

ntr

ies

as a

via

ble

alte

rnat

ive

arch

itec

ture

of

nat

ion

al c

om

pet

itiv

enes

s to

lib

eral

mar

ket

eco

no

mie

s an

d p

rop

ose

tw

o p

rin

cip

al m

ech

anis

ms

lin

kin

g f

irm

per

form

ance

an

d i

nst

itu

tion

al s

yst

em.

Th

e re

ason

fir

st c

on

cern

s in

stit

uti

on

al c

om

ple

men

tari

ty.

An

eco

no

my h

as s

ever

al i

nst

ituti

on

al

sph

eres

, n

ota

bly

th

e fi

nan

cial

sec

tor,

th

e la

bo

r, a

nd i

nd

ust

rial

rel

atio

ns

regim

e, a

nd

th

e ed

uca

tion

al a

nd

skil

ls t

rain

ing s

yst

ems.

Inst

itu

tion

al v

aria

tion

ari

ses

fro

m t

he

way

dif

fere

nt

nat

ion

al i

nst

itu

tion

al s

yst

ems

ach

ieve

coh

esio

n a

nd

way

s of

‘han

gin

g t

og

eth

er’

to

sup

port

hig

h-p

erfo

rmin

g f

irm

s an

d a

chie

ve

hig

h e

con

om

ic g

row

th (

Pec

k &

Zh

ang,

20

13).

Th

ese

inst

itu

tion

al c

om

ple

men

tari

ties

wit

hin

cou

ntr

ies

can

co-e

volv

e w

ith

th

ose

of

oth

er c

ou

ntr

ies

to p

rod

uce

dis

tin

ct g

over

nan

ce c

on

figu

rati

on

s.

T

he

seco

nd

key

con

cept

is i

som

orp

his

m. E

ach

var

iety

of

capit

alis

m i

s sa

id t

o p

rod

uce

an

‘em

ble

mat

ic f

irm

’ (B

oyer

, 2

00

5),

an

org

anis

atio

nal

form

par

ticu

larl

y w

ell

adap

ted

to i

ts n

atio

nal

in

stit

uti

on

al s

yst

em.

Th

e em

ble

mat

ic f

irm

in

th

e L

iber

al M

ark

et E

con

om

y

(LM

E),

as

we

hav

e al

read

y s

een

, is

a c

apit

al m

ark

et-g

ov

ern

ed, m

anag

eria

lly c

on

troll

ed, sh

areh

old

er v

alu

e-m

axim

izin

g f

irm

. M

ore

rece

ntl

y,

emer

gin

g m

ark

et s

chola

rs p

rop

ose

th

e d

iver

sifi

ed b

usi

nes

s gro

up a

s th

e em

ble

mat

ic f

orm

of

corp

ora

te o

rgan

izat

ion

in

th

e

hig

h-p

erfo

rmin

g A

sian

eco

no

mie

s (C

arn

ey,

Ged

ajlo

vic

, &

Yan

g,

20

09

). A

rgu

ably

, th

e S

OE

may

be

the

emble

mat

ic f

irm

in

sta

te

capit

alis

t sy

stem

s (M

asu

cch

io,

Laz

zari

ni,

Agu

iler

a, 2

01

5).

Th

e in

stit

uti

on

al s

yst

em,

ther

efore

, su

ppli

es f

irm

s w

ith

‘in

stit

uti

on

al

Page 12: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

11

capit

al’

so t

hat

fir

ms

fit,

or

bec

om

e is

om

orp

hic

wit

h, pre

vai

lin

g m

od

es o

f in

stit

uti

on

al f

un

ctio

nin

g.

Nat

ion

al i

nst

itu

tion

al s

yst

ems

wil

l

dif

fer

in t

he

way

th

ey i

nfl

uen

ce t

he

stru

ctu

re o

f em

ble

mat

ic f

irm

s, a

nd

th

eir

capac

ity t

o a

cco

mm

od

ate

non

-em

ble

mat

ic f

irm

s, a

nd

isom

orp

hic

pro

cess

es i

n d

iffe

ren

t co

nfi

gu

rati

on

s, t

her

efore

, re

sult

in

var

ied

fo

rms

of

com

par

ativ

e in

stit

uti

on

al a

dv

anta

ge

(Sch

nei

der

,

Sch

ulz

e-B

entr

op &

Pau

nes

cu, 2

01

0).

Th

us,

as

firm

s st

rive

to a

cces

s re

sou

rces

in

th

eir

loca

l en

vir

on

men

t, t

hey

are

lik

ely t

o d

evel

op

sim

ilar

pra

ctic

es a

dap

ted

to t

hei

r par

ticu

lar

inst

itu

tion

al c

on

figu

rati

on

(H

all

& S

osk

ice,

20

01).

T

he

VO

C f

ram

ework

was

bas

ed o

n a

det

aile

d s

tud

y o

f a

few

dev

elop

ed e

con

om

ies,

an

d t

he

fram

ewo

rk d

oes

not

adeq

uat

ely

captu

re t

he

full

in

tern

atio

nal

het

ero

gen

eity

am

on

gst

in

stit

uti

on

al c

on

figu

rati

on

s (G

lober

man

an

d S

hap

iro,

20

02

). A

pply

ing f

uzz

y s

et

anal

ysi

s to

mu

ltip

le m

easu

rem

ents

of

nat

ion

al i

nst

itu

tion

al c

har

acte

rist

ics,

FJA

S (

20

16

) ex

ten

ded

th

e n

oti

on

of

the

inst

itu

tion

al s

yst

em

from

aty

polo

gy t

o a

n e

mpir

ical

ly b

ased

tax

on

om

y,

wh

ich

ex

pli

citl

y i

ncl

ud

ed e

mer

gin

g,

dev

elopin

g a

nd

tra

nsi

tion

cou

ntr

ies.

T

he

full

VIS

cla

ssif

icat

ion

of

nin

e n

atio

nal

syst

ems,

or

confi

gu

rati

ons,

is

pre

sen

ted

in

Tab

le 1

; th

e fi

rst

two a

re t

he

VO

C t

rad

itio

nal

LM

E a

nd

CM

E e

con

om

ies,

con

tain

ing d

evel

op

ed E

uro

pea

n a

nd

An

glo

-Sax

on

eco

no

mie

s. O

ur

rese

arch

con

sid

ers

on

ly t

he

latt

er s

even

con

figu

rati

on

, w

hic

h w

ere

dev

eloped

to c

over

th

e u

nd

erst

ud

ied

eco

no

mie

s of

Eas

tern

Eu

rope,

Asi

a, L

atin

Am

eric

a, a

nd A

fric

a. O

ur

pro

posi

tion

is

that

fir

m p

erfo

rman

ce w

ill

be

infl

uen

ced

by t

he

con

figu

rati

on

to w

hic

h a

cou

ntr

y b

elo

ngs,

in

ad

dit

ion

to s

tan

dar

d

per

form

ance

eff

ects

at

the

firm

an

d n

atio

nal

lev

el.

Th

us,

th

e w

ay t

hat

en

terp

rise

s m

igh

t re

solv

e in

tern

al c

on

trad

icti

on

s an

d i

nte

rnal

ise

exte

rnal

eff

ects

mig

ht

be

ver

y d

iffe

ren

t, f

or

exam

ple

, in

th

e em

ergin

g L

ME

(h

ence

fort

h c

on

figu

rati

on

1 b

ecau

se,

as s

how

n i

n T

able

2,

we

do n

ot

cover

th

e L

ME

an

d C

ME

con

figu

rati

on

s of

VIS

in

ou

r w

ork

) an

d s

tate

-led

(co

nfi

gu

rati

on

5)

con

figu

rati

on

s re

spec

tivel

y.

Pri

vat

e fi

rms

pro

bab

ly r

epre

sen

t th

e em

ble

mat

ic f

irm

s in

th

e fo

rmer

an

d S

OE

s in

th

e la

tter

(S

hap

iro a

nd

Glo

ber

man

, 2

01

2).

Oth

er V

IS

Page 13: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

12

con

figu

rati

on

s m

ay a

lso h

ave

sett

led

in

to a

sta

ble

in

stit

uti

on

al e

qu

ilib

riu

m;

for

exam

ple

, th

e fa

mil

y-l

ed c

on

figu

rati

on

(co

nfi

gu

rati

on

2

in T

able

2)

is d

om

inat

ed b

y p

ow

erfu

l re

nt-

seek

ing

bu

sin

ess

gro

ups,

whic

h r

esis

t in

stit

uti

on

al d

evel

op

men

ts t

hat

ch

alle

nge

thei

r re

nts

(Car

ney

, D

ura

n,

van

Ess

en &

Sh

apir

o,

20

17

).

DA

TA

AN

D M

ET

HO

DS

Ou

r d

atas

et h

as t

hre

e d

imen

sion

s –

fir

m;

cou

ntr

y;

and

tim

e. T

he

info

rmat

ion

ab

ou

t fi

rms

der

ives

fro

m t

he

Wo

rld

Ban

k E

nte

rpri

se

Su

rvey

(W

BE

S)

(htt

p:/

/dat

a.w

orl

dban

k.o

rg/d

ata-

cata

log/e

nte

rpri

se-s

urv

eys)

; an

en

terp

rise

dat

abas

e1 c

oll

ecte

d b

y s

urv

eys

of

over

12

0,0

00

fir

ms

in m

ore

th

an 1

30

cou

ntr

ies

acro

ss A

sia,

Lat

in A

mer

ica,

Eas

tern

an

d C

entr

al E

uro

pe,

an

d A

fric

a b

etw

een

20

06

an

d 2

01

6

(Worl

d B

ank, 2

01

1).

