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Society for American Archaeology
Some Relationships between Behavioral and Evolutionary ArchaeologiesAuthor(s): Michael Brian SchifferReviewed work(s):Source: American Antiquity, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Oct., 1996), pp. 643-662Published by: Society for American ArchaeologyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/282009 .
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AS
SOME RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN BEHAVIORALAND EVOLUTIONARY ARCHAEOLOGIES
MichaelBrianSchiffer
Diversity in archaeology's social theories is desirable, butfactioning of the discipline into antagonistic, paradigm-based
camps undermines he scientific enterprise.In order topromote effortsat buildingbridges betweendifferenttheoreticalpro-
grams, this paper examines relationships between behavioral archaeology and evolutionary (selectionist) archaeology.Potential commonground is broughtto light, incompatibilitiesare critically examined,andpossible synergies are explored.It is concluded that there is nofundamentalreason why these twoprograms cannot work in concert to achieve the goal of
explaining behavioral (or evolutionary) change in human societies. Whetherproductive relationships can be established
between otherprograms remains to be determinedon a case-by-case basis.
La diversidad de teorias sociales en arqueologia es necesaria,pero la partici6n de la disciplina enfacciones antagonisticasbasadas en paradigmassabotea la empresa cientifica. Parapromover esfuerzosdestinados a crearpuentes entreprogramasteoricos distintos, este articulo examina las relaciones entre arqueologia conductualy arqueologia evolucionista (selec-
cionista). Se resaltan las areas comunes,se examinancriticamente las incompatibilidades,y se exploranposibles sinergias.Se concluyeque no existen razonesfundamentalespor las que estos programasno puedan trabajaren conciertopara alcan-
zar la meta de explicar cambio conductual (o evolutivo)en sociedades humanas. Laposibilidad de que se establezcan rela-
ciones productivasentre otrosprogramas queda por determinarsecaso por caso.
Scienceconsists n groupingacts so thatgen-eral laws or conclusionsmay be drawn romthem
-Charles Darwin, The Autobiography ofCharlesDarwin, 1809-1882, p. 70
Since the early 1970s, processual archaeol-
ogy's social theory (sensu Schiffer 1988)hassufferedmany ndignitiesat thehandsof
critics (for useful discussions, see Lamberg-
Karlovsky 1989; Preucel 1991; Trigger 1989;
Yoffee and Sherratt1993). Even so, processual-ism-albeit now in manyvarieties-remains well
entrenched n everydaypractice,andit is doubtful
that any competingprogramwill be able to dis-
lodge it and achieve a comparable position ofdominance. For the foreseeable future, then, a
multitudeof minorityprograms, ncludingbehav-
ioral,evolutionary, ognitive,andMarxistarchae-
ologies, will struggle to win followers and alterdisciplinary practice (see discussions in
Wandsnider 992).As a result,archaeologistsmayneed to become accustomed to an abundanceof
seemingly incompatible ocial theories,contribut-
ing to the "thousandarchaeologies" previouslywelcomed(Schiffer1988:479).Althoughdiversityin social theory is desirable(Knapp 1996), divi-
sion of archaeology into antagonistic camps,
seemingly ncapableof engagingeach other n dis-
cussions of substantive issues, diminishes the
integrityof thedisciplineas a scientificenterprise.An alternativepatternof communicationcan
be envisioned. Instead of caricaturing,misrepre-
senting, or summarilydismissingrivalprograms,
archaeologists might make a diligent effort to
understand each other's social theory-maybeeven build some intellectual bridges. Perhapsbecause their positions on significant issues of
Michael Brian Schiffer * Departmentof Anthropology,Universityof Arizona,Tucson,AZ 85721
AmericanAntiquity, 61(4), 1996, pp. 643-662.
Copyright? by the Society forAmericanArchaeology
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AMERICANANTIQUITY
social theory lie between today's theoretical
extremes, some behavioral archaeologists are
eager to hold discussions with practitionersof
other programs (Walker et al. 1995:8); manypapers in ExpandingArchaeology (Skibo et al.
1995), for example, initiatepromisingdialogues
(e.g., McGuire 1995; Nielsen 1995; O'Brien and
Holland 1995b; Orser 1995; Senior 1995; Wylie
1995). Similarly, n the context of historicalcase
studies,I have alreadyexploitedcommongroundbetween behavioral and postprocessual archae-
ologies for explaining instances of behavioral
change pertaining to portable radios (Schiffer
1991) and early electric automobiles(Schifferet
al. 1994). Surprisingly,both studies also haveevolutionary eatures n thattheytreat,diachroni-
cally, the interplaybetween variationand selec-
tion processes (more on this below). Although
handling unconventional subjects, the portableradioandautomobileresearchesnonethelessraise
hopesthatadditionalworkalongtheselines mightlead eventually to a more integrateddiscipline
(see also Duke 1995).An explicit experiment n communication,his
paperexaminessomerelationships etweenbehav-
ioral and evolutionary archaeologies (both aredefinedbelow).That theremaybe important ela-
tionshipsbetweenthese two programshas already
been suggestedby severalevolutionists(O'BrienandHolland1995a:178-179, 193, 1995b;O'Brien
et al. 1994).Needlessto say,thestructure ndcon-
tent of the following discussionsreflect but one
behavioralarchaeologist's erspective.The relationships xaminedbetweenevolution-
aryandbehavioral rchaeologies reof threekinds.
First, areas of potentialcommon ground are set
forth;possibleshared enetsturnoutto be surpris-
ingly numerousandsignificant.Second,thepapertreats he assumptions f evolutionary rchaeologythatseem incompatiblewith behavioralprinciples.It is suggested hatsomeevolutionary ositionsare
insupportable nd,more importantly, re actually
peripheral-if not detrimental-to evolutionary
archaeology.Andthird,possiblesynergiesbetween
thetwoprograms reexplored. beginwitha brief
overviewof bothprograms.
Behavioral ArchaeologyAn outgrowthof processualarchaeology,behav-
ioral archaeologycrystallizedas an explicit pro-
gram in the early 1970s at the University of
Arizona (for a history, see Schiffer 1995a).
Confrontedeven thenby a plethoraof competingarchaeologies,J. JeffersonReid, William Rathje,andI offereda framework f fourinterdependent
strategiesfor reintegratinghe discipline (Reid et
al. 1975; Schiffer 1976:Chapter1). The founda-
tion of this frameworkis a new definition of
archaeology as "the study of the relationshipsbetween human behaviorand materialculturein
all times and all places" (Reid et al. 1975:864).The discipline, we maintained,had outgrownits
traditionalboundariesandwas reconfiguringas a
new science-a behavioralarchaeology.Behavioralarchaeologists,dependingon their
interests, ask idiographic (historical) or nomo-
thetic (general)questionsaboutthe relationshipsbetween people and artifacts (Reid et al. 1975;
Schiffer 1975a). Although behavioral theorists
tend to privilege nomothetic questions (e.g.,Schiffer 1975a, 1976, 1988, 1992), if only to
make up for theirprofoundneglect elsewhere in
the discipline, much behavioralarchaeologyhas
been idiographic.Behavioralistsemphatically ee
no conflict between history and science (Reid1995; Schiffer 1995b).
During ts briefexistence,behavioralarchaeol-
ogy'smainnomotheticcontributionshavebeen to
the realmsof reconstruction heory and method-
ological theory(sensuSchiffer1988).Thisshould
not be surprisinggiven thatprocessualarchaeol-
ogy had failed to lay a firm foundation or infer-
ence; withoutthe tools for creatinga behavioral
past, the prospects for a behavioralarchaeologyseemed bleak. In view of the improvementof
inference in recent years, however,some behav-ioralistsnow assign to the creationof social the-
ory a higher priority (Schiffer 1992, 1995b;
Walkeret al. 1995). Although progress remains
modest, behavioral archaeology nonetheless
offersa distinctiveconceptual rameworkhatcan
informthe developmentof new social theory.Behavioralistsseek to explain variabilityand
change in human behavior by emphasizing the
study of relationshipsbetween people and their
artifacts.By focusing on people-artifact nterac-
tions, behavioralistshave crafteda frameworkofconcepts, principles, and proceduresfor investi-
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RELATIONS ETWEEN EHAVIORALNDEVOLUTIONARYRCHAEOLOGIES
gatinghumanbehaviorwheneverand wherever t
occurs. (Foran introduction o behavioralarchae-
ology, see Schiffer [1995c]; for a concise codifi-
cation of fundamentalenets,
from whichmuchof
this section is adapted,see Schiffer [1995d]; for
recent developments, see Longacre and Skibo
[1994] and Skibo et al. [1995].) In the following
synopsis, I highlight the tenets of behavioral
archaeologymost relevant for engaging the evo-
lutionaryprogram.As the name implies, behavioralists ay stress
on studyingbehavior:whatpeople actuallydid or
do (Nielsen 1995;Reid 1995;Walkeret al. 1995).The basic units of behaviorareactivities,defined
as the interactionbetweenelements (e.g., human,artifact, animal), at least one of which is an
energy source (Rathjeand Schiffer 1982:Chapter3; Schiffer1992; Schiffer and Skibo 1997).Thus,artifacts are an integralpart of humanactivities,from a marriageceremonyto rebuildinga diesel
engine. After all, a white wedding gown is as
essential to a traditional church wedding as
wrenches are to tearing down an engine; in the
absence of either, crucial interactions would be
adverselyaffected.
