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Securitization of Migration in the European Union:

Mind your semantics!?

Gijs Norden

Student number: 1013653

Leiden University

Master Thesis Crisis and Security Management

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. M. Den Boer

Second reader: Dr. J. Matthys

Word Count:

March 2016

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Table of Contents

1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………Page 3-4

2 Literature Review Page 4-9

2.1 Copenhagen School………………………………………………………….…………………………......Page 4

2.2 Securitization Theory………………………………………..……………………………………………...Page 5

2.3 World Risk Society……………………………………………..…………………………………………...Page 5-6

2. 4 Connecting Migration to Security……………………………….………………………………………...Page 7-9

3 Theoretical Framework Page 9-17

3.1 Politics of Insecurity………………………………………………………...……………………………...Page 9-10

3.2 Framing Migrants…………………………………………………………..………………………………Page 10-12

3.3 Spread of Trust and Fear…………………………………………………………………………………...Page 12

3. 4 Administering inclusion and exclusion…………………………………………………………….............Page 13

3.5 Structuring alienation and predisposition towards violence……………………………………..………...Page 13-14

3.6 Importance of Audience………………………………………………………………..…………………...Page 14-16

3.7 Internal and External Security …………………………………………………………………………......Page 16-17

4 Case Selection Page 17-25

5 Research Method Page 25-31

5.1 Unit of Analysis……………………………………………………………………………………………..Page 26-28

5.2 Different existential danger frames……………………...……………………………………………….....Page 28-30

5.3 Semantic Code Scheme for frames…………………………………………………………………..………Page 31

6 Findings Page 32-45

6.1 Dutch EU Presidency of 1997…………………………………………………………………...……….....Page 33-36

6.2 Dutch EU Presidency of 2004…………………………………………………………………..………......Page 37-40

6.3 Dutch EU Presidency of 2016……………………………………………………………...…………….....Page 41-45

7 Synthesis Page 45-53

7.1 Dutch EU Presidency of 1997………………………………………………………………..…………......Page 46-48

7.2 Dutch EU Presidency of 2004……………………………………………………………………..………..Page 48-50

7.3 Dutch EU Presidency of 2016…………………………………….…………………………………...……Page 50-52

7.4 Comparing the Presidencies……………………………………………………………………………..….Page 52-53

8 Final Conclusions and Discussion Page 53-58

8.1 Final Conclusions……...……………………………………………..…………………………………..…Page 52-54

8.2 Discussion …………………………………………………………..………………………………………Page 54-57

9 Literature References Page 59-64

Annex I Sources of policy documents Page 64-70

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1. Introduction

During the Summer of 2015 there was an increase in the numbers of refugees applying for

asylum in the European Union. Most of these refugees come from war torn regions such as Syria

and Iraq (BBC 2015). These large numbers of people, asking for shelter and security, are a big

challenge for the European Union and its Member States. In many states there are different

opinions about how to deal with these refugees. There are also voices, in for example the

Netherlands, that portray these refugees as a threat to national security of Western States (Van Den

Dool 2015). These groups of refugees are framed as a security issue because IS, allegedly stated

that they would send terrorists and fighters among the refugees to disrupt European societies

(Kaplan 2015). This leads to a securitization of refugees and migration in general. One could think

that this process securitization of refugees and migrants is a completely new phenomenon, linked

to this specific crisis. Others might think that 9/11 was a turning point and the beginning of

portraying migrants as a security problem. However, this is not the case. Refugees and migrants

have been portrayed as a threat to security far before these events, for example during the

Yugoslavian wars during the 1990’s (Barutciski 1994, 32).

This thesis will look into the securitization of migration. It will look into framing by the

Council of Europe of migrants and refugees, during three different migration crises. It will analyze

whether and how migrants and refugees have been securitized during the European Union

Presidencies of the Netherlands. This will be done by analyzing different (policy) documents

which were issued by the Dutch government as well as the Council of the European Union. The

main research method is discourse analysis. It will analyze the (securitization) discourse during

three successive Presidencies of the Netherlands of the European Union, namely in 1997, 2004 and

2016. Because the Presidency of 2016 of the Netherlands is still ongoing at the time of writing the

Council of the European Union documents of the “troikas” of each Dutch Presidency will be taken

into account, referring to EU Presidencies prior and after the Netherlands EU Presidency with the

fixed duration of six months each.

The topic of this thesis can be situated in a broader context of research in the field of security

studies. Although there are many case studies and applications of securitization theory, there are

hardly any studies that compare the frames of particular migrant groups over the course of

different times. If they do look into securitization frames of migrant groups, the studies do not

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compare different migrant groups overtime (Nickels 2007, 37). The theoretical background of this

thesis will be mainly focused on the approach of Huysmans (2006). Huysmans can be placed in the

more critical group of scholars of the Critical Security Studies (CSS). Huysmans’ theoretical

approach will be completed with the works of Bigo (2001), Balzacq (2005) and others, to include

some of the framing theory and other aspects. The research question this thesis seeks to answer is:

how do the Council of the European Union and the holder of the Presidency, namely the Dutch

Government, frame migrants and refugees during the relevant Presidency terms? Moreover, when

we compare these Presidencies, can we observe any successive shifts in the way migrants are

framed as a security issue?

In the next section of this thesis the relevant literature concerning the securitization of migration

theory will be discussed. Then the theoretical framework will be elaborated on. Followed by the

research design, including the case selection and research method of this thesis. Finally, the

findings, a synthesis and final conclusions and a discussion will be presented.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Copenhagen School

During the cold war security was mostly linked to military and state security. However,

during the 1980’s and especially after the Cold War scholars began to identify other realms of

security. Scholars like Ullman (1983), Nye (1988), were among the first to argue that security was

nog only linked to states and their military and political power (COT 2007, 18-19). But security

could also be applied to fields like economic, societal and environmental issues (Buzan, Weaver &

De Wilde 1998, vii). The analysis of the broadening or deepening of security to other fields became

known as the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. The Copenhagen School is a strand in

International Relations studies, three authors that are seen as the ‘founding fathers’ of the School

are Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap De Wilde. Their book Security: A new Framework for Analysis,

is seen as one of the primary books of the School. The Copenhagen school can be placed in the

broader context of the critical security studies and the social constructivist strand in International

Relations (McDonald 2008, 565-566). The school is mostly known for its development of the

concept of securitization which will be elaborated on in the next paragraph.

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2.2 Securitization Theory

The securitization of migration is actually an application of securitization theory to the field

of migration. Securitization theory has its origins in the work of authors such as Barry Buzan

(1991). It is also closely linked to the abovementioned Copenhagen School. For example, Ole

Weaver (1995) argued that security issues do not come out of the blue, but are constructed as such

by securitizing actors through speech acts. Security (issues) can therefore not be seen as a given

fact but it should be seen as an intersubjective discursive process (Tromble 2014, 527). Tromble

(2014), adapts the definition of Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, and describes the process of

securitization as:

“The process of securitization is begun when an actor (or set of actors): (1) identifies

something a referent object, as existentially threatened; (2) suggests that the source of that

threat; and (3) calls for extraordinary measures – or departures from the rules of normal

politics, such as secrecy additional executive powers and activities that would otherwise be

illegal. The process of securitization is then complete or “successful” when the actor’s

intended audience accepts all three components as given and itself perpetuates the

securitizing discourse (Tromble 2014, 527-528)”.

There have been criticisms to this view because it is regarded as too narrow, by focusing only on

speech acts of dominant actors (McDonald 2008, 563; Williams 2003). Others like Bigo (2002) and

McDonald (2008) argue that also bureaucratic practices can also be important to take into account

when studying securitization. Through the years the securitization theory has been adjusted and

applied to many different fields. In the next section the connection between migration and

securitization theory will be explained and elaborated on.

2.3 World Risk Society

In 1992 Ulrich Beck introduced the term (world) risk society. Almost a decade later Beck revisited

his risk society theory. And added world to his concept of risk society in 1999. After 9/11 he argued

that the world risk society was visible in nearly all global problems. Beck argues that

modernization has created a division between quantifiable risks in the world in which we think

and act, and the non-quantifiable insecurities that people create. Risk is linked to control and it

assumes we can make policies by which we can counter the risks (Beck 2002, 40). However, in a

world risk society there are risks that are uncontrollable, and sometimes even incomprehensible to

us that are at the same time created by human behavior. It does not mean that the world has

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become more dangerous, but it means that uncontrollable risks have “de-bounded”. It is

uncontrollable on three different axioms, spatial, temporal and social. Spatial refers to the fact that

modern risks do not stop at borders, they are often cross-border problems, such as large numbers

of refugees, economic crises and climate change (Beck 2002, 41). In other words, national security is

no longer national, it has become international because states have become interdependent and

closely related.

In order to deal with for example international migration, it is necessary for (nation) states to

cooperate transnationally (Beck 2002, 46-47). The temporal axiom means that the risks are stretched

over a long period of time, which makes it hard to make policy for more than just the short term.

The social axiom refers to the difficulty of determining who is responsible for causing the risks or

problems, it is for example hard to determine the exact person who caused a financial crisis or who

started environmental problems. Mainly because these problems are the outcomes of behavior of

many different people (Beck 2002, 41).

Beck then argues that there are three different dimensions of conflict in the world risk society,

ecological conflicts, global financial crises and global terror networks threats that have empowered

governments and nation-states (Beck 2002, 41). Nowadays this terrorist networked threat has

spread across the globe and together with wars and other conflicts have caused millions of people

to search refuge in other countries. This new large migration problem is an aspect Beck has left out

of his revisiting of the world risk society theory. But mobility was already a big issue that was

linked to globalization, moreover human tragedies had already taken place, for example the

Balkan crisis and for example ethnic cleansing in Rwanda. There are other authors who did

observe this migration issue, David Held and Anthony McGrew observed that migration had been

an ongoing since the end of the Cold War (Held and McGrew 1999, 7). However, there are aspects

of the terrorist network threat that can also be found in the discourse around migration. For

example, active trust is being substituted with active mistrust of the (unknown) other, but also

because accidents or unintended incidents are replaced by fear of (bad) intentions (Beck 2002, 45).

And environmental issues can cause migration problems too, perhaps even more than wars do.

For example, in 2012 extreme weather drove more than 32 million people out of their homes, Held

and McGrew argue (Held and McGrew 1999, 7).

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2.4 Connecting Migration to Security

However, migration has been recognized as a security issue. Copenhagen School Member Buzan

(1991) was one of the first to connect migration and security to each other. Along with ecological

issues, migration was one of the first fields to which the security nexus was broadened (Buzan

1997, 6-7). Before it was studied in relation to security, migration was mostly studied in the fields

of sociology, anthropology and history (Huysmans and Squire 2009, 1). One of the first migration

issues that was being securitized was even during the Cold War. It was argued that the migration

flows of East German refugees contributed to bringing down the Berlin wall and that they

therefore had a big part in the erosion and finally the collapse of the German Democratic Republic.

Thus the general argument goes that population flows can pose a threat to the security and

stability of nation-states and moreover the international order (Huysmans 2006 ,16). To prevent

this state erosion due to migration and a possible collapse of their state, states like North Korea but

also the German Democratic Republic prohibited their citizens to leave the country. These kind of

measures are mostly found in totalitarian states. However, there are a lot of accounts that counter

the argument that population flows can cause erosion and collapse. For example, these arguments

say nothing about the stability of the hosting country, mostly about the country where people flee

from. Moreover, population flows can often be absorbed into hosting societies, when they are

willing to do so. Think for example about the internally displaced persons during World War 2 in

Europe. But also the Belgian refugees in the Netherlands during World War 1 or the Jewish

refugees in the 1930’s. Both groups were absorbed into Dutch society, although their absorption

depended mostly on their social economic status (Laqua 2012, 480-81; Moore 1984, 75).

Some critics initially rejected the link, because they argued that the security discourse could

have negative effects on migrants (Collyer 2006, 255). They argued furthermore that the link

between security and migration is not universal. It is especially made a security problem in

Western and mostly wealthier countries. According to Collyer (2006) this is mainly explained by

the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the London and Madrid bombings, in which allegedly migrants

were involved (Collyer 2006, 256). However, this can be contradicted by the fact that already

before these attacks occurred, security and migration were already linked to each other by

different scholars (Adamson 2006; Bigo 2002; Buzan 1991; Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002; Huysmans

2002; Weiner 1992). Other critics like Christina Boswell (2007) argues that there is actually an

absence of securitization in migration control after 9/11. Her main criticism is that securitization

theory’s assumptions diminish possible alternative patterns of issue-framing in public discourse

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and that it takes for granted the uniform rationality in explaining organizational action (Boswell

2007, 593). According to the securitization literature there are two ways in which organizations

take part in securitizing, both underpinned by the assumption that they are power-maximizing.

The first is that security agencies try to expand to other areas, they can do so by the legitimization

by a security discourse in the public domain. The other way is that agencies try to expand their

power by avoiding public scrutiny, by for example trying to go beyond national scrutiny by

cooperating at the European level (Boswell 2007, 592-593). However, while Boswell acknowledges

that securitization is often happening, she does not discard the theory in general. She adds that

securitization should not be the starting point of research. She argues that researchers also have to

take in mind that there are other possible ways of framing politics and mechanisms at work than

just securitization (Boswell 2007, 59). Lavenex on the other hand argues that there is a big

normative aspect in refugee policies which have been developed in the European Union. There are

tensions between internal security on the one side and human rights’ issues on the other side.

Refugee policies cannot just be justified on the basis of material interests; it is mainly a normative

policy. These policies are derived from universal human rights (Lavenex 2001, 852). In her work

she focuses on the Europeanization of refugee policies. This entails the European integration

agenda and especially the institutionalization of actions of the EU but also the institutionalization

of meaning. Which means that ideational factors are becoming of vital importance as well as the

procedural and institutional aspects (Lavenex 2001, 853).

