Scoping study on “Engagement with the Parliament of Uganda under the ECD Project”

Final Study Report

Submitted to: Evaluation Capacity Development Project

Officer of the Prime Minister Kampala Uganda

Prepared by: Charles Abola

02 February 2014

Executive Summary The Evaluation Capacity Development (ECD) Project seeks to raise awareness on the need for evaluations and to underline their importance for transparent policy-making. The project’s overall objective is to enable selected ministries, departments and agencies, and civil society organisations in Uganda mainstream professional monitoring and evaluation practices for policy-making and for steering policy measures, programmes and projects. The project focuses on four intervention areas: raising awareness through information events and workshops, developing Ugandan evaluation standards, offering tailor-made training courses, and the establishment of a master course evaluation in a blended learning format. Under its awareness-raising component, the ECD Project observes that the demand for evaluation/accountability is from Parliament. Strengthen the general understanding and awareness of the use and usefulness of evaluations within Parliament would therefore ensure demand for and use for evaluations. The Ugandan Parliament like most legislatures, is concerned with law making and accountability. The 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda gave Parliament the power to restrain the executive through the exercise of its oversight function. In discharge of this role, parliament working through standing, sessional and select committees is responsible for ensuring transparency and accountability in the application of public funds, and monitoring and evaluating the implementation of government programmes and projects. To achieve this more responsibly, opposition Members of Parliament (MPs) chair accountability committees like the Public Accounts Committee. Parliament can play a significant role in stimulating demand for and use of evaluations in policy making and implementation. The ECD project commissioned a scoping study to clarify and further define the scope and focus of ECD’s envisaged support, and in particular, identifying the specific target group within Parliament’s Administration and the potential capacity development outcomes at institutional and policy levels. This report provides the consultants analysis of information obtained through document reviews, interviews with stakeholders within and outside Parliament, and discussions with ECD project staff. Consultations were carried out over a rather short period of time (11 – 16 November, 2013) and as such not all the envisaged stakeholders in civil society and heads of parliamentary committees were consulted. The information obtained from stakeholders who participated is however adequate to provide direction to the ECD project team on how to engage with the Parliament of Uganda. Parliament derives its mandate and functions from the 1995 Constitution and subsequent constitutional amendments (2005), the Laws of Uganda and its own Rules of Procedure. Evaluations are directly linked to parliaments oversight discharged through standing, sessional and select committees with support of technical staff. Accountability committees of Parliament are chaired by opposition members and play a key role in assessing and evaluating the activities of government and other bodies. Parliament’s rules of procedure allow for it to compel Ministers to answer questions about policy and also in relation to ministerial policy statements. Sessional committees of parliament have mostly monitored projects. A limited number of evaluations driven by petitions from MPs have been commissioned by Parliament. Parliament use evaluation reports from the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) and individual MPs have referred to Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) reports in furthering committee business. Limitations to Parliament’s demand for and use of evaluations lies in its inability (within committees and also technical staff of the parliamentary service) to properly conceptualise, conduct and use evaluations in the business of parliament. The lack of a monitoring and evaluation framework, mixed interest by MPs in demanding for evaluations, and inadequate funding, all constrain Parliaments ability to demand for and use evaluations in its work. Additional staff have recently been recruited to support the research function that also covers evaluation of government policies, programmes, laws and regulations. The new staff are competent in research practice and methodologies however need additional capacity to be able to conduct evaluations. Parliament’s relationship with the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), the Evaluation Sub Committee and other government stakeholders for evaluation is dictated by its constitutional mandate of oversight to the executive to which OPM and other government Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDA) belong.

Unlike institutions such as the OAG that is mandated to report to parliament, the OPM, the National Planning Authority (NPA) and the Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) are not required by law to do so. As leader of government business in Parliament, the OPM among others coordinates monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of government policies and programmes. The OPM issues bi-annual and annual performance reports to cabinet to facilitate identification of areas where emphasis needs to be placed to achieve set targets and also for generating policy actions for the next financial year. The annual performance reports are essentially intended to provide timely and focused reports to cabinet and other decision makers on the performance of government during the previous period. The OPM does not submit these reports to Parliament, rather Parliament just like any other MDA contributes its share of these reports to the OPM for discussion at bi-annual cabinet retreats. Parliament’s administrative setup has the Parliamentary Commission at the helm (the highest governance organ) and is chaired by the Speaker of Parliament. Its composition caters for Parliament through four Commissioners, the leader of government business, the leader of Opposition and the Minister of Finance, Planning and Economic Development. It works through two arms – the political arm (the house with its committees) headed by the speaker and the technical arm (the parliamentary service) overseen by the Clerk to Parliament. From the political arm, the committee structures and especially accountability committees are best placed to demand for and use evaluations although in reality individual members have provided a more effective entry point. In addition, parliamentary fora have demonstrated that they are a good lobby on specific issues before the house but being loose coalitions they their decisions are not legally binding. From the technical arm, the research services department is best suited to support the committees conceptualising, commissioning and utilising evaluations. The demand for evaluations in parliament have been largely driven by petitions from individual Members of Parliament (MPs) both within the committees and also at the individual level through the plenary, and CSOs; whistle blowers; and reports of the OAG. The main incentive for MPs to demand for evaluation has been the desire to be seen by the public (and voters) as exercising their oversight role. Opposition to evaluations has often come from Ministers and ruling party MPs especially when the issue for evaluation is considered to be an indictment to the ruling government/party. In some instances the executive has opposed investigations and evaluations into particular issues. Actions of some MPs to oppose investigations have been attributed to their being compromised with bribes. Parliament’s role in strengthening linkages between stakeholders in evaluations can for the moment be traced to the passing of the national M&E Policy. This is in line with its lawmaking function. Efforts through support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to harmonise roles between Parliament, the NPA and civil society in relation to monitoring the National Development Plan (NDP) has progressed but challenges continue to hamper conclusion of the process. Evaluations feed into virtually all the stages of the policy cycle right from agenda setting to policy termination. Parliament is however largely involved in discussing policy alternatives, monitoring implementation, assessing policy and recommending adaptation succession or termination. Evaluations would therefore play a significant role in the above-mentioned stages. Parliament’s reputation in fighting corruption has been received well in the general public. Accountability committees especially the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) has been instrumental in causing the prosecution of persons who have been implicated in corruption scandals. A major challenge for the committee is that there is a huge backlog of reports from previous parliaments that renders some of the cases at least in the public eye to have been overtaken by events. Also interference from the executive has at times impacted on the work of the committee while non action on committee recommendations generates the impression in the general public that parliament is merely a barking dog.

