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Police Use of Force in Seattle, January 2009 – March 2011

Matthew J. Hickman, Ph.D.

Seattle University

Loren T. Atherley, M.A.

Northwest Justice Solutions

December, 2012

Points of view expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not represent or

reflect views of Seattle University. Please direct all correspondence to either Matthew J.

Hickman (hickmanm@seattleu.edu) or Loren T. Atherley (lorentatherley@gmail.com).

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ABSTRACT

This study provides a descriptive statistical analysis of Seattle Police Department use of

force reports – the same reports that were used in a recent Department of Justice

investigation concerning the use of excessive force. An additional goal of the study was

to attempt to replicate the government’s finding that 20% of uses of force by Seattle

police are excessive or unconstitutional. All use of force records during the period

January 1, 2009, through March 25, 2011, (N = 1,240) were coded for content, including

administrative data elements as well as the content of report narratives. Incidents were

coded for both officer force level and suspect resistance level, in both static and

sequential forms, following Alpert’s force factor method. Relevant Graham factors were

also coded. The incidence of force, incident characteristics, officer characteristics,

suspect demographics, and force factors are described and discussed. The data were also

geocoded and mapped in order to better understand the spatial distribution of police use

of force in Seattle.

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INTRODUCTION

In December 2011, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, in

conjunction with the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Washington (collectively,

“DOJ”), released a report entitled, Investigation of the Seattle Police Department. In this

report, the DOJ described the results of their investigation in Seattle consistent with their

role of identifying “patterns or practices of conduct by law enforcement agencies that

deprive individuals of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or

laws of the United States” (p. 1). In both the report and a televised news conference it

was announced that the DOJ found “SPD engages in a pattern or practice of using

unnecessary or excessive force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United

States Constitution and Section 14141” (p. 3) and “When SPD officers use force, they do

so in an unconstitutional manner nearly 20% of the time” (p. 4).

A finding that 1 out of 5 uses of force are unconstitutional should be taken very

seriously, for if true, it suggests a very serious problem. For the two and a quarter year

period studied by DOJ, this would amount to approximately 250 use of excessive force

incidents. Such a finding demands careful scrutiny to ensure a thorough understanding of

the problem so that police reform efforts will be meaningful and long-lasting.

Unfortunately, the DOJ report does not contain a description of their methodology that

would permit one to directly replicate the analysis.

Absent a clear methodology, we sought to replicate this finding using common

social science methods. In addition, and perhaps more important, we provide a thorough

descriptive analysis of use of force incidents in Seattle. It is our hope that those involved

in police reform efforts will use these data to better understand police use of force in

Seattle and move forward with reform efforts from a rational basis. Specifically, we

provide answers to the following questions:

• When, where, and how often do the police in Seattle use force?

• What are the underlying offenses in use of force incidents?

• What are the characteristics of a typical suspect and what do they do?

• How many officers are typically involved and what do they do?

• How are the interactions distributed in terms of both suspect and officer actions?

• How often might the use of excessive force occur in Seattle?

• How is police use of force geographically distributed in Seattle?

Regardless of whether one agrees with our methods, analysis, and conclusions, we

believe that our creation of a research platform for understanding use of force in Seattle is

a substantial step forward. We believe that our data collection provides a useful and

important decision tool for understanding the nature and scope of police use of force in

Seattle. Our descriptive analysis only scratches the surface of a rich data source, but this

is a necessary first step and is only the beginning of an ongoing program of research. We

anticipate being able to make these data publically available (subject to SPD approval) so

that anyone who is interested may explore the data. We welcome and encourage other

researchers to replicate our findings in the interest of science and the pursuit of

knowledge.

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KEY FINDINGS

Recognizing that some individuals may not have the time or interest in reading

the entire report, we summarize the key findings here. Readers interested in the details of

our methodology and the comprehensive set of findings will want to read the entire

report. In sum, we analyzed 1,240 use of force incidents during the period January 1,

2009 through March 25, 2011.

When, where, and how often do the police in Seattle use force?

Police use of force in Seattle is a statistically rare event. The police in Seattle use

force at the rate of about 2.4 incidents for every 100 arrests. Use of force is more

frequent on weekends, and during the late evening/early morning hours. The West

Precinct has the largest share of use of force incidents, with about one in three uses of

force reported in that precinct. (See Table 3 & Figures 1 - 3)

What are the underlying offenses in use of force incidents?

Officers indicated the type of incident on the use of force reporting forms. This

describes the general nature of the dispatch or on-view incident and associated incident

characteristics. These characteristics are not mutually exclusive, so several type

characteristics may be indicated for a particular incident. Forty percent of the incidents

were reported as involving some type of felony matter, and fights or disturbances were

indicated in 30% of incidents. About 1 in 5 involved violent crimes and/or were drug

related. Eighteen percent were characterized as involving mental/suicidal suspects.

Domestic violence was indicated in 15% of use of force incidents. (See Figure 4)

What are the characteristics of a typical suspect in use of force incidents, and what

do they do?

The vast majority of force incidents involved a single subject upon whom force

was used. The median age for all suspects was 29 years, they were most frequently male

(87%), and most frequently white (45%) or black (40%). The race distribution for

suspects in use of force incidents is roughly equivalent to the race distribution for all

arrestees during the study period. Half of suspects exhibited signs of intoxication (either

drugs or alcohol), and nearly 3 in 10 exhibited signs of mental illness or were suicidal or

delusional. Suspects fled from officers in about one quarter of incidents. Maximum

suspect resistance levels were typically in the form of defensive resistance (48%) or

active resistance (25%). Suspect resistance resulted in WACIC Officer Safety reports

being filed in 19% of the incidents. Suspects complained of injury in about half (51%) of

incidents. (See Figures 5 - 10)

How many officers are typically involved and what do they do?