Within the securitization of migration literature there have been different views, critiques

and approaches. In the early 1990s most attention was given to states and their “original”

inhabitants, later this changed and authors as for example Collyer argue that not only the state and

its people matter but also the effects for migrants themselves (Collyer 2006, 260; Goodwin-Gill

1999, 3; Faist 2004, 15). This was in accordance with a more general trend in IR that a state centric

approach shifted towards a more agency centric approach in social constructivism (Checkel 1998,

328). Other authors such as Didier Bigo (2006) focus on internal and external factors of security. He

basically argues that security is mostly tackled at a transnational level, states can no longer rely on

themselves for their security, they need to cooperate with other states at a transnational level.

Especially the impact of Europeanization has aided formalizing transnational relations between

security actors and the creation of European institutions that are in charge of fundamental rights

and data protection (Bigo 2006, 385). Thierry Balzacq (2005) on the other hands takes another

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approach, he focuses his research on three basic assumptions. He argues that an effective

securitization has to be audience-centered, that it is context dependent and that effective

securitization is power-laden (Balzacq 2005, 171). Jef Huysmans is also a well-known author in the

field of securitization of migration. He has published several articles, books chapters and books on

the subject, including some on the normative dilemma of writing security1. In the next section on

the theoretical framework, the work of Balzacq (2005), Bigo (2001) and Huysmans (2006) and

others will be combined and elaborated on. It will serve as the theoretical foundation for the

analysis of the discourse of Dutch EU Presidencies during several refugee crises.

3. Theoretical Framework

As argued above, security threats and insecurities are not just given study material or given

problems that need to be solved. They are the product of social and political practices. A

theoretical approach that tries to understand how these practices work and what the social and

political implications are of this, is securitization theory which is a part of critical security studies

(CSS) (Voelkner et al. 2015, 1). This thesis uses the theoretical backgrounds of the critical security

studies, and mainly securitization theory. It will build on theoretical contributions of Huysmans

(2006), Bigo (2001), Balzacq (2005) and other academic authors to the securitization theory.

3.1 Politics of Insecurity

Huysmans for example makes a convincing case for the politics of insecurity. He argues that it can

be a political danger to put something on the political agenda as a threat to security or to not do

this. Politics of insecurity are thus not only concerned with policy reactions to an already defined

threat or questions the degree and nature of this threat. Politics of insecurity is also concerned with

contesting the use of security language in relation to particular subjects (Huysmans 2006, 7). But

what is actually meant by insecurity? This question was answered by Béland (2007), he argues that

(collective) insecurity is a social and political construction, that is actively promoted by policy

makers and politicians. It means that personal and environmental matters are transformed into

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See for the normative dilemma Huysmans (2002). For other works on securitization of migration see Huysmans (2000; 2006; 2009; 2011).

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social and political issues (Béland 2007, 320-321).

The focus on the use of security language is important because it can have implications for policy

options. An issue that is framed as a (national) or (health) security issue may get more drastic

governing solutions than when no securitization took place (Curley and Harington 2011, 142).

When this is applied to the issue of migration we can see that cross border movement and the

presence of aliens in a particular state often brings issues like political loyalties, calculations of the

impact on the economy, military and other capacities of states, to mind (Huysmans 2006, 30).

However, in order to pass policies on issues like migration it is necessary to get support, political

actors can get support by using particular frames. The next paragraph will elaborate on the issue of

framing in combination with migration.

3.2 Framing migrants

Framing is a concept that is most often linked to the media. But frames are not only used by the

media but are, for example, also being used by politicians and policy makers. Either through the

media or through their own forums like personal, and party websites or government websites.

Framing is “the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or

reorient their thinking about an issue” (Chong and Druckman 2007, 104).

There are two main types of frames, namely frames in thought of the individual and frames in

communication. The first refers to set of dimensions that affect the evaluation of an individual

towards a particular subject (id. 2007, 105). This thesis however will focus on the frames in

communication. Because these are the frames that are often used in politics and by policy makers.

According to Jacoby (2000) politicians try to attract voters for their policies by persuading them to

think about their policies along particular lines. They can do so by focusing on specific features of

their policies. For example, stressing the likely effects or the relationship of the policies to

important values of the audience (Jacoby 2000, 751). So frames give specific definitions and

interpretations of political issues for a specific, or the general audience. In other words, they try to

guide the audience with a specific frame to perceive and interpret matters and events in a specific

way (Shah et al. 2002, 343).

The framing of migrants as for example, an existential danger, instead of different kinds of uneases

that can be dealt with, is mainly an act of political will. The uneases which may be connected with

migration, and which may be experienced in daily life, are linked to an existential situation by

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politicians and policy makers. By doing so it becomes easier for them to promote political

autonomy and unity (Mehan 1997, 253-254; Huysmans 2006, 50).

Refugees and migrants are often framed as a danger to the survival of political units, such as

specific communities, states or regions. This danger can occur in different ways. For example, by

numbers, when there is a sudden large increase in immigrants. These large numbers of migrants

can be framed as that they will disturb the labor markets of states which can cause popular unrest.

Governments like to avoid popular unrest and therefore they will make policies to prevent these

unrests (Jørgensen and Meret 2012, 293; Huysmans 2006, 47). Politicians often use or refer to strong

wordings that are used, such as ‘flood’ and ‘invasion’ of immigrants. These words cause the public

to think they are in existential danger, which can be the path towards the legitimation of particular

measures and policies. Not only numbers of migrants are used for securitizing arguments. The

specification of characteristics, and cultural differences of immigrants and refugees in comparison

to the hosting state or society can be used to frame them as an existential danger to this hosting

society or community (Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002, 24-26).

Even though these aspects are important to the securitization process, Huysmans argues that they

are mostly uneases but do not necessarily in themselves mean an existential danger to the survival

of a political community or a state. It is mostly not the state that needs to be secured, but the

‘autonomy of the community as a political unity, often defined in terms of its independent identity

and functional integrity’ (2006, 48). Which means, as said above that linking these uneases to an

existential situation is mostly a political choice.

Migration thus tends to be framed by politicians and policy makers as an existential danger to a

political unity’s survival. Migration can, on the other hand, be framed in positive ways as well, for

example that migrants contribute positively to the labor market and economic growth. And, as

argued before, history has proven otherwise as well. Often the uneases can be dealt with by the

absorbing capacity of societies. For example, the absorption of Protestant and other religious

refugees and migrants by the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands in the 16th century. This

period serves as an example of migration having positive outcomes to Dutch society, especially

they contributed to the economic welfare of the Dutch Republic (De Vries 1985, 667-678). By

securing an independent identity and functional integrity states are able to take ownership of their

territory. Where they can deepen their cultural and national identity and develop their own way of

governing. By creating this identity and autonomy it is easier to define a ‘them’ and ‘us’. It makes

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it easier to define who is an outsider, a migrant or even an illegal migrant (Ceyhan and Tsoukala

2002, 24-25; Mehan 1997, 258-259). This makes it easier for politicians and policy-makers to portray

their own state as a complete and harmonious place that is then being threatened and frustrated by

for example migration. The only solution then seems to be to get rid of this existential danger of

migration which will then supposedly help restoring a peaceful and free political entity (Den Boer

1998, 3; Mehan 1997, 258-259; Huysmans 2006, 49).

Security framing can lead to the creation of an autonomous domain of politics that claims unity,

and therefore a division between us and them, this happens by three different strategies, the

spread of fear and trust, the conduct of inclusion and exclusion and finally the institution of

alienation and a predisposition towards violence (Huysmans 2006, 51). These three different

strategies will be elaborated on below.

3.3 Spread of Trust and Fear

Security framing creates domains of political interaction by spreading trust and fear. In the case of

migration this can mean that we trust those who are (culturally) close to us, (Western, European)

and fear those who are at distance of us (Non-Western, Non-European). Thus it can mean that

these people that are at distance of us can disturb cultural identities that are similar, for example,

Muslim identity politics versus the liberal states of Europe. Some argue that they are incompatible

(Adamson and Triadafilopoulos and Zolberg 2011, 850-851). This is often reflected and integrated

in and a part of policies for the assimilation and cultural integration of immigrants. The danger of

this is that immigrants that are less able to assimilate, can easily be politicized into outsiders that

should be feared. It can then be created indirectly by creating a negative frame of the ‘others’. For

example, by systematically referring to Islam as a threat. This implicitly reasserts the Christian

West as opposed to Islam. Thus trust can be achieved through identifying or creating sources of

fear or distrust. In this way we know who to trust and who to fear. In this way politics of

insecurity simultaneously represents the politics of knowledge (Huysmans 2006, 51-54). This can

then make distinctions between Muslims and non-Muslims, the first then trying to establish their

own (political) identity (Adamson et al. 2011, 850-851). This can already be seen in some western

societies where the political right advocates exclusionary politics with regard to certain citizens in

society, such as Wilders in the Netherlands, the FPÖ in Austria and LePen with Front National in

France. In the Netherlands one party in Parliament, Denk, states that they oppose this and want to

actively defend the ‘other side’ (Beweging Denk 2016).

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3. 4 Administering inclusion and exclusion

This strategy is about how the instrumental or governing side of security practice layers relations

and administers inclusion and exclusion. There are different ways to deal with existential fear. One

of them is to reduce the vulnerability or tackling the danger itself. Security policies are mostly

directly and explicitly linked to a strategy of distancing from and neutralizing threats. For

example, defining borders and boundaries. But also Having intensified border controls can create

distance between a society and the dangerous external surroundings (Buonfino 2004, 41). But also

the use of technology and registration, special ID cards for refugees and immigrants can internally

distance them from the host population. An even more drastic measure can be the detainment of

refugees who are still in the process of getting a refugee status or refugees who do not meet the

legal conditions of a host country and who are to be deported (Bigo 2006, 394). By creating both

physical and symbolic distances between the host population and the migrants an atmosphere of

inclusion and exclusion can easily be developed.

3.5 Structuring alienation and predisposition towards violence

The process of including and excluding is very vulnerable to intensifying constantly. The

securitization only makes the including and integration with outsiders more difficult. Huysmans

brings up the example of guest workers who never fully belonged to their new surroundings but

were integrated socially and economically. They were never seen as a danger. People were mostly

indifferent to them. The process of securitization has portrayed these people a danger to the

culture, public order and welfare provisions to which they contributed themselves by years of

hard work. It seems to have also lead to ethnic profiling of ethnic minorities and migrants in

general (Van der Leun and Van der Woude 2011, 445; Huysmans 2006, 57). By framing or seeing

migrants as a danger to society, it makes it easier to enhance negative feelings towards

immigrants. Which can lead to a call for more restrictive migration policies that need to protect the

independent identity and functional integrity of a state (Huysmans 2006, 57). These migration

policies are then becoming stricter and more sophisticated as migrants become more innovative in

avoiding the measures. People can then get an image of refugees and migrants as being not

genuine refugees but just economic immigrants that try to benefit from welfare. Which then

reinforces the calls for even stricter migration policies (Huysmans 2006, 57-58).

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The aspect of violence is also often invoked in relation to migrants. For example, youth from

migrant background from more backward neighborhoods are often associated with images or

rioting, violent criminality and other forms of violence (Van der Leun and Van der Woude

2011,445). But also migration is often linked to violence and war (Huysmans 2006, 59). However,

Huysmans argues that these extreme securitization views and policies compete in political arenas

with views supporting the continuing of immigration to cope with declining populations. And that

securitization language is part of the political game to evoke or perpetuate crisis situations,

emergencies enemies and dangers for political gain. However often they do also offer reassurance

by showing that they do something about it with (restrictive) policies. By perpetuating and

evoking crisis situations, politicians and policy makers can also legitimate their policy plans and

ideas. However, this of course cannot be undertaken without a perceptive audience. The next

subsection elaborates on the importance of audiences for the securitization process.

3.6 Importance of Audience

Balzacq (2005) argues that securitization is better understood as “a strategic (pragmatic) practice

that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the

psycho-cultural disposition of the audience and the power that both speaker and listener bring to

the interaction” (Balzacq 2005, 172). Moreover, the author proposes that the audience, political

agency and context are crucial for an analysis of securitization and that these should not be

overlooked. He disagrees with the view that securitization can be seen as just a speech act. In

which a speech act becomes effective from the act being done (Balzacq 2005, 176). He argues that

external factors, such as audiences matter as well. But Balzacq does not explain in detail how the

audience should be convinced of the message of the policy makers and or politicians, he does not

elaborate on the level of persuasiveness. Mehan on the other hand argues that the securitization

process can be seen as a speech act. She refers to the fact that “words of a Khomeini, a Stalin, a

Hitler have power: they have mesmerized and electrified, reminding us that words can have a

diabolic as well as a liberating and activating power (Mehan 1997, 251). Although Balzacq tries to

modify the CS security studies’ theory he does not reject it at fully. He argues that he is only trying

to strengthen it, by adding variables that have been neglected (Balzacq 2005, 179). However, he

does, as argued above, ignore the variable of perception, receptiveness and potentially

responsiveness, particularly related to the if, how and why audiences are being persuaded by

political voices. How can the audience be convinced and even persuaded to act according to the

words which are expressed by political leaders?

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To convince an audience of your security message it is necessary to relate the statement to an

external reality (Balzacq 2005, 182). The success of securitization depends on a perceptive

environment and or audience. A security actor has to decide what the right (critical) moments are,

in which, the susceptible audience will be easily convinced by his message of securitization (De

Graaf 2011, 63; Balzacq 2005, 182). This means that the speech act has to be an intentional, rational

and discursive act. Austin (1962) with his speech act theory goes into this matter in more detail.

Austin argued that words can actually count as actions. He makes a distinction between

performatives and constatives. Constatives are statements that can be seen as being either true or

false. Performatives on the other hand cannot be seen as such. Performatives can be defined as

words that actually count as performance of an action. These words can either be felicitous or

infelicitous (Emike 2013, 241). Another related concept is the perlocutionary act, these acts are “the

effects on, or thoughts or feelings of the audience or the speaker produced by the act of saying

something”. Austin then makes a distinction between the act of doing something and the act of

attempting to do something (Emike 2013, 242). Perlocution is thus central to understanding how a

particular issue can become a security problem. By using securitizing words an actor intentionally

chooses to convince its target audience in a particular environment or circumstances.

