SECTION IV

Valles v. COMELEC, GR 137000, August 9, 2000FACTS:Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines. She was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, and has participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but also as a candidate. In May 1998, she ran to be a governor but her citizenship has been contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr.ISSUE:Whether or not Ybasco is a Filipino CitizenHELD:YES, Ybasco is a Filipino Citizen. The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth. Ybasco was born before 1935 Constitution took effect and the law that has been in effect during that time was the organic acts of the Philippines has changed the citizenship of Spanish subjects living in the Philippines to be Philippine citizens.Ong Chia v. Republic, GR 127240, March 27, 2000FACTS:Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as required in 2, and lack of the disqualifications enumeratedin 3 of the law. The trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed all the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former placer of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, 7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of 2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of 2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence.The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, petitioner resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in the petition.The Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already noted, reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the importance naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower court and brought up for the first time on appeal. ISSUE:Whether or not the court of appeals gravely abused its discretion in ruling that in naturalization cases, the appellate courtcan deny an application for philippine citizenship on the basis of documents not presented before the trial court and not forming part of the records of the case.HELD:NO. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals.The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents.As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, 7 clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and former places of residence. This provision and the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied.

CHILDREN OF FILIPINO FATHERS AND MOTHERS

*Gatchalian v. Board of Commissioners 197 SCRA 853FACTS:On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of natural mother Mariana Gatchalian. On June 27, 1961, Willian, then twelve years old, arrives in Manila from Hongkong together with a daughter and a son of Santiago. They had with them certificate of registration and identity issued by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the secretary of foreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens.On July 6, 1961, the board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as Filipino citizens and issued an identification certificate to William. The board of commissioners was directed by the Secretary of Justice to Review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Filipino citizen such included the case of William. As a result of the decision of the board of special inquiry this recommended for the reversal of the decision of the Board of Commissioners. Acting commissioner issued an order affirming the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. On August 15, 1990, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation ordered the arrest of William and was released upon posting P 200,000 cash bond. Thus on the 29th of the same month, he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of Manila. A motion to dismiss was filed but denied.ISSUE:Whether or not William Gatchalian is to be declared as a Filipino citizen.HELD:YES. Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960.Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV of the Constitution, which provides:Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. . . .Thus, in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present: 1) a person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party; 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and 3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.*Tecson v. Comelec, 423 SCRA 277FACTS:Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his certificate of candidacy on 31 December 2003 for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition to disqualify FPJ and cancel his certificate of candidacy by claiming that FPJ is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, his parents were foreigners: his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.ISSUE:Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.HELD:YES. The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Based on the evidence presented which the Supreme consider as viable is the fact that the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan Poe, who in turn was the father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he died on September 11, 1954 at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Evidently, in such death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Poe was stated to be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. Considering that the allegations of petitioners are not substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have been benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there is no doubt that Allan Poe father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen. And, since the latter was born on August 20, 1939, governed under 1935 Constitution, which constitution considers as citizens of the Philippines those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines, Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a natural-born citizen of the Philippines regardless of whether or not he is legitimate or illegitimate.Go v. Ramos 598 SCRA 266FACTS. The complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Jimmy averred that the complaint for deportation initiated by Luis was merely a harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business dealings. Jimmy maintained that there is no truth to the allegation that he is an alien, and insisted that he is a natural-born FilipinoBoard of Commissioners (Board) in Finding Jimmys claim to Philippine citizenship in serious doubt by reason of his fathers questionable election thereof, the Board directed the preparation and filing of the appropriate deportation charges against Jimmy. the corresponding Charge Sheet was filed against Jimmy, charging him of violating as The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.Bureau of Immigration Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr. issued Warrant of Deportation .112According to Carlos, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of 1916 deemed all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands as well as their children born after the passage of said laws to be citizens of the Philippines. Because his father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the passage of the Jones Law of 1916, he (Carlos) undoubtedly acquired his fathers citizenship. Article IV, first paragraph, of the 1935 Constitution therefore applies to him. ISSUE: WON the Philippine Bill of 1902 or the Jones Law of 1916 make Carlos a citizen of the Philippines.HELD: It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. Moreover, we have also ruled that an illegitimate child of a Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself. However, it is our considered view that absent any evidence proving that Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a Filipina, the aforestated established rule could not be applied to him.ISSUE: Whether the election of Philippine citizenship conferred on Carlos Filipino citizenship.HELD: NO.Com. Act No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.Carlos and Jimmy neither showed conclusive proof of their citizenship nor presented substantial proof of the same, we have no choice but to sustain the Boards jurisdiction over the deportation proceedings.Gonzales v. Rennisi 614 SCRA 292

