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NATOSecuring

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An official publication of the Atlantic Treaty Association

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3NATO Securing our world

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NATOSecuring

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ContentsForewords

11 AndersFoghRasmussenSecretary General of NATO

15 TheRtHonDavidCameronMPPrime Minister of the United Kingdom

17 DouglasELutePermanent Representative for the

United States to NATO

Introductions

22 GeneralKnudBartelsChairman of the NATO Military Committee

25 HonDrKarlALamersMPPresident of the Atlantic Treaty Association

Editor’s letter

27 ContinuedevolutionSimon Michell, Editor

NATO inside view

28 Tacklingtoday’schallengesDamon Wilson looks at ways in which NATO can

adapt to the security challenges that are threatening

its periphery today in order to stay relevant to the

interests of its members

31 Theenlargementconundrum –who'snext?

Terhi Suominen considers the potential costs and

benefits of admitting aspirant members to NATO

in the light of recent geopolitical developments,

which have provoked fresh debate on the subject

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6 NATO Securing our world

34 Smartdefence,connectedforcesand progressivepolicy

NATO's response to the complexity of today’s

security environment must involve culturally

appropriate forces and look beyond military

measures to social investment, says Hugh Segal

The security challenge

38 TheloomingthreatofglobalinstabilityJason Wiseman explores how NATO responds to

political instability around the world, and how

ATA fully supports its efforts by acting as a bridge

between the Alliance and civil society

41 WhyistheWestfailinginitsrelations withRussia?

Projecting a strong public image across the world

will be crucial if NATO is to re-establish good

relations with Russia, writes Solomon Passy

44 TheUnitedKingdomandAfghanistanAs the deadline for withdrawal looms, Dennis

Hartshorne analyses the United Kingdom's

objectives in Afghanistan, outlining the political

and military approaches used to create stability

47 ATA’sroleintheMediterranean andMiddleEast Having played a pivotal role in promoting dialogue

in the Mediterranean and Middle East, ATA is set to

intensify its efforts, explains Fabrizio W Luciolli

50 EmergingsecuritythreatsThe new security context, with particular regard

to Russia, poses a number of short- and long-term

challenges for the Alliance, explains Jamie Shea

54 AlliancesandtheAsiansecuritydilemmaDavid Fouquet looks at NATO's long-standing

partnerships with countries throughout Asia,

and the impact on these of a recent flare-up in

tensions in the Asia-Pacific region

Promoting NATO partnerships

57 Celebrating20yearsofthe PartnershipforPeaceprogramme

Now celebrating its 20th anniversary, the

Partnership for Peace programme is still

going strong, and has an expanding scope

60 BridgingtheMediterraneanSeaAssessing the status of two key NATO regional

partnership programmes: the Mediterranean

Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative

64 BestofbothworldsHow do NATO's Response Force and the European

Union Battlegroups complement one another?

NATO operations worldwide

66 SafeguardingenergysuppliesNATO and its partners are working to secure the

safe transit of oil and gas to Europe, and in doing

so, they are countering the threat of piracy

70 ConfrontingterrorismLooking at the counterterrorism role of NATO’s

Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism

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73 MovingforwardonKosovoReviewing the progress of the Alliance's

peacekeeping operation in Kosovo and what

it means for the wider western Balkans

76 NATO'sdisasterresponse The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination

Centre plays a pivotal role in providing assistance

during civil emergencies, operating all year round

Strengthening military capabilities

80 RebalancingNATOforcesAfter more than a decade of war in Afghanistan,

what should the Alliance plan for as it contemplates

its place in a dangerous 21st-century?

84 ClosingthegapAssessing NATO members’ capabilities following the

launch of initiatives designed to increase European

cooperation, thus reducing the reliance on US assets

88 RampingupNATOcyberdefenceHaving recognised cyber as a major component

of modern warfare through the adoption of a

cyber defence policy, the focus is now on shared

knowledge and interoperability

90 TakingtheleadoncybersecurityThe United States’ cyber-protection policies offer

safeguards for both business and government. What

could NATO countries gain from such an approach?

92 NATOballisticmissiledefence: isitachievable? A defensive and offensive strategy, and robust

situational awareness are essential for NATO to

effectively respond to the growing threat from BMs

98 UpwardlymobileNATO's Strategic Airlift Capability, Strategic

Airlift Interim Solution and HIP Helicopter

Task Force are designed to plug the gaps in its

airborne-transport capabilities

101 AirsuperiorityThe Air Command and Control System initiative

is a radical enhancement to NATO’s ability to

safeguard European skies for many years to come

104 AllianceISTARNATO’s Air Ground Surveillance programme

enhances its ability to gather near real time data

in order to follow events on the battlefield

111 MaritimeprojectionNATO members provide a suitably varied maritime

capability to address the range of security threats

at sea, but what ships will they need in the future?

114 AdvertisingindexNAt

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FOrewOrd

Anders Fogh Rasmussen Secretary General of NATO

Our Summit in Wales will be a chance to demonstrate continued transatlantic

resolve and unified action at a critical moment for the NATO Alliance.

We will meet as we prepare to complete International Security Assistance Force

(ISAF), our longest combat mission. We have worked hard and sacrificed much to

deny international terrorists safe haven in Afghanistan. Better security has made

it possible for Afghans to develop their own country and decide their own future.

When the relevant legal arrangements are in place, NATO stands ready to continue

supporting Afghanistan to build on the gains we have made.

The end of ISAF marks a significant chapter in NATO history. At the same time,

we face multiple threats around our borders, ranging from terrorism to fragile states

and proliferation. We see an arc of crises from North Africa to the Middle East. And

Russia’s aggressive action against Ukraine has fundamentally challenged our vision

of a Europe whole, free and at peace. In this changed world, NATO remains ready to

protect our Allies against any threat.

As the crisis in Ukraine unfolded, we took immediate steps to strengthen collective

defence, with more planes in the air, more ships at sea, and more troops on the ground.

Every one of NATO’s 28 Allies has played its part in this defensive effort.

At the Summit, we will adopt a Readiness Action Plan to ensure that NATO is fully

prepared to defend any Ally against any threat.

We are looking closely at how we can best deploy our forces for defence and

deterrence. We are considering reinforcement measures, including the pre-positioning

of equipment and supplies. We are reviewing our defence plans, threat assessments,

intelligence-sharing agreements, early-warning procedures and crisis response

planning. We are developing a new exercise schedule. And we want to further

strengthen our multinational response force, which is designed to respond rapidly

to any crisis, anywhere.

We will also strengthen political and military cooperation with our partners,

and provide support to those who request it so they can develop their own defence

structures and military forces. This will help us prevent conflicts before they start

and project stability without always having to deploy large numbers of troops.

To meet the challenges we face, we need to continue investing in modern armed

forces that can operate effectively together to defend NATO territory, manage crises

beyond our borders and build security with our partners. Over the past five years

Allies have, on average, cut defence spending by 20 per cent. At the same time, the

United States’ share in total Allied defence spending represents more than two-thirds.

So it is critical that we commit to reversing the trend of declining defence budgets,

spending better on key capabilities, and addressing imbalances across the Alliance.

Such a pledge will reinforce the transatlantic bond that has been the bedrock of our

security for 65 years. And it will reaffirm our continuing and unwavering commitment

to the common security of North America and Europe.

NATO’s purpose in the 21st century is to keep our nations safe, the bond between

Europe and North America strong, and our region and the world stable. The Wales

Summit will demonstrate that NATO remains an essential source of stability in a

changed world.

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FOrewOrd

The Rt Hon David Cameron MP Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

This will be the first NATO Summit in the United Kingdom since Margaret

Thatcher hosted the London Summit in 1990, just as the Cold War was ending.

That Summit proved a turning point for the Alliance as leaders charted a new course

for NATO and for a Europe “whole, free and at peace”.

In 2014, the world is more unpredictable than ever and leaders will meet in Wales

at another pivotal moment in the history of the Alliance. In Afghanistan, our combat

mission is coming to an end. To the East, Russia has ripped up the rulebook with its

illegal annexation of Crimea and aggressive destabilisation of Ukraine. To the South,

an arc of instability spreads from North Africa and the Sahel, to Syria, Iraq and the

wider Middle East. This Summit will agree how NATO should adapt to respond to

and deter such threats in order to ensure the continued collective defence of all its

members. To do this we need to address the following areas.

First, seven months into the Russia-Ukraine crisis, NATO must agree on long-term

measures to strengthen our ability to respond quickly to any threat, to reassure those

allies who fear for their own country’s security, and to deter any Russian aggression.

While NATO has only ever sought to be a partner to Russia, it must be clear that

neither it nor its members will be intimidated.

Second, as the ISAF mission in Afghanistan draws to an end, allies must consider

how to support the Afghan Government in the years ahead, in particular through

NATO’s new mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces from the

start of next year and by helping to financially sustain these forces in the near future.

Third, the Alliance must agree how NATO will address the risks in an unstable

world – the challenges that are posed by failed states, terrorism, cyberattacks and

extremist ideologies.

NATO must have the capabilities it needs to respond to changing threats. That

requires investment. The UK is only one of four members of the Alliance to meet the

target of spending two per cent of our GDP on defence – we want others to commit to

investing more, particularly in research and equipment. As we invest in our defence

elsewhere, so we should invest in security beyond the Alliance’s borders, strengthening

the capacity of forces elsewhere to tackle local conflicts through new defence capacity-

building missions, for example to Georgia or the Middle East.

Fourth, as the world’s broadest security network, with partnerships with over 40

countries and organisations on four continents, the Summit offers the opportunity to

demonstrate a clear commitment to working with others who share our values and

to maintaining an international rules-based order that promotes freedom, democracy

and the rule of law.

Fifth, and finally, we should recognise the sacrifices made by our Armed Forces.

In the UK, we have enshrined an Armed Forces Covenant in law to ensure that our

Armed Forces get the respect and support they deserve. Building on this, it is my

personal priority to establish a new ‘North Atlantic Armed Forces Charter’ to make

clear our shared commitment to our Armed Forces and their families.

At the London Summit in 1990, leaders agreed that “we need to keep standing

together, to extend the long peace we have enjoyed these past four decades”. The

Wales Summit, with these ambitious priorities, should prove that NATO continues

to be a rock-solid alliance with strong partnerships around the world that fosters

global peace and stability, creating a secure environment for our economies to grow.

Working together for peace and stability

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FOrewOrd

Douglas E LutePermanent Representative for the

United States to NATO

As NATO leaders gather in Wales on 4 September, our work is clear: heads

of state and government will be taking decisions to ensure that NATO,

the world’s strongest, most durable alliance, will continue to meet new security

challenges for years to come.

The threats are real, and every day grow more complex: instability on our

eastern and southern flanks, the rise of non-state actors, and emerging threats

such as cyber and ballistic missile attacks. And as the bedrock of transatlantic

security, NATO’s mission has never been more important. In this two-day

event, President Barack Obama and other world leaders will focus on a diverse

range of challenges: NATO’s evolving mission in Afghanistan; challenges on

NATO’s periphery, including the Ukraine crisis and the impact of Russia’s actions

on transatlantic security; the readiness of Alliance capabilities; and the deepening

and broadening of NATO’s partnerships.

At the Summit, we’ll focus on four main themes.

First, Afghanistan. After 12 years, NATO can be proud of its legacy in Afghanistan.

Our objectives remain clear: disrupting threats posed by al-Qaeda, supporting Afghan

security forces and giving the Afghan people the opportunity to succeed as they stand

on their own. Together with the Afghan people and international partners, NATO

helped build an army and police force; and, created a secure space for improvements

in health, education, women’s rights, media freedom and governmental institutions

– all building blocks for a secure and democratic future – to take hold. And NATO’s

commitment doesn’t end when ISAF’s combat mission draws to a close at the end of

2014. NATO will remain a partner for Afghanistan as we transition to a new mission

focused on training, advising and assisting Afghan security forces. We will provide

the tools and the training, and the Afghans will provide the courage and the will

to succeed. Much remains to be done, but Afghanistan’s future is in the hands of

Afghans, while NATO stands ready to support.

Second, challenges on NATO’s periphery. NATO leaders will meet with Ukrainian

President Petro Poroshenko to discuss the crisis caused by Russia’s illegal aggression,

the most severe challenge to European security since the end of the Cold War. All

28 Allies today contribute to reassurance measures in the air, on the land and at sea

among the eastern Allies, signaling NATO’s unity and resolve. At the Summit, we’ll

address additional reassurance measures and further adaptations to NATO’s posture in

response to this challenge. Leaders will also discuss the rapidly evolving situations

in Syria and Iraq, as well as persistent instability in North Africa, especially Libya.

Third, capabilities. NATO’s mutual security guarantee rests on the ability of each

Ally to come to the defence of the others. Leaders will consider a Readiness Action

Plan that adapts the Alliance to new challenges. Our nations must ensure that NATO

has the capabilities required – experienced troops, modern equipment, world-class

training, regular operational exercises, and ongoing education. Military capability is

the core of the Alliance, and this requires defence investments. Allies all benefit from

NATO’s security guarantee and all must contribute proportionately, especially now

that we are beginning to recover from the worst recession in Alliance history. Together

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FOrewOrd

we must reverse the decline in defence spending, move towards the NATO target of

two per cent of GDP and 20 per cent of military spending allocated to investment,

and improve in meeting NATO’s agreed performance metrics. Each Ally must commit

to doing its part to keep our Alliance strong, ready and able to meet current and

emerging threats. Shared benefits mean shared responsibility.

Finally, partnerships. With over 40 partners around the world, NATO has a

valuable network that exports stability well beyond the borders of the Alliance –

from Mauritania, east to Japan, from Sweden, south to the Persian Gulf. Our partners

enhance Alliance operations, add critical capabilities, and provide political and

geographic diversity. We believe NATO’s partners benefit, too, gaining access to

world-class training, exercises and education; building capacity in their own

security institutions; opening political dialogue on shared interests; and even

pooling resources to gain efficiencies. NATO partnerships are a two-way street

and, as we meet in Wales, our leaders will consider how this Alliance will continue

to invest in NATO partnerships beyond 2014.

Overall, the Summit provides Alliance leaders with the opportunity to renew

NATO’s core mission: our binding obligation to Article 5, the mutual defence

commitment in the Washington Treaty. As President Obama joins our Allies and

partners in Wales, the world will focus again on NATO. Since 1949, NATO has been

the world’s strongest, most durable and most effective military alliance. It is a family

of nations from both sides of the Atlantic who are committed to peace and freedom,

and determined to defend these common values. In Wales, we will reaffirm that

commitment and determination, and make sure that NATO has what it takes to keep

our nations secure and our citizens safe.

NAT

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President Barack Obama speaks with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Leaders will discuss diverse challenges at the Wales Summit

AM132_NATO Ad_Securing our World publication.indd 1 2014-08-05 11:10 AM

IntroductIon

22 nAto Securing our world

General Knud Bartels Chairman of the NATO Military Committee

The Wales Summit brings with it a unique set of opportunities and challenges

for the NATO military authorities, setting the stage for NATO’s future as one

of the most significant summits since the end of the Cold War. The Alliance will

seek to build on the experiences of the past and set the conditions for the future in

these turbulent times.

Events in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa have reinforced the

need for the Alliance’s military to be ready, relevant and responsive in an increasingly

uncertain security environment, characterised by complex, so-called hybrid, and

asymmetric threats. In recent months we have seen how the Alliance can effectively

bring together contributions from 28 Allied Nations to deliver a series of military

reassurance measures to Eastern Allies under the auspices of collective defence. In

Afghanistan, the Alliance has developed unparalleled interoperability and operational

experience alongside a large number of partner nations. But, we cannot rest on our

achievements and must continue to evolve as the threats to NATO and global security

have evolved in often unpredictable ways.

Therefore, at the Summit, NATO will demonstrate its commitment to the continued

evolution of its military structures through a Readiness Action Plan. This will underpin

the development of more responsive, agile and capable Alliance military forces able

to support the three strategic core tasks of collective defence, crisis management

and cooperative security. In doing so, the Alliance’s military will seek to exploit the

advantages of its new lean command structure, adapted NATO Response and Special

Operations Forces, and nested Allied joint enablers.

Delivering on the Connected Forces Initiative will be central to this ongoing

transformation to retain and expand the interoperability achieved in Afghanistan,

while broadening the range of activities and exercise scenarios. Education, exercises,

training and evaluation will be key themes for NATO’s military, requiring both

investment and commitment from nations and the Alliance as whole. As a catalyst

for this process, NATO will develop a more relevant, more demanding and more

inclusive programme of exercises starting with Trident Juncture in 2015, which

will be the largest NATO exercise of this type in more than 20 years.

Finally, NATO remains the most powerful global defensive alliance in terms

of combined GDP, military spending and military technology. There is an urgent

requirement to arrest the decline in investment seen over recent years in order to

ensure that NATO maintains this qualitative advantage. That investment must be

focused on critical capability areas and also support the associated training and

enablers necessary, which have been under-resourced in the past.

NATO’s military structures continue to offer the highest degree of professionalism,

capability and political choice for the Alliance, and we should pay tribute to the men

and women who make up these forces on a daily basis. Our challenge will be to ensure

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ensure we are agile, adaptable and fit for purpose in an uncertain world.

NAT

O

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First in the AirFirst on the Ground – Anywhere


INTrOducTION

Hon Dr Karl A Lamers MPPresident of the Atlantic Treaty Association

The beginning of the 21st century has led us to an interconnected world where

dependence on one another has become a global imperative for our security.

This has allowed us to share our resources and expertise while also making us

vulnerable to various shared threats, compelling us to take collective responsibility

for the security of our citizens, allies and partners.

It is crucial to realise that not only local authorities or military institutions are

responsible for global security. A wide spectrum of non-governmental actors, media

and, especially, civil societies play a fundamental role in promoting security and

awareness. Different actors have different functions, but they all strive towards a

common goal, which is based on shared norms and values seeking to promote and

strengthen a broader sense of security cooperation. In short, we all strive to contribute,

one way or another, to the security of our countries, regions and the world. In order

to explain security, we need a comprehensive approach that encompasses all actors in

the field. This is why the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) pursues both a top-down

approach from our governments and highest authorities, and a bottom-up approach

from grass-roots organisations, civil societies and community leaders.

Effective and long-lasting peace can only be achieved together with a common

understanding that security is a necessity in our lives. We have recently witnessed

that threats and challenges to our safety can happen to anyone at any time with a

devastating impact on our livelihood. Living in a more prosperous part of the world

does not allow us to sit back and enjoy the achievements of the past – we still have

to point out why defence matters.

We cannot allow the concepts of security and defence to only truly be understood

once under attack. In times of peace, which many in the Euro-Atlantic region have

become overly accustomed to, it becomes rather easy to give up on maintaining a

defensive mindset. Today, together with the rebirth of territorial aggression and the

rise of violent extremism, we find ourselves facing one of the most trying times in

recent memory. This makes it necessary for NATO and ATA to explain the importance

of collective and cooperative defence so that security measures can be perceived in

terms of investment, rather than expenditure.

Our role is to promote confidence and trust between nations, governments and security

institutions such as NATO. This can only be done by improving the understanding of the

need for security for everyone. Military efforts must be supplemented by those of non-

military structures and society, including every civilian. Therefore, we advocate for a

hand-in-hand approach in order to maximise the benefits to all nations.

Crucially, we encourage increased dialogue and understanding of the enlargement

process of the Alliance. Effectively integrating aspiring countries through the ‘open door

policy’ remains highly critical in order to abolish the dividing lines in Europe for good

and unite people across the continent. In the interlinked world of today, partnerships

matter more than ever before, whether they are political, economic or military. It goes

without saying that cooperation leads to stability and that the inclusive approach of the

Alliance is the key towards securing our world.

ww

w.c

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Fall 2014. Our journey begins…

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EdiTOr’s lETTEr

Two years ago at the

Chicago Summit, NATO

leaders faced a multiplicity

of challenges: financial,

political and military. This

September, the heads of state

of the 28 NATO Alliance

members will face similar

dilemmas, but with the added

complication of a rampant

and vicious insurgency led

by the Islamic State (IS)

forces in Syria and Iraq, and a Russia that is flexing its muscles

on the eastern borders of the Alliance.

Already, the United States has taken unilateral action with

air strikes in Iraq to assist Kurdish forces beat back IS. NATO

will need to decide what actions, if any, it will take in support

of its most powerful member. Difficult decisions will also have

to be made in respect of Russia’s destabilisation of Ukraine.

Added to that, the nations affected by the Arab Spring are

facing continued stresses as they move from revolution to the

next phase of their political evolution. The implications this

has for NATO partnership programmes like Mediterranean

Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative will need to

be carefully considered.

NATO, however, has shown in the past that it can find

consensus and act collectively to help stabilise the regional

security on its outer rim. That same resolve must be found

again at the Celtic Manor. However, increased military

expenditure is required, particularly by those nations that

are not currently able to invest the minimum target of

two per cent of GDP in their defence capabilities. That said,

there are already signs that the sustained budget cutbacks

that most Alliance members have had to implement over

the past years may be coming to an end – at least for some.

Just as in preceding NATO summits, those gathered at

Celtic Manor in Wales will once again have to grapple with

the capability gap between the United States and Europe.

Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya almost three years

ago highlighted the continued lack of sufficient critical airborne

assets in European inventories – tankers, ISTAR (intelligence,

surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance) platforms

and transporters. Access to a single European fast-jet aircraft

carrier during OUP was also a significant reminder of the

impact of legacy planning decisions.

Joint capabilitiesThat said, NATO is making sustained headway on a number

of capability programmes, whose impact, once implemented,

will be huge. The Air Command and Control System (ACCS)

is starting to reach operational capability – albeit over a

staged and iterative schedule. The system, which will offer air

operations commanders an enhanced unified air picture over

Europe, will plug into the European Phased Adaptive Approach

ballistic missile defence system that is continuing to reach

maturity. The Air Ground Surveillance (AGS) programme is

also ploughing ahead. Once in service, it too will offer NATO

commanders unparalleled situational awareness. In short,

the completion of these collaborative efforts by the end of

the decade will deliver considerable joint capabilities for the

protection of NATO’s member states.

Equally as important as those capabilities, cyber defence is

an area of growing concern – one in which the Alliance is now

investing significant resources and planning. Together, these

new, enhanced competencies focus back on NATO’s core raison

d’être – collective defence.

Continued evolutionSimon Michell, editor

NATO iNside view


Dar

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a pro-russian rebel at the barricades on a road leading into slovyansk, eastern Ukraine. russian aggression could trigger a series of conflicts, threatening european stability


NATO iNside view

Conflict and bloodshed on the periphery of the NATO region must be dealt with head-on at this year’s summit if the Alliance is to remain

relevant to its members’ interests, argues Damon Wilson

Tackling today’s challenges

As NATO leaders gather in Wales, transatlantic security

faces the most serious challenges it has confronted

since the end of the Cold War. From Ukraine and Syria, to

Iraq and Libya, the frontiers of the Alliance are plagued by

conflict and bloodshed. Yet, as NATO seeks to look beyond

Afghanistan and chart its future course in Wales, many Allies

are reluctant to face these new challenges head-on. Dodging

these issues at the UK Summit would be a mistake. In fact,

focusing exclusively on the defence of NATO Allies’ risks

would leave the Alliance less secure over time.

After more than a decade of war-fighting and peacekeeping,

NATO Allies are understandably eager to bring an end to the

Alliance’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in

Afghanistan and transition to a strictly training and advising

mission. At the same time, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine

has reinforced many of the Allies’ desires to focus on collective

defence of the Alliance and to ensure the credibility of the

Washington Treaty’s Article 5 commitment that an attack

on one Ally would be treated as an attack on all.

Wales, no doubt, will reinforce Allied solidarity and

commitment to each other’s defence as the most essential

elements of deterrence. Yet, in the absence of a NATO strategy

to deal with instability on its periphery, the Alliance will face

more difficult security challenges in the future.

In the East, if Russian aggression is not stopped, a series

of conflicts and crises will unfold, threatening European

stability. In the South, continued conflict and instability in

the Arab world could not only threaten to destabilise NATO

Ally Turkey and key partners in the region, but also lead to

massive refugee and immigration flows to southern Europe.

