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Page 1: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)
Page 2: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

Secret  Sharing  •  A dealer and n participants •  The dealer has a secret s •  Distribute shares (functions of s) to participants such that -  any k can recover s -  any (k-1) get no information about s

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dealer

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dealer

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n = 6

Page 3: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

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Example: n = 6, k = 2

•  alphabet  is  F7  •  r  is  chosen  uniformly  at  random  from  the  field  

Page 4: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

Applica9ons  

Several  cryptographic  protocols  use  Shamir’s  secret  sharing:  

• Secure  mul9party  func9on  computa9on  

• Key  distribu9on  • Archival  storage    

 e.g.,  Ben-­‐Or–Goldwasser–Wigderson  (BGW)  protocol  for  secure          n-­‐party  func9on  computa9on:  2n  secret  sharings  ini9ally,    n  more  for  each  mul9plica9on  

   

Page 5: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

Most  protocols  assume  dealer  can  communicate  directly  with  all  par9cipants  

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dealer

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Page 6: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)
Page 7: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

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dealer

Page 8: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

s+r

s+2r

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2

3

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5

6

dealer

Page 9: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

s+r

s+2r

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6

dealers+3r

+r3

r3

s+ 3r + r3

r 3

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4

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dealer

Page 10: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

s+r

s+2r

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2

3

4

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6

dealers+3r

+r3

r3

s+ 3r + r3

r 3

1

2

3

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5

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dealer

not  allowed:  par.cipant  1  can  obtain  secret  

Page 11: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

⇒  

Secret  sharing  across  networks  

Page 12: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

Outline  

•  Literature  

•  New  “SNEAK”  algorithm  

•  Informa9on-­‐theore9c  lower  bounds  

•  Summary  &  open  problems  

Page 13: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

s+r

s+2r

1

2

3

4

5

6

dealer

Literature:  Pairwise  agreement  protocols  

D.  Dolev,  C.  Dwork,  O.  Waarts,  and  M.  Yung,  “Perfectly  secure  message  transmission,”    Journal  of  the  ACM,  vol.  40,  no.  1,  pp.  17–47,  1993.    

Page 14: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

s+r

s+2r

1

2

3

4

5

6

dealer

Literature:  Pairwise  agreement  protocols  

Page 15: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

s+3r

+r3

r3

s+ 3r + r3

r 3

1

2

3

4

5

6

dealer

Literature:  Pairwise  agreement  protocols  

Page 16: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

s+3r

+r3

r3

s+ 3r + r3

r 3

1

2

3

4

5

6

dealer

Literature:  Pairwise  agreement  protocols  

Page 17: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

s+4r

+r4

r4

s+ 4r + r4

r4

s+4r+r4

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2

3

4

5

6

dealer

Literature:  Pairwise  agreement  protocols  

For  every  par9cipant  i  :  1.  Dealer  finds  k  node  disjoint  paths  to  i  2.  Computes  secret  shares  of  this  i’s  share  

3.  Transmits  these  new  shares  on  these  k  paths  

Page 18: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

Literature:  Pairwise  agreement  protocols  

•  Communica9on  inefficient  

•  High  amount  of  randomness  

•  Significant  coordina9on  in  the  network  

Page 19: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

Literature:  Secure  Network  Coding  

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dealer

S   S  

S  

S   S  

S  S  

S  

S  

S   S  

S  

S   S  

S  

•  Every  set  of  k  par9cipants  has  a  sink  •  Eavesdropping  of  any  (k-­‐1)  nodes  should  leak  no  informa9on  

S  =  Sink  

Page 20: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

Nodal-­‐eavesdropping:  Very  licle  known  

Page 21: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

Our  “SNEAK”  algorithm  

SNEAK  =  Secret-­‐sharing  over  a  Network  with  Efficient  communica9on                                    And  distributed  Knowledge-­‐of-­‐topology  

Page 22: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

s+r, r

+ra

s+2r,r+2r

a

(s+r)+3(r+ra)(=(s+3r)+(r+3ra))

(s+2r)+3(r+2r a

)

(=(s+3r)+2(r+3r a

))