Facts: Michael Alfio Pennisi (respondent) was born on in Queensland, Australia to Alfio Pennisi, an Australian national, and Anita T. Quintos (Quintos), allegedly a Filipino citizen. In March 1999, respondent filed a petition for recognition as Filipino citizen before the Bureau of Immigration (BI). On 17 February 2000, BI Associate Commissioner Alan Roullo Yap issued an order granting respondents petition for recognition as Filipino citizen. The DOJ affirmed Recognition Order No. 206679.Respondent was drafted and played for the Red Bull, a professional basketball team in the Philippine Basketball Association (PBA)Senate Committees on Games Amusement and Sports and on Constitutional Amendments (Senate Committees) jointly submitted Committee Report No. 256 (Committee Report) recommending, among other things, that (1) the BI conduct summary deportation proceedings against several Filipino-foreign PBA players, including respondent. CA ruled in favor of Respondent.ISSUE: WhetherHELD: Judicial review is permitted if the courts believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct. When the evidence submitted by a deportee is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. Courts may review the actions of the administrative offices authorized to deport aliens and reverse their rulings when there is no evidence to sustain the rulings.Cabiling v. Fernandez 625 SCRA 56

FACTS: Cabilings the children of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, a Taiwanese, and Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a Filipina.They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country for almost sixty (60) years; they spent their whole lives, studied and received their primary and secondary education in the country; they do not speak nor understand the 113Chinese language, have not set foot in Taiwan, and do not know any relative of their father; they have not even traveled abroad; and they have already raised their respective families in the Philippines.Bureau of Immigration received the Complaint-Affidavit of a certain Mr. Catral, alleging that Felix (Yao Kong) Ma and his seven (7) children are undesirable and overstaying aliens. ISSUE: WON Felix and his 7 children should be considered undesirable aliens.HELD:NO. The 1935 Constitution declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority In both cases, we ruled against the petitioners because they belatedly complied with all the requirements. The acts of election and their registration with the nearest civil registry were all done beyond the reasonable period of three years upon reaching the age of majority.The instant case presents a different factual setting. Petitioners complied with the first and second requirements upon reaching the age of majority. It was only the registration of the documents of election with the civil registry that was belatedly done.

PARAGRAPH (3)

*Co. v. Electoral Tribunal - 199 SCRA 692

FACTS: Ong won the congressional election of 2nd District of Norther Samar. The other 2 electioneers were Balinquit and Co. The two questioned the citizenship of Ong contending that he is not a Filipino citizen before the House Electoral Tribunal. HRET decided in favor of Ong and Balinquit and Co brought the petition to the Supreme Court.Issue: Whether or not Ong is a natural born Filipino citizenshipRuling: Yes, Ong is a natural born Filipino Citizen. Ong became a Filipino Citizen through his mother and not through his father. It is unneccessary to trace the citizenship of Ong to his father since his father was already a Filipino citizen when he was born. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whether or not the respondent chose to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother and father were Filipinos. Ong could not have elected any other citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality.Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of his father which he could possibly have chosen.*Republic vs Sagun

Facts: Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio Ci and did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was not recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City. Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to annotate the same on her birth certificate.114

Issue: Essentially, the issues for our resolution are: (1) whether respondents petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is sanctioned by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence; (2) whether respondent has effectively elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.

