secureworld st. louis: survival in an evolving threat landscape

Survival in an Evolving Threat Landscape

David HobbsDirector of Security SolutionsEmergency Response [email protected]

August 2013

Radware Confidential August 2013

AGEN

DA2012 Availability-based threats

Attacks on the us banks

Others 2012 popular attack patterns & trends

Radware ERT Survey

Slide 3Radware Confidential Jan 2012

2012 Attack Motivation - ERT Survey


2012 Target Trend - ERT Survey


Main Bottlenecks During DoS Attacks - ERT Survey


Attacks Campaigns Duration


Attack Duration Requires IT to Develop New Skills

War Room Skills Are Required


Attacks Traverses CDNs (Dynamic Object Attacks)


AGEN




“Overview”

• What triggered the recent US attacks?• Who was involved in implementing the attacks and name of the operation?• How long were the attacks and how many attack vectors were involved?• How the attacks work and their effects.• How can we prepare ourselves in the future?


“What triggered the attacks on the US banks?”

• Nakoula Basseley Nakoula (Alias- “Sam Bacile”), an Egyption born US resident created an anti Islam film.

• Early September the publication of the ‘Innocence of Muslims’ film on YouTube invokes demonstrations throughout the Muslim world.

• The video was 14 minutes though a full length movie was released.


“Protests generated by the movie”


The Cyber Response


“Who is the group behind the cyber response?”

• A hacker group called “Izz as-Din al-Qassam Cyber fighters”.• Izz as-Din al-Qassam was a famous Muslim preacher who was a leader in the

fight against the French, US and Zionist in the 1920’s and 1930’s.• The group claims not to be affiliated to any government or Anonymous.• This group claims to be independent, and it’s goal is to defend Islam.


“Operation Ababil launched!”

• “Operation Ababil” is the codename of the operation launched on Septembetr18th 2012, by the group “Izz as-Din al-Qassam Cyber fighters”

• The attackers announced they would attack “American and Zionist targets”.• “Ababil” translates to “swallow” from Persian. Until today the US thinks the

Iranian government may be behind the operation.• The operations goal is to have “Youtube” remove the anti-muslim film from it’s

site. Until today the video has not been removed.


“The attack campaign in 2 phases”

• The attack campaign was split into 2 phases, a pubic announcement was made in each phase.

• The attacks lasted 10 days, from the 18th until the 28th of September.• Phase 1 - Targets > NYSE, BOA, JP Morgan.• Phase 2 – Targets > Wells Fargo, US Banks, PNC.


New York Stock Exchange

The Attack

Vectors and Tactics!

Slide 18

“Attack Vectors”

• 5 Attack vectors were seen by the ERT team during Operation Ababil.

1. UDP garbage flood.

2. TCP SYN flood.

3. Mobile LOIC (Apache killer version).

4. HTTP Request flood.

5. ICMP Reply flood. (*Unconfirmed but reported on).

*Note: Data is gathered by Radware as well as it’s partners.

Radware Confidential Jan 2012

“UDP Garbage Flood”

• Targeted the DNS servers of the organizations, also HTTP.• Up to 1Gbps volume (Possibly higher).• All attacks were identical in content and in size (Packet structure).• UDP packets sent to port 53 and 80.• Customer attacked Sep 18th and on the 19th.


“Tactics used in the UDP garbage flood”

• Internal DNS servers were targeted , at a high rate.• Web servers were also targeted, at a high rate.• Spoofed IP’s (But kept to just a few, this is unusual).• ~ 1Gbps.• Lasted more than 7 hours initially but still continues...

Packet structure

Slide 21

Parameter Value Port 53 Value Port 80

Packet size 1358 Bytes Unknown

Value in Garbage ‘A’ (0x41) characters repeated

“/http1”(\x2f\x68\x74\x74\x70\x31) - repetitive


“DNS Garbage flood packet extract”

• Some reports of a DNS reflective attack was underway seem to be incorrect.• The packets are considered “Malformed” DNS packets, no relevant DNS

header.


“Attackers objective of the UDP Garbage flood”

• Saturate bandwidth.• Attack will pass through firewall, since port is open.• Saturate session tables/CPU resources on any state -full device, L4 routing

rules any router, FW session tables etc..• Returning ICMP type 3 further saturate upstream bandwidth.• All combined will lead to a DoS situation if bandwidth and infrastructure cannot

handle the volume or packet processing.


“TCP SYN flood”

• Targeted Port 53, 80 and 443.• The rate was around 100Mbps with around 135K PPS.• This lasted from the Sep 18th for more than 3 days.


“SYN flood Packet extract”

Slide 25

-All sources are spoofed.-Multiple SYN packets to port 443.