Regional threatsIf the Wales Summit ignores these challenges, it risks creating

a perception of an Alliance licking its wounds, reluctant

for a fight, weakening its greatest contribution to security:

deterrence. An agenda that avoids the tough issues may even

embolden adversaries who oppose NATO interests and values.

To NATO’s east, a resurgent Russia under Vladimir Putin

has invaded and annexed Crimea and continues to wage a

hybrid war against Ukraine, undermining the pillars of

stability that have been the guarantee of peace in the region.

On NATO’s south-east frontier, extremist terrorist forces are

waging war in Syria and Iraq, posing a direct threat to Turkey’s

security and broader transatlantic security in the near term.

To NATO’s south, the collapse of civilian authority in

Libya and increased repression in Egypt risk producing

further instability that breeds future terrorists and sends

waves of refugees seeking asylum across the Mediterranean.

These challenges are daunting. There are no simple

solutions. And NATO is not always the answer. Yet NATO’s

strength is its adaptability – that is, the Alliance’s ability

to be relevant to ensuring the security of its members.

During the Cold War, NATO provided security to its

members through its deterrence of the Soviet threat,

helping to avoid large-scale bloodshed. With the collapse

of the Soviet Union, NATO advanced its members’ security

by reaching out to former adversaries, forging far-reaching

partnerships and, ultimately, welcoming many as new Allies.

The Alliance responded to the crises in the Western

Balkans by becoming an operational Alliance, demonstrating

its capability to use military force to bring peace. Since 9/11,

NATO has agreed to tackle security threats from wherever

they may originate, leading to its long mission in Afghanistan.

In the absence of a NATO strategy to deal with instability on its periphery, the Alliance

will face more difficult security challenges in the future

NATO iNside view


NATO forces and infrastructure are in place to help deter a

Russia that now treats NATO allies as potential adversaries.

Second, the countries designated as NATO’s most capable

partners should include Georgia and Ukraine, two that are

on the fault line of European insecurity today. Georgia, after

all, has been the partner that has contributed more than any

other to the mission in Afghanistan. Ukraine, meanwhile, has

participated in every NATO operation since the Balkans, and is,

unfortunately, swiftly gaining credible fighting capacity. These

nations, along with Sweden, Finland, the United Arab Emirates

and Australia, will buttress the Alliance’s capabilities, binding

them closely in a network of contributors to security.

Third, NATO’s new defence capacity-building initiative

will most likely be targeted to help Montenegro prepare to

become an Ally quickly, and to train the African Union and

its leading force contributors to better manage crises on the

African continent. However, this initiative should also be

offered to Ukraine and

Libya, the two countries

most in immediate need of

stronger defence capacities

to maintain security on

their own territories. To be

relevant, NATO’s capacity-

building initiative should

address the two countries

that are most in need of

greater capacity on the

Alliance’s periphery.

This initiative could

evolve into a new strategy

for the Partnership for

Peace countries that now feel threatened by Russia. This kind

of targeted partnership package would not address issues

related to membership, but rather focus on helping partners,

ranging from Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to Kazakhstan

and Azerbaijan, to build their capacity to defend their

sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Fourth, as the Allies put a new emphasis on intelligence-

sharing to guarantee more common situational awareness,

they should focus on ensuring shared information to inform

more common strategies toward the disasters of Iraq and Syria,

while preparing for potential challenges in the Arctic.

This effort should form the basis of a new strategy among

key NATO Allies – the United States, Turkey, France and the

United Kingdom – in cooperation with Arab partners to make

sure that terrorist forces hostile to NATO members’ interests

do not prevail in Syria or Iraq. The Alliance will not provide

the answer to all of these security challenges. But to be relevant

to its own members’ interests, it must not relegate itself to a

peripheral role on today’s greatest security threats.

But this has also helped to transform the Alliance so that it

is better prepared to defend against new threats, for example,

the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass

destruction, as well as terrorism and cyberthreats.

Today, the question is whether the Alliance has the will

and capability needed to continue to adapt, in order to remain

relevant to ensuring the security of its members.

Prepared for the futureIn the run-up to the Wales summit, NATO Secretary General

Anders Fogh Rasmussen deserves immense credit for advancing

an agenda focused on precisely this necessary adaptation. He

has pushed the Allies to make sure that NATO is fit for purpose,

as well as prepared for the future.

First, Allies have left no doubt about their commitment to

collective defence, underscoring this with a focus on military

deployments to NATO’s easternmost Allies, including the Baltic

states, Poland and Romania.

Along with the Supreme

Allied Commander Europe

(SACEUR), Rasmussen has

led the charge to ensure that

Allied forces are prepared

to respond to any threat

quickly, including by

reinvigorating the NATO

Response Force to achieve its

original purpose of serving

as a rapid-reaction force in

the event of a crisis.

NATO’s operations in

the Balkans, Afghanistan

and Libya have also demonstrated the value of military

contributions from non-NATO members. Wales will mark

a watershed in not only recognising the value of these

partners, but also providing a pathway to a guarantee that

the Alliance’s capabilities are permanently bolstered by

like-minded partners, rather than hastily assembled in

an ad hoc fashion in each new scenario.

After years of difficult training missions in Iraq and

Afghanistan, the Alliance and its militaries have developed

capabilities critical to helping local forces provide security.

Significant to NATO’s adaptation, the Wales Summit will

launch a new defence capacity-building initiative in which

the Alliance will work with other nations and organisations

to help them develop the capacity to manage crises and

conflicts. The idea is that NATO’s advance spadework will help

prevent future crises while also making certain that partners

can increasingly address their own regional security needs.

In turn, NATO and the member countries themselves won’t so

often be called on as the only forces capable of ensuring peace.

These Wales initiatives are the key to the Alliance’s

adaptation. However, it is equally important how NATO leaders

agree to apply these new tools. To ensure that the Alliance

is relevant, they should seek to offer and apply these to the

relevant crisis the Alliance is facing today. First, they should

agree to make the Alliance’s temporary measures – put in place

to reassure the Eastern Allies – more permanent, ensuring that

Mr Damon Wilson is executive Vice President of the atlantic council of the United states. Previously, he served as special assistant to the President, and senior Director for european affairs at the national security council, the White House. He has been involved in every nato summit since Washington in 1999

Allies have left no doubt about their commitment to collective defence, underscoring this with a focus on military deployments to NATO’s easternmost Allies, including the

Baltic states, Poland and Romania


NATO iNside view

NATO has continued to grow since the Cold War ended – a process influenced by global security dynamics – but admitting new members

involves costs and benefits for both parties, says Terhi Suominen

The enlargement conundrum – who’s next?

NAT

O

A NATO meeting of foreign affairs ministers. The Alliance now has 28 member countries, 22 of which are from the European Union

For 65 years, NATO has been the premier international

collective military and security institution in the world.

It has been the sole and pre-eminent Euro-Atlantic security

actor, and at the core of America and Europe’s relationship.

NATO has been compared to ‘an iron fist in a velvet glove’.

Throughout its existence, the Alliance changed and moved

forward, but the nature of security itself has also transformed.

The most apparent of these changes was the disappearance of

the single threat. From the beginning, the Alliance’s military

forces opposed a common enemy, the Soviet Union, and its

existence was only seen as a balance of the Soviet threat.

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet

Union, NATO started to change, but its evolution was not all

plain sailing. During NATO’s post-Cold War transformation,

it continued to play a key role in transatlantic geopolitical

stability. This is when enlargement emerged as a topic.

Today, NATO is an organisation of 28 member countries.

NATO has gone through three enlargement rounds since the

United States

Canada

Iceland

NATO iNside view


end of the Cold War, which were in 1999, 2004 and 2009.

Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty describes how the

enlargement process of admitting new countries is conducted.

The Article states that: “the Parties may, by unanimous

agreement, invite any other European State in position to

further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the

security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.

Any state so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by

depositing its instrument of accession with the Government

of the United States of America.”

Enlargement todayNATO enlargement is not only based on the requirements

that the aspirant countries should fulfil, because having

the will and fulfilling the criteria is not enough. Primarily,

NATO enlargement is a political process and the decision-

making is affected by international security dynamics and

political considerations.

Recent geopolitical developments in Eastern Europe have

inevitably produced an impact on the Alliance and its future.

More than two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union

and the end of the Cold War, the crisis in Ukraine is driving

NATO back to its original purpose: to protect its members

against a perceived Russian threat. Before the crisis in Ukraine

emerged, Europe was not seen as a continent of potential

threats and the United States was perceived as being less

focused on matters of European security. The developments

in Ukraine have sent NATO back to basics, provoking debate

on NATO membership in many potential aspirant countries

and rekindling discussion, especially in the non-aligned states

of Finland and Sweden.

Finland is known for its longstanding policy of military

non-alignment. However, it wants to “keep all doors open” and

preserve “an option to NATO”. In line with this, the country

has not pursued membership, but has been systematically

aiming at getting as close to NATO as possible. For instance,

the country joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme

in 1994 to work alongside NATO Allies in areas where bilateral

aims converge, and also supports NATO-led operations. Finland

has worked alongside the Allies in security and peacekeeping

operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan.

Finland is politically aligned, but militarily non-aligned.

While military non-alignment is technically possible, it is

more complicated in practice. Since Finland joined the EU,

the political link to NATO emerged. NATO and the EU are

intimately linked and largely overlapped organisations. Today,

the two organisations share the majority of their members – 22

out of 28 NATO member countries are also members of the EU.

The EU and NATO share common strategic interests and

work together in a spirit of partnership and complementarity.

North Atlantic Ocean

North Pacific Ocean

NATO member countries

United Kingdom

Norway

Denmark

EstoniaLatvia

Lithuania

Portugal

Spain

Poland

Germany

Belgium

Netherlands

France

Luxembourg

Italy

Czech Republic

Slovakia

Romania

Hungary

TurkeyBulgaria

Slovenia

Croatia Albania

Greece


NATO iNside view

the Finnish political establishment comes out with its concrete

arguments. A similar situation emerged in the beginning of the

1990s, before Finland joined the EU.

NATO enlargement and NATO’s Open Door Policy remain

core elements of its overall strategy, and an important objective

on the transatlantic agenda. All NATO nations concur that the

Alliance’s door should remain open for new members.

In the first place, NATO is a security policy instrument and

a community of shared values. NATO enlargement, as well as

NATO membership, entails both political costs and political

benefits for NATO and potential new members alike. The

question is whether benefits outweigh costs; new members

should be security providers, not only security consumers.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and

do not reflect the opinion of the Atlantic Council of Finland

Ms Terhi Suominen is the Secretary General of the Atlantic Council of Finland. Prior to her current position, she served in policy think tank Finnish Business and Policy Forum EVA, the European Business Leaders Convention (EBLC), Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence at the University of Turku and Turku School of Economics. She holds Masters of Political Science and Bachelor of Business Administration degrees from the University of Turku

Close cooperation between these two organisations is an

important element in the development of an international

comprehensive approach to crisis management and operations

that require the effective application of both military and

civilian means. It is important to avoid unnecessary duplication

of effort in the framework of the EU and NATO.

The challenge of public opinionThe question of Finland’s NATO membership is not a simple

yes or no issue. While there are several arguments both for

and against, there is no decisive conclusion. Roughly 30 per

cent of Finns are in favour of membership, with figures staying

more or less unchanged since the first opinion polls. In Finland,

public opinion has been divided into two groups: NATO

enthusiasts and NATO sceptics. Finnish discussion has been

coloured black and white, with the issue being simply whether

to join or not. In order to improve the public’s understanding

of NATO, there is a demand for more detailed, extensive and

profound information.

The challenge for Finland is that the NATO debate is

seen far too often as a political battle behind the scenes.

This deadlock can only be broken by political activity and

commitment. A key to opening public debate is to get the

politicians involved in frank discussions. However, it is

unlikely that any change will occur in public opinion before

Arctic Ocean

Mediterranean Sea

NorthSea

Black Sea

BalticSea

NATO member countries

NATO INSIDE VIEW


Alongside acute intelligence capacity and enhanced Special Forces deployability, social and economic investment is needed in order to

stop the spread of want and fear that plays into the hands of terrorist recruiters in areas of instability, writes Hugh Segal

Smart defence, connected forces and

progressive policy

Complexity of targets was not a dominant challenge

during the Cold War. Two world views were positioned

against each other, with serious conventional military and

nuclear capacity, and with all the intelligence and counter-

intelligence depth necessitated by the strategic challenge.

Unofficial allies or non-aligned states of either the Soviets or

the West were parsed for where they had stood in the event of

hostilities. NATO was the focus, consolidator and aggregator

of our poised military resolve to contain the Soviets in

communist Eastern Europe.

The end of the Cold War – while a great tribute to the

essential resolve of NATO’s planning, military doctrine and

joint defence concept – has produced a multilayered complexity

to the issue of global security, which the simplicity of the Cold

War tended to obviate. In the Middle East, for example, the

Cold War was really about who the Soviet and American client

states were, following the demise of the United Kingdom’s

military role in the region.

Subsequently, Egypt’s role as a Soviet client state versus

Israel’s role as a US client state were really the underlying

realities that forced a unified United Nations response to

the Suez Crisis, in which countries such as Canada did more

than their fair share, diplomatically and militarily, in defence

of the imperative of Alliance unity, as well as reducing the

threat of thermo-nuclear war.

The same can be said of the conclusions reached about

geostrategic priorities in Asia and Africa, for better or worse,

before the unification of Germany. The Cold War provided

the clarifying framework for analysis and the prioritising of

strategic interests. While this conclusion may have been too

blunt, too broad or insufficiently nuanced, it served well.

Nostalgia for the Cold War is misplaced. We cannot

be nostalgic about the risk of thermo-nuclear destruction.

Indeed, our hard reality involves a new complexity where

nation states are not always the ally or the threat, while the

alliances arrayed against NATO principles of democracy,

individual liberty, rule of law and free markets are equally

as likely to be sustained by non-state actors, foreign-funded

insurgencies, or religious and denominational extremists.

Going deeperEmbracing this new complexity must be a central priority of

the Connected Forces Initiative and the NATO Response Force

direction, which was recently agreed on by Allied leaders. This

is about enhanced multilingual, culturally appropriate and

rapidly deployable NATO forces, which are assisted by advanced

human and signal intelligence, and are operating at a far deeper

level than previously. It is about the infiltration and subversion

of terrorist networks poised to attack NATO members and

interests. It is about parsing Sunni and Shia factionalism in

an intellectually acute and actionable way. It is about avoiding

the conclusion that a military alliance can only act through

exclusively military, combat or open deployment means. It is

about reallocating NATO defence budget cuts in Europe, the

United States and Canada with a smart-spending and diversified

deployment instrumentality that was not available before now.

Imagine the lives that might have been saved and the

suffering that might have been avoided if, after the Soviet

withdrawal from Afghanistan, NATO had had the intelligence

and presence of mind to deploy investment through its member

states – in education, roads, healthcare and women’s rights –

in Afghanistan, before the Taliban collusion with al-Qaeda


NATO INSIDE VIEW

Militant Islamists parade along the streets of Syria’s Raqqa province. Multilingual, culturally appropriate and rapidly deployable NATO forces will be better placed to infiltrate and subvert terrorist networks

REUT

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NATO INSIDE VIEW


made an Article 5 military response the unavoidable option

to the unprovoked 9/11 attack on American civilians.

NATO relying only on derivative intelligence and the

deployability of its member states is not sufficient. Instead,

the Alliance must have an enhanced apprehensive intelligence

and deployability capacity resident in its own operations and

planning headquarters. The activities of NATO’s Intelligence

Fusion Centre in support of existing operations in Afghanistan

and Kosovo, Operation Ocean Shield against piracy and

Operation Active Endeavour against terrorism, are all worthy

of respect and praise. In

Afghanistan or Bosnia, NATO

troops found that having

the UK’s Department for

International Development,

the United States Agency for

International Development,

the Canadian International

Development Agency or other

deployed investors in social

infrastructure integrated

into their pure defence

and combat capacity was of immeasurable value in terms of

community relations and building trust. We have this type of

capacity and myriad instruments to engage with long before a

NATO military commitment is justified or unavoidable.

More than traditional combat deploymentThe end of the Cold War and NATO’s successful core strategy

might best be summed up in this question: what did we do in

terms of commitment, investment, intelligence and non-combat

deployment in various places to prevent combat altogether?

The answer, in different parts of the world, varies. The Marshall

Plan, the US economic support after the Second World War for

a Europe that was impoverished, desolate, hungry and actively

courted by the Stalinist communist option, was not a combat

deployment. But it had as much to do with rebuilding freedom,

and containing totalitarian reach and hegemony, as did the

deployment of military forces to the west of the Iron Curtain.

Today, the ruthlessness of Islamic State terrorists in Syria

and Iraq, the role of Iran in funding terrorist insurgencies in

Lebanon and Gaza, Boko Haram and al-Qaeda in the Islamic

Maghreb (AQIM) are all forces aiming to destroy Western

values, peaceful Muslim and Christian populations, and the

Middle East’s only democracy, Israel. The active recruitment

and military training of young terrorists from Europe, Asia

and North America so that they might be deployed in their

prior countries of residence is a direct threat to NATO values.

For the terrorists and

those who finance them,

teenage shoppers in a town

centre, innocent people of

another faith or another

denomination of the same

religion, or young girls at

school are as valid a target

as the military forces of

the world’s democracies.

This is why a more

acute intelligence and

infiltration capacity, enhanced and more diversified Special

Forces deployability – from the air, the seas, or land – and a

real pre-deployment of social and economic investment with

the scope to diminish the extent to which want and fear feed

terrorist aspirations and recruitment have never mattered

more. A NATO Response Force as part of the Connected

Forces Initiative must be more than traditional combat

deployment. It must be about being connected to reality

on the ground before combat becomes the only option.

Hon Mr Hugh Segal, Master of Massey College at the University of Toronto, is a former chair of the Special Senate Committee on Anti-terrorism and chairs the NATO Council of Canada. Mr Segal was previously Chief of Staff to the Canadian Prime Minister and Associate Cabinet Secretary in Ontario. He has also served as Senator for Ontario

The active recruitment and military training of young terrorists from

Europe, Asia and North America is a direct threat to NATO values

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Members of the United States Agency for International development (USAId), the Provincial Reconstruction Team and the US Army take part in a working group in Afghanistan. Integrating social infrastructure investors such as USAId into NATO’s defence capacity has been of immeasurable value

Smartphones are vulnerable to electronic eavesdropping. It happens every day, millions of times, all over the world. Secusmart has something to help: a little electronic protective sheath that makes the communication of governments, public authorities, defence departments and international organisations such as NATO secure around the globe.

Take a tip from the top government agencies worldwide, take advantage of SecuSUITE for BlackBerry® 10 security, also known as the Chancellor Phone, to protect your confi dential communications. Only you can control what happens to your secrets. Their fate is in your hands.

The German Chancellor’s smartphone In use by the German government and NATO Global protection approved by NATO

www.secusmart.com

Your Protection against Electronic Eavesdropping

SEC 14.23 AZ Behoerde NATO_securing our world_210x297.indd 3 20.08.14 11:55

The securiTy challenge

38 naTO Securing our world

Against a challenging backdrop in Europe, NATO must continue its work as a military and political actor to encourage stability. The Atlantic Treaty

Association plays an important role in bridging the gap between NATO and the Euro-Atlantic region, writes Jason Wiseman

The looming threat of global instability

In what is perhaps the most effective international

organisation in history, NATO’s role over the years goes

beyond security and defence. Since the Cold War, NATO has

evolved into a key player on the world stage with the capacity

to provide conditions for democratic development and ensure

its members move towards a future of peace and prosperity.

Yet NATO’s 65th anniversary comes at a time when there is

widespread political instability, economic turmoil and social

upheaval in various regions of the globe, plaguing the safety and

security of millions. The instability this causes is contagious,

and spreading along the borders of the Euro-Atlantic.

In the six months

leading up to NATO’s

summit in Wales, the world

has witnessed a dramatic

escalation of hostilities in

Eastern Europe, a surge of

jihadist activity across North

Africa and the Middle East,

along with a rise of insurgent

attacks in Afghanistan – just

as NATO seeks to end its

longest combat mission.

Against these challenges, there is a backdrop of slow financial

recovery and global power shifting to the East. The need

for NATO leaders to address our rapidly changing security

landscape will be the basis on which this summit is judged.

Maintaining foresightGathering amid one of the most trying times in recent memory

should serve to sharpen NATO’s motivation in harnessing

two of its primary assets – capability and experience. Having

successfully helped to keep the peace in Europe for the past 65

years, a key challenge will be how to best address the seemingly

spontaneous crises that arise when weak and fledgling states

fail to provide security or well-being for their citizens.

The foundation for the political integration and prosperity

of Europe has become a reality, thanks to the common effort of

the Allies and their citizens. After the Cold War, the Alliance

went through its biggest enlargement, strengthening security

and stability in Europe to the benefit of members and non-

members alike. The democratisation and integration of post-

Soviet states has set an excellent example to countries that are

still finding their way to the Euro-Atlantic community. Simply

put, modern Europe would not be possible without NATO, and

NATO would not have been successful without its adherence to

the values and principles of freedom and democracy.

Yet, as we continue to

watch events unfold on

Europe’s southern and

eastern borders, it must be

remembered that popular

uprisings can quickly be

accompanied by chaos and

hijacked by radicals, the

results of which threaten

millions and test NATO’s

resolve to act.

In the face of these

challenges, NATO must continue to balance its role as

both a political and military actor by utilising the collective

experiences its members have gained over the years. NATO’s

military role during difficult campaigns such as Kosovo,

Afghanistan and Libya, provide valuable lessons that will

be necessary in any future engagement, including how to

fight in urban combat zones, avoid civilian casualties and

cooperate with local forces.

Similarly, NATO’s position as a political actor in helping

to warm relations between Greece and Turkey, assisting with

the integration of East Germany and Spain into Europe, or

their role in closing the gender gap in the security sector, also

offers valuable experience.

NATO’s 65th anniversary comes at a time when there is widespread

political instability, economic turmoil and social upheaval

39naTO Securing our world


A US soldier and an Afghan National Police officer search a hillside in Kunar province, Afghanistan. NATO planned its withdrawal for 2014 and has been handing over security control to Afghan forces, but there has been an increase in insurgent attacks this year

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40 naTO Securing our world

As a military power, the best way for NATO to protect

itself against the ongoing tides of political instability that

are currently massing along its borders will be to remain

committed to operations such as Ocean Shield or Active

Endeavour. Furthermore, it must continue to develop the

NATO Response Force (NRF), so that it can act quickly to

contain and solve security crises before they spread.

As a political power, NATO can draw on its network of

relationships that it has spent years establishing by using

the trust and confidence it has built among its members and

partners to mediate and solve problems. NATO is the most

reliable international organisation capable of assisting states

in building their own capabilities and providing the tools,

training and forums necessary for weak or fledgling states

to secure their borders, disarm non-state actors, marginalise

political radicalism and advance rule of law.

Taken together, the political and military power of NATO

are the two levers needed to steer future policy in order to

effectively reduce the risks associated with political instability

and assist troubled states in their pursuit to provide security and

well-being for their citizens.

Building lasting securityBeyond its operational role, NATO has the skill and practice as

a political actor to provide far-reaching assistance in building

secure and stable environments in which societies can flourish.

This is where the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) – a network

facilitator of NGOs between NATO and Euro-Atlantic societies

– has a special role to play.

As ATA celebrates its 60th anniversary this year, we look

back on its joint history with NATO and acknowledge that the

very idea of transatlantic unity has been the key to providing

the necessary conditions for member states to develop and

consolidate their democracies. As a global network of diplomats,

military officials, politicians, academics, business leaders and

young professionals, we work together to promote the values

of the North Atlantic Treaty and build networks of support for

NATO and its policies throughout the Euro-Atlantic region and

beyond. Our role is to stimulate political consultation, dialogue

and cooperation across the Atlantic and between generations.

Despite its best efforts, NATO’s missions are often deeply

misunderstood. This puts a strong burden on leaders to explain

their message in a more effective way. NATO and ATA have

prepared for this by coordinating outreach to at-risk civil

societies and engaging in long-term projects that highlight

NATO’s political role, reduce dependency on military action,

and engage the youth in issues they will soon have to face as

future leaders. This, in large part, has coloured the nature of

ATA, which stands as a bridge between NATO and civil society.