When actors try to securitize an issue they often try to convince as broad an audience as possible

because they have to keep a social relationship with the group they are targeting their message at

(Balzacq 2005, 185). They try to obtain both moral support from the general public and their

institutional body. They need especially the latter party for formal support, to get issues through

parliaments or other legislative and decision-making bodies (Balzacq 2005, 185). It thus needs to be

noted as well that audiences do not necessarily have to be the general public. The audience can

also be the power elite or put simply, other politicians. Audiences have to be able to provide a

securitizing actor with whatever he or she seeks to accomplish with the securitization process

(Vuori 2008, 72); for this thesis the target audiences are be the ministers that are a Members of the

Council of the European Union, Members of Dutch Parliament as well as the general public. Vuori

argues that in crisis situations securitization processes can be restricted to inter-elite audiences and

struggles, for example politicians in different political arenas such as parliament and EU

ministerial consultations (Vuori 2008, 72).

Balzacq finally argues that there are three components that are of importance to his assumption of

audience. The first is the audience’s frame of reference. The second is its preparedness to be

16

convinced by the securitizing actor. This depends on the whether this actor is trustworthy and

knowledgeable on the matter. Finally, the audience needs to have an ability to grant or deny the

securitizing actor a formal mandate to implement their (possible) measures (Balzacq 2005, 192). As

for the context of a security frame it is important that it fits the what Balzacq calls “Zeitgeist”. The

audience has to see how the securitization fits in the bigger picture of the Zeitgeist. Finally, the

securitizing actor needs to be able to use the proper words and frames that fit the context (Balzacq

2005, 192). But also in some way needs to indoctrinate the masses with the rightness of their story

and frame, in order for them to act (Mehan 1997, 251-252). Thus a successful securitization process

can only be achieved when the actors and their relative power, their expressions and discourse

(speech acts) have a susceptible target audience that get the feeling that they should act and

implement policy on the speech acts of the securitizing actor (De Graaf 2011, 63).

3.7 Internal and External Security

Several authors argue that a merging of internal and external security has taken place. Contrary to

what is often argued, this merger between internal and external security has not been due to

criminalization of war and militarization of crime, which is often argued (Bigo 2001; 2006; Lavenex

and Wichmann 2009; Lutterbeck 2005). Bigo states that internal and external security are mixed

duo to a 1) transformation of the social world, 2) the ways in which different agencies construct

these changes as threats (such as migration), 3) their interests in the competition for budgets and

missions and legitimacy and 4) the way in which political, bureaucratic and media games do or do

not construct social change as a political or security problem (Bigo 2001, 121).

Furthermore, the discourse on migration is positioned in competition with other issues in

the hierarchy of threats. A general trend that could be observed is that migration is not only seen

as a problem at the national level of states, it is also seen as a problem internationally, especially

for Western states (Bigo 2001, 121; Lutterbeck 2005, 233). In most political spheres the actors agree

that migration is a problem for both internal and external security. Often the migrant in general is

linked to all kinds of criminal behavior such as, drug trafficking, Islamic radicalism, organized

crime, human trafficking and terrorism. The Western world regards transnational flows of people

more and more as a danger to their political, economic and social welfare. International

organizations such as the G8 and NATO and the European Union have incorporated the topic of

migration as a potential threat to the security of states. Often the public discourse in the larger

states such as the USA, Germany and France contribute to the incorporation of migration as a

17

security issue on the international agenda. Even though smaller countries, such as the Netherlands

and Sweden and Spain have tried to change the hierarchy of issues of the G8 during the 1990s,

nowadays these countries also seem to have incorporated migration as a security problem, as

reflected in the Schengen agreement (Bigo 2001, 123-124). We can thus see that the balance of

power is also reflected in topics such as migration, the more powerful states put topics on the

agenda and the less influential states (eventually) will follow this agenda. In the next chapter the

methodology of this thesis will be presented, with an elaborate description of the Presidencies and

the backgrounds of the coinciding migrant crises.

4 Case Selection

4.1 Case Selection

For this research the Dutch EU Presidencies are being analyzed, because the Council is one of the

formal law and policy making bodies of the European Union, and as a Member of the European

Union the Netherlands takes on the role of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union

once every few years. The Presidencies of the Netherlands were chosen for both practical and

theoretical reasons. For example, a linguistic advantage and because the Netherlands is a small EU

Member State but also one of the founding fathers of the European Union. Because the

Netherlands was one of the first Member States it has a lot of experience in organizing EU

Presidencies. This makes it easier for policy makers because they can build on previous

experiences. As for example the Italian bureaucratic institutions benefitted from previous

Presidency experiences during the preparations for the Italian 2003 Presidency (Quaglia and

Moxon-Browne 2006, 352). However, politicians are not always able to capitalize these experiences.

For example, because they were not in office during the last EU Presidency of their country, but

also because, after the enlargement of the EU, there are more Member States which makes the

intervals between Presidencies wider.

Furthermore, some research suggests that small EU Member States can be relatively influential in

the European Union when they are in the position of President of the Council (Elgström 2003, 193-

18

194; Van Keulen 2006, 13). Therefore, the Netherlands seems the perfect candidate to take into

account, because it is both one of the smaller countries within the European Union and it has been

one of the countries that received a good share of refugees in the past and at the present day

(Vluchtelingenwerk.nl 2015). For example, a Member State like Belgium is giving shelter to about

29.000 refugees while the Netherlands had received 40.000 refugees by the end of May 2016 and is

expected to receive 90.000 over the whole year of 2016 (Fedasil 2016; Volkskrant 2016). In the next

paragraph we will elaborate on how the EU Presidencies of the Council of the European Union

work, what its obligations and procedures are and how the EU Presidency can influence EU

policies and law-making.

EU Presidency of the Council of the European Union

Every six months one of the Member States of the European Union takes on the Presidency of the

Council of the European Union. The responsibilities of the Presidency are established in the Treaty

of the European Union. The Presidency's tasks entail for example, that the relevant Member State

presides all Council meetings, except those on foreign affairs. The President has to report to the

European Parliament. In sequences of 18 months three Member States will be selected, in specific

order, to be President of the Council, these three are often called the troika or trio (Council of the

European Union 2015, 10-15). The importance of the rotating Council Presidency has increased.

The Presidency is now a functional and accountable element of EU policy making (Vandecasteele

and Bossuyt 2014, 233). The Member State that takes on the Presidency, of course also has to

prepare itself for the Presidency at the national level. It puts a lot of weight on the shoulders of

ministries, especially of the smaller states. Ministries sometimes suffer from wanting to do too

much in too little time. This then results in a bad allocation of resources and in the agenda being

overloaded with issues, which can annoy other Member States (Schout and Bastmeijer 2003, 14).

But when a Member State is well-prepared the efficiency of the meetings will increase (Schout and

Vanhoonacker 2006, 1060). It will help officials to see what steps should be taken and what to be

avoided. This can involve mapping out important issues at an early stage, intensive contact with

other Member States, presenting papers on the different topics or structuring the debates (id 2006,

1062-64).

Before the troika mechanism was installed there was a lack of continuity of policies, since every

Member State held the Presidency only for six months. In order to cope with this the troika was

installed. At first it was more of an informal mechanism, it was then legally laid down in the

19

Lisbon Treaty (Raik 2015, 20). The troika or trio has to establish an 18-month programme for their

term beforehand. This programme has to be approved by the Council as a whole. The troika

programme entails an introduction with strategic long term policies of the Union, an operational

section with the activities of the Council for the period of 18 months (Council of the European

Union 2015, 17). In order to have consistency in policies, a good coordination and smooth

transitions from one Presidency to the next is necessary.

Every EU Presidency has several obligations. The Presidency has to update the different files

during their six-month term, time frames and schedules for procedures of the parliament and

other institutions have to be taken into account. There needs to be an evaluation of the importance

of each file or issue and their political or technical implications. Consistency in terminology and

presentation is important as well (Council of European Union 2015, 19). To guide this consistency

from one Presidency to the next the council Secretary has an important role. It supports the

President in their duties and do some administrative work (Raik 2015, 33). Besides the formal

mechanisms the troika also experiments with new and additional obligations. For example, some

Member States invite an incoming President candidate during their Presidency to the meetings

with the European Parliament, or inform them about the negotiations, in order to prepare them for

their task and to have more consistency. Other ideas are shared training and spreading the

informal ministerial meetings over the 18-month period instead of each Presidency of six months

(Raik 2010, 32-33).

The Presidency allows Member States to initiate policies and to translate national interests into

common European concerns. However, it needs to be noted that the Council of the European

Union shares the right of initiative with the European Commission. The commission can prepare

and initiate legislation in all areas except Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and some

policies regarding police cooperation. The Council of the European has the right to initiate policies

in the area of the CFSP (Lelieveldt and Princen 2011, 59-63). Therefore, the presidency can give

Member States influence by formulating visions and bringing policy ideas to the table (Elgström

2006, 194). For the duration of the Presidency a Member performs as the administrator, agenda

manager, broker, leader and representative of the Council of the European Union. It is for smaller

Member States thus the opportunity to get their interests heard (Elgström 2006, 171). From a

normative perspective, it is deemed essential for any EU-Presidency to maintain its neutrality

regarding all EU-matters and not exploit the Presidency-term for (merely) pushing the interests of

its own electorate.

20

In the next paragraph this paper will elaborate on the three successive Dutch Presidencies of the

European Union and the three refugee crises that coincided with the three Dutch Presidencies of

the Netherlands.

Dutch EU Presidencies during three different refugee crises

As Balzacq argued, it is important to see significant events and especially securitization processes

in their Zeitgeist. Therefore, in this section some academic evaluations of these Presidencies will be

presented and the backgrounds of the refugee crises that were ongoing at the time of each

Presidency will be elaborated on. This in order to give the reader a basic idea of both the Zeitgeist

during the crises and the possible causes and events of the crises

EU Presidency of the Netherlands in 1997 during the Balkan Refugee Crisis (1991-1999)

In January 1997 the Netherlands took over the Presidency from Ireland. This was during the final

stage of the Intergovernmental Conference, which had the objective, to revise the Maastricht

Treaty of 1991. It was important for the Netherlands to make the final summit in Amsterdam on

this topic a great success in June 1997 (Van Keulen and Rood 2003, 71). The Netherlands has

always been regarded as an active Member that has tried to push for further integration (Elgström

2006 186-187). According to Van Keulen and Rood the Dutch Presidency of ’97 has to be seen in the

light of the Presidency of 1991. During the 1991 Presidency a proposal of the Netherlands for a

new treaty was rejected, this casted a shadow over the entire Presidency of 1991. And for the 1997

Presidency the Dutch became less ambitious and more modest (Van Keulen and Rood 2003, 72-73).

During the 1997 Presidency Migration and Asylum were no top priorities for the Netherlands. But

the implementation of the Dayton Agreements was of some importance after the three main

priorities, concluding the IGC, preparing the final stage of the EMU process and the EU

enlargement. However, the modest agenda received criticisms from both the national and

European parliament for being too modest and not having any clear vision at all (Elgström 2006,

187; Van Keulen and Rood 2003, 75).

In sum according to Van Keulen and Rood the Dutch Presidency of 1997 can be evaluated as a

modest and pragmatic. But it needs to be noted that an important treaty, namely the Amsterdam

Treaty was carried through during this specific Presidency. Which can be considered as a

milestone of the Dutch Presidency as well. Therefore, it is also said that this Presidency was mostly

successful for the Netherlands, especially in its main priority, the IGC (Van Keulen and Rood 2003,

79). IGC ‘s are the Intergovernmental Conferences, where Member States discuss and agree EU

21

treaty changes. Before the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in December 2009, these

conferences were the only way to revise treaties (Consillium.europa.eu 2016). So in 1997 the IGC

was an important meeting for the Member States, because it was the only platform where they

were able to debate and discuss changes to treaties. And the fact that during the Dutch Presidency,

the Amsterdam Treaty was carried through can be seen as a major success.

Backgrounds of the Yugoslavia Wars

During the Presidency of the Netherlands of 1997, which took part between January and June, the

height of the Yugoslavia refugee crisis was over. But still large numbers of former Yugoslavian

refugees were entering the European Union. Yugoslavia had fallen apart into different other states

such as Bosnia Herzegovina, Slovenia and Macedonia that wished to be independent from the

mother state. The war has been called “the worst bloodletting since World War II” (Stokes et al.

1996, 136). Tensions in Yugoslavia were already rising during the 1980s when Serbian nationalism

was upcoming after the death of communist dictator Tito who held the country together under his

strict regime. According to Stokes et al. (1996, 138) three problems were at the core of the collapse

of the Yugoslavian state, the inability of the Army to include all ethnic groups, the unrealistic wish

of the communist party to keep political control and severe economic problems. Hundreds of

thousands persons fled and tried to find asylum in other European countries (Suhrke 1998, 397).

By 1993 about 600,000 Yugoslavian refugees had entered the European Union despite visa

restrictions and other legal hindrances of European states (id. 1998, 407). During the crisis a

'sharing of the burden' was proposed by states that were most affected by the refugee crisis. For

example, Germany, Sweden and Austria (id. 1998, 408). The fact that, at that time, this was the

biggest refugee crisis in Europe, since World War 2, makes this case a noteworthy and interesting

case to take into the analysis. These are two basic requirements for case studies proposed by

Vroomen (2010, 256).

EU Presidency in 2004, Afghan refugees fleeing the Afghanistan War (2001-2010)

The 2004 Dutch EU Presidency from July to December 2004 was again mostly guided by the

already rolling agenda of the European Union. The Dutch government felt that taking the role of

efficient administrator was the most pragmatic and therefore most suitable option (Elgström 2006,

188). It was preceded again by the Irish Presidency from January until June. On the rolling agenda

were five different issues, 1. the EU enlargement, 2. sustainable strengthening of the European

22

economy, 3. further development of the areas of freedom, security and justice, 4. Financial

prospects for the coming years and finally 5. working on the EU external relations. Next to these

five main priorities there was also much attention for the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty

on the European Union (Van Keulen and Pijpers 2005, 5). However, this Presidency was not as

modest and pragmatic as the 1997 Presidency. It did have national aspects such as water

management, flooding initiative and maritime transport. But also the launch of a normative debate

on ‘norms and values’ of European integration (Van Keulen and Pijpers 2005, 5). As freedom,

security and justice was one of the main priorities, an ambitious plan were made for burden

sharing among Member States for the issue of refugees.

