section 18, article 6

32
8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6 http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 1/32 1 G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989 REP. RAUL A. DAZA, petitioner, vs. REP. LUIS C. SINGSON and HON. RAOUL V. VICTORINO IN THE LATTER'S CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, respondent. CRUZ,  J.: After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments among the several political parties represented in that chamber, including the Lakas ng Bansa, the PDP- Laban, the NP-Unido, the Liberal Party, and the KBL, in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party. On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members. On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP. The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption

Upload: donna-santy

Post on 03-Jun-2018

215 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 1/32

1

G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989

REP. RAUL A. DAZA, petitioner,vs.

REP. LUIS C. SINGSON and HON. RAOUL V. VICTORINO INTHE LATTER'S CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THECOMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, respondent.

CRUZ,  J.: 

After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House ofRepresentatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in theCommission on Appointments among the several political parties

represented in that chamber, including the Lakas ng Bansa, the PDP-Laban, the NP-Unido, the Liberal Party, and the KBL, in accordancewith Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A.Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a representative ofthe Liberal Party.

On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino wasreorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the House of

Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formallyresigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling itsnumber to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party toonly 17 members.

On the basis of this development, the House of Representativesrevised its representation in the Commission on Appointments bywithdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to thenewly-formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new

set of representatives consisting of the original members except thepetitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as theadditional member from the LDP.

The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge hisremoval from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption

Page 2: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 2/32

2

of his seat by the respondent. Acting initially on his petition forprohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, we issued atemporary restraining order that same day to prevent both thepetitioner and the respondent from serving in the Commission on

Appointments.

Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot beremoved from the Commission on Appointments because his electionthereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v.Tan. His claim is that the reorganization of the House representationin the said body is not based on a permanent political realignmentbecause the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not

yet attained political stability.

For his part, the respondent argues that the question raised by thepetitioner is political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of thisCourt. He also maintains that he has been improperly impleaded, thereal party respondent being the House of Representatives whichchanged its representation in the Commission on Appointments andremoved the petitioner. Finally, he stresses that nowhere in theConstitution is it required that the political party be registered to be

entitled to proportional representation in the Commission onAppointments.

In addition to the pleadings filed by the parties, a Comment wassubmitted by the Solicitor General as amicus curiae in compliancewith an order from the Court.

At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the

Constitution providing as follows:

Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointmentsconsisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officioChairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of theHouse of Representatives, elected by each House on thebasis of proportional representation from the political

Page 3: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 3/32

3

parties and parties or organizations registered under theparty-list system represented therein. The Chairman of theCommission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. TheCommission shall act on all appointments submitted to it

within thirty session days of the Congress from theirsubmission. The Commission shall rule by a majority voteof all the Members.

Ruling first on the jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary to therespondent's assertion, the Court has the competence to act on thematter at bar. Our finding is that what is before us is not adiscretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be

reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved hereis the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removingthe petitioner from the Commission on Appointments. That is not apolitical question because, as Chief Justice Concepcion explained inTanada v. Cuenco.

... the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance,what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question ofpolicy. In other words, ... it refers "to those questions

which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by thepeople in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to whichfull discretionary authority has been delegated to theLegislature or executive branch of the Government." It isconcerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, notlegality, of a particular measure.

In the aforementioned case, the Court was asked by the petitioners

therein to annul the election of two members of the Senate ElectoralTribunal of that chamber, on the ground that they had not beenvalidly nominated. The Senate then consisted of 23 members from theNacionalista Party and the petitioner as the lone member of theCitizens Party. Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada nominated only himself asthe minority representative in the Tribunal, whereupon the majority

Page 4: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 4/32

4

elected Senators Mariano J. Cuenco. and Francisco Delgado, from itsown ranks, to complete the nine-man composition of the Tribunal asprovided for in the 1935 Constitution. The petitioner came to thisCourt, contending that under Article VI, Section 11, of that Charter,

the six legislative members of the Tribunal were to be chosen by theSenate, "three upon nomination of the party having the largestnumber of votes and three of the party having the second largestnumber of votes therein." As the majority party in the Senate, theNacionalista Party could nominate only three members and could notalso fill the other two seats pertaining to the minority.

By way of special and affirmative defenses, the respondents

contended inter alia that the subject of the petition was an internalmatter that only the Senate could resolve. The Court rejected thisargument, holding that what was involved was not the wisdom of theSenate in choosing the respondents but the legality of the choice inlight of the requirement of the Constitution. The petitioners werequestioning the manner of filling the Tribunal, not the discretion ofthe Senate in doing so. The Court held that this was a justiciable andnot a political question, thus:

Such is not the nature of the question for determination inthe present case. Here, we are called upon to decidewhether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado bythe Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal,upon nomination by Senator Primicias-member andspokesman of the party having the largest number of votesin the Senate-behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenesthe constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate

Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination ... ofthe party having the second largest number of votes" in theSenate and hence, is null and void. The Senate is notclothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice ofmembers of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise ofits power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations

Page 5: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 5/32

5

which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearlywithin the legitimate province of the judicial department topass upon the validity of the proceeding in connectiontherewith.