We are proud to be part of this development and strongly

believe that the long-term solution to resolving political

instability is to work towards building lasting harmony

among our peoples. This can only be achieved by working

together in order to build the knowledge and support

necessary to further develop our regional security and to

continue our pursuit towards spreading the common values

that unite us as people.

Mr Jason Wiseman is the Secretary general Designate of the Atlantic Treaty Association, working with the ATA Secretariat since 2012. Prior to this, he was a National Security Analyst with the NATO Council of Canada from 2011-12. He holds an mA in government with a specialisation in counter-terrorism and homeland security and a BAH in political science. Other areas of expertise include counter-terrorism, middle eastern politics, state failure and transnational organised crime

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ATA President Dr Karl A Lamers with NATO Secretary general Anders fogh rasmussen. ATA acts as a bridge between NATO and civil society


The securiTy chAlleNge

Solomon Passy examines the West’s approach to Russia, and how to interact with a country that has values different to those we hold

Why is the West failing in its relations

with Russia?

The Grand Kremlin Palace in Moscow. There has been Russia-West cooperation in several areas, such as in dialogue with Iran

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Ever since the 10th century – when the historic state

Kievan Rus adopted Orthodox faith under the guidance

of Bulgarian clergymen – Bulgarians have embarked upon

close yet complex relations with Russia, intertwining the

evident common cultural and religious elements with ferocious

conflicts and wars for dominance. Throughout the centuries,

Bulgarians have understood that a good mutual understanding

with Russia would depend on keeping a respectful distance,

although this was sometimes inadvertently narrowed or even

destroyed by historic trials and tribulations. Together with

this historical experience, its present geopolitical position has

allowed Bulgaria to introduce the European Union to two of

its communication channels with Russia – the alphabet and

language – which is expected to improve West-Russia dialogue.

Why is it that today, despite the multitude of modern

communication channels, Russia and the West are speaking

different languages? The answer is simple. It is because of

the incompatibility of respective value systems or, to express

it in technical terms, owing to our differences in ‘default’.

Russia enjoys satisfactory and open cooperation with

the West in many areas. The dialogue with Iran, supporting

NATO in Afghanistan, working with the US to destroy chemical



weapons in Syria, the global fight against terrorism and joint

work on the International Space Station, all bear witness to

that. Yet, this cooperation is invariably based on common

interest rather than common values. In other words, Russia

will engage with others as long as it is reimbursed at the

highest possible price and this will only change when

the defaults of the West and Russia converge.

Why we get it wrongWhile the wealth of the West has arguably been rooted in

a competition aiming at the perfection of society, Russia

has predominantly built her wealth through territory. Since

territory supplies the needed wealth, this explains and

generates the impulsive and imperial attitude of Russia,

which seems to define its actions for the time being, at least.

The West allows for a recurrent error in its attitude towards

its opponents, and even partners, by habitually treating all of

them as ‘one of us’, thereby punishing or rewarding in a uniform

manner based on its own concepts. The outcome often seems

like a dialogue between inhabitants of different galaxies.

Thus, the West is prone to confusion at the very core

of its policy towards Russia, wrongly combining episodes of

untimely neglect with pledges for eternal strategic partnership.

This ultimately adds to

the bargain concessions

that lack principles and

indulgence that defies

logic. Consequently, Russia

interprets this as a sign

of weakness, encouraging

further steps towards

division and demands for

further concessions.

This is how Moscow reads

the West’s anemic response

to their effective annexation

of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, complete with

the persisting refusal to invite Georgia to join NATO.

We could imagine Russia thinking, ‘since NATO avoids a

state with problems, it will be in our interests to create the

problems’. Thus, we naturally arrived at the moment when

Crimea was annexed, practically annulling any chance of

NATO membership for Ukraine. The next possible victims

of Russian aggression are Transnistria, the breakaway state

located between Moldova and Ukraine, and Moldova itself.

For all the conditionality of historic analogies, there is

still psychological recurrence in political behaviour, which

has been seen throughout historical periods. The annexation

of Crimea is a reminder of the Anschluss of Austria, an event

particularly instructive in the wake of the ‘democratic’ fig leaf

of the Crimean referendum.

The Munich syndrome is another of those recurring

themes. At the Munich conference of 1938, the West granted

Hitler the right to dispose of the fate of the Sudetendeutsche,

thus encouraging him to occupy Czechoslovakia and divide

Poland with the USSR in 1939.

The trap that the West systematically falls into is to trying

to sacrifice temporary values to gain significant advantage.

Invariably, this approach results in the loss of both, in

addition to the loss of substantial human life.

Just as it does not succeed to the expected degree in

making concessions, the West is unsuccessful in sanctions.

These are similar in essence as the ones against Iran, North

Korea, Iraq, Yugoslavia, Libya and Cuba, and now against

Russia. Sanctions undermine values that would be much

closer to those of the average Western-European or North-

American citizen than to the inhabitants of Kamchatka or

Siberia, let alone those of the militarised region of Kaliningrad.

In the overwhelming majority, Russian citizens cannot even

imagine being more important than the state, hence their

tolerance to material deprivation, which is far higher than

that of the average Western citizen.

Consequently, Western sanctions are making Russians rally

behind President Putin – and Putin would be happy to offer a

round of drinks for that. He is currently turning into the most

charismatic Russian leader after Stalin; as much as a result of

the territories annexed by him, as for the sanctions imposed

on him. The heroic slogan of the Second World War “For the

motherland, for Stalin!” is now being edited by history itself

as “For the motherland, for Putin!” And this is all because

Putin has shown a strong understanding of the rules of public

relations and has a free

hand in using them to suit

his wishes. The West seems

to be his best ally in this.

Undoubtedly, the results

of Putin’s current political

policies today will be paid

for by the children of those

glorifying him now. Does the

West have to wait that long

until acting? The answer is

no, of course it does not.

If we insist on sanctions,

then why not turn to a smarter approach that may prove more

efficient than classic sanctions? Since Putin seeks to make

a public impact through the his acts, photographs and even

T-shirts, the West should decisively deprive him of such a

chance. Sanctions against participation in world sports

events, cultural festivals and competitions would be far more

effective than any trade sanctions or financial restrictions

placed on Putin’s entourage.

To start with, NATO should put a stop to its wrong signals

and policies. Georgia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia and Kosovo ought to urgently be

involved and allowed to join NATO as an opening to their mid-

term EU prospects. Additionally, Finland and Sweden should be

energetically encouraged to develop and deepen their relations

with NATO, and the EU ought to seek a new mode in their

strategic relations with NATO.

In the meantime, the presently neglected, yet budding,

partnerships between NATO and Japan, Korea, Australia

and New Zealand, as well as Mongolia, ought to be revitalised

urgently, since they all present unfinished business with

traditional partners. NATO urgently needs to establish new and

even unplanned partnerships. Firstly with China, secondly with

The West is prone to confusion at the very core of its policy towards

Russia, combining episodes of untimely neglect with pledges for

eternal strategic partnership



the Islamic world via the Organization of Islamic Cooperation

and, thirdly, with Latin America and Africa. Additionally,

NATO needs to communicate directly with Russian society,

rather than through the Russian government. The internet will

make this possible, despite all efforts to restrict access to it.

The West ought to be firmer in its actions with regard to smaller

dictators around the world, for example Bashar al-Assad, since

every dictator is a stronghold for all dictators.

The way forwardNATO’s most urgent and substantial need is to create a

new public image for itself among the societies of its own

member states, as well as those all over the world. Global

public opinion is NATO’s most powerful ally, which will help

it to win numerous battles prior to starting them, prevent

enemy goals being formulated and stop criminal minds

from acting. NATO also needs a new flight of qualitative

imagination and the finances to boost it. Investing $100

in information can save $1,000 from being invested in

war. Those ideas should not come as a surprise to NATO.

The Atlantic Club of Bulgaria (ACB) launched them first in

2009 and has been promoting them ever since.

Dr Solomon Passy is the President of the Atlantic club of Bulgaria. Previously the Bulgarian Minister for foreign Affairs from 2001-05, he negotiated and signed Bulgaria’s accessions to NATo and the EU. In 1990-91 and 2001-09 he was an MP and chaired the parliamentary committees on foreign affairs and defence. dr Passy has a Phd in mathematical logic and computer science

ACB also expanded the pioneer think-tank research

on ‘NATO’s Global Role in the 21st Century’, which was

completed on a NATO Manfred Wörner scholarship in

1998. The research furthered the successful policies and

the history-endorsed vision of the world, formulated as

early as 1990 by the ACB, the first pro-Atlantic organisation

set up on a Warsaw Treaty territory.

Russia will be a friend of the West only when the West

remains strong and follows policies of principle that are

not dubious. Russia will return to the political tradition of

Gorbachev and Yeltsin, which will make it a good partner

of NATO. This should be the daily message to the Russian

society. Meanwhile, the West as a whole should take good

care to ensure our global presence, as well as our appearance.

President Vladimir Putin during a televised question-and-answer session in Moscow. Putin has demonstrated a strong understanding of public relations

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the security challenge

44 natO Securing our world

An ISAF soldier from the Royal Anglian Regiment out on patrol in Afghanistan. The UK is the second largest contributor of troops to ISAF after the US Cp

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45natO Securing our world


With the deadline for withdrawal from Afghanistan approaching, Dennis Hartshorne analyses the United Kingdom’s objectives, outlining

both the political and military approaches to creating stability

The United Kingdom and Afghanistan

Afghanistan has been a key element in British foreign

policy during the early years of the 21st century.

The overriding reason for the British presence is to protect

our national security through the mechanism of helping

the Afghans take control of their own security. Along with

NATO and other allies, our aim has been to enable the

Afghans to develop the ability to maintain security in order

to prevent the return of international terrorists seeking to

use Afghanistan as a safe haven.

This has been the dominant objective of British foreign

policy in the region. Consequently, the threat to the United

Kingdom from this region has been substantially reduced.

Together with allies, the UK has played a large part in

training Afghan security forces and assisting Afghanistan

in becoming a more viable state, thereby reducing instability.

Our international partners are working in concert with the

same aim of encouraging the Afghan government’s ability to

provide proper governance with an effective infrastructure

and the provision of essential services. The UK has worked

alongside allies and partners to help the Afghan government

develop in a way that will benefit the country’s future. British

efforts in Afghanistan have focused on three key elements,

which will be analysed below.

Military supportThe UK’s military activities in Afghanistan are conducted under

the United Nations Mandate as part of NATO’s International

Security Assistance Force, widely known as ISAF. The UK

is the second largest contributor after the United States to

this coalition of nearly 50 nations. Under the auspices of ISAF,

key NATO countries that have provided more than 1,000 troops

include the US and UK, which together contribute some

75 per cent of total deployment. While the majority of British

forces have operated in Helmand, the province best known

for its hazardous insurgent activities, the British assist in and

advise on providing security and basic civilian policing services

with the aim of securing safe operational bases in Afghanistan.

This support programme will largely be completed by the

end of 2014, when the ISAF mission ends and the majority

of the British combat forces will have left Afghanistan.

Political and socio-economic supportApart from achieving stability through military operations,

the long-term goal has been to assist Afghanistan in becoming

a feasible state able to increasingly meet its people’s needs with

its own resources. This activity is largely conducted by the UK’s

Department for International Development, which operates

in three main areas to reduce poverty and increase stability:

improving security and political stability, providing economic

stimulus and assisting the delivery of basic services.

During the Tokyo Conference in 2012, the UK agreed to

maintain development assistance of £178 million per annum

until at least 2017 in order to help the Afghan government

achieve long-term economic growth. This is a challenging

task and will continue to be so.

The overriding reason for the UK’s participation in the

Afghanistan mission was to counter the threat arising from

the country serving as a base for international terrorism.

This situation threatened not only the UK, but also the rest

of the world. The Taliban had given al-Qaeda a safe haven in

Afghanistan, which allowed terrorists to plan and carry out

attacks across the world, most notably the 9/11 atrocities in the

US. The British government has consistently recognised that

Afghan security cannot be achieved by military activities alone,

and therefore actively supports the Afghan government’s efforts

to achieve a political settlement, leading to peace and stability.

These objectives are based on key historical decisions

evolved from the outset of the Afghan conflict. The UN Security

Council Resolution 1378 in 2001 contained a condemnation

of “the Taliban for allowing Afghanistan to be used as a base

for the export of terrorism by the al-Qaeda network and other

terrorist groups and for providing safe haven to Osama bin

Laden, al-Qaeda and others associated with them, and in

this context supporting the efforts of the Afghan people to



replace the Taliban regime”. The UN further authorised an

international force – ISAF – with a mandate to help the Afghans

maintain security in Kabul and the surrounding areas. In 2003,

NATO assumed political command and coordination of ISAF

and progressively, throughout 2006, assumed command of the

south and east of the country. Insurgency in the following years

required a greater military response from NATO.

In 2011, the House Of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee

reported that military pressure alone would not be enough to

bring security and stability to Afghanistan. It concluded that

without appropriate political leadership, the current military

campaign would be in danger of inadvertently de-railing efforts

to secure a political solution to what, in essence, was a political

problem. The report stressed that the US should not delay its

significant involvement in talks with the Taliban leadership

because, without US support in this respect, there could be no

long-term peace in Afghanistan.

The Committee report voiced doubts about whether success

in Afghanistan could be achieved through a strategy of “clear,

hold and build”. It concluded by stating that “there is also

evidence to suggest that the core foreign policy justification

for the UK’s continued presence in Afghanistan, namely that it

is necessary in the interests of the UK’s national security, may

have been achieved some time ago, given the apparently limited

strength of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan”.

Accordingly, in consultation with allies, ISAF approved the

deadline of 2014 for the completion of plans to transfer security

and civilian control to Afghanistan. The withdrawal process

is now nearly over. Looking back, the Committee specifically

placed on record that: “Her Majesty’s Armed Forces have our

full support in tackling the challenges before them and their

efforts are rightly described in so many instances as heroic. It is

our hope that this report will be received in the constructively

critical manner in which it is intended, and regarded as a

contribution to the wider debate which is taking place on how

to improve a situation to which there are no easy solutions.”

A way forwardAs is often the case when liberal interventionist policies

are pursued, solutions are far more complex than relatively

straightforward military ones. It is also more difficult for

such policies to gain widespread public support. The threat is

often not so readily perceived and the solutions not so readily

obvious. With new global crises on the increase, running

alongside the gradual withdrawal from Afghanistan, the new

domestic challenge is to maintain public support for such

interventions. Emerging terrorist threats and barbaric activity

in the Levant, crises in North, East and West Africa, and the

tensions in Ukraine, all require an extensive public information

programme both from the government and NATO, not only in

the UK, but throughout Western society. A new focus for ATA

and support of organisations such as the Atlantic Council of

the UK would go a long way towards alerting public opinion

to the problems, and in the maintenance of confidence in the

necessary responses from the UK and others.

Mr Dennis Hartshorne is the Director of the Atlantic Council of the United Kingdom. he is a founding member of the Council, and prior to that was the Chairman of British Atlantic Universities Committee, part of the Council’s predecessor organisation, the British Atlantic Committee. he has been the author or editor of over 120 publications of that Committee, and served as its Deputy Chairman. he is a nATo Fellow

Members of the Afghan national Army carry out weapons training. handing over security control is a vital part of nATo’s work in Afghanistan

Together with allies, the UK has played a large part in training Afghan security forces and assisting

Afghanistan in becoming a more viable state

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Anti-Mubarak protesters in Cairo during the Arab Spring, which highlighted political, social and economic instability factors

ATA’s role in the Mediterranean

and Middle EastThe security threats arising in Eastern Europe and the Middle East are

posing new challenges for NATO. Fabrizio W Luciolli explores how the Atlantic Treaty Association supports and facilitates NATO’s work

In the near future, the Atlantic Treaty Association

(ATA) and its national chapters will be called on to

face increasing tasks and responsibilities. The aggression

against Crimea and the subsequent escalation in Ukraine

has dramatically changed the agenda of the NATO Summit

and reminded the Allies of their primary commitment to

collective defence and the crucial role of Article 5 of the

Atlantic Treaty, which must be considered in times of modern

aggression, including with regards to hybrid warfare and

cyberthreats. Concurrently, due to the latest developments

in the Middle East and North Africa, the Mediterranean

flank of the Alliance has become increasingly subjected

to the threat of extremist forces.

NATO and ATA in 2014NATO has promptly reacted to the reversal of relations

with Russia by reinforcing the security of the member

states that are more liable to be affected by the fallout of

the events in Ukraine and by reasserting the collective

defence of the Washington Treaty. Moreover, NATO has

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ATA is poised to intensify its focus on the broader Middle East, building on more than 10 years of relevant dialogue and cooperation

the unfinished business in the region. In this respect, in 2014,

ATA celebrated its 60th anniversary with a council meeting

hosted in Budva by the Atlantic Council of Montenegro, thus

testifying ATA’s enduring commitment to accompany all

Western Balkans nations into the European Union and NATO.

Likewise, ATA intends to shore up its Mediterranean and

Middle Eastern dimension. There is no Iron Curtain in the

Mediterranean separating the South from the North. Yet, a

combination of conflicting viewpoints and misconceptions

inherited from the past and intertwined with current events,

hinders the deepening of relations in a cooperative security

perspective, as pointed out by the NATO Strategic Concept.

In this respect, ATA has played a pivotal role by conducting

numerous dialogues and cooperation activities involving the

NATO partner countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the

Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and other states and entities,

such as the Kurdistan Regional Government.

ATA and the Greater Middle EastThe present situation engulfing the Greater Middle East

requires major and renewed efforts in order for the Arab and

Muslim world to undertake the construction of pluralistic

societies where moderation in the political and cultural domain

will prevail over extremism

and violence. To this end,

ATA is poised to intensify

its focus on the broader

region, building on more

than 10 years of relevant

dialogue and cooperation

in the form of training

courses, research projects,

high-level conferences,

roundtables and workshops.

In particular, ATA

can orient its programmes in order to foster cooperative

security and reinvigorate the role of NATO partnerships

in the Mediterranean and Middle East. In fact, the adoption

of synergistic and coordinated responses are crucial in the

fight against terrorism, as well as crisis management and

prevention, including humanitarian emergencies.

Socio-economic issues will also be at the top of ATA’s

agenda, with a view to promoting the implementation of

modernisation and development strategies for the southern

Mediterranean. Solving lingering issues – such as youth

unemployment, food security and marginalisation – will

deprive extremist forces of breeding grounds they can

exploit, especially in countries that have previously, or are

still, experiencing domestic turmoil.

Cultural issues are also important. Sectarian divisions

are the main cause of conflicts sweeping across the Greater

Middle East today. To this end, crucial questions – such

as the future of local religious minorities and promoting

intercultural dialogue – are handled by specific ATA

research programmes and relevant initiatives.

ATA has always paid close attention to the successor

generation through a series of initiatives, educational

courses and events that are attended by young researchers,

repeatedly stated it is giving its full support to the territorial

integrity of Ukraine and the efforts made by the legitimate

leadership to restore security and stability.

Along these lines, ATA has enhanced its role in the

Baltic states and has decided to organise a flag event in

Kiev in 2014. This will be a sign of strong political backing

to the people and government of Ukraine, and will launch

a comprehensive programme of training and educational

initiatives in the country and at a regional level. In this

respect, ATA is conducting a NATO Science for Peace and

Security Programme in Georgia, while new relations have

been established with the Atlantic Council of Moldova.

However, on the eve of its 60th anniversary, it is particularly

in the Mediterranean and Middle East that ATA will test its

traditional skills in promoting dialogue and cooperation, while

fostering peace and stability in Northern and Eastern Europe.

The broader region presents a variety of security threats

and challenges, which are a growing concern for the Euro-

Atlantic and international community. Extremism and its

terrorist manifestations, the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction and ballistic missiles, arms trafficking, religious

genocides and the massive flows of refugees fleeing wars and

humanitarian crises are the most crucial and evident elements

affecting today’s security

scenario. Nevertheless, the

series of uprisings known

as the Arab Spring pointed

out the existence of even

more relevant instability

factors, which are of a

political, social and economic

nature rather than a military

one. These instability factors

are mostly damaging the new

generations, and producing a

dangerous fallout in the security domain.

In this respect, the European Union and NATO cannot

afford to disregard the ongoing developments across its

southern neighborhood. In today’s increasingly globalised

and interconnected world, the breakout of the uprisings that

swept across the region must be considered an alarming wake-

up call, urging a more constructive and effective cooperation

between the two shores of the Mediterranean.

The role of ATAIn this framework, the Atlantic Treaty Association has a

significant role to play. Written in 1956 by Gaetano Martino,

Lester B Pearson and Halvard Lange, the Report of the Committee

of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO acknowledged

the role of the Atlantic Treaty Association and paved the way

for NATO’s engagement in cultural and economic cooperation

even beyond the North-Atlantic borders. Recalling this

message, ATA can act in the Mediterranean and the Middle

East by taking stock of the extraordinary experience and

accomplishments achieved in cooperation with central

and south-eastern European countries.

The Euro-Atlantic integration of the Balkans has been

successful. However, much work remains in order to complete



professionals and PhD and university students coming from

Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The level

of interplay has grown remarkably over the past few years,

and the achievement of more structured forms of cooperation

will significantly contribute to advancing the aims of ATA

programmes in the Greater Middle East. These activities have

allowed ATA to create, consolidate and expand a new living

network of decision-makers, experts and researchers, who

will be able to enhance the cooperative security perspectives

in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. In this respect,

the level of cooperation achieved by ATA in the Western

Balkans represents an inspiring model for the new generation

in the Mediterranean and Middle East, and for the future

programmes in Eastern Europe as well.

ATA outreach in the southern neighborhood proved

to be successful and was able to offer the European Union

and NATO an extraordinary additional value, since it comes

to fill the gap that still exists between the Euro-Atlantic

institutions and the public opinions of the Arab world.

In doing so, ATA intends to have an actual impact on the

ongoing processes thanks to its connection with civil society

and the capability to engage relevant authorities and decision-

makers from NATO member states and partners, as well as from

other international organisations and entities.

Peace, security and common progress have been the key

objectives of the Alliance since its establishment, and so

should it be in the present complex international scenario.

A sense of community In order to achieve this, NATO needs to promote a security

culture that is able to reconnect the transatlantic community

with the Alliance’s fundamental values. As stated in Report of

the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO,

“a sense of community must bind the people as well as the

institutions of the Atlantic nations”. In this perspective

is the strengthening of ATA, recommitting itself and the

public opinion of NATO member and partner countries to

the enduring Atlantic values and, after 60 years, willing

and able to carry out new challenging tasks both in Eastern

Europe and in the Greater Middle East.

Dr Fabrizio W Luciolli is the President of the italian Atlantic Committee and Vice President of the Atlantic treaty Association. He is also Professor of international Security organisations at the Center for High Defense Studies of the italian Ministry of Defence and lectures at a range of national and international, military and academic institutions. Dr luciolli is also a consultant on foreign affairs and security matters to various MPs

the AtA 60th Anniversary leadership Summit at the to be Secure (2bS) Forum in budva, Montenegro

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NATO may be entering the most challenging period in its history, as it combines the demand for crisis management beyond its borders with that for collective defence in Europe. As such, it needs sustained

political and public support, writes Jamie Shea

Emerging security threats

Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March, many

commentators have been proclaiming that NATO is ‘back

in business’. Certainly, this perception has been borne out of

NATO’s immediate reaction to the crisis in Crimea.

The United States’ leadership has been back in evidence,

with Washington being the first to deploy land, sea and air

reinforcements to Poland, Romania and the Baltic states.

On a visit to Warsaw, President Barack Obama pledged

$1 billion for the European Reassurance Initiative to cover

the costs of exercises, enhanced air patrolling, and temporary

troop and naval redeployments to the Eastern Allies. Other

Allies – Germany, France, Denmark, Canada and the United

Kingdom – have sent fighter aircraft, ships and surveillance,

intelligence and reconnaissance assets. By early June 2014, all

28 Allies had allocated forces or at least planning personnel to

NATO’s immediate reassurance efforts.

At the same time, the Alliance froze its relations with

Russia – although keeping a channel for communication open

through the NATO-Russia Council – and agreed to step up its

defence-related assistance to its partner ‘countries in-between’:

Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.