However, the Member States did not reach an agreement on the Plan-Schilly that incorporated

burden-sharing (Van Keulen and Pijpers 2005, 16). The concept of burden-sharing entails the

sharing of the burden of migration among Member States of the European Union. It is based on

solidarity. It is the sharing of money and refugees in order to cope with forced migration. This to

prevent single states from having to take on all the refugees while others do not receive any

refugees nor contribute to their shelter financially. The idea of Burden-sharing became especially

important during the Balkan Wars in the 1990s. Proposals were made for a EU wide burden-

sharing system in the policy area of migration. But ever since it has been proposed there has not

been much consensus among Member States on this issue. In fact, we can see it reoccurring during

every Presidency of the Netherlands since the 1990’s (Thielemann 2003, 259-260). Eventually The

Hague Programme was adopted, which laid the basis for the further strategic development of the

EU Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. This document is also included in the analysis of this

thesis. This Programme was a multi-annual programme for closer cooperation in the fields of

freedom security and justice. But it was not seen as either ambitious or but it was seen as a key

achievement of the Dutch Presidency of 2004 (Van Keulen and Pijpers 2005, 17). In sum the Dutch

Presidency of 2004 can be compared to the one of 1997, ambitions were relatively modest and the

Presidency objectives were pragmatically defined. However according to scholars there were some

minor successes, for example the adoption of the modest The Hague Programme (Elgström 2006,

188-189; Van Keulen and Pijpers 2005, 16).

23

Background of the 2001 Afghanistan War

In 2004 the Netherlands took the EU Presidency from July to December. During that time the

United States and the Coalition of the Willing were at war with the Taliban and Mujahedeen in

Afghanistan. The Taliban gained power after the Cold War. During the Cold War the Soviet Union

supported a Communist Regime in Kabul. But after this communist regime fell, the Taliban gained

power over the territory during the power vacuum that was caused due to the fall of the

communist regime in Kabul. The Mujahedeen and the Taliban received support during the Cold

War from the United States. For example, they were supported with weapons such as Stinger anti-

aircraft missiles and financial aid (Cogan 1993, 76; Kuperman 1999, 219).

The Taliban then ruled over Afghanistan and installed a strict Islamic republic based on Sharia

law. The regime restricted women in their freedom and violated human rights. The Taliban was

able to rule their territory without let or hindrance until the American-led invasion in 2001, which

was a part of the Global War on Terrorism which started after the attacks of 9/11. As a consequence

of this war many Afghans fled their country. Many went to neighboring countries such as Pakistan

and Iran.

But a lot of people also took the long trip to the West, and especially Europe. The numbers of

Afghan refugees differ over the years. At the time of the Dutch Presidency in 2004 about 25,907

refugees came to the Netherlands (UNHCR 2004, 209). Which made it the second biggest receiving

country in Europe of Afghan refugees, after Germany which received 38,576 Afghan refugees in

2004 (UNHCR 2004, 209). In sum, the number of refugees makes the case noteworthy and

interesting to analyze in the current study. Because it was considered as a humanitarian and

refugee crisis. The fact that there were also concerns about the security threat these Afghan

refugees could pose to receiving states, makes the case even more interesting (Schmeidl 2002, 7).

They were perceived as threats to national security because these refugees came from a war-torn

country that was led by the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban. It was argued that terrorists might

have been among them (Schmeidl 2002 7-8).

24

EU Presidency of the Netherlands in 2016 during the Syrian refugee crisis (2011-present)

At the time of writing of this thesis, the Dutch EU Presidency 2016 was still ongoing and therefore

there was no scientific evaluation literature available yet. However, some scientists and think tanks

published some preliminary articles on the Presidency. The Dutch EU Presidency of January until

June 2016 had four main priorities: Europe as an innovator and job creator, stable finances and a

stable Eurozone, a forward looking energy and climate policy and finally migration and

international security. Half way through this Presidency, Senior Research Fellow Adriaan Schout

(2016), of the Clingendael Institute, wrote an article on the Dutch Presidency of 2016 that was both

published on the website of the Clingendael and a Dutch newspaper. He argued that the Dutch

received general acclaim for their European Presidency. The Dutch are praised for the energy of

the different Ministers and especially the Prime Minister. But, there were also some criticism, for

example the Dutch have lost their image of the European frontrunner, after the Eurosceptics

gained popularity and because the first government of Prime Minister Rutte was supported by the

right-wing and Eurosceptic Geert Wilders. Schout argues that the European Union lacks good

leadership, which is now essential. Therefore, most EU negotiators and policy makers are very

happy with the energy that Rutte is showing. He is being praised by his colleagues and for

example the President of the EP Schulz and Jean Claude Juncker. It seems that the Prime Minister

Rutte has a clear vision to solve problems at the European level. However, it remains unclear

whether the Presidency will achieve all its goals (Schout 2016).

Background of the Syrian refugee crisis

From January 2016 to June 2016 the Netherlands holds the Presidency of the Commission of the

European Union. This Presidency is partly marked by the refugee crisis that has been ongoing

since 2011. In that year, during the ‘Arab Spring’, a call for regime change and more democratic

values and freedom came to Syria. This lead to riots in Damascus and elsewhere in the country

and finally rebel groups took arms against the government (Khashan 2011, 29). As a result, an

armed conflict was born in which different groups started fighting against each other. Islamic

fundamentalists of ISIL, Al Nusra and other Islamic groups started fighting the regime of Assad

and each other while other opposition groups fight against the Assad regime and the Islamic

groups too. Which makes the situation very difficult to solve and to understand (Phillips 2013, 28).

It became even more difficult when other Middle Eastern states and Western states started to get

involved as well on both the rebels side as well as the Assad regime's side (Phillips 2013, 28). This

25

extremely complicated conflict has made many people refugees and or homeless (Fargues and

Fandrich 2012, 4). By March 2013 around one million Syrian refugees were registered by the

UNHCR, most of them sought refuge in neighboring countries (Syrianrefugees.eu 2013). Only a

few months, in September, later this number already doubled to two million refugees

(Syrianrefugees.eu 2013). In July 2014 the total number of refugees went up to over three million,

however Europe accepted only 100,000 refugees. Most of the refugees were still staying in the

neighboring countries such as Lebanon (Syrianrefugees.eu 2014). However, the number of

refugees that came to Europe grew rapidly over the years. In 2015 about 1 million refugees of

which over 350,000 were Syrian refugees reached Europe (BBC 2016). This makes it an even bigger

refugee crisis than the Balkan refugee crisis of the 1990s. The size and intensity of the crisis makes

this case noteworthy and interesting enough to study in depth.

5. Research Method

For this thesis the research method of discourse analysis will be used. Discourse analysis is a

research technique in qualitative research. It focuses on the use of language in policy making by

looking at how for example questions are framed and asked. Actually almost all qualitative

research makes use of discourse analysis in some way (Babb et al. 2012 ,351).

Discourse analysis does not only analyze words or language used in texts but it also looks at the

overall strategy and impact of words. It also looks at how they are being used to shape a political

understanding of a situation, or how language is used and manipulated in policy making. It thus

looks both at how it is written and what is implied or not said. This makes it different from content

analysis that mainly focuses on what is written in the text. Discourse analysis can help to examine

how concepts are expressed, including the emotive and pejorative contexts. It is therefore an

intensive approach that can only focus on a small number of key texts (Babb et al 2012, 351-352).

There are many different approaches in discourse analysis. But the two main types are the

functional discourse, which will be explained below and the critical discourse analysis. This latter

type of discourse analysis entails the focus on discourse in order to discover power relations that

can both oppress and control people. The focus of critical discourse analysis is not neutrality but it

actively tries deconstruct and reconstruct structures and patterns. The categories that are used to

26

analyze texts are not necessarily derived from theory, but may be the result of empirical induction,

e.g. through participant observation. However, such an ethnographic field method does not suit

this specific thesis (Babb et al 2012, 356-357).

Therefore, for this thesis it is most suitable to use the functional discourse analysis. Because this

type of discourse analysis tries to find discourse that matches the concepts and categories that are

mostly derived from theoretical approaches (Babb et al. 2012, 356). In this case the theoretical

backgrounds of Huysmans and others. It also helps to identify the groups or individuals that will

be under analysis. It is important to identify and select discursive texts or speech acts which can be

considered as representative of the individuals and groups that are being studied (Babb et al 2012,

358-359). In this regard, it is of utmost importance that the researcher maintains his or her

neutrality and explains the criteria on the basis of which the material was collected and selected for

further analysis. Even though we acknowledge that discourse is a wide concept which entails

speech acts but also non-verbal communication, diction and pronunciation this thesis will narrow

the concept of discourse to semantics (Vuori 2008, 74; Emike 2013, 243). This because of practical

reasons and limitations, such as non-availability of older speeches of Ministers. It will mainly look

into what securitizing words are used in policy documents, regulations and parliamentary

discussions, and will not take into account diction, pronunciation or non-verbal communication.

5.1 Unit of Analysis

For this thesis the Presidencies of the Netherlands for the European Union will be taken as the

main focus point. Official (policy) documents will be analyzed for securitization of migration

discourse. Especially the Council of the European Union documents during the full term of the

troika will be analyzed, this because Member States work together on the Programme of the

Presidencies. The documents of the Dutch government that will be analyzed are mainly letters of

the Government to parliament, but also State of the European Union documents and Public

consultation documents. The documents of the Council of the European Union that will be

analyzed are the directives, regulations, decisions and joint actions. All these aforementioned

documents, that were produced by the Council of the European Union during the full period of

the “troika”, that are related to migration and or refugees, are taken into account.

Document selection

The European Union documents were selected via the EUR-Lex website which gives access to

European Union Law, Treaties, Directives etc. The search engine of this website was used to select

27

the documents. For each Presidency the terms: “Migration 1997”, “Migration 2004”, “Migration

2016” and “Refugees 1997”, “Refugees 2004” and “Refugees 2016” were used. Then the results

were refined by selecting the years “1996”, “1997”, “2004”, “2005” or “2015”, “2016”, two years

were selected that overlap with the troikas of the Presidencies, furthermore the author “Council of

the European Union”, and the option legislation was selected. Then the results were filtered for

being related to migration, asylum(-seekers) or refugee(s), all other documents were omitted. All

the final results were then downloaded into pdf files. The EUR-Lex website has a very convenient

and easy to use search engine, so it did not cost a lot of effort and time to find the right documents

for the analysis. For the Dutch EU Presidency of 2016 the documents were selected up to 31 May

2016, which leaves only the last month of the Dutch Presidency of this particular year out of the

analysis. But in May there were no documents published on migration and refugees, so therefore

there are no documents of this month reflected in the findings section.

For the Dutch Governmental documents on the EU Presidencies, the website

www.officielebekendmakingen.nl was searched for the words “Voorzitterschap Europese Unie”,

followed by the different years “1997”, “2004” and “2016”. Then the programmes of the Dutch

government for the Presidencies of each year were downloaded in pdf files. Because the initial

search for Presidency of the European Union in combination with the terms migration and

refugees did not give many results, the terms “Presidency European Union (in du: voorzitterschap

Europese Unie)” were used. As mentioned above this resulted in finding the Presidency Programs

of each year. Then the other documents were found by following the links of the main files that

corresponded with the Presidency documents. The search engine of the Dutch Parliament is thus

not as easy to use as the EU search engine. It took a lot of time and effort to find the main file

numbers that corresponded with the successive Dutch Presidencies and then to find all the other

documents that were related to the Presidencies and refugees and migration. So besides the

Programmes of each presidency, the preparatory letters to parliament, and the state of the

European Union documents were downloaded as well. For 1997 the state of the European Union

was not directly given as such. Before 2012 it was not always a distinct written document it was

actually an integral part of the Budget plans for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was published

every year at Dutch Budget day (Europa-nu.nl 2015). Therefore, for the purpose of reconstructing

the discursive speech –acts during the 1997 Dutch EU Presidency this document was downloaded.

However, for the year 2004 and 2016 the Dutch Government did write a state of the European

Union document. Because the total documents that came up in the search of 1997 were the least,

28

namely 4 (one General Consultation document, the Presidency Programme, and two letters to

Parliament), it was best to make the same selection for the other Presidencies. So for each

Presidency one General Consultation, the Presidency Programme and two Letters to Parliament

were selected. For the years 2004 and 2016 the State of the Union was included as well. So for these

two Presidencies a total of 5 documents were selected that are both related to the Presidency and

to migration and refugees. In the next paragraph four different frames are presented. These frames

will be used as the basis for the analysis of the different documents that were mentioned above.

5.2 Different existential danger frames

As Huysmans (2006) argued migrants and refugees can be framed as an existential danger to the

survival of the political entity. This frame entails that words are being used to describe refugees as

a direct threat or danger to the state or region. For this master thesis four different frames will be

analyzed and applied to the case of Dutch Presidencies of the European Union.

1. Public Security Frame

This frame is used to argue that uncontrolled (im)migration and especially refugees pose a threat

to public order and social stability (Balabanova and Balch 2010, 384). Therefore, to deal with this

'threat' it is easier to implement new, and often much stricter, policies in order to prevent social

instability. Balabanova and Balch (2010, 394) then argue that this kind of frame often results in

policy makers and politicians making exaggerated and or spurious links between crime and

refugees or migrants in general. This can then have a negative impact on refugees and migrants,

because it becomes easier to pass legislations and measures to counter the threat and therefore

they can be more easily put out of society, this then reveals the second frame of the us versus them

frame.