(s+2r)+4(r+2ra)

(=(s+4r)+2(r+4ra))

(s+3r)+

4(r+3ra )

(=(s+

3r)+

3(r+3ra ))

(s+3r)+5(r+3ra)

(=(s+5r)+3(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+5(r+4ra)

(=(s+5r)+4(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+6(r+4ra)(=(s+6r)+4(r+6ra))

(s+5r)+

6(r+5ra )

(=(s+

6r)+

5(r+6ra ))

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2

3

4

5

6

dealer

SNEAK  algorithm  

Page 23: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

s+r, r

+ra

s+2r,r+2r

a

(s+r)+3(r+ra)(=(s+3r)+(r+3ra))

(s+2r)+3(r+2r a

)

(=(s+3r)+2(r+3r a

))

(s+2r)+4(r+2ra)

(=(s+4r)+2(r+4ra))

(s+3r)+

4(r+3ra )

(=(s+

3r)+

3(r+3ra ))

(s+3r)+5(r+3ra)

(=(s+5r)+3(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+5(r+4ra)

(=(s+5r)+4(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+6(r+4ra)(=(s+6r)+4(r+6ra))

(s+5r)+

6(r+5ra )

(=(s+

6r)+

5(r+6ra ))

1

2

3

4

5

6

dealer

s+r  r+ra  

s+2r  r+2ra  

SNEAK  algorithm  

Page 24: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

s+r, r

+ra

s+2r,r+2r

a

(s+r)+3(r+ra)(=(s+3r)+(r+3ra))

(s+2r)+3(r+2r a

)

(=(s+3r)+2(r+3r a

))

(s+2r)+4(r+2ra)

(=(s+4r)+2(r+4ra))

(s+3r)+

4(r+3ra )

(=(s+

3r)+

3(r+3ra ))

(s+3r)+5(r+3ra)

(=(s+5r)+3(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+5(r+4ra)

(=(s+5r)+4(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+6(r+4ra)(=(s+6r)+4(r+6ra))

(s+5r)+

6(r+5ra )

(=(s+

6r)+

5(r+6ra ))

1

2

3

4

5

6

dealer

s+r  r+ra  

s+2r  r+2ra  

SNEAK  algorithm  

(s+r)+3(r+ra)  

Page 25: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

s+r, r

+ra

s+2r,r+2r

a

(s+r)+3(r+ra)(=(s+3r)+(r+3ra))

(s+2r)+3(r+2r a

)

(=(s+3r)+2(r+3r a

))

(s+2r)+4(r+2ra)

(=(s+4r)+2(r+4ra))

(s+3r)+

4(r+3ra )

(=(s+

3r)+

3(r+3ra ))

(s+3r)+5(r+3ra)

(=(s+5r)+3(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+5(r+4ra)

(=(s+5r)+4(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+6(r+4ra)(=(s+6r)+4(r+6ra))

(s+5r)+

6(r+5ra )

(=(s+

6r)+

5(r+6ra ))

1

2

3

4

5

6

dealer

(s+r)+3(r+ra)  

(s+2r)+4(r+2ra)  

s+r  r+ra  

s+2r  r+2ra  

SNEAK  algorithm  

Page 26: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

s+r, r

+ra

s+2r,r+2r

a

(s+r)+3(r+ra)(=(s+3r)+(r+3ra))

(s+2r)+3(r+2r a

)

(=(s+3r)+2(r+3r a

))

(s+2r)+4(r+2ra)

(=(s+4r)+2(r+4ra))

(s+3r)+

4(r+3ra )

(=(s+

3r)+

3(r+3ra ))

(s+3r)+5(r+3ra)

(=(s+5r)+3(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+5(r+4ra)

(=(s+5r)+4(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+6(r+4ra)(=(s+6r)+4(r+6ra))

(s+5r)+

6(r+5ra )

(=(s+

6r)+

5(r+6ra ))

1

2

3

4

5

6

dealer

 (s+r)+3(r+ra)  =(s+3r)+(r+3ra)  

