Securing the Seas in Southeast Asia

Jaime Burnell

International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Singapore

"Uranium could also lead to the construction of bombs. A single bomb of this type, carried by boat and exploded in a port, might very well destroy the whole port together with some of the surrounding territory."

Letter to US President Franklin Roosevelt on 2 August 1939

Diving Instruction Manual Recovered Diving Instruction Manual Recovered from Afghanistanfrom Afghanistan

“Let our goal to be the triumph of the religion of Allah and invading the seas and diving to its deeps, lets us make the necessary preparation and power to triumph Islam”

“ Wa a’iddu lahum mastata’tum min quwwatin wa min ribatilkhaili ”

And make ready against them all you can of power, including steeds of war

OverviewOverview• The Context The Context • The Geography of ThreatThe Geography of Threat• Importance of SEA SLOCsImportance of SEA SLOCs• Assessing Terrorist Threat in the Maritime Assessing Terrorist Threat in the Maritime

Domain Domain

– Intention, Capabilities and OpportunitiesIntention, Capabilities and Opportunities– Groups with maritime terrorist capabilities in SEAGroups with maritime terrorist capabilities in SEA

• ResponseResponse

Southeast Asia Southeast Asia

• Ground zero of maritime threats, both Ground zero of maritime threats, both from piracy and terrorism from piracy and terrorism

• Home to several Islamist Terror GroupsHome to several Islamist Terror Groups• Al Qaeda networkAl Qaeda network• Planning for USS Cole attack Planning for USS Cole attack • Planning for attack against US naval Planning for attack against US naval

facilities and assetsfacilities and assets• KMM plan to attack an US ship in 2001KMM plan to attack an US ship in 2001• Plan to attack an US ship in Surabaya, Plan to attack an US ship in Surabaya,

IndonesiaIndonesia• SuperFerry 14 ( February 2004) – SuperFerry 14 ( February 2004) –

worst maritime disasterworst maritime disaster

Geography of ThreatGeography of Threat

• Straits of Malacca: Straits of Malacca: The busiest shipping The busiest shipping line in the world - linking the Indian Ocean to line in the world - linking the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and the Pacific the South China Sea and the Pacific

• Sunda and LombokSunda and Lombok

• The Singapore StraitsThe Singapore Straits

• Located within or astride geographic Located within or astride geographic archipelagoes, inhibited with large archipelagoes, inhibited with large populations with less than ideal social, populations with less than ideal social, political and economic conditions political and economic conditions

• Narrow channels, shallow reefs and Narrow channels, shallow reefs and thousands of tiny islands - ideal for piracy thousands of tiny islands - ideal for piracy and other water-borne crimes and other water-borne crimes

Maritime TerrorismMaritime Terrorism

• Terrorist attacks against maritime sectors Terrorist attacks against maritime sectors generally rare- 1.9% of all international incidents generally rare- 1.9% of all international incidents over last 30 yearsover last 30 years

• Due to:Due to:– Most terrorists are tactically conservative Most terrorists are tactically conservative – Little experience of the maritime environmentLittle experience of the maritime environment– Requires specialist equipment and skillsRequires specialist equipment and skills– Profusion of other fixed land targets offering higher Profusion of other fixed land targets offering higher visibility visibility

and greater ease of accessand greater ease of access– Overall impact potential low- unless very high profile Overall impact potential low- unless very high profile

(USS Cole) and sensational (Achille Lauro, 1985) than (USS Cole) and sensational (Achille Lauro, 1985) than media-accessible land targets.media-accessible land targets.

High Profile Maritime AttacksHigh Profile Maritime Attacks

• 1974- Hijacking of a Greek freighter in 1974- Hijacking of a Greek freighter in Karachi (Pakistan)Karachi (Pakistan)

• 1985- Seizure of the Achille Lauro1985- Seizure of the Achille Lauro

• February 2000- Bombing of a Phillipine February 2000- Bombing of a Phillipine ferry (45 killed)ferry (45 killed)

• October 2000- Suicide attack against USS October 2000- Suicide attack against USS Cole (17 Killed)Cole (17 Killed)

• October 2000: LLTE Suicide attack October 2000: LLTE Suicide attack against SL navyagainst SL navy

