second khan abdul ghaffar khan second khan abdul ghaffar ... · after the partition of the...

Husain Haqqani Former Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States

Director, South & Central Asia, Hudson Institute Washington D.C

Second Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan Second Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan Second Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan Memorial LectureMemorial LectureMemorial Lecture

Re-imagining Pakistan

Centre for Pakistan Studies MMAJ Academy of International Studies

Jamia Millia Islamia

The Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan Memorial Lecture instituted by the Centre for Pakistan Studies, MMAJ Academy of International Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi in the memory of the legendary figure Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan is an initiative to propagate the values he stood for.

Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the great Pashtun leader is still remembered in India for his role in the national movement. The values he stood for still remain relevant for contemporary times. Born in Peshawar, North-West Frontier Province in 1890, he is known for his non-violent opposition to British rule during the final years of the Empire on the Indian sub-continent. In his early career, he wanted to uplift his fellow Pashtuns through the means of education. It was during his tireless work to organise and raise the consciousness of the Pashtuns that he came to be known as Badshah Khan, the ‘King of Chiefs.’ A lifelong pacifist and a follower of Mahatma Gandhi, he also came to be known as the ‘Frontier Gandhi.’ He was deeply influenced by Mahatma Gandhi’s philosophy of non-violence and forged a close, spiritual, and personal friendship with him. In 1929, he founded the Khudai Khidmatgar (Servants of God) known as the Red Shirt Movement among the Pashtuns. The Khudai Khidmatgar was founded on a belief in the power of Gandhi’s notion of Satyagraha. It espoused non-violent nationalist agitation in support of Indian independence and sought to awaken the Pashtun’s political consciousness. His goal was a united, inde-pendent, secular India. After the Partition of the sub-continent, due to his opposition to authoritarian rule, he spent most of his time in prison and exile. In 1956, in association with some of the East Pakistani leaders he founded the Na-tional Awami Party – which was banned in 1958. He was arrested and upon his release left for Afghanistan and returned to Pakistan only in 1972. He died in 1988 after a long illness. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s political legacy is to be cherished. He is renowned amongst the Pashtuns and internationally as a leader of a non-violent movement. He is credited with his tireless advocacy of peace in the region. This great leader held no official post during his lifetime and worked tirelessly for the uplift-ment of his people. He was also a strong champion of women’s rights and education. He promoted educa-tion and social service through the work of the Khudai Khidmatgars. He was an ardent believer in the common destiny of the people of both India and Pakistan. Apart from this, his commitment to democracy and non-violence made him a legendary South Asian to be celebrated de-spite the borders in contemporary South Asia. In 1985, he was nominated for the Nobel peace prize and in 1987 he became the first non-citizen to be awarded India’s highest civilian award – the Bharat Ratna. The inaugural Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan Memorial lecture titled A Vision for Pakistan in the 21st Century was delivered by Mr. Asfandyar Wali Khan, President of the Awami National Party, Pakistan and the grandson of Badshah Khan. The Second Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan Memorial lecture was delivered on 11th August 2014 by Ambassador Husain Haqqani, former Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States and Director, South and Central Asia, Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C. His lecture was titled Re-imagining

Pakistan. The programme was chaired by Prof. Talat Ahmad, Vice Chancellor, Jamia Millia Islamia.

I t is an honour for me to be invited to deliver the Second Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan Memo-

rial Lecture at Jamia Millia Islamia.

One of the great tragedies of the Partition of the sub-continent has been the development of sepa-rate narratives of history in India and Pakistan, which do not do justice to several great men. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan – or Badshah Khan or Bacha Khan, as he is lovingly known, is one of them.

Just as most Indians know little about the early contribution of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Quaid-e-Azam to Pakistanis, to the demand for self-rule in British India, most Pakistanis remain ill-informed about the struggle of Bacha Khan against British imperialism.

Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan was a towering figure in Indian, and later Pakistani history. He spent more years in prison for his beliefs than Nelson Mandela, first under British rule and later under dictatorships in Pakistan. Bacha Khan was pun-ished by the British for demanding freedom from foreign rule. After independence, he was pun-ished in the new state of Pakistan for questioning its elites and their policies.