... whether an election of public officers has been inaccordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover, wherethe legislative department has by statute prescribedelection procedure in a given situation, the judiciary maydetermine whether a particular election has been inconformity with such statute, and particularly, whethersuch statute has been applied in a way to deny or

transgress on constitutional or statutory rights ...' (1 6 C.J.S.,439; emphasis supplied)

It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction but also the duty, to consider and determinethe principal issue raised by the parties herein."

Although not specifically discussed, the same disposition was made inCunanan v. Tan as it likewise involved the manner or legality of the

organization of the Commission on Appointments, not the wisdom ordiscretion of the House in the choice of its representatives.

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes evenless tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were toassume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, wewould still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded

 jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even

the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearlyprovides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in oneSupreme Court and in such lower courts as may beestablished by law.

Page 6: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 6/32

6

 Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice tosettle actual controversies involving rights which arelegally demandable and enforceable, and to determinewhether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part ofany branch or instrumentality of the Government.

The respondent's contention that he has been improperly impleaded iseven less persuasive. While he may be technically correct in arguingthat it is not he who caused the petitioner's removal, we feel that thisobjection is also not an insuperable obstacle to the resolution of thiscontroversy. We may, for one thing, treat this proceeding as a petition

for quo warranto as the petitioner is actually questioning therespondent's right to sit as a member of the Commission onAppointments. For another, we have held as early as in theEmergency Powers Cases that where serious constitutional questionsare involved, "the transcendental importance to the public of thesecases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely brushingaside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." The same policy hassince then been consistently followed by the Court, as in Gonzales v.

Commission on Elections, where we held through Chief JusticeFernando:

In the course of the deliberations, a serious proceduralobjection was raised by five members of the Court. It istheir view that respondent Commission on Elections notbeing sought to be restrained from performing any specificact, this suit cannot be characterized as other than a mererequest for an advisory opinion. Such a view, from the

remedial law standpoint, has much to recommend it.Nonetheless, a majority would affirm the original standthat under the circumstances, it could still rightfully betreated as a petition for prohibition.

Page 7: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 7/32

7

The language of justice Laurel fits the case: "All await thedecision of this Court on the constitutional question.Considering, therefore, the importance which the instantcase has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits,

strong reasons of public policy demand that [its]constitutionality ... be now resolved.' It may likewise beadded that the exceptional character of the situation thatconfronts us, the paramount public interest, and theundeniable necessity for ruling, the national elections beingbarely six months away, reinforce our stand. It wouldappear undeniable, therefore, that before us is anappropriate invocation of our jurisdiction to prevent the

enforcement of an alleged unconstitutional statute. We areleft with no choice then; we must act on the matter.

Coming now to the more crucial question, the Court notes that boththe petitioner and the respondent are invoking the case of Cunanan v.Tan to support their respective positions. It is best, therefore, to makea quick review of that case for a proper disposition of this one.

In the election for the House of Representatives held in 1961, 72 seats

were won by the Nacionalista Party, 29 by the Liberal Party and 1 byan independent. Accordingly, the representation of the chamber in theCommission on Appointments was apportioned to 8 members fromthe Nacionalista Party and 4 from the Liberal Party. Subsequently, 25members of the Nacionalista Party, professing discontent over theHouse leadership, made common cause with the Liberal Party andformed what was called the Allied Majority to install a new Speakerand reorganize the chamber. Included in this reorganization was the

House representation in the Commission on appointments wherethree of the Nacionalista congressmen originally chosen weredisplaced by three of their party colleagues who had joined the AlliedMajority.

Page 8: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 8/32

8

Petitioner Carlos Cunanan's ad interim appointment as DeputyAdministrator of the Reforestration Administration was rejected bythe Commission on Appointments as thus reorganized andrespondent Jorge Tan, Jr. was thereafter designated in his place.

Cunanan then came to this Court, contending that the rejection of hisappointment was null and void because the Commission itself wasinvalidly constituted.

The Court agreed. It noted that the Allied Majority was a merelytemporary combination as the Nacionalista defectors had notdisaffiliated from their party and permanently joined the new politicalgroup. Officially, they were still members of the Nacionalista Party.

The reorganization of the Commission on Appointments was invalidbecause it was not based on the proportional representation of thepolitical parties in the House of Representatives as required by theConstitution. The Court held:

... In other words, a shifting of votes at a given time, even ifdu to arrangements of a more or less temporary nature, likethe one that has led to the formation of the so-called "AlliedMajority," does not suffice to authorize a reorganization of

the membership of the Commission for said House.Otherwise the Commission on Appointments may have tobe reorganized as often as votes shift from one side toanother in the House. The framers of our Constitutioncould not have intended to thus place a constitutionalorgan, like the Commission on Appointments, at the mercyof each House of Congress.

The petitioner vigorously argues that the LDP is not the permanentpolitical party contemplated in the Constitution because it has notbeen registered in accordance with Article IX-B, Section 2(5), inrelation to the other provisions of the Constitution. He stresses thatthe so-called party has not yet achieved stability and suggests it mightbe no different from several other political groups that have died "a-

Page 9: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 9/32

9

bornin'," like the LINA, or have subsequently floundered, like theUNIDO.

The respondent also cites Cunanan but from a different viewpoint.