Th

e W

orl

d B

ank c

on

du

cted

th

e su

rvey

s at

dif

fere

nt

dat

es w

ith

so

me

cou

ntr

ies

hav

ing o

nly

on

e w

ave

(e.g

., B

razi

l

and

In

dia

), m

ost

hav

ing t

wo a

nd

a f

ew h

avin

g t

hre

e (e

.g.,

Bu

lgar

ia a

nd

DR

Con

go).

T

he

VIS

typ

olo

gy o

f in

stit

uti

on

al s

yst

ems

in T

able

1 i

ncl

ud

es m

any o

f th

e co

un

trie

s su

rvey

ed b

y W

BE

S2;

of

the

68

cou

ntr

ies

in V

IS,

the

WB

ES

dat

aset

co

ver

s 5

7. T

able

2 l

ists

th

em a

nd

sh

ow

s h

ow

th

eir

clas

sifi

cati

on

in

to t

he

seven

VIS

con

figu

rati

on

s (c

onfi

gs)

,

as w

ell

as p

rovid

ing i

nfo

rmat

ion

ab

ou

t th

e n

um

ber

of

firm

s in

eac

h c

ou

ntr

y s

ample

. U

sin

g t

hes

e 5

7 c

ou

ntr

ies

giv

es u

s a

max

imu

m

sam

ple

of

over

86

,00

0 f

irm

s, b

ut

we

excl

ud

e m

icro

-fir

ms

(few

er t

han

10

) fo

r th

e co

mpar

ison

of

SO

Es

and

PO

Es,

red

uci

ng t

he

sam

ple

to a

rou

nd

55

,00

0 f

irm

s.

We

also

can

not

anal

yse

all

of

the

con

figu

rati

on

s b

ecau

se w

e d

o n

ot

hav

e d

ata

abou

t an

y c

ou

ntr

y i

n

con

figu

rati

on

4 (

cen

tral

ized

tri

be)

in

th

e W

BE

S s

ample

. W

e u

se d

um

my v

aria

ble

s to

all

oca

te e

ach

of

the

57

cou

ntr

ies

in t

he

sam

ple

to

1 T

he

sa

mp

lin

g is

ran

do

m w

ith

re

pla

cem

en

t a

nd

str

ati

fie

d t

o b

e c

ou

ntr

y r

ep

rese

nta

tiv

e w

ith

re

spe

ct t

o f

irm

siz

e,

bu

sin

ess

se

cto

r, a

nd

ge

og

rap

hic

re

gio

n.

2 T

he

cla

ssif

ica

tio

n i

s b

ase

d o

n d

ata

co

lle

cte

d f

rom

a p

an

el

of

exp

ert

s w

hic

h i

s a

na

lyse

d t

o i

de

nti

fy s

ev

en

in

stit

uti

on

al

syst

em

s th

at

cate

go

rize

go

ve

rna

nce

arr

an

ge

me

nt

for

68

un

de

rstu

die

d c

ou

ntr

ies.

Page 14: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

13

the

appro

pri

ate

on

e of

the

six

av

aila

ble

VIS

con

figu

rati

on

s as

in

Tab

le 2

. In

ou

r re

gre

ssio

ns,

we

alw

ays

use

as

ou

r p

oin

t of

refe

ren

ce

con

figu

rati

on

5,

emer

gen

t li

ber

al m

arket

eco

nom

ies

(EL

ME

s);

this

rep

rese

nts

for

ou

r sa

mple

of

un

der

stu

die

d e

con

om

ies

the

inst

itu

tion

al s

yst

em c

lose

st t

o t

he

trad

itio

nal

An

glo

-Sax

on

go

ver

nan

ce m

od

el.

-Ta

ble

s 1 &

2:

ab

ou

t h

ere-

O

ur

mea

sure

of

firm

per

form

ance

is

lab

or

pro

du

ctiv

ity (

LP

RO

D),

def

ined

in

th

e W

BE

S a

s re

al s

ales

per

work

er. W

e an

alyse

stat

e ow

ner

ship

(S

OE

) re

gar

din

g m

ajori

ty o

wn

ersh

ip a

nd

so l

oad

it

as a

du

mm

y v

aria

ble

tak

ing t

he

val

ue

un

ity w

hen

th

e st

ate

ow

ns

more

th

an 5

0%

of

the

equ

ity i

n t

he

firm

. W

e co

ntr

ol

for

oth

er f

acto

rs l

ikel

y t

o i

nfl

uen

ce f

irm

per

form

ance

. T

he

most

im

port

ant

of

thes

e at

th

e co

un

try l

evel

is

the

level

of

nat

ion

al e

con

om

ic d

evel

op

men

t w

hic

h w

e m

easu

re a

s G

DP

per

cap

ita

(GD

Pp

c) m

easu

red i

n

logs.

We

also

con

trol

in t

hes

e d

evel

opin

g c

ou

ntr

ies

for

FD

I an

d t

he

impac

t of

spil

lover

s fr

om

dev

eloped

eco

no

mie

s u

sin

g c

ou

ntr

y-

lev

el d

ata

on

th

e so

urc

e o

f F

DI,

nam

ely t

he

per

cen

tag

e of

the

FD

I st

ock

der

ived

fro

m d

evel

op

ed e

con

om

ies,

als

o m

easu

red

in

lo

gs.

Bec

ause

of

thes

e p

ote

nti

al e

xte

rnal

eff

ects

fro

m f

ore

ign

ow

ned

fir

ms,

we

expec

t fi

rm p

erfo

rman

ce t

o b

e h

igh

er t

he

gre

ater

th

e

per

cen

tage

of

FD

I to

a h

ost

eco

no

my f

rom

dev

eloped

eco

no

mie

s.

We

also

em

plo

y t

wo f

irm

-lev

el c

on

trols

for

com

pan

y p

erfo

rman

ce,

ente

red

in

lo

gs.

Th

us,

we

incl

ud

e a

mea

sure

of

firm

siz

e

and

fir

m a

ge;

lar

ger

fir

ms

and

mat

ure

fir

ms

are

typic

ally

ass

oci

ated

wit

h h

igh

er l

evel

s of

pro

du

ctiv

ity (

Hal

l &

Wei

ss,

19

67;

Moen

,

19

99

). W

e al

so i

ncl

ud

e in

du

stry

an

d t

ime

fix

ed e

ffec

ts.

We

rep

ort

var

iable

def

init

ion

s an

d s

ou

rces

for

all

dep

end

ent

and

in

dep

end

ent

var

iable

s in

Tab

le 3

.

Co

mm

en

t [A

P1

]: D

o y

ou

ta

ke

in

to

acc

ou

nt

M&

A o

ve

r th

e p

eri

od

an

d

oth

er

typ

es

of

ow

ne

rsh

ip c

ha

nge

s?

Fo

r in

sta

nce

, if

a c

om

pa

ny

be

com

es

sta

te-o

wn

ed

, o

r p

riv

ati

sed

? I

f so

, h

ow

ma

ny

co

’s d

oe

s th

at

con

cern

?

Page 15: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

14

-Ta

ble

3:

ab

ou

t h

ere-

We

rep

ort

des

crip

tive

stat

isti

cs i

n T

able

4 a

nd

corr

elat

ion

coef

fici

ents

in

Tab

le 5

. W

e fi

nd

in

Tab

le 4

, w

hic

h r

eport

s d

escr

ipti

ve

stat

isti

cs t

hat

th

e av

erag

e fi

rm e

mplo

ys

arou

nd

11

0 w

ork

ers

and

is

18

yea

rs o

ld.

Most

fir

ms

focu

s o

n t

hei

r d

om

esti

c m

arket

(th

e sh

are

of

exp

ort

s av

erag

es 7

.5%

sal

es).

So

me

5%

of

firm

s in

th

e sa

mple

are

sta

te-o

wn

ed,

and

an

oth

er 5

% a

re (

maj

ori

ty)

fore

ign

ow

ned

. O

n

aver

age,

aro

un

d o

ne-

thir

d o

f F

DI

der

ives

fro

m o

ther

em

ergin

g a

nd

dev

elopin

g c

ou

ntr

ies.

Tab

le 5

rev

eals

th

at t

he

corr

elat

ion

coef

fici

ents

bet

wee

n t

he

ind

epen

den

t var

iable

s ar

e al

most

all

rat

her

sm

all,

most

ly w

ell

bel

ow

0.3

, su

gges

tin

g t

hat

mu

ltic

oll

inea

rity

is

not

a se

riou

s is

sue

in o

ur

dat

a3.

-Ta

ble

s 4

& 5

ab

ou

t h

ere-

Ou

r m

od

el i

s th

eref

ore

:

Ln

(L

PR

OD

) =

a1 +

a2 ln

(fi

rm a

ge)

= a

3 ln

(fi

rm s

ize)

+ a

4 (

FD

I st

ock

) +

a5 ln

(G

DP

pc)

+ a

6 ∑

I =

1..

6 (

Con

fig) i

+ a

7 S

OE

+ a

8 S

OE

*∑

i =

1..

