scott 1972 clientelism

7/30/2019 Scott 1972 Clientelism

1/24

Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia

Author(s): James C. ScottSource: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 66, No. 1 (Mar., 1972), pp. 91-113Published by: American Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1959280

Accessed: 27/09/2009 16:02

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=apsa.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the

scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that

promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

American Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

The American Political Science Review.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1959280?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=apsahttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=apsahttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1959280?origin=JSTOR-pdf


2/24

Patron-ClientPolitics andPolitical Change in SoutheastAsiaJAMES C. SCOTT

University of Wisconsin, MadisonThe analysis presented here is an effort toelaborate the patron-client model of association,developed largely by anthropologists, and todemonstrate its applicability to political actionin Southeast Asia. Inasmuch as patron-clientstructures are not unique to Southeast Asia butare much in evidence particularly in LatinAmerica, in Africa and in the less developedportions of Europe, the analysis may possiblyhave more general value for an understandingof politics in less developed nations.Western political scientists trying to come togrips with political experience in the ThirdWorld have by and large relied on either (orboth) of two models of association and con-flict. One model is the horizontal, class modelof conflict represented most notably by Marxistthought. It has had some value in explainingconflict within the more modern sector of colo-nial nations and in analyzing special cases inwhich rural social change has been so cataclys-mic as to grind out a dispossessed, revolution-ary agrarian mass. By and large, however, itsoverall value is dubious in the typical nonindus-trial situation where most political groupingscut vertically across class lines and where evennominally class-based organizations like tradeunions operate within parochial boundaries ofethnicity or religion or are simply personal ve-hicles. In a wider sense, too, the fact that classcategories are not prominent in either oral orwritten political discourse in the Third Worlddamages their a priori explanatory value.The second model, and one which comesmuch closer to matching the "real" categoriessubjectively used by the people being studied,emphasizes primordial sentiments (such asethnicity, language, and religion), rather thanhorizontal class ties. Being more reflective ofself-identification, the primordial model natu-rally helps to explain the tension and conflictthat increasingly occurred as these isolated, as-criptive groups came into contact and com-peted for power. Like the class model, however-although less well developed theoretically-the primordial model is largely a conflictmodel and is of great value in analyzing hos-tilities between more or less corporate and as-criptive cultural groupings.' Important as such' Two influential anthropologists who employ thismode of analysis arc: Clifford Gecrtz ("The Integra-

conflict has been, it hardly begins to exhaustthe political patterns of Southeast Asia and Af-rica, let alone Latin America. If we are to ac-count, say, for intra-ethnic politics or for pat,terns of cooperation and coalition buildingamong primordial groups, then the primordialmodel cannot provide us with much analyticalleverage.The need to develop a conceptual structurethat would help explain political activity thatdoes not depend solely on horizontal or primor-dial sentiments is readily apparent in SoutheastAsia.2 In the Philippines, for example, classanalysis can help us understand the recurrentagrarian movements in Central Luzon (e.g.,Sakdalistas and Huks) among desperate tenantsand plantation laborers; but it is of little help inexplaining how Magsaysay succeeded in wean-ing many rebels away from the Huks, or, moreimportant, in analyzing the normal patterns ofpolitical competition between Philippine par-ties. In Thailand, primordial demands may helpus discern the basis of dissident movements inNorth and Northeast Thailand, but neither pri-mordialism nor class analysis explains the intri-cate pattern of the personal factions and coali-tions that are at the center of oligarchic Thaitive Revolution," in Geertz, ed., Old Societies andNew States [New York: The Free Press of Glencoe,1963]); and Max Gluckman (Custom and Conflict inAfrica [Oxford: Basil and Blackwell, 1963]).

2 number of political studies of Southeast Asiahave dealt with factionalism or patron-client ties. Themost outstanding is Carl Lande's Leaders, Factions,and Parties: the Structure of Philippine Politics, Mono-graph No. 6 (New Haven: Yale University-South-east Asia Studies, 1964). For the Thai political sys-tem, Fred W. Riggs' Thailand: The Modernization ofa Bureaucratic Polity (Honolulu: East-West CenterPress, 1966) and David A. Wilson's Politics in Thai-land (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962) pursuea similar line of analysis; and for Burma, see LucianW. Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building:Burma's Search for Identity (New Haven: Yale Uni-versity Press, 1962). Some notable attempts to docomparable studies outside Southeast Asia are: ColinLeys, Politicians and Policies: An Essay on Politics inAcholi Uganda 1962-1965 (Nairobi: East Africa Pub-lishing House, 1967); Myron Weiner, Party-Buildingin a New Nation: The Indian National Congress (Chi-cago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Paul R.Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian State (Berkeleyand Los Angeles: University of California Press,1965); Frederick G. Bailey, Politics and SocialChange: Orissa in 1959 (Berkeley and Los Angeles:University of California Press, 1963).91


3/24

92 The AmericanPolitical Science Review Vol. 66politics. The almost perpetual conflicts betweenthe central Burman state and its separatist hillpeoples and minorities are indeed primordial,communal issues, but communalism is of nouse in accounting for the intra-Burman strug-gles between factions within the Anti-FascistPeople's Freedom League (AFPFL) or, later,within the military regime. Ethnicity and classdo carry us far in explaining racial hostilitiesand intra-Chinese conflict in Malaya, but theyare less helpful when it comes to intra-Malaypolitics or to interracial cooperation at the topof the Alliance party.3As these examples indicate, when we leavethe realm of class conflict or communalism,we are likely to find ourselves in the realm ofinformal power groups, leadership-centeredcliques and factions, and a whole panoply ofmore or less instrumental ties that characterizemuch of the political process in Southeast Asia.The structure and dynamics of such seeminglyad hoc groupings can, I believe, be best under-stood from the perspective of patron-client re-lations. The basic pattern is an informal clusterconsisting of a power figure who is in a positionto give security, inducements, or both, and hispersonal followers who, in return for such bene-fits, contribute their loyalty and personal assis-tance to the patron's designs. Such vertical pat-terns of patron-client linkages represent an im-portant structural principle of Southeast Asianpolitics.Until recently the use of patron-client analy-sis has been the province of anthropologists,who found it particularly useful in penetratingbehind the often misleading formal arrange-ments in small local communities where inter-personal power relations were salient. Termswhich are related to patron-client structuresin the anthropological literature-including"clientelism," "dyadic contract," "personal net-work," "action-set"-reflect an attempt on thepart of anthropologists to come to grips withthe mosiac of nonprimordial divisions. Infor-mal though such networks are, they are built,they are maintained, and they interact in waysthat will permit generalization.Although patron-client analysis provides asolid basis for comprehending the structure anddynamics of nonprimordial cleavages at thelocal level, its value is not limited to villagestudies. Nominally modern institutions such asbureaucracies and political parties in Southeast

3Class as well as ethnicity is relevant to Malay-Chinese conflict, since the different economic structureof each community places them in conflict. Many arural Malay experiences the Chinese not only as pork-eating infidels but as middlemen, money lenders,shopkeepers, etc.-as the cutting edge of the capitalistpenetration of the countryside.

Asia are often thoroughly penetrated by infor-mal patron-client networks that undermine theformal structure of authority. If we are tograsp why a bureaucrat's authority is likely todepend more on his personal following and ex-trabureaucratic connections than on his formalpost, or why political parties seem more like adhoc assemblages of notables together with theirentourages than arenas in which established in-terests are aggregated, we must rely heavily onpatron-client analysis. The dynamics of per-sonal alliance networks are as crucial in theday-to-day realities of national institutions as inlocal politics; the main difference is simply thatsuch networks are more elaborately disguisedby formal facades in modern institutions.In what follows, I attempt to clarify what pa-tron-client ties are, how they affect politicallife, and how they may be applied to the dy-namics of Southeast Asian politics. After 1)defining the nature of the patron-client link anddistinguishing it from other social ties, the pa-per 2) discriminates among different varietiesof patron-client bonds and thereby establishessome important dimensions of variation, and3) examines both the survival of and the trans-formations in patron-client links in SoutheastAsia since colonialism and the impact of majorsocial changes (such as the growth of markets,the expanded role of the state, and so forth) onthe content of these ties.