The Frontier Gandhi had embraced the philoso-phy of non-violence. In his autobiography, he ex-plained how he saw Mahatma Gandhi at a Con-gress moot while attending a conference of the Khilafat Movement in Calcutta and began to like him. “Gandhiji was addressing the meeting,” he

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wrote, adding, “A conceited young man in the audience kept on heckling him. But Gandhiji did not get angry; he just laughed and went on talk-ing. The young man interrupted again and again, but Gandhiji only laughed. This made a deep im-pression on me, and when I returned to my lodg-ing, I told my companions about it. ‘If only our Muslim leaders could remain as calm and unper-turbed as Gandhiji, the leader of the Hindus,’ I said.”

According to Bacha Khan, he was put off by the haughty response of Maulana Mohammed Ali when he spoke to him about Gandhi’s patience and self-control. “Mohammed Ali Saheb did not react as we had hoped he would. He became very annoyed and said: ‘And who do you think you are, you Pathans from the back of beyond, to come and tell me how to behave?’ Then he got up and left the room. We were very disappointed and hurt. After that I did not want to attend the Khilafat Conference anymore.”

If the conceit of the Khilafat leadership brought Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan close to Gandhi, his disappointment with the Muslim League made him an ally of the Indian National Congress. Bacha Khan saw the British, and not other Indian communities, as the enemy of the Pashtun people he led.

The Muslim League leaders did not confront the British during the course of the Second World War as they saw the British as protecting Mus-lims “in order that they could fight the Hindus.”

By his own account, Bacha Khan’s Khudai Khid-

matgar Movement had not joined the Congress until the Muslim League turned down its request for support against the British. “Now we were desperate,” he wrote. “A drowning man has no choice but to catch any straw to save himself. We were very disappointed with the Muslim League. So we asked our two friends to contact the Con-gress leaders and request them to help us. In their meeting with the Congress leaders our friends were told that the Congress would be prepared to give us all possible help, if we, from our side, would agree to join them in the struggle for the

Second Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan Memorial Lecture

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Pakistan Studies Programme, Jamia Millia Islamia

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freedom of India.” Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan became one of the most influential Muslim leaders of the sub-continent who opposed the idea of Pakistan. Oth-ers included Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Dr. Zakir Husain, co-founder and Vice Chancellor of this University. Sixty-seven years later, when the existence of Pakistan is a reality that cannot be undone, it should be possible for us to objectively examine the arguments of Muslim opponents of the Muslim League.

Unfortunately, that has not been the case in Paki-stan. The Pakistani establishment has evolved a particular narrative of what led to Pakistan’s crea-tion and any discussion of it from a different per-spective is treated, not as history but as an attack on the country’s foundation. After mobilising support for the demand for Paki-stan, and establishing it as an independent coun-try, successive Pakistani leaders have chosen to keep alive the divisive frenzy that led to Partition. If Pakistan was attained with the slogan ‘Islam in danger,’ it has been built on the slogan ‘Pakistan in danger,’ creating a constant sense of insecurity among its people.

Bacha Khan, along with some other leaders like Bengal’s Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, opposed the conjuring of this ‘ideology of Pakistan.’ He had opposed Partition but after the Partition he said: “Now that the existence of Pakistan is a fact, and the Congress and the Muslim League have both accepted that fact, I only wish to serve my country and my people, without asking for a share in anything. My people are now loyal citizens of Pakistan and we will do our bit for the reconstruc-tion and the progress of the country.”

But as he wrote himself, the “Pakistan Govern-ment was not impressed.”

It accused Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan of disloy-alty to Pakistan. It is a tragedy that this great free-dom fighter spent more time in prison in the inde-pendent state of Pakistan than he had even under British rule.

According to Bacha Khan, “Though we did not commit any crimes, the treatment the Pakistan Government meted out to us from the very begin-ning was more cruel, and more unjust than any-thing we had suffered under the rule of the for-eign infidels. The British never looted our homes, but the Islamic Government of Pakistan did. The British never had stopped us from holding public meetings or publishing newspapers, but the Is-

Centre for Pakistan Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia

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lamic Government of Pakistan did both… I could go on and on, but what is the use?” In the end, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan was as dis-appointed with the reality of Pakistan as he had been unsupportive of the idea of Pakistan. “I am afraid I do not entertain any friendly feelings for Pakistan,” he wrote in his autobiography. He con-tinued, “Pakistan was founded on hatred. She was born not of love but of hatred and she grew up on hatred, on malice, on spite and hostility. Pakistan was created by the grace of the British in order that the Hindus and the Muslims might forever be at war and forget that they were brothers. Pakistan is unable to think in terms of peace and friend-ship. She wants to keep the Pakistani people un-der control by making them live in a nightmare of riots, assaults, and ‘holy’ war.” “My religion is truth, love, and service to God and humanity,” Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan emphasised. “Every religion that has come into the world has brought the message of love and brotherhood. And those who are indifferent to the welfare of their fellow-men, those whose hearts are empty of love, those who do not know the meaning of brotherhood, those who harbour hatred and resentment in their hearts, they do not know the meaning of relig-ion.”