Held: In granting the petition, the trial court stated:This Court believes that petitioner was able to fully substantiate her petition regarding her election of Filipino citizenship, and the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City should be ordered to annotate in her birth certificate her election of Filipino citizenship. This Court adds that the petitioners election of Filipino citizenship should be welcomed by this country and people because the petitioner has the choice to elect citizenship of powerful countries like the United States of America and China, however, petitioner has chosen Filipino citizenship because she grew up in this country, and has learned to love the Philippines. Her choice of electing Filipino citizenship is, in fact, a testimony that many of our people still wish to live in the Philippines, and are very proud of our country.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Nora Fe Sagun y Chan is hereby DECLARED as FILIPINO CITIZEN, having chosen or elected Filipino citizenship.For sure, this Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. There is no specific legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. This was our ruling in Yung Uan Chu v. Republic citing the early case of Tan v. Republic of the Philippines, where we clearly stated:Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. x x xClearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of respondents Filipino citizenship as such pronouncement was not within the courts competence.As to the propriety of respondents petition seeking a judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship, it is imperative that we determine whether respondent is required under the law to make an election and if so, whether she has complied with the procedural requirements in the election of Philippine citizenship.When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution, which declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:x x x x(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. The right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty- five are citizens of the Philippines.115Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that [t]hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are Philippine citizens. It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.Being a legitimate child, respondents citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. An illegitimate child of Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself. But in the case of respondent, for her to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625, enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship, to wit:Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), [S]ection 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.Based on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for registration under C.A. No. 625 unless the party exercising the right of election has complied with the requirements of the Alien Registration Act of 1950. In other words, he should first be required to register as an alien. Pertinently, the person electing Philippine citizenship is required to file a petition with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration based on his aforesaid election of Philippine citizenship and said Office will initially decide, based on the evidence presented the validity or invalidity of said election. Afterwards, the same is elevated to the Ministry (now Department) of Justice for final determination and review.It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. The special proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely allows any interested party to file an action for cancellation or correction of entry in the civil registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the respondent. Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial courts conclusion that respondent duly elected Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the records undisputably show that respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements for a valid election. Specifically, respondent had not executed a sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentary evidence submitted by respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance, executed 12 years after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even assuming arguendo that respondents oath of allegiance suffices, its execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority and was not registered with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625. The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. Moreover, there was no satisfactory explanation proffered by respondent for the delay and the failure to register with the nearest local civil registry.116Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. As we held in Ching, the prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing requirements, respondents petition before the trial court must be denied.

PARAGRAPH (4)

So vs Republic

Facts: Edison So filed a petition for Naturalization. He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has lived in Binondo, Manila, since birth; he is exempt from the filing of Declaration of Intention to become a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, as amended, because he was born in the Philippines, and studied in a school recognized by the Government where Philippine history, government and culture are taught; he is a person of good moral character; he has all the qualifications provided under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473, as amended; he has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; it is his intention in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to China; and he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the time of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission as citizen of the Philippines. Petitioner thus caused the publication of the RTC order in Official Gazette and Today newspaper. No one opposed the petition. During the hearing, petitioner presented Atty. Adasa, Jr. who testified that he came to know petitioner in 1991 as the legal consultant and adviser of the So familys business and Mark Salcedo. Petitioner also submitted documents to support his petition.

Issue: OSG appealed the decision of the lower courts on the ground that: THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TWO (2) CHARACTER WITNESSES, NAMELY: ARTEMIO ADASA, JR. AND MARK SALCEDO WERE NOT QUALIFIED CHARACTER WITNESSES. And that PETITIONER IS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE ADMITTED AS CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES

Held: Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen. Under current and existing laws, there are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien.Petitioners contention that the qualifications an applicant for naturalization should possess are those provided for in R.A.No. 9139 and not those set forth in C.A. No. 473 is barren of merit. The qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by judicial act are set forth in Sections 2and 4 of C.A. No. 473. On the other hand, Sections 3 and 4of R.A. No. 9139 provide for the qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by administrative act.Indeed, R.A. No. 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure intended to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging. It likewise addresses the concerns of degree holders who, by reason of lack of citizenship requirement, cannot practice their profession, thus promoting "brain gain" for the Philippines. These however, do not justify petitioners contention that the qualifications set forth in said law apply even to applications for naturalization by judicial act. First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws the former covers all aliens regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions. To reiterate, the intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is administrative rather than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature believes that there is a need to liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing from which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens. The only implication is that, a native born alien has the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.In the instant case, petitioner applied for naturalization by judicial act, though at the time of the filing of his petition, administrative naturalization under R.A. No. 9139 was already available. Consequently, his application should be governed by C.A. No. 473.

Second. If the qualifications prescribed in R.A. No. 9139 would be made applicable even to judicial naturalization, the coverage of the law would be broadened since it would then apply even to aliens who are not native born. It must be stressed that R.A. No. 9139 applies only to aliens who were born in the Philippines and have been residing here. Third. Applying the provisions of R.A. No. 9139 to judicial naturalization is contrary to the intention of the legislature to liberalize the naturalization procedure in the country. One of the qualifications set forth in R.A. No. 9139 is that the applicant was born in the Philippines and should have been residing herein since birth. Thus, one who was born here but left the country, though resided for more than ten (10) years from the filing of the application is also disqualified. On the other hand, if we maintain the distinct qualifications under each of the two laws, an alien who is not qualified under R.A. No. 9139 may still be naturalized under C.A. No. 473.