2. Us versus Them Frame

In the Us versus Them Frame, the immigrant or refugee is being portrayed as an enemy and as not

being a part of the community. There is a clear distinction being made between 'us' and 'them'

(Mehan 1997, 258). By using words like 'here' and 'we', a feeling of belonging is created among a

community. While 'us' and 'them' is more commonly used to make distinctions between groups of

people. It is a sense of when they (the refugees) gain it is our (the receiving community's) loss (id.

1997, 259). It is often made stronger by mentioning the cultural differences between the refugees

29

and the hosting states and specification of characteristics of refugees to create a deeper division

(Triandafyllidou 2000, 375-376; Huysmans 2006, 48). This frame also closely linked to the strategy

of spreading trust and fear and of administering inclusion and exclusion that Huysmans

distinguished. The frame of them vs. us combines the two strategies, because both help to make a

distinction between the receiving community and the refugees by both spreading trust among the

community and fear for the refugees by referring to them as culturally and ethnically different.

Which then helps administering inclusion and exclusion by implementing measures like special ID

cards, or food stamps (Huysmans 2006, 51-55).

3. Numbers Frame/Uncontrollability frame

This frame is used to portray refugees as numbers, as large groups of unknown and most

importantly uncontrollable flows of people. This frame reduces the individual refugees to numbers

and strong wordings like crisis, flow, hordes, influx, wave, invasion or flood are used to describe

the refugees. According to these metaphors, just as we have no control over things such as the

speed and direction of physical forces, we have no control over changes in our lives and

communities. By using words, that refer to high and uncontrollable numbers of migrants or

refugees, policy makers and politicians can give the idea of migrants causing popular unrest

(Cunningham-Parmeter 2011, 1580). Which governments always try to avoid and therefore they

implement stricter policies on migration (Huysmans 2006, 47). The use of these words invokes an

idea of emergency condition with the audience. Governments are then of course expected to react

to these imminent emergency conditions (Jørgensen 2012, 51). So by using the numbers frame it

becomes much easier for governments or other governing entities such as the European Union to

implement particular policies that help to cope with the issues at hand. The use of this frame can

also be used to frame the problem being uncontrollable and unable to govern for governments.

4. Genuine refugee vs illegal immigrant

The genuine refugee vs. illegal immigrant frame is used to make a distinction between refugees

that are honest and genuine refugees that comply with the international law descriptions of

refugees, opposed to illegal immigrants that are often seen as economic migrants and or as (semi)

criminals that have registered themselves as refugees under false pretenses. For instance, former

British Prime Minister Blair created the distinction between ‘bogus asylum-seekers’ vs genuine

asylum-seekers (Den Boer 1994, 100). Policymakers make it believe as if these distinctions are easy

to identify by immigration officials, however in reality this might not be the case. Den Boer argues

30

that this ascription of refugees has become embedded in immigration discourse (Den Boer 1994,

100).

On the next page the Code Scheme for the four different frames is presented. In table 4.1 in the

right column the different frames are reflected and in the left column the wording and semantics

that correspond with the frames are reflected. All documents were analyzed for these four frames

by close reading all the documents and all pages for these key words. Which made analyzing all

the documents a very time-consuming activity. In the next chapter, after the code scheme, the

findings for each of the three successive Presidencies are presented in the different tables.

31

5.3 Semantic Code Scheme for Frames

Frame Wording/Semantics

Public security frame Migrants are a threat to public safety and especially

social (economic) security. Relations are being

made between the migrant or refugee and criminal

offences and criminal behavior. Refugees or

migrants are linked to crimes such as human

trafficking, terrorism and other crimes.

Us vs them frame Making a clear distinction between the migrant and

or refugee and the community or society at large.

Using words like “here”, “we” and “us” “them”.

Mentioning cultural differences between

refugees/migrants and hosting community, calling

for measures such as special ID Cards, food stamps,

special visas.

Numbers frame Using words like Crisis, flow, tsunami, wave, hordes,

influx, invasion, flood, to describe the refugees as

being in overwhelming numbers and an immediate

response is necessary. The policy is thus justified by

the overwhelming numbers

Genuine refugee vs illegal immigrant Clear distinction is being made between genuine

refugees that comply with definitions posed by

international law and treaties and illegal

immigrants. Words that are generally used include:

“irregular”, “Illegal”, “Unauthorized”, “Economic”.

Table 4.1

32

6. Findings

In the paragraphs below the findings of this research are shown in the different

tables. Each Dutch EU Presidency has two tables, one for the Dutch Governmental

documents and one for the Council of the European Union Policy documents. Before

the findings are presented it is instructive to explain how they are structured:

1. In each table the columns reflect the different frames and the rows reflect

the different documents. The marks in the cells show what frame(s) were used in

what document.

2. Then in the paragraph below the tables the content will be elaborated on. Of

each frame, found in the documents, an example will be given by a quote from the

text.

3. Subsequently it will be explained why this quote matches this particular

frame. For the Dutch government documents that were not in English, a translation

by the author of this thesis is provided.

As mentioned in the document selection paragraph, during the Presidency of 1997

not that many documents were published on the Dutch Presidency by the Dutch

Government. Hence, only four documents were analyzed. For the other two

Presidencies five documents were selected, that are comparable with the four

documents of 1997. Two Letters to Parliament, one General Consultation, the

Presidency Program and the State Union2. For the Dutch government documents the

frames of each document will be elaborated on because there are five documents per

Presidency. Whereas for the Council of the European Union documents there are

2 Not to be confused with the State of the European Union, the State of the Union is a document of the Dutch

government, for the Dutch parliament, of the accomplishments and state of current affairs within the

European Union of the past year and the plans for the upcoming year.

33

more than ten documents per Presidency which would make the findings section far

too long. So for this section only a few quotes and explanations are presented.

6.1 Dutch EU Presidency of 1997

Table 6.1 Dutch Governmental documents

Frame

Document

Public Security

Frame

Us vs. Them

Frame

Numbers Frame Genuine Refugee

vs. Illegal

Immigrant

No Clear

Framing or

Other

Frames

General

Consultation

January 1997

#189

X

Presidency

Programme 1997 3

X X

Letter to

Parliament

November 1996

#1

X X

Letter to

Parliament

November 1996

#6

X

Table 5.1 shows that most documents had no clear framing. However, when frames were

used the genuine refugee vs. illegal immigrant frame was used most. In the Dutch EU

Presidency Programme document the public security frame was used as well. Below the

documents will be elaborated and commented on.

The first document, that was analyzed, is the General Consultation of January 1997. During

the General Consultation the Dutch government discusses its plans for the Presidency of the

European Union, in the Second Chamber. The Second Chamber is seen as the most

influential Chamber of the bicameral Dutch system (Andeweg and Irwin 2009, 146-47). In

this particular document there are a few references to the Yugoslavia war, for example in

relation to the capturing of war criminals. But the government does not directly talk about

3 This programme was not a separate document, as explained in the Operationalization, but was a section of

the National Budget documents.

34

refugees or migration in general. The Minister ignored the question of a Member of the

Parliament who asked whether the government agrees that the success of the London

conference depended on the readmission of former Yugoslavian refugees to areas where

their ethnic group is a minority (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 1997, 8).

The Presidency Programme for 1997 states that in order “to enhance (public) security, further

cooperation is needed in the fields of policing, judicial, customs, refugee and immigration cooperation”

(Tweede Kamer 1996, 5). By stating this, the government makes a clear link between (illegal)

immigration, refugees and public security. It does so by making an explicit linguistic link

between criminal activities, for which the policing and judicial services are accountable and

the refugees, immigration policies on the other hand.

Sending (former) refugees back seems to be a really important issue during the 1997

Presidency. Both in governmental documents and in the Council of the European Union

Policy Documents. In the Presidency Program, for example, it is mentioned that “many

refugees and third country nationals, who wish to go back to their former regions out of free will, find

themselves hindered by formal non-existent but in practice impregnable borders. Despite these

hardships we have to implement the Dayton Agreement in a strict manner” (Tweede Kamer der

Staten Generaal 1996, 15). It mainly is about refugees and migrants going back out of free

will. There is no explicit mentioning of forced eviction of migrants.

The Dutch Government argues that in light of the Schengen Agreement and the implementation of the

Dayton Agreement that the cooperation needs to be continued intensely, especially in the area of the

“migration risk” (...) (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 1996, 56). This is a clear example of

migration being framed as a public security issue in the Dutch Presidency Programme

document.

In the letter to parliament number one (kst. 25110 nr. 1) the government uses the genuine

refugee vs. illegal immigrant frame. The Minister of Foreign Affairs argues that it is of the

utmost importance to counter illegal immigration by combatting the use of false documents

and human trafficking. By calling immigrants, who use these documents, illegal immigrants,

the government makes a clear distinction between genuine and lawful refugees and illegal

migrants. By using the word “illegal” the Minister invokes an image of criminal behavior

with the audience of Members of Parliament (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 1996, 7).

35

While some migrants are denied legal access, they are forced to use false documents because

they lost their old documents, but still need to cross borders (Hayter 2001, 153). The

document also shows the importance for the Dutch government of the readmission of

refugees out of free will to the former Yugoslavia.

Table 6.2 Council of the European Union policy documents

Frame

Document

Public Security

Frame

Us vs. Them

Frame

Numbers Frame Genuine Refugee

vs. Illegal

Immigrant

No Clear

Framing or

Other

Frames

Council

Regulation July

‘96

X

Council

Decision

December ‘96

X

Council

Decision May

‘97

X

Council Activity

Report ‘94/’95

(CIREA) May

‘97

X x

Council Activity

Report ’96

(CIREA) May

‘97

x

Council

Conclusions

Dublin

Convention May

‘97

x

Council

Resolution June

‘97

x

Council

Decision June

‘97

X

Council Joint

Action July ‘97

x

Council

Resolution

December ‘97

x

36

Table 6.2 shows that the frame most frequently applied by the Council of the European

Union, was the genuine or legal migrant versus the illegal migrant frame. Some examples of

this frame are for example reflected in the Council Resolution of 26 June 1997, 1) “to combat

unauthorized immigration and residence by nationals of third countries on the territory of Member

States”. 2) “Whereas the unauthorized presence in the territory of Member States of unaccompanied

minors who are not regarded as refugees must be temporary, with Member States” (Council of

European Union 1997, 1). By using words like “combat”, “unauthorized” the Council

invokes images of illegality and therefore criminal behavior of migrants, in this case of

unaccompanied minors. The unaccompanied minors, or just simply put, children, are

referred to as being criminals because they are “unauthorized” to be in a certain area.

In one document the numbers frame was used as well. This was in a CIREA report which is

the Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on Asylum. It stated that extra focus

was needed for policy and information gathering on regions where “the largest number of

asylum-seekers in Member States” originate from (Council of the European Union 1997, 3). This

was necessary according to the document to find the sources of these ‘large numbers’ of

refugees. By referring to large numbers instead of refugees or migrants in general it becomes

possible to implement the policies the Council deems necessary.

In some of the documents, such as the Council Regulation of July 1996 and the Council

Decision of June 1997, there was no sign of (clear) framing of migrants into one of the four

frames. Therefore, these documents were marked as having no clear framing. On the next

page the table that contains the findings of the Council of the European Union documents of

the EU Presidency of 1997 will be presented.

37

6.2 Dutch EU Presidency of 2004

Table 6.3 Dutch Governmental documents

Frame

Document

Public Security

Frame

Us vs. Them

Frame

Numbers

Frame

Genuine

Refugee vs.

Illegal

Immigrant

No Clear

Framing or

Other Frames

General

Consultation 12

August 2004 #7

X

(Operational)

Presidency

Programme 2004

X

Letter to

Parliament 2

December 2003

#1

X

Letter to

parliament 28

May 2004 #5

X

State of the Union X X X

In 2004 the Dutch government used several different frames in their policy documents on the

EU Presidency and in their correspondence with the Dutch parliament. In the General

Consultation of 12 Augustus 2004 the Minister of Immigration and Integration Rita Verdonk

used the genuine vs. illegal immigrant frame several times. She argued that it was necessary

to send illegal migrants back as soon as possible. Furthermore, she wishes to implement

“biometric applications. Because they are extremely important for the combat of illegal migration and

terrorism”. These words connect (illegal) migration indirectly to terrorism, as if they were

connected or interrelated. It criminalizes migrants that do not comply with the “official

qualifications” (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 2004, 8-9). There seems to be a strong

focus on sending people back during this Presidency as well. However, this time the words

out of “free will” are omitted.

The Presidency Programme document shows the genuine refugee vs. illegal immigrant

frame. For example, in the following quote: “Combating illegal migration and trafficking in

38

human beings will be an important priority in 2004 (…) of a common asylum and migration policy,

building on the legislative programme on minimum norms originating from the Amsterdam Treaty”

(Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 2003, 31). The EU wishes to combat illegal immigration

and build a common asylum and migration policy. By building on the minimum norms of

the definition of legal migration and refugees laid down in the Amsterdam Treaty. By

building on these norms the EU decides who is a legal migrant and how is regarded as

unwanted and illegal.

On the 28 of May the Dutch Government wrote a Letter to Parliament. In this letter they used

the genuine refugee vs. illegal immigrant frame to justify their aims for sending migrants

back. By declaring some migrants illegal while others are genuine refugees they make a clear

distinction, for the audience, to be able to implement policies to decrease the numbers of

migrants to the EU. This is reflected in the next quote: “The Development of a European return

policy is for the Netherlands an integral part of the fight against illegal immigration. It is both a

concluding piece and a preventive measure by the signal it gives [to (illegal) migrants]” (Tweede

Kamer der Staten Generaal 2004, 18).

In the State of the Union of 2004 there were several frames used. For example, the public

security frame and the numbers frame in the same paragraph. The Dutch government

argued that “in the combat against terrorism, the Union needs to cooperate internationally. Safe

borders help to achieve this, because international migration flows, as a consequence of conflicts or

economic considerations, still demand attention” (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 2004, 18).

However, in this quote the government does not make really clear how terrorism can be

combatted by having safe borders and how international migrant flows contribute to this.

