scanning this presentation is an amalgam of presentations by mark michael, randy marchany and ed...

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Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen C. Hayne

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Page 1: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Scanning

This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis.

I have edited and added material.

Dr. Stephen C. Hayne

Page 2: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

The Source!

“Network Scanning Techniques – Understanding how it is done”

Author: Ofir Arkin

Page 3: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

NETWORK SCANNING

Fire

Internet

Gateway

Web Server

Mail Server Database Server

Domain Controller

Inte

rnal T

hre

ats

Exte

rnal Th

reats

wall

SCANNER SCANNER

Desktops

Page 4: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Intro to Intelligence Gathering Techniques 3 Major Steps

Foot Printing Scanning Enumeration

Similar to Military Gather information on the target Analyze weaknesses Construct and launch attack

Page 5: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Footprinting

Construct a profile of the target site Adminstrative, technical & billing

contacts from the ARIN database (whois utility)

IP Address range DNS Servers Mail Servers Firewalls

Page 6: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Scanning

Art of detecting which systems are alive and reachable on the Internet

What services do they offer? TCP/UDP running on each system System architecture (Unix,

Windows, etc.) OS version and patch levels

Page 7: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Enumeration The process of extracting valid

accounts or exported resource names from systems

Uses active connections to systems and queries, therefore, more intrusive than footprinting or scanning

OS specific Gathers userid, group names, system

banners, routing tables, SNMP info

Page 8: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Intro to Scanning

What are scanners doing? What do they look like(signature)? How do they operate in order to

accomplish their tasks? What kind of information is

collected? How serious is the threat?

Page 9: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Scanning: Ping Sweeps ICMP Echo Requests(ICMP Type 8) to the

target and wait for ICMP Echo Reply (ICMP Type 0)

Unix Tools Fping, gping, nmap

Windows Ping, pinger from Rhino9 (this is a extremely

fast scanner that sends multiple ICMP echo requests concurrently

Defense: block ICMP echo requests

Page 10: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Scanning: Broadcast ICMP

Send ICMP Echo Request to broadcast address on the subnets

Unix boxes will answer requests directed to the network so we can identify the Unix boxes using this technique

Windows boxes won’t respond

Page 11: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Scanning: Non-ECHO ICMP Use non-ECHO ICMP protocols to

bypass the ‘block ICMP echo’ filters ICMP type 13 (TIMESTAMP) will

query a system for the current time ICMP type 17 (Address Mask

Request) is used by diskless systems to obtain its subnet mask at boot time.

Tools: icmpush, icmpquery

Page 12: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Scanning: TCP Sweeps TCP SYN or TCP ACK packets sent to

the target network telnet, FTP, HTTP, SMTP are the

common ports scanned Firewalls can spoof the response so

this isn’t a reliable scanning method Tools: nmap, hping (also allows

packet fragments to be sent)

Page 13: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Scanning: UDP Sweeps Relies on the ICMP PORT UNREACHABLE

message which is sent by a closed UDP port

If not received, the port is assumed to be open

Not reliable because: Routers can drop UDP packets Many UDP services don’t respond correctly Firewalls usually drop UDP packets except DNS

Page 14: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Scanning: Port Scanning

Goal: determine what services are running or in a LISTENING state

The services may suffer from vulnerabilities

A number of port scan techniques

Page 15: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Port Scanning TCP Connect() scan SYN packet sent to target port If SYN/ACK is received, port is active If RST/ACK is received, port is dead Finish the 3-way sequence by

sending an ACK then terminate the connection

Easily detected by looking at syslogs for connection or error messages

Page 16: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Port Scanning

TCP Half Open Scan (SYN Scan) Send the SYN packet to the target If SYN/ACK received, the port is

active If RST/ACK received, the port is

dead We do NOT complete the connection

Page 17: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Advanced Port Scanning Stealth Scanning techniques Intentionally violate the 3-way handshake SYN/ACK scan FIN scan XMAS scan NULL scan RFC 793 states that closed ports must

reply with a RST packet to our probe

Page 18: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Stealth Scanning

SYN/ACK scan Send SYN/ACK to target (step 2 of the

3 way handshake) TCP should respond with RST because

it figures this is a mistake We get a response which tells us the

port is closed Open ports do not send anything

Page 19: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Stealth Scanning

FIN scan Send a FIN to the target Wait for reply Open ports will respond

XMAS scan Send TCP packet with all TCP flags –

URG, ACK, PSH, RST, SYN, FIN set

Page 20: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Stealth Scanning Null Scanning