I take this opportunity to salute the memory of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan – Bacha Khan – and his family and followers for keeping aloft the flag of a pluralist, tolerant, democratic Pakistan under difficult circumstances.

* * *

T his brings me to the topic of today’s lecture, dedicated to the memory of Khan Abdul

Ghaffar Khan. But first a word about why I chose ‘Re-imagining Pakistan’ as the theme for today’s presentation. Almost every discussion of Pakistan, especially in India, inevitably tends to be about the logic and raison d’etre of the country’s creation. The process of partitioning a sub-continent along religious lines did not prove as neat as Pakistan’s founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah had anticipated. Mr. Jinnah was a lawyer who saw Partition as a solution to potential constitutional problems in an independent India. In his first address to Pakistan’s Constituent As-sembly on 11 August 1947 – exactly 67 years ago today – Mr. Jinnah had said:

I know there are people who do not quite agree with the division of India and the partition of the Punjab and Bengal. Much has been said against it, but now that it has been accepted, it is the duty of every one of us to loyally abide by it and honourably act according to the agreement which is now final and binding on all… One can quite understand the feeling that exists be-tween the two communities wherever one com-munity is in majority and the other is in minor-ity. But the question is, whether it was possible or practicable to act otherwise than what has been done. A division had to take place. On both sides, in Hindustan and Pakistan, there are sections of people who may not agree with it, who may not like it; but in my judgement there was no other solution, and I am sure future his-tory will record its verdict in favour of it. And what is more, it will be proved by actual experi-ence as we go on that it was the only solution of India’s constitutional problem.

It is clear from Mr. Jinnah’s statement that he only saw Partition as a constitutional way out of a political stalemate, as he saw it, and not the be-ginning of a permanent state of hostility between two countries or two nations. This explains his expectation that India and Paki-stan would live side by side “like the United


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Benedict Anderson, in his book Imagined Com-

munities, defined a nation as “an imagined politi-cal community, imagined as both inherently lim-ited and sovereign.” According to Anderson, a nation is a socially constructed community, joined by the imagination of people who perceive them-selves as part of that group. Many writers, includ-ing Salman Rushdie, have argued that Pakistan was “insufficiently imagined,” given the ambigui-ties inherent in the demand for Pakistan.

As a Pakistani born well after Partition, and who has known no other homeland, I understand much of the critique of Pakistan. But I am unable to dis-pense with the idea of home and millions like me now know only Pakistan as their country. We are willing to discuss its history objectively and chart a different future for Pakistan but for us Pakistan is our homeland, which we will defend and im-prove.

Pakistan’s median age today is 21, which means that 90 million of its 180 million inhabitants are less than 21 years old and have not seen either the 1947 Partition of India or the 1971 separation of Bangladesh. For the sake of these young Paki-stanis, a re-imagining of Pakistan is needed, going beyond the bitterness of the 1947 Partition and the subsequent disasters inflicted upon Pakistanis by their own rulers and leaders.

States and Canada,” obviously with open borders, free flow of ideas and free trade. It is also the rea-son why the Quaid-e-Azam insisted that his Mala-bar Hills house in Bombay be kept as it was so that he could return to the city where he lived most of his life after retiring as Governor-General of Pakistan. We all know now that Partition and the birth of Pakistan was not simply the end of an argument about constitutional options, as Mr. Jinnah had thought. The entire country was plunged into communal violence, hundreds of thousands of people from both sides were butchered and mil-lions had to flee their homes. Instead of living as good neighbours like the United States and Canada, India and Pakistan have gone on to become adversaries in a state of constant war, a situation that has not benefitted either country but has damaged Pakistan even more. The territory that constituted Pakistan was undi-vided India’s economic backyard and could not immediately provide trained manpower to lead the new country’s administration or military. While many Muslims migrated from India to Pakistan as a result of the violence that also drove Hindus and Sikhs out of Pakistan and Muslims mainly out of Punjab, others moved to take ad-vantage of economic and employment opportuni-ties in the new country. For several years after independence, higher educated migrants from In-dia – Muhajirs, as opposed to sons of the soil – secured better jobs and higher positions in the new state of Pakistan. Over the years, Pakistan evolved into an Islamist ideological state, a short-cut to resolving the com-plex inter-ethnic, social and economic dynamics among its peoples. After the loss of its eastern wing, which became Bangladesh in 1971, Paki-stan has been completely dominated by one ethnic group, the Punjabis, who tend to favour the ideo-logical model for Pakistan and are heavily repre-sented in the military, the media, and the bureauc-racy.