About 8 in 10 use of force incidents involved either one (48%) or two (33%)

officers who used force on suspects. Overall, the 1,240 incidents involved 650 officers

who used force, one third of whom were involved in a single use of force incident during

the study period. Thirty-one officers (about 5% of all officers involved in use of force

incidents) were involved in 10 or more incidents during the study period as either first

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responding officers or as backing officers, including three officers (about 0.5%) who

were involved in 20 or more incidents. The most frequently reported tactics were hands,

elbows, and arms (used in 80% of incidents), followed by feet, knees, and legs (28%),

and Tasers (23%). Less frequently reported were OC spray (7%), batons (4%), and

canines (3%). Maximum officer force levels were typically in the form of defensive

force (41%), followed by intermediate weapons (29%), and offensive force (24%). (See

Figures 11 - 14)

How are the interactions distributed in terms of both suspect and officer actions?

Results of static force factor analysis (i.e., the maximum officer force level, minus

the maximum suspect resistance level) indicate that resistance and force levels were

matched in about 36% of use of force incidents, and officers used one or two levels of

force higher than suspect resistance in another 45%. Officers used a lower level of force

compared to suspect resistance in about 14% of cases. Officers used three or more levels

of force higher than suspect resistance in about 6% of incidents. Results of dynamic

force factor analysis indicate that most incidents ended by the fourth dyadic officer-

suspect interaction. Officers on average operate at a force deficit during the first two

iterations, transitioning through balance to a force surplus thereafter. Dynamic force

factors are consistent with application of a force continuum. (See Figures 15 – 18)

How often might the use of excessive force occur in Seattle?

Filtering all use of force cases by relevant Graham factors and static force factors

results in a pool of 43 cases (or 3.5% of all use of force cases during the study period)

that were selected as potentially excessive. We strongly caution that further research is

needed to determine the overall utility of our approach, and in a broader sense, whether it

is possible to identify the use of excessive force from administrative records. In the

context of total arrests, this would equate to about 1 potential use of excessive force for

every 1,180 arrests in Seattle. Incidents identified as potentially excessive were more

balanced between 2nd and 3

rd watches (as compared to all force incidents), and were more

frequently on-view incidents as opposed to dispatched calls. All but two cases involved a

single suspect, and typically involved either one (54%) or two (35%) officers. The race

distribution for suspects in potentially excessive cases decreased for whites, and

increased for suspects in the Asian and “Other” categories. Officer tactics (hands,

elbows, arms, etc.) were similar in distribution to those for all use of force incidents.

Subjects were booked in about 60% of these incidents, and some common charges listed

were obstructing, assault, resisting, trespass, and warrants. (See Figures 19 – 21)

How is police use of force geographically distributed in Seattle?

Police use of force is distributed across the entire city; however, there are areas of

clustering and noticeable spatial patterns within the city. Higher densities of use of force

incidents were noted in the general vicinity of the following locations: In the North

Precinct, there are higher densities of use of force incidents in the general vicinity of: (1)

NE 125th St & Lake City Way NE; and (2) NE 45

th to 50

th Sts & University Way NE. In

the East Precinct, there are higher densities of use of force incidents in the general

vicinity of: (1) E Pine to E Pike Sts & Broadway to Boylston Aves; and (2) 23rd Ave to

MLK Way & E Cherry St to E Yesler Way. In the West Precinct, there are higher

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densities of use of force incidents in the general vicinity of: (1) Belltown; (2) Pioneer

Square; and (3) International District. Finally, in the South Precinct, there are higher

densities of use of force incidents in the general vicinity of: (1) Rainier Ave & S Genesee

St; (2) Rainier Ave & S Ferdinand St; (3) MLK Way & S Webster to S Othello Sts; and

(4) Rainier Ave & S Henderson St. (See Maps 1 – 2)

METHODS

The lead author submitted a Public Data Request to the Seattle Police Department

requesting all of the use of force reports that were provided to DOJ with regard to their

20% finding. The SPD responded that a Research Agreement would be a more expedient

method for processing the data request, so the lead author requested, and obtained, a

Research Agreement for these purposes. Our research is fully independent and is not

funded by the SPD. We were provided with a series of PDF files containing scanned

images of SPD use of force reporting forms and related documents during the period

1/1/09 through 3/25/11, amounting to 1,240 records in all.

Data for this study were coded from the content of these official SPD Use of

Force reports. Each report included officer identifier information, suspect demographic

information, a categorization of the type of suspect resistance and how force was applied

as well as information about location, booking, injuries and evidence of impairment or

suspected impairment. The first four pages of these reports (more if supplemental forms

are required) are comprised of entries and check boxes which were coded into a computer

database using a numeric coding system. The remainder of the report packet varied

depending on the presence of supplemental documentation, report narratives,

photographs, Washington Crime Information Center (WACIC) reports, Labor and

Industry (L&I) claim forms and Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) call logs as well as

routing information and other administrative documentation. These data fields were

entered as they appeared in the record.

Force Factors

In addition to the variables contained in the form, the authors read the narrative

reports and coded officer-suspect interactions. Force and resistance were classified based

on complimentary scales drawing from previous research.1 For each record in the

dataset, we calculated a static force factor. This compares the maximum force applied by

the officer to the maximum level of resistance (i.e., officer force level minus suspect

resistance level), and takes on numeric values ranging from -6 to 6 (see Table 1).

For example, if the maximum level of suspect resistance was “Resistance 4,” and

that was met with a comparable level of officer force (“Force 4”), this would result in a

static force factor equal to 0, indicating a proportional response. If the officer used a

higher level of force, say Force 5, then the corresponding force factor would be +1,

indicating the officer used one level of force higher than the degree of suspect resistance.

If the officer used a lower level of force, say Force 3, the force factor would be -1.

1 Alpert, G. & R. Dunham. (2004). Understanding Police Use of Force: Officers, Suspects, and

Reciprocity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Table 1. Suspect Resistance and Officer Force Levels

Level Description Level Description

Resistance 1 No resistance. The Subject is

offering no resistance or threat.