6 (

Con

fig) i

+ ∑

ind

ust

ry d

um

mie

s +

∑ t

ime

du

mm

ies.

(

1)

3 O

ne

exc

ep

tio

n i

s th

e p

osi

tiv

e c

orr

ela

tio

n b

etw

ee

n F

DI

sto

ck f

rom

de

ve

lop

ed

eco

no

mie

s a

nd

GD

P p

er

cap

ita

. H

ow

ev

er,

in

un

rep

ort

ed

re

gre

ssio

ns

we

fin

d t

ha

t

om

issi

on

of

the

fo

rme

r d

oe

s n

ot

infl

ue

nce

th

e r

esu

lts

con

cern

ing

th

e h

yp

oth

ese

s, s

o w

e i

ncl

ud

e b

oth

va

ria

ble

s in

ou

r re

po

rte

d r

eg

ress

ion

s.

Co

mm

en

t [A

P2

]: I

kn

ow

th

at

pu

ttin

g in

fir

m d

um

mie

s w

ill w

ipe

ou

t

the

SO

E d

um

my

, h

ow

eve

r, I

th

ink it

wo

uld

be

go

od

to

dis

cuss

th

at

in t

he

lim

ita

tio

ns,

esp

. a

fte

r a

ll t

he

lit

t. I

n

eco

n r

eg

ard

ing

th

e im

pa

ct o

f

ma

na

ge

me

nt

on

fir

ms’

pro

du

ctiv

ity

(Va

n R

ee

ne

n e

t a

l.).

Als

o,

pe

rha

ps

as

rob

ust

ne

ss,

yo

u

try

alt

ern

ati

ve

de

pe

nd

en

t v

ari

ab

les,

for

inst

an

ce R

OC

E p

rofi

tab

ilit

y

Co

mm

en

t [A

P3

]: D

o y

ou

ha

ve

in

fo

on

all o

f th

em

? D

ep

en

din

g o

n t

he

da

tab

ase

th

ere

is

a lo

t o

f m

issi

ng

in

fo

for

this

va

ria

ble

. It

wo

uld

be

go

od

to

kn

ow

wh

eth

er

the

sa

mp

le is

red

uce

d

or

no

t a

fte

r in

clu

din

g t

his

va

r. (

N is

mis

sin

g in

th

e d

esc

rip

tive

sta

ts.)

Co

mm

en

t [A

P4

]: T

he

re’s

a t

yp

o

he

re

Co

mm

en

t [A

P5

]: H

av

e y

ou

r tr

ied

log

to

tal

ass

ets

as

an

alt

ern

ati

ve

?

So

me

tim

es

info

on

em

plo

ye

es

is le

ss

acc

ura

te t

ha

n t

ota

l a

sse

ts

Co

mm

en

t [A

P6

]: I

f y

ou

ha

ve

tim

e

du

mm

ies,

yo

u n

ee

d t

ime

in

dic

es.

Als

o

firm

in

dic

es,

as

the

da

ta is

at

the

fir

m

lev

el

Ha

ve

yo

ur

trie

d t

o p

ut

cou

ntr

y

du

mm

ies?

Th

ey

ma

y n

ot

com

ple

tely

ov

erl

ap

wit

h y

ou

r co

nfi

gu

rati

on

du

mm

ies.

Th

at

cou

ld b

e d

on

e a

s a

rob

ust

ne

ss t

est

.

Co

mm

en

t [A

P7

]: S

tan

da

rd e

rro

rs

sho

uld

be

clu

ste

red

at

the

fir

m le

ve

l

Page 16: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

15

We

esti

mat

e fi

ve

mod

els

usi

ng O

LS

. In

th

e fi

rst,

we

incl

ud

e th

e co

ntr

ol

var

iable

s ex

clu

din

g c

on

figs;

fo

r m

od

el 2

we

add

th

e fi

ve

is

con

figu

rati

on

du

mm

y v

aria

ble

s (c

on

figs

1,

2, 3

, 6

, an

d 7

) an

d f

or

mod

el 3

we

incl

ud

e on

ly t

he

con

trol

var

iable

s an

d t

he

SO

E m

ajori

ty

du

mm

y.

Mod

el 4

, th

en i

ncl

ud

es a

ll f

ive

con

figu

rati

on

s d

um

mie

s an

d S

OE

as

wel

l as

th

e co

ntr

ol

var

iable

s. F

inal

ly,

in m

od

el 5

, w

e ad

d

the

fiv

e in

tera

ctio

n t

erm

s bet

wee

n t

he

con

figu

rati

on

du

mm

ies

and

SO

E. T

he

test

of

the

per

form

ance

eff

ect

of

stat

e ow

ner

ship

dep

end

s

on

th

e si

gn

an

d s

ign

ific

ance

of

a7,

wh

ile

the

imp

act

of

inst

itu

tion

al s

yst

ems

dep

end

s on

a6. T

he

mod

erat

ing e

ffec

ts o

f th

e in

stit

uti

on

al

syst

em o

n S

OE

per

form

ance

rel

ativ

e to

PO

Es

com

es f

rom

th

e co

effi

cien

ts o

n t

he

coef

fici

ent

a 8.

RE

SU

LT

S

We

rep

ort

ou

r re

sult

s in

Tab

le 5

, m

od

els

1-5

. W

e h

ave

just

un

der

55

,00

0 o

bse

rvat

ion

s ac

ross

57

co

un

trie

s in

ou

r sa

mple

, an

d i

n o

ur

full

spec

ific

atio

n,

we

exp

lain

so

me

22

% o

f th

e var

iati

on

in

th

e d

epen

den

t v

aria

ble

. W

e n

ote

fro

m m

od

el 1

th

at t

he

con

trol

var

iable

s ar

e

all

sign

ific

ant

wit

h t

he

expec

ted

sig

n,

and

fro

m m

od

el 2

th

at f

irm

per

form

ance

is

sign

ific

antl

y i

nfl

uen

ced

by l

oca

tion

wit

hin

a

par

ticu

lar

con

figu

rati

on

. In

par

ticu

lar,

th

e om

itte

d c

on

figu

rati

on

, n

um

ber

4 (

emer

gen

t L

ME

) is

th

e m

ost

su

pp

ort

ive

of

pro

du

ctiv

ity a

t

the

firm

lev

el,

foll

ow

ed b

y c

on

figs

1 (

stat

e le

d)

and

5 (

coll

abora

tive)

. T

her

e is

a s

econ

d c

lust

er o

f co

nfi

gu

rati

on

s w

ith

per

form

ance

effe

cts

qu

ite

sim

ilar

to e

ach

oth

er b

ut

sign

ific

antl

y w

ors

e th

an c

on

figs1

an

d 5

, n

amel

y c

on

figs

7 (

hie

rarc

hic

ally

co

ord

inat

ed);

2

(fra

gm

ente

d)

and

fin

ally

3 (

fam

ily l

ed).

Th

is r

ankin

g o

f th

e p

rod

uct

ivit

y e

ffec

ts o

f co

nfi

gu

rati

on

s d

oes

not

chan

ge

in t

he

dif

fere

nt

spec

ific

atio

ns.

Page 17: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

16

-Ta

ble

5:

ab

ou

t h

ere-

T

he

coef

fici

ent

on

sta

te o

wn

ersh

ip i

s fo

un

d t

o b

e p

osi

tiv

e an

d s

ign

ific

ant

in a

ll t

he

mod

els

in w

hic

h i

t is

in

clu

ded

. T

his

ind

icat

es t

hat

in

ou

r sa

mple

of

un

der

stu

die

d e

con

om

ies,

sta

te o

wn

ersh

ip i

s fo

un

d t

o i

ncr

ease

lab

ou

r pro

du

ctiv

ity,

all

oth

er t

hin

gs

equ

al.

Th

is r

esu

lt h

old

s w

hen

th

e S

OE

du

mm

y i

s en

tere

d w

ith

ou

t co

nfi

gs

in m

od

el 3

, an

d w

ith

con

figs

in m

od

el 4

. T

he

coef

fici

ent

and

stan

dar

d e

rror

on

th

e S

OE

var

iable

are

not

sign

ific

antl

y a

lter

ed b

y t

he

incl

usi

on

of

the

con

fig d

um

mie

s.

M

od

el 5

all

ow

s u

s to

sim

ult

aneo

usl

y c

on

sid

er t

he

pro

du

ctiv

ity e

ffec

ts o

f st

ate

ow

ner

ship

an

d t

he

mod

erat

ing i

mp

act

of

con

figu

rati

on

s an

d t

ells

a m

ore

co

mple

x s

tory

th

an o

ur

anal

ysi

s h

ith

erto

. In

th

is m

od

el,

we

do n

ot

fin

d t

hat

sta

te o

wn

ed f

irm

s h

ave

a

hig

her

lev

el o

f la

bou

r p

rod

uct

ivit

y t

han

pri

vat

e on

es;

the

SO

E d

um

my i

nd

icat

es t

hat

th

ere

is n

o s

ign

ific

ant

dif

fere

nce

bet

wee

n S

OE

s

and

PO

Es

regar

din

g p

rod

uct

ivit

y.