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F rom its inception Pakistan was seen as an anachronism by many. It also assumed per-

manent hostility from India whose leaders were opposed to Partition and had predicted the demise of the new nation. The dispute between the two nations over the Himalayan territory of Jammu and Kashmir, which remains unresolved to this day, enhanced Pakistan’s confrontation with In-dia. Unsure of their fledgling nation’s future, the politicians, civil servants and military officers who led Pakistan in its formative years decided to exacerbate the antagonism between Hindus and Muslims that had led to Partition.

Very soon after independence, “Islamic Pakistan” was defining itself through the prism of resistance to “Hindu India.” The attitude of some in India helped create that binary.

Short of resources and burdened by inheriting a large army, Pakistan also sought great power al-lies to help pay for the economic and military de-velopment of the new country. The Partition of British India’s assets in 1947 had left Pakistan with one-third of the British Indian army and only 17 per cent of its revenues. The military started out as the dominant institution in the new state, a dominance it has perpetuated over the years.

After several years of exercising behind-the-scenes influence, General Ayub Khan assumed power directly in 1958 and ruled through martial law. Three further direct military takeovers fol-lowed. The military has directly or indirectly dominated Pakistani politics and set Pakistan’s ideological and national security agenda since 1958.

Some scholars attribute Pakistan’s troubles to its inception and the ambiguity about what it means to be a Pakistani. In the words of one of them, “It is the country’s problematic and contested rela-tionship with Islam that has most decisively frus-trated its quest for a coherent national identity and for stability as a nation-state capable of absorbing the challenges of its rich and diverse society.”

The success of the Jihadi experiment against the Soviets in collaboration with the United States

Pakistan, like any other nation, is not a monolith. Its people have energy, talent and aspirations for a good life like anyone else. Most foreign visitors to Pakistan, including Indians, will tell you of our hospitality, our warmth and the capabilities of individual Pakistanis they meet.

One can disagree over or even be agnostic about whether the creation of the state of Pakistan in August 1947 was a tragedy or not. But there is no doubt that the failure of Pakistanis to create a more tolerant and democratic state and the diffi-cult reconciliation between India and Pakistan have proved catastrophic.

Ever since their nation’s creation, Pakistanis have felt compelled to defend their nationhood and to constantly define and re-define their identity. Pakistan’s unfortunate history may justify the de-scription of Pakistan as being “insufficiently imagined,” but imagination is by definition not a finite process. An entity that is insufficiently imagined can be re-imagined. Just as the imagina-tion “can falsify, demean, ridicule, caricature and wound,” it can also serve to “clarify, intensify and unveil.”

Several Pakistanis are working, albeit with great difficulty, to re-imagine Pakistan as an inclusive, pluralist, democratic, modern state that works to-ward the well-being of its own people, instead of being preoccupied with endlessly defining itself, especially in relation to its neighbours.

* * *


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The country’s most powerful institution, the mili-tary, is having to contend with several parallel insurgencies and is no longer able to fully ensure order or security. Islamist extremists have become sufficiently emboldened to attack the army head-quarters and major military installations. Al-though almost 36,695 Pakistanis have been killed by terrorists since 2008, both civilian and military leaders have yet to demonstrate resolve in con-fronting the challenge of terrorism.

Pakistan is strategically located at the crossroads of three significant regions: the Gulf, Central Asia and South Asia. It borders Iran, Afghanistan, China and India, all of whom are important for different reasons. Pakistan’s economy is stagnant, its population is increasing rapidly, and its institu-tions of state are too tied to a national ideology rooted in Islamist discourse to be able to address its multi-dimensional challenges.