Force 1 Officer presence in uniform or

marked police vehicle.

Resistance 2 Verbal resistance to complying

with lawful orders. Subject may

challenge authority or standing

and may present as “dead

weight.”

Force 2 Issuance of lawful orders and light

physical contact to include guiding,

leading and/or handcuffing. No

intentional infliction of pain for the

purpose of compliance.

Resistance 3 Use of posture and verbal threats

of physical violence. Subject may

attempt to intimidate or otherwise

pose a physical threat to officers.

Force 3 Chemical agents for the purpose of

crowd dispersal or distraction.

Tactic is often reserved for large

gatherings, civil disobedience and

fight disturbances.

Resistance 4 Physical non-compliance

including refusal to give up hands

for cuffing and attempts to flee.

Force 4 Physical control tactics such as pain

compliance holds, joint

manipulation and open handed

strikes.

Resistance 5 Active physical resistance to

compliance. Subject may attempt

to strike officers, kick and

struggle free from holds and

compliance positions.

Force 5 Advanced physical control tactics

including closed fisted strikes, knee

and elbow strikes to the body and

the extremities.

Resistance 6 Use of non-lethal weapons to

injure or otherwise actively

assault officers. Drug

paraphernalia, beverage

containers and rocks may be

employed as cutting and impact

weapons.

Force 6 Intermediate weapon use,

deployment of electronic control

weapons and impact weapons for

pain compliance and strikes to the

body and extremities.

Resistance 7 Use of lethal force as presented

by whatever means are available:

firearms, knives and motor

vehicles.

Force 7 Use of lethal force including carotid

artery holds, head strikes, and

intentional discharge of firearms.

In addition to the static indicator of maximum force and resistance, we also coded

dynamic force factors throughout the force incident. Narratives from all 1,240 cases

were read and we coded up to 10 iterations of dyadic action/reaction using the same

coding scheme as was used to code the static force factor. This helps to assess how force

incidents evolve from the perspective of the officer and provides a dynamic overview of

the incident from start to finish. Where multiple officers or suspects are involved, their

actions are represented as a composite.

Weapon draws are a problematic area in use of force research. Some parties

contend that a weapon draw is a use of force, while others contend that it is at most a

threat of force, and still others argue either side depending on the level of the draw and

the motives of the officer with regard to their safety. From a legal perspective, courts

have upheld the right of officers to protect themselves against unknown or potentially

threatening situations by drawing and pointing a firearm when it is reasonable to do so.

Civil rights organizations such as the ACLU contend that drawing and pointing of a

firearm at a subject is an application of force in itself and should be reported whenever it

occurs. As there is no definitive guidance on the reporting of firearms as “cover” or with

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the intention to discharge the weapon, agencies across the country employ different

standards.

During the study period, SPD officers did not report weapon draws consistently.

In fact, the lead author of this report was on scene at one of the use of force incidents that

occurred during the study period, as a ride-along observer on unrelated field research. In

that incident, there was a weapon drawn and pointed at the suspect that went unreported

in the subsequent use of force report. Sometimes there are references to other officers

providing “lethal cover,” or references are made to “felony stop” or “high risk stop”

procedures. Insofar as weapon draws were not consistently reported, we were faced with

a substantial measurement problem. Ultimately we decided not to record weapon draws

because we could not be confident that we were capturing their true incidence. Lethal

force, for the purposes of this study, was only coded when the officer used an impact

weapon on an area of the body with potential to cause lethal injury (such as a head

strike), used a carotid artery hold/restraint, or discharged a firearm.

Use of Excessive Force (UOEF)

Since the 1980’s the United States has been in a slow overhaul of policing and

police powers. The Rehnquist court established an objective reasonableness test on the

use of force by law enforcement officers. The case, Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 286

(1989), known more commonly as Graham, has come to be the standard for use of force

analysis.

Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that with regard to

determining the reasonableness of force, the Fourth Amendment requires that “the nature

and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests” must be

weighed against the interests of the government. To this end, Graham moved beyond the

four criteria previously applied (the need for the application of force, the relationship

between that need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted,

and whether the force was applied in good faith), and distilled excessive force in the form

of a three-prong test to be weighed with information available to the officer at the time of

action, and without the benefit of hindsight: the severity of the underlying offense, the

immediate threat posed to officers and/or the public, and fleeing or active resistance to

arrest. In assessing the “totality of circumstances,” relevant issues may include the

perception of suspect impairments, psychological threats, outnumbering of officers by

suspects, physical size, and other factors.

Where Graham factors are absent, it can be inferred so too is justification for the

use of force. Our method employs the characteristics of the reported data to identify

factors which would indicate whether the force was justified. In reviewing these data the

authors identified multiple approaches to identifying UOEF cases. Static force factor

analysis, dynamic force factor analysis, force factor modeling and variations of these

analyses enhanced by what we refer to as Graham factor filtering represent some of the

techniques considered. Identifying UOEF incidents can be a subjective process.

Guidance from the Rehnquist decision indicates that there must be a compelling

governmental interest to use force in apprehending a suspect and those factors may only

be judged based on the knowledge of the officer acting at the time, without the aid of

20/20 hindsight. Over the years, the courts have contributed to the case law on the

subject.

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The current legal definition of UOEF is rooted in the constitutional protections

afforded by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, specifically those

provisions regarding search and seizure, cruel and unusual punishment and equal

protection. Some researchers have argued to expand the definition to address

appropriateness of action. The late sociologist Carl Klockars seemed to favor a force-as-

last-resort policy advocating a strict definition that identifies appropriate use of force by

the “highly-skilled-police-officer” standard.2 In this era of modernized, professional

policing and intense scrutiny it is assumed that officers and their command are acting in

good faith. From this perspective, the identification of UOEF incidents is not one of

identifying criminal malfeasance, or overtly abusive, disparate or brutal action on the part

of the police. Rather, UOEF incidents are assumed to be the product of culture,

inadequate supervision, training, professional oversight and/or a combination of these

factors.