Thus, absent a specific provision expressly amending C.A. No. 473, the law stands and the qualifications and disqualifications set forth therein are maintained.In any event, petitioner failed to prove that the witnesses he presented were competent to vouch for his good moral character, and are themselves possessed of good moral character. It must be stressed that character witnesses in naturalization proceedings stand as insurers of the applicants conduct and character. Thus, they ought to testify on specific facts and events justifying the inference that the applicant possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law.Petitioners witnesses, Atty. Adasa and Salcedo, did not testify on his specific acts; they did not elaborate on his traits. Their testimonies do not convince the Court that they personally know petitioner well and are therefore in a position to vouch for his qualifications. As correctly found by the CA, the witnesses testimonies consisted mainly of general statements in answer to the leading questions propounded by his counsel. What they conveniently did was to enumerate the qualifications as set forth in the law without giving specific details. In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove not only his own good moral character but also the good moral character of his/her witnesses, who must be credible persons. Within the purview of the naturalization law, a "credible person" is not only an individual who has not been previously convicted of a crime; who is not a police character and has no police record; who has not perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or testimony is not incredible. What must be credible is not the declaration made but the person making it. This implies that such person must have a good standing in the community; that he is known to be honest and upright; that he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face value, as a good warranty of the applicants worthiness.

The records likewise do not show that the character witnesses of petitioner are persons of good standing in the community; that they are honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. The most that was established was the educational attainment of the witnesses; however, this cannot be equated with their credibility. In fine, petitioner focused on presenting evidence tending to build his own good moral character and neglected to establish the credibility and good moral character of his witnesses.

We do not agree with petitioners argument that respondent is precluded from questioning the RTC decision because of its failure to oppose the petition. A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, and the decision rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. A certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising subsequent to the granting of the certificate. If the government can challenge a final grant of citizenship, with more reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC within the reglementary period despite its failure to oppose the petition before the lower court.Thus, petitioner failed to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of naturalization law.

LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP

Yu vs Defensor-Santiago

Facts: Petitioner is a Portuguese national who acquired Philippine citizenship by naturalization. However, despite his naturalization, he still applied for and was issued a Portuguese passport and declared his nationality Portuguese in commercial documents he signed.

Issue: Whether petitioners acts constitute renunciation of his Philippine citizenship

Held: Express renunciation means a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced his Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport. To the mind of the court the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of petitioners Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization.

Frivaldo v. COMELEC - 174 SCRA 245

Facts: In 1988, Juan Frivaldo won as governor of Sorsogon. Salvador Estuye, President of the League of Municipalities of Sorsogon, filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation because apparently, Frivaldo, in 1983, was naturalized as an American. In his defense, Frivaldo said that he was forced to be naturalized because the then President Marcos was after him; but that participating in the Philippine elections, he has effectively lost his American citizenship pursuant to American laws. He also assailed the petition as he claimed that it is in the nature of quo warranto which is already filed out of time, the same not being filed ten days after his proclamation.

Issues: Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen. Held: He has not regained Filipino citizenship. As far as Philippine law is concerned, he is not a Filipino. He lost his citizenship when he declared allegiance to the United States. Even if he did lose his US citizenship, that did not restore his being a Filipino because he did not undergo naturalization or repatriation proceedings. Neither did his participation in the 1988 elections restore his Philippine citizenship. At best, he is a stateless person. He cannot serve as governor when he owes allegiance to a foreign state. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.*Frivaldo v. COMELEC 257 SCRA 727

Facts: This is a petition filed by herein petitioner to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Commission that which disqualified him from running for governor of Sorsogon, and suspended the proclamation of Frivaldo as the governor-elect of Sorsogon. Juan G. Frivaldo filed for candidacy for governorship. This was contested by Raul Lee who filed a petition with the COMELEC praying that Frivaldo be disqualified because he was not a Filipino citizen. Second Division of the COMELEC promulgated a Resolution granting petition. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the elections. His candidacy continued and he was voted. Three days after, the COMELEC affirmed the previous Resolution. The Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election and determined that Frivaldo garnered the largest number of votes, followed by Lee. Lee filed another petition praying for his proclamation as Governor and his petition was granted. Frivaldo filed a new petition. He alleged that he already took his oath of allegiance on June 30, 1995 and that there was no more legal impediment his proclamation as governor. On December 19, 1995, the COMELEC First Division annulled the proclamation of Lee and proclaimed Frivaldo as rightful governor. Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which COMELEC denied. Lee filed a petition questioning the Frivaldos proclamation when his (Frivaldo) judicially declared disqualification is a continuing condition and rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to and to hold the Office of Governor.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners judicially declared disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship bar him to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon.