According to him, that case expressly allows reorganization at anytime to reflect changes in the political alignments in Congress,provided only that such changes are permanent. The creation of theLDP constituting the bulk of the former PDP-Laban and to which noless than 24 Liberal congressmen had transferred was a permanentchange. That change fully justified his designation to the Commissionon Appointments after the reduction of the LP representation therein.Thus, the Court held:

Upon the other hand, the constitutional provision to theeffect that "there shall be a Commission on Appointmentsconsisting of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) membersof the House of Representatives elected by each House,respectively, on the basis of proportionalREPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIESTHEREIN," necessarily connotes the authority of eachHouse of Congress to see to it that this requirement is duly

complied with. As a consequence, it may take appropriatemeasures, not only upon the initial organization of theCommission, but also, subsequently thereto. If by reason ofsuccessful election protests against members of a House, orof their expulsion from the political party to which theybelonged and/or of their affiliation with another politicalparty, the ratio in the representation of the political partiesin the House is materially changed, the House is clothed

with authority to declare vacant the necessary number ofseats in the Commission on Appointments held bymembers of said House belonging to the political partyadversely affected by the change and then fill saidvacancies in conformity with the Constitution.

Page 10: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 10/32

10

In the course of the spirited debate on this matter between thepetitioner and the respondent (who was supported by the SolicitorGeneral) an important development has supervened to considerablysimplify the present controversy. The petitioner, to repeat, bases his

argument heavily on the non-registration of the LDP which, he claimshas not provided the permanent political realignment to justify thequestioned reorganization. As he insists:

(c) Assuming that the so-called new coalescedmajority is actually the LDP itself, then theproposed reorganization is likewise illegal andineffectual, because the LDP, not being a duly

registered political party, is not entitled to the"rights and privileges granted by law to politicalparties' (See. 160, BP No. 881), and thereforecannot legally claim the right to be considered indetermining the required proportionalrepresentation of political parties in the Houseof Representatives.

xxx xxx xxx

... the clear constitutional intent behind Section 18, ArticleVI, of the 1987 Constitution, is to give the right ofrepresentation in the Commission on Appointment only topolitical parties who are duly registered with the Comelec.

On November 23, 1989, however, that argument boomeranged againstthe petitioner. On that date, the Commission on Elections in an en

banc resolution affirmed the resolution of its First Division datedAugust 28, 1989, granting the petition of the LDP for registration as apolitical party. This has taken the wind out of the sails of thepetitioner, so to speak, and he must now limp to shore as best he can.

The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party must stillpass the test of time to prove its permanence is not acceptable. Under

Page 11: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 11/32

11

this theory, a registered party obtaining the majority of the seats in theHouse of Representatives (or the Senate) would still not be entitled torepresentation in the Commission on Appointments as long as it wasorganized only recently and has not yet "aged." The Liberal Party

itself would fall in such a category. That party was created inDecember 1945 by a faction of the Nacionalista Party that secededtherefrom to support Manuel A. Roxas's bid for the Presidency of thePhilippines in the election held on April 23, 1946. The Liberal Partywon. At that time it was only four months old. Yet no question wasraised as to its right to be represented in the Commission onAppointments and in the Electoral Tribunals by virtue of its status asthe majority party in both chambers of the Congress.

The LDP has been in existence for more than one year now. It now has157 members in the House of Representatives and 6 members in theSenate. Its titular head is no less than the President of the Philippinesand its President is Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, who took overrecently from Speaker Ramon V. Mitra. It is true that there have been,and there still are, some internal disagreements among its members,but these are to be expected in any political organization, especially if

it is democratic in structure. In fact even the monolithic CommunistParty in a number of socialist states has undergone similar dissension,and even upheavals. But it surely cannot be considered still temporarybecause of such discord.

If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157 members ofthe LDP in the House of Representatives would have to be deniedrepresentation in the Commission on Appointments and, for thatmatter, also the Electoral Tribunal. By the same token, the KBL, which

the petitioner says is now "history only," should also be written off.The independents also cannot be represented because they belong tono political party. That would virtually leave the Liberal Party onlywith all of its seventeen members to claim all the twelve seats of theHouse of Representatives in the Commission on Appointments andthe six legislative seats in the House Electoral Tribunal.

Page 12: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 12/32

12

It is noteworthy that when with 41 members the Liberal Party wasalloted two of the seats in the Commission on Appointments, it didnot express any objection. Inconsistently, the petitioner is nowopposed to the withdrawal from it of one seat although its original

number has been cut by more than half.

As for the other condition suggested by the petitioner, to wit, that theparty must survive in a general congressional election, the LDP hasdoubtless also passed that test, if only vicariously. It may even be saidthat as it now commands the biggest following in the House ofRepresentatives, the party has not only survived but in fact prevailed.At any rate, that test was never laid down in Cunanan.

To summarize, then, we hold, in view of the foregoing considerations,that the issue presented to us is justiciable rather political, involvingas it does the legality and not the wisdom of the act complained of, orthe manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribedby the Constitution. Even if the question were political in nature, itwould still come within our powers of review under the expanded

 jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of theConstitution, which includes the authority to determine whether

grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdictionhas been committed by any branch or instrumentality of thegovernment. As for the alleged technical flaw in the designation of theparty respondent, assuming the existence of such a defect, the samemay be brushed aside, conformably to existing doctrine, so that theimportant constitutional issue raised may be addressed. Lastly, weresolve that issue in favor of the authority of the House ofRepresentatives to change its representation in the Commission on

Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire inthe political alignments of its membership. It is understood that suchchanges must be permanent and do not include the temporaryalliances or factional divisions not involving severance of politicalloyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiancefrom one political party to another.