How

ever

, as

pre

vio

usl

y,

pro

du

ctiv

ity i

s fo

un

d t

o b

e h

igh

er i

n l

arg

er a

nd

old

er f

irm

s, a

nd

in

cou

ntr

ies

wit

h h

igh

er l

evel

of

dev

elop

men

t (G

PP

pc)

an

d w

ith

gre

ater

FD

I fr

om

dev

eloped

eco

no

mie

s (%

of

FD

I st

ock

). F

urt

her

more

,

pro

du

ctiv

ity r

emai

ns

sign

ific

antl

y a

ffec

ted

by t

he

inst

itu

tion

al s

yst

em o

f th

e co

un

try i

n w

hic

h t

he

firm

is

loca

ted.

Ho

wev

er,

in m

od

el 5

we

also

id

enti

fy t

he

con

figu

rati

on

for

wh

ich

th

e S

OE

may

be

con

sid

ered

th

e “e

mble

mat

ic f

irm

”. T

hu

s, w

hil

e th

e co

effi

cien

t on

th

e

SO

E d

um

my i

s in

sign

ific

ant

in m

od

el 5

, it

is

not

wh

en i

nte

ract

ed w

ith

th

e “s

tate

led

” co

nfi

gu

rati

on

du

mm

y.

In s

hort

, in

ou

r sa

mple

of

Page 18: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

17

un

der

stu

die

d e

con

om

ies,

SO

Es

and

PO

Es

do n

ot

dis

pla

y s

ign

ific

antl

y d

iffe

ren

t le

vel

s o

f la

bou

r p

rod

uct

ivit

y,

and

th

is h

old

s in

ev

ery

con

figu

rati

on

ex

cept

the

stat

e le

d o

ne.

How

ever

, in

th

e st

ate

led

con

figu

rati

on

(co

nfi

g 1

), p

rod

uct

ivit

y i

s h

igh

er i

n s

tate

ow

ned

fir

ms4

.

CO

NC

LU

SIO

NS

In t

his

pap

er,

we

firs

t ad

van

ce t

he

lite

ratu

re o

n b

oth

sta

te o

wn

ersh

ip a

nd

nat

ion

al i

nst

itu

tion

al s

yst

ems

by f

ocu

sin

g o

n t

he

impac

t of

thes

e sy

stem

s on

th

e p

erfo

rman

ce o

f fi

rms

fro

m e

mer

gin

g a

nd

dev

elo

pin

g e

con

om

ies.

We

test

an

d v

alid

ate

FJA

S’s

(2

01

6)

tax

on

om

y o

f in

stit

uti

on

al s

yst

ems

and

dem

on

stra

te t

hat

th

e co

nfi

gu

rati

on

s pro

vid

e a

n i

nd

epen

den

t an

d s

tati

stic

ally

sig

nif

ican

t

expla

nat

ion

of

the

var

iati

on

in

fir

m p

erfo

rman

ce a

cross

cou

ntr

ies.

Fu

rth

erm

ore

, F

JAS

’s v

arie

ties

of

inst

itu

tion

al s

yst

ems

per

spec

tiv

e

intr

od

uce

for

un

der

stu

die

d c

ou

ntr

ies

a n

ew e

lem

ent

that

is

con

spic

uou

sly a

bse

nt

from

th

e V

OC

per

spec

tiv

e, n

amel

y a

mo

re p

rom

inen

t

role

for

the

stat

e.

S

econ

dly

, ou

r re

sult

s sh

ed l

igh

t on

th

e kin

ds

of

inst

itu

tion

al a

rran

gem

ents

th

at w

ill

sup

port

bet

ter

ente

rpri

se p

erfo

rman

ce.

Wit

h

its

dep

icti

on

of

pat

h-d

epen

den

t in

stit

uti

on

al c

han

ge

(Hal

l &

Th

elan

, 2

00

9),

th

e co

mp

arat

ive

capit

alis

m l

iter

atu

re h

as e

mph

asiz

ed

inst

itu

tion

al c

on

tin

uit

y a

nd

th

e p

ersi

sten

ce o

f var

iety

in

cap

ital

ist

stru

ctu

res

(Jac

kso

n &

Dee

g, 2

00

8).

Th

is c

har

acte

riza

tion

may

be

app

ropri

ate

in t

he

con

tex

t of

mat

ure

in

stit

uti

on

al s

etti

ngs,

bu

t le

ss s

o i

n u

nd

erst

ud

ied

cou

ntr

ies

wh

ich

co

mpri

se a

wid

e ar

ray o

f

tran

siti

on

al,

soci

alis

t, a

nd

au

thori

tari

an r

egim

es.

Ou

r ra

nkin

g r

esu

lts

shed

so

me

pre

lim

inar

y a

nd

ad

mit

ted

ly t

enta

tive

ligh

t on

th

ese

deb

ates

, s

ug

ges

tin

g a

ran

ge

of

dis

tin

ctiv

e tr

ajec

tori

es o

f in

stit

uti

on

al c

han

ge

and

fir

m p

erfo

rman

ce.

For

exam

ple

, ou

r ev

iden

ce p

oin

ts

4 W

e co

nsi

der

in

un

rep

ort

ed r

egre

ssio

ns

the

resu

lts

from

a b

road

er s

ample

in

clu

din

g a

ll t

he

smal

l fi

rms

(< 1

0 w

ork

ers)

. T

his

in

crea

sed

th

e sa

mple

siz

e b

y a

rou

nd

30

%,

and

more

so i

n f

rag

men

ted

an

d f

amil

y-l

ed c

on

figu

rati

on

s. W

e re

-est

imat

ed m

od

els

4 a

nd

5 o

n t

hes

e sa

mple

s, a

nd

th

e re

sult

s w

ere

extr

emel

y s

imil

ar i

n a

ll k

ey r

espec

ts.

Page 19: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

18

to t

hre

e re

lati

vel

y h

igh

-per

form

ing c

on

figu

rati

on

s: e

mer

gen

t L

ME

s (c

on

fig

2),

in

wh

ich

fir

ms

ran

k f

irst

in

pro

du

ctiv

ity,

coll

abora

tiv

e

agglo

mer

atio

ns

(con

fig 6

) a

nd

sta

te l

ed (

con

fig 1

). T

he

latt

er f

ind

ing m

igh

t be

a sh

ock

to s

tron

g b

elei

ver

s o

f th

e W

ash

ingto

n

Con

sen

sus,

bu

t per

hap

s le

ss s

o t

o o

bse

rver

s of

the

rise

of

Ch

ina

and

oth

er s

tate

led

eco

no

mie

s in

Eas

t A

sia

and

els

ewh

ere.

W

e

char

acte

rize

th

e d

evel

op

men

tal

traj

ecto

ries

of

this

con

figu

rati

on

s in

dyn

amic

ter

ms

wh

ere

rela

tivel

y s

tron

g-s

tate

s ar

e pro

acti

ve

in

bu

ild

ing c

om

ple

men

tari

ties

to a

dd

ress

in

stit

uti

on

al c

on

trad

icti

on

s an

d s

eekin

g t

o d

evel

op a

coh

eren

t m

ark

et-b

ased

in

stit

uti

on

al

fram

ewo

rk.

In t

hes

e se

ttin

gs,

wh

ere

mar

ket

s an

d o

ther

sel

ecti

on

mec

han

ism

s ar

e in

ten

sifi

ed,

and d

om

esti

c fi

rms

are

ince

nti

viz

ed t

o

adap

t an

d i

mpro

ve

thei

r pra

ctic

es,

hig

h l

evel

s o

f per

form

ance

can

be

ach

iev

ed. S

tron

g s

tate

s re

tain

wh

at E

van

s’ (

19

89

) d

escr

ibes

as

emb

edd

ed a

uto

no

my,

and

av

oid

dep

end

ence

up

on

pow

erfu

l oli

gar

chs

or

fam

ily e

lite

s. T

he

pro

min

ent

role

of

the

stat

e is

su

gges

tive

of

a g

ov

ern

men

t p

oli

cy c

hoic

e fa

vo

rin

g e

xp

ort

-ori

ente

d d

evel

op

men

t, a

wel

l-tr

od

den

pat

h f

or

late

-in

du

stri

aliz

ing s

tate

s (A

msd

en,

19

91

).

Imp

ort

antl

y,

stat

e le

d c

ou

ntr

ies

do n

ot

app

ear

to b

e co

nv

ergin

g o

n e

ith

er t

he

CM

E o

r L

ME

var

ieti

es o

f ca

pit

alis

m;

inst

ead

, it

may

repre

sen

t an

alt

ern

ativ

e, h

ybri

diz

ed f

orm

of

stat

e ca

pit

alis

m.

Man

y o

f th

e co

un

trie

s in

th

ese

con

figu

rati

on

s ar

e re

lati

vel

y s

table

sin

gle

-

par

ty s

tate

s w

ith

lon

g t

ime

ho

rizo

ns

and

in

cen

tiv

es t

o a

dopt

open

tra

de

poli

cies

th

at i

mpro

ve

lon

g-t

erm

eco

nom

ic p

erfo

rman

ce.

Th

e

impli

cati

on

is

that

sta

te l

ead

ersh

ip o

f th

e ec

on

om

y b

eco

mes

a p

erm

anen

t fe

atu

re o

f th

ese

econ

om

ic s

yst

ems.

W

e co

ncl

ud

e b

y a

ckn

ow

led

gin

g s

om

e li

mit

atio

ns

of

this

stu

dy a

nd

pro

vid

ing s

om

e fu

rth

er g

uid

ance

fo

r fu

ture

res

earc

h.