I. The Nature of Patron-Client TiesThe Basis and Operation of Personal Exchange.While the actual use of the terms "patron" and"client" is largely confined to the Mediter-ranean and Latin American areas, comparablerelationships can be found in most cultures andare most strikingly present in preindustrial na-tions. The patron-client relationship-an ex-change relationship between roles-may be de-fined as a special case of dyadic (two-person)ties involving a largely instrumental friendshipin which an individual of higher socioeconomicstatus (patron) uses his own influence and re-sources to provide protection or benefits, orboth, for a person of lower status (client) who,for his part, reciprocates by offering generalsupport and assistance, including personal ser-vices, to the patron.4

4There is an extensive anthropological literaturedealing with patron-client bonds which I have reliedon in constructing this definition. Some of the mostuseful sources are: George M. Foster, "The DyadicContract in Tzintzuntzan: Patron-Client Relation-ship," American Anthropologist, 65 (1963), 1280-1294; Eric Wolf, "Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations," in Michael Banton, ed., The SocialAnthropology of Complex Societies, Association ofApplied Social Anthropology Monograph #4 (Lon-


4/24

1972 Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia 93In the reciprocity demanded by the relation-ship each partner provides a service that is val-ued by the other. Although the balance of bene-fits may heavily favor the patron, some reci-procity is involved, and it is this quality which,

as Powell notes, distinguishes patron-clientdyads from relationships of pure coercion orformal authority that also may link individualsof different status.5 A patron may have somecoercive power and he may also hold an officialposition of authority. But if the force or au-thority at his command are alone sufficient toensure the compliance of another, he has noneed of patron-client ties which require somereciprocity. Typically, then, the patron operatesin a context in which community norms andsanctions and the need for clients require atleast a minimum of bargaining and reciprocity;the power imbalance is not so great as to permita pure command relationship.Three additional distinguishing features ofpatron-client links, implied by the definition,merit brief elaboration: their basis in inequal-ity, their face-to-face character, and their dif-fuse flexibility. All three factors are most ap-parent in the ties between a high-status land-lord and each of his tenants or sharecroppers ina traditional agrarian economy-a relationshipthat serves, in a sense, as the prototype of pa-tron-client ties.6First, there is an imbalance in exchange be-tween the two partners which expresses andreflects the disparity in their relative wealth,power, and status. A client, in this sense, issomeone who has entered an unequal exchangerelation in which he is unable to reciprocatefully. A debt of obligation binds him to the pa-tron.7 How does this imbalance in reciprocity

don: Tavistock Publications, 1966), pp. 1-22; J. Camp-bell, Honour, Family, and Patronage (Oxford: Claren-don Press, 1964); John Duncan Powell, "Peasant So-ciety ...," p. 412, Carl Land6, Leaders, Factions andParties ...," Alex Weingrod, "Patrons, Patronage,and Political Parties," Comparative Studies in Societyand History, 10 (July, 1968), pp. 1142-1158.3 Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics,"American Political Science Review, 64 (June, 1970),412.

6 Another comparable model, of course, is the lord-vassal link of high feudalism, except in this relation-ship the mutual rights and obligations were of an al-most formal, contractual nature. Most patron-clientties we will discuss involve tacit, even diffuse stan-dards of reciprocity. Cf. Ruston Coulborn, ed., Feud-alism in History, (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1956).In most communities this sense of obligation is astrong moral force, backed by informal communitysanctions that help bind the client to the patron. Agood account of how such feelings of debt reinforcesocial bonds in the Philippines is Frank Lynch's de-scription of utang nlaloob in Four Readings in Philip-

arise? It is based, as Peter Blau has shown inhis work, Exchange and Power in Social Life,8on the fact that the patron often is in a positionto supply unilaterally goods and services whichthe potential client and his family need fortheir survival and well being. A locally domi-nant landlord, for example, is frequently themajor source of protection, of security, of em-ployment, of access to arable land or to educa-tion, and of food in bad times. Such servicescould hardly be more vital, and hence the de-mand for them tends to be highly inelastic; thatis, an increase in their effective cost will not di-minish demand proportionately. Being a mo-nopolist, or at least an oligopolist, for criticalneeds, the patron is in an ideal position to de-mand compliance from those who wish to sharein these scarce commodities.Faced with someone who can supply or de-prive him of basic wants, the potential client intheory has just four alternatives to becomingthe patron's subject.9 First he may reciprocatewith a service that the patron needs badlyenough to restore the balance of exchange. Inspecial cases of religious, medical, or martialskills such reciprocation may be possible, butthe resources of the client, given his position inthe stratification, are normally inadequate to re-establish an equilibrium. A potential client mayalso try to secure the needed services elsewhere.If the need for clients is especially great, and ifthere is stiff competition among patron-suppli-ers, the cost of patron-controlled services willbe less.10 In most agrarian settings, substantiallocal autonomy tends to favor the growth oflocal power monopolies by officials or landedgentry. A third possibility is that clients maycoerce the patron into providing services. Al-though the eventuality that his clients mightturn on him may prompt a patron to meet atleast the minimum normative standards of ex-change,11 the patron's local power and the ab-pine Values, Institute of Philippine Culture Papers,No. 2 (Quezon City: Aleneo de Manila Press, 1964).

8 Peter M. Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life(New York: Wiley, 1964), pp. 21-22. Blau's discus-sion of unbalanced exchange and the disparities inpower and deference such imbalance fosters is di-rectly relevant to the basis of patron-client relation-ships.9These general alternatives are deduced by Blau(p. 118) and are intended to be exhaustive.'0Later, we will examine certain conditions underwhich this may actually occur.'"There is little doubt that this last resort usuallyacts as a brake on oppression. The proximate causesfor many peasant uprisings in medieval Europe dur-ing hard times often involved revocation of smallrights granted serfs by their lords-e.g., gleaningrights, use of the commons for pasturage, hunting andfishing privileges, reduction of dues in bad crop years-rights which offered a margin of security. Such re-


5/24

94 The American Political Science Review Vol. 66sence of autonomousorganizationamong hisclients make this unlikely. Finally, clients cantheoreticallydo without a patron'sservices alto-gether. This alternative s remote,given the pa-tron's controlover vital servicessuch as protec-tion, land,and employment.Affiliatingwith a patron is neither a purelycoerced decision nor is it the result of unre-stricted choice. Exactly where a particularpa-tron-clientdyadfalls on the continuumdependson the four factors mentioned.If the client hashighly valued services to reciprocatewith, if hecan choose among competingpatrons,if forceis available o him, or if he can manage withoutthe patron's help-then the balance will bemore nearly equal. But if, as is generallythecase, the client has few coercive or exchangeresources o bring to bear againsta monopolist-patron whose services he desperatelyneeds, thedyad is more nearlya coerciveone.12The degree of compliance a client gives hispatron is a direct function of the degree of im-balance in the exchange relationship-of howdependentthe client is on his patron'sservices.An imbalancethus creates a sense of debt orobligation on the client's part so long as itmeets his basic subsistence needs and repre-sents, for the patron,a "'store of value'-socialcredit that . . . (the patron) can draw on toobtain advantages at a later time."'13 The pa-tron's dominationof needed services, enablinghim to build up savings of deference and com-pliance which enhance his status, and repre-sents a capacityfor mobilizing a group of sup-porterswhen he cares to. The largera patron'sclientele and the more dependenton him theyare, the greaterhis latent capacity to organizevolts, even though they generally failed, served as anobject lesson to neighboring patrons. Cf. FriedrichEngels, The Peasant War in Germany (New York:International Publishers, 1966); Norman Cohn, ThePursuit of the Millennium (New York: Harper, 1961);and E. B. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels (New York:Norton, 1959).1Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life, pp.119-120, makes this point somewhat differently: "Thedegree of dependence of individuals on a person whosupplies valued services is a function of the differencebetween their value and that of the second best al-ternative open to them." The patron may, of course,be dependent himself on having a large number ofclients, but his dependence upon any one client ismuch less than the dependence of any one client uponhim. In this sense the total dependence of patron andclient are similar, but almost all the client's depend-ence is focused on one individual, whereas the patron'sdependence is thinly spread (like that of an insur-ance company-Blau, p. 137) across many clients. Cf.Godfrey and Monica Wilson, The Analysis of SocialChange; Based on Observations in Central Africa(Cambridge: The University Press, 1945), pp. 28, 40."Blau, p. 269.

group action. In the typical agrarian patron-client setting this capacity to mobilize a follow-ing is crucial in the competition among patronsfor regional preeminence. As Blau describes thegeneral situation,The high-status members furnish instrumentalassistance to the low-status ones in exchange fortheir respect and compliance, which help the high-status members in their competitionfor a dominantposition in the group.1

A second distinguishing feature of the pa-tron-client dyad is the face-to-face, personalquality of the relationship. The continuing pat-tern of reciprocity that establishes and solidifiesa patron-client bond often creates trust andaffection between the partners. When a clientneeds a small loan or someone to intercede forhim with the authorities, he knows he can relyon his patron; the patron knows, in turn, that"his men" will assist him in his designs when heneeds them.'5 Furthermore, the mutual expec-tations of the partners are backed by commu-nity values and ritual.In most contexts the affection and obligationinvested in this tie between nonrelatives is ex-pressed by the use of terms of address betweenpartners that are normally reserved for closekin. The tradition of choosing godparents inCatholic nations is often used by a family tocreate a fictive kinship tie with a patron-thegodfather thereby becoming like a brother tothe parents.'6 Whether the model of obligationestablished is father-son, uncle-nephew, or el-der-younger brother, the intention is similar: toestablish as firm a bond of affection and loyaltyas that between close relatives. Thus while apatron and client are very definitely alive to theinstrumental benefits of their association, it isnot simply a neutral link of mutual advantage.On the contrary, it is often a durable bond ofgenuine mutual devotion that can survive se-vere testing.The face-to-face quality of the patron-clientdyad, as well as the size of the patron's re-source base, limits the number of direct activeties a single patron can have.'7 Even with vast

14 Blau, p. 127.':The classic analysis of the functions of gift-giving(prestation) in creating alliances, demonstrating su-periority, and renewing obligations, is Marcel Mauss,The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Ar-chaic Societies (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press ofGlencoe, 1954).16 Sidney Mintz and Eric Wolf, "An Analysis ofRitual Co-Parenthood (Compadrazgo)," SouthwesternJournal of Anthropology 6 (Winter, 1948) pp. 425-437.7Carl Land6, "Networks and Groups in SoutheastAsia: Some Observations on the Group Theory ofPolitics," Unpublished manuscript (March, 1970), p. 6.