Page 13: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 13/32

13

The Court would have preferred not to intervene in this matter,leaving it to be settled by the House of Representatives or theCommission on Appointments as the bodies directly involved. But asour jurisdiction has been invoked and, more importantly, because a

constitutional stalemate had to be resolved, there was no alternativefor us except to act, and to act decisively. In doing so, of course, weare not imposing our will upon the said agencies, or substituting ourdiscretion for theirs, but merely discharging our sworn responsibilityto interpret and apply the Constitution. That is a duty we do notevade, lest we ourselves betray our oath.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining

order dated January 13, 1989, is LIFTED. The Court holds that therespondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commissionon Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that bodypursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Nopronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Page 14: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 14/32

14

G.R. No. 86649 July 12, 1990

ANNA DOMINIQUE M.L. COSETENG and KABABAIHAN PARASA INANG BAYAN, petitioners,

vs.HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., as speaker of the House ofRepresentatives of the Congress of the Philippines; HON.

FRANCISCO SUMULONG, as Majority Floor Leader of the Houseof Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines; HON.

 JOVITO SALONGA, as Ex-Oficio Chairman of the Commission onAppointments; HON. ROQUE R. ABLAN, JR., HON. LORNA L.VERANO-YAP, HON. MIGUEL ROMERO, HON. ANTONIO V.

CUENCO, HON. ROGACIANO M. MERCADO, HON.ALAWADIN T. BANDON, JR., HON. JOSE L. CABOCHAN, HON.CARLOS R. IMPERIAL, HON. MA. CLARA L. LOBREGAT, HON.

NATALIO M. BELTRAN, JR., HON. CARMELO J. LOCSIN &HON. LUIS C. SINGSON, as Members of the Commission on

Appointments for the House of Representatives of the CONGRESSOF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

GRIÑO-AQUINO,  J.: 

The congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in the election tothe House of Representatives of the candidates of diverse politicalparties such as the PDP-Laban, Lakas ng Bansa (LB), Liberal Party(LP), NP-Unido, Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan (KBL), Panaghiusa,Kababaihan Para sa Inang Bayan (KAIBA), and some independents.Petitioner Anna Dominique M.L. Coseteng was the only candidateelected under the banner of KAIBA.

On August 26, 1987, the House of Representatives, upon nominationby the Majority Floor Leader, Cong. Francisco Sumulong, elected fromthe Coalesced Majority, eleven (11) out of twelve (12) congressmen torepresent the House in the Commission on Appointments. They were:

Page 15: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 15/32

15

1. Hon. Miguel Romero LP (Liberal Party)2. Hon. Antonio V. Cuenco LB-Panaghiusa3. Hon. Rogaciano Mercado LB (Lakas ngBayan)

4. Hon. Raul Daza LP5. Hon. Alawadin T. Bandon Jr. PDP-Laban6. Hon. Jose Cabochan PDP-Laban7. Hon. Lorna L. Verano-Yap LP8. Hon. Carlos R. Imperial IND9. Hon. Ma. Clara L. Lobregat IND10. Hon Natalio M. Beltran, Jr. LB/Unido/NP11. Hon. Carmelo J. Locsin PDP-Laban/LB

(pp. 115-116, Rollo.)

On September 22, 1987, upon nomination of the Minority FloorLeader, the House elected Honorable Roque Ablan, Jr., KBL, as thetwelfth member of the Commission on Appointments, representingthe Coalesced Minority in the House.

A year later, on September 16, 1988, the "Laban ng Demokratikong

Pilipino" (LDP, for brevity) was organized as a political party. As 158out of 202 members of the House of Representatives formallyaffiliated with the LDP, the House committees, including the Houserepresentation in the Commission on Appointments, had to bereorganized.

On October 8, 1988, petitioner Coseteng wrote a letter to SpeakerRamon Mitra requesting that as representative of KAIBA, she be

appointed as a member of the Commission on Appointments andHouse Electoral Tribunal (p. 15, Rollo). Her request was endorsed bynine (9) congressmen, namely, Hon. Lally Laurel-Trinidad, BonifacioGillego, Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Gerardo Cabochan, Jose D. Aspiras,Oscar Santos, Eduardo N. Joson, Antonio H. Cerilles and IsacioPelaez.

Page 16: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 16/32

16

On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives, on motion of theMajority Floor Leader and over the objection of Cong. Raul A. Daza,LP, revised the House majority membership in the Commission onAppointments to conform with the new political alignments by

replacing Rep. Raul A. Daza, LP, with Rep. Luis C. Singson, LDP, asfollows:

1. Hon. Miguel L. Romero LDP2. Hon. Antonio V. Cuenco LDP3. Hon. Rogaciano M. Mercado LDP4. Hon. Alawadin T. Bandon, Jr. LDP5. Hon. Jose L. Cabochan LDP

6. Hon. Carlos R. Imperial LDP7. Hon. Maria Clara L. Lobregat LDP8. Hon. Natalio M. Beltran, Jr. LDP9. Hon. Carmelo J. Locsin LDP10. Hon. Luis C. Singson LDP11. Hon. Lorna L. Verano-Yap LP

(p. 122, Rollo.)

Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th memberrepresenting the House minority.

On February 1, 1989, Congresswoman Coseteng and her party, theKAIBA, filed this Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs (which maybe considered as a petition for quo warranto  and injunction) prayingthis Court to declare as null and void the election of respondentAblan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan,

Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as members of theCommission on Appointments, to enjoin them from acting as suchand to enjoin also the other respondents from recognizing them asmembers of the Commission on Appointments on the theory that theirelection to that Commission violated the constitutional mandate ofproportional representation because:

Page 17: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 17/32

17

1) the New Majority (158 LDP members out of the 202 members of theHouse) is entitled to only nine (9) seats out of the twelve to be filled bythe House (p. 29, Rollo);

2) the members representing the political parties, or coalitions thereof,must be nominated by their respective political parties or coalitions;

3) the nomination and election of respondent Verano-Yap by therespondents as representative of the minority was clearly invalid (p.31, Rollo); and

4) that similarly invalid was the retention of respondent Ablan asMinority member in the Commission because he was neither

nominated nor elected as such by the minority party or parties in theHouse (p. 31, Rollo).

Petitioner Coseteng further alleged that she is qualified to sit in theCommission on Appointments as a representative of the Minoritybecause she has the support of nine (9) other congressmen andcongresswomen of the Minority (p. 31, Rollo).

In their collective Comment, the respondents House ofRepresentatives, the Speaker, the Majority Floor Leader, the membersof the Commission on Appointments including Congressman RoqueR. Ablan, but excluding Congresswoman Lorna Verano-Yap (whofiled a separate Comment), alleged: (1) that the legality of thereorganization of the Commission on Appointments is a politicalquestion, hence, outside the jurisdiction of this Court to decide, and(2) that in any case, the reorganization was "strictly in consonancewith Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution" i.e., on the basis ofproportional representation of the political parties, considering themajority coalition "as a form of a political party" (pp. 115, 118, Rollo).They further alleged that as of March 3, 1989, 160 members of theHouse (including 26 former Liberals) had expressly renounced inwriting their respective political party affiliations and formallyaffiliated with the LDP leaving only 15 Liberals in the House (p.

Page 18: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 18/32

18

119, Rollo).i•t•c-aüsl After its petition for registration as a politicalparty was granted on August 28, 1989 by the First Division of theCOMELEC) and affirmed on November 23, 1989 by the COMELEC enbanc, the LDP become the new Majority in the House. They finally

argued that as KAIBA is part of the Coalesced Majority whichsupports the administration of President Corazon C. Aquino, not ofthe minority, petitioner is bound by the choice of the CoalescedMajority of the members who would sit in the Commission onAppointments.

Representative Lorna Verano-Yap, in her comment alleged that thepetitioner has no better light than those already selected, to be chosen

as a member of the Commission on Appointments because: (1) theConstitution was not violated in electing Yap and eleven (11) otherHouse members to the Commission on Appointments; (2) respondentYap is a rightful incumbent; and (3) petitioner's claim to a seat on theCommission on Appointments is without legal and factual basis (pp.217-218, Rollo).

The Commission on Appointments took a neutral stand on thepetition as the issues involved may touch on the validity of its

organization and the legality of the entitlement of the LDP or the LPto representation, which are raised in the case of Daza vs. Singson,G.R. No. 86344, then pending before this Court (pp. 195-198, Rollo).

The issue here is whether the members of the House in theCommission on Appointments were chosen on the basis ofproportional representation from the political parties therein asprovided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which

reads:

Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointmentsconsisting of the President of the Senate, asexoficio  Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members ofthe House of Representatives elected by each House on the

Page 19: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 19/32

19

basis of proportional representation from the politicalparties and parties or organizations registered under theparty-list system represented therein. The chairman of theCommission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The

Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to itwithin thirty session days of the Congress from theirsubmission. The commission shall rule by a majority voteof all the Members. (Art. VI, 1987 Constitution.)

After deliberating on the petition and the comments of therespondents, we hold that the petition should be dismissed, notbecause it raises a political question, which it does not, but because

the revision of the House representation in the Commission onAppointments is based on proportional representation of the politicalparties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987Constitution.

The "political question" issue was settled in Daza vs. Singson, G.R. No.86344, December 21, 1989, where this Court ruled that "the legality,and not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission onAppointments as prescribed by the Constitution" is justiciable, and,

"even if the question were political in nature, it would still comewithin our powers of review under the expanded jurisdictionconferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution,which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has beencommitted by any branch or instrumentality of the government."

The composition of the House membership in the Commission on

Appointments was based on proportional representation of thepolitical parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP inthe House. They represent 79% of the House membership (which maybe rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in theCommission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which maybe rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining two

Page 20: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 20/32

20

seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) asthe next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL(respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in theHouse. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House

membership in the Commission on Appointments was done "on thebasis of proportional representation of the political parties therein."