(s+2r)+4(r+2ra)  

s+r  r+ra  

s+2r  r+2ra  

SNEAK  algorithm  

Page 27: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

s+r, r

+ra

s+2r,r+2r

a

(s+r)+3(r+ra)(=(s+3r)+(r+3ra))

(s+2r)+3(r+2r a

)

(=(s+3r)+2(r+3r a

))

(s+2r)+4(r+2ra)

(=(s+4r)+2(r+4ra))

(s+3r)+

4(r+3ra )

(=(s+

3r)+

3(r+3ra ))

(s+3r)+5(r+3ra)

(=(s+5r)+3(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+5(r+4ra)

(=(s+5r)+4(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+6(r+4ra)(=(s+6r)+4(r+6ra))

(s+5r)+

6(r+5ra )

(=(s+

6r)+

5(r+6ra ))

1

2

3

4

5

6

dealer

(s+2r)+4(r+2ra)  

s+r  r+ra  

s+2r  r+2ra  

SNEAK  algorithm  

 (s+r)+3(r+ra)  =(s+3r)+(r+3ra)  

Page 28: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

s+r, r

+ra

s+2r,r+2r

a

(s+r)+3(r+ra)(=(s+3r)+(r+3ra))

(s+2r)+3(r+2r a

)

(=(s+3r)+2(r+3r a

))

(s+2r)+4(r+2ra)

(=(s+4r)+2(r+4ra))

(s+3r)+

4(r+3ra )

(=(s+

3r)+

3(r+3ra ))

(s+3r)+5(r+3ra)

(=(s+5r)+3(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+5(r+4ra)

(=(s+5r)+4(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+6(r+4ra)(=(s+6r)+4(r+6ra))

(s+5r)+

6(r+5ra )

(=(s+

6r)+

5(r+6ra ))

1

2

3

4

5

6

dealer

(s+2r)+4(r+2ra)  

s+3r  r+3ra  

s+r  r+ra  

s+2r  r+2ra  

SNEAK  algorithm  

 (s+r)+3(r+ra)  =(s+3r)+(r+3ra)  

Page 29: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

s+r, r

+ra

s+2r,r+2r

a

(s+r)+3(r+ra)(=(s+3r)+(r+3ra))

(s+2r)+3(r+2r a

)

(=(s+3r)+2(r+3r a

))

(s+2r)+4(r+2ra)

(=(s+4r)+2(r+4ra))

(s+3r)+

4(r+3ra )

(=(s+

3r)+

3(r+3ra ))

(s+3r)+5(r+3ra)

(=(s+5r)+3(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+5(r+4ra)

(=(s+5r)+4(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+6(r+4ra)(=(s+6r)+4(r+6ra))

(s+5r)+

6(r+5ra )

(=(s+

6r)+

5(r+6ra ))

1

2

3

4

5

6

dealer

(s+2r)+4(r+2ra)  

 (s+3r)+5(r+3ra)      

s+3r  r+3ra  

s+r  r+ra  

s+2r  r+2ra  

SNEAK  algorithm  

Page 30: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

s+r, r

+ra

s+2r,r+2r

a

(s+r)+3(r+ra)(=(s+3r)+(r+3ra))

(s+2r)+3(r+2r a

)

(=(s+3r)+2(r+3r a

))

(s+2r)+4(r+2ra)

(=(s+4r)+2(r+4ra))

(s+3r)+

4(r+3ra )

(=(s+

3r)+

3(r+3ra ))

(s+3r)+5(r+3ra)

(=(s+5r)+3(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+5(r+4ra)

(=(s+5r)+4(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+6(r+4ra)(=(s+6r)+4(r+6ra))

(s+5r)+

6(r+5ra )

(=(s+

6r)+

5(r+6ra ))

1

2

3

4

5

6

dealer

(s+2r)+4(r+2ra)  =(s+4r)+2(r+4ra)  

 (s+3r)+5(r+3ra)      

s+3r  r+3ra  

s+r  r+ra  

s+2r  r+2ra  

SNEAK  algorithm  

Page 31: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

s+r, r

+ra

s+2r,r+2r

a

(s+r)+3(r+ra)(=(s+3r)+(r+3ra))