Lastly, parliament’s strengths and potential for taking up a stronger role in Evaluation lie in its mandate, leadership, accountability committee and competent research and planning staff. Weaknesses include the poor conceptualisation of evaluations, lack of a law for evaluations, absence of frameworks for evaluations, and mixed interest among MPs in regard to evaluations. Opportunities in working on the potential of Parliament on the other hand include donor interest in improving good governance in the country and increasing public interest in accountability from government, while challenges are interference from the state and bickering in the opposition that may affect the work of the accountability committees.

1. Introduction

1.1. Background The Evaluation Capacity Development (ECD) Project is financed through a multiregional fund established by BMZ to raise awareness on the need for evaluations and to underline their importance for transparent policy-making. The project’s overall objective is to enable selected ministries, departments and agencies, and civil society organisations in Uganda mainstream professional monitoring and evaluation practices for policy-making and for steering policy measures, programmes and projects. In working towards this objective, the project focuses on four intervention areas or components: raising awareness through information events and workshops, developing Ugandan evaluation standards, offering tailor-made training courses, and the establishment of a master course on Evaluation in a blended learning format. The ECD project is implemented in partnership with OPM as its political partner and also lead partner to the

component on strengthening within government and civil society, the general understanding of the use

and usefulness of evaluations. Other implementing partners being Makerere University for the blended learning Masters course in M&E; the Uganda Evaluation Association (UEA) for the evaluation standards based on the African Evaluation Association (AfrEA) evaluation guidelines. The Parliament of the Republic of Uganda is the national legislative body, which derives its mandate, roles/functions from Chapter Six of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda. Because Parliament’s responsibility includes scrutinizing government policy and administration and ensuring equitable allocation of resources and effective service delivery, the ECD Project observes that in Uganda, the demand for evaluation/ accountability should from Parliament i.e. Accountability Committee like the Public Accounts Committee and the public in general. This is means that Parliament could be a central stimulator for the creation and voicing of demand for evaluation of government policies, programmes or strategies and the use of their results for better or more effective service delivery. Therefore, ECD is considering a closer engagement and cooperation with Parliament within the project to make use of their potentials and mandates within the Evaluation sector. The ECD project commissioned a consultancy to conduct a scoping study on engagement with Parliament. This report presents the consultants findings in relation to the objectives and key questions below.

1.2. Objectives of this Scoping Study The purpose of the study was to clarify and further define the scope and focus of ECD’s envisaged support of Parliament. In particular, help to identify the specific target group within the Parliament Administration for the ECD support and the potential capacity development outcomes at institutional and policy levels. The study will primarily contribute to the results under the first component of the ECD Project (Awareness raising). Stimulating evaluation demand for both policy-makers and evaluators in Uganda is a result under Component 1 of the ECD Project (“Building an understanding of the objectives, methods and benefits of professional evaluations”).

1.3. Key questions for the Scoping Study The study was intended to answer the following key questions:

1. What are the mandate, role(s) and functions of parliament (and its different departments) and how does this relate to the commissioning, implementation and/or use of evaluation? What are the limits and de facto constraints in fulfilling these roles? What are the actual capacities and experiences of Parliament to take up these roles?

2. How does the Parliament relate to the OPM and the ESC and/or other relevant government actors for evaluation?

3. What are the key structures in the parliamentary setup and what role should they play in demanding and/or using evaluation?

4. What would be the key drivers in parliament driving demand for evaluation? What are incentives for doing this? Who would oppose such a direction?

5. What role could parliament play in strengthening linkages between stakeholders in the evaluation sector?

6. How would evaluations feed into the policy cycle in parliament? 7. What has been parliament’s de facto role in fighting corruption in Uganda and what reputation

does parliament have with regard to corruption within civil society? 8. What are the key strength/weaknesses/opportunity/challenges for parliament and why should it

become a partner for ECD?

1.4. Methodology In line with the ToRs, information on the key questions was obtained through the combined use of document reviews, individual stakeholder consultations/interviews and discussions with the ECD project team. Documents reviewed included the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, the five-year strategic plan of the Parliament of Uganda (2012 – 2017), ECD awareness raising strategy, position paper on propositions for collaboration with Parliament in the frame of the ECD Project (under component 1 & 3); the Republic of Uganda National Policy on Public Sector Monitoring and Evaluation, concept note on capacity building in evaluation: October 2013-February 2014, performance and effectiveness of law-making and oversight: the 6th – 8th Ugandan Parliaments (DGF March 2013 publication), and ECD progress reports (April & October 2013). Stakeholders consulted included 3 Parliamentary Service staff namely the Director Corporate Planning & Strategy, the Director Research Services, and the Acting Director Institute of Parliamentary Studies also the Assistant Director for Monitoring & Evaluation. Other stakeholders consulted included: the Uganda Debt Network, the National Planning Authority and the Uganda Evaluation Society. Also consulted was Mr. Derek Poate, Evaluation Consultant. Discussions with the ECD were held as part of the inception activities to clarify the terms of reference, discuss the approach to the study and also provide information (progress to date) to guide the consultant.

1.5. Limitations of this study Consultations were undertaken over a very short period of time (11 – 16 November, 2013) and as such invitations to stakeholders were also short. A number of stakeholders in civil society and parliament (heads of committees and parliamentary for a) could not be consulted as a result. Not withstanding the above, the consultant considers the findings from the stakeholders who were able to avail time for discussions adequate to provide direction to the ECD project team on how to engage with the Parliament of Uganda.

1.6. Report Structure The report contains three sections. The first section introduces the background and rationale for the study, its objectives and scope, and methodology to achieve those objectives. The second section provides findings in regard to the key study questions. The third section presents conclusions and recommendations. Appendices include List of persons consulted, and documents reviewed.

2. Main Findings in relation to the study questions

2.1. Overview This chapter of the report presents a triangulation of findings from documents reviewed, the Internet sources, and interviews with different stakeholders in government, CSOs, evaluation practitioners, the Uganda Evaluation association and development partners. Effort has been made to identify within the text the various sources of information contained in the various sections.