Furthermore, by portraying migration as a flow they invoke an image of uncontrollability in

the audiences’ minds.

39

Table 6.4 Council of the European Union policy documents

Frame

Document

Public Security

Frame

Us vs. Them

Frame

Numbers

Frame

Genuine

Refugee vs.

Illegal

Immigrant

No Clear

Framing or

Other Frames

Council

Regulation

February 2004

X X

Council Decision

February 2004

X X

Council

Regulation March

2004

X X

Council Decision

April 2004

X

Council Directive

April 2004

X

Council Directive

April 2004

X

Council Decision

December 2004

X

Council

Regulation

December 2004

X

Council Decision

December 2004

X

Council Decision

December 2004

X

Council: The

Hague

Programme

March 2005

X X

In the Council of the European Union policy documents, that were produced during the

Troika of the Dutch Presidency, two frames were used. These frames were the number frame

and the genuine vs. illegal immigrant frame. Of each frame an example from the documents

will be given and it will then explain why this quote fits the frame. An example of the

genuine refugee vs illegal immigrant frame, that can be found in the Council Decision of 29

April 2004 is: “The purpose of this Decision is to coordinate joint removals by air, from two or more

40

Member States, of third-country nationals who are subjects of individual removal orders (…)”

(Council of the European Union 2004, 2). By making policies and agreements on the removal

of third-country citizens that have been declared illegal migrants, the Council creates an

image in the minds of the audience between genuine refugees that are allowed to stay and

illegal immigrants that have to be removed according to this policy document.

In the Council Decision of 2 December 2004 a good example of the numbers frame can be

found.

“A financial reserve should be established for the implementation of emergency measures to provide

temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of refugees (…) on minimum standards for giving

temporary protection in the event of mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a

balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences

thereof”.

In this policy decision the amounts migrants are framed as bringing (severe) consequences to

a Member State when these states receive “such persons” and to cope with these

consequences states should be able to get financial aid from the EU. However, the Decision

does not elaborate on what these consequences are. It invokes again the idea of

uncontrollability by using words like “mass” and “influx”.

On the next page the last paragraphs of this chapter will be presented with the findings of

the most recent Dutch EU Presidency of 2016. Which was still ongoing at the time of writing,

will be shown in tables 6.5 and 6.6.

41

6.3 Dutch EU Presidency of 2016

Table 6.5 Dutch Governmental documents

Frame

Document

Public Security

Frame

Us vs. Them

Frame

Numbers

Frame

Genuine

Refugee vs.

Illegal

Immigrant

No Clear

Framing or

Other Frames

General

Consultation 7

April 2015

X

Presidency

Programme 2016

X X

Letter to

Parliament 28

January ’15

X X

Letter to

Parliament 22

December 2015

X

State of the Union X X

During the Presidency of 2016 the most frequently applied frame was the Genuine Refugee

vs. the Illegal Immigrant frame. After analyzing the General Consultation with Dutch

Parliament of the 7th of April, it became clear that the Public Security Frame was invoked.

An example of this frame is shown in this quote: “The following point is the internal security and

the external security. I think that this is the biggest challenge of the upcoming weeks and months. I am

referring to the migration from North-Africa (..)” (Eerste Kamer der Staten Generaal 2015, 14).

This quote shows that the Dutch government links the internal security of the European

Union to the issue of migration. They use the frame to create an image of migration posing a

danger to the EU internal and external security in order to get support for new migration

measures to enhance internal and external security of the European Union.

In the Dutch EU Presidency Programme of 2016 a numbers frame was used, reflected in the

following quote: “Increased influx of people in search of a safe haven makes it clear that a common

border, asylum and migration policy is necessary” (Programme of the Dutch Presidency of the

Council of the European Union 2015, 9). The Government argues that the number of people

that tries to find shelter in the European Union makes it necessary to have common policies.

42

So by giving the audience the idea that the situation is uncontrollable unless there are

common policies they are trying to convince the audience of the ‘necessity’ of the policies.

“The proposals for laws for a readmission mechanism and the European List of Safe Countries of

Origin will play a prominent role during the Dutch Presidency” (Programme of the Dutch Presidency

2015, 17). “(…) the necessary measures that have been agreed on, like the action plan human

trafficking and return” (Programme of the Dutch Presidency 2015, 17).

These two quotes show that during this particular Presidency the Netherlands has also tried

to focus (again) on returning refugees to ‘safe countries of origin’.

The Letter to Parliament of 28 January 2016 contains two combinations of genuine refugee

vs. illegal immigrant frame and the numbers frame. The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs

writes to the parliament that “irregular migration flows ask for a common answer and coordinated

actions. These are big challenges” (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 2016,2). By referring to

migration as being irregular and to “flows”, the government again invokes the idea that

these migrants are irregular and that they are uncontrollable, which needs to be addressed

with new measures and laws. Besides this example there is an even better example. “The

growing influx of illegal immigrants and asylum seekers are important themes [during the current

Presidency]” (Tweede Kamer der Stategen Generaal 2016, 9). By making a clear distinction

between “illegal” immigrants and genuine asylum seekers the Minister invokes the image

among the audience that there are a lot of them and that they cannot be controlled. This

becomes even stronger with the words “growing” and “influx”.

This quote of the Letter to Parliament of 22 December 2015 shows that the Dutch government

is concerned that the migrants and refugees will pressure some core values of the European

Union. “The current influx of immigrants to Europe puts the common fundamental values under

pressure at different fronts. It is not only about the responsibility of Member States to guarantee basic

rights of immigrants, but also the embracement and respect to European common values by

immigrants through the tracks of integration” (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 2015, 1). By

stating this, the government is trying to create an image with the audiences that migrants

and refugees have different core values than the European citizens. And that they are thus

fundamentally different than ‘we’ are and need to be integrated in order to protect ‘our’ core

values.

43

In the State of the Union text document for the Dutch EU Presidency of 2016 the Dutch

Minister of Foreign Affairs argues that the government tries to aim at the readmission of

refugees and migrants. And that they should be given shelter in safe third-countries and

those who can be send back should be send back. The document also shows both the number

frame and the genuine refugee vs illegal immigrant frame. Quotes of both frames and a

guiding explanation will be given. The number frame is reflected in this quote: “The increased

influx of human beings seeking refuge clearly shows that a common border, asylum and migration

policy is necessary” (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 2015, 6). By using the words influx

and increased the Minister invokes a picture of incontrollable amounts of refugees. For

which, as he argues, a common European asylum and migration policy is necessary. So by

referring to the numbers he tries to give the audience the idea that new policies are

absolutely necessary to stop the social unrest. An example of the genuine refugee vs illegal

immigrant frame is the following quote: “When agreements are made with third countries about

safe shelter and readmission. And when this is a real possibility, refugees can be send home on the

basis of international and European laws” (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 2015, 6). This

quote shows that the Dutch government aims at sending refugees and migrants back who

come from ‘safe’ third countries. The Minister tries to create the image that there are a lot of

illegal immigrants among the refugees that can and should be send back as soon as possible

as long as it is in agreement with international and European laws.

44

Table 6.7 Council of the European Union Policy documents

Frame

Document

Public Security

Frame

Us vs. Them

Frame

Numbers

Frame

Genuine

Refugee vs.

Illegal

Immigrant

No Clear

Framing or

Other Frames

Council Decision

October 2015

X

Council Decision

November 2015

X

Council Decision

December 2015

X

Council

Conclusions

December 2015

X

Council

Regulation

January 2016

X

Council

Regulation March

2016

X

Council

Implementing

Decision March

2016

X

Council Decision

March 2016

X

Council Decision

April 2016

X

A few examples of the used frames in the Council of the EU documents will be given in this

paragraph. For example, this next quote gives an example of the numbers frame that was

used in the Council Decision of November 2015. “Due to the urgent needs, it is necessary to

mobilise an important additional amount to finance measures to alleviate the migration and refugee

crisis” (Council of the European Union 2015, 1). With this quote the Council uses the word

crisis to give the audience the idea that migrants come in such big numbers that they cause a

crisis. By using the word “crisis”, the Council of the European Union implies that immediate

attention and financial resources are necessary to deal with the issue.

45

Then the next example is of the illegal vs genuine refugee frame, this frame was used in for

example the Council Decision of March 2016. A quote that reflects this frame is: “(…) decision

of the Joint Readmission Committee on implementing arrangements for the application of Articles 4

and 6 of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on readmission of

persons residing without authorization from 1 June 2016 (…)” (Council of the European Union

2016, 2). In this decision the Council makes a distinction between illegal migrants and

genuine refugees and migrants that are allowed to reside within the European Union. It then

allows the removal of people who came to the European Union without formal

authorization, to be readmitted by Turkey.

Finally, the last quote is from the Council Conclusions of December 2015 document: “In the

light of the European Council’s conclusions of October 2015, which state that tackling the migration

and refugee crisis is a common obligation which requires a comprehensive strategy and a determined

effort over time in a spirit of solidarity and responsibility”. With these remarks the Council of the

European Union calls for measures on the basis of common solidarity. The call for solidarity

and responsibility resonates in all successive Dutch Presidencies that were analyzed in this

thesis. In the next chapter the Synthesis of the findings listed above will be elaborated on.

The synthesis has the same layout as the current findings chapter, however it will have an

extra paragraph where the findings of all the successive Dutch EU Presidencies will be

compared.

7. Synthesis

In these paragraphs the data, that was presented in the paragraphs above, will be analyzed

in the light of the theoretical framework. It will take stock of the findings, in order to give an

answer to the main research question of how migrants and refugees are framed during EU

Presidencies. But it will also try to give tentative explanations of why these frames were

applied and what other background information can be of importance for understanding

these different framings of refugees and migration in general. Each Presidency has its own

sub-chapter in which the most applied frame will be presented, the audience aspect will be

explained and finally some final observations on aspects that stood out during the analysis of

46

the different documents during each Presidency. Finally, this chapter will conclude with a

comparison of the Presidencies, in order to give an answer to the main research question in

the Conclusion chapter.

7.1 1997 Presidency

Most Frequently Applied Frame

The frame that was applied most in both the government documents and the Council of the

European Union documents of the 1997 Dutch EU Presidency is, the genuine vs illegal

immigrant frame. In most documents a clear distinction was made by the Council of the EU

and the Dutch government between genuine refugees that are lawfully allowed to stay and

should be helped, treated good versus the illegal migrants that should be removed from the

EU Member States territories. By creating this distinction in the minds of their respective

audiences the Council and the Dutch Government make it easier to pass laws and

agreements on the removal of these illegal immigrants. But at the end of the 1997 Dutch EU

Presidency an agreement was achieved with the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty. Even

though the Amsterdam Treaty allowed the EU to create measures in the area of immigration

and asylum, there were not that many measures specified yet that could determine what

migrants are legal and which ones illegal. In fact, the Amsterdam Treaty called for measures

to be made in the areas of immigration and asylum within the next five years (European

Communities 1997, 29-30).

However, during this Presidency there was also a focus on migrants who seemingly wanted

to return out of free will. According to for example the Council Regulation of 25 July 1996

these individuals should get full support from the Member States to return to their former

homes and the EU should help building a safe environment for them in their home states

(Council of the European Union 1996, 2). By creating the image for their audiences that these

people were willing to leave out of free will, makes it easier to facilitate their return with

policies and measures. Something closely related to this what stood out during the Dutch

Presidency of 1997, was that there was no mentioning of forced eviction of refugees who

have been refused status and illegal immigrants. As said above in both the Dutch

government documents and the Council of the European Union documents the main focus

47

was on refugees returning out of free will, especially in the light of the Dayton Agreements,

and hindrances that returning migrants encounter when they wish to go back.

Audience

When we look at what audiences the documents had we can observe the following: for the

government documents the audience is mostly Members of the Dutch Parliament. These

MP’s have to be convinced by necessity of the proposed measures and the decisions that had

to be negotiated on at the European level, in order to do so the government thus applied the

genuine vs. illegal immigrant frame in two different documents. For the EU documents the

audiences are both the Ministers of the Council of the European Union and the Members of

the European Parliament. There is a difference in the tone that is used in the plans and

consultations with the national parliament and in the tone in the Council Regulations and

Decisions. For the latter it is a more legal terminology and legal references to international

treaties etc. while in the governmental documents there is more variety in usage of frames to

convince them of their plans for the Presidencies. The Decisions and Regulations are of

course in essence EU laws and rules, which have to be concise and are often formulated in a

more static way. Whereas the Dutch Government documents contain arguments used in

debates by Ministers. These texts also contain more elaborate speech acts by which the

audience of the Dutch Parliament and general public have to be convinced of the proposed

measures.

Observation

However, in most of the documents the 1997 Presidency seems to be mostly concerned with

the returning of refugees and migrants out of free will. And in a part of the documents none

of the four frames were applied. This can possibly be explained by the fact that the height of

the crisis was already over at the time the Dutch took over the Presidency of the European

Union in 1997. In the light of this Zeitgeist it seems logical that most refugee and migration

policies and measures were aimed at sending back migrants and making a distinction with

semantics between bonafide refugees and bogus refugees. Of which the latter should be

returned according to the European Council as soon as the circumstances of the Balkan allow

this. However what policymakers and politicians did not know back then was that the

Yugoslavia Wars would not officially end until 2001, when the Albanian minority of

48

Macedonia stopped their armed conflict with the Macedonian government (International

Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 20164). The fact that the height of the crisis was

over can then also explain why the numbers frame was not applied in direct referencing to

the Balkan crisis. However, it was applied, but only to refer to migrant crises in general in

the Council Activity Report of CIREA in 1996. In the next paragraph the 2004 Presidency will

be analyzed into more detail.

7.2 2004 Presidency

In this section the Presidency of 2004 will be analyzed more into detail. The paragraphs have

been divided into three sections. The first section is about the frames that were most

frequently applied in the documents during the Dutch Presidency of the European Union in

2004. The part is about the audience and the final paragraphs are about some observations of

aspects that stood out during this particular Presidency.