(s+2r)+3(r+2r a

)

(=(s+3r)+2(r+3r a

))

(s+2r)+4(r+2ra)

(=(s+4r)+2(r+4ra))

(s+3r)+

4(r+3ra )

(=(s+

3r)+

3(r+3ra ))

(s+3r)+5(r+3ra)

(=(s+5r)+3(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+5(r+4ra)

(=(s+5r)+4(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+6(r+4ra)(=(s+6r)+4(r+6ra))

(s+5r)+

6(r+5ra )

(=(s+

6r)+

5(r+6ra ))

1

2

3

4

5

6

dealer

 (s+3r)+5(r+3ra)      

s+3r  r+3ra  

s+r  r+ra  

s+2r  r+2ra  

(s+2r)+4(r+2ra)  =(s+4r)+2(r+4ra)   s+4r  

r+4ra  

SNEAK  algorithm  

Page 32: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

s+r, r

+ra

s+2r,r+2r

a

(s+r)+3(r+ra)(=(s+3r)+(r+3ra))

(s+2r)+3(r+2r a

)

(=(s+3r)+2(r+3r a

))

(s+2r)+4(r+2ra)

(=(s+4r)+2(r+4ra))

(s+3r)+

4(r+3ra )

(=(s+

3r)+

3(r+3ra ))

(s+3r)+5(r+3ra)

(=(s+5r)+3(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+5(r+4ra)

(=(s+5r)+4(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+6(r+4ra)(=(s+6r)+4(r+6ra))

(s+5r)+

6(r+5ra )

(=(s+

6r)+

5(r+6ra ))

1

2

3

4

5

6

dealer

 (s+3r)+5(r+3ra)  =(s+5r)+3(r+5ra)  

s+3r  r+3ra  

s+r  r+ra  

s+2r  r+2ra  

s+4r  r+4ra  

s+5r  r+5ra  

 (s+4r)+6(r+4ra)      

SNEAK  algorithm  

Page 33: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

s+r, r

+ra

s+2r,r+2r

a

(s+r)+3(r+ra)(=(s+3r)+(r+3ra))

(s+2r)+3(r+2r a

)

(=(s+3r)+2(r+3r a

))

(s+2r)+4(r+2ra)

(=(s+4r)+2(r+4ra))

(s+3r)+

4(r+3ra )

(=(s+

3r)+

3(r+3ra ))

(s+3r)+5(r+3ra)

(=(s+5r)+3(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+5(r+4ra)

(=(s+5r)+4(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+6(r+4ra)(=(s+6r)+4(r+6ra))

(s+5r)+

6(r+5ra )

(=(s+

6r)+

5(r+6ra ))

1

2

3

4

5

6

dealer

s+3r  r+3ra  

s+r  r+ra  

s+2r  r+2ra  

s+4r  r+4ra  

s+5r  r+5ra  

 (s+4r)+6(r+4ra)  =(s+6r)+4(r+6ra)  

s+6r  r+6ra  

SNEAK  algorithm  

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s+r, r

+ra

s+2r,r+2r

a

(s+r)+3(r+ra)(=(s+3r)+(r+3ra))

(s+2r)+3(r+2r a

)

(=(s+3r)+2(r+3r a

))

(s+2r)+4(r+2ra)

(=(s+4r)+2(r+4ra))

(s+3r)+

4(r+3ra )

(=(s+

3r)+

3(r+3ra ))

(s+3r)+5(r+3ra)

(=(s+5r)+3(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+5(r+4ra)

(=(s+5r)+4(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+6(r+4ra)(=(s+6r)+4(r+6ra))

(s+5r)+

6(r+5ra )

(=(s+

6r)+

5(r+6ra ))

1

2

3

4

5

6

dealer

s+3r  r+3ra  

s+r  r+ra  

s+2r  r+2ra  

s+4r  r+4ra  

s+5r  r+5ra  

s+6r  r+6ra  

SNEAK  algorithm  

Page 35: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

s+r, r

+ra

s+2r,r+2r

a

(s+r)+3(r+ra)(=(s+3r)+(r+3ra))