6/24

1972 Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia 95resources, the personal contact and friendshipbuilt into the link make it highly unlikely thatan active clientele could exceed, say, one hun-dred persons. The total following of a given pa-tron may be much larger than this, but nor-mally all except 20-30 clients would be linkedto the patron through intermediaries. Since weare dealing with positive emotional ties (the ra-tio of "calculation" to affection may of coursevary), a leader and his immediate entouragewill be comparatively small.The third distinctive quality of patron-clientties, one that reflects the affection involved, isthat they are diffuse, "whole-person" relation-ships rather than explicit, impersonal-contractbonds. A landlord may, for example, have aclient who is connected to him by tenancy,friendship, past exchanges of services, the pasttie of the client's father to his father, and ritualcoparenthood. Such a strong "multiplex" rela-tion, as Adrian Mayer terms it,"' covers a widerange of potential exchanges. The patron mayvery well ask the client's help in preparing awedding, in winning an election campaign, orin finding out what his local rivals are up to;the client may approach the patron for help inpaying his son's tuition, in filling out govern-ment forms, or in getting food or medicinewhen he falls on bad times. The link, then, is avery flexible one in which the needs and re-sources of the partners, and hence the nature ofthe exchange, may vary widely over time. Un-like explicit contractual relations, the very dif-fuseness of the patron-client linkage contrib-utes to its survival even during rapid socialchange-it tends to persist so long as the twopartners have something to offer one another.'9Just as two brothers may assist each other in ahost of ways, patron-client partners have a rela-tionship that may also be invoked for almostany purpose; the chief differences are the

"8Adrian C. Mayer, "The Significance of Quasi-Groups in the Study of Complex Societies," in MichaelBanton, ed., The Social Anthropology of Complex So-cieties, pp. 97-122. Mayer would call a short-term,contractual interaction that was limited in scope asimplex tie.19In another sense the patron-client dyad is fragile.Since it is a diffuse, noncontractual bond, each part-ner is continually on guard against the possibility thatthe other will make excessive demands on him, thusexploiting the friendship. A patron may, for example,prefer to hire an outsider for an important job be-cause he can then contractually insist that the workbe of top quality. With a client, it would be a delicatematter to criticize the work. As in friendship, "thediffuseness of the [patron-client] obligation places acorresponding demand for self-restraint on the partiesif the relationship is to be maintained." William A.Gamson, Power and Discontent (Homewood, Illinois:Dorsey, 1968), p. 167.

greater calculation of benefits and the inequal-ity that typifies patron-client exchange.The Distinctiveness of the Patron. The role ofpatron ought to be distinguished from such roledesignations as "broker," "middleman," or"boss" with which it is sometimes confounded.Acting as a "broker" or "middleman"-termswhich I shall use interchangeably-meansserving as an intermediary to arrange an ex-change or transfer between two parties whoare not in direct contact. The role of middle-man, then, involves a three party exchange inwhich the middleman functions as an agent anddoes not himself control the thing transferred.A patron, by contrast, is part of a two-personexchange and operates with resources he him-self owns or directly controls.20 Finally, theterms "middleman" and "broker" do not spe-cify the relative status of the actor to others inthe transaction, while a patron is by definitionof superior rank to his client.Important as this distinction is, it is easilylost sight of for two reasons. First, it is not al-ways a simple task to determine if someonepersonally controls the resources he uses to ad-vance himself. What of the case in which a civilservant distributed the subordinate posts in hisjurisdiction to create an entourage? Here itwould seem that he was acting as a patron, in-asmuch as the jobs he gave out were meant aspersonal gifts from the store of scarce values hecontrolled and were intended to create a feelingof personal debt and obligation among recipi-ents. The social assessment of the nature of thegift is thus crucial. If we were to find, on theother hand, that the civil servant was viewed assomeone who had acted as an agent of job-seekers and put them in touch with a politicianwho controlled the jobs, then he would be act-ing as a broker. It is only natural that many anambitious public official will seek to misrepre-sent acts of brokerage or simple adherence tothe rules as personal acts of patronage, therebybuilding his following.21 To the extent that he

20 A broker does, in a real sense have a resource:namely, connections. That is, the broker's power-hiscapacity to help people-is predicated on his ties withthird parties.21U.S. Congressmen spend a good portion of theirtime trying to seize personal credit for decisions whichbenefit their constituents whether or not they had any-thing to do with the decision-as broker or patron.For similar reasons, cabinet ministers in Malaysia and

elsewhere have travelled about the country with gov-ernment checks in hand, making grants to mosques,temples, and charitable groups in a way that will dra-matize the largesse as an act of personal patronage.Every government decision that benefits someone repre-sents an opportunity for someone to use that act toenlarge the circle of those personally obligated to him.


7/24

96 The American Political Science Review Vol. 66succeeds in representinghis act as a personalact of generosity,he will call forththatsense ofpersonal obligationthat will bind his subordi-nates to him as clients.22A second potential source of confusion inthis distinction s that the termsdesignaterolesand not persons, and thus it is quite possiblefor a simle individualto act both as a brokerand a patron.Such a role combinationi notonly possible,but is empiricallyquite common.When a local landowningpatron,for example,becomesthe head of his village'spoliticalpartyhe is likely to become the middlemanbetweenmany villagersand the resourcescontrolledbyhigherpartyofficials. In this case he may haveclients for whom he also servesas broker.Thediffuse claims of the patron-clienttie actuallymake it normalfor the patronto act as a bro-ker for his clients when they must deal withpowerful third parties-much as the patronsaint in folk Catholicismwho directlyhelps hisdevoteeswhile also acting as their brokerwiththe Lord.23 If on the other hand, the politicalparty simply gives the local patron direct con-trol of its programsand grants in the area, ittherebyenhanceshis resourcesfor becoming apaton on a largerscaleand eliminates he needfor brokerage.Patrons ought finally to be differentatedfrom other partly related terms for leadershipsuch as "boss,""caudillo,' or "cacique."?C9BSS1is a designationat once vague and richly con-notative. Although a boss may often functionas a patron,the termatself implies (a) thathe isthe most powerful man in the arena and (b)that his power rests more on the inducementsand sanctions at his disposal than on affectionor status.As distinctfrom a patronwho may ormay not be the supreme ocal leaderandwhoseleadershiprests at least partly on rank and af-fection, the boss is a secular leader par excel-lence who dependsalmost entirely on palpableinducementsand threatsto movepeople.As weshall show later, a settledagrarianenvironmentwith a recognizedstatus hierarchyis a typicalsetting for leadershipby patrons,while a moremobile, egalitarianenvironment s a typicalset-Eng for the rise of bosses.The final two terms,"caudillo"and "cacique"are most commonlyusedin LatinAmericato designate he regional-often rural-bosses. Again the implicationisthat coercion is a main pillarof power, and inthe case of the caudillo, a personalfollowingis

2X nd it naturally follows that in underdevelopedtries, where the patrimonial view of office isespecially strong, a public post could be a client-creang resource.2 Foster, "The Dyadic Contract in Tzintzuntzan;"pp. 1280.4294.

common." A "cacique"or caudillo " may actas patron to a number of clients but he typi-cally relies too heavily on force and lacks thetraditional legitimacy to function mainly as apatron. At best, a caciqe or caudillo may, likea boss, be a marginalspecial case of a patron,providingthat a portionof his following is be-neathhim socially and bound to him in partbyaffected ties. Over time, however,a metamor-phosis may occur. Just as the successfulbrew-ery owner of late 18th century Englandmightwell anticipatea peerageforhis son, the caciqewho today imposeshis rule by force may do wellenoughto set his son up as a landowner,whosehigh status and legitimacystrengthenshis roleas patron.Patron and Clients as Distinctive Groupings.To this point, the discussion has centered onthe natureof the singlelink betweenpatronandclient If we are to broadenthe analysisto in-cludethe largerstructures hat are relatedby thejoining of many such links, a few new termsmust be introduced.First, when we speak ofa patron's immediate following-those clientswho are directly tied to him-we will refer toa patron-clientcluster. A second term, enlargfing on the cluster but still focusing on one per-son and his vertical links is the patron-clientpyramid. This is simply a vertical extensiondownwardof the cluster in which linkages areintroduced beyond the first-order.25 elow aretypical representations f such links.