With terrorists trained in Pakistan showing up all over Europe and in places as far from one another as Mali and Indonesia, Pakistan’s change of di-rection is now a global concern. International as-sistance, especially from the United States and some from China and Saudi Arabia, has brought Pakistan back from the brink in the past. But ris-ing Xenophobia and Islamo-nationalism — exhib-ited prominently after the discovery of Osama bin Laden in a Pakistani garrison town — make con-tinued U.S support for Pakistan difficult. In recent years, China has also been restrained in its sup-port for Pakistan because of concerns over pres-ence of Uighur Jihadists.

It is no longer easy for Pakistan’s military or ci-vilian elite to create a semblance of stability with covert arrangements with the United States or with China. Distrust between the erstwhile allies is at an all-time high. A Fox News Poll in 2012 showed that 74 per cent of Americans do not view Pakistan as an ally and want to cut off all aid to Pakistan. A recent Pew Poll showed Pakistani dis-approval of the United States at 59 per cent, com-pared with 80 per cent with an unfavourable view of the U.S in 2012. The same poll shows that only 30 per cent of the Chinese people have a favour-able view of Pakistan. Pakistan ranks among the

and much of the non-communist world encour-aged Pakistan’s strategic planners to expand Ji-

had against India, and into post-Soviet Central Asia. Pakistan’s sponsorship of the Taliban in Af-ghanistan, and the presence on its territory of Islamist militants from all over the world, was the outcome of its desire to emerge as the centre of global Islamic resurgence. Ironically, not all Pakistani leaders supporting this strategy were motivated by religious fervour. In most cases, they simply embraced Islamism as a politico-military strategic doctrine that would en-hance Pakistan’s prestige and position. The focus on building an ‘ideological state,’ how-ever, has caused Pakistan to lag behind in almost all areas that define a functional modern state. At the moment the ‘insufficiently imagined’ Paki-stan, is the world’s only nuclear-armed Muslim country that has been described as slowly sliding towards state failure for at least the last two dec-ades. As a Pakistani, it offends and worries me that the rest of the world sees my state as being constantly on the brink of failure. I am not willing to retreat into a shell and blame the rest of the world for asking tough questions about my country. I, along with my other countrymen, want to find answers to the world’s tough questions. The return of cha-otic democracy has exacerbated Pakistan’s ethnic, religious and social divisions even as it has had the positive effect of giving its people a voice.


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nal factors has led to what may be described as ‘the Pakistan crisis.’

Some scholars attribute the military’s continued interest in political power to its institutional busi-ness interests. Others offer more sympathetic views of the military’s role, suggesting that Paki-stan’s complex circumstances, rather than design, have shaped Pakistan’s history including the mili-tary’s ascendancy. Most agree that the military remains and is likely to remain the dominant pol-icy-maker in Pakistan and is unlikely to easily change its worldview. In all crucial areas, the role of Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus, principally the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is significant as the covert driver of Pakistani policy and any change in Pakistan’s direction would involve un-derstanding of the ISI’s objectives and methods.

Pakistan’s deep state insists on defining Pakistani nationalism narrowly and focuses on delegitimis-ing all those who offer alternative visions for the country as traitors. Its strength lies in creating the illusion of virtual unanimity in Pakistan on criti-cal issues such as relations with India and Af-ghanistan, the role of Islam, Jihadism and atti-tudes towards the rest of the world.

The disproportionate focus on ideology, military capability and external alliances has weakened Pakistan internally. One element of national power – the military one – has been developed at the cost of all other elements of national power. The country’s institutions, ranging from schools and universities to the judiciary, are in a state of

countries least liked in the U.S in a Gallup Poll, alongside Iran and North Korea.

If the influence of Islamists in Pakistan continues to rise, it would most likely be increasingly adver-sarial towards the U.S and the west. Islamist en-thusiasm for creating an Islamic East Turkestan would not sit well with China. This would only increase Pakistan’s isolation.

In any case, Pakistan’s direction as a nation can-not and should not be determined by the U.S and other outsiders and the principal actors in this process would have to be Pakistanis. Pakistan has faced a deep crisis of identity and suffers from chronically weak state institutions. Its fears about its viability and security have led it to seek alli-ance with the U.S on the one hand and to pursue a nuclear deterrent and sub-conventional military capability (i.e. Islamist terrorism) against India (and Afghanistan), on the other.