Send TCP packet that turns off all flags The target should send a RST to all closed ports RFC 793 says this should work for every TCP

implementation Windows, CISCO, BSDI, HP/UX, MVS, Irix are

broken. They send RST to open ports as well. If FIN/NULL/XMAS scans show closed ports

then SYN scan them to find open ports. If they match, you have one of the above systems.

Page 21: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Inverse Mapping Gather info about hosts or networks which

aren’t there We make assumptions about what is there RESET Scan

Routers will give information on a net even if the question doesn’t make sense

Routers will report non-existent addresses No HOST UNREACHABLE or TIME EXCEEDED

means the IP exists

Page 22: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Inverse Mapping Proxy Scanning/FTP Bounce Scanning Attacker.com connects to FTP server which

has a world writable directory and opens a control connection

Attacker can then ask the FTP server to initiate an active server data xfer process to send a file anywhere on the net. Hobbit’s paper has more details

Use to scan behind a firewall

Page 23: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Port Scanning Techniques TCP Reverse Ident Scanning

Ident protocol (RFC 1413) determines the owner of a TCP connection by communicating on port 113

Full TCP connection to the host Slow scan

Defeats IDS that look for lots of connection in a short period of time.

Typical scan rate: 2 ports/day

Page 24: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Port Scanning Techniques Fragmentation Scanning

All IP packets can be fragmented RFC 791 defines the min/max fragment

size 8 octets (min frag size) are enough to

contain the src/dst port numbers This forces the TCP flags field into the

second fragment

Page 25: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Port Scanning Techniques Fragmentation Scanning

Some filters/IDS may incorrectly reassemble or completely miss portions of the scan

Filters that queue all IP fragments can handle this method

Fixed in most vendor’s products

Page 26: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Port Scanning Techniques

Decoy Scanning The target net thinks the hosts you

specify as decoys are scanning them also

Makes it impossible to determine who the real scanner is

Signature: TTL field usually contained the same number

Nmap bypasses this error Traceroute the source IP

Page 27: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Port Scanning Techniques

Coordinated Scans Multiple IP’s used in the scan Each one of them probes specific ports in

a different time period, different scan rate Detection depends on the time period the

probes take place Coordinated scans are the most discrete

way of probing a target

Page 28: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Operating System Detection

Banner Grabbing Telnet banners identify the OS version

FTP/IIS SYST command

DNS HINFO Record Pair of strings identifying the host’s HW

Page 29: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Operating System Detection

TCP/IP/Stack Fingerprinting Uses distinct variation in TCP stack

implementation to get the OS type Send specific TCP packets to target and

observe the response Varies with vendor because they

interpret the RFC differently when they wrote their TCP stacks

Page 30: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Operating System Detection

FIN packet sent to open port. RFC 793 says “don’t respond to the FIN”.

Many stacks will respond with a RST. Windows, BSDI, CISCO, HPUX, MVS, Irix do this.

Page 31: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Operating System Detection

Bogus Flag Probe SYN packet with undefined flag is sent Linux < 2.0.35 will keep the flag in their response.

Other OS will RST the connection TCP ISN sampling

Find pattern of the ISN Traditional 64K (older Unix) Random Increment (FreeBSD, DGUX, Irix, newer

Solaris) True Random (linux) Time Dependent Modules (MS Windows)

Page 32: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Operating System Detection

Don’t Fragment Bit Some OS use this bit to enhance

performance TCP Initial Window

Some OS stack implementations have a unique initial window size on their returned packets

AIX returns Ox3F25, OpenBSD, FreeBSD use 0x402E

Page 33: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Operating System Detection

ACK Value Some IP stacks differ in the value they

use for the ACK field Send FIN/PSH/URG to a closed port. Most

implementation will set the ACK number in the returned packet to be the same as the sequence number received.