Patron-Client luster Patron-Clientyramid

Althoughverticalties are our main concern,wewill occasionally want to analyze horizontaldyadicties, say, betweentwo patronsof compa-rable standing who have made an alliance,Such alliancesoften form the basis of factionalsystems in local politics. Finally, patron-clientFor good descriptions of both types of leadership,see Eric R. Wolf and E. C. Hansen, "Caudillo Poitics: A Structural Analysis," Comparative Studies liSociety and History, 9, 2 (January, 1967), 168-179and Paul Friedrich, "The I.egtimacy of a Cacique,"in Marc J. Swartz, ed., Local Level Politics: Socialand Cultural Perspective (Chcago: Aldine 1968),pp. 243-269.'e terms "cluster," "network," and "firs and"aead" orders are adapted froi a somewhat similarusage by J. A. Barnes, "Netorks and Political Pr"csea" in Swartz, ed, pp. 107-130.


8/24

1972 Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia 97networks are not ego-focused but refer to theoverall pattern of patron-client linkages (plushorizontal patron alliances) joining the actorsin a given area or community.Patron-client clusters are one of a number ofways in which people who are not close kincome to be associated. Most alternative formsof association involve organizing around cate-gorical ties, both traditional-such as ethnicity,religion, or caste-and modern-such as occu-pation or class-which produce groups that arefundamentally different in structure and dy-namics. The special character of patron-clientclusters stems, I believe, from the fact that, un-like categorically-based organizations, suchclusters a) have a basis of membership that isspecific to each link,26 and b) are based on in-dividual ties to a leader rather than on sharedcharacteristics or horizontal ties among follow-ers.Some other important distinctions betweencategorical and patron-client groupings followfrom these particular principles of organiza-tion. Here I rely heavily on Carl Lande's moreelaborate comparisons between dyadic follow-ings and categorical groups.27

1. Members' Goals: Clients have particular-istic goals which depend on their personalties to the leader, whereas categoricalgroup members have common goals thatderive from shared characteristics whichdistinguish them from members of othersuch groups.2. Autonomy of Leadership: A patron haswide autonomy in making alliances andpolicy decisions as long as he provides forthe basic material welfare of his clients,whereas the leader of a categorical groupmust generally respect the collective inter-est of the group he leads.

3. Stability of Group: A patron-client cluster,being based on particularistic verticallinks, is highly dependent on its leader'sskills and tends to flourish or disintegratedepending on the resources of the leaderand the satisfaction of individual clientdemands. A categorical group, by con-trast, is rooted more firmly in horizontallyshared qualities and is thus less dependentfor its survival on the quality of its lead-ership and more durable in its pursuit ofbroader, collective (often policy) inter-ests.

I Mayer, "The Significance of Quasi-Groups . . ."p. 109.27Land, "Networks and Groups . . ." (unpublishedmanuscript), pp. 6-12.

4. Compositionof Group:Patron-client lus-ters, because of the way they are created,are likely to be more heterogeneous inclass composition than categorical groupswhich are based on some distinctive qual-ity which members share. By definition,patron-client pyramids join people of dif-ferent status rankings while categoricalgroups may or may not be homogeneousin status.5. Corporateness of Group: In a real sense apatron-client cluster is not a group at allbut rather an "action-set" that exists be-cause of the vertical links to a commonleader-links which the leader may acti-vate in whole or in part.28 Followers arecommonly not linked directly to one an-other and may, in fact, be unknown toeach other. An organized categoricalgroup, by contrast, is likely to have hori-zontal links that join members together sothat it is possible to talk of a group exis-tence independent of the leader.

Although this listing is not exhaustive, itdoes illustrate the special character of patron-client networks. Bearing in mind the genericqualities of these ties, we now turn to the rangeof variation within the genus.II. Variation in Patron-Client Ties

One could potentially make almost limitlessdistinctions among patron-client relationships.The dimensions of variation considered hereare selected because they seem particularly rel-evant to our analytical goal of assessing thecentral changes in such ties within SoutheastAsia. Similar distinctions should be germane tothe analysis of other preindustrial nations aswell.The Resource Base of Patronage. A potentialpatron assembles clients on the basis of his abil-ity to assist them. For his investment of assets,the patron expects a return in human resources-in the form of the strength of obligation andthe number of clients obligated to him. The re-source base or nature of the assets a patron hasat his disposal can vary widely. One useful ba-sis for distinguishing among resources is the di-rectness with which they are controlled. Pa-trons may, in this sense, rely on a) their ownknowledge and skills, b) direct control of per-sonal real property, or c) indirect control ofthe property or authority of others (often thepublic). The resources of skill and knowledgeare most recognizable in the roles of lawyer,

-'Mayer, p. 110.


9/24

98 The American Political Science Review Vol. 66doctor, literates, local military chief, teacher-religious or secular. Those equipped with theseskills control scarce resources than can enhancethe social status, health, or material well beingof another. Inasmuch as such resources rest onknowledge, they are less perishable than morematerial sources-although the time of the ex-pert is limited-and can be used again andagain without being diminished. Such resourcesare relatively, but not entirely, secure. In thecase of lawyers and literati, for example, theexchange price of their services depends respec-tively on the continued existence of a court sys-tem and the veneration of a particular literarytradition, both of which are subject to change.The value of a local military chief's protectionis similarly vulnerable to devaluation once thenation state has established local law and order.Reliance on direct control of real property isa second common means of building a clien-tele. Traditionally, the typical patron controlledscarce land. Those he permitted to farm it assharecroppers or tenants became permanentlyobligated to him for providing the means oftheir subsistence. Any businessman is in a simi-lar position; as the owner of a tobacco factory,a rice mill, or a small store he is able to obli-gate many of those of lower status whom heemploys, to whom he extends credit, or withwhom he does business. This kind of resource,in general, is more perishable than personalskills. A landlord has only so many arableacres, a businessman only so many jobs, ashopkeeper so much ready cash, and each mustcarefully invest those resources to bring themaximum return. Like any real property, more-over, private real property is subject to seizureor restrictions on its use.A third resource base available to the poten-tial patron is what might be called indirect,office-based property. Here we refer to patronswho build a clientele on the strength of theirfreedom to dispense rewards placed in theirtrust by some third party (parties). A villageheadman who uses his authority over the distri-bution of communal land to the poor or thedistribution of corvee labor and taxation bur-dens in order to extend his personal clientelewould be a typical example of traditional office-based patronship. One can classify similarlyoffice-holders in colonial or contemporary set-tings whose discretionary powers over employ-ment, promotion, assistance, welfare, licensing,permits, and other scarce values can serve asthe basis of a network of personally obligatedfollowers. Politicians and administrators whoexploit their office in this way to reward clientswhile violating the formal norms of public con-duct are, of course, acting corruptly. Finally,

we should add private-sector office-holders inthe private sector such as plantation managers,purchasing agents, and hiring bosses, who mayalso use their discretionary authority to nurturea clientele.Indirect, office-based property is least securein many respects, as its availability depends oncontinuity in a position that is ultimately givenor withdrawn by third parties. A landlord willusually retain his local base whereas an office-holder is likely to be swept out by a new victorat the polls or simply by a power strugglewithin the ruling group. In spite of the risks in-volved, these posts are attractive because theresources connected with many of them are fargreater than those which an individual canamass directly.The categories of resources just discussed arenot mutually exclusive. It is common, for ex-ample, for a patron to have a client who is obli-gated to him by being a tenant on his land andalso by having secured an agricultural loanthrough his patron's chairmanship of the rulingparty's local branch. The resources that cementa dyadic tie may thus be multiple-it is often aquestion of deciding which is the predominantresource. Much the same analysis can be madeof a patron-client cluster or network, since apatron may have clients who are bound to him

by quite different resources, and it is often im-portant to determine what the main resource isthat holds the cluster together.Resource Base of Clientage. As the other mem-ber of a reciprocating pair, the client is calledupon to provide assistance and services whenthe patron requires them. The variation in thenature of such assistance is another means ofdistinguishing one patron-client dyad from an-other. Here one might want to differentiate:(1) labor sevices and economic support, asprovided by a rent-paying tenant or employee,(2) military or fighting duties, such as thoseperformed by members of a bandit group fortheir chief, and (3) political services such ascanvassing or otherwise acting as an agent of apolitician. Within the "political service" cate-gory one may wish to separate electoral ser-vices from nonelectoral political help. I shouldadd here that the term "clients" can refer tothose who are in the middle of a patron-clientpyramid-being a client to someone higher up.and a patron to those below. In this case, a su-perior patron will be interested in his client'spotential services, but those services will in-clude the size, skills, assets, and status of theclient's own subordinate following.Just as a patron-client dyad can be distin-guished by the main resource base of clientage