Ou

r

stu

dy f

aces

lim

itat

ion

s at

both

th

e th

eore

tica

l an

d e

mpir

ical

lev

els.

Co

mm

enci

ng w

ith

th

eory

, w

e h

ave

foll

ow

ed t

he

lite

ratu

re i

n b

asin

g

ou

r cl

assi

fica

tion

of

inst

itu

tion

al s

yst

ems

up

on

tax

on

om

ies,

wh

ich

der

ive

thei

r cl

assi

fica

tory

dis

tin

ctio

ns

from

em

pir

ical

ly o

bse

rved

clu

ster

s o

f ch

arac

teri

stic

s, r

ath

er t

han

fro

m a

n u

nd

erly

ing c

on

ceptu

aliz

atio

n a

s w

ou

ld b

e th

e bas

is f

or

a ty

polo

gy.

Giv

en t

hat

Page 20: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

19

un

der

stu

die

d e

con

om

ies

are

typ

ical

ly e

volv

ing r

apid

ly a

nd

are

oft

en s

ubje

ct t

o s

ign

ific

ant

inst

itu

tio

nal

ch

anges

, so

met

imes

rel

ated

to

rev

olu

tion

, ci

vil

war

or

maj

or

econ

om

ic a

nd

so

cial

dev

elop

men

t (C

oll

ier,

20

07

), o

ur

tax

on

om

y m

ay p

rovid

e an

un

stab

le b

asis

for

lon

g-

term

an

alysi

s. F

urt

her

mo

re,

we

hav

e ch

ose

n t

o b

ase

ou

r st

ud

y o

n t

he

VIS

cla

ssif

icat

ion

, w

ith

ou

r co

ntr

ibu

tion

pri

mar

ily f

ocu

sed

on

explo

rin

g t

he

com

ple

x i

nte

r-re

lati

on

ship

s am

on

g i

nst

itu

tion

al s

yst

ems,

en

terp

rise

go

ver

nan

ce s

yst

em,

and

fir

m p

erfo

rman

ce.

Wh

ile

ou

r re

sear

ch h

as p

rovid

ed s

om

e ev

iden

ce o

f th

e v

alid

ity o

f th

e V

IS t

axon

om

y i

n e

xpla

inin

g f

irm

per

form

ance

in

un

der

stu

die

d

econ

om

ies,

fu

ture

res

earc

her

s m

ay w

ish

to r

evis

it t

he

tax

on

om

y i

tsel

f to

ex

plo

re w

het

her

clu

ster

an

alysi

s b

ased

on

a r

ich

er

char

acte

riza

tion

of

inst

itu

tion

s ca

n p

rovid

e an

equ

ally

val

id b

ut

more

fin

e-g

rain

ed s

pec

ific

atio

n o

f in

stit

uti

on

al s

yst

ems

in

un

der

stu

die

d e

con

om

ies.

On

th

e em

pir

ical

sid

e, w

e h

ave

ben

efit

ted

fro

m t

he

Worl

d B

ank’s

vas

t d

ata

coll

ecti

on

ex

erci

se a

t th

e en

terp

rise

lev

el o

n

un

der

stu

die

d e

con

om

ies.

How

ever

, th

e W

BE

S d

atas

et a

lso i

mp

ose

s so

me

lim

itat

ion

s. M

ost

im

po

rtan

tly,

thou

gh

th

ere

are

a fe

w

cou

ntr

ies

surv

eyed

th

ree

tim

es,

the

bu

lk o

f th

e d

atas

et c

om

pri

ses

eith

er s

ingle

yea

r obse

rvat

ion

s or

obse

rvat

ion

s fr

om

on

ly t

wo w

aves

.

Th

is h

as m

ade

it i

mp

oss

ible

to u

se e

mpir

ical

met

hod

s th

at d

isti

ngu

ish

bet

wee

n f

irm

-lev

el, co

un

try-l

evel

, an

d c

on

figu

rati

on

eff

ects

.

Fu

ture

wo

rk m

ay,

ther

efo

re,

nee

d t

o s

eek e

ith

er p

anel

dat

a fo

r u

nd

erst

ud

ied

eco

no

mie

s or

focu

s pri

mar

ily o

n t

he

cou

ntr

ies

wit

h t

hre

e

wav

es t

o e

xplo

re t

hes

e d

isti

nct

ion

s. F

urt

her

more

, th

e d

ata

do h

ave

cert

ain

lim

itat

ion

s, c

on

cern

ing p

erfo

rman

ce a

nd

ow

ner

ship

mea

sure

s, a

nd

fu

ture

res

earc

h s

hou

ld i

nves

tig

ate

way

s to

im

pro

ve

thes

e m

easu

res.

Ou

r an

alysi

s w

ou

ld,

in p

arti

cula

r, b

e im

pro

ved

by

usi

ng a

mea

sure

of

tota

l fa

ctor

pro

du

ctiv

ity

.

Page 21: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

20

In

su

mm

ary,

we

pro

pose

an

d f

ind

evid

ence

for

the

argu

men

t th

at,

wh

en w

e tu

rn o

ur

atte

nti

on

to u

nd

erst

ud

ied

econ

om

ies,

sta

te o

wn

ed f

irm

s ca

n p

erfo

rm b

ette

r th

an p

riv

ate

on

es,

thou

gh

on

ly i

n t

he

righ

t in

stit

uti

on

al e

nvir

on

men

t. W

e h

ave

fou

nd

this

“ri

gh

t in

stit

uti

on

al e

nvir

on

men

t” t

o b

e th

e on

e re

ferr

ed t

o w

ith

in t

he

VIS

cla

ssif

icat

ion

as

“sta

te l

ed,”

an

d u

nsu

rpri

sin

gly

it

incl

ud

es s

om

e o

f th

e su

cces

sfu

l ec

on

om

ies

of

Eas

t A

sia

such

as

Ch

ina.

Th

us

in e

con

om

ic s

yst

ems

in w

hic

h t

he

stat

e ac

ts a

s th

e piv

ota

l

coo

rdin

ator

of

econ

om

ic a

ctiv

ity a

nd

pro

vid

es t

he

sup

port

an

d c

om

ple

men

tari

ties

gen

erat

ing e

con

om

ic d

evel

opm

ent,

sta

te o

wn

ed

firm

s ar

e m

ore

pro

du

ctiv

e th

an p

rivat

e on

es.

We

hav

e n

ot

in t

his

pap

er c

on

sid

ered

th

e m

ech

anis

ms

wh

ereb

y t

he

stat

e pro

vid

es s

up

port

to S

OE

s in

sta

te-l

ed e

con

om

ies,

an

d t

his

may

in

clu

de

stat

e-pro

vid

ed s

ubsi

die

s, p

refe

rred

acc

ess

to c

riti

cal

inpu

t re

sou

rces

, an

d

mon

op

oly

pow

er i

n o

utp

ut

mar

ket

s. T

his

is

an i

mp

ort

ant

topic

for

futu

re r

esea

rch

.

Page 22: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

21

BIB

LIO

GR

AP

HY

Agu

iler

a, R

. V

., &

Cre

spi-

Cla

der

a, R

. (2

01

6).

Glo

bal

corp

ora

te g

over

nan

ce:

On

th

e re

levan

ce o

f fi

rms’

ow

ner

ship

str

uct

ure

. Jo

urn

al

of

Wo

rld

Busi

nes

s, 5

1(1

), 5

0-5

7.

Am

sden

, A

. H

. (1

99

1).

Dif

fusi

on

of

dev

elop

men

t: T

he

late

-in

du

stri

aliz

ing m

od

el a

nd

gre

ater

Eas

t A

sia.

A

mer

ica

n E

con

om

ic

Rev

iew

, 8

1(2

), 2

82

-28

6.

Boar

dm

an,

A.,

an

d A

. V

inin

g.

19

89

. “O

wn

ersh

ip a

nd

Per

form

ance

in

Co

mpet

itiv

e E

nvir

on

men

ts:

A

Com

par

ison

of

the

Per

form

ance

of

Pri

vat

e, M

ixed

, an

d S

tate

-Ow

ned

En

terp

rise

s.”

Jou

rna

l of

La

w a

nd E

con

om

ics

32

(1

): 1

–3

3.

Car

ney

, M

., G

edaj

lovic

, E

., &

Yan

g,

X.

(20

09

). V

arie

ties

of

Asi

an c

apit

alis

m:

Tow

ard

an

in

stit

uti

on

al t

heo

ry o

f A

sian

en

terp

rise

. A

sia

Pa

cifi

c Jo

urn

al

of

Ma

nag

emen

t, 2

6(3

), 3

61

-38

0.

Car

ney

, M

., D

ura

n,

P.,

van

Ess

en,

M.,

Sh

apir

o,

D.

(20

17

). F

amil

y f

irm

s an

d n

atio

nal

com

pet

itiv

enes

s: d

oes

fam

ily f

irm

pre

val

ence

m

atte

r? J

ou

rna

l of

Fa

mil

y B

usi

nes

s S

tra

teg

y on

lin

e.

Coll

ier,

P.

(20

07

). T

he

Bo

tto

m B

illi

on

. O

xfo

rd:

Ox

ford

Un

iver

sity

Pre

ss.