Held: No. The decision of the Supreme Court declaring Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and his disqualification was for the purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections; and that there is no final judgment of his disqualification for the May 8, 1995 elections. Moreover, his Filipino citizenship was restored, and his previous registration as a voter was likewise validated as of the day he was repatriated, and that was on August 17, 1994. Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.Labo, Jr, v. COMELEC - 176 SCRA 1

Facts: In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. Was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified; that he was naturalized as an Australian after he married an Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make him an Australian; that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became an Australian when he married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the Australian was later declared void for being bigamous. Labo further asserts that even if hes considered as an Australian, his lack of citizenship is just a mere technicality which should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority.

Issue: Whether or not Labo can retain his public office

Held: No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was naturalized as an Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an Australian. It was his act of subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to the government of Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an Australian passport to return to the Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. He lost his Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost his Australian citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a Filipino through an act of Congress none of this happened.120 Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship should not overcome the will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have, even unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution simply by electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted for Labo had they known he is Australian). The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen*Labo, Jr, v. COMELEC 211 SCRA 297

Facts: For the second time around, believing that he is a Filipino ctizen, Ramon Labo, Jr filed his COC for mayor of Baguio City on 1992 elections. Ortega on other hand, also filed his COC for the same office on 1992. On March 26, 1992, petitioner Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the COMELEC on the ground that Labo is not a Filipino citizen. Respondent Comelec issued the assailed resolution denying Labos COC and resolved motu proprio to suspend the proclamation of Labo in the event he wins in the elections for the City Mayor of Baguio. On May 15, 1992, petitioner Labo filed the instant petition for review with prayer, among others, for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to set aside the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec; to render judgment declaring him as a Filipino citizen; and to direct respondent Comelec to proceed with his proclamation in the event he wins in the contested elections. Petitioner Ortega submits that since this Court did not issue a temporary restraining order as regards the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling Labos certificate of candidacy, said resolution has already become final and executory. Ortega further posits the view that as a result of such finality, the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes should be declared Mayor of Baguio City.

Issue. Whether or not Petitioner Labo who had the highest number of votes is qualified to assume as Mayor of Baguio City.

Held: No. At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition on May 15, 1992, the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling his (Labos) certificate of candidacy had already become final and executory a day earlier, or on May 14, 1992, said resolution having been received by petitioner Labo on the same day it was promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992 and in the interim no restraining order was issued by this Court.The resolution cancelling Labos certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen having acquired finality on May 14, 1992 constrains the SC to rule against his proclamation as Mayor of Baguio City.Sec. 39 of the LGC provides that an elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines. Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification for the contested office. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective office. The fact that he was elected by the majority of the electorate is of no moment.Aznar v. Osmena - 185 SCRA 703

Facts: Respondent Emilio Lito Osmena filed his certificate of candidacy before the COMELEC as the Governor of Cebu Province. Aznar, herein petitioner, as the representative of the Cebu PDP- Provincial council and as the incumbent Chairman of such, filed a petition against the respondent before the Comelec contending that he should be disqualified because he is not a Filipino citizen, instead an American citizen. Petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation showing a Certificate issued by the Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago that the respondent as an American Citizen is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration and Immigrant Certificate of Residence. The Comelec en banc ordered the Board of Canvassers to continue canvassing but to suspend the proclamation upon the filing the motion of herein respondent for the Temporary Restraining Order to the Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers from tabulation and proclamation of the respondent until the resolution of said petition.

Issue: Whether or not Osmena is an American thus disqualified to run in the elections121

Held: No. The respondent did not lose his Filipino Citizenship and thereby qualified as a candidate for the Provincial Governor of Cebu Province. The petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino Citizenship by any of the modes provided under C.A. No. 63 namely: (1) By naturalization in a foreign country; (2) By express renunciation of Citizenship; and (3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of foreign country. Thus, it is clear that private respondent Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned herein above or by any other mode of losing Philippine Citizenship. His father is Filipino thus, without proof to the contrary, the presumption that he is a Filipino remains*Mercado v. Manzano GR 135083 May 26, 1999FACTS: Petitioner Mercado and private respondent Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion remained pending until after the election. The board of canvassers tabulated the votes but suspended the proclamation of the winner. Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC en banc reversed the decision and declared private respondent qualified to run for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati.