Thus, so far, so good. The current reassurance efforts have

built on plans that were already under way in the Alliance to

refocus on Europe after 11-and-a-half years of the International

Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Indeed, even before Russia’s

annexation of Crimea, NATO held its first major exercise

in Eastern Europe for decades (Steadfast Jazz) and devised

a Connected Forces Initiative that used regular exercises,

training and education in order to preserve the interoperability

of its forces that had been slowly acquired in ISAF. This

initiative also aims to get its forces back into the culture and

practice of major manoeuvres and force-on-force war-fighting

skills. The return to collective defence and more traditional

notions of deterrence, containment and the balance of power,

however, will inevitably raise questions as to whether Allies,

and the NATO organisation, are up to the job. This question

will be all the more pressing in a new security environment

where everything that NATO does henceforth will be tested.

The shift in global military spending towards Russia, the

Middle East and Asia testifies to this. Over the past decade,

Allied defence budgets have declined by 15 per cent on average,

while Russia’s has increased by 150 per cent. As war in Europe

goes from the previously unthinkable to the possible and

conceivable, the price that the Allies will have to pay for

their security has now become much higher than before

the Ukraine-Russia crisis. This context poses a number of

short-term and long-term challenges for the Alliance.

Two schools of thoughtIn the first place, NATO will need to decide what long-term

military posture to adopt in Central and Eastern Europe.

Currently, there are two schools of thought among Allies. One

group – unsurprisingly, those from Central and Eastern Europe

– would like to see substantial combat forces stationed in the

East, and go back to a posture of forward defence along borders.

In this view, NATO’s command structure and combat brigades

are stationed in countries that face no threat, instead of being

on the territories where the threat is much more real. In 1997,

the Alliance gave an assurance to Russia, as part of the NATO-

Russia Founding Act, that it would not station substantial

combat forces, nuclear weapons or military infrastructure on

the territories of its new member states. However, many from

these countries argue this assurance was conditional on Russia

also respecting international law and exercising restraint.

Other Allies are reticent at the thought of a major and

permanent redeployment of forces from West to East. They

prefer to occupy the moral high ground of sticking to the ‘three

noes’ commitment, in the hope that one day Russia will come

to its senses and want to re-establish a strategic partnership

with NATO. In their view, the more NATO sticks to its various

commitments vis-à-vis Russia and refuses to engage in a new

Cold-War syndrome of confrontation, the easier it could be



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A russian soldier guards the entrance to a military base in Perevalnoye, crimea. russia’s annexation of crimea this year has led to renewed tensions with NATo members



for Russia to rethink its position. Moreover, the advantage of

rotations and exercises is that they are scalable. In other words,

they can be rapidly adapted either up or down, as befits the

level of threat from Russia, or the possibilities of cooperation.

Naturally, the ability of these Allies to persuade Poland or the

Baltic states of the merits of this reinforcement strategy depends

largely on their willingness to spend money on upgrading and

improving the readiness of forces in the West, so that they

are able to respond quickly. However, it can be argued that

the high-readiness, high-mobility reinforcement strategy will

also allow the Allies to deal with other crises; for instance, an

intervention in the Middle East or North Africa, or perhaps in

response to a major terrorist incident.

Readiness Action Plan That said, there is a way to reconcile these two visions of

reassurance within the Alliance’s proposed Readiness Action

Plan. This would involve increasing NATO’s presence in the

new member states through the stationing of three or four air

squadrons, a permanent naval task force in both the Baltic

and Black seas, and establishing a military headquarters, for

instance a specific headquarters for NATO’s Rapid Response

Force. The Allies could also agree to increase their fixed air

defence assets and radars in this region, and upgrade ports

and airfields to function as reception facilities. In addition,

the Alliance could go back to standing defence plans, where

headquarters involved in collective defence could have forces

already assigned to them in peacetime, which they could train

and exercise for specific roles. This would avoid the time-

consuming process of generating forces from scratch, once

operational plans are approved by the North Atlantic Council.

Pre-delegating crisis-response measures to the Supreme Allied

Commander Europe (SACEUR) to cope with an emerging

crisis would also speed up NATO’s response and thus reinforce

deterrence by allowing him to enhance situational awareness,

and to re-deploy and rearrange forces.

In this context, deterrence is a concept that needs to be

rediscovered, but there is a difficult question to answer here.

How far will Russia be deterred by a show of military strength

by the Alliance, especially if the Russian strategy is more

one of subversion and spreading influence through energy

deals, business contracts and propaganda campaigns, than

one of seriously thinking about challenging NATO’s Article 5

through a military attack? In the final analysis, NATO’s role

in deterrence is essential, but also inevitably limited. In fact,

some of the most effective tools are economic. Consequently,

deterrence must involve other like-minded organisations that

can complement NATO’s largely military competencies with a

more diverse set of tools. The European Union is an obvious

partner. But, depending on what or who is to be deterred, other

Euro-Atlantic organisations will have a role to play, such as the

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

But actions and responses must be coordinated. Russia has

seen the deepening of the relationship between the EU and

swiss President and head of the osce, Didier Burkhalter, meets russian President Vladimir Putin in Vienna in June for bilateral talks

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Dr Jamie Shea is Deputy Assistant secretary General of NATo’s emerging security challenges Division. he has worked with NATo since 1980 in positions including Director of Policy Planning in the private office of the secretary General; and Assistant to the secretary General of NATo for special Projects

In this environment of austerity, it will be essential for the Allies to have a common view of what they

need on a prioritised basis

Ukraine as equally acceptable as, if not even less acceptable

than, the deepening of its relationship with NATO. In a new

environment, where economic steps can produce major

military repercussions and vice versa, NATO and the EU

will have to coordinate their actions in a way they have not

managed to do in the past.

Yet, as Europeans look to Americans to provide the bulk of

reassurance, and vice versa, old NATO debates on transatlantic

burden-sharing are bound to revive. For Europeans, NATO will

be about the Americans coming to the rescue once again, while

the US, shifting the responsibility onto the Allies, will be able to

avoid hindering its pivot to the Asia-Pacific – where the Russian

assertiveness in Crimea could encourage China to act similarly

in pressing its claims in the South China Sea.

Unsurprisingly, at a time when it is spending 73 per cent of

the total NATO budget, the US is pushing its European Allies

to meet the target of devoting two per cent of gross domestic

product (GDP) to defence, and devoting 20 per cent of that to

modernisation and equipment. In 2012, the Europeans spent

an average of $473 per capita

on defence, while Americans

spent $2,057; each European

soldier costs €23,829,

compared with the €102,264

that the US invests. Yet, will

the shock of the Ukraine

crisis be enough to push the

majority of Allies to increase

their defence spending? Only

three Europeans meet the

two per cent target, while

only five hit the 20 per cent target. Currently, 14 spend below

1.5 per cent, and five are spending even less than one per cent.

If all the Allies met the two per cent target, NATO would have

an extra $90 billion a year to spend on its armies.

Delivering on collective prioritiesHowever, public support for more military spending will only

be forthcoming if the public has a clear idea of what the money

will be spent on and how it could substantially improve the

Alliance’s military posture. In this environment of austerity,

it will be essential for the Allies to have a common view of

what they need on a prioritised basis and then to be effectively

organised in clusters or framework nations to deliver those

capabilities. Instead of one European army, we are likely to

see several European armies organised around lead nations or

regions, such as the Benelux, Visegrad or Nordic groupings.

NATO’s two strategic commanders have recently come up

with a list of 16 shortfalls, which also correspond to the vital

enabling capacities for all modern multinational military

operations. They concern the lack of reconnaissance capabilities

and joint information surveillance. The other gaps concern

deployable headquarters, command and control for ground and

air operations, as well as the need for better integration of air

defence and ballistic missile defence.

It is not all bleak news, though. Based on the European

Defence Agency’s Pooling & Sharing initiative, Europeans

finally have the Airbus A400M transport aircraft, more and

better helicopters, considerable technological expertise in

combating improvised explosive devices drawing on ISAF

experience, and air-to-air refuelling capacities.

The procurement of Global Hawks by NATO and an EU

common drone programme will also gradually improve

Europe’s intelligence, reconnaissance and command and

control capabilities. That said, the key task for both NATO

and the EU in the months ahead, and particularly with NATO’s

Wales Summit in September in mind, is to identify groupings

to plug the 16 shortfalls. The initiative of Germany to form a

Capability Development Group and of the UK to form a group

to develop an expeditionary force represents the best way

ahead, as these offer the best chance for medium and small

countries to plug into a framework organised by a major

country, thereby providing essential niche capabilities.

In a more dangerous world, NATO will need as many

friends and willing partners as it can persuade to work with

it. Consequently, an ‘interoperability platform’ bringing

the Allies together with 24 of their most active partners

can also help preserve

relationships, consolidated

through operations such

as ISAF. Subsequently, this

will increase the pool of

capabilities that NATO can

draw on for its missions.

In return for building their

forces to NATO standards,

and training and exercising

with the Alliance, these

particularly valuable partners

can be granted special privileges. These could include early

consultation, intelligence sharing and liaison positions in the

NATO command structure, as well as operations and planning

divisions. Partners can also be involved in NATO’s efforts to

build defence capacity and train local forces in North Africa, the

Middle East and Eastern Europe, as they also have experience

in these regions through their participation in similar EU

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) or through

United Nations programmes.

So, in conclusion, NATO is perhaps entering the most

challenging period of its history, as it must deal with collective

defence in Europe and crisis management beyond for the first

time. Getting the strategy right will stimulate and require

debate, and the means will not be forthcoming without

sustained political and public support. Thus, the role of the

Atlantic Council and the Atlantic Treaty Association becomes

also ever-more important: to support NATO and to be properly

and adequately supported by it.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.



The Alliance has long-standing partnerships with countries throughout Asia. David Fouquet looks at NATO’s past involvement in the region and

its place in the existing and emerging security architecture

Alliances and the Asian

security dilemma

That the NATO Alliance has emerged as a security player in

regions beyond its original theatre of operation in the Euro-

Atlantic area is no longer in doubt following its deployments

in Afghanistan and the Gulf of Aden. But the issue of whether

it has established a defined and consistent role or plan for its

involvement in Africa, the Middle East or Asia is still unsettled

and is rarely discussed on a firm basis. Occasionally, and

especially in recent years, some states or political figures

from the Asia-Pacific have sought to intensify relations with

the Alliance and urged the latter to increase its involvement.

Some members, especially the United States, have an

established and defined role through a system of alliances and

relationships in the Asia-Pacific and other regions as well. The

United Kingdom and France, through territorial possessions or

defence agreements, have a different but established presence.

A global networkNATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen addressed

the relationship with Asia-Pacific in a presentation on the US’s

west coast earlier in 2014, noting that “the US and Canada

both border on the Pacific. Other Allies have territories and

interests in the Pacific. And all Allies have concerns about the

Pacific.” In order to meet such concerns and associated security

requirements, he said: “We will also bolster our partnerships.

As we prepare to complete our combat mission in Afghanistan

at the end of the year, we must maintain the close ties we have

forged on the field of battle. Global threats like terrorism, piracy

and missile attacks cross borders. They are too big for any one

country to tackle alone. We can only deal with them together.

Not just as an Atlantic Alliance. But as a global network.”

This network already includes partners in the region

that have signed partnership agreements and been engaged

alongside NATO in Afghanistan, as well as in the anti-piracy

maritime mission in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia.

They have expressed readiness to maintain such a relationship.

The most prominent of these are Japan, the Republic of Korea,

Australia and New Zealand, while a number of other countries

have also been involved and shown interest.

The Secretary General at that time did not address the

Central Asian region, a geographic security theatre even closer

to NATO that presents its own concerns and challenges, which

range from political instability to trafficking and terrorism

routes. While NATO has long-established relations through the

Partnership for Peace programme with countries in the region,

its states and populations have more recently become the object

of specific interests on the part of virtually all global or regional

powers. The US, European Union, Russia, China and others

have demonstrated such interests through creating their own

modern versions of the Silk Road, which historically connected

almost the entire Euro-Asian continent.

The rise of ChinaWhile the majority of such concepts involve civilian, economic,

infrastructure and other elements, the political, security and

defence aspects are also evident.

Possibly the most complex and far-reaching relationship

between the Alliance and Asia is one carried out informally

and whose objectives have yet to be defined with the rise of

China. During the Cold War and its immediate aftermath,

which culminated in the bombing of the Chinese embassy in

Belgrade during NATO operations in Kosovo in 1999, relations

were characterised by suspicion and hostility. Launched as an

informal series of lunches and other private meetings between

the Chinese ambassadors and NATO secretary generals, the



Cadets of the People’s Liberation Army take part in bayonet drills near Beijing. Relations between NATO and China have been complex since the Cold War ended

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later encounters have involved conferences, lectures and

some maritime anti-piracy operational cooperation. The latter

have been the most advanced of such military contacts. They

included Alliance operations in the Gulf of Aden in recent years,

when China hosted and participated in related multilateral

conferences and planning.

While some in the West and, to a lesser degree, China have

suggested other potential areas of mutual interest, including

other maritime issues, Afghanistan, Central Asia and various

global security or non-traditional security challenges, these

have tended to remain at the conceptual level.

While some NATO Member States have more official,

extensive and sophisticated relations with China and its

military forces, in China, as hosts, or in the context of UN

peacekeeping or other multilateral concerns, at the NATO

level these have been limited, in part from residual historical

or ideological divisions and perceptions.

As in many regions of the globe, there is a wide arc that

encompasses the Asia-Pacific and the Euro-Asian continent,

so these are complex, sensitive and sometimes delicate issues.

Planners, policymakers, the entire security community, and

populations and other stakeholders all need to reflect on how

Mr David Fouquet is a senior Associate of the european institute for Asian studies, and an established Journalist covering foreign, security and economic relations. He has also worked as a lecturer and as a consultant for major international companies

to balance legitimate security concerns while maintaining

productive dialogues and relationships for stability.

The security dimension is a notoriously difficult enough

element to consider and deploy, but it is generally accepted that

there are no military solutions to the wider political-security-

economic-social dynamic. Nowhere has this been more

evident than in the more recent flare-up of tensions in the

Asia-Pacific region involving a number of countries over

their historic maritime sovereignty and territorial rivalries.

This friction between rival claimants to land and maritime

territories in the South China Sea, East China Sea and other

neighbouring waters has already involved the attention and

resources of numerous countries in the region, including

Western Alliance partners, other strategic partners, NATO

members and international institutions.

Although not entirely the stimulus and reasoning behind

the recent US ‘pivot’ or ‘re-balancing’ towards Asia, these tense

relationships not only have their role to play in the US decision,

but are also affected by the policy adopted by Washington.

The situations require more attention, time and patience, as

well as further internationalisation.

Although there may be no clear posture for the Alliance

to be directly involved in the existing and emerging security

architecture in the Asia-Pacific and the Eurasian continent,

the Alliance and its member states should be intellectually

and, to an appropriate degree, diplomatically engaged with

organisations such as ASEAN’s Regional Forum, the Shanghai

Cooperation Organisation and the newly emerging Conference

on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia.

Chinese peacekeeping soldiers prepare to leave for mali, december 2013. China has also hosted conferences relating to NATO’s gulf of Aden operations

Planners, policymakers, the entire security community and other

stakeholders need to reflect on how to balance security concerns while maintaining productive dialogues

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PrOmOTiNg NATO PArTNershiPs

After two decades in existence, the NATO Partnership

for Peace (PfP) programme, which is overseen by the

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), is still going strong,

despite the current difficulties with Russia and Ukraine. In

fact, there are countries such as Cyprus and Kosovo that are

lining up to join the programme in the near future. PfP is not

an alliance, as each country signs a bilateral agreement with

NATO that does not bind it to the other PfP members; nor does

it bind them to the articles of the 1949 Washington Treaty that

created NATO. It is one of three main wider forums that NATO

has instigated to assist and cooperate with its neighbours, the

other two being the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the

Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI).

Also 20 years old, the MD now comprises the countries of

Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.

The ICI, on the other hand, was launched a decade later in 2004

and is made up of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab

Emirates, with Saudi Arabia and Oman also showing some

interest. Each of these groupings represents a different region.

As the name suggests, the MD is based around the nations

bordering the Mediterranean Sea. The ICI is essentially made

up of countries of the Middle East, whereas PfP is focused on

Europe, particularly the former Soviet republics.

Countries that sign the bilateral agreement to become a PfP

participating state do so for different reasons. This was true

for the first batch of 23 countries that became signatories in

January 1994. Some nations signed up as a first step to joining

NATO itself – Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic,

Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia

and Slovenia. Others – in particular those traditionally neutral

countries such as Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta, Sweden and

Turkmenistan – are unlikely to become NATO members. They

join PfP in order to reap the benefits of the programme itself

Celebrating 20 years of the Partnership for

Peace programmeOn 11 January 2014, NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme marked

its 20th anniversary. Simon Michell takes a closer look at the initiative, assessing its aims and its growing scope

with regard to capacity-building and cooperation, as well as to

coordinate their overseas peacekeeping, humanitarian aid and

conflict operations where applicable.

Notably, Ireland, Finland and Sweden have played significant

roles in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force

(ISAF) coalition in Afghanistan. Russia, however, is never

likely to join NATO. That does not mean that it has not been

an active participant. Russian ships have participated in NATO’s

Operation Active Endeavour, which works to prevent terrorists

using the Mediterranean Sea to transport arms and personnel.

Just as NATO itself has gone through various stages

of enlargement, so has PfP, with new signatories in 1995

(Austria, Belarus, Malta and the Former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia), 1999 (Ireland), 2000 (Croatia), 2002 (Tajikistan)

and 2006 (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia).

PfP: raison d’êtreAccording to NATO, the aims and goals of PfP are simple and

wide-ranging: “Based on a commitment to the democratic

principles that underpin the Alliance itself, the purpose of the

Partnership for Peace is to increase stability, diminish threats

Most PfP countries have helped NATO in its overseas operations,

which, in these times of austerity, is an impressive level of commitment

Norwegian Sea

Greenland Sea

Arctic Ocean

Barents Sea

Kara Sea

NorthSea

BalticSea

Bay ofBiscay

Mediterranean Sea

Black Sea CaspianSea

RedSea

PersianGulf

Arabian Sea Bay ofBengal

Gulf of Guinea

Indian Ocean



PfP Member StatesThe NATO Partnership for Peace programme celebrated its 20th anniversary in January 2014

IrelandSwitzerland

Austria

Serbia

FYR Macedonia

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Malta

Moldova

Azerbaijan

Armenia

UzbekistanGeorgia

Kyrghyz Republic

Tajikistan

Turkmenistan

Belarus

Ukraine

Sweden

Finland Russia

Kazakhstan

Montenegro



to peace and build strengthened security relationships between

individual Euro-Atlantic partners and NATO, as well as among

partner countries.” NATO hopes to achieve this by engaging

with each country across a number of activities, which the

Alliance likes to refer to as a PfP ‘toolbox’. This toolbox has

more than 1,400 separate activities, from which each PfP state

can choose, split into the following three main sub-themes:

capacity-building, transformation support and wider issues.

Not surprisingly, the fundamental focus is on defence-

related activities, but it does also pull in aspects that are more

closely associated with the civilian activities of the PfP nation.

Domestically, it touches on the individual country’s efforts to

implement defence reform, policy and training, as well as civil-

military relations, education, civil-emergency planning and

disaster response. On the bilateral basis, it covers military-to-

military cooperation, including participation in joint exercises

and training, and cooperation within the fields of science and,

more recently, environmental issues. Each country chooses its

own pace and scope to suit its particular requirements.

Over the past 20 years, PfP has managed to attract the

vast majority of countries around the outer borders of NATO,

with the result that a common understanding between these

countries and NATO has been achieved, creating a far less

confrontational environment than existed throughout the

20 years that preceded the programme. Moreover, most of the

PfP countries have also helped NATO in its overseas operations,

which, in these times of austerity, demonstrates an impressive

level of commitment. Beyond operations, PfP has also supported

the reform of democratic defence sectors; funded the destruction

of ammunition and millions of mines and small arms; developed

NATO policies on women in peace and security; and cooperated

on the management of humanitarian emergencies.

Success and setbacksIn November 2010, NATO leaders decided that the success of

PfP had led to a need to streamline its activities in order to

make them more efficient and manageable. At the same time,

it was agreed that the activities contained within the toolbox

should also be offered on a wider basis – they are now available

to the MD and ICI partners.

Naturally, there have been some setbacks along the way.

One of the most challenging, but most important, relationships

NATO enjoys is with Russia. Here, the fundamental premise

that no PfP nation should use military aggression against its

neighbour for territorial gain was not adhered to when Russia

annexed the Crimea. NATO’s response to this was unequivocal.

“The basic principles of PfP include the commitment to refrain

from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity

or political independence of any state, to respect internationally

recognised borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means. In

that context, many participants deplored that one member of

the EAPC, Russia, had violated these principles, most recently

through the illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea and

its interference in Ukrainian affairs.” No doubt, this crisis will

be a major theme of the 2014 NATO summit in Wales.

Non-NATO contributors to ISAF meet NATO’s North Atlantic Council. General Philip Breedlove (right) talks to then acting Ukrainian Defence Minister Colonel General Mykhailo Koval (left) and Major General Anatolii Petrenko (centre), Ukraine’s military representative to NATO, in June 2014

The Turkish delegation distributes information about courses at the Turkish Partnership for Peace Training and Education Centre

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Recent turmoil in North Africa and Syria has focused attention on two of NATO’s regional partnership programmes: the Mediterranean Dialogue

and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. Simon Michell assesses the current status of the two activities

Bridging the Mediterranean Sea

Between them, members of the Mediterranean Dialogue

(MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)

account for 11 countries (MD: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,

Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia; ICI: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar

and United Arab Emirates) in two of the world’s most volatile

regions. It is no surprise, then, that both the MD and the ICI

have their roots in the same aspirations: NATO’s wish to help

strengthen regional stability, enhance international security and

improve governance along the shoreline of the Mediterranean

Sea and in the strategically important waters of the Persian

Gulf. While doing this, NATO is also attempting to dispel any

misconceptions that MD or ICI member countries may have

about the Alliance and its intentions.

With the exception of Lebanon, Libya and Syria, every

country that borders the Mediterranean is now a member of

either NATO, the MD or

the Partnership for Peace

(PfP) process, which places

the Alliance’s vast array of

tools and expertise at their

disposal. Looking specifically

at the MD partners,

Mauritania is currently

exceptional in that it is not

a Mediterranean state, but,

due to the strategic importance of two nearby islands groups –

Portugal’s Madeira Islands and the Spanish Canary Islands – it

was invited to join the forum. This is not as strange as it might

first appear as, right from the outset, the MD was open

to countries beyond the Mediterranean coast.

The ICI partners are made up of four of the six Gulf

Cooperation Council (GCC) states, with Saudi Arabia and

Oman declining the offer to participate in the process,

but nevertheless indicating an interest in it and frequently

participating in discussions. Again, like the MD, the ICI is

open for new members to join.

This year is an important one for the MD and the ICI, with

the MD celebrating its 20th anniversary and the ICI its 10th.

As well as the age difference, there are significant variations

in the structures and agendas of the two organisations. The

seven nation states of the MD process interact with NATO

on bilateral and multilateral bases, meaning that the 28 NATO

states meet with the MD countries on a 28-plus-one basis, as

well as within a group: 28 plus seven. ICI, on the other hand,

only operates bilaterally: a methodology more akin to the PfP

model. Both programmes, however, are supervised by NATO’s

new Political Partnerships Committee, as is the PfP programme.

To give an example of how this works and the scope of the

cooperation, political consultations in the MD NATO-plus-one

format are held on a regular basis, both at the ambassadorial

and working levels. These discussions provide an opportunity

for sharing views on a range

of issues relevant to the

security situation

in the Mediterranean,

as well as on the further

development of the political

and practical cooperation

dimensions of the ‘dialogue’.

Meetings in the NATO-

plus-seven (including the

North Atlantic Council-plus-seven) format are also held on

a regular basis, often following NATO summits, ministerial

meetings, chiefs of defence meetings and other major NATO

events. These meetings represent an opportunity for two-way

political consultations between NATO and MD partners.