Most Frequently Applied Frame

One of the things which can be easily observed in table 3, for the Presidency of 2004, is that

(again) the frame of genuine refugee vs. illegal immigrant was the most frequently applied

frame, it was actually in all but one documents of the Dutch Government. This could

possibly be explained by the fact that the Dutch Presidency Programme explicitly stated that

for the Netherlands during the 2004 Presidency: “Combatting illegal migration and trafficking in

human beings will be an important priority in 2004. The Council will, in addition, take forward work

on the further development of a common asylum and migration policy, building on the legislative

programme on minimum norms originating from the Amsterdam treaty “(The Irish and Dutch

Delegations of the Council of the European Union 2003, 31). This quote makes clear that

during this Presidency the Netherlands wanted to put an emphasis on sending refugees back

and in order to do so the responsible Ministers had to portray a part of the refugees and

migrants as illegal migrants. By framing them as illegal it criminalizes them implicitly, which

makes it easier to get support from their audience for the proposed measures.

4 For more information about the timeline of the different conflicts see: http://www.icty.org/en/about/what-

former-yugoslavia/conflicts

49

In the Council of the European Union documents in Table 4, we can observe that in some

documents there is a combination of frames within the same documents. But in general we

can observe that only two frames were most frequently applied in these documents, the

genuine vs. illegal immigrant frame and the numbers frame. The use of the first frame can

be explained by the fact that the Dutch government made this a priority already in their

Presidency Programme before their term began, as argued above. The use of the numbers

frame could possibly be explained with the example of the before mentioned Council

Decision of 2 December 2004. In this Decision the Council of the European Union asked for

more financial means in the event of a “mass influx of refugees”. So it was not directly

related to the Afghan refugee crisis, but in more general terms to large groups of migrants

entering the European Union. By using words like “mass” and “influx” the Directive invokes

the idea of uncontrollability of the problems with the susceptible audience. And that the

solution to this uncontrollability is more financial means to a common European Fund.

Audience

The audiences are the same as for the 1997 Presidency. Members of Parliament for the Dutch

Government Documents and Other Ministers who have a seat in the Council of the European

Union. But also the Members of the European Parliament, because a lot of Directives and

Regulations have both the name of the Head of the Council and the Head of the European

Parliament. We can observe a difference in tone between the documents that were sent to

Dutch parliament versus the more statutory and legislative documents of the Council of the

European Union. This can possibly be explained by the fact that the Directives and

Regulations of the Council are the end products of negotiations among the Member States,

whereas the Dutch government documents only reflect the opinion of the Dutch

government. And because the documents of the Dutch government were sent to the

parliament that has to support the proposed measures of the government. So they have to

persuade their audience (Dutch MP’s), in believing their message and supporting their

views.

Observation

One thing that stood out was that in none of the Documents there was any reference to any

migration crisis. Even though the numbers frame was invoked at different times. So there

50

was no specific emphasis on the Afghan refugee crisis and no direct reference to this specific

crisis. Whereas in 1997 there were specific references to the crisis at that moment, even

though the height of that crisis was already over when the Dutch government took over the

Presidency.

During the 2004 Dutch Presidency of the EU there was a lot of focus on the return of (illegal)

immigrants in general, but specifically to (safe) third-countries. This can be partly explained

by the fact that at this time in the Netherlands a center-right-wing government was in office,

led by then Prime Minister Balkenende, with an Immigration and Integration Minister who

was very strict on asylum, Minister Rita Verdonk. In the Netherlands her nickname at that

time was “Iron Rita”, (in reference to the illustrious Iron Lady Margaret Thatcher) because of

her stringent policies on immigration and integration (Van der Haar 2013, 217).

7.3 2016 Presidency

Even though this Dutch EU Presidency was not finished yet at the time this thesis was

written. There were interesting findings in the documents that were published until the end

of May 2016. In this section the results will be presented in the paragraphs below, followed

by a section about audience and finally some observations about aspects of the 2016 Dutch

EU Presidency that stood out.

Most Frequently Applied Frame

The frame that was found most in the documents of the Dutch Presidency of 2016 was again

the genuine refugee vs. illegal immigrant frame. However, a larger variety of frames was

found in the documents of this particular Dutch Presidency. For example, the Dutch

government documents of 2016’s Dutch Presidency show the biggest variety of applied

frames of all the three successive Dutch Presidencies. It is the only Presidency where the

documents demonstrate the explicit usage of an exclusionary discourse by means of an “us

vs. them” frame. It was observed in the Letter to Parliament of 22 January 2016. In which the

Dutch government argued that: “It is not only about the responsibility of Member States to

guarantee basic rights of immigrants, but also the embracement and respect to European

common values by immigrants through the tracks of integration” (Tweede Kamer der Staten

51

Generaal 2015, 1). Furthermore, the government argued in the same paragraph that the

migrant influx puts pressure on fundamental values of the EU. The use of these words

strengthen the idea with the audience that these migrants differ fundamentally from us and

that they have different fundamental and core values. By creating the distinction between us

and them it alienates the migrants from Europeans or in this case Dutch Members of

Parliament. Which can then lead to support for measures that perhaps unintentionally

enhance the distance between the migrants and the host population.

This large variety of frames can possibly be explained by the fact that the migrant crisis in

the European Union and other regions was still at its highpoint, or just past it, when the

Dutch Presidency of the European Union commenced in January 2016. This explanation is

tentative, because this can, of course, only be argued in hindsight, when a crisis is over.

Audience

The audiences of the documents of the Dutch Presidency of 2016 are again the Dutch

Members of Parliament for the Government documents. The audience of the other category

documents are the Ministers of the Council of the European Union and for a few documents,

the Members of the European Parliament. These documents have the names of both the

Council and the European Parliament. As said above, we have observed more variety among

frames applied in the government documents than in the Council documents. This is

possibly related to the audiences as well. As the Council is more a legislative body that

produced formal Regulations and Decisions whereas in Dutch parliament the coalition has to

be convinced of the plans and some of the opposition parties as well. So different frames

were applied to convince them of the message that these different policies were necessary.

For example, using the public security frame in a General Consultation about the

preparations for the Presidency the government tried to put emphasis on EU wide security

and national Dutch security. By framing migrants as a threat to security they make the

audience feel that the measures are absolutely necessary for the survival of the State. Because

what Member of Parliament would not want to guarantee the survival of the Dutch State?

52

Observations

One important aspect, that needs to be mentioned is that the Dutch Presidency has not yet

ended, yet at the time of writing of this thesis. Therefore, it is too early for hard conclusions,

particularly given the circumstance that the refugee crisis has not yet ended and may even

adopt a semi-permanent character. However, the findings up until the end of May 2016

supplied sufficient material to generate some findings about the dominant discursive

framing.

Again the emphasis on returning refugees to, for example, safe third-countries is present in

most of the documents. E.g. in the Dutch Presidency Programme: “it concerns both

addressing political and economic causes of migration as well as the approach to human

trafficking, return and border control”. It is clear that one of the Dutch priorities at the

beginning of the Presidency was to address the return of migrants and to fight against

human trafficking in the European Council.

Another aspect that stood out in the Council of the European Union documents was that the

Council calls for measures on the basis of common solidarity. The call for solidarity and

responsibility resonates in all successive Dutch Presidencies that were analyzed in this thesis,

but it gets mentioned more often during the 2016 Dutch European Union Presidency.

7.4 Comparing the Presidencies

In this section the successive Dutch EU Presidencies will be compared. Mostly in terms of the

overall most frequently applied frames and other aspects that were remarkable.

One thing that becomes clear when we start comparing the individual Presidencies is that

the most frequently applied frame is the genuine vs illegal immigrant frame. But there seems

to be more variety in the use of discursive frames in the documents of the Dutch government

than in those of the Council of the European Union. An explanation for this could be that for

the analysis of the Council documents only legislations, regulations and decisions were used.

These documents are the end product of negotiations and debates among the Ministers of the

Council. While the documents of the Dutch government also included general consultations

with the Dutch Parliament and Letters to Parliament in which the government was able to

53

support their arguments more elaborate than in the legal and declaratory documents of the

Council. It is thus more likely that the genuine vs. illegal immigrant frame is being used in

the legal documents, which are based on political decision-making processes in which the

European Council, European Commission and European Parliament have been co-legislative

actors.

One observation that stood out was that in each case, there was hardly any referencing to the

refugee crises at hand. In most of the documents the Council or Dutch government often

referred to refugee and migration crises in general. However, there were some references to

the particular crises, some during the 1997 Dutch Presidency but mostly in the 2016

Presidency. This can perhaps be explained by keeping in mind that the refugee crisis was

still quite intense when the Dutch Presidency began and it was therefore on top the (policy)

agenda. In the documents of the 2004 Dutch Presidency there was no mentioning of the

Afghan refugee crisis or any reference to a particular crisis at all. The Council of the

European Union and the Dutch government did not make any specifications about particular

groups of refugees or crises in the documents that were analyzed in this thesis. Whereas

during the 1997 Presidency there was some referencing to the Yugoslavia Wars and

especially to the Dayton Agreement. This agreement was signed in 1995 and put an official

end to one of the Yugoslavia Wars, namely the Bosnian War (Caplan 2000, 213).

But perhaps the most interesting and striking observation is that during every single

Presidency the call for the same measures were repeated. But apparently these calls were

unheard. For example, during every Presidency there was a call for solidarity and a

mentioning, in comparable terms, of burden-sharing. But also the ever resonating call for

sending people back to territories that are deemed safe. And even though in 1997 the EU

started to build institutions, such as CIREA, that would monitor the flows of migrants and

analyze situations in neighboring regions in order to predict future migration flows, it still

seems the EU is incapable of succeeding in preparing itself for groups of refugees. Because

during every refugee crisis, that was part of the analysis of the successive Dutch EU

Presidencies, it seems like the European leaders are completely caught by surprise. When

analyzing and reading the documents word by word it almost becomes frustrating, to read

how often the same measures are being proposed and then when one reads the documents of

the next Presidency a few years later, the same measures are being proposed again.

54

8. Final Conclusions and Discussion

8.1 Final Conclusions

The main Research Question this research has tried to answer is: How do the Council of the

European Union and the Dutch Government frame migrants and refugees during Dutch

Presidencies of the European Union?

We analyzed the securitization discourse of migration of the Dutch Presidencies of the

European Union in different documents by means of four main frames. These were:

1) A Public Security Frame, where migrants are explicitly being framed as a threat to

the public safety of the state and especially to the social (economic) security. Spurious

relationships are being made between the migrant or refugee and criminal offences and

criminal behavior in general. By giving the audience the idea that these migrants pose a

threat to security the speech actor justifies its measures and policies.

2) An Us vs. Them Frame where a clear and explicit distinction is being made

between the migrant or refugee and the community at large. It excludes them from the rest of

society, and makes policies for the removal or further exclusionary measures easier to

implement. Because people already have the image created, by the securitizing speech act,

that these people are not a part of ‘our’ society.

3) A Numbers Frame in which the speech actor refers to migrants and refugees as

numbers or using words that invoke metaphors of storms and or war, in order to invoke the

idea that the situation is uncontrollable or severe that immediate measures are necessary.

4). A Genuine Refugee vs. Illegal Immigrant Frame, which makes a clear distinction

between genuine refugees that comply with definitions of refugees posed by International

and European Law and Treaties and the illegal immigrants on the other side of the spectrum.

The use of this frame gives the audience the idea that these illegal persons are then of course

to be removed because they are framed as breaking the law. In the documents that were

analyzed all the frames were at least found once in the discourse on immigration. But some

were applied more often than others. In the next paragraph a conclusive answer to the

research question will be given.

55

Answer to the Research Question

In the discourse of migration of the successive Dutch EU Presidencies migrants and refugees

are mostly framed as being either an illegal immigrant or a genuine refugee that is in need of

immediate help. By creating this clear distinction with the audiences the Presidencies create

the image that some migrants can be seen as criminals or as being economic migrants that

should be send back to their ‘safe’ countries of origin because they do not have a legitimate

reason to stay within the European Union. The second most frequent applied frame to justify

policies and measures was the Numbers Frame. Where new measures were being framed as

necessary in the light of the large number of people at the external borders of Europe. When

a speech actor uses this discursive frame the actor tries to create an image of uncontrollability

in the mind of the audience. And the only solution to stop the uncontrollability is to

implement the policies the actor is proposing. And the audience becomes susceptible to

accepting this message because it loses sight of the individual refugee or migrant.

Concluding Remarks

It also seems like the EU keeps falling back to “mantrafications”, during every crisis there are

these calls to solve the refugee crises together. However, when it comes down to working

closer together it turns out that these plans are not feasible or there is no political will. For

example, as mentioned before, the quota systems, financial burden sharing systems and

burden sharing in general were all solutions that came back during each of the three

successive Dutch EU Presidencies and every crisis but were never agreed on and

implemented. There is also a lack of permanent and structural shelter to refugees. Every

crisis seems to be a complete surprise to the European governments and therefore they use

solely ad-hoc policies. Which is interesting given the fact that the EU has been promoting the

use of risk assessment methodologies to anticipate the arrival of migrants at Europe’s

external borders. For example, by agencies like CIREA but also Centre for Information,

Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration (CIREFI) and of

course Frontex (Kleinschmidt 2006, 233).

56

Scientific and Societal Relevance

The theoretical concepts that were used were useful in explaining and understanding what

frames were used and how they were used to implement policies concerning refugees and

migration in general. However, there were no direct and explicit references, in the migration

discourse, to refugees or migrants being an existential danger to the Member States of the

European Union. On the other hand, the subtler framing of migrants as being illegal and

criminalizing then can also have, as said before, serious consequences for refugees. Because

we have to ask ourselves some questions, are people illegal just because they want a better

life? Because they wish to escape poverty, violence and other atrocities. Are their countries of

origin really a safe place to live?

This research added to the body of knowledge in comparing the discursive framing of

migrants and refugees during three successive Dutch EU Presidencies. This thesis has tried

to be innovative in the comparison of migration discourse of the Council of the European

Union or specifically the Dutch Presidencies of the European Union. It also added to the

body of knowledge by not only looking at speech acts, such as general consultation debates

in Parliament but also looking at the outcomes of negotiations and debates, namely EU

policy documents, Decisions, Directives and Regulations.