ISSUE: WON the private respondent should be disqualified to hold a government seat on the ground of Dual Citizenship.

HELD: NO. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition. With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, Section 5 of the Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. In including Section 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, Section 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: [D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control. By electing 122Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.Tabaso v. CA 500 SCRA 9

FACTS: In 1968, when petitioner was seven years old, his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen of the United States. By derivative naturalization (citizenship derived from that of another as from a person who holds citizenship by virtue of naturalization), petitioner also acquired American citizenship. Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-born Filipino, and that he lost his Philippine citizenship by derivative naturalization when he was still a minor.

ISSUE: Is Jeovanie Tabasa a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by reason of political or economic necessity under RA 8171?

HELD: He does not. The only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following: a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of the filing of the petition for repatriation.

NO COLLATERAL ATTACK

Vilando v. HRET 656 SCRA 17

FACTS: Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental. Because of this, her opponent, Paras and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases against Limkaichong. They alleged that Limkaichong was not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born her father was still a Chinese and that her mother, lost her Filipino citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichongs father. During the pendency of the case against Limkaichong before the COMELEC, Election day came and votes were cast. Results came in and Limkaichong won over her rival Paras. COMELEC after due hearing declared Limkaichong as disqualified. Few days after the counting of votes, COMELEC declared Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate. On the following days however, notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted elections. This is in compliance with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before the COMELEC. Limkaichong assailed Paras petition arguing that since she is now the proclaimed winner, it should be the HRET which has the jurisdiction over the matter and not the COMELEC. COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong.

ISSUE: WON Limkaichong is qualified to hold an office in the Republic of the Philippines123

HELD: YES. Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The governing law is the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution. The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959 Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental, which granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent any evidence to the contrary. Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore, following the line of transmission through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied with the requirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Respondent participated in the barangay elections as a young voter in 1976, accomplished voter's affidavit as of 1984, and ran as a candidate and was elected as Mayor of La Libertad, Negros Oriental in 2004. These are positive acts of election of Philippine citizenship. The case of In re: Florencio Mallare, elucidates how election of citizenship is manifested in actions indubitably showing a definite choice. We note that respondent had informally elected citizenship after January 17, 1973 during which time the 1973 Constitution considered as citizens of the Philippines all those who elect citizenship in accordance with the 1935 Constitution.

Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

Bengson v. HRET GR 142840, May 7, 2001FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen. Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps. In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection. Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election.

ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

HELD: YES. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:1. by naturalization,2. by repatriation, and3. by direct act of Congress.Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:1. desertion of the armed forces;1242. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and5. political economic necessity

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.R.A. No. 2630 provides:Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.In re Mallare 59 SCRA 344

FACTS:A complaint was filed by the acting immigration commissioner for the investigation on the citizenship of florencio mallare for the purpose of determining whether or not his name will be erased from the list of persons authorized to practice law in the Philippines as he was admitted to the BAR on March, 1962. After an investigation, it appeared that respondent Mallare's father, Esteban Mallare, was a Chinese up to his death; and his mother admittedly being a Chinese, respondent is likewise a Chinese national, thus, respondent was declared excluded from the practice of law; his admission to the bar was revoked. Respondent moved for reconsideration on the ground of newly discovered evidence which consist of (1) an entry in the registry of baptism of the Immaculate Concepcion Church at Macalelon, Quezon, purporting to show that Estaben Mallare (respondent's father) is the natural son of Ana Mallare, a Filipino; and (2) testimonies of certain persons who had a known Esteban Mallare and his mother during their lifetime.