The other political parties or groups in the House, such as petitioner'sKAIBA (which is presumably a member also of the CoalescedMajority), are bound by the majority's choices. Even if KAIBA were tobe considered as an opposition party, its lone member (petitionerCoseteng) represents only .4% or less than 1% of the House

membership, hence, she is not entitled to one of the 12 House seats inthe Commission on Appointments. To be able to claim proportionalmembership in the Commission on Appointments, a political partyshould represent at least 8.4% of the House membership, i.e., it shouldhave been able to elect at least 17 congressmen or congresswomen.

The indorsements of the nine (9) congressmen and congresswomen infavor of the petitioner's election to the Commission areinconsequential because they are not members of her party and they

signed identical indorsements in favor of her rival, respondentCongresswoman Verano-Yap.

There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the Housemembers in the Commission on Appointments should have beennominated and elected by their respective political parties. Thepetition itself shows that they were nominated by their respectivefloor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not by

their party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution.The validity of their election to the Commission on Appointments — eleven (11) from the Coalesced Majority and one from the minority — is unassailable.

Page 21: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 21/32

21

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Costsagainst the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Page 22: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 22/32

22

G.R. No. 106971 October 20, 1992

TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., AND LAKAS-NATIONALUNION OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS (LAKAS-

NUCD), petitioners,vs.

NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ALBERTO ROMULO and WIGBERTOE. TAÑADA, respondents.

NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, petitioner-in-intervention.

CAMPOS, JR.,  J.: 

This is a petition for Prohibition to prohibit respondents SenatorAlberto Romulo and Wigberto Tañada from sitting and assuming theposition of members of the Commission on Appointments and toprohibit Senators Neptali Gonzales, as ex-officio Chairman, of saidCommission from recognizing and allowing the respondent senatorsto sit as members thereof.

As a result of the national elections held last May 11, 1992, the Senateis composed of the following members or Senators representing therespective political affiliations:

LDP ––  15 senatorsNPC ––  5 senatorsLAKAS-NUCD ––  3 senatorsLP-PDP-LABAN –– 1 senator

Applying the mathematical formula agreed to by the parties as follow

as:

No. of senators of a political party x 12 seats–––––––––––––––––––––––––– Total no. of senators elected

Page 23: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 23/32

23

the resulting composition of the senate based on the rule ofproportional representation of each political party with electedrepresentatives in the Senate, is as follows:

Political Party/ Proportional

Political Coalition Membership Representatives

LDP 15 7.5 membersNPC 5 2.5 membersLAKAS-NUCD 3 1.5 membersLP-PDP-LABAN 1 .5 members

At the organization meeting of the Senate held on August 27, 1992,Senator Romulo in his capacity as Majority Floor Leader nominated,for and in his behalf of the LDP, eight (8) senators for membership inthe Commission on Appointments, namely Senators Angara, Herrera,Alvarez, Aquino, Mercado, Ople, Sotto and Romulo. The nominationof the eight senators was objected to by Petitioner, Senator Guingona,as Minority Floor Leader, and Senator John Osmeña, in representationof the NPC. To resolve the impasse, Senator Arturo Tolentino

proposed a compromise to the effect that Senate elect

. . . 12 members to the Commission on Appointments, eightcoming from the LDP, two coming from NPC, one comingfrom the Liberal Party, with the understanding that thereare strong reservations against this proportion of thesenumbers so that if later on in action in the Supreme Court,if any party is found to have an excess in representation,and if any party is found to have a deficiency inrepresentation, that party will be entitled to nominate andhave elected by this body its additional representatives.

The proposed compromise above stated was a temporaryarrangement and, inspite of the objections of Senator Guingonaand Osmeña, to enable the Commission on Appointments to be

Page 24: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 24/32

24

organized by the election of its members, it was approved. Theelected members consisted of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN,two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD.

On September 23, 1992, Senator Teofisto Guingona. Jr., in his behalfand in behalf of Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats(LAKAS-NUCD), filed a petition for the issuance of a writ ofprohibition to prohibit the respondent Senate President NeptaliGonzales, as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission onAppointments, from recognizing the membership of Senators AlbertoRomulo as the eight senator elected by the LDP, and Wigberto E.Tañada, as the lone member representing the LP-PDP-LABAN, in the

Commission on Appointments, on the ground that the proposedcompromise of Senator Tolentino was violative of the rule ofproportional representation, and that it is the right of the minoritypolitical parties in the Senate, consistent with the Constitution, tocombine their fractional representation in the Commission onAppointments to complete one seat therein, and to decide who,among the senators in their ranks, shall be additionally nominatedand elected thereto.

Section 18 Article VI of the Constitution of 1987 provides fro thecreation of a Commission on Appointments and the allocation of itsmembership, as follows:

Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointmentsconsisting of the President of the Senate as ex-officioChairman, twelve members of the House ofRepresentatives, elected by each house on the basis of

 proportional representation from the political parties ororganizations registered under the party list systemrepresented therein. The Chairman of the Commissionshall not vote except in case of a tie. The Commission shallact on all appointments submitted to it within the session

Page 25: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 25/32

25

days of the Congress from their submission of all themembers. (Emphasis supplied.)