8.2 Discussion

In this final discussion chapter, this thesis will reflect on the conclusions and findings of the

research and will make some recommendations for policy makers and politicians. It then will

also reflect on the shortcomings and strengths of the research. And it will finally give

recommendations for further research in the field of securitization of migration discourse of

the Dutch European Union Presidencies.

The main message of this research would be: politicians and policy makers use discourse

during the Presidencies which set the tone for the securitization of migrants and refugees.

Particularly EU Presidency terms offer a strategic window of opportunity to national

politicians to influence, rearticulate and transform the international discourse. Amongst the

audiences who are the “recipients” of these discursive speech acts are the members of the

57

national electorate. As some research has shown, words do have consequences and may be

called “performative” in their strength and persuasive power. By securitizing and framing

migrants and immigrants as illegal you criminalize a group of (often vulnerable) people may

fall subject to criminalization. By focusing on illegal immigrants and on policies to send them

back, society feels encouraged to regard them as exploiters at best and as criminals at worst.

However sometimes (European) governments make big mistakes by sending people back to

‘safe’ third countries5. This can have serious humanitarian consequences, e.g. if people get

hurt or worse, if they die in their country of origin. Therefore, policy makers and politicians

should mind their semantics.

Besides this message, the “mantrafications” of “new” measures during every crisis are the

same, but policymakers and politicians do not seem to learn from their mistakes or from

previous humanitarian crises. The leaders of Europe keep on making ad-hoc policies instead

of finding more permanent solutions to imminent problems.

Every Research has its strengths and weaknesses, this thesis at hand is no exception to this.

Firstly, it has to be acknowledged that the research method, that was used for this thesis, is

susceptible to personal interpretations. Even though research should be conducted as neutral

and as impartial as possible, it still might be possible that another scholar might conduct the

same research with the same sources but might find slightly different outcomes. This is

because social science and in particular critical studies and discourse analysis research is

never completely neutral or impartial. That is why this research has tried to avoid this by

specifically mentioning quotes that were examples of frames for every Dutch Presidency.

Another important factor to take into account is the fact that at the time of writing the third

Presidency of 2016 had not ended yet, it still had a month to go. Thus it is not possible to

draw really strong conclusions on the 2016 EU Presidency of the Netherlands. However, this

particular Presidency did show the biggest variety of used frames already for the documents

up until the end of May 2016. 5 For example in 1996 it turned out that some Bosnian villages were not safe at all, even though the EU stated

they were. This happened later on too in 2006, ‘illegal’ refugees were sent back to the civil war in Liberia

because the Dutch government stated it was safe to go back.

See for example (both in Dutch):

http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4324/Nieuws/article/detail/1536915/2006/07/16/Terugkeer-vluchtelingen-

rsquo-Veilig-rsquo-volgens-Verdonk.dhtml and http://www.volkskrant.nl/archief/-bosnie-te-onveilig-voor-

terugsturen-vluchtelingen~a434655/

58

Despite these weaknesses the findings of this research were interesting. After extensive

reading of all the different documents and analyzing semantics to assess whether the texts

contained any frames. We found out that migrants and refugees are mostly referred to in a

genuine refugee vs. illegal immigrant frame. By analyzing the documents word by word it

allowed us to reach beyond the surface and to be comprehensive in the kind and number of

discursive frames that could be observed. Also the fact that this research spanned three

successive Dutch European Union Presidencies into account, makes the research unique.

This allowed us to observe any differences in framing of migrants and refugees in a period of

almost 20 years.

Further research should take the susceptibility to personal interpretation into mind and

perhaps replicate studies like these to find out whether other research shows the same

results. Another recommendation would be to take into account the factor of the political

spectrum. Because right-wing governments are often more likely to be ‘tough’ on

immigration while left-wing governments are often said to be less strict. By taking this factor

into account future research can possibly explain differences in the usage of frames in the

securitization of migration discourse. The concept of discourse can also be taken more

broadly by not only looking at semantics, but also look into nonverbal communication,

pronunciation and diction.

59

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Annex 1: List of Documents used for the Analysis

Dutch Government Documents

Presidency of 1997

1. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. Verslag van een algemeen overleg vastgesteld 28

januari 1997 (General Consultation). Vergaderjaar 1996-1997, 21 501-02, enz., nr. 189.

2. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. Vaststelling van de begroting van de uitgaven en de

ontvangsten van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (V) voor het jaar 1997 (Presidency

Programme as a part of National Budget of Foreign Affairs). Vergaderjaar 1996-1997, 25000

Hoofdstuk V, nr. 2.

3. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. Nederlands Voorzitterschap van de Europese Unie

van 1 januari tot 1 juli 1997: Brief van de Minister en de Staatssecretaris van Buitenlandse

Zaken (Letter to Parliament). 19 november 1996. Vergaderjaar 1996-1997, 25110, nr. 1.

4. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. Nederlands Voorzitterschap van de Europese Unie

van 1 januari tot 1 juli 1997: Brief van de Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken en van Defensie

(Letter to Parliament). 29 November 1996. Vergaderjaar 1996-1997, 25110, nr. 6.

Presidency of 2004

1. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. Nederlands EU-voorzitterschap 2004

Ontwerpbesluiten Unie-Verdrag: Verslag van een Algemeen Overleg, vastgesteld 12

65

augustus 2004 (General Consultation). 12 August 2004. Vergaderjaar 2003-2004, 29361 en

23490, nr. 7.

2. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. Operational Programme of the Council for 2004

submitted by the incoming Irish and Dutch Presidencies. 2 December 2003. Vergaderjaar

2003-2004, 29361, Nr. 1-b2.

3. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. Nederlands EU-voorzitterschap 2004: Brief van de

Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken (Letter to Parliament). 24 December 2003. Vergaderjaar

2003-2004, 29361, nr. 2.

4. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. Nederlands EU-voorzitterschap 2004: Brief van de

Minister en Staatssecretaris van Buitenlandse Zaken (Letter to Parliament). 28 May 2004.

Vergaderjaar 2003-2004, 29361, nr. 5.

5. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. Staat van de Europese Unie 2004-2005: Brief van de

Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken en de Staatssecretaris voor Europese Zaken (State of the

Union). 21 September 2004. Vergaderjaar 2003-2004, 29803, nr. 1.

Presidency of 2016

1. Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal. Nederlands EU-voorzitterschap 2016: Verslag van een

Mondeling overleg, vastgesteld 7 april 2015 (General Consultation). 7 April 2015.

Vergaderjaar 2015-2016, 34139, B.

2. Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken. Programma van het Nederlands voorzitterschap van

de Raad van de Europese Unie: 1 januari – 30 juni 2016 (Presidency Programme 2016). 7

January 2016. Vergaderjaar 2015-2016, 34139, Nr. 10.

3. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. Nederlands EU-voorzitterschap 2016: Brief van de

Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken (Letter to Parliament). 28 January 2015. Vergaderjaar 2014-

2015, 34139, Nr. 1.

4. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. Nederlands EU-voorzitterschap 2016: Brief van de

Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken (Letter to Parliament). 22 December 2015. Vergaderjaar

2015-2016, 34139, Nr. 9.

66

5. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. Staat van de Europese Unie, Nederlands EU-

voorzitterschap 2016: Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken (State of the Union). 16

November 2015. Vergaderjaar 2015-2016, 34166 en 34139, Nr. 22.

Council of the European Union Documents

Presidency of 1997

1. Council Regulation (EC) No 1628/96 of 25 July 1996 relating to aid for Bosnia and

Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslav Republic

of Macedonia. Published 14. 8. 1996. Official Journal of the European Communities

2. Council Decision of 16 December 1996 on monitoring the implementation of instruments

adopted by the Council concerning illegal immigration, readmission, the unlawful

employment of third country nationals and cooperation in the implementation of expulsion

orders (96/749/JHA). Published 31. 12. 1996. Official Journal of the European Communities.

3. Council Decision of 26 May 1997 on the exchange of information concerning assistance for

the voluntary repatriation of third-country nationals (97/340/JHA). Published 5.6.1997.

Official Journal of the European Communities.

4. Activity Report on the Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on Asylum

(Cirea) for 1994 and 1995. 26 May 1997. (97/C 191/05). Published 23.6.1997. Official Journal of

the European Communities.

5. Activity Report on the Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on Asylum

(Cirea) for 1996. 26 May 1997.(97/C 191/06). Published 23.6.1997. Official Journal of the

European Communities.

6. Council Conclusions of 27 May 1997 concerning the practical implementation of the

Dublin Convention (97/C 191/04). Published: 23.6.1997. Official Journal of the European

Communities.

7. Council Resolution of 26 June 1997 on unaccompanied minors who are nationals of third

countries. (97/C 221/03). Published 19.7.1997. Official Journal of the European Communities.

67

8. Council Decision of 26 June 1997 on monitoring the implementation of instruments

adopted concerning asylum. (97/420/JHA). Published 7.7.1997. Official Journal of the

European Communities.

9. Council Joint Action of 22 July 1997 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of

the Treaty on European Union concerning the financing of specific projects in favour of

displaced persons who have found temporary protection in the Member States and asylum-

seekers. (97/477/JHA). Published 31. 7. 97. Official Journal of the European Communities.

10. Council Resolution of 18 December 1997 laying down the priorities for cooperation in the

field of justice and home affairs for the period from 1 January 1998 to the date of entry into

force of the Treaty of Amsterdam (98/C 11/01). Published 15.1.1998. Official Jouranl of the

European Communities.

Presidency of 2004

1. Council Regulation of 19 February 2004 on the creation of an immigration liaison officers

network. (EC No 377/2004. Published 2.3.2004. Official Journal of the European Union.

2. Council Decision of 23 February 2004 setting out the criteria and practical arrangements

for the compensation of the financial imbalances resulting from the application of Directive

2001/40/EC on the mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of third-country

nationals. (2004/1 91/EC). Published 27.2.2004. Official Journal of the European Union.

3. Council Regulation of 10 March 2004 establishing a programme for financial and technical

assiatance to third countries in the areas of migration and asylum (AENEAS). Regulation

(EC) No 491/2004. Published 18.3.2004. Official Journal of the European Union.

4. Council Decision of 29 April 2004 on the organization of joint flights for removals from the

territory of two or more Member States of third-country nationals who are subjects of

individual removal orders. (2004/57 3/EC). Published 6.8.2004. Official Journal of the

European Union.

5. Council Directive of 29 April 2004 on the residence permit issued to third-country

nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject of an

68

action to facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent authorities.

2004/81/EC. Published 6.8.2004. Official Journal of the European Union.

6. Council Directive of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status

of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need

international protection and the contenct of the protection granted. 2004/83/EC. Published:

30.9.2004. Official Journal of the European Union.

7. Council Decision of 2 December 2004 establishing the European Refugee Fund for the

period 2004 to 2010. (2004/904/EC). Published 28.12.2004. Official Journal of the European

Union.

8. Council Regulation of 13 December 2004 on the requirement for the competent authorities

of the Member States to stamp systematically the travel documents of third country nationals

when they cross the external borders of the Member States and amending the provisions of

the Convention implementing the Schengen agreement and the common manual to this end.

(EC) No 2133/2004. Published 16.12.2004. Official Journal of the European Union.

9. Council Decision of 13 December 2004 amending Decision 2002/463/EC adopting an action

programme for administrative cooperation in the fields of external borders, visas, asylum

and immigration (ARGO programme). (2004/867/EC). Published 18.12.2004. Official Journal

of the European Union.

10. Council Decision of 22 December 2004 providing for certain areas covered by Title IV of

Part Three of the Treaty establishing the European Community to be governed by the

procedure laid down in Article 251 of that Treaty. (2004/9 27/EC). Published 31.12.2004.

Official Journal of the European Union.

11. Council: The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the

European Union. (2005/C 53/01) Published 3.3.2005. Official Journal of the European Union.

Presidency of 2016

69

1. Council Decision of 28 October 2015 on the mobilization of the Flexibility Instrument for

immediate budgetary measures under the European Agenda on Migration. (EU) 2015/2248.

Published 4.12.2015. Official Journal of the European Union.

2. Council Decision of 25 November 2015 on the mobilization of the Flexibility Instrument for

immediate budgetary measures to address the refugee crisis. (EU) 2016/253. Published

24.2.2016. Official Journal of the European Union.

3. Council Regulation of 2 December 2015 repealing certain acts from the Schengen acquis

(EU) 2015/. Published 2.12.2015. Official Journal of the European Union.

4. Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member

States, meeting within the Council, amending the Work Plan for Culture (2015-2018) as

regards the priority on intercultural dialogue. (2015/C 417/07). Published 15.12.2015. Official

Journal of the European Union.

5. Council Regulation of 20 January 2016 repealing certain acts from the Schengen acquis.

(EU) 2016/93. Published 2.2.2016. Official Journal of the European Union.

6. Council Regulation of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the

movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (codification) (EU) 2016/399.

Published 23.3.2016. Official Journal of the European Union.

7. Council Implementing Decision of 10 March 2016 on the temporary suspension of the

relocation of 30% of applicants allocated to Austria under Decision (EU) 2015/1601

establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of

Italy and Greece. (EU) 2016/408. Published 19.3.2016. Official Journal of the European Union.

8. Council Decision of 23 March 2016 establishing the position to be taken on behalf of the

European Union within the Joint Readmission Committee on a Decision of the Joint

Readmission Committee on implementing arrangements for the application of Articles 4 and

6 of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the

readmission of persons residing without authorization from 1 June 2016. (EU) 2016/551.

Published 9.4.2016. Official Journal of the European Union.

70

9. Council Decision of 11 April 2016 on the position to be taken on behalf of the European

Union within the Joint Readmission Committee set up under the Agreement between the

European Community and the Russian Federation on readmission, concerning a

recommendation with regard to readmission applications requiring the arrangements of

interviews. (EU) 2016/630. Published 26.4.2016. Official Journal of the European Union.