(s+2r)+3(r+2r a

)

(=(s+3r)+2(r+3r a

))

(s+2r)+4(r+2ra)

(=(s+4r)+2(r+4ra))

(s+3r)+

4(r+3ra )

(=(s+

3r)+

3(r+3ra ))

(s+3r)+5(r+3ra)

(=(s+5r)+3(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+5(r+4ra)

(=(s+5r)+4(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+6(r+4ra)(=(s+6r)+4(r+6ra))

(s+5r)+

6(r+5ra )

(=(s+

6r)+

5(r+6ra ))

1

2

3

4

5

6

dealer

s+3r  r+3ra  

s+r  r+ra  

s+2r  r+2ra  

s+4r  r+4ra  

s+5r  r+5ra  

s+6r  r+6ra  

SNEAK  algorithm  

Page 36: SecretSharing&nihars/publications/Secret... · 2017. 7. 11. · SecretSharing& • A dealer and n participants • The dealer has a secret s • Distribute shares (functions of s)

SNEAK   Pairwise-­‐agreement  Communica.on   12   24  

s+r, r

+ra

s+2r,r+2r

a

(s+r)+3(r+ra)(=(s+3r)+(r+3ra))

(s+2r)+3(r+2r a

)

(=(s+3r)+2(r+3r a

))

(s+2r)+4(r+2ra)

(=(s+4r)+2(r+4ra))

(s+3r)+

4(r+3ra )

(=(s+

3r)+

3(r+3ra ))

(s+3r)+5(r+3ra)

(=(s+5r)+3(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+5(r+4ra)

(=(s+5r)+4(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+6(r+4ra)(=(s+6r)+4(r+6ra))

(s+5r)+

6(r+5ra )

(=(s+

6r)+

5(r+6ra ))

1

2

3

4

5

6

dealer

s+3r  r+3ra  

s+r  r+ra  

s+2r  r+2ra  

s+4r  r+4ra  

s+5r  r+5ra  

s+6r  r+6ra  

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SNEAK   Pairwise-­‐agreement  Communica.on   12   24  

Knowledge  of  topology   know  only  one-­‐hop  neighbours  

node  disjoint  paths  on  en9re  graph  

s+r, r

+ra

s+2r,r+2r

a

(s+r)+3(r+ra)(=(s+3r)+(r+3ra))

(s+2r)+3(r+2r a

)

(=(s+3r)+2(r+3r a

))

(s+2r)+4(r+2ra)

(=(s+4r)+2(r+4ra))

(s+3r)+

4(r+3ra )

(=(s+

3r)+

3(r+3ra ))

(s+3r)+5(r+3ra)

(=(s+5r)+3(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+5(r+4ra)

(=(s+5r)+4(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+6(r+4ra)(=(s+6r)+4(r+6ra))

(s+5r)+

6(r+5ra )

(=(s+

6r)+

5(r+6ra ))

1

2

3

4

5

6

dealer

s+3r  r+3ra  

s+r  r+ra  

s+2r  r+2ra  

s+4r  r+4ra  

s+5r  r+5ra  

s+6r  r+6ra  

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SNEAK   Pairwise-­‐agreement  Communica.on   12   24  

Knowledge  of  topology   know  only  one-­‐hop  neighbours  

node  disjoint  paths  on  en9re  graph  

Randomness   2   5  

s+r, r

+ra

s+2r,r+2r

a

(s+r)+3(r+ra)(=(s+3r)+(r+3ra))

(s+2r)+3(r+2r a

)

(=(s+3r)+2(r+3r a

))

(s+2r)+4(r+2ra)

(=(s+4r)+2(r+4ra))

(s+3r)+

4(r+3ra )

(=(s+

3r)+

3(r+3ra ))

(s+3r)+5(r+3ra)

(=(s+5r)+3(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+5(r+4ra)

(=(s+5r)+4(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+6(r+4ra)(=(s+6r)+4(r+6ra))

(s+5r)+

6(r+5ra )

(=(s+

6r)+

5(r+6ra ))