ISSUE:WON respondent herein is considered to be a Filipino pursuant to his grandmother, Ana Mallare being a FilipinoHELD:YES.The assertion of the witnesses, that Ana Mallare is a Tagalog (and, therefore, a Filipino citizen), cannot be assailed as being mere conclusions devoid of evidentiary value. The declarations were not only based on the reputation in the community regarding her race or race-ancestry, which is admissible in evidence, but they must have certain factual basis. For it must be realized that in this Philippine society, every region possesses certain characteristics all its own. Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship. Neither could any act taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled. assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were legally married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter and when he was about 22 years old Esteban was already participating in the elections and campaigning for certain candidate. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine citizenship. it would be unfair to expect the presentation of a formal deed considering that prior to the enactment of Commonwealth Act 625 no particular proceeding was required to exercise the option to elect Philippine citizenship, granted to the proper party by Section 1, subsection 4, Article IV of the 1935 Philippine Constitution. It is true that in the death certificate of Esteban Mallare, he was referred to as a Chinese national, and in the birth certificates of respondent and his brothers and sister, they were declared to be of Chinese nationality. Respondent likewise appeared to have applied for alien registration on August 25, 1950 (Exh. "N"). While said documents are public and the entries therein are, consequently, presumed to be correct, such presumption is merely disputable and will have to yield to more positive evidence establishing their inaccuracy.Chen Teck Lao v. Republic 55 SCRA 1

FACTS:The application for naturalization of Chan Teck Lao was granted by SC by subsequently, more than ten years later the Office of the Solicitor General filed the petition for the cancellation of the certificate of naturalization, raising the 125 alleged jurisdictional question based on the subsequent Tan Ten Koc ruling that there was no showing or proof that the Nueva Era was a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Tarlac, where the petitioner then resided.

ISSUE:WON naturalization of Filipino citizenship of Chan Teck Lao be cancelled

HELD: NO. First, this is a case of naturalization proceeding rather than a denaturalization proceeding. To rely on the 1964 Tan Ten Koc ruling which, after all these years, would require that positive proof as to the paper wherein the application was published in the place where the proceeding was had being of general application to petitioner-appellant who, as far back as June 15, 1950, had already been granted his citizenship by this Court, his certificate being issued two years thereafter, would, in the language of Gan Tsitung, be far from "just, fair and reasonable." Citizenship obtained through naturalization is not a second-class citizenship." From such a perspective then, to impose an additional burden for the first time to warrant the denaturalization of a citizen whose naturalization was obtained after the most exacting scrutiny not only by the lower courts but by this Tribunal, and especially so after a long lapse of time, would be clearly to subject him to a risk that certainly the Constitution, with its pledge of equal protection, cannot tolerate.For the "effective operation of courts in the social and economic scheme requires that their decision have the respect of and be observed by the parties, the general public and the courts themselves. Furthermore, it is to be noted that petitioner-appellant met all the qualifications for citizenship.Cordero v. COMELEC 580 SCRA 12

FACTS: Petitioner file a complaint before the COMELEC Law Department and asserted that Tambunting made false assertions in his certificate of ccandidacy thus, Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements. Petitioner assert that is not a natural-born Filipino citizen by presenting a certification from the Bureau of Immigration which, pursuant to such certificate, petitioner stated that Tambunting is an American by acquiring American citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii. COMELEC: dismiss the complaint.

ISSUE:WON Tambunting is disqualified for losing its Filipino citizenship

HELD:NO. Tambunting doesnt lose its Filipino citizenship, rather, he had acquired an additional citizenship pursuant to the different nationality of his parent, mother is a Filipino and father is an American, which makes him having Dual Citizenship and he acquired such dual citizen not by naturalization but since he was born as such. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The certification from the Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino. Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from running for public office.

Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.

Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.

Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.

*AASJS-Calilung v. Datumanong, G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2007

FACTS: Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of Justice Simeon Datumanong to stop respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." Rep. Act No. 9225(scope):-signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on August 29, 2003-Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic(sec 3)-Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.-Derivative Citiznship. - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who reacquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.(sec 4)-Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;(a) the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said foreign country; (b) the said foreign country maintains armed forces in the Philippine territory with its consent provided that at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with its service to said foreign country.5. Cancellation of certificate of naturalization; or6. Having been declared by final judgment a deserter of the armed forces of the Philippines in times of war.7. In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husbands country, sheacquires his nationality.127(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or(b) are in the active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens. Petitioners allege that the said law, specifically section 2 and 3, allowing dual allegiance and not dual citizenship. Furthermore, petitioner maintains that section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law allows natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by simply taking and oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance. The Constitution, however, is categorical that dual allegiance is inimical to the national interest.ISSUE:WON Rep. Act No. 9225 unconstitutional?