2.2. Mandate and Role/Functions of Parliament in Evaluations

2.2.1. Mandate and Functions of Parliament in relation to evaluation

The Parliament of Uganda derives its mandate and functions from the 1995 Constitution and subsequent constitutional amendments (2005), the Laws of Uganda and its own Rules of Procedure. More specifically, Article 79 of the Constitution, Parliament has powers to make laws on any matter “for the peace, order, development and good governance of Uganda.” The provisions in the constitution strengthen Parliament’s law making and oversight/accountability

functions1. Evaluations are designed to provide evidence-based information that is credible, reliable and useful, enabling the timely incorporation of findings, recommendations and lessons into the decision-making processes of the implementing agencies. In the context of government, evaluations strengthen accountability regarding Government policies and programmes and therefore fall within Parliament’s oversight role. Further to the functions prescribed under Article 79 of the constitution, Parliament carries out oversight through performing the following functions:- scrutinizing government policy and administration and in particular “assuring transparency and accountability in the application of public funds, and monitoring the implementation of government programmes and projects”2; ensuring equitable allocation of resources and effective and efficient service delivery; providing by giving legislative sanction to

taxation and acquisition of loans.3 This oversight function is conducted through standing committees with

support from technical departments of the parliamentary service. In strengthening the exercise of this role, opposition MPs chair accountability committees. Article 90 (3) of the Constitution stipulates that ‘Parliament shall appoint committees necessary for the efficient discharge of its functions. Further, it is provided that Parliament shall prescribe the powers and

functions of the Committees by its rules of procedure.4 In accordance with Article 90 of the Constitution, the rules and procedures of parliament (2012) prescribe the functions of standing committees to include “assessing and evaluating activities of Government and other bodies”5. In exercise of this function, Parliamentary committees may conduct investigations, hold public hearings, require reports from the Executive, or commission a study in reaction to complaints, criticisms, opposition, or abuses surrounding a program, operation, agency, or official. As such, accountability committees (Public Accounts, Local

1 Chapter Six, Articles 77 - 79 of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda provides for the establishment,

composition and functions of Parliament and empowers Parliament "to make laws on any matter for the peace, order, development and good governance of Uganda", and "to protect the Constitution and promote democratic governance in Uganda".

2 http://www.parliament.go.ug/new/index.php/about-parliament/functions-of-parliament

3 Parliament Strategic, Investment and Development Plan (PSIDP 2012-2017)

4 Article 90(3)

5 Specifically Rules of Procedure of Parlaiament of Uganda (R.147 (C)).

Government Accounts, Government Assurances, Commissions, Statutory Authorities and State Enterprises) would greatly benefit from evaluations findings in their work of scrutinising government expenditure. In addition, one of the rules developed by Parliament requires Ministers to answer questions from MPs about policy and in response to Ministerial Policy Statements6 thus individual MPs would as such find results of evaluations of great use in demanding accountability. . The National Policy on Public Sector Monitoring and Evaluation (2013) is intended to improve the performance of the public sector through the strengthening of the operational, coordinated, and cost-effective production and use of objective information on implementation and results of national strategies, policies, programmes and projects. It also aims to enhance the basis for decision makers: Cabinet, Parliament, Permanent Secretaries and Local Councils; to make evidence-based public policy and programmatic decisions and strengthen accountability regarding Government policies and programmes. The Policy further aims to improve the confidence of the Ugandan people in the capability of Parliament and the Government to systematically hold MDAs and LGs to account for achieving results based on reliable information7. Roles and responsibilities of parliament in respect of performance monitoring and evaluation are highlighted as: scrutinising various objects of expenditure and the sums to be spent on each; assuring transparency and accountability in the application of public funds; and monitoring the implementation of Government programmes and projects.

2.2.2. Limitations also include:

While parliaments mandate and functions support its involvement in evaluations, some factors currently limit its demand for and use of evaluations and these include the following. Inadequate technical capacity of MPs and technical staff to conceptualise, conduct and utilise evaluations resulting in huge case backlogs with respect to accountability committees scrutiny and use of reports (OAG reports to PAC & LGAC). An example cited by technical staff is a Value for Money report prepared and presented to parliament by the OAG that revealed lack of capacity among MPs to understand and interpret findings in OAG reports. While committees and individual MPs with support of technical staffs may demand for evaluations, they are unable to clarify and specify in good detail the scope of specific investigations/evaluation on matters of public interest and this undermines the quality of evaluations that may be commissioned. Parliament lacks frameworks to guide its technical arm in the commissioning and implementation of monitoring and evaluation. In the absence of a monitoring and evaluation framework that defines parameters and indicators for evaluation (internal & external) and a corresponding management information system to facilitate systematic tracking of information, Parliament cannot be able to commission meaningful and comprehensive evaluation studies that would support its policy work. Evaluations are received with mixed interests among MPs and technocrats in government. Some MPs are interested in demanding for and using evaluations while others are not and this is often manifested in late commissioning investigations/evaluations, inadequate and slow handling of reports before committees/house thus huge backlogs, inability to raise quorum so as to discuss matters on the floor of parliament, and outright objections to investigations. This interest or lack of is often linked sensitivity of the issue for before the house or committees and in some cases allegations of bribes given to MPs have arisen like in the oil bribery case involving three cabinet ministers during the 9th Parliament. Some ruling party MPs tend to get swayed away easily by politics and the executive if it is deemed that the issue for evaluation is likely to hurt the image of government or powerful individuals in government. Diversionary

6 Performance & Effectiveness of Law-making and Oversight: The 6

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7 The Republic of Uganda, National Policy on Public Sector Monitoring and Evaluation, Final Draft (April 2013)

tactics have often come into play to undermine or frustrate evaluations and the executive has simply not answered questions or acted upon recommendations of parliament that are based on reports submitted to parliament. For example a recent established that only 56% of questions raised to Ministers by MPs in the 8th Parliament were answered and even when answered, this was not done within the stipulated timeframe of 2 weeks8. Technocrats in government whose departments are subject to scrutiny have also demonstrated reluctance to support evaluations and often attempt to influence MPs who are on monitoring visits to project sites. Funding for activities of Parliaments’ technical departments responsible for evaluations is generally inadequate and this limits its ability not only to conduct evaluations that has been restricted to 1 or 2 annually yet there are a number of areas identified for evaluation but also to mobilise adequate human resources also. For example, since 2002, only 18 staff provided the research support to all the committees of Parliament. The recent elevation of the research function to a department to be staffed with 39 researchers has seen the number increase to 29 with the remaining staff to be recruited soon. The M&E policy recognises the need to a law requiring all institutions to comply with the requirements of this policy will be necessary. Thus the lack of a supportive law for monitoring and evaluation leaves room for reluctant government departments to pay less attention to evaluations and their use in design and implementation of government policies and programmes.