10/24

1972 Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia 99so can a patron-client cluster be categorized bythe modal pattern of client services for the clus-ter or pyramid as a whole.Balance of Affective and Instrumental Ties. Bydefinition, instrumental ties play a major role inthe patron-client dyad. It is nonetheless possibleto classify such dyads by the extent to whichaffective bonds are also involved in the relation-ship. At one end of this continuum one mightplace patron-client bonds which, in addition totheir instrumental character, are reinforced byaffective links growing, say, from the patronand the client having been schoolmates, comingfrom the same village, being distant relatives,or simply from mutual love. Comparable affec-tive rewards may also spring from the exchangeof deference on the one hand and noblesseoblige on the other in a settled agrarian statusnetwork-rewards that have value beyond thematerial exchanges they often involve. At theother end of the spectrum lies a dyadic tiemuch closer to an almost neutral exchange ofgoods and services. The more purely coercivethe relationship is and the less traditional legiti-macy it has, the more likely that affective bondswill be minimal.This distinction has obvious analytical value.If we were to look at a patron's entire follow-ing, we would be able to classify each verticalbond acrording to the ratio of affective to in-strumental rewards involved. (one could, ofcourse, do the same for horizontal alliances.Using this criterion we could identify a set offollowers among whom the ratio of affective toinstrumental ties was relatively high, reflectingperhaps distant kinship, old village or neighbor-hood ties, or comparable bonds. The loyalty ofthis set of followers would be less dependentupon a continued flow of material benefits, sim-ply because their loyalty is partly based on non-material exchanges. As we move beyond thispartly affective following to a patron's othersupporters, the weight of instrumental, usuallymaterial, ties becomes relatively more impor-tant. The nature of a man's following-the bal-ance of affective to instrumental ties obligatinghis clients to him-can tell us something aboutits stability under different conditions. When apatron increases his material resource base, it ishis instrumental following that will tend to

29 There is no contradiction, I believe, in holdingthat a patron-client link originates in a power rela-tionship and also holding that genuine affective tiesreinforce that link. Affective ties often help legitimatea relationship that is rooted in inequality. For an ar-gument that, in contrast, begins with the assumptionthat some cultures engender a psychological need fordependence, see Dominique 0. Mannoni, Prosperoand Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization (NewYork: Praeger, 1964).

grow rapidly, and when he is in decline, thatsame following will shrink rapidly, as clientslook for a more promising leader. The degreeof dependence on material incentives within afollowing is, in principle, a quality one couldmeasure by establishing how much more thantheir present material rewards a rival patronwould have to offer to detach a given numberof another's clients.The affective-instrumental distinction justmade leads to a similar, but not identical, dis-tinction between the core and periphery of aman's following. These categories actually aredistributed along a continuum; at the peripheryof a man's following are those clients who arerelatively easy to detach while at the core arefollowers who are more firmly bound to him.The periphery is composed of clients boundlargely by instrumental rewards, while the coreis composed of clients linked by strong affectiveties, as well as clients who are attracted to apatron by such strong instrumental ties thatthey seem unbreakable.30 This amounts, ineffect, to a distinction between a man's virtuallyirreducible following and his more or less fluc-tuating, "fair-weather" following. Patrons canthen be differentiated by the size of their core-following relative to their peripheral-following.A landlord or a businessman will generallyhave a sizable core group composed both of hisfriends, kin, etc., and of his tenants or employ-ees. This nucleus is his initial following; hisclientele may grow larger, but it is unlikely tocontract further than this durable core. A poli-tician or bureaucrat, on the other hand, unlesshe is privately wealthy, is likely to have a com-paratively smaller core group composed mostlyof those with whom he has strong affective tiesand, hence, a relatively large proportion of"fair-weather" clients. The blows of fortunesuch a politician or administrator suffers aremore likely to be instantly and fully reflected ina reduction of the size of his clientele, which islargely a calculating one. Politicians, and bu-reaucrats, because they have smaller core fol-lowings and because they can, through theiroffice, often tap vast resources, are apt to havemeteoric qualities as patrons; the landholder,by contrast, is likely to cast a steadier, if dim-mer, light.Balance of Voluntarism and Coercion. Thereare obvious and important differences in the de-gree of coercion involved in a patron-clientbond. At one end are the clients with virtuallyno choice but to follow the patron who directly

: F. G. Bailey uses the terms "core" and "support"in much the same fashion: see his "Parapolitical Sys-tems," in Swartz, ed., Local-Level Politics, pp. 281-294.


11/24

100 The American Political Science Review Vol. 66controls their means of subsistence. Here onemight place a tenant whose landlord provideshis physical security, his land, his implementsand seed, in a society where land is scarce andinsecurity rife. Nearer the middle of this con-tinuum would perhaps be the bonds betweenindependent smallholders who depend on alandlord for the milling and marketing of theircrops, for small loans, and for assistance withthe police and administration. Such bonds arestill based on inequality, but the client, becausehe has some bargaining power, is not simplyputty in his patron's hands. Finally, let us as-sume that an electoral system has given clientsa new resource and has spurred competitionamong patrons for followings that can swingthe election to them. In this case the inequalityin bargaining power is further reduced, and theclient emerges as more nearly an independentpolitical actor whose demands will receive afull hearing from his patron.In general, the oppression of the client isgreater when the patron's services are vital,when he exercises a monopoly over their distri-bution, and when he has little need for clientshimself. The freedom of the client is enhancedmost when there are many patrons whose ser-vices are not vital and who compete with oneanother to assemble a large clientele-say forelectoral purposes.The greater the coercive power of the patronvis-a-vis his client, the fewer rewards he mustsupply to retain him. A patron in a strong posi-tion is more likely to employ sanctions-threatsto punish the client or to withdraw benefits hecurrently enjoys-whereas a relatively weakerpatron is more likely to offer inducements-promises to reward a client with benefits hedoes not now enjoyA' In each instance, supe-rior control over resources is used to gain thecompliance of followers, but the use of sanc-tions indicates a higher order of power than theuse of inducements.Assessment of the coercive balance and ofthe ratio of sanctions to inducements can bemade not only for a dyad but also for a patron-client cluster or pyramid. The cluster of a localbaron with a private army may be held intactby a mix of deference and. sanctions, while acampaigning politician may build a cluster sim-ply with favors if he has no coercive power ortraditional legitimacy. Each cluster or pyramidhas its special vulnerability. The coercive clus-ter will be jeopardized by a breach of the pa-tron's local power monopoly, and a cluster

3 Here I follow the distinctions made in Blau, Ex-change and Power in Social Life, pp. 115-118. Otherpower theorists have made the same distinction.

based on inducements will be in danger if itsleader's ncome or access to public funds is cutoff.DurabilityOverTime. Patron-clientdyadsmaybe rather ephemeral,or they may persist forlong periods.32 n a traditionalsetting they arelikely to last until one of the partnershas died.Knowing how durable such ties are can alsotell us something about the structure of com-petition over time. Where dyads are persistentthey tend to producepersistentfactional struc-tures with some continuity in personnel overtime, at least stable clusters or pyramids thatmay recombine in a variety of ways but areconstructedfrom the same components.Wheredyads are fragile, personal alignments mayundergoan almosttotalreorderingwithina dec-ade.Since patron-client clusters are based ulti-mately on power relations, they will endurebest in a stable setting that preservesexistingpower positions. A particularpatron will thusretain his clients as long as he continues todominate the supply of services they need. Apatronis also likely to keep his followersif thescope of reciprocitythat binds them is greater.That is, the more of the client's vital needs apatroncan meet (i.e., if he can supplynot onlyland and securitybut also influencewiththe ad-ministration,help in arrangingmortgages orschooling, and so forth), the greater the ten-dency for the tie to be invoked frequentlyandto endure over long periods. Compared withpatrons who can provide only legal services,only financialhelp, or only educationaladvan-tages, the multiplexbond between patron andclient is a solid linkagethat servesmanyneeds;since it is more of a whole-person ie, it will becalled into actionoften.Homogeneityof Following. A patronmay havea heterogeneous et of followersdrawnfrom allwalks of life, or he may have a following com-posed, say, of only his poor sharecroppersoronly clerical subordinates in his office.33Theproportionof a man'ssupporterswho share so-cial characteristicsand the salience of thosesocial characteristics o them constitute a mea-sure of how homogeneousa following is. Sincea patron,by definition,occupiesa highersocialstation than his clients, the greaterthe homo-geneity in a following, the greater the latent31Both J. A. Barnes, "Networks and Political Pro-cess," in Swartz, pp. 107-130, and Powell, PeasantSociety . .. ., p. 413, discuss this variable.