HELD:RA 9225 is Constitutional. in studying the intent of the legislative branch in drafting the assailed law is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. It does not recognize dual allegiance. To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization

SECTION V*MACALINTAL vs COMELEC GR No. 157013, July 10, 2003FACTS:Romulo B. Macalintal a member of the Philippine Bar, sought the declaration of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) as unconstitutional. Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election.ISSUES:Whether or not Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution?HELD:NO.He focuses solely on Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in ascribing constitutional infirmity to Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, totally ignoring the provisions of Section 2 empowering Congress to provide a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. It is a basic rule in constitutional construction that the Constitution should be construed as a whole.R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the first paragraph of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution that Congress shall provide a system for voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. It must be stressed that Section 2 does not provide for the parameters of the exercise of legislative authority in enacting said law. Hence, in the absence of restrictions, Congress is presumed to have duly exercised its function as defined in Article VI (The Legislative Department) of the Constitution. Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin.

*Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC 497 SCRA 649Facts: Petitioners are dual citizens (by virtue of Republic Act No. 9225 - Citizenship Retention and ReAcquisition Act of 2003, allowing one to retain or re-acquire Phil. Citizenship) who want to exercise their right to suffrage under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). The Comelec denies on the ground that they fail to meet the qualification of 1-year residency required by the Constitution.Issue: WON dual citizens may exercise their right to suffrage as absentee voters even short of the 1-yr residency requirement.Held: YES. Court held that there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in thePhilippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. Since it is by basic knowledge that duals are likely to be non-residents, RA 9189 aims to enfranchise as much as possible OFW the qualification to vote as court ruling in the case of Macalintal. Furthermore, by the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds that those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and ReAcquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.

LABO, JR. vs COMELEC (1989) Facts: Petitioner and Respondent were candidates for the office of the Mayor of Baguio City during Elections. Having garnered the highest number of votes, Petitioner was elected and proclaimed winner while Respondent garnered the second highest number of votes. Subsequently Respondent filed a petition for quo warranto contesting the election of the Petitioner on the ground that the latter is a naturalized Australian citizen and was divested of his Philippine citizenship having sworn allegiance to the Queen of Australia. Petitioner opposes to the contrary.Section 42 of the Local Government Code provides for the qualifications that an elective official must be a citizen of the Philippines. From the evidence adduced, it was found out that citizenship requirements were not possessed by the petitioner during elections. He was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such. Issue: Whether respondent having garnered the 2nd highest number of votes can replace the petitioner as Mayor Held: No. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City. The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections. In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the Court then, with three dissenting and another two reserving their vote. One was on official leave. Re-examining the decision on Santos vs Comelec, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes, was supported by ten members of the Court, without any dissent, although one reserved his vote, another took no part, and two others were on leave. There the Court held: x x x it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless. LABO, JR. vs COMELEC (1992) Facts: For the second time around, believing that he is a Filipino citizen, Ramon Labo, Jr filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Baguio City for the 1992 elections. Petitioner Ortega on other hand, also filed his candidacy for the same office. Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the COMELEC on the ground that Labo is not a Filipino citizen. Comelec issued the assailed resolution denying Labos COC and thereby disqualifying Labo. Accordingly, Labo may still continue to be voted upon as candidate for City Mayor of Baguio City subject to the final outcome of this case in the event the issue is elevated to the Supreme Court either on appeal or certiorari. Comelec resolved, motu proprio to suspend the proclamation of Labo in the event he wins in the elections for the City Mayor of Baguio. Labo filed the instant petition for review with prayer, among others, for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to set aside the resolution of respondent Comelec; to render judgment declaring him as a Filipino citizen; and to direct respondent Comelec to proceed with his proclamation in the event he wins in the contested elections. Ortega argues that respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it refused to implement its resolution notwithstanding the fact that said resolution disqualifying Labo has already become final and executory. Ortega submits that since this Court did not issue a temporary restraining order as regards the resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling Labos certificate of candidacy, said resolution has already become final and executory. Ortega further posits the view that as a result of such finality, the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes should be declared Mayor of Baguio City. Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy (e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, be final and executory unless stayed by the Supreme Court. Issues: (1) WON Petitioner Labo who had the highest number of votes is qualified to assume as Mayor of Baguio City.(2) WON disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the candidate (Ortega) receiving the next highest number of votes to be proclaimed as the winning candidate for mayor of Baguio City. Held: (1) No. At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition on May 15, 1992, the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling his (Labos) certificate of candidacy had already become final and executory a day ea