Est

rin

, S

., a

nd

Per

oti

n,

V.,

(1

99

1):

"D

oes

Ow

ner

ship

Alw

ays

Mat

ter"

, In

tern

ati

on

al

Jou

rna

l of

Ind

ust

ria

l O

rga

niz

ati

on,

Vol.

9, p

p.

55

-7

2.

Est

rin

, S

., H

anou

sek,

J., K

oče

nd

a, E

., &

Sv

ejn

ar,

J. (

20

09

). T

he

effe

cts

of

pri

vat

izat

ion

an

d o

wn

ersh

ip i

n t

ran

siti

on

ec

on

om

ies.

Jo

urn

al

of

Eco

no

mic

Lit

era

ture

, 4

7(3

), 6

99-7

28

.

Est

rin

, S

. &

Pel

leti

er, A

. (2

01

8).

Pri

vat

izat

ion

in

Dev

elopin

g C

ou

ntr

ies:

Wh

at A

re t

he

Les

son

s of

Rec

ent

Ex

per

ien

ce?

Wo

rld

Ba

nk

Eco

no

mic

Rev

iew

, 2

01

8,

33

, 6

5-1

02

.

Evan

s, P

. (

19

95

).

Em

bed

ded

Au

ton

om

y: S

tate

s a

nd

In

dust

ria

l A

uto

no

my

Pri

nce

ton

: P

rin

ceto

n U

niv

ersi

ty P

ress

. F

ain

shm

idt,

S.,

Ju

dge,

W.

Q.,

Agu

iler

a, R

. V

., &

Sm

ith

, A

. (2

01

6).

Var

ieti

es o

f in

stit

uti

on

al s

yst

ems:

A c

on

tex

tual

tax

on

om

y o

f u

nd

erst

ud

ied

cou

ntr

ies.

Jo

urn

al

of

Wo

rld

Busi

nes

s. o

nli

ne

Page 23: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

22

Fri

edm

an,

M.,

(1

96

2),

Cap

ital

ism

an

d F

reed

om

, C

hic

ago:

Un

iver

sity

of

Ch

icag

o P

ress

. G

alal

, A

., L

. Jo

nes

, T

and

on

, P

. an

d V

og

elsa

ng,

I. (

19

94

). W

elfa

re C

on

seq

uen

ces

of

Sel

ling

Pu

bli

c E

nte

rpri

ses.

Ox

ford

: O

xfo

rd

Un

iver

sity

Pre

ss.

Glo

ber

man

S,

and

Sh

apir

o D

. (2

00

2).

Glo

bal

fo

reig

n d

irec

t in

ves

tmen

t fl

ow

s: T

he

role

of

go

ver

nan

ce i

nfr

astr

uct

ure

s. W

orl

d

Dev

elop

men

t 3

0(1

1):

18

99

-19

19

.

Gu

gle

r, K

., P

eev,

E.,

& S

egal

la, E

. (2

01

3).

Th

e in

tern

al w

ork

ings

of

inte

rnal

cap

ital

mar

ket

s: C

ross

-cou

ntr

y e

vid

ence

. Jo

urn

al

of

Co

rpo

rate

Fin

an

ce, 2

0,

59-7

3.

Hal

l, P

. A

., &

Sosk

ice,

D.

W.

(20

01

). V

ari

etie

s of

cap

ita

lism

: T

he

inst

itu

tion

al

fou

nd

ati

ons

of

com

pa

rati

ve a

dva

nta

ge. O

xfo

rd:

Ox

ford

U

niv

ersi

ty P

ress

. H

all,

P.

A.,

& T

hel

en,

K.

(20

09

). I

nst

itu

tion

al c

han

ge

in v

arie

ties

of

capit

alis

m.

So

cio

-Eco

no

mic

Rev

iew

, 7(1

), 7

-34

. H

all,

M.,

& W

eiss

, L

. (1

96

7).

Fir

m s

ize

and

pro

fita

bil

ity.

Th

e R

evie

w o

f E

con

om

ics

an

d S

tati

stic

s, 4

9(3

), 3

19

-33

1.

Hay

ek,

von

F.A

. (1

94

4).

Th

e R

oa

d t

o S

erfd

om

. L

on

don

: R

ou

tled

ge.

H

osk

isso

n,

R.

E.,

Wri

gh

t, M

., F

ilat

otc

hev

, I.

, &

Pen

g,

M.

W.

(20

13

). E

mer

gin

g m

ult

inat

ion

als

from

mid

-ran

ge

econ

om

ies:

Th

e in

flu

ence

of

inst

itu

tion

s an

d f

acto

r m

arket

s. J

ou

rna

l of

Ma

nag

emen

t S

tud

ies,

50(7

), 1

29

5-1

32

1.

Jack

son

G.

& D

eeg,

R.

(2

00

8).

C

om

par

ing c

apit

alis

ms:

u

nd

erst

and

ing i

nst

itu

tion

al d

iver

sity

an

d i

ts i

mpli

cati

on

s f

or

in

tern

atio

nal

bu

sin

ess,

Jo

urn

al

of

In

tern

ati

on

al

Busi

nes

s S

tud

ies,

39

, 4

, 5

40

-56

1.

Jom

o,

K.

S.

(20

08).

“A

Cri

tica

l R

evie

w o

f th

e E

vo

lvin

g P

riv

atiz

atio

n D

ebat

e.”

In P

riva

tiza

tio

n:

Su

cces

ses

an

d F

ail

ure

s, e

dit

ed b

y G

. R

ola

nd

, 1

99

–2

12

. N

ew Y

ork

: C

olu

mbia

Un

iver

sity

Pre

ss.

Kh

ann

a, T

., &

Pal

epu

, K

. G

. (2

01

0).

Win

nin

g i

n e

mer

gin

g m

ark

ets:

A r

oa

d m

ap

fo

r st

rate

gy

an

d e

xecu

tio

n. H

arvar

d B

usi

nes

s P

ress

.

Page 24: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

23

Kolo

dk

o,

G.

(19

99

). T

ran

siti

on

to a

mar

ket

eco

no

my a

nd

su

stai

ned

gro

wth

. Im

pli

cati

on

s fo

r th

e p

ost

-Was

hin

gto

n c

on

sen

sus,

C

om

mu

nis

t a

nd

Post

-Com

mu

nis

t S

tud

ies

32

(3

), 2

33

-26

1.

Kolo

dk

o,

G.

(20

02

). F

rom

sh

ock

to

th

erap

y: t

he

po

liti

cal

eco

no

my

of

post

soci

ali

st t

ransf

orm

ati

on

, O

xfo

rd:

Ox

ford

Un

iver

sity

Pre

ss.

Korn

ai, J.

(1990):

The

Road t

o a

Fre

e E

conom

y. S

hif

ting f

rom

a S

oci

ali

st S

yste

m:

The

Exa

mple

of

Hungary

, N

ew Y

ork

: W

. W

. N

ort

on a

nd

Budap

est:

HV

G K

iadó.

La

Port

a, R

., &

Lop

ez-d

e-S

ilan

es, F

. (1

99

9).

“B

enef

its

of

Pri

vat

izat

ion

-Evid

ence

fro

m M

exic

o.”

Qu

art

erly

Jo

urn

al

of

Eco

no

mic

s 1

14

(4

): 1

19

3–2

42

. M

usa

cch

io,

A.

& L

azza

rin

i, S

. (2

01

4)

Rei

nve

nti

ng

Sta

te C

ap

ita

lism

: L

evia

tha

n i

n B

usi

nes

s, B

razi

l an

d B

eyo

nd

. 1

st e

d. C

amb

rid

ge,

M

ass.

: H

arvar

d U

niv

ersi

ty P

ress

. M

usa

cch

io,

A.,

& L

azza

rin

i, S

. G

& A

gu

iler

a, R

. V

. (

20

15

). N

ew v

arie

ties

of

stat

e ca

pit

alis

m:

Str

ateg

ic a

nd

go

ver

nan

ce

impli

cati

on

s. A

cad

emy

of

Ma

na

gem

ent

Per

spec

tive

s, 2

9(1

), 1

15-1

31

.

Meg

gin

son

W.

(20

05

): T

he

Fin

an

cia

l E

con

om

ics

of

Pri

vati

zati

on

, O

xfo

rd U

niv

ersi

ty P

ress

, N

ew Y

ork

. M

eggin

son

, W

. &

Net

ter,

J.

(20

01

). “

Fro

m S

tate

to

Mar

ket

: A

Su

rvey

of

Em

pir

ical

Stu

die

s on

Pri

vat

izat

ion

.” J

ou

rna

l of

Eco

no

mic

Lit

era

ture

39

(2

): 3

21

–8

9.

Moen

, Ø

. (1

99

9).

Th

e re

lati

on

ship

bet

wee

n f

irm

siz

e, c

om

pet

itiv

e ad

van

tag

es a

nd

ex

port

per

form

ance

rev

isit

ed.

Inte

rna

tio

na

l S

ma

ll

Busi

nes

s Jo

urn

al,

18(1

), 5

3-7

2.

No

rth

, D

. C

. (1

99

4).

E

con

om

ic p

erfo

rman

ce t

hro

ugh

tim

e. A

mer

ica

n E

con

om

ic R

evie

w, 8

4, 3

59

-68

. N

uti

, D

.M.