The organizational origins of UOEF as a product of psychological, sociological

and environmental factors has driven the artifacts of UOEF underground. From the most

skeptical point-of-view, all cases in which force was used above what was necessary to

match the resistance of the offender are viewed as potentially UOEF incidents. Only

where Graham factors are present justifying force and no alternative exists, and where

the maximum force applied is truly a last resort measure, we presume any highly skilled

officer would have acted accordingly necessitating the action by legal and professional

standards.

UOEF is difficult to identify, and the artifacts of UOEF and empiricism are all

that are available to us. The role of academic research is to employ the scientific process

in search of the truth, and to apply that truth where possible in order to help make the

world a better place in which to live. We are left with the content of official records to

provide indicators of UOEF. These data are naturally limited by their representation of

the officer applying force. We have to assume these reports reflect a degree of bias

toward the officers writing them. As these documents are intended to record justification

for the application of force, the authors used these reports to eliminate those incidents

where force was justified and focus on the remainder for indicators of UOEF.

A hypothetical will demonstrate the problem. While on patrol an officer observes

a juvenile male committing an act of vandalism. The officer approaches the subject,

identifies himself as a police officer and issues a lawful order to the subject to surrender.

The subject flees and the officer gives chase. The suspect is younger, visibly unarmed

and considerably smaller than the officer. In apprehending the suspect the officer tackles

him and successfully takes him into custody. As a result of the tackle the suspect

receives superficial abrasions to his knees and minor bruising, and no medical attention is

required.

Under Graham this incident could be considered UOEF. The subject was not a

danger to the public, he was fleeing but it was a non-violent crime and it is arguable that

there existed no compelling governmental interest for his apprehension. Furthermore, the

arresting officer was plainly aware of these factors at the time that force was applied.

His actions may have derived from the suspect’s lack of respect for formal social

2 Klockars, C. (1995). A theory of excessive force and its control. In W. A. Geller & H. Toch (Eds.), And

justice for all: Understanding and controlling police abuse of force (pp. 11-29). Washington, DC: Police

Executive Research Forum.

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controls. This UOEF incident does not readily appear to be an egregious overreach of

police authority and may not be easily identified by examining force and resistance

levels. Thus, an analysis of the data focusing on large, positive force factors as potential

UOEF would be crude at best.

Graham Factor Filtering As demonstrated by the hypothetical, a more detailed analysis is required to

confidently identify potential UOEF incidents. Rather than bluntly pointing to the

outliers in a distribution of force factors, a systematic identification and elimination of

incidents with sufficient justification for the application of force is more appropriate. We

operationalized Graham factors from the SPD use of force reports as follows (Table 2):

Table 2. Operationalization of Graham Factors

Graham factor Report Section Variable (code)

Evidence of threat or

intention to inflict harm

“Force / Resistance Used

by Subject (check all that

apply)”

Threat level (from

narrative)

- Impact Weapon (2)

- Knife (4)

- Firearm (5)

- Weapon present or suspected (4)

Evidence of intention to

flee

“Force / Resistance Used

by Subject (check all that

apply)…Subject Flight”

- Motor Vehicle (1)

- Foot (2)

- Other (3)

Evidence of a compelling

governmental interest to

intervene or interdict

“Type of Incident (check

all that apply)”

- Felony (1)

- Violent Crime (4)

- Fight Disturbance (6)

- Domestic Violence (8)

- Mental / Suicidal (10)

Indicators of an impaired

rational ability (no single

factor taken as indicator,

multiple factors must be

present)

“Subject Impairments

(check all that apply)”

- Poor Balance (2)

- Rambling / Incoherent Speech (3)

- Smelled of Alcohol (4)

- Subject indicated drug / alcohol use (5)

- Subject indicated not using prescribed

medication (6)

- Slurred Speech (7)

- Possible mental illness / suicidal /

delusional (8)

- Possible intoxication (alcohol / drugs)

(10)

If we assume all incidents where an officer uses force against a citizen and is at a

force surplus (force factors 1 and above) have the potential to be UOEF incidents, we can

begin to eliminate justifiable use of force incidents by applying a logical analysis of the

Graham factors. Most of the factors listed in Table 2 are evidence of a compelling

interest to seek compliance, where the subject poses a substantial risk to officers and/or

public safety. Other factors are counter-indicative of alternatives to force.

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Statistical Significance

Before proceeding with the analysis, a few words on the issue of statistical

significance are in order. Sample-based statistics are estimates of a true population value

(or population parameter) that would have been obtained had one analyzed all of the data

rather than a sample of the data. Due to sampling variability, statistical estimates always

have a degree of error associated with them. Tests of statistical significance are

necessary to determine whether an observed difference in the sampled data is due to a

real and true difference, or if it could’ve been obtained by chance due to sampling

variability.

We have analyzed all UOF incidents during the study period and we do not seek

to generalize our findings beyond the study period. As such, we treat these as population

data. The numbers we report are treated not as sample-based statistical estimates, but

rather as population parameters having no sampling variability associated with them.

Any observed difference in the data is treated as a real and true difference in the data, and

statistical significance is not considered relevant. Therefore, we do not report any tests of

statistical significance, and readers should instead consider the substantive significance of

any observed differences.

ANALYSIS

When, where, and how often do the police in Seattle use force?

During the study period (1/1/09 through 3/25/11), there were a total of 1,240 use

of force reports. In the aggregate, this amounts to approximately 46 incidents per month,

or about 1.5 incidents per day.

In order to better understand the incidence of police use of force, we standardized

force incidents in terms of arrest activity. Table 3 presents arrest-based rates of use of

force during the study period. Overall, police in Seattle use force in about 2.4 out of

every 100 arrests. This rate is fairly consistent over the study period, with monthly rates

varying from 1.9 per 100 (March, 2009) to 3.1 per 100 (April, 2010).