1

2

3

4

5

6

dealer

s+3r  r+3ra  

s+r  r+ra  

s+2r  r+2ra  

s+4r  r+4ra  

s+5r  r+5ra  

s+6r  r+6ra  

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General  SNEAK  algorithm  Details  in  ISIT  paper/arXiv  

✓ communica9on-­‐efficient  ✓ randomness-­‐efficient  ✓ distributed  ✓ determinis9c  

SNEAK  =  Secret-­‐sharing  over  a  Network  with  Efficient  communica9on                                    And  distributed  Knowledge-­‐of-­‐topology  

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General  SNEAK  algorithm  Details  in  ISIT  paper/arXiv  

✓ communica9on-­‐efficient  ✓ randomness-­‐efficient  ✓ distributed  ✓ determinis9c  

Needs  graph  to  sa9sfy  a  certain  condi9on  

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Condi9ons  on  the  graph  •  Necessary  for  any  algorithm:  “k-­‐connected-­‐dealer”  

–  Exist  k  node-­‐disjoint  paths  from  dealer  to  every  par9cipant  

s+r, r

+ra

s+2r,r+2r

a

(s+r)+3(r+ra)(=(s+3r)+(r+3ra))

(s+2r)+3(r+2r a

)

(=(s+3r)+2(r+3r a

))

(s+2r)+4(r+2ra)

(=(s+4r)+2(r+4ra))

(s+3r)+

4(r+3ra )

(=(s+

3r)+

3(r+3ra ))

(s+3r)+5(r+3ra)

(=(s+5r)+3(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+5(r+4ra)

(=(s+5r)+4(r+5ra))

(s+4r)+6(r+4ra)(=(s+6r)+4(r+6ra))

(s+5r)+

6(r+5ra )

(=(s+

6r)+

5(r+6ra ))

1

2

3

4

5

6

dealer

k=2  

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Condi9ons  on  the  graph  •  Required  for  our  algorithm:  “k-­‐propaga8ng-­‐dealer”  

– ∃ordering  of  par9cipants  such  that  each  par9cipant  has  edges  coming  in  from  either  (a)  the  dealer  or  (b)  from  k  par9cipants  preceding  it  in  the  ordering  

1

2

3

4

5

6

dealer

ordering  =  1,2,3,4,5,6  

k  =  2  

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Condi9ons  on  the  graph  

ordering  =  layers  next  to  dealer,  rest  increasing  distance  from  dealer  

Layered  networks                        k=3  

D  

ordering  =  increasing  distance  from  dealer  

1-­‐D  geometric  networks  k-­‐connected-­‐dealer  ⇒  k-­‐propaga9ng-­‐dealer  

1

2

3

4

5

6

dealer

ordering  =  1,2,3,4,5,6  

k=2  

backbone    networks  

Any  DAG:  k-­‐connected-­‐dealer  ⇒  k-­‐propaga9ng-­‐dealer  

•  Many  graphs  sa9sfying  k-­‐propaga8ng-­‐dealer  

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SNEAK  algorithm  is  oblivious  to  ordering  

•  Need  not  know  anything  about  the  network  

•  Nodes  only  know  one  hop  neighbours  

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What  if  ‘k-­‐propaga9ng-­‐dealer’  not  sa9sfied  ?  

•  No  leak  of  informa9on  

– No  (k-­‐1)  nodes  get  any  informa9on  about  s  

•  Extensions  of  SNEAK  (heuris9c)  in  paper  

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Informa9on-­‐theore9c  Lower  Bounds  

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Informa9on-­‐theore9c  Lower  Bounds  Theorem:  Lower  Bound  

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Informa9on-­‐theore9c  Lower  Bounds  Theorem:  Lower  Bound  

1

2

3

4

5

6

dealer

1  

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Informa9on-­‐theore9c  Lower  Bounds  Theorem:  Lower  Bound  

1

2

3

4

5

6

dealer

1   deg  <  k  

not  possible  

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Informa9on-­‐theore9c  Lower  Bounds  Theorem:  Lower  Bound  

1

2

3

4

5

6

dealer

1   deg  <  k  deg  ≥  k  

.            deg            .  deg  –  k  +  1  

not  possible  

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Informa9on-­‐theore9c  Lower  Bounds  Theorem:  Lower  Bound  