Theartifacts andevenpeople) takingpart n anactivityhave,by virtueof theirmaterialcomposi-tion and form, specific properties hat affect their
suitability or interactingn particularways.These
activity-specific capabilitiesare knownas perfor-mance characteristics nd can pertain o any kindof interaction-mechanical, thermal,visual, etc.
(Nielsen 1995;SchifferandSkibo 1987, 1997).Activities are usually carriedout, often recur-
rently, by people in behavioral components-a
society'sunits of organization.Behavioralcompo-
nents, such as householdsand communities,con-sist of people, places, and artifacts(RathjeandSchiffer1982:Chapter; Schiffer1992:Chapter ).
Because each kind of artifact tends toward
uniqueness n its set of properties ndperformancecharacteristics, here are few true "functionallyequivalent" artifact types (Schiffer 1979).Activities,whichvary n energysources,otherele-
ments, and interactionpatterns,also usually lackexact functionalequivalents Schiffer1979).Thus,when one kind of artifactreplaces another n an
activity or when one kind of activity replacesanother n a behavioral omponent,"disjunctions"
are created that can initiate further change
processes. As a result, much behavioralchangeoccurs n response o the (often unintended) onse-
quencesof
previousartifact and
activity replace-ments(Schiffer1979, 1992:Chapter ).
Change processes, which involve selection
betweenalternativeartifactsor alternativeactivi-
ties, entail compromises among performancecharacteristics and interactions (McGuire and
Schiffer 1983; Schiffer and Skibo 1987);patternsin these compromisesare influencedby specificbehavioral actors of lifewayandsocial organiza-tion (McGuireand Schiffer 1983; Schiffer 1992;Schiffer and Skibo 1987, 1997). These compro-
mises can be illuminated, n the case of artifacttypes, by use of performancematrices,which fur-
nish explicit comparisons n relationto activity-
specific performance characteristics (Schiffer1995b;Schifferand Skibo 1987).
Farfrombeing autonomous, ndividualactivi-
ties in a behavioralsystem (e.g., a society) are
connected,directlyor indirectly, o all otheractiv-ities by movements of people and artifacts. The
structured elationshipsbetween activities estab-
lish the causal pathwaysalong which behavioral
changestravel(Schiffer 1979; Schifferand Skibo1997). Change processes can also restructure
relationshipsbetweenactivities.
The life historyof artifacts andof people) is a
favored framework for organizing behavioral
studies (Rathje and Schiffer 1982:Chapter4;Schifferand Skibo 1997;Walker1995;Walkeret
al. 1995). Life histories based on groups ofrelatedactivities or processes (e.g., procurement,manufacture, nduse) are knownas flow models
(Schiffer 1972, 1976), whereas those focused on
individualactivitiesaretermedbehavioralchains(Schiffer 1975b, 1976). Developmental cycles(Goody 1971), anotherorganizing ramework, rethe definablestages of existence in the life histo-ries of behavioral components (Rathje and
Schiffer1982:Chapter ; Reid andShimada1982;Rock 1974).
Behavioral archaeology'sbasic concepts and
principles establish a basis for formulatingresearchable questions about variability and
change. Above all, this theoretical framework
emphasizes that behavioral or societal change ischange in activities.
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AMERICAN ANTIQUITY
The explanationof behavioralvariabilityand
change depends on having available countless
new experimental aws andtheories;the fashion-
ingof these
principles,while an effort still in its
infancy (Schiffer 1995b), has enjoyedsome suc-
cess (contra Dunnell 1992a, 1992b).
Behavioralists, however, cannot supply off-the-
shelf answers to explanatory questions. Rather,we have a framework hat,when realizedthroughvaried research strategies-e.g., experimental
archaeology, thnoarchaeology, rehistory,histor-
ical archaeology, and history-can contribute,
principle by principle, to building a new behav-
ioral science (Walkeret al. 1995).
Evolutionary Archaeology
Evolutionaryarchaeologyhas its proximateroots
in the writings of Robert C. Dunnell, especiallyhis 1980 paper in Advances in ArchaeologicalMethod and Theory (see also Dunnell 1978a,
1982, 1989). Beginningin the mid-1980s, contri-
butionsto the literatureof evolutionaryarchaeol-
ogy have come frommany investigators, ome of
whom, especially in the context of case studies,areelaboratingandbroadening heprogram e.g.,
the papers n Teltser1995a).Althoughthe discus-sions below treat mostly Dunnell's seminal for-
mulation of evolutionary archaeology, recent
contributions-some seemingly more behav-
ioral-are also consulted.
The evolutionaryprogramrests on the claim
that Darwiniantheory has not been properlyor
widely applied to culturalphenomena(Dunnell
1980).This contention,however,does not sit well
with the processualarchaeologistswho also con-
sider themselvesto be evolutionistsorregard heir
work as evolutionary for examples of the latter,see Johnsonand Earle 1987; Sanderset al. 1979;
Spencer 1990). Similarly, archaeologistswhose
research s informedbybehavioral cology or evo-
lutionaryecology also wearthe Darwinianmantle
(e.g., Bettinger 1991; O'Connell and Hawkes
1981, 1984; Simms 1987). Perhapsappreciatingthattheirprogram s but one of several maintain-
ing an evolutionarystance,proponentsof evolu-
tionaryarchaeologyhavetakenrecentlyto callingthemselves "selectionists" (e.g., Graves and
Ladefoged 1995:160; Jones et al. 1995:16;Leonard and Reed 1993:648; Neff 1992:179,
1993:27;O'Brien and Holland1990:45).Theterm
"selectionist"also identifies the process-naturalselection-that these latterarchaeologistsbelieve
to bemost important or explaining evolutionary
change.In thispaper,selectionistandevolutionist
are used interchangeably.Evolutionfor the selectionistis the differential
persistenceof discretevariants Dunnell1980:38).
Commonly,variantsarealternative arietiesof an
artifact class that are winnowed over time byselection processes. Selectionists stress that arti-
fact variants can affect the biological fitness of
humanorganisms; rtifactshavingsuch effects are
"functional," hereasartifactsneutralwithrespect
to fitness are "stylistic"(Dunnell 1978a, 1980).However,many selectionist studies focus on the
"replicative uccess"of artifacttypes rather han
on the reproductive success of individuals
(Leonard and Jones 1987:214; O'Brien and
Holland 1990; but see Neff 1992:156).The con-
cept of extended phenotype (Dawkins 1982),which readily encompasseshuman activities and
artifacts(Jones et al. 1995; Neff 1992; O'Brien
and Holland 1995b;O'Brienet al. 1994), permitsselectionists to integrate evolutionary concerns
with the reality that the archaeologicalrecordismainlyartifacts,"the hardpartsof the behavioral
segmentof phenotypes" Dunnell 1989:44).
Explanationconsists in showing how specificfactors of the selective environment-usually the
natural environment-were responsible for the
differential persistence of competing variants
(Leonardand Reed 1993:650). The selectionist,
then, strives to account for the unique contin-
gency-bound successes and failures of artifact
classes (and other traits of the extended human
phenotype) in the history of a locality or region(Dunnell 1980:39;Neff 1993:28).
A distinction of signal importance is that
betweenprocessesof variety-generation nd vari-
ety-selection (Dunnell 1980:39), evolutionists
emphasize the latter, showing little interest in
investigating he sourcesof new variants.