Based on the mathematical computation of proportional

representation of the various political parties with elected senators inthe senators in the Senate, each of these political parties is entitled to afractional membership in the Commission on Appointments as statedin the first paragraph of this decision. Each political party has a claimto an extra half seat, and the election of respondents Senator Romuloand Senator Tañada to the Commission on Appointments by the LDPmajority is precisely questioned by the petitioners because, accordingto them, it unduly increased the membership of LDP and LP-PDP-

LABAN in the commission and reduced the membership of theLAKAS-NUCD and NPC correspondingly. In view of the conflictingclaims of each of the political parties/coalition duly represented in theSenate to a fractional membership in the Commission onAppointments, the election of respondents Senator Romulo andSenator Tañada has become controversial and its validityquestionable. Hence, this petition. It has been established that thelegality of filling up the membership of the Commission on

Appointments is a justiciable issue and not a political question.We deem it necessary to resolve the respondents' argument as to thenature of the instant petition. There is no doubt that the issuesinvolved herein are constitutional in nature and are of vitalimportance to our nation. They involve the interpretation of Section18, Article VI of the Constitution which creates a Commission onAppointments. Where constitutional issues are properly raised in thecontext of the alleged facts, procedural questions acquire a relatively

minor significance and the "transcendental importance to the publicof the case demands that they be settled promptly and definitelybrushing aside . . . technicalities of procedure".

For the purpose of resolving the case at bar, the instant petition maybe regarded as one of prohibition wherein the Senate is claimed to

Page 26: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 26/32

26

have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction when it designatedrespondent Senator Romulo as eighth member of the Commission onAppointments, upon nomination by the LDP, and respondent SenatorTañada as LP nominee, notwithstanding, that, in both instance, LDP

and LP are each entitled only to "half a member". In the alternative,the petition may be regarded as one for mandamus, in which it isclaimed that the LAKAS-NUCD and NPC were unlawfully excludedfrom the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which each isentitled. Considering the importance of the case at bar and in keepingwith the Court's duty under the Constitution to keep the otherbranches of the government within the limits of the Constitution andthe laws of the land, this Court has decided to brush aside legal

technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of this case.

The issues for determination by this Court may be stated as follows:

1) Whether the election of Senators Alberto Romulo andWigberto E. Tañada as members of the Commission onAppointments is in accordance with the provision ofSection 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

2) If said membership of the respondent senators in theCommission is violative of the Constitutional provision,did the respondent Senate act in grave abuse of discretionin electing the respondent Senators?

3) If there was grave abuse of discretion by respondentSenate, acting through the LDP majority, should a writ ofprohibition enjoining, prohibiting and restraining

respondent Senators from sitting as members of andparticipating in the proceeding of the Commission onAppointments be issued?

It is an established fact to which all the parties agree that themathematical representation of each of the political partiesrepresented in the Senate is as follows:

Page 27: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 27/32

27

LDP –– 7.5

NPC –– .5

LAKAS-NUCD –– 2.5

LP-PDP-LABAN –– 1.5

It is also a fact accepted by all such parties that each of thementitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the rule onproportional representation of each of the political parties. Aliteral interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of theConstitution leads to no other manner of application than as

above. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 towhich each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in theSenate converted a fractional half membership into a wholemembership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to beable to elect Senator Romulo. In so doing one other party'sfractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving thelatter's representation in the Commission on Appointments toless than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is

clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer incompliance with its mandate that membership in theCommission be based on the proportional representation of thepolitical parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave morerepresentation to the LDP and reduced the representation of onepolitical party „1¤7 either the LAKAS-NUCD or the NPC.

On the claim of Senator Tañada that under the ruling in the case ofSenator Lorenzo Tañada, and the cases of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile,he has a right to be elected as a member of the Commission onAppointments because of: (a) the physical impossibility of dividing aperson, so that the fractional membership must be rounded up intoone senator; (b) being the sole elected senator of his party, his party isentitled to be represented in the Commission on Appointments; (c)having been elected senator, rounding up into one full senator his

Page 28: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 28/32

28

fractional membership is consistent with the provision and spirit ofthe Constitution and would be in full accord with the principle ofrepublicanism that emphasizes democracy.

The cases of the two former senators mentioned cannot be invoked asa precedent in support of incumbent Senator Tañada's claim to amembership in the present Commission on Appointments. In the timeof his illustrious father, out of 24 elected senators in the upperchamber of Congress, 23 belonged to the Nacionalista Party, whileSenator Lorenzo Tañada, who belonged to the Citizen's Party, was thelone opposition. By force of circumstance, he became a member of theCommission on Appointments because he alone represented the

minority party. Had there been another senator belonging to a partyother than the Citizens' Party, this problem of who should sit as thesole representative of the opposition party would have arisen. In thecase of Senator Ponce Enrile, there were two senators elected from theopposition party, namely, he and Senator Estrada. Applying the ruleof proportional representation mentioned earlier (see formula), theopposition was entitled to full member (not a fractional membership).Senator Enrile was thus legally nominated and elected as the minority

representative in the Senate. In the present case, if there were apolitical parties in the Senate, and We follow Senators Tañada's claimthat he is entitled to full membership as lone representative of hisparty, We the anomaly of having 13 senators, where the Constitutionallows only twelve (12) in the Commission on Appointments.

We find the respondents' claim to membership in the Commission onAppointments by nomination and election of the LDP majority in theSenate as not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987

Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not incompliance with the requirements that twelve senators shall beelected on the basis of proportional representation of the resultingfractional membership of the political parties represented therein. Todisturb the resulting fractional membership of the political parties inthe Commission on Appointments by adding together two halves to

Page 29: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 29/32

29

make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representationbecause it will give the LDP an added member in the Commission byutilizing the fractional membership of the minority political party,who is deprived of half a representation.