A practical set of goals and activitiesWhen the ICI was established, as a result of discussions that

took place during the highly successful Istanbul NATO Summit

in June 2004, it was agreed that the basis for the relationship

would be on the same ethical and political principles as the

Both the MD and the ICI have their roots in NATO’s wish to help

strengthen regional stability

61nAto Securing our world


The conflict in Syria has changed the political environment in the Middle East, prompting NATO to consider how the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative processes can be transformed

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MD (non-discrimination, self-differentiation, inclusiveness,

two-way engagement, non-imposition, complementary and

mutual reinforcement and diversity), but with a more practical

set of goals and activities than originally existed with the MD.

However, the establishment of the ICI on this more active

basis also led to a rethink of the MD model, resulting in what

is known as Enhanced MD, with the consequence that the

MD member states were given access to a significantly larger

set of the activities within NATO’s toolbox that was already

on offer to the PfP nations. This process continued to evolve

until, at their Berlin meeting in April 2011, NATO foreign

ministers endorsed the establishment of a single Partnership

Cooperation Menu (PCM) for all partners. As of 1 January 2012,

the single-partnership menu became effective, thus dramatically

expanding the number of activities accessible to MD countries.

In practice, this means that MD and ICI countries are able

to participate in military exercises, as well as request assistance

with a wide range of activities, from defence modernisation and

civil-emergency planning to border security, counterterrorism

and the prevention of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

proliferation. To a large but perhaps differing extent, these

partnerships have managed to increase stability and security

in both regions. Moreover, they have helped to draw ICI

members in particular into NATO operations, with Qatar and

the UAE joining in the NATO-led, United Nations-mandated

operation to protect civilians during the Libyan conflict.

Bahrain and the UAE also participated in the International

Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

However, the Arab spring, of which the Libyan unrest was

a significant element, and the Syrian civil war, which started a

year later in 2011, have changed the political environment in

the region. This has forced NATO into considering how the

MD and ICI processes can be transformed. In addition, the

Alliance will need to carefully monitor MD and ICI members

as the process of revolution and counter-revolution continues

to play out. The tendency for some of these governments to

become more authoritarian is a risk that may lead to NATO

being regarded as legitimising this trend.

Despite some tangible successes over the decades, there is

an undoubted need for change in the two programmes. Just as

the 2004 Istanbul summit was a major turning point in NATO’s

relations with these two regions, the 2014 summit in Wales

should seize the moment and deliver a step change in the

relationship between this growing number of NATO and

non-NATO partner states.

In May 2014, a group of high-level representatives from Morocco visited NATO HQ to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Mediterranean Dialogue

Istanbul Cooperation Initiative: key principles

■■ Non-discrimination: all partners are offered the same basis for their cooperation with NATO;

■■ Self-differentiation: allowing a tailored approach for MD and ICI countries. Individual Cooperation Programmes (ICP) allow interested countries and NATO to frame their practical cooperation in a more prospective and focused way, enabling them to outline the short- and long-term objectives of cooperation with the Alliance, in accordance with NATO’s objectives and policies;

■■ Inclusiveness: all countries should see themselves as shareholders of the same cooperative effort;

■■ Two-way engagement: the agreements are a ‘two-way partnership’, where NATO seeks partners’ contributions for its success through regular consultations; special emphasis is placed on practical cooperation;

■■ Non-imposition: partners are free to choose the pace and extent of their cooperation with the Alliance. NATO has no wish to impose anything upon them;

■■ Complementarity and mutual reinforcement: efforts for the region are complementary and mutually reinforcing in nature; and

■■ Diversity: the agreements respect and take into account the specific regional, cultural and political contexts of the respective partners.

Source: NATO

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NATO and the European Union have each created expeditionary battlegroups. Martin Temperley considers how the two

units complement one another

Best of both worlds

While the NATO Alliance remains the main defence

organisation capable of collectively protecting Europe, the

European Union (EU), which is primarily a political-economic

partnership, has developed the EU Battlegroup (EUBG) concept.

In 1999, the EU Common Security and Defence Policy emerged

from earlier Western European Union agreements, and in 2004

the EU Battlegroup was agreed. The concept has been brought

to a point where a solely European-composed combat force

could be deployed to respond to certain emergencies.

EU Battlegroups are land forces, based on battalion-sized

combat formations drawn from EU member states, and can

be armour or infantry based. The EU’s declared intention is

to deploy BGs to conduct operations under United Nations

Security Council Resolutions, or directly if, for instance,

the protection and evacuation of EU citizens were required.

The EUBGs were declared operational in 2007, and two out

of the 18 are planned to be held available at any time. They

are not standing forces, but, instead, units are earmarked for

expeditionary deployment. Live-fire exercises and combined

exercises have been conducted, but no operational deployment

of an EUBG has yet been made.

Politicians, military analysts, academic researchers and

officials have expended thousands of words in discussing the

relative values of NATO forces and the EUBGs, and particularly

the existence of the EUBGs alongside the developing NATO

Response Force. NATO’s longest mission, the 13-year

Alliance-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in

Afghanistan, is winding down, and the NATO Response Force

(NRF) is now becoming more purposeful, just as the EUBGs

are coming available for deployment. The risk might be that a

shortage of deployable forces at a time of budgetary cutbacks

across Europe and North America could make this difficult.

A Greek Special Forces instructor shows a Spanish soldier how to perform a takedown on a hostile crew member of a suspect vessel

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In certain geographical areas, EU Battlegroups could be applied where US or NATO involvement

would not be appropriate

For member governments, there is no particular competition

or contradiction, as one quotation from a recent British

parliamentary report makes clear: “NATO is still the only

credible defence community capable of the territorial defence

of Europe, and of engaging in those conflicts that are complex,

medium- or large-scale, or require sophisticated operations. It

is essential that the United States continues to participate in

the defence of Europe through NATO.”

Clear applications for deployment It is, for many members, a matter of scale and capability. The

EUBGs’ battalion-scaled forces have clear applications for

deployment in certain humanitarian missions, and mixed

civilian and military operations. Such forces are suitable

for short-term deployments. Limited peacekeeping rather

than peace-making operations are favoured by a force of

this composition. That said, EUBGs certainly require airlift

capability, and possibly the support of sea-based and Special

Forces elements. In certain geographical areas, for example

parts of Africa and the Middle East, EUBGs may be able to

be applied where US or NATO involvement would not be

appropriate. In addition to humanitarian operations, EU

missions might include policing, monitoring and training.

The UK parliamentary report says: “In the medium term the

EU should concentrate on these classes of operations, and

ensure they are delivered successfully.”

Operation Artemis is frequently held up as a pioneering

example of this, being a French-led EU mission to the

Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003, before the EUBGs

emerged. A small force of 1,800 operational personnel, mostly

French, later boosted with some Swedish Special Forces, were

deployed swiftly and decisively after a UN call for assistance.

At that time, a breakdown of civil order made it necessary to

secure the airport, and to protect refugees and civilians in the

town of Bunia, where a massacre was feared. The operation

was successfully completed

in about eight weeks.

Austrian, Cypriot and Irish

personnel served at the

Artemis headquarters. It

was claimed to be the first

autonomous EU military

mission outside Europe.

In contrast to EUBGs,

the NRF is a joint-brigade,

scaled formation comprising

three battlegroups (defined as much larger than EUBGs) with

appropriate support. It has around 13,000 soldiers, further

supported by a naval force drawn from established NATO

maritime groups, combat aircraft and ground support aircraft,

and Special Operations Forces. If required, a task force capable

of chemical, biological and nuclear defence operations can be

added. A major exercise is scheduled for the NRF in 2015, and

its importance will grow as the NATO Alliance transforms

its military effectiveness. NATO has moved away from the

concept of large massed forces. The NRF is intended to further

reflect this with better training, improved leadership and the

application of advanced technology. Elements of the NRF have

already been deployed on disaster-relief missions in the US

(following Hurricane Katrina) and in Pakistan after a major

earthquake struck the country in 2005. Operational command

alternates between Joint Forces Command in Brunssum, the

Netherlands, and Naples, Italy.

Charter stipulationsWhile the membership of the EU and NATO mostly overlaps

(with 21 nations being members of both), there are some

exceptions. Non-NATO Sweden, for instance, is, in fact, an

EU member. Finland is similarly EU and non-NATO. Norway

is a NATO member, but not a member of the EU, and the same

applies to Turkey. Part of the charter forming the EUBGs

demanded that there should be no duplication of what was

done under NATO (with its

established headquarters

and commands), and no

decoupling from the US and

NATO, while it is stipulated

that no discrimination be

applied against non-EU

members such as Turkey.

Some capability could

be gained for Europe if

countries outside NATO

with a background of non-alignment or neutrality – Sweden

being an example – committed to the EUBG, and it is hard to

argue that this would damage NATO.

It would also be hard to find any European who would deny

that the exceptional military-technological capability of the

US was a cornerstone of NATO’s own capability. And if the

underlying long-term agenda is to uncouple European defence

from the US, EU and NATO insiders alike always emphasise

that it is important to remember that the North Atlantic

Alliance includes a North American member that is not the

US: Canada – stable, eurocentric in background and policy,

and a deeply dedicated peacekeeper nation.

NATO’s Response Force will grow in importance after the military operation in Afghanistan draws to a close at the end of 2014

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66 nato Securing our world

Without oil and gas, Europe would grind to a halt. Simon Michell reveals how NATO is working alongside its partners to ensure that these vital supplies get through the Strait of Hormuz to the Mediterranean Sea

and then on to their final destinations

Safeguarding energy supplies

In its most recent figures for the first quarter of 2014, the

International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported 49 incidents

of piracy on the high seas. This was the lowest figure since 2007,

when it reported 41. At its highpoint, more than 400 attacks

or attempted attacks were taking place per year (445 in 2010

and 439 in 2011). Much of the reason for this reduction in the

number of incidents is the increase in the number of countries

cooperating to monitor the situation and send naval vessels to

protect shipping – particularly in the Mediterranean Sea and

the waters that connect the Persian Gulf to the Suez Canal.

Although there was much to be encouraged about in the

IMB report, it nevertheless cited the example of an incident in

January 2014 when a tanker was fired upon approximately 115

miles off the coast of Oman from a skiff launched from a mother

vessel. Thankfully, the attack was repelled and the international

navies that were patrolling the waters subsequently intercepted

the skiff’s mother ship – an Indian dhow that had itself been

hijacked only a few days previously. Some 11 Indian crew

members were freed and five suspected pirates apprehended.

This incident clearly demonstrates the essential role of the

international navies in containing the threat of Somali piracy.

The IMB, however, is insistent that, despite the drop in pirate

attacks, the international maritime presence must be maintained.

In the words of IMB Director Pottengal Mukundan, “there can

therefore be no room for complacency as it will take only one

successful Somali hijacking for the business model to return”.

These waters are of paramount international relevance,

as they are perhaps the single most important transit lane

for energy supplies on the planet – almost 20 per cent of

the world’s oil and gas is shipped through them.

International maritime security operations As the largest military alliance in the world, NATO undertakes

widespread security operations in various regional locations

worldwide. Stabilisation and peacekeeping are key roles for

many of these missions, but energy security also represents

a significant part of the operations that the Alliance carries

out – particularly maritime security operations.

At the Bucharest NATO Summit in April 2008, the allies

were presented with a report entitled ‘NATO’s Role in Energy

Security’, which outlined guiding principles, options and

recommendations for activities. Since then, the impetus has been

maintained and, in 2013, the NATO Energy Security Centre of

Excellence was opened in Vilnius, Lithuania. At the inauguration

ceremony, Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated:

“Energy security is not a call to arms. But, when it comes to

understanding the security implications of global resource

developments, NATO must be ahead of the curve.”

In principle, there are five main areas where NATO assists

in the international effort to safeguard energy supplies:■■ information and intelligence fusion and sharing;■■ projecting stability;■■ advancing international and regional cooperation; ■■ supporting consequence management; and ■■ supporting the protection of critical infrastructure.

That said, much of the critical infrastructure related to oil

and gas is located at sea, including drilling rigs, distribution

platforms, pipelines and, of course, the tankers that ship the

energy supplies around the world.

The increased naval presence in the waters around the Horn of Africa

has managed to reduce considerably the incidence of attacks

67nato Securing our world


This Japanese oil tanker sustained damage as it passed through the Strait of Hormuz in what was believed to have been a terrorist attack. Some 20 per cent of the world’s energy supplies must transit the narrow stretch of water

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2014 FUTURE LEADERS

Summit • Wales20

14 FUTURE LEADERSSummit • Wales

The Atlantic Council wishes to congratulatethe delegates participating in the

Future Leaders Summit alongside the NATO Summit in Wales.

Representing 34 countries in North America, Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, and Asia, the delegates are CEOs and entrepreneurs,

civil society leaders, parliamentary staff, senior government advisors, diplomats,

and military personnel and veterans.

Follow the delegates on Twitter with #FutureNATO.

For more information, please visit AtlanticCouncil.org.

Thank you to our partners for making the Future Leaders Summit possible: Robert J. Abernethy, NATO, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Allied Command

Transformation, Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Washington, DC, Airbus Group, The Scowcroft Group, US Mission to NATO, and Julie Finley.

2014 FUTURE LEADERS

Summit • Wales20

14 FUTURE LEADERSSummit • Wales

The Atlantic Council wishes to congratulatethe delegates participating in the

Future Leaders Summit alongside the NATO Summit in Wales.

Representing 34 countries in North America, Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, and Asia, the delegates are CEOs and entrepreneurs,

civil society leaders, parliamentary staff, senior government advisors, diplomats,

and military personnel and veterans.

Follow the delegates on Twitter with #FutureNATO.

For more information, please visit AtlanticCouncil.org.

Thank you to our partners for making the Future Leaders Summit possible: Robert J. Abernethy, NATO, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Allied Command

Transformation, Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Washington, DC, Airbus Group, The Scowcroft Group, US Mission to NATO, and Julie Finley.

69nato Securing our world


NATO’s Maritime Command (MARCOM) at Northwood,

London, is the headquarters for the Alliance’s counter-piracy

and anti-terrorist naval activity. Its main area of operations is

in the Mediterranean Sea, through which 65 per cent of energy

supplies to Western Europe pass either above or below the water

(undersea pipelines carry oil from Libya to Italy and Morocco

to Spain). Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), launched in

2001, when Article 5 of the NATO treaty was invoked for the

first time following the attacks on New York’s Twin Towers

and the Pentagon building in Washington, has a remit to

monitor potential terrorist activity in the Mediterranean.

Standing NATO Maritime Groups 1 and 2 are used in OAE,

with non-NATO navies now also participating. So far, more

than 115,000 vessels have been hailed and, of these, some

162 have been boarded by OAE sailors.

The other major NATO maritime operation – also supervised

from Northwood – is Operation Ocean Shield (OOS), which

patrols the waters south of the Suez Canal, the southern

approaches of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea,

and along a corridor shadowing the Somali coastline. This has

a specific remit to, “provide naval escorts and deterrence, while

increasing cooperation with other counter-piracy operations

in the area in order to optimise efforts and tackle the evolving

pirate trends and tactics”. As already mentioned, the increased

naval presence in the waters around the Horn of Africa has

managed to reduce considerably the incidence of attacks.

So much so that, in June 2014, the North Atlantic Council

extended Operation Ocean Shield until the end of 2016.

A vital element of the maritime security work that NATO

carries out in the energy security field is that of encouraging

non-NATO navies to participate. The areas involved are so

vast that it requires a much broader coalition to maintain a

credible presence. Both OAE and OOS regularly interoperate

with foreign navies outside the Alliance, among them Australia,

Georgia, India, Israel, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi

Arabia and Ukraine.

In addition, the European Union’s own anti-piracy force

(EUNAVFOR) undertakes a complementary mission under

the name Operation Atalanta, which involves a considerable

amount of coordination and collaboration between the two

forces. Added to that is the Combined Task Force (CTF) 151,

which operates in the same waters under a counter-piracy remit.

Controlled out of Bahrain, the CTFs 150, 151 and 152 are units

within a non-political grouping of 30 countries that are also

involved in maritime security operations. Many of the NATO

nations also contribute to Op Atalanta and the CTFs with the

result that interoperability has become a much easier process.

NATO, alongside its partners and friends, has shown that

it is possible to counter piracy proliferation if the political will

exists. However, the waters around the Arabian Sea may be safer

now, but the piracy problem remains a challenge in South-East

Asia, where the majority of pirate attacks currently take place.

Another hotspot that is growing in intensity is off the West

African coast. It remains to be seen whether the political will

that was mustered to protect shipping in the waters off the

Middle East can be achieved elsewhere. NATo’s operation ocean Shield, which patrols the waters south of the Suez Canal, is helping to contain piracy off the coast of Somalia

Launched in 2001, NATo’s operation Active endeavour keeps a close watch for terrorist activity in the Mediterranean Sea

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Chris Aaron reviews the development of NATO’s counterterrorism role since 2001, and the focus of its new counterterrorism policy

Confronting terrorism

NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept identified terrorism as a

threat to Alliance security. However, it emphasised that the

threat was as much an issue of ‘force protection’ as of national

security, and was only one of a range of security concerns,

such as weapons proliferation and peripheral instability, that

dominated in the post-Cold War security environment

Clearly, NATO’s role in countering terrorism was under

discussion, but the fundamental impetus for adopting a

counterterrorism policy came with the 9/11 attacks on the United

States, which led to the invocation of Article 5 on 12 September

2001. Edgar Buckley’s article in the summer 2006 issue of NATO

Review provides a fascinating, first-hand account of that decision.

The invocation of Article 5 paved the way for NATO to bring

its political and military capabilities to the table in response

to the terrorist attack. On 4 October 2001, NATO agreed

eight measures to support the US, measures that significantly

anticipated the terrorism role and policy that the Alliance

subsequently adopted, as well as forming the basis for two

antiterrorism missions: the deployment of NATO AWACS to

the US, and Operation Active Endeavour to patrol the eastern

Mediterranean to deter terrorist activity and illegal trafficking

(a mission that continues in expanded form to this day).

NATO summits in 2002 further developed the doctrinal

basis for its engagement with terrorism: Reykjavik ended

the debate on out-of-area operations and facilitated NATO

support for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

and operations elsewhere, while the Prague Summit approved

the development of NATO’s Military Concept for Defence

Against Terrorism (MCDAT).

This decade-long process of resetting NATO’s stance from

one of territorial defence to security guarantor reached its

culmination, or at least maturity, with regard to terrorism,

at the Chicago Summit in May 2012, when the organisation

approved policy guidelines on counterterrorism, subtitled

‘Aware, Capable and Engaged for a Safer Future’.

NATO’s ACEThe MCDAT identified four roles: antiterrorism – essentially

defensive measures; counterterrorism – primarily offensive

measures; consequence management, mitigating the effects

of a terrorist attack once it has taken place; and military

cooperation. Given that, in most NATO states, it is civil

authorities – such as police, security services and customs

– that have the lead on terrorism, MCDAT also stated that

NATO should deepen its collaboration with civil authorities to

maximise its effectiveness against terrorism, while respecting

national and institutional responsibilities.

The policy guidelines on counterterrorism present these

roles and wider issues, under the three pillars of awareness,

capability and engagement (ACE).

Awareness: Given its experience of managing shared security

and sensitive information among a host of national members,

NATO is in a position to improve a common understanding

of terrorist threats and vulnerabilities among allies through

consultation, the enhanced sharing of information and

intelligence, continuous strategic analysis, and assessments

in support of national authorities.

The Emerging Security Challenges Division, created in

NATO headquarters in August 2010, acts as a locus for the

assessment of non-traditional risks and challenges, including

terrorism, in a cross-cutting manner. The NATO Intelligence

Liaison Unit (ILU), also created in 2010, has resulted in an

improved flow of terrorism analysis to the North Atlantic

Council. Through the ILU in Brussels, and the intelligence

liaison cell at Allied Command Operations in Mons, Belgium,

analytical approaches to terrorism and its links with other

The invocation of Article 5 paved the way for NATO to bring its

political and military capabilities to the table in response to 9/11



transnational threats have been enhanced, as has cooperation

among the NATO civilian and military intelligence components

and intelligence-sharing with partners.

Capability: Providing member states with the capability

to deter, defend against and respond to terrorist attacks is

another core function that NATO is well placed to deliver. Its

knowledge and operational experience in the fields of airspace

security, air defence, maritime security, CBRN (chemical,

biological, radiological and nuclear) response, non-proliferation

of weapons of mass destruction, protection of critical

infrastructure and use of special forces is well established.

Through the Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work

(DAT POW), NATO aims to accelerate capability developments,

and innovative technologies and methods that address

asymmetric threats such as terrorism in a more comprehensive

and informed way. DAT POW uses new or adapted technologies

or methods to detect, disrupt and defeat asymmetric threats

under three capability umbrellas: incident management,

force protection/survivability and network engagement. The

Centres of Excellence (CoE) structure, established as part of

the Alliance transformation programme, will also contribute

to capability and the sharing of lessons learnt, particularly

through the Defence Against Terrorism CoE in Turkey, the

HUMINT (Human Intelligence) CoE in Romania, and others.

The training, education and exercises based on different

threat scenarios organised by CoEs, as well as bodies such

as the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, and the

NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy, will continue to

improve interoperability by assimilating lessons learnt and

best practices. These capabilities may also be offered to allies

(on request) in support of civil-emergency planning and the

protection of critical infrastructure, particularly as it may

relate to counterterrorism.

NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Programme also

contributes to developing new technologies for antiterrorism.

The STANDEX project has been highlighted as a particular

success. In a joint development with Russia, under the auspices

of the NATO-Russia Council, scientists have successfully field-

tested a stand-off explosives-detection system that can be used

in crowded spaces, such as transit systems or sports venues, to

identify suspicious packages or individuals. While the system

is now being developed for commercial production, further

research is planned for wider applications for the detection

techniques and systems to disrupt detected devices.

Engagement: Information-sharing, consultations, exercises,

education and Centres of Excellence all contribute to NATO’s

abilities to counter terrorism, and serve to improve the

capabilities of member states, but NATO recognises that

combating terrorism requires a holistic approach by the

international community. The Alliance aims to strengthen its

cooperation with partner countries as well as international

and regional organisations, in particular the United

Nations, European Union and Organization for Security

and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), in accordance with the

Comprehensive Approach Action Plan. The UN Global Counter-

Terrorism Strategy, international conventions and protocols

against terrorism, together with the relevant UN resolutions,

provide a common framework for efforts to combat terrorism.

NATO works closely with the UN Counter-Terrorism

Committee and its executive directorate, as well as with the

Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and many of

its relevant component organisations, and has also established

close relations with the OSCE’s Transnational Threats

Department’s Action Against Terrorism Unit.

The Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T),

which was adopted at the Prague Summit in November 2002,

provides a framework for practical cooperation between NATO

and partner countries. The action plan defines partnership

roles as well as instruments to fight terrorism and manage its

consequences. For instance, NATO and partner countries work

together to improve the safety of airspace, including through

exchange of data and coordination procedures related to the

handling of possible terrorist threats. Originally developed

under the auspices of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council,

the PAP-T has since been opened to participation of all partner

countries. With the terrorist threat rising steadily in the US

and Europe, NATO has a pivotal role to play in ensuring the

safety of not just its citizens, but also those of its partners.

operation active endeavour was established as one of NaTo’s anti-terrorism measures following the invocation of article 5 in 2001

displaced Iraqis receive food from a charity in a refugee camp outside of arbil. The recent emergence of IsIs (now ‘the Islamic state’) in syria and Iraq has set alarm bells ringing across the West

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NATO has been leading a peacekeeping operation in Kosovo since June 1999 as part of a wider effort to bring security and stability to the Balkans.

Mike Bryant reviews the progress

Moving forward on Kosovo

On 3 April 2014, the upper airspace over Kosovo was

reopened to civilian flights. Hungary’s air navigation

service provider, Hungarocontrol, is acting as a technical

enabler, although airspace will remain under NATO/KFOR

(Kosovo Force) jurisdiction.

According to NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh

Rasmussen, “the reopening of the upper airspace in Kosovo

is a significant step that benefits the entire western Balkans”.

It is thought that up to 180,000 civilian flights a year could be

better off as a result, with shorter routes meaning reduced

flight times as well as various consequential economic and

environmental benefits.