Selectionists akepainsto distinguish heirpro-
gram from others in archaeology hat are seem-
ingly evolutionary.For example,neoevolutionary
stagemodels,whichposittransformationsf entire
societies from tribe to chiefdom or chiefdom tostate,are dismissedas Spencerianor Lamarckian,
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RELATIONSBETWEEN BEHAVIORALAND EVOLUTIONARYARCHAEOLOGIES
not Darwinian e.g., Dunnell 1980:40). Similarly,the adaptive-systemsmodels built by processual-ists andsometimesby behavioralists re also heav-
ilycriticizedas
beingnon-Darwinian ecause
theyconflate variety-generationand variety-selection
processes(e.g., LeonardandJones1987:200-201).These "adaptationist"cenariosassume that sys-tems change as a result of people intentionally
solving problems,steeringtheir behavior n waysthat are "adaptive," uch as intensifying subsis-
tencein response o demographic renvironmental
stress.Inrecentcase studies,however, ome osten-
sibly selectionistmodels closely resembleadapta-tionistscenarios e.g., GravesandLadefoged1995;
Leonard 1989; Leonardand Reed 1993). Whenprocessualistsand behavioralistsuse these latter
case studies to obtaina quickpeek intothe evolu-
tionaryprogram, hey areaptto becomeconfused,
wonderingwhat is different or distinctive about
selectionism.
In Search of Common Ground
Because neither evolutionary archaeology nor
behavioral archaeology is a homogeneous pro-
gram, the search for common ground between
them is an exercise fraught with peril.Practitionersof each will doubtless take excep-tion to some statements enumerated n this sec-
tion. Nonetheless,the identificationof widely-ifnot universally-shared assumptions,tenets, and
principles establishes a startingpoint for further
discussions. The following 11 statementsrepre-sent a firstapproximation f the commonground.
1. That both programs espouse a scientific
epistemology is an uncontroversial laim: we are
scientistsstriving o explain empiricalphenomena
by explicitly employing well warranted heoriesand laws. Because scientific activity involves not
only the explicit use of theoriesand laws but also
their origination and evaluation, behavioralists
have been energetic in establishingnew princi-
ples; selectionists, however,have been disinclined
thus far to ask or answer nomothetic questions
(see discussionsbelow).2. Scientists arealso permitted o pose histori-
cal questions. Both programsattach importanceto these questions and emphasize that scientific
methodsare appropriateor evaluatingour tenta-tive answers-i.e., models andhypotheses.
3. In the explanationof variationand change,culture is not treated as a causal agent (Braun
1991:427; O'Brien and Holland 1992:37;
Ramenofsky1995:137;Schiffer 1995a;Walkeret
al. 1995:2-4). The adjective "cultural"merelymeans learned, as in cultural transmission;
human,as in culturalphenomena;or societal, as
in cross-culturalregularity.Selectionists should
take no exception to this statement, but some
behavioralistsmightbe rather eluctant ojettison
anthropology'smost sacred cow.
4. The phenomenologicalworld of interest is
variationand change in human behavioror soci-
eties. Despite Dunnell's (1980:48) occasional
acknowledgment hat "humanbehavior" s "theprincipalsubjectmatter," ome selectionists maycontestthis tenet,which is expressed n systemic-context terms, because they believe that their
realm is the archaeological record (Teltser
1995b:3). Operatinganalyticallyin the systemic
context, however,requiresbehavioralreconstruc-
tion or inference,which in the abstract s anath-
ema to many selectionists (e.g., Dunnell 1978a,
1978b, 1989, 1992a, 1992b).Inpractice,however,selectionistsmake behavioral nferencesand seek
to explainchangein systemic-contextphenomena(see "On Behavioral Inference"below). As this
becomes generally appreciated, electionistsmay
acceptvariationandchangein humanbehavioror
societies as the focus of inquiry.5. Evolutionarychange is regardedas the dif-
ferential persistence of discrete variants.
Selectionists insist that all change be treatedin
this way, because any other move forsakes a
Darwinianperspective Dunnell 1980). Doubtless
influenced by selectionists, some behavioralists
have come to appreciate the value of treatingchange as the differentialpersistenceof discrete
variants(e.g., Schiffer 1991; Schiffer and Skibo
1987, 1997; Schiffer et al. 1994); yet, the possi-
bility is kept open that other kinds of changealso
occur-perhaps even some that are transforma-
tion-like.
6. To explain evolutionarychange,the investi-
gatorsituatesthe competitionbetween alternative
variantswithin a specific selective environment,
showinghow the replication(or reproduction)of
each kind of variantwas favoredordisadvantagedby virtueof its propertiesandperformancechar-
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AMERICANANTIQUITY
acteristics(e.g., Maxwell 1995;Neff 1992, 1993;O'Brien et al. 1994). Inaccounting ordifferential
persistence in these terms, specific historical
explanationsoffered
byselectionists and behav-
ioralists converge-at least structurally-to a
considerableextent(compare, orexample,Braun
1983; O'Brien et al. 1994; Schiffer and Skibo
1987), as can data requirements(O'Brien and
Holland 1995b).7. Behaviorand artifactsarepartof the human
phenotype. So long as behavior is defined as
activities (specific matter-energy interactions
between people, artifacts, etc.), this statement
should be acceptable o mostpractitionersn both
programs(compare O'Brien and Holland 1995with Walkeret al. 1995).8. Artifacts play diverse roles in activities,
involving performance-based interactions of
many kinds (Braun 1995; Nielsen 1995; Schiffer
and Skibo 1997). This statement s the stock and
tradeof the behavioralistbutshould occasion few
objectionsfrom selectionists.
9. In comparisonwith genetic transmissionof
variation,cultural ransmission nvolves different
processes andmechanisms,andtheirunderstand-
ing may requirenew laws and theories (Dunnell1978a:198, 200). Tobehavioralists, his statement
is self-evident,but selectionists have been slow to
follow up its implicationswith appropriate omo-
thetic research.
10. The life-history framework s useful for
sorting out some causes of variation. In behav-
ioral archaeology,studying the life histories of
artifacts,people, and behavioralcomponents is
fundamental Rathjeand Schiffer 1982; Schiffer
1992), and new applications appear frequently
(e.g., Schiffer and Skibo 1997; Walker 1995).Implicitlyselectionistsemploythis frameworkn
their recognition,for example, that lithic blanks,
preforms,and bifaces were not competitivevari-
ants but stood in ontogenetic (developmental)relations to one another.There is also interestin
trackingthe life histories of phenotypic features
(O'Brien and Holland 1992:52). Whetherselec-
tionists are willing to extend the life-historyframework to other classes of variants (e.g.,behavioralcomponents)remainsto be seen.
11. It is important o distinguishbetweenvari-ety-generation and variety-selection processes.This tenet is widely championedby selectionists
(e.g., Dunnell 1989:39;Teltser1995b:6)and alsoseems compatible with behavioral archaeology.Behavioralistsmight add that explanations for
variety-generationnd
variety-selectionprocessesare apt to requiredifferentbodies of theory (forfurther discussion, see "Seeking Synergies"below).
Incompatibilities
Although hecommongroundbetween evolution-
ary and behavioralarchaeologiesmay be appre-ciable, there are also some formidable
incompatibilities. Surprisingly, the selectionist
tenets thatcannotbe assimilatedby behavioralists
have nothing to do with evolutionary heory perse. Indeed,a case can be made that these selec-
tionistpositionsarealso at odds withmodernevo-
lutionarybiology.Theargumentdevelopedin this
section is simple: the parts of selectionism that
behavioralists ind most unpalatableare without
foundation, and, moreover,these ideas actuallyundermine efforts to establish an evolutionary
archaeology.
Theory and Model Building in Science
From a behavioral perspective, it appears thatselectionistshave unusualviews abouttheoryand
model building. For example, according to
Dunnell(1989:36), one grand heorygeneratesall
of a field'shypothesesand links all of its explana-tions (Dunnell 1982:5). Apparently, hen, evolu-
tionary theory alone can solve archaeology's
myriad explanatory problems. Although a few
fields do have grandtheories,such as Darwinian
evolution in biology and general relativity in
physics, these theories are but a tiny part of the
nomotheticproductsof those sciences-the partmost visible to people on the outside. On the
inside, as textbooksandjournal articles demon-
strate,are countless othertheories andexperimen-tal laws (sensu Nagel 1961; see also Salmon
1982), many-if not most-exhibiting indepen-dence from the grand theory. Even in biology,
explanations or mitosis and DNA replicationare
not deducible from evolutionarytheory, and in
physics general relativity cannot explainthermionic emission or the effects of doping on
semiconductors. Each of these phenomena ismade intelligible by process-specific principles.The actualstructure f theory n anyscience, then,
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RELATIONS BETWEEN BEHAVIORALAND EVOLUTIONARYARCHAEOLOGIES
is a multitudeof principles-ranging fromsimpleto complex, concrete to abstract,and narrowto
broad-that oftendeal with unrelatedphenomena.