2.2.3. Capacities and experience in evaluations

Relevant departments namely research services, corporate planning and strategy, and the parliamentary budget office exist and are to a great extent adequately staffed to support the evaluation function of parliament business (internal) on the one hand and government policies, programmes, laws and regulations (external) on the other hand.. The monitoring and evaluation function is provided in the terms of reference of departments. For instance, the corporate planning and strategy department is responsible for monitoring and evaluating programmes funded donors and through the consolidated fund, and also Parliaments Strategic Investment Development Plan (PSIDP). The research services department is responsible for monitoring and evaluating government policies, programmes, laws and regulations. The newly created research services department now has 29 of the intended 39 researchers and the remaining 10 are due for recruitment this financial year to close the gap. It is reported that while the existing research team is competent in research methodology and practice, they need further training and guidance in evaluation processes and practice for their effective participation in the commission and implementation of evaluations. Evaluations that feed into the work of Parliament are those carried out by institutions that report directly to parliament such as the Office of the Auditor General (financial), Uganda Human Rights Commission (human rights), and the Inspectorate of Government (Corruption). Committees have thus mostly utilised OAG reports, and government bi-annual performance reports published by the M&E department in the OPM. Reports of studies undertaken by civil society have also been utilised but mostly by individual members in furtherance of committee business. In addition, Committees with support from parliamentary service staff have commissioned evaluations implemented by the technical departments (research services) who provide their reports provided to the committees for utilisation. Sessional committees of Parliament have conducted monitoring of government projects that have at times been misconstrued as evaluations. Over the years, research staff at the request of committees has conducted evaluation studies that have been limited to projects/programmes within a particular committee’s business/sector. Staff however note that the demand for studies is largely adhoc and most times driven by petitions, whistle blowers, media reports and availability of funding. On average research staff have undertaken 1 - 2 studies annually, which

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is quite low given that the country has over 20 ministries, departments and agencies that implement government programmes.

2.3. Parliaments relationship with the OPM and the ESC and/or other relevant government actors for evaluation

Article 108A of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda mandates the Prime Minister to, inter alia, be the Leader of Government Business in Parliament and be responsible for coordination of implementation of Government Policies across Ministries, Departments and other Public Institutions. In implementing this mandate, the OPM carries a number of functions including coordinating the monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of government policies and programmes, and also coordinating and monitoring the implementation of Special Government Policies and programmes for Northern Uganda, Luwero-Rwenzori, Karamoja, Bunyoro and Teso Affairs. These functions are operationalized through the departments of Monitoring and Evaluation and that of Policy Implementation Coordination and policies, through which the OPM reports findings to Cabinet, through the government bi-annual performance reports. The reports facilitate cabinet in identification of areas where emphasis needs to be placed to achieve the set targets and also for generating key policy actions (planning and budgeting decisions) for the coming Financial Year. The Evaluation Subcommittee (ESC) on the other hand was established under the National Monitoring and Evaluation Technical Working Group (NM&ETWG) and is chaired by the OPM. Its membership comprises key Government institutions, Government-financed research institutions, and external stakeholder representation from the NGO, private sector and development partner community. The Evaluation Sub-Committee oversees the selection of evaluation topics for funding. Once chosen, funds are transferred to the lead institution from the virtual evaluation fund as per the evaluation financial plan. The mode of implementation of the evaluation depends on the capacity of the lead institution. Different models are being followed:- ‘in-house’ by existing evaluation specialists within the Ministries, some being conducted in a ‘mixed’ manner, using internal and external specialists and others being fully externally commissioned. Other government stakeholders in evaluations in the country include the National Planning Authority and the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, that separately have a mandate and role to play in national evaluations, and therefore each accesses resources on a case-by-case basis. Parliaments relationship with the OPM, the ESC and other relevant government actors for evaluation is guided by its constitutional role. Currently there’s no legal provision that compels OPM to submit its monitoring and evaluation reports to Parliament although Parliament contributes its its share of these reports to OPM for discussion at bi-annual cabinet retreats just like any other MDA. In fact OPM initially developed indicators for monitoring and evaluating the work of Parliament but were found to be unrealistic and have with the involvement of parliament are being improved to make them more objective. An example is the indicator that relates to bills tabled and passed which appeared to place the responsibility for presentations of bills on parliament and yet that is indeed a responsibility of the OPM. Revisions to the indicators are underway and Parliament is working on these together with the OPM. Parliament sees OPM’s role as that of monitoring government programmes and not evaluation since it would not be objective in evaluating itself. Parliaments engagement with other relevant stakeholders such as the OAG is also dictated by the legal obligations of the OAG to provide reports to Parliament. OAG is considered as neutral an arm of Parliament that evaluates financial performance of government MDAs. In the case of other stakeholders such as the NPA, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, and the Presidents Office (Economic Monitoring), parliaments relationship has remained at the level of discussing budget propositions and

policy statements. Parliament has also made use reports generated by these departments but these have been largely supply driven i.e. reports circulated to parliament and not demanded by parliament. Parliament however sees the role of NPA as that of monitoring the NDP and that this could be extended to evaluation since they don’t implement the NDP. In such a case, OAG would handle the financial evaluation while NDP handles the technical evaluation of government programmes. Although UNDP has provided support to facilitate harmonisation of oversight between Parliament, Civil Society and the NPA, to-date no significant progress has been made since the three institutions have not established agreement on a platform to facilitate harmonization.