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Table 3. Arrest-based rates of use of force in Seattle

Year

Month

Arrests

Force

Rate of force per

100 arrests

Overall 50,748 1,240 2.44

2009 January 2,080 48 2.31

February 1,850 48 2.59

March 1,929 37 1.92

April 1,926 47 2.44

May 1,945 45 2.31

June 1,933 45 2.33

July 2,049 52 2.54

August 2,015 51 2.53

September 1,914 40 2.09

October 1,918 47 2.45

November 1,695 45 2.65

December 1,744 45 2.58

2010 January 2,052 48 2.34

February 1,847 39 2.11

March 1,900 49 2.58

April 1,827 56 3.07

May 1,934 55 2.84

June 1,958 51 2.60

July 1,950 53 2.72

August 1,895 44 2.32

September 1,870 47 2.51

October 1,909 47 2.46

November 1,711 36 2.10

December 1,757 43 2.45

2011 January 1,889 44 2.33

February 1,531 46 3.00

March* 1,720 32 1.86

Note: Arrest data were provided by the Seattle Police Department.

* Includes all arrests but only force incidents through 3/25/11, thus the

actual rate for March, 2011, is probably higher.

It is important to note that these overall figures can mask important variation by

day of week and time of day. Use of force in Seattle is more frequent on weekends, with

36% of all incidents during the study period occurring on Saturdays and Sundays (see

figure 1). Force is also more frequent during the late evening and early-morning hours,

with 60% of all incidents occurring during the hours 2000-0359 (see figure 2).

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Figure 1. Use of Force Incidents, by Day of Week

142156 160 161

175

235

211

0

50

100

150

200

250

Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday

Day of week

Number of incidents

Figure 2. Use of Force Incidents, by Time of Day

141

360

739

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

0400 - 1159 1200 - 1959 2000 - 0359

Time of Day (Watch)

Number of Incidents

The West Precinct has the largest share (34%) of use of force incidents, followed

by the South Precinct (21%). The North and East Precincts each account for about 17%

of incidents (see figure 3). The Southwest Precinct had the lowest proportion of use of

force incidents (10%). Incidents that occurred outside of Seattle are not included in this

figure.

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Figure 3. Use of Force Incidents, by Precinct

215

422

212

262

118

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

North West East South Southwest

Precinct

Number of incidents

What are the underlying offenses in use of force incidents?

Officers recorded the type of incident on the use of force reporting forms. This

indicates the general nature of the dispatch or on-view incident and associated incident

characteristics. These characteristics are not mutually exclusive, so several type

characteristics may be indicated for a particular incident. Forty percent of the incidents

were reported as involving some type of felony matter, and 38% non-felony matters (see

figure 4). Fights or disturbances were indicated in 30% of incidents. About 1 in 5

involved violent crimes and/or were drug related. Eighteen percent were characterized as

mental/suicidal. Domestic violence was indicated in 15% of use of force incidents.

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Figure 4. Percent of Use of Force Incidents, by Type of Incident

40.3

37.5

29.5

21.8

20.0

18.2

15.5

15.2

12.1

10.7

5.9

1.3

0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0 45.0

Felony

Non-felony

Fight/disturbance

Violent crime

Drug related

Mental/suicidal

Property crime

Domestic violence

Multiple subjects

Traffic related

Warrant service

Civil disorder

Percent of incidents

What are the characteristics of a typical suspect in use of force incidents, and what

do they do?

The vast majority of use of force incidents (94%) involved a single suspect upon

whom force was used. It is important to note that in some cases, the suspect(s) fled or

otherwise left the scene without being enumerated. For example, the use of OC Spray to

stop and disperse fighting crowds after bar closings in Belltown or in Pioneer Square may

result in no enumerated suspect(s). Another example might be mass demonstrations

wherein numerous individuals are involved in an incident but not enumerated. In cases

where the number of individual suspects was not identified, we coded these as zeros;

there were a total of 22 such cases (1.8%) among the total. Figure 5 shows the

distribution of force incidents by the number of suspects upon whom force was used.

16

Figure 5. Use of Force Incidents, by Number of Suspects

22

1171

37 7 2 10

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

0 1 2 3 4 20

Number of suspects

Number of incidents

A total of 1,252 suspects were identified in the use of force records, representing

1,193 unique suspects. The vast majority (96%) were suspects in a single use of force

incident during the study period (see figure 6). There were some “repeat” suspects upon

whom force was used, including 39 individuals who were involved in two incidents,

seven individuals who were involved in three incidents, and two individuals who were

involved in four incidents during the study period.

Figure 6. Suspects, by Number of Use of Force Incidents

1145

39 7 20

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1 2 3 4

Number of incidents

Number of suspects

At the incident-level (i.e., including “repeat” suspects), the average age of

suspects in use of force incidents was 32 years (SD=12), and the age of suspects ranged

from 12 to 78 years. The age distribution exhibits positive skew, so the median age (29

years) is perhaps a better measure of central tendency (see figure 7).

17

Race was determined for 1,262 suspects in use of force incidents. Forty-five

percent were White; 40% Black; 5% Asian; 3% American Indian; and 6% Other (see

figure 8). As shown, these figures are roughly comparable to the race distribution for all

arrestees during the study period (arrestee data were provided by SPD). Whites

comprised 50% of all arrestees and 45% of those upon whom force was used during the

study period. Blacks comprised 38% of all arrestees and 40% of those upon whom force

was used during the study period. Asians comprised 6% of all arrestees and 5% of those

upon whom force was used during the study period. American Indians comprised 3% of

both the arrestee and force populations. Individuals in the “Other category” represented

3% of the arrestee population and about 6% of those upon whom force was used.