Despite the constant re-writing of constitutions, Pakistan is far from developing a consistent sys-tem and form of government. Political polarisa-tion persists between Islamists and secularists, between civilians and the military, and among different ethnic and political groups. Political fac-tions have often found it difficult to cooperate with each other, or to submit themselves to rule of law, often with the aid of a military intelligence apparatus that plays a behind-the-scenes role in exaggerating political divisions to justify military intervention.

Pakistan’s military, which dominates the Paki-stani state even in the presence of an elected gov-ernment, has developed a policy tripod that in-cludes emphasis on Islam as a national unifier, hostility towards India as the principal foreign policy objective and an alliance with the U.S that helps defray the costs of Pakistan’s massive mili-tary expenditures. These policy precepts encour-age extremist Islamism and obstruct Pakistan’s evolution as a normally functioning state. Paki-stan’s pursuit of strategic objectives dispropor-tionate to its capacity has been inadvertently en-couraged by its alliance with the U.S. This con-vergence of potential internal collapse and exter-


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general decline. The economy’s stuttering growth is dependent largely on the flow of concessional flows of external resources. Pakistan’s GDP stands at $ 222 billion in absolute terms and $ 547 billion in purchasing price parity – the smallest economy of any country that has so far tested nu-clear weapons.

Pakistan today suffers from massive urban unem-ployment, rural under-employment, illiteracy and low per capita income. Twenty-two per cent of the population lives below the poverty line and another twenty-one per cent lives just above it, resulting in almost half the people of Pakistan be-ing very poor. It is little comfort for Pakistanis living in poverty when they are told that poverty across the border in India or Afghanistan is even starker. Soon after independence, 16.4 per cent of Pakistan’s population was literate compared with 18.3 per cent of the much larger population in In-dia. For almost fifteen years, Pakistan made no allocation for literacy in its national budget. By 2011, India had managed to attain 74.04 per cent literacy while Pakistan’s literacy rate stood at around 55 per cent. What was a 2 per cent differ-ence in literacy rates has expanded into a 20 per cent difference in 67 years. In 2009, Pakistan al-located 2.7 per cent of its budget for education and the school life expectancy in Pakistan is seven years. A staggering 38 per cent of Paki-stanis between the school-going age of five and fifteen are completely out of school.

With a population of 180-190 million out of which 60 per cent fall in the working age category of 15-64 and another 35 per cent under 14 years of age, Pakistan has a demographic dividend which can also turn into a demographic night-mare. The low literacy rate and inadequate invest-ment in education has led to a decline in Paki-stan’s technological base, which in turn hampers economic modernisation. Textiles are the coun-try’s major industry but despite being a major cot-ton-producing nation, Pakistan has been unable to become a leader in value-added textile products.

With one of the lowest tax-to-GDP ratios in the world of around 9 per cent, a GDP growth rate ranging between 1.7-2.4 per cent and population

growth rate of 1.5 per cent, Pakistan needs for-eign as well as domestic investment in addition to drastic changes in local laws all of which need broad political consensus and stability both of which are lacking.

With almost 40 per cent of its population urban-ised the government spends around 2.6 per cent on public healthcare. As a result social services are also in a state of decline. On the other hand, Pakistan spends almost 6 per cent of its GDP on defence and is still unable to match the conven-tional forces of India, which outspends Pakistan 3 to 1 while allocating less than 3 per cent of GDP to military spending.

Over the decades, Pakistan has managed to evade crises and failure status primarily because the in-ternational community has bailed out Pakistan.

There is an alternative vision of Pakistan as a plu-ralist, multi-ethnic, modern democratic Muslim state functioning under rule of law for the mate-rial well-being of all its citizens.

But in recent years, those articulating or support-ing this alternative vision have been marginalised as a result of the dominance of Pakistan’s national discourse by Islamists and Islamo-nationalists. Re-imagining Pakistan involves changing the na-ture of the Pakistani state, from an ideological Islamic one to a state that is pragmatic in defining its national interest and functional in attaining it. The first step in re-imagining Pakistan would be to abandon the narrow ideological paradigm of Pakistani nationalism. Pakistan is here to stay and


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no one in the world wants it dismembered if it functions effectively as a responsible international member. Armed with nuclear weapons Pakistan does not need to live in fear or insecurity. The state of insecurity fostered in Pakistan is psycho-logical and should now be replaced with a logical self-confidence.