(20

18

). T

he

Ris

e, F

all

an

d F

utu

re o

f S

oci

ali

sm,

EA

CE

S C

on

fere

nce

20

18

Key

note

Ad

dre

ss

Rod

rik,

D.

(20

06

). G

ood

bye

Was

hin

gto

n C

on

sen

sus,

Hel

lo W

ash

ingto

n C

on

fusi

on

? A

Rev

iew

of

the

Worl

d B

ank's

Eco

no

mic

Gro

wth

in

th

e 1

99

0s:

Lea

rnin

g f

rom

a D

ecad

e of

Ref

orm

. Jo

urn

al

of

Eco

no

mic

Lit

era

ture

, 4

4 (

4):

97

3-9

87

. S

hap

iro,

D.

& G

lob

erm

an,

S.

(20

12

). “

Th

e In

tern

atio

nal

Act

ivit

ies

and

Im

pac

ts o

f S

tate

-Ow

ned

En

terp

rise

s” i

n S

ove

reig

n I

nve

stm

ent:

Page 25: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

24

Co

nce

rns

an

d P

oli

cy R

eact

ion

s, K

arl

P.

Sau

van

t, L

isa

Sac

hs

and

Wou

ter

P.F

. S

chm

it J

on

gblo

ed (

edit

ors

), O

xfo

rd U

niv

ersi

ty P

ress

, 2

01

2 (

Ch

apte

r 5

).

Sh

leif

er, A

. &

Vis

hn

y,

R.

(19

94

): “

Poli

tici

ans

and

Fir

ms.

” Q

ua

rter

ly J

ou

rna

l of

Eco

no

mic

s 4

6:

99

5-1

02

5

Sch

nei

der

, M

. R

., S

chu

lze-

Ben

trop,

C.,

& P

aun

escu

, M

. (2

01

0).

Map

pin

g t

he

inst

itu

tion

al c

apit

al o

f h

igh

-tec

h f

irm

s: A

fu

zzy-s

et

anal

ysi

s o

f ca

pit

alis

t var

iety

an

d e

xp

ort

per

form

ance

. Jo

urn

al

of

Inte

rna

tio

na

l B

usi

nes

s S

tud

ies,

41(2

), 2

46

-26

6.

Sti

gli

tz, J.

E.

(19

98)

“More

In

stru

men

ts a

nd

Bro

ader

Goal

s: M

ovin

g T

ow

ard

th

e P

ost

-Was

hin

gto

n C

on

sen

sus,

” th

e 1

99

8 W

IDE

R

An

nu

al L

ectu

re,

Hel

sin

ki,

Jan

uar

y 1

99

8,

repri

nte

d C

hap

ter

1 i

n T

he

Reb

el W

ith

in,

Ha-

Joon

Ch

ang (

ed.)

, L

on

don

: W

imble

do

n

Publi

shin

g C

om

pan

y,

20

01

, p

p.

17

-56

. W

ade,

R.

(20

03

) G

ove

rnin

g t

he

Ma

rket

: E

con

om

ic T

heo

ry a

nd

th

e R

ole

of

Go

vern

men

t in

East

Asi

an

In

dust

ria

liza

tio

n. P

rin

ceto

n, N

J:

Pri

nce

ton

Un

iver

sity

Pre

ss.

Wil

liam

son

, J.

(1

99

0)

“Wh

at W

ash

ingto

n M

ean

s b

y P

oli

cy R

eform

,” C

hap

ter

2 i

n L

ati

n

Am

eric

an

Adju

stm

ent:

Ho

w M

uch

Has

Hap

pen

ed?

Joh

n W

illi

amso

n (

ed.)

, 1

99

0,

Was

hin

gto

n:

Inst

itu

te f

or

Inte

rnat

ion

al E

con

om

ics.

Vic

ker

s, J

., a

nd

G.

Yar

row

. (1

98

8).

Pri

vati

zati

on

: A

n E

con

om

ic A

na

lysi

s. C

ambri

dg

e, M

A:

MIT

Pre

ss.

Wo

rld

Ban

k (

20

11

), U

nd

erst

an

din

g t

he

Qu

esti

on

na

ire.

Av

aila

ble

fro

m:

htt

ps:

//w

ww

.en

terp

rise

surv

eys.

org

/~/m

edia

/GIA

WB

/En

terp

rise

Su

rvey

s/D

ocu

men

ts/M

eth

od

olo

gy/Q

ues

tion

nai

re-M

anu

al.p

df.

(A

cces

sed

: 1

9 O

ctob

er 2

01

7).

Page 26: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

25

Tab

le 1

: F

JAS

(2

01

6)

VIS

Con

figu

rati

on

s in

68

Un

der

stu

die

d C

ou

ntr

ies

Sum

mar

y o

f cl

assi

fica

tion S

chem

e

M

arket

-bas

ed

Coll

abora

tive

Sta

te-L

ed

Fra

gm

ente

d w

ith

Fam

ily-

Cen

tral

ized

E

mer

gen

t C

oll

abora

tive

Hie

rarc

hic

ally

(L

ME

)*

(CM

E)*

Fra

gil

e S

tate

L

ed

Tri

be

LM

E

Agglo

mer

atio

ns

Coord

inat

ed

Aust

rali

a A

ust

ria

Arg

enti

na

Angola

A

lger

ia

Bah

rain

B

ots

wan

a C

zech

Rep

ub

lic

Bulg

aria

C

anad

a B

elgiu

m

Ban

gla

des

h

Cam

eroon

Aze

rbai

jan

Iran

C

hil

e E

stonia

G

eorg

ia

Irel

and

Den

mar

k

Bel

arus

D.R

. C

ongo

B

razi

l K

uw

ait

Hong K

ong

Hungar

y

Jord

an

New

Zea

land

Fin

land

Chin

a E

gyp

t C

olo

mb

ia

Qat

ar

Isra

el

Lat

via

K

azak

hst

an

Sw

itze

rlan

d

Fra

nce

**

India

E

thio

pia

M

exic

o

Sau

di

Ara

bia

N

amib

ia

Lit

huan

ia

Kore

a (S

outh

) U

K

Ger

man

y

Indones

ia

Ghan

a M

oro

cco

UA

E

Sin

gap

ore

P

ola

nd

Leb

anon

U

SA

It

aly**

Mal

aysi

a K

enya

Nig

eria

South

Afr

ica

Slo

vak

Rep

ubli

c R

om

ania

Ja

pan

M

ongoli

a R

wan

da

Per

u

Slo

ven

ia

Tai

wan

N

ether

lands

Pak

ista

n

Sen

egal

T

unis

ia

T

urk

ey

N

orw

ay

Phil

ippin

es

Sudan

Y

emen

Ukra

ine

P

ort

ugal

**

Russ

ia

Tan

zania

S

pai

n**

Sri

Lan

ka

Ugan

da

Sw

eden

T

hai

land

Ven

ezuel

a

V

ietn

am

* T

hes

e ec

onom

ies

hav

e b

een c

lass

ifie

d b

y H

all

and S

osk

ice

(2001)

and s

ub

sequen

t li

tera

ture

. T

he

LM

E g

roup

corr

esp

onds

to t

he

com

par

tmen

tali

zed s

yst

em i

n W

hit

ley’s

NB

S,

and t

he

CM

E e

nco

mpas

ses

var

ious

sub

typ

es o

f co

llab

ora

tive

syst

ems

incl

uded

in N

BS

such

as

coll

abora

tive,

hig

hly

coo

rdin

ated

, an

d c

oord

inat

ed i

ndust

rial

dis

tric

t.

** T

hes

e ec

onom

ies

are

oft

en c

lass

ifie

d a

s uniq

ue

sub

typ

es o

f co

llab

ora

tive

syst

ems

wher

e th

ere

is m

ore

sta

te d

om

inan

ce a

nd,

in s

om

e ca

ses,

rel

ativ

ely l

iber

al l

abor

rela

tions

(Sch

nei

der

, 2013;

Hal

l &

Thel

en,

2009;

Gro

svold

& B

ram

mer

, 2011).

Page 27: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

26

Tab

le 2

: W

orl

d B

ank E

nte

rpri

se S

urv

ey S

ample

Cou

ntr

ies

wit

hin

th

e V

IS C

on

figu

rati

on

Str

uct

ure

an

d N

um

ber

of

Fir

ms

in e

ach

Cou

ntr

y

Con

fig1

C

on

fig2

C

on

fig3

C

on

fig5

C

on

fig6

C

on

fig7

Sta

te-l

ed

Fra

gm

ente

d/

frag

ile

stat

e F

amil

y l

ed

Em

ergen

t L

ME

C

oll

abora

tive

Ag

glo

mer

atio

ns

Hie

rarc

hic

ally

co

ord

inat

ed

Cou

ntr

y

Fre

q.

Cou

ntr

y

Fre

q.

Cou

ntr

y

Fre

q.

Cou

ntr

y

Fre

q.

Cou

ntr

y

Fre

q.

Cou

ntr

y

Fre

q.