18

Figure 8. Race distribution, Suspects in Use of Force Incidents

Compared with Arrestees

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

White Black American

Indian

Asian Other

Race

Percent

All Arestees

Use of Force Suspects

Gender was determined for 1,267 suspects in use of force incidents. (There was

additionally a transgender individual for whom a specific sex category could not be

determined. It is important to note that there were additional transgender suspects, but a

dominant gender was identified in the report for these other cases). Eighty-seven percent

of suspects were male, and the remaining 13% female.

Suspects may exhibit impairments that affect their judgment and behavioral

decision-making. There was no evidence of impairment noted for 26% of suspects in use

of force incidents. However, about half of suspects exhibited signs of intoxication (either

drugs or alcohol) (Figure 9). In about a third of cases, suspects indicated to the officer(s)

that they had been using drugs and/or alcohol (32%), exhibited rambling or incoherent

speech (33%), or smelled of alcohol (36%). Slurred speech (24%) and poor balance

(17%) were also noted impairments. A possible mental illness, suicidal intentions, or

delusional behavior was noted in 28% of incidents.

Figure 9. Percent of Suspects Exhibiting

Impairments, by Type of Impairment

49.5

35.8

33.1

31.9

28.4

24.2

17.0

0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0

Possible intoxication (alcohol/drugs)

Smelled of alcohol

Rambling/incoherent speech

Subject indicated drug/alcohol use

Possible mental illness/suicidal/delusional

Slurred speech

Poor balance

Percent of suspects

19

In addition to impairments, suspects fled from officers in about a quarter of

incidents, by either foot (26.5%) or motor vehicle (3.1%). These figures also include a

small subset of cases in which suspects fled by both motor vehicle and foot.

As discussed earlier, we measured suspect resistance by reading report narratives

and coding suspect resistance levels on a seven-point scale. The scale categories

included:

1. Cooperative/no resistance 2. Verbal noncompliance/passive resistance 3. Psychological threat 4. Defensive resistance 5. Active resistance 6. Aggravated active resistance I 7. Aggravated active resistance II

Figure 10 shows the distribution of incidents along the seven-point continuum

described above. In nearly half (48.5%) of all incidents, the highest level of suspect

resistance was defensive resistance. Next most frequent was active resistance, with one

quarter (25%) of incidents falling in that category.

Figure 10. Percent of Use of Force Incidents,

by Maximum Suspect Resistance Level

1.0 9.9 9.0

48.5

25.2

5.7 0.70.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

Cooperative/no resistance

Verbal noncompliance/passive resistance

Psychological threat

Defensive resistance

Active resistance

Aggravated active resistance I

Aggravated active resistance II

Maximum resistance level

Percent of incidents

Another way of gauging the seriousness of suspect resistance in use of force

incidents is by the presence of Hazard Report & Washington Crime Information Center

20

(WACIC) Officer Safety Entry reports filed along with the use of force report. These

WACIC reports are to be completed by officers “… if combative resistance or physical

aggression that is intended to overpower, disable or injure is directed toward an officer.”

These forms instruct officers: “Do not fill out this report if the suspect only physically

pulls away, lies down or acts in other similar non-combative ways.” Once entered into

WACIC, other officers will then be notified about the potentially combative suspect

should they encounter him/her when performing a records check. WACIC reports were

filed in 19% of all use of force incidents during the study period.

Suspects complained of injury in 51% of incidents (although this refers only to

the first suspect reported and is thus conservative), and suspects were reported by officers

as visibly injured in 69% of incidents, but the injuries were sometimes a result of

something that happened prior to police involvement. Among those suspects

complaining of injury, 20% specifically refused treatment. The majority were treated by

EMS personnel at the scene or at a police precinct. In 14 cases (or about 1% of all use of

force incidents), suspects were treated and admitted to a hospital.

How many officers are typically involved and what do they do?

Eighty-one percent of all incidents involved force used by a single officer (48%),

or by two officers (33%) (see figure 11). Another 12% involved force used by three

officers. The remaining seven percent of cases involved force used by four or more

officers.

Figure 11. Use of Force Incidents, by Number of Officers Using Force

596

411

149

58 18 4 2 1 10

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 29

Number of officers

Number of incidents

Our analysis yielded 650 unique officers involved either as first responding

officers or as backing officers in the 1,240 use of force incidents during the study period.

It is important to note that not all officers were accounted for; we recorded up to six

21

officers involved, but there were a few incidents that exceeded that range, including one

incident that involved 29 officers. About a third (34%) of the officers in the use of force

data were involved in a single incident during the study period (Figure 12); about half

(53%) in one or two incidents; two-thirds (66%) in one to three incidents; and about

three-quarters (76%) in one to four incidents. Ninety-five percent of officers in the use of

force data were involved in less than ten incidents during the study period. Thirty-one

officers (about 5%) were involved in 10 or more incidents during the study period, and

there were three officers (about 0.5%) who were involved in 20 or more use of force

incidents during the study period.

Figure 12. Number of Officers Involved in Multiple Incidents,

by Number of Force Incidents

223

119

89

64

39 3322 22

8 3 3 8 2 3 2 3 2 2 1 1 10

50

100

150

200

250

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 20 23 24

Number of incidents

Number of officers

Slightly more than half of the use of force incidents (55%) resulted from the

dispatch of an officer to a scene, while the remainder (45%) were on-view incidents.

As to the specific tactics employed, we recorded all tactics used by officers (as

indicated on the use of force reporting form) involved in each incident (Figure 13). As

can be seen, hands, elbows, and arms were the most frequently reported (80%), followed

by feet, knees, and legs (28%). Tasers were reported as being used in 23% of incidents.

Less frequently used were OC spray (7%), batons (4%), canines (3%) and other types

(3%).