(Onthe structure of
theoryin
archaeology,see
Schiffer1988.)Anothercurious view is thatlaws andtheories
are true by definition. Dunnell (1982:16) arguesthat
Laws, or theoretical laws, are rational,ideational onstructshatultimately rededuc-tions ... fromprimitivedefinitions.Theyare
always rueby virtueof theirconstructionndarenotcontingency ound.
The example he provides, d = vt (distance
equalsvelocity times time),does conformto thesecriteriabecause, in fact, it is not a scientific law
or theory at all, but a mathematical aw (on the
distinction, see Salmon 1982). The position that
theory is immune to empirical falsification
(Dunnell 1982:16) manifestly contradictsscien-
tific practice;as Sober(1984:82) notes, "theoret-
ical claims ought to be testable." The most
abstractand general theories, of course, may be
difficult to test--even today,Einstein'stheory of
generalrelativity s still undergoingevaluation-
yet they are potentially testable (Nagel 1961).Finally,I note thatthe conceptof"true by defini-tion"is itself problematic e.g., Sober 1984:62).
In view of the contentionthattheories aredef-
initionally true, it is surprisingthat theories arealso said to have a substantialempiricalcontent.
According to Dunnell (1989:44), a discipline'sgrand heorymust"generate ts own data"and theunits specified in the theory must be "directlymeasurable in the phenomenological world"
(Dunnell 1982:7, 1994:34). A view more gener-
ally held in science is that the entities, mecha-nisms, or processes postulatedby a theory haveno immediateempiricalcontent,fortheyare often
unobservable.To operationalizeor test a theory,one employs appropriateunits and instrumentsfor measuring the variables that it implicates.These instruments(and the rules of correspon-dence that link them to the theory) involve stillother laws and theories. For example, in testingthe kinetic theoryof gases, which involves invisi-ble entities called molecules, one has to measure
a gas's temperature.Temperaturecan be mea-sured,for example, with a mercurythermometeror infraredthermometry;n eithercase the instru-
ment'soperation s based on principlesother than
the kinetic theory. In addition, from the kinetic
theory one can deduce neithermercury'scoeffi-
cient of thermalexpansion
nor agas's
infrared
emission spectrum. n short,scientific theoriesdonot articulate immediately with the empiricalworld(Sober 1984:73);interposedbetween theo-
ries andobservationsare rulesof correspondence,lower-levelprinciples,andmeasuring nstruments
that are based on still other theories and laws
(Nagel 1961;Tschauner1996).Failure to appreciatethe complex, principle-
rich apparatus hat links theories to observations
can lead to unhelpfuladvice on building archae-
ological theory and models. To wit, Dunnell(1980:88) asserts that a theory's variables "can-
not be defined in behavioralterms."Going fur-
ther he claims, "If archaeologists are going to
employ evolutionarytheory,they must rewrite itin terms of variables that are empirical in the
[archaeological] record" (Dunnell 1980:88). Ifthis recipe were followed literally,then a theorywould be precluded from implicating mecha-nisms andprocesses, which aredecidedlybehav-
ioral phenomena unobservable in the static
archaeological record. At best, archaeologistswould be reduced to crafting relationshipsbetweenmeasurementson sherds,chips of stone,and so on-scarcely the stuff of theory (but see
O'Brien and Holland 1992); at worst,archaeolo-
gists would be operatingin the murkyworld of
merged systemic andarchaeologicalcontexts(onthenecessity of keepingthese contextsconceptu-ally and analytically distinct, see Reid 1985,
1995). In the final analysis, evolutionarytheoryitself cannot be rewritten n archaeological-con-
text terms:sherdswere not partof anyone'sphe-notype (unless reused), yet a cooking pot-asystemic-context entity operationalizedthroughbehavioral nference-was.
The selectionist prohibition against framingmodels andtheories in behavioral erms is out of
step with practice in modern evolutionarybiol-
ogy. In the latterdiscipline, theories and models
incorporatebehavioralvariableson a wide rangeof systemic phenomena, such as predator-preyinteractions,mating patterns,foraging behavior,
and maintenanceof territories,none of which isempirical in the paleontological and paleoenvi-ronmental ecords.Itcouldnotbe otherwise;after
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all, "behaviors at once causeandconsequenceof
evolution" Plotkin 1988:8).In accordwith evolutionarybiologists, and in
contrast o the selectionistposition,
behavioralists
maintain that theories, models, and explana-tions-even those offeredby selectionists-must
be framed n behavioral erms.Ironically, upportfor this claim can be found in Dunnell's (1989)own effort to build an evolutionarymodel. In that
paperhe seeks to explainthe selectionfor "waste"
behavior, specifically the Woodland mortuarycults of the easternUnited Statesthat left behind
obtrusiveburialmounds. The variablesand para-meters of the model include "mean carrying
capacity,""no change or difference in subsis-tence," "populations n equilibriumat different
sizes," "shortfalls in productivity,""intensifica-
tion" of subsistence, "waste-typebehavior,"and
"mortuary ult"(Dunnell1989:48).Tomy knowl-
edge, surveyarchaeologistsnever encountera car-
rying capacity or a waste-typebehavior,nor do
excavators uncover a productivityshortfall or a
mortuarycult. In every instance,these variables
and parametersare more-or-lessbehavioral(i.e.,
systemiccontext),not-as Dunnell(1980:88)pre-
scribes-written interms"thatareempirical n therecord."Other selectionist models invoke vari-
ables and parameters hat are equally systemic
(e.g., GravesandLadefoged1995;Leonard1989;
Leonard and Reed 1993; O'Brien et al. 1994).
Despiterhetoric o the contrary, electionistsbuild
models almostas behavioralas behavioralists.
Becausetheoriesandmodels are formulated n
behavioralterms, the investigator s obligatedto
forge links, through measurement,to empiricalunits in the archaeologicalrecord.This linkage
process is called inference, and it brings us to asecond incompatibility.
On Behavioral Inference
Many selectionists deny the need for behavioral
inferenceanddenigrateas unscientificthe activi-
ties of archaeologistswho reconstructthe past.These efforts are labeled "reconstructionism,"
which Dunnell (1978a:194) elevates to the status
of a paradigm,attributing ts full flowering to
processual and behavioral archaeologies.
According to Dunnell (1978a:195), "behavioralreconstructions.. cannotbe the foundationof an
approach hatprofesses to be both scientific and
evolutionary."Behavioral reconstruction is not
science (Dunnell 1980:78, 1982:20, 1989:43,
1992a:87), but a purveyor of "just-so stories"
(Dunnell 1982:20)that should be abandoned
(Dunnell 1989:45).The decisive dismissal of inference contradicts
many thoughtfulworks in archaeologicalepiste-
mology (e.g., Fritz 1972; Patrik 1985; Salmon
1982; Schiffer 1976; Sullivan 1978; Wylie 1985)and also ignores the countless, well-established
inferences that have greatlyenhancedthe under-
standing of past societies worldwide. What is
more, modern evolutionary biology could not
exist without paleoenvironmentaland paleoeco-
logical reconstruction,not to mention a host ofinferencesaboutthe behaviorof particular axa.
Because selectionist models are actually
expressed in behavioralterms, they do requireinference (see also Wylie 1995:207-208).Evidence that supportsthis latter claim can be
foundin Dunnell's 1989) ownexplanatory ketch
dealing with "waste" behavior. When treating
specifics of the Woodlandcase, he is forced to
operationalize he model by means of behavioral
inferences. Dunnell does not himself construct
these inferences from archaeological evidence,but relies mainlyon reconstructionsprofferedbyotherinvestigators,as in "thenonagriculturalta-
tus of the Woodlandassociatedwith the mortuarycult" (1989:49). Sometimes, without any evi-
dence or argument,he makes assertions about
pastbehavior,such as that the mortuary ult "fre-
quently entails the laborious construction of
earthenmoundsandthemanufacture nddisposalof vast quantitiesof goods, many of which are
costly imports" (1989:48). Dunnell's study of
waste is indicative:every selectionist model canbe shownto rest, implicitlyor explicitly,on a net-
work of behavioral inferences (for other exam-
ples, see Graves and Ladefoged 1995; Leonard
1989; Leonard and Reed 1993; O'Brien and
Holland1992;O'Brienet al. 1994).