The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation ismandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to themajority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule onproportional representation; otherwise, the party with a majorityrepresentation in the Senate or the House of Representatives can bysheer force of number impose its will on the hapless minority. Byrequiring a proportional representation in the Commission on

Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a check on the majorityparty in the Senate and helps to maintain the balance of power. Noparty can claim more than what it is entitled to under such rule. Toallow it to elect more than its proportional share of members is toconfer upon such a party a greater share in the membership in theCommission on Appointments and more power to impose its will onthe minority, who by the same token, suffers a diminution of itsrightful membership in the Commission.

Section 18, also assures representation in the Commission onAppointments of any political party who succeeds in electingmembers to the Senate, provided that the number of senators soelected enables it to put a representative in the Commission onAppointments. Drawing from the ruling in the case of Cosetengvs. Mitra, Jr., a political party must have at least two senators in theSenate to be able to have a representatives in the Commission onAppointments, so that any number less than 2 will not entitle such a

party a membership in the Commission on Appointments. Thisapplies to the respondent Senator Tañada.

We lay down the following guidelines accordingly:

Page 30: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 30/32

30

1) In the Senate, political party or coalition must have atleast two duly elected senators for every seat in theCommission on Appointments.

2) Where there are more than two political partiesrepresented in the Senate, a political party/coalition with asingle senator in the Senate cannot constitutionally claimsseat in the Commission.

We do not agree with respondents' claim that it is mandatory toelect 12 Senators to the Commission on Appointments. TheConstitution does not contemplate that the Commission onAppointments must necessarily include twelve (12) senators andtwelve (12) members of the House of Representatives. What theConstitution requires is that there be at least a majority of theentire membership. Under Section 18, the Commission shall ruleby majority vote of all the members and in Section 19, theCommission shall meet only while congress is in session, at thecall of its Chairman or a majority of all its members "to dischargesuch powers and functions herein conferred upon it".Implementing the above provisions of the Constitution, Section

10 Chapter 3 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments,provides as follows:

Sec. 10. „1¤7 Place of Meeting and  Quorum: TheCommission shall meet at either the session hall of theSenate or the House of Representatives upon call of theChairman or as the Commission may designate. Thepresence of at least thirteen (13) members is necessary to

constitute a quorum. Provided, however, that at least four(4) of the members constituting the quorum should comefrom either house. . . .

It is quite evident that the Constitution does not require the electionand presence of twelve (12) senators and twelve (12) members of the

Page 31: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 31/32

31

House of Representatives in order that the Commission may function.Other instances may be mentioned of Constitutional collegial bodieswhich perform their composition is expressly specified by theConstitution. Among these are the Supreme

Court, Civil Service Commission, Commission onElection, Commission on Audit. They perform their function so longand there is the required quorum, usually a majority of itsmembership. The Commission on Appointments may perform itsfunctions and transact it s business even if only ten (10) senators areelected thereto as long as a quorum exists.

It may also be mentioned that while the Constitution provides for

equal membership from the Senate and the House of Representativesin the Commission on Appointments, the senators on the one hand,and the representatives, on the other, do not vote separately but

 jointly, and usually along party lines. Even if Senator Tañada wouldnot be able sit in the Commission on Appointments, the LP-LDP-LABAN would still be represented in the Commission bycongressman Ponce Enrile who has become a member of the LP. Onthe other hand, there is nothing to stop any of the political party in

order to fill up the two vacancies resulting from this decision.Assuming that the Constitution intended that there be always twelve(12) senators in the Commission on Appointments, the instantsituation cannot be rectified by the Senate in disregard of the rule onproportional representation. The election of senator Romulo andSenator Tañada as members of the Commission on Appointments bythe LDP majority in the Senate was clearly a violation of Section 18 ofArticle VI of the 1987 Constitution. Their nomination and election by

the LDP majority by sheer force of superiority in numbers during theSenate organization meeting of August 27, 1992 was done in graveabuse of discretion. Where power is exercised in a mannerinconsistent with the command of the Constitution, and by reason ofnumerical strength, knowingly and not merely inadvertently, said

Page 32: Section 18, Article 6

8/11/2019 Section 18, Article 6

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/section-18-article-6 32/32

exercise amounts to abuse of authority granted by law and graveabuse of discretion is properly found to exist.

In the light of the foregoing and on the basis of the applicable rules

and jurisprudence on the matter before this Court, We declare theelection of Senator Alberto Romulo and Senator Wigberto Tañada asmembers of the Commission on Appointments as null and void forbeing in violation of the rule on proportional representation underSection 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.Accordingly, a writ of prohibition is hereby issued ordering the saidrespondents Senator Romulo and Senator Tañada to desist fromassuming, occupying and discharging the functions of members of the

Commission on Appointments; and ordering the respondents SenatePresident Neptali Gonzales, in his capacity as ex-officio Chairman ofthe Commission on Appointments, to desist from recognizing themembership of the respondent Senators and from allowing andpermitting them from sitting and participating as members of saidCommission.

SO ORDERED.