3 This variable thus relates not to a dyad but to thefollowing in a cluster or pyramid.


12/24

1972 Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia 101shared interests among followers that mightthreaten the relationship. When a landed patronwhose clients are his tenants, for example, sellsoff what had been common pasture land, allhis tenants are equally affected. Their sharedsituation and the common experiences it pro-vides create a potential for horizontal ties,whereas a heterogeneous clientele lacks thispotential.Field Variables. Occasionally, we will wantto describe and contrast configurations of pa-tron-client clusters within a political arenarather than dealing with a single cluster ordyad. Four particularly useful distinctions inthis respect are a) the degree of monopoly overlocal resources by a single patron, b) the de-gree of monopoly over links to other structuresby a single patron, c) the density of patron-client linkages in the population,34 and d) theextent of differentiation between different pyra-mids and clusters. The first two variables areself-explanatory and measure the degree ofdominance exercised by a patron over local andsupralocal resources. "Density" refers to theproportion of a given population that is a partof the patron-client network. In some situa-tions, for example, a large part of the lowerclasses may not actually have any vertical linksof clientage to a patron. To gauge accuratelythe explanatory power of patron-client politicsin a political field requires that we know forhow much of the population such ties are effec-tive. Finally, the degree of differentiation amongclusters is a means of discerning whether onecluster looks pretty much like the next one orwhether many clusters are socioeconomicallydistinct. In the classical feudal situation, thepyramidal structure of one lord's small domainwas similar to that of his neighbor-the socialstructure of the landscape resembled a repeti-tive wallpaper pattern-and competition wasthus between almost identical units. In othercircumstances, pyramids may be differentiatedby predominant occupation, by institutionalaffiliation, and so forth, so that the seeds of adistinctive and perhaps durable interest havebeen sown.m. Survival and Development of Patron-ClientTies in Southeast Asia

A. Conditions for SurvivalAs units of political structure, patron-clientclusters not only typify both local and nationalpolitics in Southeast Asia, they are also as char-"My use of the term is adapted from Barnes, p.117.

acteristic of the area's contemporary politics asof its traditional politics. In one sense, the "style"of the patron-client link, regardless of its con-text, is distinctively traditional. It is particu-laristic where (following Parsons) modern linksare universal; it is diffuse and informal wheremodern ties are specific or contractual; and itproduces vertically-integrated groups with shift-ing interests rather than horizontally-integratedgroups with durable interests. Despite their tra-ditional style, however, patron-client clustersboth serve as mechanisms for bringing togetherindividuals who are not kinsmen and as thebuilding-blocks for elaborate networks of ver-tical integration. They cannot, therefore, bemerely dismissed as vestigial remains of archaicstructures but must be analyzed as a type ofsocial bond that may be dominant in some con-texts and marginal in others.In my view, most of traditional and contem-porary Southeast Asia has met three necessaryconditions for the continued vitality of patron-client structures: (1) the persistence of markedinequalities in the control of wealth, status, andpower which have been accepted (until re-cently) as more or less legitimate; (2) the relaxtive absence of firm, impersonal guarantees ofphysical security, status and position, or wealth,and (3) the inability of the kinship unit toserve as an effective vehicle for personal secu-rity or advancement.The first condition is more or less self-evi-dent. A client affiliates with a patron by virtueof the patron's superior access to importantgoods and services. This inequality is an expres-sion of a stratification system which serves asthe basis for vertical exchange. Classically inSoutheast Asia, the patron has depended moreon the local organization of force and access tooffice as the sinews of his leadership than uponhereditary status or land ownership. Inequali-ties were thus marked, but elite circulationtended to be comparatively high. With the pen-etration of colonial government and commer-cialization of the economy, land ownershipmade its appearance (especially in the Philip-pines and Vietnam) as a major basis of patron-age. At the same time access to colonial officereplaced to some extent victory in the previ-ously more fluid local power contests as the cri-terion for local patronage. Although land own-ership and bureaucratic office have remainedtwo significant bases of patronship in postcolo-nial Southeast Asia, they have been joined-and sometimes eclipsed as patronage resources-by office in political parties or military rank.If inequities in access to vital goods werealone sufficient to promote the expansion of pa-


13/24

102 The AmericanPolitical Science Review Vol. 66tron-client ties, such structures would predomi-nate almost everywhere. A second, and moresignificant, condition of patron-client politics isthe absence of institutional guarantees for anindividual's security, status, or wealth. Whereconsensus has produced an institutionalizedmeans of indirect exchange-one that is legallybased, uniformly enforced, and effective-im-personal contractual arrangements tend tousurp the place of personal reciprocity. A pa-tron-client dyad, by contrast, is a personal secu-rity mechanism and is resorted to most oftenwhen personal security is frequently in jeop-ardy and when impersonal social controls areunreliable. In this context, direct personal tiesbased on reciprocity substitute for law, sharedvalues, and strong institutions. As Eric Wolfhas noted, "The clearest gain from such a (pa-tron-client) relation . . . is in situations wherepublic law cannot guarantee adequate protec-tion against breaches of non-kin contracts."35It is important to recognize the unenviablesituation of the typical client in less developednations. Since he lives in an environment of scar-city, competition for wealth and power is seenas a zero-sum contest in which his losses areanother's gain and vice-versa.36 His very sur-vival is constantly threatened by the caprice ofnature and by social forces beyond his control.In such an environment, where subsistence needsare paramount and physical security uncertain,a modicum of protection and insurance canoften be gained only by depending on a superiorwho undertakes personally to provide for hisown clients. Operating with such a slim margin,the client prefers to minimize his losses-at thecost of his independence-rather than to maxi-mize his gains by taking risks he cannot afford.When one's physical security and means oflivelihood are problematic, and when recourseto law is unavailable or unreliable, the socialvalue of a personal defender is maximized.The growth of strong, institutional ordersthat reduce the need for personal alliances wasa rare occurrence-the Roman and Chineseimperial orders being the most notable excep-tions-until the 19th and 20th centuries, whenmodem nation-states developed the technicalmeans to impose their will throughout their ter-ritory. Before that, however, the existence of afair degree of local autonomy was inevitable,

IWolf, "Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Re-lations ....," p. 10.* In this connection, see my Political Ideology inMalaysia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968),chapter 6; and for zero-sum conceptions among peas-ats, see George M. Foster, "Peasant Society and theImage of Limited Good," American Anthropologist,65 (April, 1965), 293-315.

given the limited power available to most tradi-tional kingdoms. The greater that autonomy, orwhat might be called the localization of power,the more decisive patron-client linkages werelikely to be. In settings as diverse as much ofLatin America, feudal Europe, and precolonialSoutheast Asia, the localization of power waspervasive and gave rise to networks of patron-client bonds. From time to time in SoutheastAsia a centralizing kingdom managed to extendits power over wide areas, but seldom for verylong or with a uniform system of authority. Atypical Southeast Asian kingdom's authorityweakened steadily with increasing distancefrom the capital city. Beyond the immediate en-virons of the court, the ruler was normally re-duced to choosing which of a number of com-peting petty chiefs with local power bases hewould prefer to back.A7 Such chiefs retainedtheir own personal following; their relationshipto the ruler was one of bargaining as well asdeference; and they might back a rival claimantto the throne or simply defy demands of thecourt when they were dissatisfied with their pa-tron's behavior. Thus, the political structure oftraditional Southeast Asia favored the growthof patron-client links, inasmuch as it was neces-sary for peasants to accommodate themselvesto the continuing reality of autonomous per-sonal authority at almost all levels.The localization of power is in many sensesas striking a characteristic of contemporary asof traditional Southeast Asia. As Huntingtonaptly expressed it, "The most important politicaldistinction among countries concerns not theirform of government but their degree of govern-ment."38 Many of the outlying areas of South-east Asian nations, particularly the upland re-gions of slash-and-burn agriculturalists, areonly intermittently subject to central govern-ment control and continue to operate withmuch autonomy. By far the most importantmanifestation of the localization of power,however, has occurred within the very bureau-cratic and political institutions that are associ-ated with a central state. The modern institu-tional framework is a relatively recent importin Southeast Asia; it finds minimal supportfrom indigenous social values and receives onlysporadic legal enforcement. With the exceptionof North Vietnam and Singapore, where a por-tion of the intelligentsia with modernizing ide-3 See, for example, Edmund R. Leach, "The Fron-tiers of Burma," Comparative Studies in Society andHistory, 3 (October, 1960), 49-68.3 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Chang-ing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press,1968), p. 3.