Despitethe selectionists'anti-reconstructionist
rhetoric, evaluation of their models patently
requiresbehavioral nference,and in this respect
evolutionary archaeology does not differ from
behavioral,processual,or postprocessualarchae-
ologies (on the latter'sdependenceon behavioralinference, see Duke [1995], Saitta [1992], and
Tschauner [1996])-or evolutionary biology
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RELATIONS ETWEEN EHAVIORALND EVOLUTIONARYRCHAEOLOGIES
(e.g., Thomason 1995). In view of the contradic-
tion between their pronouncementsand practiceon inference (Watsonet al. 1984:255-256), evo-
lutionaryarchaeologistscannotcrediblymaintainany longer that reconstruction s defective and
unscientific. Indeed, until selectionists take
archaeological inference seriously by treating it
explicitly and adoptingmodernmethodology, he
goals of theirprogramwould appear o be out of
reach. Fortunately, n several recent selectionist
papers,there is modest movementtowardexplic-
itly countenancing behavioral inference (e.g.,Jones et al. 1995; O'Brien and Holland 1995b;Teltser1995b).
Closely relatedto the claims that theoriesandmodels should not be built in behavioralterms
and that reconstructionof past behavior is to be
avoided is the selectionist position on functional
principlesand actualisticstudies,a thirdpoint of
incompatibility.
Functional Principles and Actualist Studies
Selectionists downplay the importanceof func-
tional principles n specific explanationsand dis-
regard he actualistic sources of these principles.
Dunnell notes thatecology and evolution are dis-tinct bodies of theory,the former concernedwith
functionalrelationshipsandmechanism, he latter
with historical explanations (Dunnell 1980:36;
1982:12). Both bodies of theory, he does grant,"arecommonly intermingled n particularexpla-nations"(Dunnell 1980:36, cf. 39). Indeed,spe-cific evolutionary explanations in biology are
utterly dependent on functional and behavioral
principles supplied by actualisticstudies, includ-
ing experimentsandethology(Endler1986;Krebs
andDavies 1981:28-29). Moreover,withoutprin-ciples producedby functionalanatomy,ethology,andbehavioral cology,modernevolutionarybiol-
ogy would be explanatorily impotent. A close
examinationof selectioniststudies alsorevealsuse
of manyfunctionaland behavioralprinciples,and
some are even explicit (e.g., Graves and
Ladefoged 1995). Given that the constructionof
selectionistexplanationsrequiressuch principles,it is troublesome hat nowherein the selectionist
literature anone find a discussion on theplace of
the archaeologicalequivalentof behavioralecol-ogy with its actualistic, nomothetic emphasis.When Dunnelldoes mentionthenecessityof func-
tional principles,he is alludingto laws of chem-
istry and physics, not behavioral laws built by
archaeologists e.g., Dunnell 1992b).Onereasonforthe reluctance f evolutionists o
call attention o functionaland behavioralprinci-
ples maystem froma defectiveargumentheyraise
againstreconstruction.t is asserted hatsuchprin-
ciples presupposethat "behaviorcannot change"
(Dunnell 1989:44; cf. Dunnell 1992a:81,
1992b:213; O'Brien and Holland 1995b; Neff
1992). Because behavior s "continuously hang-
ing," laws of human behavior "are structurally
impossible"(Dunnell 1992b:213). Since behav-
ioralists above all appreciatethat behaviors do
change, the ability to establishgeneral principlesmust rest on a basis other han thebelief in behav-
ioral stasis.
In their own version of uniformitarianism,behavioralists argue that certain behavioral
processes-such as boiling food in a ceramicves-
sel over an open fire or disposal of secondaryrefuse in cities-although not universal,exhibit
some regularitieswhenever and wherever theyoccur (Schiffer 1975c, 1978, 1996; Skibo
1992:25-28;Walker t al. 1995).The identification
of a behavioralprocessenablesthe investigatoroseek or create the "behavioralcontexts"(sensuWalkeret al. 1995:4) where nomotheticresearch
maylead to the recognitionof regularitiessuchas
correlatesandc-transforms).Boundaryconditions
of behavioralprocesses enumeratethe identical
characteristicsmong seeminglydissimilar-often
culturally diverse-empirical phenomena. For
example,the McKellarprinciple specifies that in
frequentlymaintainedactivity areas, only small
artifacts remain behind as primary refuse
(McKellar 1983; Schiffer 1976:188-189,1987:62-63). The behavioralprocess of activity-area maintenance s boundedby the term "in fre-
quentlymaintained ctivityareas." ntheseactivityareas, and only in these activity areas, does this
behavioral regularity hold. It holds, however,
despitetemporaland spatialdifferences n artifact
types, in kinds of activities,and in the natureof
activityareas.(The thresholdsize of residualpri-
mary refuse is expected to vary with situational
factors such as the maintenance technology
employed, permeabilityof the substrate,and thenatureof the refuse[Schiffer1976:189,1987:63].)The conceptsof behavioralprocessandboundary
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AMERICANANTIQUITY
conditionscanhelpus to resolvetheapparent ara-dox between the constancyof behavioral egulari-ties (andtheprinciples hatdescribe hem)and the
inconstancyof
specificbehaviors
(cf.Hull
1988:463).It should now be clear why the theories and
experimentalaws yielded by nomotheticresearch
in actualisticcontexts areseldom,if ever,"univer-
sal": behavioralprocesses can have very limited
temporalandspatialdistributions. hus,principles
describingthese processes often exhibit a highlycircumscribedgenerality.But this is no cause for
concernsincethe behavioralists content o devise
and employ principles having quite confining
boundaryconditions-as long as they are usefulfor answeringresearchquestions.To achieve anything like the richly textured,
historically contingent explanations crafted by
evolutionarybiologists, selectionistswill need to
employcountlessfunctionalandbehavioralprinci-
ples (see Sober 1984).What is more,to createthe
new principles that an evolutionaryarchaeology
requires,selectionistswill have to ask their own
nomotheticquestions n makingfulluse of the dis-
cipline'sactualistic esearch trategies e.g., exper-
imental archaeologyand ethnoarchaeology-seeSchiffer1978;Schifferet al. 1994;Skibo 1992).
In the very recent selectionist literature, ome
investigatorshave begun to find roles for experi-mental and ethnoarchaeologicalfindings (e.g.,Dunnell 1995:42; Dunnell and Feathers 1991;
Dunnell et al. 1994; Maxwell 1995; Neff
1992:150; O'Brien and Holland 1990:60,
1995:184;O'Brienet al. 1994). Moreover, n rec-
ognizing thatperformancecharacteristics f arti-
fact types affect their replicative success in
particular electiveenvironments, few selection-ists themselvesarebeginningto carryout experi-ments (e.g., Dunnell and Feathers1991; O'Brien
et al. 1994). Perhapsone day soon selectionist
practicewill includeeven ethnoarchaeology.
Discussion
As originally formulated,the evolutionary pro-
gram containsa numberof tenets that contradict
importantparts of behavioral (and processual)
archaeologies.Try as I might, however,I fail to
appreciatewhy anyof these ideas is necessaryforan evolutionary archaeology. Nothing in
Darwinian heory perse norin modernevolution-
arybiology precludes framing heories and mod-
els in behavioralterms, prohibitsmaking infer-
ences aboutthe past, or rules out the conduct of
actualistic,nomothetic studies. These views in
fact distance selectionism from productiveresearch strategies, practiced by behavioralists
and evolutionary biologists alike, that could
improvethe evolutionaryprogram.Moreover,by
maintaining enets that behavioralistsandproces-sualists regard as clearly wrong, selectionists
alienatethe very archaeologistswho ought to be
most receptive to their insights on evolution.
Selectionistsmay be well advised to cast off the
conceptualbaggagethathas so burdened he pro-
gram(see also Wylie 1995).
Seeking Synergies
Building on the common groundbetween evolu-
tionaryand behavioralarchaeologies,andexploit-
ing ideas from both programs,I now attemptto
indicate,with examples,how the studyof behav-
ioral(orevolutionary) hangemightbe enhanced.
Clarifying Selection Processes
In using the term "naturalselection," Darwin
called attentionto a kind of selection differentfromthatpracticed, orexample,by plantand ani-
mal breeders. In natural selection, competing
organisms are winnowed by environmental ac-
tors, such as predatorsandtemperature xtremes.