• October 2002- French Tanker Limburg October 2002- French Tanker Limburg 158,000 t. of crude oil158,000 t. of crude oil

• February 2004- Superferry 14February 2004- Superferry 14

• Potential targets- Queen Mary 2Potential targets- Queen Mary 2

Factors Increasing Perceived Threat Tactical

• Restricted operational space on land - Target hardening of land based targets and aviation sector

• Opaque and amorphous environment

• Vast areas of un-policed waters

• Lax port security, poor coastal surveillance, profusion of targets, trend toward ‘skeleton crews’

• Terrorists showing increasing tactical sophistication

• Increased terrorist resource constraints

• Increasing terrorist-criminal nexus esp. piracy

Factors Increasing Threat Potential Perceptual/Psychological/ Systemic

• Maritime Sector as conduit of Global activity

• Perception as alternative venue for mass casualty attacks, targeting LNG carriers/terminals, refineries, petrochemical installations, cruise ships and passenger liners

• Copy Cat Phenomenon: Precedent of USS Cole bombing- generated enormous political capital, underscored vulnerability of vessels at port

• Lack of a coordinated International Response

Assessing Terrorist Threat in the Maritime Assessing Terrorist Threat in the Maritime DomainDomain

Adversarial AnalysisThe Threat Matrix

Capability

OpportunityIntention

Ideological disposition

Past Activities

Human

Material

Vulnerability of the Target

Security environment

Composition of the support base

When rising interests meet with capabilityWhen rising interests meet with capability

• Terrorist Groups known to be using shipping for transport of banned and contraband goods as well as for human smuggling

• A shift in strategy towards economic targets –Limburg, Bali, Kenya, Pakistan, Al- Khobar, Istanbul

• Al Qaeda:- Inclination to target businesses - smuggling bombs including nuclear or radiological devices

• Demonstrated capability to deliver the same tactics time and time again

• Can replicate land capabilities in the maritime domain

Motivation/Intention

Terrorist Groups with Maritime Terrorist capability

• The number of contemporary terrorist groups with a maritime capability is few

• The best known are:– PIRA– LTTE– Al Qaeda– The Contras– Palestinian Groups – PFLP, Hamas– ASG, GAM, MILF

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

• ASG- Basilan Island ASG- Basilan Island • Hybrid group – about Hybrid group – about

50% traditional mariners50% traditional mariners• Links with AQ, JI and Links with AQ, JI and

LTTELTTE

Green/ coastal operations

Blue/ Deep sea operations

Brown/riverine operations

ASG

Very Limited

Medium to High

Abu Sayyaf Group (Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)ASG)

• Nadzmi Sabdullah, @ “Commander Global,” planned many maritime operations including the kidnapping raids on Sipadan in 2000 and Palawan in 2001.

• Galib Andang, @ “Commander Robot,” led the 2000 Sipadan maritime kidnapping raid.

ASG AttacksASG Attacks

• Sasa Wharf, Davao City- 02 April 2003

– Filipina Princess– Superferry 15

• These ships were pier-side Sasa wharf, Davao City when it was bombed

ASG AttacksASG Attacks

• SuperFerry 14 - SuperFerry 14 - February 2004February 2004

• Joint operation by Joint operation by ASG, JI and RSMASG, JI and RSM

• Worst maritime Worst maritime terrorist actterrorist act

Moro Islamic Liberation FrontMoro Islamic Liberation Front

• Largest, most capable rebel group Largest, most capable rebel group in the Philippinesin the Philippines

• Strong links to Al-Qaeda/JIStrong links to Al-Qaeda/JI• Demonstrated capabilityDemonstrated capability• Our Lady Mediatrix (2000)Our Lady Mediatrix (2000)• Small arms attack on Philippine Small arms attack on Philippine

Navy Ship (2000)Navy Ship (2000)• Sasa Wharf, Davao City Bombing Sasa Wharf, Davao City Bombing

(2003)(2003)

• Allegedly made enquires with North Korea for a possible sale of a mini submarine

• Intent limited to their Area of Intent limited to their Area of OperationsOperations

Blue WaterOperations

Logistical Capacity

General Water borne

Attacks

SmugglingInc Weaponry

IED

MILF

Medium to high

Very Limited

Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) “Free Aceh Movement”