The reopening of Kosovo’s airspace forms part of a NATO-

led aviation normalisation process covering the wider western

Balkans region, an effort that has encompassed not only NATO

and the Government of Hungary, but also many neighbouring

states, the European air traffic management organisation

Eurocontrol, and several other partners.

Ethnic Albanians flee a Serb advance through the Drenica region, Kosovo, in March 1999. The conflict turned thousands of people into refugees

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KFOR first deployed into Kosovo on 12 June 1999, just two days

after the suspension of the 78-day Operation Allied Force NATO

air campaign over Kosovo that was designed to end the conflict in

the region, which had turned thousands of people into refugees.

PeacekeepingOperation Allied Force was halted following the signing of

a military technical agreement (MTA) between NATO and

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The same day as the air

campaign ceased, 10 June 1999, the UN Security Council

Resolution 1244 welcomed Yugoslavia’s acceptance of the

principles of a political solution, including an immediate end

to violence. UNSCR 1244 also agreed the deployment of an

international force to maintain the peace, one that featured

substantial NATO involvement. KFOR – a peace enforcement

(more commonly known as ‘peacekeeping’) mission operated

under Chapter VII of the UN Charter – draws its mandate

from that MTA and UNSCR 1244.

Today, KFOR incorporates approximately 5,000 soldiers

from up to 31 countries. It has remained in situ despite Kosovo’s

unilateral declaration of independence that was announced in

February 2008; indeed, its role grew around that time, NATO

agreeing in June of that year to take on the missions of both

standing down the local Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and

creating a new multi-ethnic, lightly armed force called the

Kosovo Security Force (KSF), which has the tasks of providing

crisis response and assistance to civil authorities in the case

of natural or other emergencies, explosive ordnance disposal

(EOD) and assisting in civil protection. KSF was declared

fully operational by the North Atlantic Council in July 2013.

NATO has also helped in the creation of the body that

exercises civilian control over the KSF. While primary

responsibility for that lies with NATO Headquarters in

Brussels, KFOR continues to support the NATO advisory

team in Pristina, the capital of and largest city in Kosovo.

A further development in April 2013 saw Belgrade and

Pristina ink a ‘normalisation’ agreement, which has tangibly

helped to improve relations between Serbia and Kosovo.

Yet, at its core, KFOR’s mission remains what it was in 1999:

peacekeeping. Initially deployed to protect ethnic Albanians

from ‘ethnic cleansing’ (among a number of other missions,

such as to demilitarise the Kosovo Liberation Army [KLA]

and support the international humanitarian effort in the area),

it has equally sought to protect ethnic Serbs from a similar fate.

Its focus on preventing ethnic strife and protecting

ethnic minorities has caused it to mount regular patrols

near threatened communities, as well as man checkpoints

in vulnerable localities. It has also acted to protect sites of

historical value, although – in what is known as a process of

To check on progress, nATo Supreme Allied commander Europe general Philip M Breedlove visited KFor in Pristina in november 2013

There has been a gradual transfer of responsibility for security at cultural

heritage sites away from KFOR and towards the Kosovo Police

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‘unfixing’ – there has been a gradual transfer of responsibility

for security at religious and cultural heritage sites away from

KFOR and into the hands of the Kosovo Police.

RestructuringIndeed, the ongoing improvement in relations between the

various ethnic and political parties in Kosovo (although it is

worth noting that there have been a number of armed clashes

and this improvement has been by no means smooth nor

constant) has allowed NATO to adopt a policy of reducing

KFOR’s presence on the ground as a static force wherever

possible, instead focusing on operational flexibility and

effective intelligence collection to cope with any threats.

KFOR has gradually adjusted its force posture into what is

described by NATO as a “deterrence presence”.

Troop reductions are decided by the North Atlantic

Council (NAC) on the basis of conditions on the ground,

and are therefore not driven by a timetable. At 5,000 strong,

KFOR’s current manpower level is roughly only 10 per cent

of the 50,000 troops that made up the force when it was

originally deployed back in 1999.

In keeping the peace, KFOR continues to cooperate closely

with the United Nations and European Union, as well as other

relevant international agencies as appropriate, in order to support

the development of a democratic, multi-ethnic, peaceful Kosovo.

KFOR was initially stood up as four multinational brigades

(MNBs), one in the east, one in the centre, one in the north-

east and the last of the quartet in the south-west. In 2006,

a reorganisation brought a move to five regionally based

multinational task forces (MNTFs) and further change in

February 2010 saw a switch to mission-tailored multinational

battle groups (MNBGs). Further change was just around

the corner, however, and, in October 2010, KFOR adopted

its present structure of just two MNBGs. With MNBG East

headquartered at Camp Bondsteel near Urosevac, and MNBG

West headquartered at Camp Villagio Italia in Pec, HQ KFOR

remains at Camp Film City in Pristina.

Highly mobile and able to rapidly deploy at the first signs

of trouble, the battle groups are each composed of numerous

companies that are based at various camps throughout Kosovo.

NATO also maintains a reserve force that can quickly provide

reinforcement as and when it is required.

KFOR is led by Commander KFOR (COMKFOR), who reports

to the Commander of Joint Force Command Naples (COMJFCN).

The current COMKFOR is Major General Salvatore Farina, who

assumed the command in September 2013.

KFor currently operates with 5,000 personnel, 10 per cent of the original force

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NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre is responsible for coordinating disaster-relief efforts among the Alliance’s member and partner countries. Mike Bryant highlights how it handles

the task with fortitude and skill

NATO’s disaster response

Representing NATO’s principal civil-emergency response

mechanism throughout the entire Euro-Atlantic region –

for 28 NATO members and 22 partner countries – the Euro-

Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC)

operates 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.

Handling requests for assistance and coordinating the

response to both natural and man-made disasters, EADRCC

forwards any requests for assistance to NATO and partner

countries that, in response, communicate any offers of help

back to the centre and/or the country affected by the disaster.

Using its Aidmatrix software system, it maintains a record of

assistance offered, assistance accepted, assistance still required,

relevant dates, and the evolving situation in disaster-affected

areas. Relevant information is fed to NATO and its partner

countries in the form of daily situation reports, as well as

being published on the NATO website.

International operationsAll of the centre’s work is undertaken in close cooperation with

the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian

Affairs (OCHA), which holds the primary role in coordinating

international disaster-relief efforts. It also liaises closely

with NATO non-military authorities and with other relevant

international agencies. As such, EADRCC acts as a regional

coordinating mechanism, supporting and complementing

UN relief operations, rather than directing them.

When a disaster occurs that requires international

assistance, EADRCC submits requests – it does not dictate – to

NATO members and partners as to what assistance they might

provide based on the information that the centre can offer. And,

of course, the authorities in the stricken country will remain

the primary responsible party for disaster management.

EADRCC forms part of the International Staff Operations

Division based at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, and is

headed by the director of civil-emergency planning. Established

in 1998 by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the

centre was created to form one half of a twin-element strategy

to coordinate the EAPC’s response to international disaster

relief. The other element is the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response

Unit (EADRU), a non-standing multinational force of civilian

and military elements that are deployable in the event of a

disaster in any EAPC country.

In the early part of its existence, EADRCC was heavily

involved in coordinating the humanitarian assistance effort

of EAPC nations supporting refugees from the Kosovo War.

Since then, it has responded to more than 60 requests for

assistance, most frequently relating to natural disasters, and

– since 2004 – has coordinated assistance from NATO and

partner nations in 40 different emergencies. For example, it

helped in the response to the impact of Hurricane Katrina in the

United States in 2005 and the massive Pakistani floods of 2010.

Most recently, in June 2014, EADRCC received a second request

for assistance from Turkey in regard to the large numbers of

Syrian refugees who had crossed the border into the country,

fleeing from the fighting in their country. Just a month prior

to that, in May, it responded to a request for assistance from

Bosnia and Herzegovina in respect to flooding in that region.

EADRCC operates with a small staff of fewer than 10, but

this complement can be augmented by additional civilian or

military NATO personnel or with EAPC delegations to NATO.

The centre also exploits the experience and knowledge of

national civil experts that can be called on to provide it with

advice and information as required.

NATO regards EADRCC as an example of what can be

achieved when Alliance members and partners work closely

together. It allows smaller and poorer, as well as larger and

richer, countries to actively participate in disaster-response

efforts; in so doing, many NATO partners – previously purely

recipients of Alliance support – have also become valued

contributors to its civilian operations.

The exercises conducted on an annual basis under

the EADRCC umbrella are intended to foster improved



Those affected by the 2010 floods in Pakistan received assistance from NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC)

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collaboration between NATO, Partnership for Peace (PfP)

and other partner countries participating in them. They offer

practice in standard disaster-response procedures and develop

the interoperability and capability skills of the EADRU. They

are among the largest and most complex civilian protection

training opportunities, bringing together both military

and civilian teams in exercises that are designed to be as

challenging and realistic as possible. They take in scenarios

as wide-ranging as flooding, storms and CBRN (chemical,

biological, radiological and nuclear) threat simulations. So

far, EADRCC has held large-scale exercises in NATO member

and partner countries, including Armenia, Croatia, Finland,

Georgia, Italy, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Romania, the Russian

Federation, Turkey, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

Expanding mandateAs well as its primary responsibilities of coordinating the

responses of EAPC countries to disasters occurring in

their regions, maintaining close liaison with various UN

and European Union bodies, and acting as a focal point for

information-sharing among the relevant bodies involved in

emergency response, EADRCC also has a number of day-

to-day operational tasks that it very quickly assumed after

its formation. These have included working with the UN

Military and Civil Defence Unit (MCDU) to maintain a list of

national civil and military elements for which EAPC members

have indicated potential availability, and conditions for their

involvement in EADRU operations, and facilitating the rapid

deployment of EADRU into disaster areas as and when required.

Moreover, amendments to the centre’s remit have come about

as a result of changes in the military operational environment.

Thus, since the terrorist attacks in the US of 11 September

2001, EADRCC has been tasked with the coordination of

international assistance from EAPC countries to help deal

with the consequences of CBRN incidents, including terrorist

attacks involving such weapons.

Then, in 2004, the North Atlantic Council widened

EADRCC’s mandate to include the handling of requests for

assistance from the Afghan Government in the event of a

natural disaster. In 2007, that remit was extended once more

to incorporate those same provisions in respect of all areas in

which NATO had been involved militarily.

Clearly, while the EADRCC’s mandate has evolved and

grown over the years, the centre has continued to play a pivotal

role in supporting disaster relief work in countries right across

the Euro-Atlantic zone.

syrian refugees arrive in Turkey. EADRCC has responded to Turkish requests for assistance with the flood of refugees from its neighbour

Since the Kosovo War, EADRCC has responded to more than 60 requests

for assistance, most frequently relating to natural disasters

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strengthening military capabilities


Professor Julian Lindley-French, senior fellow of the Institute of Statecraft, examines the implications of more than a decade of war in Afghanistan, and argues that NATO must go back to its first

principles if it is to counter diverse 21st-century threats

Rebalancing NATO forces

“The enemy may be seen or unseen… it is not massed

tanks on the European mainland we need, but the latest

in cyberwarfare, unmanned aircraft technology and Special

Forces capability.” In announcing an additional £1.1 billion

expenditure on the United Kingdom’s Armed Forces on

14 July 2014, UK Prime Minister David Cameron captured the

essential dilemma NATO and the forces of its member states

face: what to plan for? As host of the September 2014 NATO

Wales Summit, Cameron is fully aware of the choices faced

by the Alliance as it pulls out of Afghanistan and, for the first

time, properly considers its place in a dangerous 21st century.

Much of the focus remains on the struggle against Islamic

fundamentalism that led NATO to deploy to Afghanistan and

which remains a central security concern for almost all Alliance

members. However, with Russia’s 2014 usurpation of Ukraine-

Crimea and the growing cyber-threat from both state and non-

state actors, the very concept of ‘defence’ needs to be revisited

by NATO. In other words, if NATO and its member nations

are to resolve the force-planning dilemma, the Alliance needs

to go back to first principles.

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen pointed

out in 2014 that while defence spending in several NATO

nations had decreased by more than 20 per cent over the past

five years, Russia had increased its spending by 10 per cent

in real terms each year over the same period. Indeed, Moscow

now devotes 20 per cent of all public expenditure to defence as

part of the 2010 Defence Modernisation Programme. Similarly,

China expanded its defence budget by 12.7 per cent in 2013,

the latest year-on-year double-digit increase since 1989.

As the Alliance emerges from Afghanistan and a

13-year campaign determinedly focused on stabilisation

and reconstruction, it is clear that NATO’s centre of gravity

will once again need to become far more strategic. In force-

planning terms, that will require a military capability that

is able to operate across the mission spectrum from low- to

high-end operations. Moreover, there are likely to be far

more of these operations than in the recent past.

However, such an upgrade in capability and capacity is

hindered by two fundamental challenges. First, the United

States plans to cut its defence budget to $450 billion by 2020,

which implies a cut greater than the combined annual defence

expenditure of all the European allies. Second, because the US

is increasingly being called upon to act as the strategic stabiliser

across the Asia-Pacific region, European forces will need to

become more autonomous from the Americans, while at the

same time, integrating more closely with them.

The change in the essential strategic contract that such

a shift implies between America and its European allies is

perhaps the greatest challenge the Alliance faces. Traditionally,

European forces have provided relatively weak spokes to the

American force hub. That must change. Indeed, implicit in the

July 2014 launch of the first of Britain’s two super-carriers,

HMS Queen Elizabeth, is the creation of a European force hub

able to support and strengthen the Americans while acting,

if needs be, as an autonomous hub over time and distance.

In fact, NATO already considered its strategic future back

in 2010, but simply failed to act on it as operations swamped

strategy. Indeed, the 2010 Strategic Concept provides more than

European forces will need to become more autonomous from the Americans, while at the same time, integrating more closely with them



NATO forces attend the scene of a suicide car-bomb attack in Kabul. As the Alliance pulls out of Afghanistan, countering Islamic fundamentalism remains a focus for most members

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enough strategic guidance, but has hitherto lacked sufficient

political investment. An essential NATO dilemma is the extent

to which ‘strategy’ will for once trump ‘politics’ in Europe.

While any meaningful strategic horizon scan would suggest

such a need, deep barriers remain. First, the eurozone crisis and

austerity politics in Europe have tended to make governments

view defence as a luxury and thus a budget to be cut. Second,

sound strategy is established first and foremost on strategic

unity of effort and purpose. Germany is now Europe’s strongest

political power, but remains deeply ambivalent about the use of

force and indeed, its relationship with the US. Third, Operation

Unified Protector over Libya revealed deep capability gaps,

particularly in terms of the so-called strategic enablers of ISTAR

(intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance)

air-to-air refuelling and remotely piloted air systems (RPAS).

And yet, implicit in the Strategic Concept, the need

for the Alliance to generate influence across the mission

spectrum remains and pertains. That means a NATO able to

offer continuing support to a fragile Afghanistan beyond the

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission and

at the same time capable of acting as a credible conventional

deterrent and, if needs be, a war-fighter to prevent the kind

of adventurism in which Russia has recently been engaged.

Given the widening gap between NATO military capability

and capacity, a radical approach is the most prudent one.

NATO’s Article 5 collective defence architecture remains the

bedrock of Alliance credibility. And yet, it is in urgent need

of modernisation – based on the following three elements:

missile defence, cyber defence and deeply joint, networked

advanced expeditionary forces.

However, it is the 21st-century balance between protection

and projection that is the key to NATO’s continued strategic

utility. It is vital that NATO helps pioneer a new type of deep,

joint force able to operate across air, sea, land, cyber, space and

knowledge. It is a force that must also be able to play its full

part in cross-government civilian and military efforts building

on the lessons from the ISAF campaign. To realise such a

vision, the Alliance will need to go beyond Smart Defence and

the Connected Forces Initiative. Deep connectivity will require

NATO’s command structures to be further reformed, with

transformation and experimentation brought to the fore.

NATO’s European allies need to undergo a profound mind-

set change if they and the Alliance are to deal with the harsh

realities of a hyper-competitive future and the harsh strategic

judgements it will impose. Life after Afghanistan will not

be easy or quiet for the Alliance. At the very least, all NATO

European allies must spend more and spend better. They must

invest the agreed two per cent a year of their national wealth

(GDP) in their armed forces and drive forward military reforms,

as well as pooling, sharing and some defence integration.

russian servicemen near the Ukrainian border. NATO must rebuild its conventional deterrent credibility in order to counter russian expansionism

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The United States still provides the lion’s share of a number of crucial NATO capabilities. Jim Winchester reviews how European

member countries are seeking to reduce the imbalance

Closing the gap

The United States has worldwide responsibilities outside

NATO, so comparing numbers of platforms is not always

fair, but numbers provide the ability to surge resources to any

region in times of crisis. For example, 80 per cent of sorties

over Libya during NATO’s Operation Allied Protector in 2011

were flown by US assets. Wanting to increase their share of

the contribution to operations, European NATO countries, as

well as a number of partner nations, are modernising fleets and

pooling assets for greater efficiency, but generally not increasing

the number of airframes in their respective air arms.

The United States Air Force’s Air Mobility Command

operates almost 300 of the huge C-17 Globemaster III and C-5

Galaxy jet transport aircraft alone, supplemented by a large civil

reserve air fleet (CRAF). This befits America’s long-standing

global missions, but with increasing out-of-area operations

conducted by European countries in recent decades, moves

to create a force capable of strategic reach are bearing fruit.

Capabilities: areas of focusUnder the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) initiative,

NATO has operated three C-17s since 2009, with some 10

countries, including the non-NATO Sweden and Finland,

participating in the Heavy Airlift Wing based at Pápa, Hungary.

In addition, an overlapping group of 12 European countries

is involved in the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS),

which charters Antonov An-124-100 aircraft from Russian



and Ukrainian companies as an interim solution pending

deliveries of the Airbus A400M Atlas. The Atlas, which fits

neatly between the C-17 and the smaller C-130J Hercules in

terms of range and capacity, is at last entering service with

France and Turkey, to be followed by Germany, the United

Kingdom, Spain, Belgium and, finally, Luxembourg by 2018.

In all, 180 A400Ms are on order for NATO countries.

Again, the US air-to-air refuelling (tanker) fleet dwarfs

that of Europe with around 650 aircraft in service, but, at the

same time, replacement programmes for legacy aircraft have

progressed further in Europe than they have in the US. For

example, Italy has already introduced Boeing 767-based tankers,

whereas the KC-46A Pegasus, which is also based on the Boeing

767, is not expected to enter United States Air Force service

before 2017. Airbus A330 tanker/transports are beginning to

enter service with the UK and France (14 each) and Spain (two).

However, according to the European Defence Agency (EDA),

there are only 42 refuelling platforms across Europe, made

up of 12 types (as of late 2013), including some KC-130s and

C-160 Transalls. Both types and numbers have since reduced

with the retirement of the RAF’s VC-10 and TriStar. The EDA

has made refuelling a priority and is establishing a programme

of pooling and sharing, but, in the short term, has suggested

leasing or contracting commercial providers. The first option

has not met with much enthusiasm from member states, while

the single commercial air refuelling operator has had only

occasional European work to date. In November 2012, 10

countries (Belgium, France, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg,

the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal and Spain) agreed

to work towards the acquisition of a common European

strategic Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT), with an initial

operational capability (IOC) of 2020.

With the addition of Spain in January 2015, the European

Air Transport Command (EATC), founded in 2010, will have

six members. Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, France and

Luxembourg have assigned transport, tanker and medevac

assets to the EATC comprising nearly 150 aircraft of more than

a dozen types. Missions and training events are planned, tasked

and controlled from the EATC headquarters in Eindhoven, the

Netherlands. The EATC has organised several exercises in 2014,

including European Air-to-Air Refuelling Training (EATT),

which took place in June at Bulgaria’s Plovdiv Airbase, and

According to the European Defence Agency, there are only 42 refuelling

platforms across Europe

The UK is considering leasing or buying the P-8 Poseidon as a possible replacement for the cancelled Nimrod MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft

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the European Advanced Airlift Tactics Training Course

(AATTC), which is to be held in Spain in September.

Aside from the long-standing NATO Airborne Early

Warning & Control (AEW&C) Force of E-3D Sentry

aircraft, based in Germany at the Geilenkirchen NATO

Air Base, European ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance,

target acquisition and reconnaissance) cooperation is on

a much more limited basis, although progress is being made.

That said, the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) programme

has existed for 23 years without yet fielding any platforms. At

one time, a manned platform, then a mixed manned/unmanned

fleet, AGS will now comprise five Global Hawk Block 40 high-

altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)

operated by 12 NATO countries on behalf of all 28.

The UK and France will also contribute a number of Sentinel

aircraft and Heron TP UAVs to the system, which will be run

along the lines of the AEW&C Force, beginning in 2016-18

and based out of Sigonella, Italy.

European air arms field a small and disparate collection of

signals intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft used mainly for national

taskings. One rare example of trans-NATO cooperation that

is actually in place is the UK’s acquisition from the US of the

RC-135W Rivet Joint under Project Airseeker to fill the gap left

by the Nimrod R1 retirement. However, there is no replacement

on the horizon for France’s Transall C-160G Gabriel SIGINT

and C-160H Astarté communications relay aircraft or Sweden’s

Gulfstream S102B Korpen. The utility of the UK’s Global

Express-based Sentinel and King Air-based Shadow platforms

has been recognised by extending their service beyond the

previously stated out-of-service date of 2015, in a decision

recently announced at the 2014 Farnborough Air Show.

There are no multinational arrangements in Europe at this

time for the long-range maritime patrol (LRMPA) role. The US

Navy is replacing its 1950s-designed P-3 Orion with the P-8

Poseidon, while most other P-3 users are in a constant cycle of

reworks and systems upgrades. The Dutch, however, sold their

P-3s to the Germans in 2005 and the British took a ‘capability

holiday’ when the Nimrod MRA4 project was cancelled under

the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). Many

British personnel are flying with the US and other allied nations

as ‘seedcorn’ to regenerate a LRMPA capability, although a

decision on whether to do this must await the 2015 SDSR. UK

defence officials have reportedly been showing strong interest in

the P-8 and have not ruled out leasing, an arrangement that was

used to introduce the C-17 in the 2000s. In the meantime, the

reprieved Sentinels are to get expanded maritime capabilities.

ConclusionIn summary, the last few years have seen several new initiatives

get off the ground to increase European cooperation, and these

are now seeing results in terms of the more efficient allocation

of resources and increased common training programmes. Not

all the countries on this side of the Atlantic are participating

in every one of these arrangements, but progress is being made

within the constraints of defence budgets that have long been

shrinking or static in real terms.

NATo’s european members have ordered some 180 Airbus A400M Atlas aircraft to help fill the tactical airlift gap

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Simon Michell highlights NATO’s growing competence in the cybersecurity realm and looks at the benefits of sharing knowledge

Ramping up NATO cyber defence

Shared knowledge and interoperability are key to

implementing a comprehensive cyber defence policy and strategy

In the run-up to the May 2014 unofficial Ukrainian

referendum for the establishment of independent entities

in the eastern part of the country, a number of NATO’s public

domain websites crashed after suffering cyberattacks. The

affected sites were back up and running very quickly, and

NATO spokesperson Oana Lungescu confirmed that the attacks

had not had any operational impact on the Alliance’s capability.

NATO has long been aware of cyber vulnerability; as far back

as its Prague Summit in 2002 – five years before the massive

attacks that brought parts of Estonia’s national IT infrastructure

to a standstill – the Alliance decided to put cyber defence firmly

on the political agenda. During a NATO defence ministers’

meeting in June 2007, just a

few weeks after the events in

Estonia, it was agreed that a

thorough assessment of the

Alliance’s approach to cyber

defence was urgently needed.

The findings

recommended specific roles

for the Alliance as well as the

implementation of a number

of new measures aimed at

improving cyber protection.

The development of a NATO cyber defence policy was called

for – which was particularly timely given that the 2008 conflict

in Georgia highlighted the use of cyber as a major component

of conventional warfare.

The Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD

CoE) was established in Tallinn, Estonia, in 2008 with a remit

to “enhance the capability, cooperation and information sharing

among NATO, NATO nations and partners in cyber defence by

virtue of education, research and development, lessons learned

and consultation”. It is perhaps ironic that Estonia had first

proposed the concept of a cyber defence centre in 2004, the

same year it joined the Alliance.