Today he term"cultural election" s in vogue to
designate processes internalto a humanpopula-tion (e.g., Durham 1991:165), whereas natural
selection is retained for selective agents in the
naturalenvironment.Evolutionaryarchaeologistshavediscussedthenecessityof a conceptlike cul-
turalselection,butno consensushas emerged forvarious viewpoints, see Braun 1995:132-133;
Dunnell 1980:53, 63, 1989:41;LeonardandJones
1987:211; O'Brien and Holland 1992:45, 48,
1995:178;Rindos 1984, 1989).In considering cultural selection, Dunnell
evinces skepticismwhile asking,
Is therea point n human volutionaryistoryat which electiondoesbecomeaninternalul-turalmatterndependentf environmentalon-straint ndchangebecomes ransformational?thinknot,ormoreprecisely, think t wouldbe
prematureo assume o [Dunnell1980:65].
Internalselection is not a process Dunnell is
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RELATIONS ETWEEN EHAVIORALND EVOLUTIONARYRCHAEOLOGIES
eager to embracebecause it implies to him that
change is transformational, o longer the differ-
ential persistence of discrete variants.However,
Dunnell furnishes no argument showing thatinternalselectionmust be transformational; sug-
gest thatit need not be.
In demonstrating that internal selection is
compatiblewith a Darwinianview of change,one
first needsappropriatewaysto conceptualizeboth
the entities being selected and the selection
process. Drawing inspirationfrom Hull's (1988)
expansiveview of selection, I define a populationas any collection of potentially competing vari-
ants. The differential persistence of variants is
governed by the population'sselective environ-ment,which exerts selective pressures.Clearly, f
a populationis internal to a human society, the
selective environmentmay also be internal. For
example, the population of all condoms beingoffered for sale in the United States today has a
selective environment hat includes condom-pur-
chasing activities-an environment internal to
U.S. society. In contrast,a population'sselective
environmentmayconsistmainlyof external,non-
culturalprocesses. An example is a community's
populationof wild-animalprocurement ctivities,which aresubjectto selection, forexample,by the
abundance and accessibility of game. One can
even conceive of populationsthat undergoboth
internaland externalselectivepressures,such as a
neolithic village's agricultural ctivities.
None of these processes need be called "cul-
tural" election or"natural"election.Thisdistinc-
tion perhapshad utility in the nineteenthcentury,but it is not useful today in the study of cultural
phenomena. Of transcendent mportance is the
identificationof populations, onsistingof discretevariants,and the specific selective pressuresto
which such populationsare subject. Selection is
selection,regardlessof the culturalor noncultural
character f environmental gentsand mechanisms
(Hull 1988; O'Brien and Holland 1990). More
importantly,volutionremains he differential er-sistence of discretevariants;here s no theoretical
need to embrace ransformationalhange.In archaeological cases, however, we will
encounter instances of transformation-like
change.The bulk of these may result from onto-geneticprocesses,as in lithicreductionsequences
(Dibble 1995; Goodyear 1974), "devolutionary
cycles" of structures David 1971), sequences of
ceramicreuse (Deal and Hagstrum1995), stagesof householddevelopment(Schiffer et al. 1981),and
growth-relatedalterations in
communityorganization Wills and Leonard1994). The pos-sible occurrenceof non-ontogenetictransforma-
tions of one variant nto another s, for now,best
left an open question.
Appropriate Units and Scales of Selection
A questionfollowingimmediately rom theprevi-ous discussion is, Which populationsof variants
shouldbe the foci of evolutionary tudy?In selec-
tionistarchaeology, his question s framedas one
of scale. Although Dunnell (1980:53) notes thatselectiongoes on "ata varietyof differentscales,"he does not discuss scales otherthan those of the
individualorganismand the culturalsystem as a
whole;he also doubts hat natural electioncan be
effective abovethe individualorganism 1980:55)until "the appearance of complex society"
(1980:66; see also Wenke 1981). In short, the
scale problem remains essentially unresolved
(Dunnell 1989:39, 41, 1995). Anotherrenderingof the questionis, What are the appropriate nits
of selection (Dunnell 1995; Teltser1995b)?Thisquestion,too, lacks definitive answers atpresent,even in evolutionary biology (Hull 1988; Lloyd
1988; Sober 1984; Williams 1992). It is clear,
however, that modern evolutionary biologistsembraceandstudy evolutionary hangein diverse
units at manyscales (e.g., Dawkins 1982:113).As in evolutionary biology, one can find in
behavioral archaeology the employment of a
bewildering array of units along with analysesconducted at countless scales. This seemingly
undisciplined approachreflects the recognitionthat the evolution of culturalphenomenaoccurs
simultaneouslyata greatmanyscales.Thiscomes
aboutbecause (1) there is a vastdiversity n kinds
of units, (2) units occur in multiple hierarchies,
(3) units are interrelated n complex ways both
within andbetweenhierarchies,and (4) there are
highlyvariedselectionprocesses, at manyscales,thataffect differentkinds of unitsdifferentially.
Althoughthe units employedby behavioralists
were not adopted with evolutionary questions
explicitly in mind, they can nonetheless be con-ceived as generalkinds of systemic populations,
particular xamplesof which exhibitdiscretevari-
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AMERICAN ANTIQUITY
ation;thus, they might be useful in evolutionarystudies. ProvisionallyI suggest that the generalunits of behavioralevolution-i.e., the scales at
which selectiontakesplace-are
artifacts,activi-
ties, behavioralprocesses,andbehavioralcompo-nents. Each of these units,of course,is actuallya
hierarchyof morespecific units;the latterneed to
be identified in particularresearch contexts. For
presentpurposes,I focus on the artifact includingits constituentpartsand assemblies),activity,and
severaltypes of behavioral omponent.Parts are the separatelyfabricatedpieces or
substancesof an artifact; xamples nclude a chert
arrowpointand a personalcomputer'sPC)power
transformer.The assembly is a set of parts thatfunctionstogetherin an artifact.An arrow and a
PC's power supply are examples. Assembly is a
very flexibleconceptthat can be used to designatethe many levels lying between discretepartsand
artifacts foranotherapproach o subdividingarti-
facts and linking the latter into systems, see
Oswalt 1976).The artifact s the set of integratedassemblies that functionstogetherin an activity;
examples are a bow-and-arrow and a PC.
Activities areexemplified by huntingwith a bow-
and-arrow ndwritingwitha PC'swordprocessor.Behavioralcomponents,the "tangibleunits of
a society's social organization"Schiffer 1992:4),are entities thatcarryout recurrent ets of activi-
ties in patternedlocations (Rathje and Schiffer
1982). There are two main kinds of behavioral
components.The first is residentiallybased, and
is defined by ever-largeraggregates of people;from least to most inclusivearehouseholds,com-
munities, regional systems, and empires (Rathjeand Schiffer 1982; Schiffer 1992:4-6). A second
type of behavioralcomponent,which has no resi-dential basis, is the task group. In task groups,such as workparties,religiouscongregations,and
corporations,people come together to performactivities such as hunting or assembling PCs
(Schiffer 1992:6);they may or maynot have ded-
icatedactivityareas andfacilities.
At eachscale (orfor eachtypeof unit),one can
define populationsof discretevariants.For exam-
ple, the populationof automobilesbeing used in
the United States today contains numerousvari-
ants on the basis of manufacturer,body style,engine size, type of transmission, uxury appoint-
ments, etc. Similarly,among the population of
U.S. households are variants based on wealth,richness of artifactinventory,generationalcom-
position, size of dwelling, degree of residential
mobility,and so forth. One can also define sub-
populationsof behavioralcomponents,such as all
corporations hat manufacture adios, and delin-
eate variants(e.g., radio-makingcompanies dif-
fering in size, output, variety of models
manufactured).
Having specified provisionalscales and units
for evolutionarystudy,I next turn to the problemof identifying the selective environment or any
particularunit. Because behavioralistshave done
much of theirworkat the scale of artifacts,espe-
cially on artifact-activity elations,the followingdiscussionis most applicableat thatscale.
The immediate selective context can be
defined as all activities in the life history of an
artifact ype; that is, the activities thattakeplace
during processes of procurement,manufacture,
transport,distribution, torage,use, maintenance,
reuse, disposal, etc. These activities exert selec-
tive pressures, and the result is the differential
persistence of variants (O'Brien et al. 1994;Schiffer and Skibo 1997).The replicativesuccess
of a givenvariant s influencedby its activity-spe-cific-i.e., behaviorallyrelevant-properties and
performancecharacteristics.Selection pressuresin the immediateselectivecontext leadto artifacts
thatembodydesign compromisesof manykinds,as in trade-offsbetweenperformance haracteris-
tics pertainingto manufacture,use, and mainte-
nance processes (McGuire and Schiffer 1983;O'Brien and Holland 1990, 1992; O'Brien et al.