14/24

1972 Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia 103ologies and popular backing have taken power,these new institutions do not command wideloyalty and must therefore fight for survival ina hostile environment. The net effect of thisfragile institutional order is to promote thegrowth of personal spheres of influence withinministries, administrative agencies, and parties.Sometimes the vertical links are strong (e.g.,Thailand) and sometimes a high degree of de-centralization or "sub-infeudation" occurs (asin parliamentary Burma from 1955 to 1958).In either case, what replaces the institution areelaborate networks of personal patron-clientties that carry on more or less traditional fac-tional struggles rather than operate as agentsof a hierarchial organization. Patron-client pol-itics are thus as much a characteristic of fac-tion-ridden central institutions as of the geo-graphical periphery in these nations.The third condition under which patron-client bonds remain prominent relates directlyto the capacity of such ties to foster coopera-tion among nonkin. As a mechanism for pro-tection or for advancement, patron-client dyadswill flourish when kinship bonds alone becomeinadequate for these purposes.Although kinship bonds are seldom com-pletely adequate as structures of protection andadvancement even in the simplest societies, theymay perform these functions well enough tominimize the need for nonkin structures. Suchis the case among small isolated bands of hunt-ers and gatherers, among self-sufficient, corpo-rate lineages and within corporate villages.""None of these conditions, however, is particu-larly applicable to Southeast Asian societies.The highland areas are inhabited by poorly in-tegrated minorities but only rarely are these mi-norities so isolated as to lack economic and po-litical ties with the larger society. Corporate lin-eages, outside traditional Vietnam, are uncom-mon in low-land Southeast Asis where bilateralkinship systems lead to overlapping kindredsrather than mutually exclusive lineages. Fi-nally, corporate village structures (except inJava and perhaps Vietnam's Red River delta)are not typical of Southeast Asia. The scope fornonkin ties in general, and patron-client linksin particular, has thus been quite wide through-out the region.Even when government did not impinge

19Corporate villages are included here since theygenerally stress shared kinship links to a common an-cestor. Part of the corporate character of the Java-nese village was perhaps further reinforced as a con-sequence of the collective exactions required by Dutchcolonial policy. "Sanctioned reciprocity" is probably abetter term for village structuresin Java and Tokin than"corporate."

much on their activities, villagers in traditionalSoutheast Asia still had need of extrakin andextravillage contacts. They needed to securemarriage partners, to assure themselves protec-tion and contacts for the limited but vital tradecarried on between villages, and finally to es-tablish an outside alliance in case a villagequarrel forced them to seek land and employ-ment elsewhere.40 If vertical dyadic ties were ofsome value in the traditional context, they as-sumed a more decisive role in the colonial andpostcolonial periods. First, the commercializa-tion of the economy and the growth of marketsenhanced the value of cooperative arrange-ments among nonkin. Both corporate kingroups and corporate village structures had de-pended on a certain level of economic autarchyfor their vitality-an autarchy which colonialeconomic policy quickly eroded. These corpo-rate structures (where they existed) tended "tolose their monopoly over resources and person-nel in situations where land and labor becamefree commodities."'41 As the communal landcontrolled by the village dwindled, as outsiderscame increasingly to own land in the village,and as villagers increasingly worked for non-kin, the value of patron-client links increasedfor all concerned.In traditional Southeast Asia, as in feudalEurope, then, the inability of kindreds to pro-vide adequate protection and security fosteredthe growth of patron-client structures. The lim-ited effectiveness of kindreds as units of coop-eration and security was further reduced by thenew structures and uncertainties of the colonialeconomy. Within this new economy, the goalsof wealth, protection, power, and status couldnot be realized without outside links to nonkin(and often nonvillagers), and the establishmentof these links, for the most part, followed thepatron-client model.

The relative decline in the protective capac-ity of kindreds (which, given the absence ofstrong, predictable new institutions wouldwiden the scope of patron-client ties) acceler-ated the political transformation of the colonialand postcolonial period as well. Both adminis-tration and electoral politics created new politi-cal units that did not generally coincide withthe kindred or with the traditional village. As"Richard Downs, "A Kelantanese Village of Ma-laya," in Julian H. Steward, ed., Contemporary

Change in Traditional Societies, Vol. II: Asian RuralSocieties (Champaign-Urbana, Illinois: University ofIllinois Press, 1967), p. 147.41Wolf, "Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Re-lations . . . " p. 5. For a brilliant account of the sameprocess in England, see Karl Polanyi, The GreatTransformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).


15/24

104 The American Political Science Review Vol. 66Gallin has shown for electoral politics inTaiwan, the political vitality of the corporatelineage is sapped by changes in the governingunit which no longer permit a single lineage todominate. The lineage thus loses much of thematerial basis of its previous solidarity, andnew dyadic ties become the means by whichwinning coalitions are built in the new unit.42Political consolidation, like economic consoli-dation, beyond minimal kin and village unitscan thus enlarge the potential role of such non-kin structures as patron-client clusters.Considering all three criteria, SoutheastAsian states, like most traditional nations, sat-isfy most conditions for the survival of patron-client structures as a common means of cooper-ation. First, the disparities in power and statusthat form the basis of this kind of exchangehave, if anything, become more marked sincethe colonial period. Second, nonkin structuresof cooperation have always been important inthe complex societies of Southeast Asia andhave become more significant because of thenew economic and political dependencies intro-duced by colonialism and nationhood. Finally,with the possible exceptions of Singapore andNorth Vietnam, the nations of Southeast Asiahave not developed strong modem institutionswhich would begin to undermine purely per-sonal alliance systems with impersonal guaran-tees and loyalties.At this point in the argument, it is essentialto show how patron-client structures, as oneform of vertical cleavage, coexist with commu-nalism, another form of vertical cleavage, inSoutheast Asia. If loyalty to an ethnic or reli-gious group is particularly strong it will meanthat the only possible partners in most patron-client dyads will be other members of the samecommunity. Since the community is a categori-cal group which excludes some possible dyadicpartnerships, it represents a different form ofcleavage from patron-client links. Verticaldyadic bonds can, nonetheless, coexist withcommunal cleavage in at least three ways: 1)as intercommunal patron-client ties above cor-porate communities; 2) as intercommunal pa-tron-client ties above factionalized communi-ties, and, 3) as intracommunal patron-clientstructures. First, when communal groups dodeal corporately with the outside-as quite afew small, highland tribes do in Southeast Asia-we may get patron-client ties that join theirleaders, as clients, to regional or national lead-ers. If two distinct corporate communities were

42Bernard Gallin, "Political Factionalism and ItsImpact on Chinese Village School Organization inTaiwan," in Swartz, ed., pp. 377-400.

linked through their leaders who were clients ofan outside leader, the structure could look likethat in Figure A.

communal communalgroup group

Figure A

More often in Southeast Asia, however, thesecond situation prevails in which a number ofpatrons with separate followings within thesame communal group compete for the mostadvantageous links to the outside. A simplerepresentation of this pattern is presented inFigure B, in which two patrons are linked as

Figure Bclients to an outside patron and thereby haveestablished a working alliance against a thirdpatron in the same communal group who islinked to a different outside leader. Here, thecommunal group is rent by factionalism andhas multiple ties to the outside world.43 Thevertical links outside the communal group,however, are likely to be somewhat weaker ormore tentative than links within the commu-nity. This is so because all competing subordi-nate patrons and their clientele fall within acommunal unit which shares a potentiallystrong interest; if the communal group as awhole were threatened, the shared parochiallinks would serve as the basis for a unity thatmight supersede any exterior patron-clientlinks. The situation described in Figure B isonly likely to arise, then, if there are no salient

43A combination of situations one and two wouldoccur when the tacit rules within a communal groupallowed patron-client conflict but forbade the losingor weaker patrons within the communal group frommaintaining ties to outside leaders.


16/24

1972 Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia 105collective threats to the communal group as awhole.The mixture of communalism and patron-client structures portrayed in Figures A and Bfocuses on the extracommunal patron-clientlinks that achieve a measure, however weak, ofintercommunal integration. A third mixture ofcommunal and dyadic association focuses in-stead on intracommunal politics alone. Thiswould be represented by just the boxed portionof Figure B, which indicates that, even if com-munal conflict is widespread, it may well bethat the intracommunal politics of each con-tending group is best described by the patron-client model.The salience of communal feeling, especiallyin Malaysia, Burma, and Laos, but also in In-donesia and Vietnam makes such mixtures ofcommunalism and patron-client politics com-mon. Except at the apex of the political struc-ture where a leader may have leaders of smallercommunal groups as his clients, most patronshave followings that are almost exclusivelydrawn from their own community. Intercom-munal integration tends to take place near theapex of the political structure with the base ofeach communal pyramid remaining largely sep-arate. The links that represent this integrationtend, moreover, to be fragile and to disintegratein the face of a communitywide threat. Bothcommunalism and patron-client links share thepolitical stage, but patron-client structures aremost prominent in periods of peace and stabil-ity. In addition, the process of politics withineach communal group-in effect holding com-munal affiliation constant-is usually best anal-yzed along patron-client lines. In nations suchas Thailand, the Philippines, and Cambodia,which are comparatively homogeneous cultur-ally, there are few communal barriers to theproliferation of patron-client linkages. Thus,the patron-client model can be applied to thosenations in its "pure" form since communal af-filiation is not important in creating discontinu-ous patron-client networks.