“Attackers objective of the TCP SYN floods”

• SYN floods are a well known attack vector.• Can be used to distract from more targeted attacks.• The effect of the SYN flood if it slips through can devastate state-full devices

quickly. This is done by filling up the session table.• All state-full device has some performance impact under such a flood.• Easy to implement.• Incorrect network architecture will quickly have issues.


“Mobile LOIC (Apache killer version)”

• Mobile LOIC (Low Orbit Iron Cannon) is a DDoS tool written in HTML and Javascript.

• This DDoS Tool does an HTTP GET flood.• The tool is designed to do HTTP floods.• We have no statistics on the exact traffic of mobile LOIC.

Slide 27

*Suspected*Suspected


“Mobile LOIC in a web browser”


“HTTP Request Flood”

• Between 80K and 100K TPS (Transactions Per second)• Port 80• Followed the same patterns in the GET request (Except for the Input parameter)• Dynamic user agent


“HTTP flood packet structure”

• Sources worldwide (True sources most likely hidden).• User agent duplicated.• Attack time was short (No confirmed timeline)• Rates are unknown.• Dynamic Input parameters.

GET Requests parameters


“HTTP flood packet parameters identified”

Slide 31

HTTP Request Samples

GET /financial-literacy/all-about-investing/etvs?2408b

GET /financial-literacy/all-about-investing/bonds?4d094

GET /inside-the-exchange/visiting?aad95

GET /

HTTP Request Samples

DoCoMo/2.0 SH902i (compatible; Y!J-SRD/1.0; http://help.yahoo.co.jp/help/jp/search/indexing/indexing-27.html)Googlebot/2.1 ( http://www.googlebot.com/bot.html)

IE/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 1.1.4322;)Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.4b) Gecko/20030505 Mozilla Firebird/0.6

Opera/9.00 (Windows NT 5.1; U; en)

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1;)

msnbot-Products/1.0 (+http://search.msn.com/msnbot.htm)


“Identified locations of attacking IP’s”

Slide 32

Worldwide!


“Attackers objective of the HTTP flood”

• Bypass CDN services by randomizing the input parameter and user agents.• Because of the double user agent there was an flaw in the programming behind

the attacking tool.• Saturating and exhausting web server resources by keeping session table and

web server connection limits occupied.• The attack takes more resources to implement than non connection orientated

attacks like TCP SYN floods and UDP garbage floods. This is because of the need to establish a connection.


Unconfirmed Vectors of attack

Slide 34

“Breach”


“Unconfirmed attacks”

• The following 2 attack vectors were reported to us by our customers however we have no data internally to indicate these attacks took place.

• The data was either gathered through intelligence the customer had (IRC chat, Forums etc..) or something they suspected and reported to Radware but never provided logs for.

• The 2 other vectors suspected are:– ICMP Reply Flood.– Dirt Jumper.


“ICMP Reply flood”

• This attack was gathered through Cisco logs at the customers site.• We have no statistics on the attack.


“ICMP Reply Flood explained”

• ICMP “Requests” (ICMP Type 8) are sent to the target in order to generate multiple ICMP “Reply” (ICMP Type 0) packets.

• This can also be from spoofed IP’s (Sent packets, ICMP Type 8). • This saturates bandwidth on the servers up/down stream as well as CPU processing to

process the ICMP packets and respond.• To do a replay flood you just spoof the SRC IP of the ICMP request.


“Dirt Jumper”

• Dirt Jumper is a BOT currently at version 5.• Dirt jumper is used in various HTTP floods.• POST, GET and download floods are supported by the latest version of Dirt

Jumper.• User Agent and Referrer randomization are supported too.


“Dirt Jumper C&C”


AGEN




Availability-based Threats Tree

Slide 42

Availability-based Threats

Network Floods (Volumetric)

Application Floods

Low-and-SlowSingle-packet

DoS

UPD Flood

ICMP Flood

SYN Flood

WebFlood

DNS SMTP

HTTPS


Asymmetric Attacks


HTTP Reflection Attack

Slide 44

Website A Website B(Victim)

Attacker

HTTPGET


iframe, width=1, height=1

search.php

HTTP Reflection Attack Example


HTTPS – SSL Re Negotiation Attack

Slide 46

THC-SSL DoSTHC-SSL DOS was developed by a hacking group called The Hacker’s Choice (THC), as a proof-of-concept to encourage vendors to patch a serious SSL vulnerability. THC-SSL-DOS, as with other “low and slow” attacks, requires only a small number of packets to cause denial-of-service for a fairly large server. It works by initiating a regular SSL handshake and then immediately requesting for the renegotiation of the encryption key, constantly repeating this server resource-intensive renegotiation request until all server resources have been exhausted.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ex2xz0ZOKKs&list=UU4HQOaZv6s6A4ek3ptaff7w