22

Figure 13. Percent of Use of Force Incidents, by Tactics Employed

79.5

27.7

22.8

7.3

3.6

3.1

2.6

0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0

Hands/Elbows/Arms

Feet/Knees/Legs

Taser

OC Spray

Baton

K-9

Other

Percent of incidents

As discussed earlier, we measured maximum officer force levels by reading report

narratives and coding officer force levels on a seven-point scale. The scale categories

included:

1. Police presence, verbal direction 2. Strong verbal order with minimal contact 3. OC spray 4. Defensive force, forcibly subdued suspect with open hands or feet 5. Offensive force, forcibly subdued suspect using closed hands or feet 6. Intermediate weapon 7. Deadly force

Figure 14 shows the distribution of incidents along the seven-point continuum

described above. In about 4 out of 10 incidents, the highest level of officer force was

defensive physical force. Next most frequent was the use of an intermediate weapon,

with almost 3 out of 10 incidents falling in that category. About one quarter (24%) of

incidents involved officers using offensive physical force.

23

Figure 14. Percent of Use of Force Incidents,

by Maximum Officer Force Level

0.0 2.0 4.1

41.0

23.9

28.7

0.30.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

40.0

45.0

Police presence, verbal direction

Strong verbal order with minimal contact

OC spray

Defensive force

Offensive force

Intermediate weapon

Deadly force

Maximum force level

Percent of incidents

Officer injuries were reported in 17% of incidents, although this figure relates

only to the first officer reported, and is thus conservative. Officers typically self-treated

or were treated by EMS personnel.

How are the interactions distributed in terms of both suspect and officer actions?

Here we report on the distribution of force factors (i.e., level of officer force

minus level of suspect resistance). A value of ‘0’ indicates that police force was

proportional to suspect resistance. Positive values indicate officers using a higher level

of force compared to suspect resistance, and negative values indicate officers using a

lower level of force compared to suspect resistance. In general, officers following a force

continuum model will use a higher level of force in order to overcome a given level of

suspect resistance, thus +1 events (and to some extent, +2 events, some of which may be

an artifact of skipping over OC spray, or going to an intermediate weapon such as the

Taser rather than physically fighting an individual) are to be expected. Overall, about

80% of use of force incidents fell in the 0 to 2 range, and about 14% fell in negative

categories (Figure 15). The remaining 6% were in the 3 to 5 range.

24

Figure 15. Percent of Use of Force Incidents,

by Force Factor (Force - Resistance)

0.4

2.3

10.9

35.6

27.1

17.7

3.9

1.90.3

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

40.0

-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5

Force Factor

Percent of incidents

Since the static force factor only captures the maximum levels of officer force and

suspect resistance, an examination of dynamic force factors may help to understand the

evolution. As previously mentioned, we coded up to 10 dyadic iterations of officer-

suspect actions. More than half of all cases end by the fourth iteration (Figure 16).

Figure 17 shows the average levels of officer force and suspect resistance at each

iteration. Overall, officers on average entered situations at a force deficit, and

transitioned into a force surplus by iteration three. This generally reflects initial attempts

to reason with noncompliant suspects either with voice commands or limited physical

contact.

25

Figure 16. Number of Incidents, by Number of Force-

Resistance Iterations

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Iteration Number

Number of Incidents

Figure 17. Dynamic Force and Resistance Levels

0.00

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

3.00

3.50

4.00

4.50

5.00

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Iteration Number

Average Force or Resistance Level

Officer

Suspect

Figure 18 shows the average force factor at each iteration. As can be seen, force

factors are generally negative in the first two iterations. Average force factors transition

through zero to positive values thereafter, consistent with the notion of a force

continuum.

26

Figure 18. Dynamic Force Factors

-1.00

-0.50

0.00

0.50

1.00

1.50

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Iteration Number

Average Force Factor

How often might the use of excessive force occur in Seattle?

As previously discussed, our approach is to filter out cases based on both Graham

factors and static force factors in order to identify a pool of potentially excessive

incidents. Selecting use of force incidents having an absence of Graham factors as

defined (i.e., threat or intention to inflict harm, fleeing, a compelling governmental

interest to intervene, and impaired rational ability), and having a static force factor equal

to or greater than 1, yields an initial pool of 59 cases. Fourteen of these cases were OC

Spray deployments, generally involving large crowds and alcohol establishments, and

resulting in no enumerated suspects. We removed these cases from the pool. In addition,

two of these cases involved animals. In one case, the officer fired a Taser at a dog that

was injuring another dog; the Taser had the desired effect and the dog ran off. In the

other case, the officer fired his sidearm at the dog but missed. Both animal cases were

removed from the pool.

The remaining 43 cases (3.5% of all cases) are characterized as potentially

excessive. In the context of total arrests, this equates to about 1 potential use of excessive

force for every 1,180 arrests in Seattle. We strongly caution that further research is

needed to determine the overall utility of our approach. In a broader sense, we need

socio-legal research to determine whether it is even possible to identify use of excessive

force from administrative records. It should also be noted that the filtering method will

include cases that, upon further review, are probably not excessive; likewise, it will miss

some cases that are. The filtering method relies on the accuracy of administrative data

elements, and it is possible that some characteristics may not be correctly identified in

use of force reports or that omitted details in the forms could result in erroneous

selection. We describe the cases below with these cautions in mind.

Similar to all use of force cases, these potentially excessive cases are slightly

more frequent on weekends, but whereas all force incidents are heavily loaded (60%) in

the 3rd watch (2000 – 0359), the potentially excessive cases are more balanced between

27

2nd (40%) and 3

rd (44%) watches (Figure 19). Similar to all use of force cases, the West

Precinct accounts for about a third (35%) of the potentially excessive cases, but the East

Precinct has a larger share of potentially excessive cases (28%) as compared to that

Precinct’s share of all use of force cases (17%) (Figure 20). One of the potentially

excessive incidents occurred outside the City of Seattle.