B. The Transformation of TraditionalPatron-Client Ties1. The General Trend. The typical patron intraditional Southeast Asia was a petty localleader. Unlike the representative of a corporatekin group or a corporate village structure (rareoutside Vietnam and Java, respectively), thelocal patron owed his local leadership to hispersonal skills, his wealth, and occasionally tohis connections with regional leaders-all ofwhich enhanced his capacity to build a personalfollowing. The fortunes of such petty leaders

waxed or waned depending on the continuingavailability of resources and spoils which servedto knit together a following. Perhaps the moststriking feature of local patron leadership inSoutheast Asia was its fluidity and instability,which contributed to a relatively high rate oflocal elite circulation. In contrast to India,where hereditary office-holding and landhold-ing provided somewhat greater continuity, thetypical local leader in Southeast Asia had puttogether many of the necessary resources ofwealth, force, connections, and status on hisown and could probably only promise his sona slight advantage in the next round. Two im-portant reasons for this oscillation in local powerare a) the weakness of the central state, whichlacked either the force or durability to sustainand guarantee the continuation of local powerelites, and b) the relative ease with which clientsin a slash-and-burn economy could, if dissatis-fied simply move to another area, thus under-mining their ex-patron's basis of power.44Patron-client systems have survived-evenflourished-in both colonial and postindepen-dence Southeast Asia. There have been impor-tant changes, however. New resources for pa-tronage, such as party connections, develop-ment programs, nationalized enterprises, andbureaucratic power have been created. Patron-client structures are now more closely linked tothe national level with jobs, cash, and petty fa-vors flowing down the network, and votes orsupport flowing upward. In the midst of thischange, old style patrons still thrive. Highlandleaders, for example, still operate in a personalcapacity as patron/brokers for their peoplewith lowland leaders. Landowners in the Philip-pines and elsewhere have used their traditionalcontrol of land and the tenants who farm it towin positions of local or regional party leader-ship. Whatever the particular form they take,patron-client networks still function as themain basis of alliance systems among nonkinthroughout Southeast Asia.The nature of patron-client bonds withinSoutheast Asia has varied sharply from one pe-riod to the next and from one location to an-other. Different resources have risen or plum-meted in value as a basis of patronage depend-ing upon the nature of the political system:(See table on next page.)

44 See, for example, Edmund R. Leach, The PoliticalSystems of Highland Burma (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 1954), and J. M. Gullick, IndigenousPolitical Systems of Western Malaya, London Schoolof Economics Monographs on Social Anthropology#17 (London: University of London/Athlone Press,1958).


17/24

106 The American Political Science Review Vol. 66Secular Trends mithe Nature of Patron-Client Ties MiSoutheast Asia

Quality Traditional ContemporaryI. Duration of bond more persistent less persistent2. Scope of exchange multiplex [increasingly] simplex3. Resource base local, personal external links, office-based4. Affective/instrumental higher ratio of affective to lower ratio of affective tobalance instrumental ties instrumental ties5. Local resource control more local monopoly less local monopoly6. Differentiation between less differentiation more differentiationclusters7. Density of coverage greater density less densityThe capacity to mobilize an armed followingwas particularly valuable in the precolonialera; access to colonial office was a surer basisof patronage than armed force in the colonialperiod; and the ability to win electoral contestsoften became the central resource with the ad-vent of independence. Not only have resourcebases proved mercurial over time, but the na-ture of patron-client ties in the indirectly ruledhighland areas has remained substantially dif-ferent from lowland patterns. Amidst this vari-ety and change, it is nevertheless possible todiscern a number of secular trends in the char-acter of patron-client bonds. Such trends arefar more pronounced in some areas than oth-ers, but they do represent directions of changethat are important for our analysis.(1) In comparison with more bureaucraticempires, patron-client bonds in precolonialSoutheast Asia were not, as I have pointed out,markedly persistent With the quickening of so-cial change brought about by the commerciali-zation of the economy and the penetration ofthe colonial state into local affairs, however, apatron's resource base became even more vul-nerable to the actions of outside forces overwhich he had little or no control. It was an in-genious patron indeed who could survive thecreation of the colonial state, the export boom,the depression of the 1930s, the Japanese occu-pation, and independence with his resourcesand clientele intact. The major exception to thistrend was the colonial period in indirectly ruledareas where colonial military and financialbacking of traditional rulers, if anything,brought a stability-or stagnation-to politicalsystems that had been more chaotic. Elsewhere,patron-client links tended to become more frag-ile and less persistent.(2) With the differentiation of the economyand its effects on the social structure, the scopeof exchange between patron and client tendedto narrow somewhat. Where traditional patronscould generally serve as all purpose protectors,the newer patron's effectiveness tended to bemore specialized in areas such as political influ-

ence, modern sector employment, or adminis-trative influence. Although patron-client ties re-mained flexible and personal, the more limitedcapacities of the patron tended to make relation-ships less comprehensive and hence less stable.4-(3) The traditional patron for the most partoperated with personally controlled local re-sources. One effect of the colonial period-andindependence as well-was to increase radi-cally the importance of external resources forlocal patronage. A following based on purelylocal office or landholding was seldom sufficientto sustain a patron in a new environment whereschools, agricultural services, regional banks,and public employment represented competingsources of patronage. The growing role of out-side resources, in most cases, thus led to com-petition among patrons, each of whom re-cruited followings with the particular resourcesat his command.46 In addition, since those whocontrolled the new resources were generallyoffice-holders subject to transfers or politicalchanges at the center, the new patrons were lesssecure than older patrons and probably more in-clined to maximize their gains over the short run.(4) Because the new patron-client ties wereweaker and less comprehensive, and becausethe new patrons were often from outside thelocal community, the instrumental nature ofthe exchange became more prominent. A rela-tionship that had always involved some calcula-tions of advantage lost some of its traditionallegitimacy and grew more profane. Patron-client exchanges became more monetized, cal-culations more explicit, and concern centered"Again, indirectly ruled areas were often exceptionsin that local rulers tended to take on new powersunder the colonial regime and thus became more com-prehensive patrons than in the past.'For Malaysia, M. G. Swift, Malay Peasant So-ciety in Jelebu (London: University of London, 1965),pp. 158-60 captures this shift in local power. A gen-eral treatment of such changes is contained in RalphW. Nicholas, "Factions: A Comparative Analysis," inM. Banton, general ed., Political Systems and theDistribution of Power, Association of Applied SocialAnthropology Monograph #2 (London: TavistockPublications, 1965), pp. 2141.


18/24

1972 Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia 107more on the rate of return from the relation-ship rather than on its durability. This trendmeant that newer patron-client clusters werelikely to have a comparatively large "fair-weather" periphery, a comparatively small core-following, and a less "constant" patron as well.(5) The breakdown of local patron monop-olies follows logically from most of the changeswe have already discussed. Where one locallandowner or traditional leader had once domi-nated he now faced competitors who might belocal administrators of state welfare in loanprograms, teachers in new secular schools, alocal trader or businessman, or the residentmanager of a foreign-owned plantation. Fac-tional strife which reflects this competition wasmost common in villages where socioeconomicchange and government penetration had beenfar-reaching, and less common in more tradi-tional areas.47(6) As differentiation occurred within thelocal societies, they gave rise to patron-clientclusters that were distinct. A bureaucrat mighthave a following primarily within his agency, abusinessman among his laborers, and a land-owner among his tenants. This process of dif-ferentiation among clusters provided the poten-tial basis for durable group interests inasmuchas many clusters now had an institutional dis-tinctiveness.(7) While the changes we have examinedmay have assisted the vertical integration of pa-tron-client pyramids, they tended to reduce theuniversality of coverage. That is, more andmore people in the new market towns and cit-ies, on plantations, and on small plots theyrented from absentee landlords were no longerattached-or were very weakly attached-topatrons. These new elements of the populationvaried greatly in their interests and their levelsof organization, but, in any event, they fell out-side the older patron-client network.

"In his study of politics in an Indonesian town,Clifford Geertz has shown that the more traditionalhamlets were more likely to be united under a par-ticular leader than were hamlets which had changedmore; The Social History of an Indonesian Town(Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965), Chapter 6. Thisfinding is corroborated by Feith's study of the 1955Indonesian elections; Herbert Feith, The IndonesianElections of 1955, Interim Report Series, Modern In-donesia Project (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1961),pp. 28-30. A comparative study of two Burmese vil-lages also supports this conclusion: cf. Manning Nash,The Golden Road to Modernity (New York: Wiley,1965). In this context, directly ruled lowland areastended to develop factional competition among dif-ferent patrons, while less directly ruled areas (espe-cially highland areas) more frequently retained someunity behind a single patron who remained theirbroker with the outside world.

While some long run trends in patron-clientties seem clear, it is difficult to say anythingabout the balance between voluntarism andcoercion over time. On the one hand, changesin the economy have made clients less autono-mous and more dependent on patrons for pro-tection against a fall in world prices, for cashadvances before the harvest, and so forth. Alsocontributing to a decline in the client's bargain-ing position is the imported legal system ofproperty guarantees which allow a wealthyman, if he so chooses, to resist pressures for re-distribution that operated in a traditional set-ting. On the other hand, the breakdown of localpatronly monopolies and the exchange re-sources that electoral systems often place in thehands of clients work in the opposite direction.Given these contradic

scott 1972 clientelism

Documents