Windows responds with ACK=Sqn#+1

Page 34: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Operating System Detection

ICMP Error Message Quenching RFC 1812 suggests limits on various error

message rates. Only a few OS follow the RFC.

Send UDP packets to random, high, UDP port and count the number of unreachable messages received within a given amount of time.

Page 35: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Operating System Detection

ICMP Message Quoting ICMP error messages should quote a small

amount of info from the ICMP message that caused the error.

Example: Host unreachable This is quoted when the PORT

UNREACHABLE message is received in the IP Header + 8 bytes.

Solaris and Linux provide more info than is needed

Page 36: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Operating System Detection

ICMP Error Message Echoing Integrity Some OS stack implementations alter the

IP header when sending back an ICMP error message.

Another way to target an OS. ICMP Type of Service

ICMP PORT UNREACHABLE TOS field Linux uses 0xC0 for this value. All others use 0.

Page 37: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Operating System Detection

Fragmentation Handling Different stack implementations handle

overlapping fragments differently. TCP Options

RFC 793, RFC 1323 define TCP options. Not all OS implement host options.

Send query with option set. Target sets the option only if it supports it. Some OS support advanced options, others don’t.

Page 38: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Banner Checks Check the service output retrieved during TCP

port scan for version number220 mail.domain.com ESMTP Sendmail 8.6.1/8.6.1,

the version number indicates a vulnerability. Banner checks cannot always determine whether

a vulnerability has been patchedVulnerabilities that can be detected by banner checks include:

– SMTP (Sendmail, MMDF, Lotus Domino, etc.)– POP/IMAP– FTP (wu-ftpd, etc.)– SSH– INN

Page 39: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

URL CHECKS

Check for vulnerabilities in specific programs on web server:

You can try to exploit the vulnerability:Check whether specially crafted URL returns contents of some file which is known to reside on the server.

Or just see if the file exists on the web server:Check whether URL returns 200 OK response.

Page 40: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Firewalking

A technique used to gather information about a remote network protected by a firewall.

2 purposes Determine the ACL of a FW by mapping

open ports on the FW. If FW drops ICMP ECHO request/reply, this

technique is effective

Page 41: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Firewalking

Uses traceroute style packet filtering to determine whether the packet passes through the FW.

Need 2 pieces of info IP of last known gateway BEFORE the FW.

This is our waypoint. IP of host located behind the firewall.This

is used as a destination to direct packet flow.

Page 42: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Firewalking If we traceroute a host behind the FW and get

blocked by the ACL, we find the FW. We then try to traceroute same host using

different transport protocol (TCP, UDP, ICMP). If we get a response, 2 possible conclusions: This particular traffic is allowed by the FW. We know a host exists behind the FW.

Trying to pass packets on all ports/protocols through the FW, monitor the response will produce the ACL. Use slow scan to avoid detection! Send packets to all hosts inside the net.

Page 43: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

War Driving With a laptop and wireless card, an attacker can

drive down the street and join many wireless LANs! Windows Tools:

NetStumbler WinPcap

Linux Tools: Airsnort WEPCrack

More here

Page 44: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

War Chalking

Variant of “hobo” language Key:

SSID () – closed, )(– openBandwidth

Retina)(1.5

Page 45: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

War Driving Defenses

Use Virtual Private Network (VPN) All data from end system to VPN

gateway inside of wireless device encrypted and authenticated

SLAN is a freeware VPN on Linux or Windows:

http://slan.sourceforge.net Allow connection to specific MACs

Page 46: Scanning This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen

Conclusions

Understanding the importance of detecting these scans could prevent intrusions to the scanned systems.

Use an IDS to gather scan signatures. Develop filters for these scans