1

2

3

4

5

6

dealer

1   deg  <  k  deg  ≥  k  

.            deg            .  deg  –  k  +  1  

Corollary:  communica9on  ≥  n  

not  possible  

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Suppose  graph  sa9sfies  “d-­‐propaga9ng-­‐dealer”  for  some  d  ≥  k  

Communica9on  Complexity  

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Suppose  graph  sa9sfies  “d-­‐propaga9ng-­‐dealer”  for  some  d  ≥  k    

•  any  algorithm    ≥    n  

Communica9on  Complexity  

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Suppose  graph  sa9sfies  “d-­‐propaga9ng-­‐dealer”  for  some  d  ≥  k    

•  any  algorithm    ≥    n  

•  SNEAK      =                                                                            (linear  in  n)    

Communica9on  Complexity  

n dd − k +1

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Suppose  graph  sa9sfies  “d-­‐propaga9ng-­‐dealer”  for  some  d  ≥  k    

•  any  algorithm    ≥    n  

•  SNEAK      =                                                                            (linear  in  n)  

•  pairwise-­‐agreement:  ‘typically’  super-­‐linear,    worst  case      

 

Communica9on  Complexity  

n dd − k +1

≈ n2

e.g.:  

1

2

3

4

5

6

dealer

(sa9sfies  2-­‐propaga9ng-­‐dealer  condi9on)  

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Further,  in  the  paper  

•  Analysis  of  randomness  requirements  

•  Addi9onal  analysis  of  communica9on  complexity  

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Summary  &  Future  Work  

•  SNEAK  algorithm  – efficient,  distributed  

•  Informa9on-­‐theore9c  lower  bounds  – download  for  any  node  – 9ght  for  the  case  when  knowledge  of  only  one-­‐hop  neighbours  is  available  

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Summary  &  Future  Work  

•  SNEAK  algorithm  – efficient,  distributed  

•  Informa9on-­‐theore9c  lower  bounds  – download  for  any  node  – 9ght  for  the  case  when  knowledge  of  only  one-­‐hop  neighbours  is  available  

Heuris9c  extension  when    k-­‐propaga9ng-­‐dealer  condi9on    is  not  met.  Guarantees  ?  

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Summary  &  Future  Work  

•  SNEAK  algorithm  – efficient,  distributed  

•  Informa9on-­‐theore9c  lower  bounds  – download  for  any  node  – 9ght  for  the  case  when  knowledge  of  only  one-­‐hop  neighbours  is  available  

Heuris9c  extension  when    k-­‐propaga9ng-­‐dealer  condi9on    is  not  met.  Guarantees  ?  

Other  classes  of  graphs  sa9sfying  k-­‐propaga9ng-­‐dealer  condi9on?  

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Summary  &  Future  Work  

•  SNEAK  algorithm  – efficient,  distributed  

•  Informa9on-­‐theore9c  lower  bounds  – download  for  any  node  – 9ght  for  the  case  when  knowledge  of  only  one-­‐hop  neighbours  is  available  

Heuris9c  extension  when    k-­‐propaga9ng-­‐dealer  condi9on    is  not  met.  Guarantees  ?  

Other  classes  of  graphs  sa9sfying  k-­‐propaga9ng-­‐dealer  condi9on?  

Tighter  bounds  for    secret  sharing  in  a  network  

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Summary  &  Future  Work  

•  SNEAK  algorithm  – efficient,  distributed  

•  Informa9on-­‐theore9c  lower  bounds  – download  for  any  node  – 9ght  for  the  case  when  knowledge  of  only  one-­‐hop  neighbours  is  available  

Heuris9c  extension  when    k-­‐propaga9ng-­‐dealer  condi9on    is  not  met.  Guarantees  ?  

Tighter  bounds  for    secret  sharing  in  a  network  

 What  carries  over  to  general  secure  network  coding  ?  

Other  classes  of  graphs  sa9sfying  k-­‐propaga9ng-­‐dealer  condi9on?  

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Thanks!  Ques9ons?