1994; Schifferand Skibo 1987) or even between
activities within a given process (Schiffer and
Skibo 1997). Compromises are necessitatedbecause, ordinarily,no single design can maxi-
mize an artifact'sentire set of activity-specific
performance haracteristics.An understanding f
the patterns n design compromisesrequiresone
to delve, sometimes deeply, into what can be
called the extended selective context. Activities,
agents, and mechanisms that make up the
extended selective context are those coupled,byflows of energy,artifacts,or people, to activities
in the immediate selective context (on such con-
nections, see Schiffer 1979, 1992). Examplesofimmediate and extended selective contexts are
furnishedbelow.
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RELATIONS ETWEEN EHAVIORALND EVOLUTIONARYRCHAEOLOGIES
Variety-GeneratingProcesses and Stimulated
Variation
The literature f selectionistarchaeology
slargelysilent aboutvariety-generating rocesses, perhaps
because Dunnell (1978a:197) in an early paper
proclaimed"that he specific originor inventionof
new elements becomes a trivialinquiry."Dunnell
(1978a:197) also asserted hat invention"is analo-
gous to mutation n biological systems;" hus,as a
"randomphenomenon"(Dunnell 1980:66), new
variants would be beyond prediction (Dunnell
1980:62).Construingvariety-generating rocessesin this mannerhas, I suggest, hampered he study
of behavioral volution.Like modern evolutionary biologists (e.g.,Nitecki 1990), archaeologists houldregardvaria-
tionand ts sourcesas subjectseminentlyworthyof
explanation.Variationn a populationat one pointintime is a consequenceof bothpriorselectionand
variety-generating rocesses (e.g., inventionand
borrowing).Study of the latter is clearly crucial,forthe creationof new variants n culturalpopula-tions occurs commonly and sometimes at highrates.Because selection operateson variation, he
state of variationat one point in time immediatelyconstrains he outcome of selection (cf. Dawkins
1982:42-46; Neff 1992:147). Thus, one cannot
explainevolutionary hange n specific cases with-
out documenting and accounting for large and
rapidchangesin the availablevariation.New vari-
ants can arise throughan expansionof inventiveactivities in existing behavioral components,through heproliferation f behavioral omponents
undertakingnventiveactivities,or both.
An argumentcan be made thatvariety-gener-
ating processes work in patternedways. Someprocesses, forexample,cause inventionsof a par-ticularkind to clustermarkedly n time andspace.Indeed,the historicaland archaeologicalrecordsfurnishevidence of ratherdramatic-and some-times predictable-increases in the conduct of
variety-generating activities (Hughes 1983;Schiffer 1993).
One hypothesisto account for some burstsof
variety-generation s that information(as matteror energy) coming from changed conditions in
selective contexts can stimulate an increase ininventiveactivitiesof behavioralcomponentsandcan foster the creationof new behavioralcompo-
nents. This process, which is illustrated n some
detail below, can be called stimulatedvariation
(compare to Neff's [1992:146] discussion of
"directedvariation"and Braun's[1991:431] con-
cept of "directed nnovation").Unlike "directed
mutation" Dawkins 1982:112) and"guidedvari-
ation"(Boyd and Richerson 1985:94-98), which
more than flirt with Lamarckianmechanisms of
change, the process of stimulatedvariation n no
way obviates selection; after all, every variant
producedduringan instanceof stimulatedvaria-
tion can be selectedagainst.Selection thusretains
its Darwinian role, but variety-generationbecomes central o evolutionary nquiry, he study
of its mechanismsandprocesses far fromtrivial.Theprocessof stimulatedvariation anhelp us
to reconcileadaptationist nd selectionistviews of
behavioral hange.In theadaptationistramework,a changingnatural nvironment r a growingpop-ulationexertsselectivepressures hatareperceivedas stresses or problemsby a cultural ystem'spar-
ticipants e.g., Hill 1977).Problem-solvingbehav-iors usually lead to an appropriate esponse,and
theresult s a new adaptation.As selectionistshave
pointedout, however, he adaptationistmodelpre-
sumes thatpeople enjoy a certainomniscienceinidentifyingsignificantproblemsandin forecastingthe future(e.g., Braun 1991:428, 1995:129;Neff
1992:146;see also Schiffer1979, 1992:Chapter).
Essentiallytransformational, daptationist xpla-nations conflate processes of variety-generationandvariety-selectione.g., Jonesetal. 1995:17-18;Rindos 1989:3).
An appreciationor stimulatedvariationallows
us to assignproblem-solvingtsproperrole in evo-
lution, that of producing new variants (Braun
1995:129;Rindos 1989:13-15). Variation reatedby this process (and certainlythere are others-
Basalla [1988]) is not directedby futureadaptiveneeds,but is shapedby contemporaneoushenom-ena intheselectiveenvironment,uchas anartifactthatdoes notreachbehaviorally ignificantperfor-mancelevels in an activityor an activitythat doesnot effectivelyplay its role in a behavioral ompo-nent. If stimulatedvariationhappensto furnish avariant hatbecomes fixed very rapidly, he entire
evolutionaryprocess may be so telescopedthat it
appears ransformational-when n fact it was not.Thetelescopingof evolutionaryprocessesis exac-
erbated,of course, by the low resolutionof most
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AMERICANANTIQUITY
archaeological hronologies,which makes it diffi-
cult to discernrapidexpansionsandcontractions f
variation.Whennotutterlyoverlooked, uch varia-
tion islikely
to be dismissed as mere noise that
complicatestypology-construction.Aware of this
problem,archaeologists houldnowdiligentlyseek
the fine-grainedbehavioralvariation,predictedbythe process of stimulatedvariation, hat our cul-
ture-historicalunits so relentlessly obscure (seealso Plog 1974).
At the present time, neitheradaptationistnor
selectionist explanations furnish adequateaccountsof transformation-likehangesin behav-
ior. In stressingthatproblem solving createsnew
adaptations, adaptationist explanations areincomplete and misleading because they glossover the false starts,partialsolutions,unintended
consequences, and dead-endsthatproblemsolv-
ing also begets. Equallyunsatisfactoryare selec-
tionist explanationsthat ignore large and rapidincreases in the variation availableto selection.
Perhapsthe process of stimulatedvariation can
contribute o buildinga fully generalevolutionary
theorythatassigns ample weight to both variety-
generationandvariety-selection.
Some Illustrations
To illustrate he concepts ust developed,I mainly
exploit my historical researchon radios, which
providessome well-controlleddata sets.
In studies of artifacts in capitalist industrial
societies, it is useful to examine variety-genera-tion and variety-selection in relation to three
processes that occur in the life historyof a prod-uct type: invention,commercialization, ndadop-tion (e.g., Schiffer 1991; Schiffer et al. 1994).
These processes are examinedhere in turn.In the inventionprocess, people createproto-
types of parts,assemblies,and artifacts n order o
demonstrate heir performancecharacteristics o
financiers, entrepreneurs,and manufacturers.A
major source of variation,invention is hardly a
randomprocess;rather,nventiveactivitiescan be
highly patternedby stimulatedvariation.These
strongeffects are often discernibleas a clusteringin time andspaceof similar nventions.For exam-
ple, just after the turn of the last century, nven-
tions proliferated n the partsand assembliesthatwent into radio transmitters nd receivers(Aitken1976, 1985). This was an instance of stimulated
variation hat derived from the immediate selec-
tive context of radios-particularly use activities.
Radios at thattime were used mainly for ship-to-shore
communication,which was
unreliable,however,over long distances. In response to the
blatantperformancedeficiencies of transmitters
and receivers, various task groups invested
resources n the inventionof partsandassemblies
that could raise the power of transmittersand
boost the sensitivity and selectivity of receivers.
This quickly expandingpopulationof inventions
served as the rawmaterial or selection.
Commercialization involves putting a part,
assembly,or artifact ntoproductionandbringing
it to market. This process has both variation-selectingandvariation-generating spects.Onthe
one hand, commercialization is undertakenbytask groups,such as financialandmanufacturing
corporations, hat rigorouslywinnow inventions,with only some reaching he marketplace.On the
otherhand,commercialization eneratesvariation
in the products available for selection by con-
sumer activities.
Stimulatedvariation can also play a role in
commercialization, as another radio example
demonstrates (Schiffer 1991). Figure 1 showschangesin the frequencyof U.S. companiesman-
ufacturingvacuum-tube adios for the home mar-
ket from 1920 to 1955. (It is assumed that
variation n this populationis directlyrelatedto
the frequency of different radios commercial-
ized.) The graph ndicatestwo dramatic ncreases
in variation n these behavioralcomponents:(1)in the early 1920s, beginningin 1922, and (2) in
the late 1940s, commencing n 1946after he war-
caused hiatusin the manufacture f home radios.