Figure 19. All Use of Force and Potentially Excessive Incidents, by Time

of Day

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

0400 - 1159 1200 - 1959 2000 - 0359

Time of Day (Watch)

Percent of Incidents

All Use of Force

Potential UOEF

Figure 20. All Use of Force and Potentially Excessive Incidents, by

Precinct

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

40.0

North West East South Southwest

Precinct

Percent of incidents

All Use of Force

Potential UOEF

The types of incidents (i.e., the general nature of the dispatch or on-view incident)

were characterized for 32 of the potentially UOEF cases. 24 were identified as non-

felony, 8 as drug related, 8 as traffic related, 7 as property crime, 4 involved multiple

subjects, 3 involved warrant services, and 1 was identified as a civil disorder. (Note that

these are not mutually exclusive categories).

Suspects in these cases were typically male (83%), and the age distribution is

substantively similar to that for all use of force cases (median 29 years of age). With

regard to race, the proportion of cases involving White suspects declines from all

28

arrestees (50%), to those upon whom force is used (45%), to those involving potential

UOEF (40%) (Figure 21). There are increases in the proportion of Asian and “Other”

suspects from arrestees to EUOF cases. For example, the other category increases from

all arrestees (3%), to those upon whom forced is used (6%), to those involving potential

UOEF (12%).

Figure 21. Race distribution, Suspects in All Use of Force and

Potentially Excessive Incidents, Compared with Arrestees

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

White Black American Indian Asian Other

Race

Percent Arrestees

All Use of Force

Potential UOEF

Incidents identified as potentially excessive were more frequently on-view

incidents (67%), in contrast to all use of force incidents (45%). All but two cases

involved a single suspect, and typically involved either one (54%) or two (35%) officers.

Officer tactics (hands, elbows, arms; feet, knees, legs; Taser; etc.) were similar in

distribution to those for all use of force incidents. Suspects were booked in about 60% of

these incidents, and some common charges listed were obstructing, assault, resisting,

trespass, and warrants.

How is police use of force geographically distributed in Seattle?

As previously noted, the West Precinct has the largest share of use of force

incidents, accounting for just over one-third of the incidents during the study period.

However, precinct-level aggregations mask important local spatial variation in the use of

force. Here, we report on some basic spatial analyses to explore this local variation.

Map 1 is a point map of the greater Seattle area where each point indicates a use of force

incident. As can be seen, use of force incidents are distributed across the entire city. A

cursory visual inspection suggests clustering and other patterning in the distribution of

incidents.

29

Map 1. Point Map of Use of Force Incidents in Seattle

30

Map 2 displays a kernel density estimation of use of force incidents over the study

area. Higher densities are noted on the map in several locations. In the North Precinct,

there area higher densities of use of force incidents in the general vicinity of: (1) NE

125th St & Lake City Way NE; and (2) NE 45

th to 50

th Sts & University Way NE.

In the East Precinct, there are higher densities of use of force incidents in the

general vicinity of: (1) E Pine to E Pike Sts & Broadway to Boylston Aves; and (2) 23rd

Ave to MLK Way & E Cherry St to E Yesler Way.

In the West Precinct, there are higher densities of use of force incidents in the

general vicinity of: (1) Belltown; (2) Pioneer Square; and (3) International District.

Finally, in the South Precinct, there are higher densities of use of force incidents

in the general vicinity of: (1) Rainier Ave & S Genesee St; (2) Rainier Ave & S

Ferdinand St; (3) MLK Way & S Webster to S Othello Sts; and (4) Rainier Ave & S

Henderson St.

It should be emphasized that this is a very macro-level view of use of force

incidents and that greater specificity can be achieved, especially in the downtown core

and with Precinct-level analyses. We forego such analyses here in order to avoid

potential micro-level spatial labeling and privacy concerns.

31

Map 2. Kernel Density Estimation of Use of Force Incidents in Seattle

32

CONCLUSION

In many ways, this is just the beginning. The descriptive analysis presented in

this report is a necessary first step toward understanding the nature and scope of police

use of force in Seattle, but it is also the proverbial tip of the iceberg. The key findings are

summarized in the front of the report and need not be repeated here. The next step is to

move from description toward explanation.

The spatial component of police use of force is an important area for continued

research. Everything occurs in time and space, and to ignore these aspects of police use

of force is to miss a large part of the story. Merging these data with available crime data,

Census data regarding community characteristics, as well as data from other researchers

engaged in attitudinal studies of Seattle neighborhoods, may prove quite fruitful in

explaining the distribution of police use of force, as well as achieving broader social

justice goals.

Alternative data sources, such as complaints filed with the ACLU or other

entities, should also be brought to bear on the question of the incidence of police use of

force. A significant limitation of the present research is reliance upon official use of

force reports, which contain statements from the officer, witnesses, the investigating

supervisor and members of the SPD chain of command involved in reviewing them, but

not the subject of the action. Further, these reports are written for the purpose of

documenting justification for the application of force. As such they contain an inherent

bias toward police. This is not to say these reports are inaccurate; these are official

statements given by sworn officers whom we presume are giving the most accurate

statement possible.

In reviewing use of force reports, we took no license in interpreting the actions of

either party. But we were also looking for specific elements of interaction (force and

resistance levels) and a more thorough analysis of the report narratives is certainly in

order. One of the benefits of the data file we have generated along with our initial

descriptive analysis is that we now have an accurate sampling frame from which a

statistically valid sample of cases can be drawn for more detailed qualitative analysis.

We close by acknowledging that, despite the relatively benign picture that

emerges from empirical data, the public outrage and calls for a DOJ investigation cannot

be ignored. We entrust our public servants, especially in law enforcement, with

tremendous powers of coercion. When a law enforcement officer uses force against a

citizen it is disturbing. From a psychological standpoint the impact can be dramatic for

bystanders, let alone the subjects of violence themselves. We cannot ignore the reality of

violence simply because it occurs rarely. However, we would hope that those engaged in

police reform efforts would do their best to ensure that such reforms are rooted in a

rational understanding of police use of force, so that their efforts are truly meaningful and

long-lasting.