2.4. Key structures in the parliamentary setup and their potential roles in evaluations

Parliament’s governance structure places the Parliamentary Commission at the helm. The commission is chaired by the Speaker of Parliament and has seven other members, namely, the Leader of Government Business, Leader of Opposition, the Minister of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, and four Commissioners elected among the Members of Parliament. Below the Commission are the House (political) and Parliamentary Service (technical) respectively. The House is headed by the Speaker of Parliament and has three types of committees namely standing, sessional, and select committees.

Sessional committees are established for each ministry/department/agency to conduct oversight

and are concerned with policy and action programmes and in so doing, keep the workings of each

ministry under review.

Standing committees handle issues of accountability, financial oversight, and human rights. Select

committees are established when needed to examine/review any institution or activity. The house

for its part allows debates, oral questions and adjourns debates on a wide range of issues including

committee reports that are brought to its floor. There are 13 standing committees and 16 sessional

committees and all accountability committees are chaired by opposition parties. There is no

specific committee responsible for monitoring and evaluation however that function is built-in

within the mandate of sessional committees. The accountability committees (Public Accounts,

Commissions, Statutory Authorities and State Enterprises, Local Government Public Accounts and

Government Assurances) play a key role in demanding for and utilising findings of evaluations. The

Office of the Auditor General (OAG) receives and examines audited accounts showing the

appropriation of the sums granted by Parliament to meet the public expenditure of government

and provides its reports to parliament for use by the accountability committees. The demand for

evaluation by committees is adhoc and is usually at the discretion of the Speaker. It is also noted

that committees tend to focus on monitoring and not evaluation, thus a need to facilitate clear

understanding of the difference between monitoring and evaluation.

Select committees are adhoc committees established by the Speaker to handle particular issues for

which the house seeks further investigations

In addition to the house committees, members of parliament with specific interest have established networks referred to as parliamentary fora. These parliamentary fora have been very active in advocating for issues such as anticorruption, women and children’s affairs among others. The African Parliamentarians

Network Against Corruption (APNAC) Uganda Chapter for instance advocates for strengthening anticorruption systems with a focus among others on putting in place anticorruption monitoring and evaluation systems under the national anticorruption plan. The Greater North Parliamentary For a (GNPF) has also been very active in raising matters on Northern Uganda and demanding for accountability and improved service delivery to the war ravaged region. The Parliamentary Service is headed by the Clerk to Parliament and comprises two directorates (parliamentary affairs and corporate affairs) and 13 departments and offices. These technical departments support the work of the political arm of parliament. The departments of corporate planning and strategy and research services support the work of committees in commissioning routine and planned evaluations by identifying areas that need to be evaluated and implementing the evaluations. The Parliamentary Budget Office for example assists Parliament (budget committee) in conducting legislative oversight and utilizing its constitutional investigatory powers to ensure transparency and accountability with respect to central government expenditures. Overall, the key mechanisms for evaluations within the parliamentary structure are therefore the: committees of parliament in particular the accountability committees; sessional committees, select committees, and the house, with support of the technical departments. Parliamentary fora can also play a role in demanding for evaluations and utilizing findings for their advocacy work. In relation to evaluation, four key roles are envisaged within parliament and these are: initiating, leading, participating and following-up. These roles are explained below as follows: Initiating an evaluation is the first step and basically entails determining which outcomes and projects/programmes will be evaluated and how finding will be used. In undertaking the above tasks, the initiator of the evaluation needs to assess whether the subject of evaluation is ready for evaluation. A key question to ask is whether the proposed evaluation is: still relevant and feasible, complementary to the previous analysis, and likely to add value to existing information and other planned and future evaluations by government and other partners. Leading an evaluation refers to taking the lead responsibility in carrying out the evaluation. This entails leading the development of the evaluation terms of reference (ToR); managing the selection and recruitment of the external evaluators; managing the contractual arrangements, the budget and the personnel involved in the evaluation; providing executive and coordination support to the reference group; providing the evaluators with administrative support and required data; liaising with and responding to the initiators of the evaluation; connecting the evaluation team with the key evaluation stakeholders; reviewing the inception report and the draft evaluation report(s); ensuring the final draft meets quality standards. Participating ideally entails contributing to the roles of the entity taking lead responsibility and also contributing to the actual evaluation. For instance, participating in the drafting and review of the draft ToR, assisting in collecting required data, overseeing progress and conduct of the evaluation, and reviewing the draft evaluation report and ensure final draft meets quality standards. Follow-up is done after the final evaluation report has been submitted and accepted. It entails organising for a reflection on the key issues, findings and recommendations of the evaluation to foster learning and sharing of knowledge. Follow-up actions and their associated responsible institutions and time frames are collectively identified and agreed upon through this process. At a focus group discussion involving parliamentary service staff drawn from the departments of clerks, research services, corporate planning and strategy and parliamentary budget office, roles and

responsibilities in relation to evaluation were mapped out as in the matrix below. Evaluation Areas

Parliamentary Structures Parliaments Business

Government Policies, Programmes,

Laws & Regulations

National Development Plan (NDP)

Office of the Speaker Follow-up Follow-up Initiate

Follow-up

Follow-up

House / Plenary Initiate Follow-up Initiate

Participate

Follow-up

Follow-up

Standing Committees Initiate – Business

Follow-up

Initiate

Follow-up

Initiate

Participate

Follow-up

Initiate – National Economy, Finance & Budget

Follow-up

Sectoral Committees Initiate

Follow-up

Initiate

Participate

Follow-up

Participate – Human Rights, Gender Social Services

Follow-up

Select Committees Initiate

Follow-up

Initiate

Participate

Follow-up

Adhoc Committees Initiate

Follow-up

Initiate

Participate

Follow-up

Individual Members of Parliament Initiate

Follow-up

Initiate

Research Services Participate Initiate

Lead

Initiate

Lead

Initiate

Lead

Participate

Corporate Planning and Strategy Initiate

Lead

Participate Participate

Parliamentary Budget office Participate Initiate

Follow-up

Initiate (budget & finance laws)