In June 2011, NATO defence ministers approved a revised

cyber defence policy and an associated action plan, the details

of which were agreed the following October. From then

on, cyber was steadily incorporated into all levels of NATO

infrastructure and day-to-day operations. In April 2012, cyber

was integrated into the NATO Defence Planning Process

(NDPP), meaning that national and Alliance cyber activities

would be harmonised in order to meet agreed targets.

Strategic steps to counter cyber intrusionsThe following month, the Chicago Summit ruled to bring all

of the Alliance’s networks under centralised protection and

set about bolstering the NATO Computer Incident Response

Capability (NCIRC). A tight deadline was set for completion

of the work. The Secretary General’s annual report that year

confirmed that “2013 was a

year of considerable progress

in NATO’s ability to defend

itself against cyberattacks.

NATO has implemented

NCIRC centralised protection

at NATO headquarters,

commands and agencies.

This is a major upgrade

of NATO’s protection

against the cyberthreat.

NATO networks in the

51 NATO locations that make up NATO headquarters, the

NATO command structure and NATO agencies are under

comprehensive 24/7 surveillance and protected by enhanced

sensors and intrusion detection technologies.”

Alongside this initiative, NATO also launched in November

2013 a ‘smart defence’ project – the Malware Information

Sharing Platform (MISP) – aimed at helping to defeat cyber

intrusions. NATO said: “The ultimate goal of the project is

to develop a NATO capability, available to all NATO nations,

through which nations commit to sharing their information.”

As such, MISP, with Belgium as the lead nation, will facilitate

information sharing of the technical characteristics of malware

within a trusted community without having to share details

of an attack. Ambassador Sorin Ducaru, Assistant Secretary

General for NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges division,



The 2008 conflict in Georgia highlighted cyber as a component of conventional warfare

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said of the significant step: “The common development of a

new capability under the umbrella of NATO also helps to ensure

the interoperability among those who share this capability.”

Cybersecurity exercisesShared knowledge and interoperability are key to implementing

a comprehensive cyber defence policy and strategy. Another way

NATO is embedding this concept into its operations is through

two main series of exercises. The Cooperative Cyber Defence

Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) is responsible for holding the

annual Locked Shields exercises, the latest of which, held in

May 2014, brought together nearly 300 participants from

17 nations. Over two days, 12 teams of defenders from all

over Europe were pitted against one attacking team with the

aim of training the teams of IT specialists to detect and mitigate

large-scale cyberattacks and handle security incidents.

Although the scenarios for these types of exercises are

fictitious and the events take place in a specially built self-

contained environment, the attack and defence methods used

are real, thereby giving the defending teams an opportunity

to test their skills under real-life conditions. Equally as

important, the teams need to work together, which helps

to strengthen the international security community by

establishing trusted networks, as well as getting them used

to the practice of sharing information and experience.

The other main training effort is the three-day annual

Cyber Coalition exercise, which is now in its sixth year. Cyber

Coalition 2013 was hosted by the Estonian Defence College

in Tartu. With over 30 nations (the 28 NATO member states

as well as non-NATO partners: Austria, Finland, Ireland,

Sweden and Switzerland, plus observers from the European

Union and New Zealand) taking part, it was the largest training

exercise of its kind ever to have taken place. Although similar to

Locked Shields, the Cyber Coalition exercises have a somewhat

broader scope in that they help to train technical personnel

and their leadership and to test the ability of allies and partners

to coordinate and cooperate their actions in warding off

multiple simulated cyberattacks.

Jamie Shea, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging

Security Challenges at NATO, highlighted the importance of

the exercise and similar efforts, by pointing out that there is a

range of differing skill levels across the Alliance that all need to

be brought up to a consistent standard: “In NATO we are always

vulnerable through our weakest link.” By establishing a higher

benchmark across the Alliance, all nations within it are better

able to cope with the growing menace.

Strengthening military capabilitieS


Peter Roberts, Senior Research Fellow at Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), reviews how the United States is evolving its cyber

defence strategies and legislation to tackle increasingly complex threats

Taking the lead on cybersecurity

On 10 June 2010, Senators Joe Lieberman, Susan Collins

and Tom Carper proposed the introduction of legislation

entitled ‘Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset’. The aim

was to provide resilience to American cyber capabilities by

legalising actions against attacks that had the potential to

disrupt either telecommunications or the country’s economy.

This followed a series of studies by both the Bush and Obama

administrations into national cyber vulnerabilities and the

legalisation of potential response options. This analysis and

the legislation enacted through the Department of Defense,

Department of Homeland Security, et al, resulted in the

development of a US Government mandate for cyberspace

that has come to be known as ‘Protect the Nation’.

The actions enabled by those cyber-protection policies

provide reassurance to companies physically located in the US.

The ‘cyber over-watch’ of the combined presence of the National

Security Agency (NSA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),

DHS and the newly created US Cyber Command (CYBERCOM)

underpins economic protection and resilience. It also acts as a

cyber safety net to the US Defense Enterprise against industrial

and international espionage activity. The safeguards that

those agencies provide are largely focused on ensuring

that research and development, exquisite technological

improvements and breakthroughs are not lost to competitors.

They also have a secondary role in protecting US forces

deployed at range from the continental US.

Developing a national cybersecurity strategy: challenges and opportunitiesAs governments deploy smaller military force packages, there

is a reliance on the connectivity between the deployed units

and their home operating bases to enable operational command

and control, as well as for logistical and administrative support.

While undoubtedly creating efficiencies, that connectivity

has now also become a critical vulnerability, which can be

exploited by third parties. Attacks on cyber networks or

operating systems have been demonstrated to have significant

advantage in military campaigns and as with many concepts,

transfer easily into a commercial construct.

Unpicking the supply-chain network within any business

model rapidly overcomes technological superiority and

resilience, or to put another way, their competitive advantage.

The past decade has seen a marked rise in disruption of the

supply or distribution chain in both the military and industrial

sectors through cyber failures or attacks. The role of US

Government agencies in mitigating these impacts is critical

to preventing wider damage across the defence, security and

industrial sectors. Commercial benefits, in terms of such things

as data protection, intellectual property protection, counter

industrial espionage and protection of reputation are all useful

by-products of the US Government mandate.

Few other nations have established a ‘protect the nation’

mandate for execution by their own security and intelligence

services or militaries, leaving industry to be self-sufficient

in network protection and vulnerability testing. It is possible

that in future, some governments may take responsibility

for the cyber elements of critical national infrastructure, The 624th Operations Center at Joint Base San Antonio, Texas, where personnel conduct cyber operations for the Air Force network

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but few appear to have an appetite for providing direct cyber

protection to engineering and logistics firms that service,

supply and sustain government contracts, let alone other

elements of their economies. This may appear a nonsensical

approach given that disruption to the national supply

chain could do lasting damage to a nation state. However,

governments face a media environment that is fiercely resistant

to increased official involvement in cyberspace, and complex

issues relating to legality, resources and expertise. Thus, the

responsibility for cybersecurity is falling on companies that

are, in turn, bearing the costs of cyber insurance premiums.

Since there is little agreement about what good cybersecurity

looks like, companies are unsurprisingly at a loss as to what

standard they are seeking to achieve and thus the amount of

resource they need to invest by way of mitigation to protect

their data and online reputation.

Moreover, it is also entirely feasible that governments

will start to require assurance from industry over cyber and

network security when considering the awarding of government

contracts. The difficulty here is how to provide that assurance

when there is no established standard. Several governments

have gone so far as to advocate the SANS 20 Critical Security

Controls as an ‘approach’ companies may wish to adopt, but

have gone no further in their facilitation of this.

Various routes to achieving a cyber standard have been

offered, but few have been widely adopted. They have been

centred primarily on internal training and self-reporting,

neither of which significantly lower premiums. An alternative

path may result from a conflation of insurance premium

charges and the availability of ‘cyber ranges’ that enable

networks to be tested to a given level of resilience. The

resultant business model could allow an organisation to map

its network architecture, system configuration, software,

application accesses and current security system to ‘play’ that

specific system on a cyber-range facility against a series of

increasingly complex tests and threats.

The resulting system analysis would demonstrate cyber

vulnerabilities against an industry standard scorecard,

which, in turn, would deliver analysis that would allow

insurance underwriters to charge more appropriate premiums

as well as providing company boards and stakeholders with

reassurance. A measured assurance standard would also enable

governments to award contracts with a better understanding of

the cyber risk that accompanied it.

There is no such system currently in use in Europe, although

cyber ranges and assessment tools are indeed already available.

The utility for both business and government is, however,

clear. One has only to consider the impact that the Thatcham

standard had on the car insurance industry in the 1990s to

acknowledge the benefits that such a systematic approach

could bring across the cybersphere.

The responsibility for cybersecurity is falling on companies that are bearing the costs of cyber

insurance premiums


sTreNgTheNiNg miliTAry cApAbiliTies

The SM-3 missile forms the backbone of NATO’s emerging sea-based ballistic missile defence capability

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Defence consultant and missile defence expert Jeffrey Allen Baxter examines NATO’s growing ability to counter ballistic missile attacks

NATO ballistic missile defence: is it achievable?

The art of warfare has always been a constant struggle

between offence and defence. Ballistic missile defence

(BMD) is no exception. Ever since Germany peppered the

United Kingdom with the devastating V-2 rockets during the

Second World War, offence has outpaced defence. That is,

until now. Successful missile intercepts employing systems

such as Aegis, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)

and even the Israeli Iron Dome have proven that defence is

catching up and reliable BMD is an achievable goal. NATO

should, and will, play a vital role in the future of BMD. The

BMD playing field is beginning to even out, and the shield is

now demonstrating that it can deal with the sword.

The need for NATO BMDThe threat to NATO and United States-deployed forces

from ballistic missiles (BMs) was highlighted at the 2011

Multinational BMD Conference by Frank A Rose, deputy

assistant secretary at the US Department of State’s Bureau of

Arms of Control, Verification and Compliance. In his speech

to the audience in Copenhagen, he pointed out that “the threat

from short-, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles

to our deployed forces, allies and partners is growing, and this

threat is likely to increase in both volume and complexity in the

coming years. Many states are increasing their inventories, and

making their ballistic missiles more accurate, reliable, mobile

and survivable. Trends in ballistic missiles show increased

ranges, more advanced propellant systems, better protection

from pre-launch attack and the ability to counter BMD systems.”

Inventories and capabilities of all classes of BMs are growing,

not only among current states with ballistic missile capabilities,

but among other countries as well.

The major threats to NATO and deployed US Forces in the

Middle East come from Iran and Syria, both of which have

fielded short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and medium-

range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), with Iran also considered to

be developing and testing intermediate-range ballistic missiles

(IRBMs) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Added

to that, the increasing rise of well-funded non-state actors has

meant that the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)

delivered from SRBMs has become a more tangible menace. In

short, the proliferation of BMs now threatens NATO and US

defences, as well as high-value targets and key population centres.

According to the 2013 National Air and Space Intelligence

Center’s (NASIC) Ballistic & Cruise Missile Threat report,

Iran has launched a mobile, solid propellant MRBM (2009);

successfully tested the liquid-fuelled Qiam-1 (2010); fielded the

third-generation Fateh-110 (2010); successfully tested the fourth

generation of the Fateh-110 and an anti-ship ballistic missile

(ASBM) variant (2012); fielded the 2,000km-range Shahab 3

(2012); tested the 2,000km-range solid propellant Sejil; and

conducted several launches of its Safir space-launch vehicle –

a potential technology precursor to Iran’s ICBM pursuits. As

extensive as this list is, NASIC cites that Iran may only have

fewer than 100 SRBM and 50 MRBM/IRBM launchers. In a

similar vein, Syria is reported to have fewer than 100 SRBM

launchers. However, launchers can be reloaded, masking the

true magnitude of the ballistic missile threat. Nevertheless,

these countries are inexorably adding to their ballistic missile

inventories. It is, therefore, essential that NATO continues to

develop a strategy of robust situational awareness, alongside

an offensive and defensive strike capability, in order to deter

ballistic missile attacks on any NATO country.

Effective ballistic missile defence There are three basic phases in the flight of a ballistic

missile: the boost, midcourse and terminal. Each phase

generates advantages and disadvantages for missile defence

systems. The boost phase is defined as lasting from launch



to booster burnout. A ballistic missile is most vulnerable in

its boost phase, given its relatively clear ballistic trajectory,

large signature, lack of penetration aids (penaids), limited

manoeuvring capability, and the presence of large amounts of

explosive propellant. Despite these factors, intercept timelines

are short and require interceptors to be extremely fast and

located very close to the adversary’s launch sites.

The midcourse phase starts at booster burnout through

warhead re-entry. It is the longest phase of flight, thereby

offering the longest engagement times. However, this

phase presents significant challenges for BMD sensors in

maintaining a continuous track on the target, owing to the

distances compared with those of the boost phase, as well as

smaller signatures and the possible deployment of penaids.

Ranges and speeds require very powerful radars and large

interceptors. Moreover, the BMD system may also have to deal

with manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles (MARVs) and multiple

independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVS).

The terminal phase is defined as the time from re-entry

to warhead impact. While intercept timelines are short, there

are no decoys to consider, allowing for terminal BMD systems

– both radars and interceptors – to be smaller. That said, the

threat might easily overwhelm these missile defence systems

with raid saturation, MARVs and MIRVs. Furthermore, non-

traditional penaids – cyberattacks and electronic warfare on

key missile defence networks, sensors and communications

nodes, or direct kinetic attack from terrorist actions – present

further challenges to terminal defences.

Understanding the specifics in a BMD kill chain is vital.

The key steps are: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

(ISR); detection; tracking; identification; threat assessment;

engagement; and kill assessment or battle damage assessment

(BDA). ISR refers to the collection of as much information and

knowledge as possible regarding the adversaries’ capabilities

(tactics, performance, numbers and so on), deployment of forces,

and intent. Early detection provides greater opportunities for

engagement planning and calculating the launch point, as well

as a larger intercept window. Tracking refers to determining

target location, speed and direction. Identification, using ISR

and detection data, and intelligence estimates, helps determine

target class, type and predicted impact point. Sensors involved

in the first three steps include space-based infrared (IR) sensors,

surface-based and airborne radars, and IR and visual sensors.

As the data is collected, it must be fed into a command,

control and communications, and battle management (C3BM)

system that processes sufficient data to predict threat launch

points (where the targets are in the battle space) and impact

points, as well as to generate an appropriate response to each

threat. Engagement is currently the act of firing an interceptor

to destroy the target. Lastly, BDA leverages several of the same

systems from the first three steps to determine whether the

engagement was successful or not, and presents the next steps

for possible re-engagement. Two of the biggest challenges are

having enough of the right type of sensors and interceptors

in the right locations, as well as access to robust and secure

distributed networks to implement C3BM to all the BMD nodes.

Work has started on the Aegis Ashore facility with SPY-1 radar and SM-3 land-based interceptors in Deveselu, Romania

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Even with a direct hit on an inbound ballistic missile, debris

from the engagement has the potential to cause widespread

damage, especially if the missiles are armed with WMD. The

main challenges associated with debris mitigation are therefore:■■ tracking debris over multiple theatres and coordination

between theatres; ■■ predicting the direction and size of the debris field; and ■■ optimising shot strategies to mitigate the effects of debris

on population centres or other countries and locations.

Along with the challenges stated above, BMD effectiveness

must be balanced with affordability. To that end, several factors

should be considered. First is the scalability of the overall

architecture and how it is to be implemented. The principles of

open architecture should be applied to the greatest extent, and

consideration must be given to multinational security concerns

as well as interoperability. Furthermore, the ability to rapidly

integrate new and legacy systems in a ‘plug and play’ manner

greatly reduces overall system integration and validation costs.

An SM-3 Block 1B interceptor is launched from USS Lake Erie during a Missile Defense Agency test. More SM-3 Block 1B interceptors are to be deployed as part of the european Phased Adaptive Approach, expanding the area defended from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles



Second, design considerations for BMD sensors, interceptors,

communications, C3BM and networks must factor in not only

the required capabilities for the near and far term, but also

vulnerabilities at a system and subsystem level. Lastly, the

effectiveness and affordability of any given architecture must

take into account the adversary’s understanding of NATO

and US BMD capabilities, the mobility of threat systems,

components and inventory robustness.

Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence In 2005, NATO established the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic

Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme to protect deployed

NATO forces from SRBMs and MRBMs. Less than a decade

later, following NATO summits in Lisbon in 2010 and Chicago

in 2012, the ALTBMD mission was expanded to include the

protection of NATO European populations and territory from

all classes of ballistic missiles. Accordingly, the ALTBMD

Programme Office was renamed the NATO Ballistic Missile

Defence Programme Office in July 2012. Conscious of the

potential impact this decision may have had on non-NATO

countries – particularly Russia – NATO Deputy Secretary

General Alexander Vershbow has categorically stated: “The

NATO system is designed to be big enough to defend against

limited attacks by states and

non-state actors potentially

threatening us, while

remaining small enough not

to fuel regional arms races. It

is configured (in terms of the

types of interceptors, their

numbers and locations) to

defend against the principal

threats to NATO’s European

territory, namely, countries

in the Middle East, and is

not directed against Russia’s

much larger and more sophisticated strategic deterrent forces.”

Under the NATO BMD programme, the system will

consist of a multi-layered (space, air, land and sea) collection

of distributed sensors and interceptors provided by NATO

member countries, to deliver lower-layer BMD coverage.

NATO itself will develop and provide the C3BM system to

integrate each country’s capabilities into a collective NATO

capability. In addition, the US contribution to the defence

of Europe, called the European Phased Adaptive Approach

(EPAA), will be integrated with NATO’s BMD programme

to address the upper-layer defence requirements.

On 27 January 2011, the ALTBMD Programme Office

delivered the first mobile and deployable interim C3BM

capability to NATO’s Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC)

in Germany. This interim capability allows for BMD planning,

the linking of radars and interceptors from each contributing

country into a lower-layered BMD capability, the provision of

early warning of incoming ballistic missiles, and the limited

monitoring and direction of theatre missile defence assets.

Significantly, the interim capability will be interoperable

with the EPAA’s command, control, battle management and

communications (C2BMC) sensors and interceptors.

Full operational capability (FOC) of a NATO BMD

system that will provide complete coverage and protection

for all of NATO’s European populations, territory and forces

is expected by 2018.

This initial FOC will include an upgraded C3BM system

that will be fully integrated with NATO’s air defence system;

AN/TPY-2 radar(s) stationed in Turkey; the Aegis Ashore

site with SPY-1 radar and SM-3 land-based interceptors

stationed in Romania (2015) and Poland (2018); four Dutch

air defence frigates with BMD-capable radars; the NATO

BMD C3BM system hosted by Germany; and four US Aegis

BMD ships to be stationed in Spain. Lastly, there are plans

for possible NATO-Russian BMD cooperation, as witnessed

in the 2012 simulated missile defence exercise, although

recent events have put these on hold.

US European Phased Adaptive ApproachIn 2009, the US announced a change in its long-standing

BMD approach to Europe. Under the Obama administration’s

new BMD strategy, the plan for US Homeland BMD to counter

ICBMs from rogue nations using ground-based interceptors

(GBIs) and missile-defence radars in Poland and the Czech

Republic will be replaced with a Phased Adaptive Approach,

for the protection of US

forces and allies from SRBMs

and MRBMs. The Approach

is divided into three phases.

Phase One (today’s

capability) is designed

to counter existing

SRBM and MRBM threats

using current proven

BMD systems, including

US Aegis BMD-capable

ships, forward-based

AN/TPY-2 radars, as

well as upgrades to the C2BMC system at NATO’s CAOC

at Ramstein Air Base, Germany.

Phase Two (2015) expands the defended area coverage

against SRBMs and MRBMs with the deployment of more

capable SM-3 Block 1B interceptors (US Aegis BMD ships, a

land-based relocatable Aegis Ashore site in Romania), and a

longer-range, networked and interoperable regional BMD with

NATO’s BMD C3BM system. This construct allows for launch on

remote, leveraging forward-based sensor data for an enhanced

engagement capability, and an expanded battle space.

Phase Three (2018) expands BMD capability to counter

SRBMs, MRBMs and IRBMs for the whole of Europe, with the

deployment of the more advanced SM-3 Block IIA interceptor

with a longer range and advanced seeker capabilities, an

improved networked capability through C2BMC upgrades

to provide engage on remote, and a second Aegis Ashore

site located in Poland.

Protecting NATO forces and populations from attack while

maintaining cordial relations with its neighbours stands as one

of the most difficult challenges facing NATO’s leadership. The

summit in Wales is the perfect opportunity to underline NATO’s

resolve to provide a collective defence to all its members.

Under the NATO BMD programme, the system will consist of a multi-layered collection of distributed

sensors and interceptors provided by NATO member countries


STRENGTHENING MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Airborne transport is a critical feature of modern military operations. Yet, with the exception of the United States, NATO countries still do not possess enough airlift capacity. Alan Dron explains how the Alliance is

pooling its resources to address this imbalance

Upwardly mobile

Airlift capacity is one of those capabilities of which

military commanders never have enough. Since the end

of the Cold War, as expeditionary warfare has become the

norm, the need to transport personnel and heavy equipment

over long distances, quickly, has become increasingly important.

With this in mind, NATO has three projects in place to

strengthen its abilities in this sector: the Strategic Airlift

Capability (SAC), the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS)

and the HIP Helicopter Task Force (HIP TF).

The need for airlift capacity was graphically shown last

year with France’s intervention to block Islamist rebels from

capturing the Malian capital, Bamako. Paris requested help

from Washington, London and Ottawa in order urgently to

move troops and equipment to the West African country to

block the advancing insurgents. Within 48 hours, two British

Royal Air Force Boeing C-17 Globemaster IIIs were at Évreux

airbase, near Paris, embarking men and armoured vehicles. The

following day, Canada provided another C-17 and the United

States Air Force (USAF) then dispatched five more to transport

a French mechanised infantry battalion to Bamako from Istres-

Le Tubé airbase in southern France. Five other NATO countries

(Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain)

provided transport aircraft, along with a further C-17 from the

SAC’s Heavy Airlift Wing, based at Pápa airbase in Hungary,

and were also involved in moving materiel to Mali.

The incident demonstrated the vital role that airlift plays in

modern military operations. It also illustrated the SAC’s ability

to cater for the needs of NATO members that do not possess

sufficient heavy military cargo capabilities of their own.

The Strategic Airlift CapabilityTen NATO countries, plus two Partnership for Peace countries,

formed the SAC in 2008. They acquired three C-17s and now

manage, support and operate them on behalf of NATO. Pooling

resources makes significant financial savings possible, and the

SAC arrangement gives countries access to assets that would

be too costly for them to acquire as individual purchasers.

The Boeing C-17 Globemaster III is a strategic transport

aircraft capable of carrying a payload of 72 tonnes of cargo

over 4,450km (2,400 nautical miles). That capability makes it

one of the very few aircraft in the world able to carry modern

main battle tanks. It has the useful ability – unusual for such a

large aircraft – to use rough, short airstrips, making use of its

reverse thrust to shorten its landing run, enabling it to deliver

supplies close to where they are required.

The SAC C-17s are configured and equipped to the same

standard as those operated by the USAF. This commonality aids

operational integration during multinational missions. They

are used primarily to meet national requirements, but are also

able to be allocated for NATO, United Nations or European

Union use. The SAC Heavy Airlift Wing has been involved in

several humanitarian missions in recent years, ferrying urgent

aid to Haiti and Pakistan following natural disasters, as well

as in supporting peacekeeping missions in Africa and NATO

missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan.

The Strategic Airlift Interim SolutionSALIS, as its name suggests, was initially conceived as a method

of gaining additional heavy airlift capacity before the SAC

came on line and before the new Airbus A400M Atlas heavy

transport aircraft began to appear on NATO squadrons’ aprons.

In order to accomplish this, a consortium of NATO countries

set up the Strategic Air Lift Coordination Cell (SALCC) at Royal

Netherlands Air Force Base Eindhoven early in 2006. This cell

runs SALIS, which has 14 participating nations and which

draws on Antonov An-124-100 Ruslan heavy transport aircraft

supplied by two commercial companies: Russia’s Volga-Dnepr

Airlines and Ukraine’s Antonov Airlines.