Low & Slow

Slide 47

Availability-based Threats

Network Floods (Volumetric)

Application Floods

Low-and-SlowSingle-packet

DoS

UPD Flood

ICMP Flood

SYN Flood

WebFlood

DNS SMTP

HTTPS

Low-and-Slow


Low & Slow

• Slowloris• Sockstress• R.U.D.Y.• Simultaneous Connection Saturation


Slowloris

Slide 49

SlowlorisSlowloris is a denial-of-service (DoS) tool developed by the grey hat hacker “RSnake” that causes DoS by using a very slow HTTP request. By sending HTTP headers to the target site in tiny chunks as slow as possible (waiting to send the next tiny chunk until just before the server would time out the request), the server is forced to continue to wait for the headers to arrive. If enough connections are opened to the server in this fashion, it is quickly unable to handle legitimate requests.Slowloris is cross-platform, except due to Windows’ ~130 simultaneous socket use limit, it is only effective from UNIX-based systems which allow for more connections to be opened in parallel to a target server (although a GUI Python version of Slowloris dubbed PyLoris was able to overcome this limiting factor on Windows).


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qZ60NBPSoho

R.U.D.Y (R-U-Dead-Yet)

Slide 50

R.U.D.Y. (R-U-Dead-Yet?)R.U.D.Y. (R-U-Dead-Yet?) is a slow-rate HTTP POST (Layer 7) denial-of-service tool created by Raviv Raz and named after the Children of Bodom album “Are You Dead Yet?” It achieves denial-of-service by using long form field submissions. By injecting one byte of information into an application POST field at a time and then waiting, R.U.D.Y. causes application threads to await the end of never-ending posts in order to perform processing (this behavior is necessary in order to allow web servers to support users with slower connections). Since R.U.D.Y. causes the target webserver to hang while waiting for the rest of an HTTP POST request, by initiating simultaneous connections to the server the attacker is ultimately able to exhaust the server’s connection table and create a denial-of-service condition.


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fZqi41fJfBs

Black hat 2013 - Universal DDoS Mitigation Bypass

The main idea behind this presentation was to demonstrate a new tool which is combined with Captcha solving and JavaScript engine.

They covered the types and world of DDoS attack like -• Volumetric – Packet rate based and Bit-rate based. • Non Volumetric – Protocol and Application-based (Apache killer, Slowloris,

Rudy, SMURF)• Blended – all of the above together – very common and effective.

After showing the different attack vectors they have covered the current known (to them) mitigation techniques – non-vendor specific:

• Traffic policing (simple rate limit) • Proactive resource release (Mostly for low&slow attacks)• B/W listing• Resource isolation (Across different AS)• Secure CDN



After complete w/ the long prolog they gave the specifications of the new tool

– Kill’em All 1.0

• The tool will support the following features -• Auth bypass (including re-authentication every X seconds capability)• HTTP redirect• HTTP cookie• JavaScript• Captcha

According to the presenters the strengths of the tool are -• True TCP behavior• Believable and random HTTP headers (Including the GET request itself)• JavaScript engine• Captcha solving• Random payload• Tunable post authentication traffic model.



The perpetrators allege that the tool is technically indistinguishable from human.

• They say it was tested successfully against both anti-DDoS devices and

Services, they mentioned by name only CloudFlare and Akamai.

• They have concluded the session saying that DDoS is very expensive and that current solutions are falling behind.


Challenge & Response Escalations


Script 302 Redirect Challenge

JS Challenge Special Challenge (6.09)

Kamikaze Pass Not pass Not passKamina Pass Not pass Not passTerminator Pass Pass Not pass

Here are the results Kamikaze and Kamina will not pass DefensePro JS Challenge. Terminator will pass both 302 and JS, however, we have been prepared for this and have developed a set of new challenges which it will not pass. They are available at version 6.09.00 (current DP release). To our knowledge the only tool in the world who can currently handle Terminator.

DefensePipe Operation Flow

Protected Online Services

DefensePro

AppWall

Protected Organization

DefensePipe Scrubbing Center

DefensePros

Defense Messaging

ISP

Volumetric DDoS attack that blocks the Internet

pipe

ERT with the customer decide to divert the traffic

Clean traffic

Sharing essential information for

attack mitigation

On-premise AMS mitigates the attack

© R

adw

are

2013

Radware Security Products Portfolio

Slide 56

AppWallWeb Application Firewall (WAF)

DefenseProNetwork & Server attack prevention device

APSolute VisionManagement and security reporting & compliance

http://www.tolly.com/TV/TV_home.aspx

Thank Youwww.radware.com


secureworld st. louis: survival in an evolving threat landscape

Technology

radware confidential

radware ert survey slide

movie slide

attack vectors

dos attacks ert survey

cyber response slide

recent us attacks

attack duration