Lead

Participate

Institute of Parliamentary Studies Participate

Clerks Participate Initiate

Participate

Initiate

Legislative and Legal Services Initiate

Lead

Office of the Auditor General (OAG) Initiate

Follow-up

Initiate Initiate

Follow-up

2.5. Key drivers, incentives and opposition to evaluation Evaluations in parliament have been driven by petitions (individual including members of parliament and civil society), whistle blower accounts, media reports highlighting issues of public interest, house recommendations on an issue, and reports of mandated institutions like the OAG. The main incentives for undertaking evaluations lie in the constitutional mandate of parliament (providing oversight), related laws, and rules of procedure of parliament. For example, the Budget Act provides that by a given date, every Ministry should provide a report to Parliament and so it is Parliament’s responsibility to validate the reliability of information provided. Parliament as an institution desires to be seen to be

playing its oversight role thus compelling it to demand for evaluations. An example is a recent demand by the Speaker to all Committee heads to provide reports on their work since the beginning of the 9th Parliament. Individual members of parliament likewise want to be seen by the public to be playing their oversight role and this too acts as an incentive to commission and utilise evaluation findings. Opposition to evaluations often comes from Government Ministries that are not performing well in implementation of their programmes. At times MPs representing government tend to oppose suggestions from the accountability committees that are headed by opposition MPs. Also opposition to evaluations may be from within the executive especially where the issues are deemed to be crucial for the image of government.

2.6. Parliament’s role in strengthening linkages between stakeholders in evaluation Parliaments contribution to strengthening linkages between evaluation stakeholders can only be traced to the passing of the National M&E policy. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided funding for harmonisation of roles between civil society, the NPA and Parliament in regard monitoring and evaluation of the National Development Plan (NDP), but little has been done in this regard. The lack of progress in this regard can partly be attributed to the inadequate conceptualisation of evaluations as a concept and the lack of a clear framework to guide monitoring of evaluations of government policies, programmes, laws and regulations. Parliament as an oversight institution can strengthen linkages between stakeholders in the evaluation sector through sharing of information on government policies, programmes, laws and regulations that are due to for evaluation. Also where issues relating to policies, programmes, laws and regulations have been raised in reports or petitions, Parliament can demand or encourage CSOs, OPM, and MDAs to undertake evaluations to facilitate a better understanding and learning. In addition, Parliament can strengthen linkages among evaluation stakeholders through the passing of a law on monitoring and evaluation that clarifies roles of each stakeholder in the evaluation sector and also compels parliament and the executive to utilize findings and recommendations of evaluation reports.

2.7. Evaluations and the policy cycle in parliament The policy cycle illustrated below describes how an issue moves from its initial inception through to implementation, evaluation and succession or termination.

Stages in policy cycle Description

Agenda Setting How an issue comes to the attention of policy makers. The process is not always rational, and it can often be difficult to see why some issues rise to the top of political agendas while other, seemingly more important issues, remain unaddressed

Policy Formulation Decision-makers (governments, health regions, hospitals, care teams etc.) formulate policy options. Government policy-making usually occurs behind the scenes and is carried out by professional policy analysts

Policy Adoption / Decision-making

How decision-makers decide what to do or not do about an issue

Policy Implementation Putting the decisions into effect. Not as simple as it sounds, as it usually entails changing habits and ingrained ways of doing things

Policy Assessment / Evaluation

Examining implementation and outcomes to check if the policy has been properly implemented if the desired outcomes were achieved.

Policy Adaptation Adjusting policies as necessary or improving policy related regulations, resources, staffing etc.

Policy Succession Maintaining or redirecting a policy to a new problem situation.

Policy Termination Bringing to an end a policy either due to resolution of the problem of policy failure.

Policy evaluation is catered for in the policy cycle and is meant to determine whether MDAs, legislatures, and courts are in compliance with statutory requirements of a policy and whether they are achieving desired policy objectives. In practice, policy evaluation is seldom systematically undertaken with evaluators in government relying largely on monitoring results to argue for continuation of a particular policy (NAADS, Microfinance etc). When properly executed evaluations will guide policy makers in adapting, replicating or termination of a policy. In discharge of its oversight role, Parliament can make use of evaluations to inform the various stages of its engagement in the different stages of the policy cycle. Interactions with stakeholders suggest that evaluations feed more specifically in the following stages: agenda setting (placing problems on the public agenda), policy formulation (discussing alternative policy options to deal with an issue), policy adoption, policy adaptation (recommending adjustments) and policy succession (maintaining & redirecting towards a new problem) and policy termination (due to success or failure) stages.

2.8. Parliament’s de facto role and reputation in fighting corruption in Uganda Parliament has exposed corruption and the PAC has been central in this. Parliament has provided legal frameworks for fighting corruption in Uganda. The 8th & 9th Parliaments have so far been very vigorous in fighting corruption. Key to Parliaments’ fight against corruption is the Office of the Auditor General that derives it mandate and function from Section 13(1), Article 163(3) of the 1995 Constitution as amended and the National Audit Act, 2008 (NAA). Among the functions of the OAG are: undertaking financial audit of all public accounts in respect of all public offices in accordance with laws which govern them; carrying out value for money audits; reporting fraud and corruption identified during audits to the appropriate authorities; and assisting the Parliamentary Committees in carrying out their oversight functions effectively and assessing the adequacy of responses from the auditees to audit observations. Key challenges for Parliament however remains the huge backlog of OAG reports from previous parliaments and the fact that recommendations of parliament that are not backed by law are not implemented by government departments/executive. In addition, recommendations contained in reports of the accountability committees have not fed adequately into the budget policy process due to the lack of a policy framework. For example government has in some cases responded through Treasury Memoranda to PAC statements and recommendations derived from OAG reports, and in other cases remained silent9. Parliaments work does not extend to CSOs and as such the only contribution of Parliament has been to put in place laws and policies (NGO Act and Policy) to promote transparency and accountability in civil society. The passage of legislation to regulate the conduct of CSOs was also in part intended to enhance accountability and transparency within the CSO sector whose source of funding is donors. CSOs involved in governance sector (accountability & transparency work) have for their part always demonstrated interest in working with and learning how to work better with Parliament. CSOs are willing to provide technical assistance on specific topics including the budget and to inform MPs about issues/need in the public domain. There have been increasing opportunities for CSOs to engage in dialogue with parliament in relation to specific issues, and also for parliament to consult CSOs. CSOs are free to attend committee sessions such as that of the Public Accounts Committee which are open to the public. CSOs are also recognised as stakeholders and participate in the budget cycle. UDNs budget monitoring reports and evidence-based studies have often been utilised by MPs at committee level and on the floor of the house.