The Antonov An-124s are capable of handling ‘outsize’ loads

of up to 150 tons. Under the SALIS contract, the two companies

guarantee availability of two An-124s for charter at any given

time for any of the participating countries’ national usage,

plus similar availability of up to a further six of the aircraft for

rapid deployment of forces in support of NATO or EU missions.

This arrangement has proved popular, with a series of contract

extensions, the most recent of which runs until the end of 2014.

The strained relations between NATO and Russia over

events in Ukraine may have an impact on the future of the

SALIS contractual arrangements, as will the introduction

of the Airbus A400M tactical transport aircraft, which are



NATO’s Strategic Airlift Command (SAC) operates the huge Boeing C-17 Globemaster III jet transport aircraft

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now starting to arrive at their units in France, Turkey and

the United Kingdom. The A400M, 170 of which have been

ordered by NATO members, has a payload of 37 tonnes. This

is considerably lower than that of either the C-17 or An-124,

but is nevertheless a substantial improvement on that of the

C-130 (around 20 tonnes), which currently makes up the

tactical transport fleets of most of the Alliance’s members.

The HIP Helicopter Task ForceThe third multinational transport capability is the HIP

Helicopter Task Force (HIP TF). Nine European members,

led by the Czech Republic, developed the organisation,

which facilitates deployment of the series of the hugely

successful Russian-built Mil Mi-8, Mi-17 and Mi-171

medium, multipurpose transport helicopters to assist with

tactical lift capabilities. This assistance can take the form of

pre-deployment training; command and control capabilities;

base support; or financial aid. Under HIP TF, these helicopters

have been deployed to Afghanistan, where their rugged

construction and good hot-and-high performance have made

them particularly useful in the country’s searing summer heat.

Helicopters have been a critical component of NATO

operations in Afghanistan, given the lack of a fully developed

road system to transport troops and equipment, as well as the

serious risk to surface transport of improvised explosive devices

(IEDs). Several countries that operate ‘HIPs’ were willing to

send additional aircraft to help the International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF) contingent, but needed assistance

to deploy and operate them. The HIP TF is, therefore, part of

a broader NATO helicopter initiative aimed at addressing

rotary-wing shortfalls on operations.

Each of these airborne-transport pooling arrangements

has proven to be extremely successful in plugging gaps in

NATO airborne-transport capabilities, but if the Alliance is

to overcome the imbalance between the numbers of transport

aircraft the US has at its disposal and those belonging to the

European countries, more will have to be done.

The Strategic Airlift Interim Solution charters Antonov An-124-100 Ruslan aircraft to transport large military equipment and other supplies

The HIP Helicopter Task Force was launched to help satisfy ISAF’s demand for tactical helicopter airlift in Afghanistan

Helicopters have been a critical component of NATO operations in Afghanistan, given the lack of a

fully developed road system

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The military loves acronyms, and NATO’s new Air Command and Control System has more than its fair share, but beneath this alphabet soup is a

radical enhancement to the Alliance’s ability to safeguard European skies for many years to come. Thomas Withington explains

Air superiority

The Air Command and Control System (ACCS) initiative

is designed to replace a number of national air operations

command and control (C2) systems with a scalable C2 system

that will be rolled out across NATO’s European membership.

The C2 systems that the ACCS architecture will replace enable

air force personnel to see a recognised air picture (RAP) of their

country’s airspace. The RAP is developed by integrating the

radar pictures produced by several national radars – each of

which watches a particular section of national airspace – into

one big picture. It enables personnel to see exactly what is

flying through and approaching their airspace. If a threat

is detected, the RAP can then be used to guide interceptor

aircraft or surface-to-air missiles towards the hostile aircraft

or flying object, such as a cruise or ballistic missile. The

computer software controlling the ACCS will not only allow

each country equipped with the ACCS architecture to produce

their RAP, it will also connect all of these RAPs together to

enable NATO’s commander of Allied Command Operations at

Ramstein Air Base in Germany to see a seamless European

RAP depicting the airspace of NATO’s European membership.

As well as updating legacy national air C2 systems with a

new means of generating the RAP at the national and European

level, the ACCS includes a dimension that enables user nations

to plan and execute air operations, whether those operations

occur above NATO members’ countries or during out-of-area

operations. Presently, NATO uses its Integrated Command and

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the new nato air Command and Control system (aCCs) will direct nato fighter aircraft towards suspicious incoming airborne threats



If a threat is detected, the recognised air picture can then be used to guide interceptor aircraft or surface-to-air

missiles towards the flying object

large-scale sporting events, and the thousands of people in attendance, will be better protected from attack by the new aCCs

Control (ICC) software for the drafting of the air tasking order

(ATO), the extensive document that forms the bedrock of any

NATO-led air campaign, detailing the activities and schedules

of all participating combat aircraft over a 24-hour period.

Whereas NATO members had previously used the ICC and its

Multi-AEGIS Site Emulator (MASE) software for ATO and RAP

generation respectively, the advent of ACCS will enable them to

perform both these functions using the ACCS architecture alone.

In 1999, NATO awarded Air Command Systems International,

a consortium that includes United States defence contractor

Raytheon and its French counterpart Thomson-CSF (now

Thales), a contract worth $500 million for the development

of the ACCS. These two companies are now continuing their

ACCS work via their joint ThalesRaytheonSystems (TRS)

venture. NATO’s ACCS Management Organisation supervises

its implementation on behalf of the Alliance, with all 28

members contributing to its funding via the NATO Security

Investment Programme.

ACCS architectureThe ACCS architecture includes two main entities: the ARS

(air control centre, RAP production centre and sensor fusion

post) and the CAOC (Combined Air Operations Centre).

The ARS is designed for deployment at the national level to

ensure air sovereignty and to control national airspace via the

production of the RAP, which is produced by fusing together

a country’s disparate radars. The CAOC is used to draft and

execute air operations and to produce the ATO. Both ARS and

CAOC functions can be collocated into a single CARS (CAOC

and ARS combined). In addition to fixed ARS and CAOC sites

across NATO’s European membership, the Alliance is receiving

deployable versions of the ARS and CAOC, known as the

DARS and DCAOC respectively. These can be used to provide

deployed airspace control (DARS), such as protection above a

summit meeting or major

sporting event, or to provide

command for a NATO out-of-

area air operation (DCAOC).

TRS and NATO have

put the ACCS architecture

through exhaustive testing at

a number of locations, known

as ‘validation sites’, around

Europe. ARS validation has

occurred at the Belgian air

components’ Control and

Reporting Centre, which performs air sovereignty control of

Belgian airspace from Glons in the east of the country. Both the

CAOC and the DCAOC have undergone validation at NATO’s

Combined Air Operations Centre at Uedem, Germany, close to

the Dutch border. CARS validation has been performed at one

of NATO’s CAOCs located at Poggio Renatico, northern Italy,

and at the Armée de l’Air (French Air Force) CDC 05.942 air

operations centre at Lyon-Mont Verdun airbase, eastern France.

Meanwhile, the DARS has undergone validation at the

Royal Netherlands Air Force base at Nieuw Milligen. With

validation complete, these sites will have their respective ARS,

CAOC, DCAOC and CARS facilities declared operational. Italy

is expected to become the first country to declare an initial

operating capability (IOC) for its CARS by the end of 2014, with

a full operating capability (FOC) being declared by late 2015.

Along with validating the various components of the ACCS,

TRS is tasked with rolling out the ACCS software and hardware

(the computers, communications links and infrastructure)

across the European members of NATO that are replacing

their legacy air C2 systems with the ACCS architecture. TRS

is already under contract to do this for the Czech Republic,

Denmark, France, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway,

Poland, Portugal, Spain and Turkey – a process that should be

completed by the end of 2016.

Beyond these countries, the

second replication phase

could begin in late 2014,

with ACCS architecture

rolled out in Albania,

Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia,

Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania,

Romania, Slovakia and

Slovenia, which could be

completed by the end of

2017. ACCS will also be

patched into NATO’s European Phased Adaptive Approach

(EPAA) ballistic missile defence (BMD) capability to enable

personnel to detect and respond to a ballistic missile attack

against the Alliance’s members.

Canada, the United Kingdom and the US remain outside

the ACCS initiative. Canada and the US do provide a financial

contribution to the initiative and, as the ACCS is primarily

focused on protecting NATO’s European airspace, there is less

of a need for these countries to connect to it. The UK could

have its air surveillance and control system modernised at a

later date to patch into the ACCS, or have this system replaced

altogether with the ACCS architecture.

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www.thalesraytheon.com© 2013 ThalesRaytheonSystems. All rights reserved.

WHATEVER ITS SHAPE,NOTHING ESCAPES OUR NET

Every second of every day, ThalesRaytheonSystems provides superior protection through integrated Air and Missile Command and Control Systems, Air Defense Radars and Weapons Locating Radars. With the Air Command and Control System (ACCS), ThalesRaytheonSystems and NATO are developing a new Air Command and Control solution across 17 NATO nations in Europe. This unprecedented, integrated approach aims to meet the global security challenges of the 21st century.

www.thalesraytheon.com© 2013 ThalesRaytheonSystems. All rights reserved.

WHATEVER ITS SHAPE,NOTHING ESCAPES OUR NET

Every second of every day, ThalesRaytheonSystems provides superior protection through integrated Air and Missile Command and Control Systems, Air Defense Radars and Weapons Locating Radars. With the Air Command and Control System (ACCS), ThalesRaytheonSystems and NATO are developing a new Air Command and Control solution across 17 NATO nations in Europe. This unprecedented, integrated approach aims to meet the global security challenges of the 21st century.



NATO chose the R-Q4 Block 40 Global Hawk to make up the air segment of its AGS programme

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active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, was adopted.

The ground segment, on the other hand, remained virtually

unchanged, as its functional and operational characteristics

were largely independent of the actual aircraft and sensor used.

In February 2009, the NATO nations participating in the

AGS programme (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Canada [which

later withdrew], Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia,

Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia

and the United States), started the process of signing the

Programme Memorandum of Understanding (PMOU). By

February 2012, it was agreed that NATO common funding

would cover infrastructure, satellite communications and

operations and support. In addition, an agreement was reached

that would see the United Kingdom’s Sentinel R1 manned

ISTAR aircraft, which is also equipped with a GMTI capability,

and the future French IAI Heron TP UAV system, available

as national contributions-in-kind, partly replacing financial

contributions from those two allies. Following the signature

of the procurement contract at the Chicago Summit in May

2012, the project got under way and is expected to become

available to the Alliance within the 2015-17 timeframe.

System componentsWith the changes taken into account, the air segment is now

made up of five Global Hawk Block 40 HALE (high-altitude,

long-endurance) UAVs, which are currently in development,

and equipped with the MP-RTIP ground surveillance radar

sensor, plus an extensive suite of line-of-sight and beyond-line-

of-sight, long-range, wideband data links. Moreover, it will also

contain the UAV flight control stations.

Peter Grant reviews NATO’s Air Ground Surveillance programme and underlines its importance to the Alliance’s ability to understand what

is happening on the battlefield

Alliance ISTAR

AGS was designed to furnish NATO with a complete and integrated ground surveillance capability,

offering unrestricted access to data

Knowing where the enemy is located and what he is doing

has always been a vital element in the conduct of warfare

and the delivery of effect. Today, the constituent parts of this

function are grouped together under the term ‘intelligence,

surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance’, more

commonly referred to by its acronym, ISTAR. Its purpose is to

give the commander of troops, whether a corporal in charge of

a six-man infantry section, the commander-in-chief of an army,

or a head of state, the best information to make a decision.

However, not every nation within the NATO Alliance has

the resources to operate a comprehensive ISTAR organisation.

Originating from the Defence Planning Committee, in 1995,

plans were undertaken to implement an Alliance Ground

Surveillance (AGS) system that will give commanders a

comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground. NATO

Defence Ministers agreed that “the Alliance should pursue

work on a minimum, essential NATO-owned and operated AGS

core capability, supplemented by interoperable national assets”.

The AGS programme was designed to furnish NATO with a

complete and integrated ground surveillance capability, offering

unrestricted and unfiltered access to ground surveillance data

in near real time and in an interoperable manner. The initiative

was to include an air segment with airborne radar sensors and

a ground segment comprising fixed, transportable and mobile

ground stations for data exploitation and dissemination, all

connected through high-performance data links.

In 2004, before the financial crisis struck, NATO decided

to move ahead with a mixed-fleet approach. The air segment

was originally to include Airbus A321 manned aircraft and

Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 40 unmanned

aerial vehicles (UAVs), both carrying versions of a Transatlantic

Cooperative AGS Radar (TCAR), with the ground segment

having an extensive set of fixed and deployable ground stations.

However, when it became clear that this option would

stretch the budgets of the Alliance, most of whose nations

had just experienced (or were about to experience) acute

financial shocks, NATO decided to discontinue the more

expensive mixed-fleet approach in 2007. To this end, the

A321 and TCAR elements of the mixed fleet were dropped

and instead, a simplified approach, based on the off-the-shelf

Global Hawk Block 40 UAV and its associated multi-platform

radar technology insertion programme (MP-RTIP) AN/ZPY-2

ADCOM SYSTEMSPO Box 25298, ICAD, Abu Dhabi, UAETel: +971 2 55 00 630Fax: +971 2 55 00 631Email: [email protected]

United-40 Block 5

ADCOM SYSTEMS is one of the world’s leading companies engaged in the design and manufacture of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). As designers, we are always guided by the idea of doing something to help humanity. We are looking for a way to show the world that UAVs can be used for civilised purposes, whether for humanitarian aid, or to provide the necessary help to avoid risking the lives of crew members.

We are looking to work closely with various United Nations departments in order to gain a profound understanding of what is needed and what we can to do help UAV support missions.

We are committed to changing the public’s common perception, as well as changing the military face of unmanned aviation. We believe that we can change the cliché and prove that UAVs do not have to be used solely for destructive purposes.

It is a long-held ambition of ADCOM SYSTEMS to design and develop serious UAV systems with the capacity to become a powerful means of dealing with the consequences of natural and industrial disasters, as well as provide support and help to those in need. We are convinced that our main objective as human beings must be to make the world a better place for our contemporaries, as well as future generations.

With this in mind, we are constantly cooperating with various international companies to acquire all types of sensors, learn from their experiences and develop new high-quality equipment to comply with the needs of our customers.

We hope that our approach will win the support of civilised governments and conscious companies all over the world. There is no better investment than an investment made in the interest of humanity.

We would like to thank the United Nations for giving us the opportunity to express our vision and aspirations to make the world a better place.

Ali Al DhaheriChief Designer and CEO

Eyes on target

www.radionor.no

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Radionor_annonse_005.pdf 1 21.08.2014 08:31:48



The ground segment will provide an interface between

the AGS core system and a wide range of command, control,

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C2ISR) systems

to interconnect with and provide data to multiple deployed and

non-deployed operational users, including reach-back facilities

remote from the surveillance area. There will be a number of

ground stations both mobile and transportable, providing data-

link connectivity, data-processing and exploitation capabilities

and interfaces for interoperability with C2ISR systems.

The support segment, including dedicated mission support

facilities, will be located at the AGS main operating base at

Sigonella Air Base in Italy, which will serve both as a NATO

joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (JISR)

deployment base and a data-exploitation and training centre.

AGS core capabilityThe Global Hawk ISTAR platform has already proven its

usefulness for this sort of intense surveillance tasking, having

logged more than 115,000 flight hours supporting operations

in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Nigeria.

Once in service with NATO, each AGS Global Hawk Block

40 UAV will be able fly at 60,000 feet for more than 30 hours.

The NATO-owned and -operated AGS core capability will

enable the Alliance to perform persistent surveillance over

wide areas from high-altitude, long-endurance, unmanned

aerial platforms operating at considerable stand-off distances

and in any weather or light condition. The sensors deployed

include swath and spot synthetic aperture radar (SAR)

and ground moving-target indicator (GMTI) capabilities to

collect information that will provide decision-makers with

a comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground.

They will continuously detect and track moving objects

throughout observed areas and will provide radar imagery

of areas of interest, as well as of stationary objects.

In July 2014, US Air Force Global Hawk Block 30s flew

three successful full-day sorties from Orland Main Air Station,

Norway, as part of NATO’s 10-day trial ‘Unified Vision 2014’,

which involved satellites, aircraft, UAVs, naval vessels, ground

sensors and human intelligence from 18 NATO countries. This

demonstration of JISR capability was aimed at showcasing and

evaluating the Alliance’s ability to deploy assets, as well as

gather and fuse intelligence from multiple sources – in space,

in the air, on land and at sea – at different stages of operations.

The AGS Global Hawk Block 40 aircraft are now in

production at Northrop Grumman’s Moss Point, Mississippi

facility. Although there is no specific date released for the first

flight, the company expects to attain initial operating capability

in 2017 and full operating capability in 2018.

RQ-4 Block 40 Global Hawk uAVs represent a significant capability enhancement on the Block 20 version pictured here

NATO AGS Block 40 Global Hawk uAVs in production at Northrop Grumman’s moss point, mississippi facility

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STRENGTHENING MILITARY CAPABILITIESSTRENGTHENING MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Iain Ballantyne looks at NATO’s evolving naval missions and asks what sort of ships and capability it will need to ensure

maritime security in the future

Maritime projection

The vessels of Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures

Group 1 (SNMCMG1) and SNMCMG2 have long been a

familiar sight in the Baltic, the Mediterranean and the Black

Seas – on exercise or eliminating the residual menace posed

by munitions from past wars. In recent months, both task

groups have paid visits to the ports of NATO Member States

that fear the Russians may have ambitions in their direction.

Similarly, the frigates, destroyers and cruisers of Standing

NATO Maritime Group 1 and SNMG2 have been kept busy

on reassurance missions.

At present, NATO fields different types of vessels, even

within the same task groups. For example, SNMG1, at the time

of writing, comprises HDMS Esbern Snare (Denmark, a flexible

support ship), FGS Magdeburg (Germany, a Braunschweig-class

corvette) and USS Taylor (United States, a Perry-class frigate).

Meanwhile, SNMCMG2 comprises ITS Avieri (Italy, an

Artigliere-class frigate) as flagship, leading the mine-hunters

HMS Chiddingfold (British, Hunt class), ITS Rimini (Italian,

Gaeta class) and TCG Akçay (Turkish, Aydin class).

Given that they share a common purpose, why not impose

on these maritime task groups identical vessels that can

do everything in one platform? Commonality is surely the

Holy Grail for NATO, but it is not easy to achieve, for various

reasons, not least the need for bespoke requirements in

different countries that have sovereign operational needs, and

for preserving indigenous technology and associated industries.

NATO maritime task groups patrol the seas to counter threats and reassure friendly states

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The UK’s future Global Combat Ship (GCS) will be able to swap roles using a modular equipment concept

When facing down potentially intense threats, nothing but a vessel

that can truly protect itself and wage war at the high end of

the spectrum will do

BAE

SyST

EmS

Budget pressures, when combined with a still demanding

portfolio of missions, do seem to drive some navies towards

at least aspiring to create a ship that can do everything.

The Danes, with their C-Flex ships, might appear to offer

the template, should NATO strive for such a common vessel.

The Esbern Snare and her sister Absalon possess an ability to

switch roles via different mission modules, tackling everything

from anti-submarine warfare (ASW) to mine countermeasures,

task-group command, military transportation and hospital-

ship duties. They also make

useful patrol platforms, and

are fitted with anti-ship and

anti-air missiles in addition

to a 127mm gun.

Another example is the

US Navy’s radical-looking

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS),

which similarly aspires to

achieve flexible goals. The

LCS (which comes in two

hull types) is a multipurpose

platform that can switch

from mine-hunting to anti-surface warfare (ASW) via different

mission modules, while also tailoring embarked personnel for

the task at hand. However, as is the case with all ships of this

type, the process requires the vessel to return to port in order

to switch roles by taking aboard new modules and crew.

In the UK there has, in recent years, been an aversion to

calling the country’s future frigate a frigate. Rather, the Type

26 is known as the Global Combat Ship (GCS). The GCS will,

though, be a frigate in all but name, with the full range of the

usual capabilities (anti-submarine, anti-surface, anti-air, land

attack and maritime security). It will also be able to embark a

medium-sized helicopter and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

Beyond the Type 26, the British have ambitions for a multi-role

vessel that will take on mine warfare, hydrographic surveying

and offshore-patrol tasks. A Royal Navy concept paper labelled

such a platform the ‘Black Swan’ class – partly in tribute to an

earlier class of the same name that provided sterling service

in winning the Battle of the Atlantic. This latter-day sloop of

war would have a mission bay to, in the words of the concept

paper, achieve cost-effectiveness due to the manner, “in which

it can be reconfigured to

suit a number of roles,

hence ensuring that costly

capability is only deployed

when required”. Unmanned

air, surface and sub-surface

systems would feature

prominently, for as the

concept paper goes on to

say, “unmanned systems

will have a major impact on

future maritime operations”.

The Black Swan concept

foresees a crew of as few as 16 sailors embarked for the mine-

hunting role, around 40 in the counter-piracy/counter-drugs

mission and 40 for sea control. The concept would also

offer mission packages, such as: ■■ counter-piracy/counter-drugs – Wildcat helicopter, two

rotary-wing UAVs, unmanned surface systems (USSs),

plus two rigid hull inflatable boats (RHIBs);■■ mine hunting – USSs and unmanned underwater systems

(UUSs), plus towed-sonar, and underwater launch and

recovery of mine eliminators (such as Seafox) and two or

three rotary-wing UAVs; and



■■ sea control – Merlin and/or Wildcat helicopters, up to

eight UAVs, plus, potentially, dozens of smaller unmanned

systems down to ‘nano-sized’, as well as containerised

mission modules for missiles/guns and containerised

sensors, including ASW towed-array sonar.

It is two years since the above-mentioned Black Swan

concept paper was published, and the world moves on, with

threats evolving all the time. The American experience has

showed that the frigate endures. Having navigated down the

LCS route, the US has taken stock and changed direction, at

least partially, to kick-start a programme for a new class of

multi-role frigates. Although the LCS can do a lot of things,

and is as big as a frigate, it has one major potential Achilles

heel, that is: lack of survivability in a high-threat zone. US

Secretary of State for Defense Chuck Hagel said: “The LCS

was designed to perform certain missions – such as mine-

sweeping and anti-submarine warfare – in a relatively

permissive environment. But we need to closely examine

whether the LCS has the independent protection and

firepower to operate and survive against a more advanced

military adversary and emerging new technologies.”

Need for a mix of vesselsWhen facing down potentially intense threats, such as those

posed by the Russians in the Black Sea and Baltic, or by the

Iranians in the Strait of Hormuz, nothing but a vessel that

can truly protect itself and wage war at the high end of the

spectrum will do, hence the American change of direction.

Therefore, the answer to the question of what sort of ships

and capabilities NATO needs to ensure maritime security is

all of the above. There is clearly a place in both sovereign

navies and the multinational task groups for a mix of different

vessels. There will be fewer platforms, but they must be capable

of performing all kinds of missions. Some NATO navies will

only be able to afford the Black Swan-type sloop. Other Member

States will have to field frigates, destroyers and cruisers in

order to protect ‘the little guys’.

Counter-mining activity from FGS Weilheim, a German mine-hunter. NATO countries field different types of vessel for the same task group

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Atlantic Council ...................................................................................68

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CAE ......................................................................................................20

EUROtrade S.A. ...................................................................................94

Frequentis ...........................................................................................10

General Dynamics ............................................................................. 116

GKN Aerospace ....................................................................................12

Harris ...................................................................................................87

Havelsan ...............................................................................................63

Land Rover .............................................................................................2

LOM PRAHA ....................................................................................... 14

OBE-One ..............................................................................................26

Prox Dynamics .................................................................................. 115

Radionor .............................................................................................108

Rafael.............................................................................................. 4 & 7

Secusmart ............................................................................................37

Shipping Consultants Associated Ltd ............................................... 110

SICOM s.p.a ..........................................................................................82

SkyLink Aviation Inc ...........................................................................24

Supergum .............................................................................................78

ThalesRaytheonSystems ................................................................... 103

Thuraya ................................................................................................18


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