Both episodes, I suggest, came about throughstimulatedvariation.The first burstof variation n
the populationof radiocompaniesresultedfrom
the advent of commercial entertainmentbroad-
casting,in November1920,which some entrepre-neurs and manufacturersnterpretedas a portentof profits for firms that commercializedhome
radios. The second expansion of variation
stemmed romthemovement, nto radio(andtele-
vision) manufacture,of electronics companies
seeking new productsand new marketsafterthe
cessation of wartime production.With pent-updemand for consumer products after the priva-tions of the GreatDepressionand WorldWarII,
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RELATIONS ETWEEN EHAVIORALND EVOLUTIONARYRCHAEOLOGIES
200 -
0,
cn
0.
Eo
C-.
0
ctC.
o
>C)
cO
100 -
C)
a,
CD
A
0 I
1920 1930 1940 1950
Figure 1. Changes in the frequency of companies in the United States that manufactured vacuum-tube radios for the
home market, 1920-1955. Based on data in Grinder (1995), each company's period of radio production was estimated
from the time range of annual models listed.
manyfirms eagerly embracedhome-radiomanu-
facture;by 1949, however, the vast majorityof
newcomers had failed in the radio business.An even more dramatic nstanceof stimulated
variationduring commercializationcomes from
the history of U.S. portable radios (Schiffer
1991).Duringthe GreatDepression,battery-pow-ered sets that were designed to be easily carried
aroundwere rare n the marketplace. n 1939 and
1940, however,there was a phenomenal ump in
the variety of portable radio models offered to
consumers(Figure2). The cause of this burst of
commercialization activity was situated in the
extended selective context of radios and radiocompanies. To wit, with the intensification of
warfareactivities in Europe,radio makers saw an
opportunity o offer a type of productthat could
allow Americans to hear war news anywhere.It
should be noted that this episode of stimulated
variation involved the commercializationactivi-
ties of establishedradio-makingcompanies;new
firms were not founded to produce portableradios(see Figure 1).
Duringadoption,consumersbuy anduse com-
mercializedproducts. Purchasingactivities exertselectivepressures,and the lattercanbe swift and
sure. In 1953 nearly two million portableradios
were sold in the United States (ElectronicIndustriesAssociation 1970:13)-and every one
contained vacuum tubes. Late in 1954 the firsttransistorportableradiowas commercialized,and
others were rapidly broughtto market.Althoughfor a few years more expensive than their tube
counterparts,ransistor adios had marvelousbat-
tery economy along with the cachet of "moder-
nity."As a result, consumers quickly selected
againstthe tube-basedportablesand,in less than
seven years, only transistor radios remainedon
the market Schiffer 1991).
Surprisingly, he adoption process is also an
important source of variation, as consumersbecome inventors, iterallyplayingwith theirnew
toys. A new productis tried out in old activities
and the possibilities of new activities are
explored; the result is an expansion of activity
variation,which can contribute o stimulatedvari-
ation in processes of invention and commercial-
ization. For example, in the early 1920s, people
exploredthepossibilitiesof home radios,a newlycommercialized product, taking them outdoors
and using them in diverse activity settings, from
motorcycle-policeon the beat to hot-air balloonraces. These experimentswere widely publicizedin radiomagazines and called attention o possi-
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AMERICAN ANTIQUITY
120 -
03
0
10.20
CO
CZ
a,
0
CZ
Laa,
U3-
100 -
80 -
60 -
40 -
20 -
1
0 1.1
1920 1930 1940 1950
Figure 2. Changes in the frequency of different portable radio models manufactured and sold in the United States,1920-1955. Based on a ca. 10 percent interval sample of radios listed by Grinder (1995). To be counted as a portableradio, the receiver must use battery or three-way power and be designated as "portable."All portable radios in thisdatabase employ vacuum tubes.
bilities for new kinds of radios.Impressedby the
opportunities, inventors and entrepreneurs
respondedwith newradiodesignsforspecial-pur-pose communicationsgear, some of which were
commercialized Schiffer 1991).
Discussion
This framework f processes in the life historyof
a product type-invention, commercialization,and adoption-allows one to investigate variety-
generationand variety-selectionin a systematicmanner. n historiesof theportableradio(andthe
early electric automobile [Schiffer et al. 1994]),
the complex interactionof variety-generation ndvariety-selectionprocesses has been illuminated.
The intricateconnectionsof variety-generationandvariety-selectionprocessesestablish relation-
shipsbetweenunits of evolution at diverse scales.
Significantly, in the evolution of cultural phe-nomena,selectionprocesses at one scale can cre-
ate variationat others.Forexample,the selection
of inventions for commercializationby financial
andmanufacturingorporationseads to variation
in products available in the wholesale market-
place. Selection of this variation by retailingbehavioralcomponents hen createsproductvari-
ation in the retailmarketplace. n turn,the selec-
tion processes of consumers influence the varia-
tion in household artifact inventories. One can
envision that the latter variation will be actedupon by additionalselection processes, thereby
affecting the differential persistence of house-
holds. These cascading effects and complicated
relationshipsof variety-generatingand variety-
selecting processes ensure that both must be
treated n evolutionaryexplanations.
Conclusion
In an effort to promote constructive dialoguebetween different heoreticalprograms, hispaper
has examined some relationshipsbetween evolu-tionaryand behavioralarchaeologies, ocusingon
potentialcommon ground, ncompatibilities,and
possible synergies.Various assumptions, tenets, and principles
were delineatedthat have some potentialto form
common groundbetween the two programs.The
statements summarizingthis apparentcommon
groundappear o be of some importance.Tenetsof evolutionaryarchaeology hatcannot
be accepted by behavioralistswere scrutinized.It
was argued hatthese incompatibilities tem fromquestionable ssumptionshatarenot, in fact,inte-
gral to the selectionistprogram.Abandonment f
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RELATIONS BETWEEN BEHAVIORALAND EVOLUTIONARYARCHAEOLOGIES
these assumptions would make evolutionary
archaeology compatible,not just with behavioral
archaeology,but also with modern evolutionary
biology.Finally,the possibility that the two programscould enjoy synergies was examined through a
treatment of variety-generation and selection
processesalongwith scales andunitsof selection.
And what of the "thousandarchaeologies"once welcomed Schiffer1988:479)? remain om-
fortablewith a diversityof ideas-even a plethoraof socialtheories.Whatdoes concernme, however,is the prospectof archaeologybecoming perma-
nentlyorganized ntoparadigm-basednclaves hat
exchangeonly epithets.This is an intellectual ux-urythatarchaeology, disciplinewithtoo fewprac-titioners spread over too much subject matter,cannot afford. Perhapsit is time to dispute the
Kuhniandogma that differentparadigms-in this
case theoretical rograms orexplainingvariabilityand changein humanbehaviorand societies-are
conceptuallyncommensurable,nd so theirpracti-tionerscannottakepart n meaningfuldialogues.I
suggestthatthedegreeof compatibility rcomple-
mentaritybetween differentprogramsshould be
determinedon a case-by-casebasis. In the case ofbehavioraland evolutionaryarchaeologies,there
appearo be manyopportunitiesorsubstantive is-
cussions, and even hints that the two programsworking nconcertcouldproducea more ntegratedand successful science. Perhaps he establishmentof aconstructiveworking elationship etweenevo-
lutionaryarchaeologyand behavioralarchaeologycould serve as a model for interactionbetween
other,seeminglyless reconcilable, heoreticalpro-
grams.
Acknowledgments.An earlierversionof this paperwas read at
the Universityof Washingtonin January1994. I thank the
Department f Anthropology, ndespeciallyJulie K. Stein,for
the invitationto speak.AnnetteSchifferhelpedto record the
data for Figures1 and2. I am gratefulto the people who fur-
nishedperceptiveandhelpfulcomments on earlierversions ofthis paper, ncludingStevenL. Kuhn,Vincent M. LaMotta,R.Lee Lyman,PatrickD. Lyons,HectorNeff, Michael J. Shott,James M. Skibo,Julie K. Stein, PatriceA. Teltser,William H.
Walker, LuAnn Wandsnider, and especially Michael J.O'Brien and StephenL. Zegura.I am indebted to PatriceA.
Teltser,visiting
scholar in theLaboratory
of Traditional
Technology,1992-1995, for leading manystimulatingdiscus-sions about evolutionaryarchaeology.I thankMariaNievesZedefio fortranslating he abstract.
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