9 Performance & Effectiveness of Law-making and Oversight: The 6

th-8

th Uganda Parliaments, March 2011, p.3

2.9. Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Challenges for parliament’s partnership with the ECD

2.9.1. Strengths

The first strength of parliament is its constitutional mandate backed by its rules of procedure that place emphasis on its oversight role. In exercise of this mandate, parliament can then demand for evaluations and also use the finding to make suggestions/recommendations on particular issues of public interest. The leadership of the 9th is strong and has so far demonstrated commitment to its mission of improved accountability, rule of law and national development within a multi-party democracy system in Uganda. This is demonstrated by the business so far transacted in the 1st and 2nd sessions of the 9th parliament. The ECD project can therefore take advantage of this strength to further the cause for parliament to play a key role in demanding for evaluations and using the findings in its work. Opposition members of parliament chair all accountability committees and this serves as strength to parliament since it is the role of the opposition to question the government of the day and hold them accountable to the public. The leadership of these committees has to-date been instrumental in holding government MDAs accountable for issues brought to their attention through reports and petitions. Technical departments of parliament have competent and dedicated staff that serve the numerous committees. Until recently for instance research support to committees was being provided by only 18 research staff who inspite of budgetary constraints provided respective committees information as required. Additional staff have now been recruited into the newly elevated research services department and this will greatly improve on the ability of parliament to undertake research to support its business. The newly created Institute of Parliamentary Studies was established to train current and future Members of Parliament and legislative staff in law-making procedures. IPS currently runs training courses within parliament using local expertise and a modular approach. This institute could therefore serve as a training point for evaluations which is currently not one of the courses targeting MPs and technical staff in the related departments. The institute is currently funded through government but opportunities for funding with development partners through the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF) exist. In this regard ECD could partner with the IPS around creating a better understanding within parliament of evaluations.

2.9.2. Weaknesses:

At both the political (committees) and technical levels, conceptualisation of evaluations is poor. While reference is made to the conduct of evaluations, in practice most activities that have been carried out relate to monitoring and not evaluation. For the proper conduct of evaluations, there is need to support parliament to understand the difference between monitoring and evaluations. Related to the above, is the lack of clearly defined key procedures and frameworks to support evaluations of parliaments business on the one hand and government programmes on the other hand. Conducting meaningful evaluations in the absence of a clear framework would therefore be futile. The lack of a law for monitoring and evaluation weakens parliaments demand for evaluations and also action by the executive on recommendations of parliament that would have been based on evaluation reports. The M&E policy remains largely vague on parliament’s role in evaluations having highlighted the main roles of parliament in relation to monitoring and evaluation. Members of parliament have at times acted in a manner that raises doubts of their ability to play their oversight role. Decisions reached in the party caucuses especially the ruling party caucus often place political considerations at the fore. In relation to the conduct of evaluations, a caucus may for instance choose to vote against an investigation on particular issues that are like to expose government weaknesses.

2.9.3. Opportunities:

There is good will in the donor community to support good governance in the country. Parliament is thus seen as one of the main institutions that can promote good governance and so donors have and are more willing to support parliament. Examples of donor support to Parliament include the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). UNDP has provided funding to facilitate harmonisation of oversight roles between parliament, the NPA and civil society while DGF is supporting parliaments strategic plan with a focus on strengthening its oversight role and institutional development. A number of government programmes have been supported over numerous years and yet no substantive evaluation has been undertaken to inform the subsequent phases. Recent experience with the NAADS programme therefore present opportunities for parliament to commission evaluations of programmes to which government has invested significantly over the past years.

2.9.4. Challenges:

A major threat to parliaments involvement in evaluations is interference from the executive and government. In the past this has been manifested through caucus deliberations and rejection of certain issues before the house and thus compelling the members of the caucus to oblige. The continued bickering in the opposition (FDC) also threatens the oversight function of accountability committees, which are opposition chaired. A change in leadership of the committees will impact on progress registered so far.

3. Conclusions and Recommendations

3.1. Conclusions This study based on information obtained in documents reviewed and discussions with stakeholders concludes as follows in regard to the study questions. Overall, this study concludes that the Parliament of Uganda’s oversight to the executive translates into a responsibility of assessing and evaluating activities of government. As such this forms a strong basis for the ECD project’s engagement with Parliament in stimulating demand for and use of evaluation to inform the policy process. Accordingly, the scope and focus of the ECD projects support to parliament should target committee of parliament especially the accountability committees extending gradually to other standing, sessional and select committees that are central to demanding for and using evaluations. In addition, technical departments especially that of research services and corporate planning and strategy should be targeted as they commission and implement evaluation studies but also support the use of evaluations at committee level. ECDs support should be directed at strengthening capacity through training and on-going mentoring in monitoring and evaluation to entrench proper conceptualisation of evaluations as opposed to monitoring and the use of evaluations in enhancing Parliaments work. More specifically, the gain to parliament will be strengthened capacity at the political and technical levels to conceptualise, commission, conduct and utilise evaluation findings for effective policy formulation, adoption and assessment. Parliament of Uganda has a constitutional mandate that relates to the commissioning, implementation and/or use of evaluation. In discharge of its oversight role, parliament through the floor of the house and committees with support of its technical departments has and undertaken limited evaluation studies or utilised evaluation reports. Key constraints in regard to evaluations are the limited understanding at the political and technical levels within Parliament of evaluations and how findings can enhance the demand for accountability from government MDAs, lack of supportive laws on monitoring and evaluation, and funding among others. Parliament’s relationship with the OPM, the ESC and other relevant government actors for evaluations is limited to its constitutional mandate and the principle of separation of powers between the legislative, judicial and executive arms of government. As such Parliament views OPM as part of the executive whose work is overseen by the institution of parliament. No formal engagements between OPM and parliament currently exist except for recent engagements around indicators that OPM developed for monitoring parliament. In regard to other relevant government actors for evaluations, parliament has largely restricted its engagement with those who constitutionally report to it. For instance, parliament receives and discusses reports of the OAG, and engages with the Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development around the budget process. Accordingly, there is need to a supportive legal instrument for Parliaments engagement with the OPM, the ESC and other government actors that are currently not compelled to engage with Parliament on matters of evaluations. In addition, it is suggested that all Public entities OAG, Inspectorate of Government (IGG), the OPM, NPA, Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC), CSOs etc involved in some kind of oversight should share their findings at a bi-annual meeting which will include Parliamentary Committees, so Parliament can come up with one Annual Report. Structures in the parliamentary setup that can play a role in demanding for and using evaluations include the floor of the house, committees, and parliamentary fora. Committees in particular scrutinise particular issues that relate to government programmes and as such would be a good starting point in the demand for evaluations. However, for this to take root, committee chairpersons and members need to understand