• Straits of Malacca - Singapore, West Malaysia, Southern Thailand, and Myanmar and into the Indian Ocean as far west as Sri Lanka

• Contacts with smuggling syndicates ( narcotics people, stolen goods, petroleum, and arms) and pirate gangs operating across the Straits of Malacca

Green/ coastal operations

Blue/ Deep sea operations

Brown/riverine operations

GAM

Medium to high

Very Limited

Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)

• Sympathizers among ethnic-Acehnese in Penang (Malaysia) and Islamic mariners in Southern Thailand (PULO)

• ‘Kidnap for Ransom’• Tirta Niaga IV, Exxon Mobil

Tender

• September 200- claimed protection money from the users of the straits

Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)

• Indonesian Marines Indonesian Marines burn suspected burn suspected GAM craftsGAM crafts

• Impact of Tsunami Impact of Tsunami

• Peace AgreementPeace Agreement

Al Qaeda

• Estimated to have 15 to as many as 300 vessels of varying sizes

• “Prince of the Sea” - Abdulrahim Mohammed Abda Al-Nasheri mMasterminded the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in Aden

• A 180-page file listing “targets of opportunity,” included large cruise liners sailing from Western ports

• Diving manual recovered from Afghanistan -“Let our goal to be the triumph of the religion of Allah and invading the seas and diving to its deeps, lets us make the necessary preparation and power to triumph Islam”

Al Qaeda AttacksAl Qaeda Attacks

• Plotted an attack on the British aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal as it passed through the Gibraltar Straits to participate in the US led coalition war against Iraq – supported by Salafia Jihadia

• Plan to attack NATO ships in the Straits of Gibraltar, thwarted by the Moroccan authorities

• Plans to bomb the Fifth Fleet Headquarters in Bahrain

• February 2002 plan to hijack a passenger airliner and crash it onto a US warship in the Indian Ocean (AQ Ass. Groups in SA)

Jemaah IslamiyahJemaah Islamiyah

• No dedicated maritime organizationNo dedicated maritime organization

• Used maritime domain extensively for sending Used maritime domain extensively for sending recruits to training camps in Philippinesrecruits to training camps in Philippines

• Conducted covert surveillance of maritime Conducted covert surveillance of maritime assets in Singapore, including oil refinery assets in Singapore, including oil refinery facilities on Jurong Island and a US vessel at facilities on Jurong Island and a US vessel at the Changi Naval Base the Changi Naval Base

• Increasing coordination between JI, ASG, MILF Increasing coordination between JI, ASG, MILF and RSMand RSM

New Configurations- New ThreatsNew Configurations- New Threats

• SEA terror groups – ASG/MILF/JI SEA terror groups – ASG/MILF/JI currently enhancing their currently enhancing their underwater capabilitiesunderwater capabilities

• 2 JI members reportedly training 2 JI members reportedly training 23 ASG and MILF elements in 23 ASG and MILF elements in scuba diving & underwater scuba diving & underwater demolition skillsdemolition skills

• Upon completion of the training, Upon completion of the training, the graduates will be divided into the graduates will be divided into groups - each tasked to conduct groups - each tasked to conduct underwater bombings against underwater bombings against seaports and vessels in Mindanao seaports and vessels in Mindanao

• Capability can be replicated Capability can be replicated elsewhereelsewhere

JI MILF

ASG

ConclusionConclusion

• Must focus on degrading the land capabilities of Must focus on degrading the land capabilities of the groupsthe groups

• To change focus: from the land to the sea To change focus: from the land to the sea instead of just ‘At Sea’ - "securing the littoral" instead of just ‘At Sea’ - "securing the littoral"

• Interdiction and constant disruption of the LIMO Interdiction and constant disruption of the LIMO capabilities  thereby degrading of "capabilities" capabilities  thereby degrading of "capabilities" and minimising the "opportunities" of the and minimising the "opportunities" of the asymmetric maritime threatsasymmetric maritime threats

The risk of terrorist attack can perhaps never be eliminated, but sensible steps can be taken to reduce the risk. The issue here is how seriously do the governments take the threat of maritime terrorism…Post-Limburg, we cannot continue to hope for the best and ignore the lessons.“

(International Maritime Bureau (IMB)of International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)