Once pluralism and secularism are no longer dirty words in my country, and all national discussions need not be framed within the confines of an Islamist ideology, it will become easier for Paki-stan to tackle the Jihadi menace. It goes without saying that there should be no support from the state for any militant Jihadi group based on false strategic premises. Jihadi terrorism is now a threat to Pakistan and must be eliminated for Pakistan’s sake.

The shift away from ideological nationalism to functional nationalism – “We are Pakistanis be-cause we were born in Pakistan” as opposed to

“We are Pakistanis because our forebears re-solved to create an Islamic state” – will help change the milieu in which various Islamist ex-tremist and Jihadi groups recruit and operate in Pakistan.

Once the state has resolved to end support to all Jihadis and is reconciled to a pluralist Pakistan open to multiple visions for the country’s future, extremists would have to contend for Pakistani hearts and minds rather than having a captive fol-lowing generated by a national narrative taught in schools and promoted by the national media.

Pakistan must also overcome archaic notions of national security. Instead of viewing ourselves as a ‘warrior nation’ we should see ourselves as a ‘trading nation’ that can take advantage of our location for economic purposes. Pakistan could easily be the trans-shipment route for goods and services between India, the Middle East and Cen-tral Asia. It could have oil and gas pipelines run-ning through it, with attending benefits. India and Afghanistan would be major trading partners in-stead of being viewed as permanent enemies or strategic threats. High literacy, global connec-tivity, increased agricultural and industrial pro-ductivity, and a prosperous citizenry would be the goals of the state in a re-imagined Pakistan.

These objectives would replace Pan-Islamism, Jihadism, and pursuit of parity with India and strategic depth which have been Pakistan’s unat-tained ambitions of the past.

Only by re-imagining itself can Pakistan find peace with itself and its neighbours and stop be-ing viewed by the rest of the world as a troubled state, a failing state or a crisis state.

I wish and pray that this process of re-imagination can overtake the tide of extremism and intoler-ance which is currently sweeping my country.

Thank you!

[All quotes attributed to Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan are

from Abdul Ghaffar Khan, K. B. Narang and Helen H. Bou-

man, My Life and Struggle: Autobiography of Badshah

Khan (Delhi: Hind Pocket, 1969)]


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Centre for Pakistan Studies MMAJ Academy of International Studies Jamia Millia Islamia New Delhi 110025

URL: http://www.jmi.ac.in

About the Centre for Pakistan Studies

The Centre for Pakistan Studies, at the MMAJ Academy of Interna-

tional Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi was established as

a programme in 2004. It was upgraded to a Centre in April 2014.

Pakistan is not only India’s most important neighbour and im-

pinges heavily on India’s national consciousness and security but

also is an interesting case study of political development in South

Asia. Its internal social, economic and political dynamics are

complex. Its attempt to create a national identity, social cohesion

and uneven economic development are reflective of the prob-

lems faced by many of the Third World countries. Pakistan’s en-

gagement with Islam and ideology, civil-military relations, its

strategic ambitions and regional policies present interesting

challenges to scholarship. Despite a shared history, cultural and

linguistic heritage, Pakistan is also one of the most difficult secu-

rity challenges for India. Pakistan is not only of interest to schol-

ars but also policy makers. The Centre for Pakistan Studies hopes

to not only promote a greater understanding of Pakistan but also

inform public policy. The Centre encourages interdisciplinary re-

search focusing on history, sociology, contemporary politics,

trade and economics, geopolitics, security and foreign policy and

also popular culture and literature of Pakistan.

The objectives of the Centre for Pakistan Studies are to:

• Promote Indian understanding of Pakistan in historical and

contemporary perspectives.

• Develop scholarship, build capacity and expertise on Pakistan.

• Stimulate debate in public domain in India for policy-making.

• Network with similar institutions.

• Publish regular research findings.

The Centre for Pakistan Studies offers the following three op-

tional courses in the M. Phil programme: Political Development

and Foreign Policy of Pakistan; State and Civil Society in Pakistan;

and Military and Politics in Pakistan. In the last few years, the

Centre has organised several seminars, panel discussions, round-

tables, guest lectures by scholars and other eminent personali-

ties from Pakistan to develop a greater understanding of the re-

gion and Pakistan.

The coordinator of the Centre is Prof. Ajay Darshan Behera.

second khan abdul ghaffar khan second khan abdul ghaffar ... · after the partition of the...

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