the contributions of evaluation to their work. A parliamentary forum for monitoring and evaluation currently does not exist and so the establishment of one could be considered going forward. The key drivers in parliament for evaluations have been individual MP/CSO petitions, committee reports, media reports, whistle blower, house recommendations on an issue, and reports of mandated institutions like the OAG. These are still envisaged to be crucial for driving demand in parliament for evaluations. The main incentives for undertaking evaluations lie in the constitutional mandate of parliament, related laws, and rules of procedure of parliament that emphasize oversight to the executive. Parliament as an institution and individual members of parliament want to be seen by the public to be playing their oversight role and this too acts as an incentive to commission and utilise evaluation findings. Opposition to evaluations often comes from the executive, government MDAs, and ruling party MPs who tend to oppose suggestions from the accountability committees that are headed by opposition MPs. Parliament’s role in strengthening linkages between stakeholders in the evaluation sector is seen as that of passing relevant legislation to compel stakeholders to commission and present findings of evaluations to relevant committees of parliament, and also compel the executive to act on its recommendations. To support the commissioning of evaluations parliament can suggest to stakeholders areas that need to be evaluated. Evaluations would feed into the policy cycle in parliament at the stages of considering policy alternatives (formulation), adoption of policies, evaluation and post-evaluation stages that may relate to adaptation, succession or termination of a policy. The 9th Parliament has within its oversight role been seen to play an active role in fighting corruption. The public accounts committees and the APNAC have been at the forefront of the demand for accountability from government departments and officials implicated in corruption related scandals. Their efforts were on occasions frustrated by the executive thus casting parliament as more of a barking dog. Parliaments key strengths lie in its constitutional mandate of oversight to the executive, strong leadership, committees especially the accountability committees, and competent technical staff. These strengths can play a role in the demand for and use of evaluations in the work of parliament. Inspite of its strengths, parliaments’ weaknesses currently include the limited conceptualisation of evaluations, lack of supportive laws for monitoring and evaluations, and lack of seriousness by MPs as manifested by absenteeism from committee or house deliberations. Support from development partners to the promotion of good governance and public interest especially given government investment in recurring programmes present good opportunities for parliament to demand for and use evaluations findings in its work. Challenges or threats to parliaments demand for evaluations are interference in the work of parliament by the executive and bickering in the opposition that is likely to see changes in the leadership of the opposition in the house and also committee chairpersons.

3.2. Recommendations This study suggests based on the findings above that the ECD project should engage with parliament in order to strengthen the demand for and use of evaluations in the country. More specifically support to parliament should focus on the creation of a better understanding of the concepts – monitoring and evaluation among research staff representing the technical arm of parliament and also among committees targeting initially chairpersons but ultimately members of the committees. In this case the institute of parliamentary studies can be supported to provide training to the individual members of parliament. In addition to the above recommendation, as part of the capacity building efforts in evaluation practice for technical staff, the ECD project should consider providing training in evaluation to committee heads and technical staff of relevant departments in Parliament and also facilitate a process to develop a framework

for monitoring and evaluation with relevant indicators. In doing so, clarification of roles of technical departments should be done and responsibility assigned for the different stages in the monitoring and evaluation cycle. An evaluation capacity development strategy needs to be developed to guide and focus any support to Parliament. The strategy should be based on a capacity assessment of Parliament that highlights strengths weaknesses, and opportunities in regard to evaluation, and proposed actions to strengthen capacity for meaningful conduct or use of evaluation findings to support the work of Parliament. The ECD project should consider providing mentoring support to Parliament in the areas of policy analysis and evaluations. Support here would be provided through consultants who would support line department staff in conducting at least one policy study and one evaluation thus providing staff practical experience. For this to happen, the ECD project working with Parliament would need to identify the evaluation topic and policy analysis topic and ensure that line department staff and funding is availed/allocated to commission independent studies. There is need to ECD clarify the relationship between Parliament and the OPM in regard to evaluations. The OPM as leader of government business would greatly benefit from independent evaluations that assess the implementation of government activities. This relationship can be specified in the M&E policy or a specific law on monitoring and evaluation that clearly distinguishes responsibilities of the OPM and Parliament respectively in regard to the commissioning, implementation and use of evaluations.

Annex 1: List of documents reviewed

1. Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995

2. Constitutional Amendment No. 1, 2005

3. Constitutional Amendment No. 2, 2005

4. Parliament of Uganda Rules of Procedure, 2012

5. Five year Strategic Plan for Parliament of Uganda 2012 - 2017

6. National Policy on Public Sector Monitoring and Evaluation, 2013. The Republic of Uganda

Officer of the Prime Minister

7. ECD Progress Report, October 2013

8. ECD Progress Report, April 2012 - April 2013

9. Concept Note on capacity Building in Evaluations, October 2013

10. ECD/GIZ Position Paper. Propositions for Collaboration with Parliament in the frame of the

ECD Project (under component 1&3), October 2013

11. Kasfir, Nelson and Stephen Hippo Twebaze 2013. “Performance Effectiveness of Lawmaking

and Oversight: The 6th – 8th Uganda Parliaments”.

Annex 2: Organisations and Persons Consulted

Ref Organisation Person Consulted 1 Parliament of Uganda John Mugabi Bagonza, Director RS 2 Parliament of Uganda Dison Okumu, Director PRS 3 Parliament of Uganda Charles Binwe, Ag. Director IPS & Asst. Director CPS/M&E 4 Uganda Debt Network Juliet Akello (Ms), 5 Uganda Evaluation Association Rosetti N.Nayenga, Secretary General 6 National Planning Authority Chris Otim Nockrach, Planner 7 ECD Project Johanna Pennarz (Ms), Advisor 8 ECD Project Rita Mwase (Ms) 9 ECD Project Isabel Hofstaetter (Ms)

10 Private Evaluation Practice Charles Derek Poate, Evaluation Consultant