Arg

enti

na

2,1

17

A

ng

ola

7

85

Aze

rbai

jan

7

70

Bots

wan

a 6

10

Cze

ch R

epu

bli

c 5

04

Bu

lgar

ia

1,5

96

Ban

gla

des

h

2,9

46

C

amer

oon

3

63

Bra

zil

1,8

02

Ch

ile

2,0

50

Est

on

ia

54

6

Geo

rgia

7

33

Bel

aru

s 6

33

D

R C

on

go

1

,22

8

Colo

mbia

1

,94

2

Isra

el

48

3

Hu

ng

ary

6

01

Jord

an

57

3

Ch

ina

2,7

00

E

gyp

t 2

,89

7

Mex

ico

2

,96

0

Nam

ibia

9

09

Lat

via

6

07

Kaz

akh

stan

1

,14

4

Ind

ia

9,2

81

E

thio

pia

1

,49

2

Moro

cco

4

07

Sou

th A

fric

a 9

37

Lit

hu

ania

5

46

Leb

anon

5

61

Ind

on

esia

2

,76

4

Gh

ana

1,2

14

Nig

eria

4

,56

7

Pola

nd

9

97

Rom

ania

1

,08

1

Mal

aysi

a 1

,00

0

Ken

ya

1,4

38

Per

u

1,6

32

Slo

vak

5

43

Tu

rkey

2

,49

6

Mon

goli

a 7

22

R

wan

da

45

3

Tu

nis

ia

59

2

Slo

ven

ia

54

6

Uk

rain

e 1

,85

3

Pak

ista

n

2,1

82

S

eneg

al

1,1

07

Yem

en

83

0

Ph

ilip

pin

es

2,6

61

S

ud

an

66

2

Ru

ssia

5

,22

4

Tan

zan

ia

1,2

32

Sri

Lan

ka

61

0

Ug

and

a 1

,32

5

Th

aila

nd

1

,00

0

Ven

ezu

ela

82

0

Vie

tnam

2

,04

9

Tota

l 3

6,7

09

T

ota

l 1

4,1

96

Tota

l 1

5,5

02

Tota

l 4

,98

9

Tota

l 4

,89

0

Tota

l 1

0,0

37

Page 28: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

27

Tab

le 3

: D

efin

itio

ns

and

Sou

rces

of

Var

iable

s

Var

iable

D

efin

itio

n

Sou

rce

Pro

du

ctiv

ity (

Lo

g)

Lab

or

pro

du

ctiv

ity i

s re

al s

ales

(u

sin

g G

DP

d

efla

tors

) d

ivid

ed b

y f

ull

-tim

e per

man

ent

wo

rker

s W

BE

S

Exp

ort

(%

of

tota

l sa

les

that

are

ex

po

rted

dir

ectl

y)

S

ales

exp

ort

ed d

irec

tly a

s per

cen

tage

of

tota

l sa

les.

W

BE

S

Fir

m A

ge(

Lo

g)

Yea

r fi

rm b

egan

op

erat

ion

to y

ear

of

surv

ey

con

du

cted

W

BE

S

Fir

m S

ize

(Lo

g)

Lo

g o

f n

um

ber

of

per

man

ent

wo

rker

s W

BE

S

% o

f F

DI

sto

ck f

rom

D

evel

oped

Eco

nom

ies

(Lo

g)

Per

cen

tag

e of

FD

I fr

om

dev

eloped

cou

ntr

ies

to

sou

rce

econ

om

y

UN

CT

AD

's B

ilat

eral

FD

I S

tati

stic

s

GD

P p

er C

apit

a (L

og

)

GD

P p

er c

apit

a is

gro

ss d

om

esti

c pro

du

ct d

ivid

ed

by m

idyea

r p

opu

lati

on

. G

DP

is

the

sum

of

gro

ss

val

ue

add

ed b

y a

ll r

esid

ent

pro

du

cers

in

th

e ec

on

om

y p

lus

any p

rod

uct

tax

es a

nd

min

us

any

subsi

die

s n

ot

incl

ud

ed i

n t

he

val

ue

of

the

pro

du

cts.

It

is

calc

ula

ted

wit

hou

t m

akin

g d

edu

ctio

ns

for

dep

reci

atio

n o

f fa

bri

cate

d a

sset

s o

r fo

r d

eple

tion

an

d d

egra

dat

ion

of

nat

ura

l re

sou

rces

. D

ata

are

in

curr

ent

U.S

. d

oll

ars.

Th

e var

iable

is

load

ed i

n l

ogs.

Wo

rld

Ban

k W

orl

d

Dev

elop

men

t In

dic

ato

rs

Tab

le 4

: D

escr

ipti

ve

Sta

tist

ics

Var

iable

M

ean

S

td.

Dev

. M

in

Max

Lab

or

Pro

du

ctiv

ity(L

og)

13

.60

2

.79

-3.4

0

29

.00

Exp

ort

(%

of

tota

l sa

les

that

are

ex

port

ed d

irec

tly)

7

.54

8

22

.06

0

10

0

Fir

m A

ge

17

.72

1

4.9

1

0

21

0

Fir

m S

ize

1

12

.5

51

4.9

0

37

77

2

% o

f F

DI

sto

ck f

rom

Dev

elop

ed E

con

om

ies

64

.73

2

4.0

1

0

99

GD

P p

er C

apit

a 5

59

7.7

6

53

38

.56

24

6.8

03

36

28

1.2

Co

mm

en

t [A

P8

]: M

ay

be

ad

d

p2

5,

p5

0,

p7

5

Page 29: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

28

Tab

le 5

: R

egre

ssio

n R

esu

lts;

Bas

e S

ample

Ex

clu

des

Sm

all

Fir

ms

Var

iable

L

abo

r P

rod

uct

ivit

y(L

og)

as D

epen

den

t V

aria

ble

Mo

del

1

Mo

del

2

Mo

del

3

Mo

del

4

Mo

del

5

Fir

m A

ge

(Lo

g)

0.0

50

**

-0.0

12

0.0

45

**

-0.0

16

-0.0

15

(0

.01

5)

(0.0

15

) (0

.01

5)

(0.0

15

) (0

.01

5)

Fir

m S

ize

(Lo

g)

0.0

81

**

0.0

53

**

0.0

75

**

0.0

48

**

0.0

49

**

(0

.00

9)

(0.0

09

) (0

.00

9)

(0.0

09

) (0

.00

9)

% o

f F

DI

stock

0

.26

7*

*

0.3

93

**

0.2

76

**

0.4

02

**

0.4

09

**

(0

.02

5)

(0.0

25

) (0

.02

5)

(0.0

25

) (0

.02

5)

GD

P p

er C

apit

a -0

.86

3*

*

-1.0

90

**

-0.8

62

**

-1.0

93

**

-1.0

96

**

(0

.01

5)

(0.0

21

) (0

.01

5)

(0.0

21

) (0

.02

1)

Co

n1 (

Sta

te l

ed)

-1

.82

2*

*

-1

.83

5*

*

-1.8

49

**

(0

.06

1)

(0

.06

1)

(0.0

61

)

Co

n2 (

Fra

gm

ente

d)

-2

.91

7*

*

-2

.92

5*

*

-2.9

25

**

(0

.07

0)

(0

.07

0)

(0.0

70

)

Co

n3 (

Fam

ily l

ed)

-3

.06

6*

*

-3

.07

4*

*

-3.0

76

**

(0

.05

6)

(0

.05

6)

(0.0

56

)

Co

n6 (

Coll

abo

rati

ve)

-1.9

10

**

-1

.91

4*

*

-1.9

14

**

(0

.07

1)

(0

.07

1)

(0.0

71

)

Co

n7 (

Hie

rarc

hic

ally

)

-2.8

61

**

-2

.85

7*

*

-2.8

53

**

(0.0

63

)

(0.0

63

) (0

.06

3)

SO

E m

ajo

rity

1

.32

3*

*

1.2

76

**

-1.4

85

(0

.13

7)

(0.1

32

) (1

.23

4)

SO

E* C

on

1

3.3

68

**

(1

.24

5)

SO

E* C

on

2

1.5

15

(1

.30

0)

SO

E* C

on

3

1.3

76

(1

.31

7)

SO

E* C

on

6

2.2

93

(1

.35

9)

SO

E* C

on

7

0.8

86

(1

.34

2)

Co

nst

ant

18

.72

4*

*

24

.54

6*

*

18

.76

8*

*

24

.61

8*

*

24

.65

9*

*

Page 30: Saul Estrin , Zhixiang Liang, Daniel Shapiro and Michael ...eprints.lse.ac.uk/91944/1/Estrin_State-capitalism.pdf · Consensus (Williamson, 1990), has since been widely criticised

29

Note

: F

igu

res

in p

aren

thes

es a

re s

tan

dar

d e

rrors

. *

**

den

ote

d s

tati

stic

al s

ign

ific

ance

at

the

99

.9%

lev

el;

**

den

ote

d s

tati

stic

al

sign

ific

ance

at

the

99

% l

evel

; *

den

ote

d s

tati

stic

al s

ign

ific

ance

at

the

95

% l

evel

.

(0

.19

1)

(0.2

51

) (0

.19

1)

(0.2

51

) (0

.25

1)

Ind

ust

ry C

on

trol

Yes

Y

es

Yes

Y

es

Yes

Y

ear

Co

ntr

ol

Yes

Y

es

Yes

Y

es

Yes

Ob

s 5

4,9

85

54

,98

5

54

,98

5

54

,98

5

54

,98

5

F

36

7.8

0

47

2.7

8

35

8.9

2

46

2.3

9

40

4.7

7

Adj

R-s

qu

ared

0

.15

7

0.2

21

0.1

59

0.2

22

0.2

23