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Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University of Texas at Austin ---------------------------------- --------------- Calvin Weeks, CISSP, CISM Director, IT Security The University of Oklahoma

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Page 1: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Security After Blaster(what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand)

Angel Cruz, CISSPDirector & University ISO

The University of Texas at Austin

-------------------------------------------------

Calvin Weeks, CISSP, CISMDirector, IT Security

The University of Oklahoma

Page 2: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Higher Education’sInformation Security

Risk Landscape(the sky is falling!)

Page 3: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Higher Education In The News

• Hackers Steal Vital Data• Credit Card Numbers Stolen from University• Hackers Access Medical Database• Hacker Steals SSNs from Database• Worm cripples University email• Data on 59,000 People Stolen• Virus may damage personal data

Page 4: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Our Technology at Risk

• High-performance computers• Desktops & laptops• LANS: wired & wireless pipes• Residential Networks: processing power,

networks• Home computers via high speed access• Internet & Internet2 gateways

Page 5: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Our Data at Risk

• Confidential, Sensitive, & Private Data– Credit Card #s, ACH (NACHA) bank #s– Student & Employee Records (SSN)– Patient Records (SSN)– Institutional Financial Records– Investment Records– Donor Records– Research Data, Other Intellectual Property– Homeland Security Data

Page 6: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Info Security Threats

• Distributed denial of service & enumerations• Viruses and worms• SPAM• Vendor shipped insecure systems (Windows,

Linux, Unix, IIS, SQL)• Software project practices• Naïve or untrained/under-trained users

Page 7: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

More Info Security Threats

• Massive CPU power & bandwidth available to crackers as well as HE, e-commerce

• New concerns about cyber-terrorism• Bandwidth hogging applications - File Sharing• Improperly managed security devices• User activities

Page 8: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Environmental Security Challenges

• Perimeter difficult to define• Diverse HW/SW with wide range of ownership• System administrators distributed, autonomous;

many lack formal training• Increasing demands for distributed computing,

mobile/wireless• Lack of central authority• Grants rarely buy IT support• Few clearly-defined security goals

Page 9: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Cultural Security Challenges

• Tolerance, experimentation, & anonymity valued• Top-down regulations generally resisted• Faculty independence• Fear of change• Many theoretical & technical experts• Persistent belief that security is counter to

academic freedom

Page 10: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Campuses especially vulnerable

• We operate open networks with weak firewalls at the Internet border

• We welcome personally-owned computers on the campus network

• We resist standards • We run “thin” on technical staff in many depts• We value innovation over stability• Many of our users are especially naïve

Page 11: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

How to survive – risk protection

• Identify high value information resources;

• Assess risk and countermeasures;

• Select and implement balanced protection;

• Maintain and support your protections.

Page 12: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

How to survive - resources

• Provide resources for:– Computer systems administration– System administrator training– End-user training: faculty, staff, students

• Assign an Info Security Officer/Liaison;

• Know your ISAC contacts.

Page 13: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

What ISO offers to UT

• Security risk assessments (not audits)

• Disaster recovery planning support

• Security standards & best practices

• White-Hat scanning• Security policy• Legislative analysis

• Intrusion detection• Incident response• Forensic analysis• Project advisement• Technology management

support• User education &

targeted training (role-based)

• ISO web site

Page 14: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

The Threat Landscape(the sky HAS fallen!)

Page 15: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

UT Info Sec Incidents Jan – Aug 03

Jan-03 Feb-03 Mar-03 Apr-03 May-03 Jun-03 Jul-03 Aug-03

All IncidentsViruses

Page 16: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

SQL SlammerJanuary 24-27 2003

• 11:40 PM - UT T&N tools indicate DDOS event

• 12:40 AM - T&N edge filters placed

• 1:00 AM - Campus network stabilized

• Until 8:00 AM - Emails -- UT departments, TX agencies, UT System & other educational institutions.

• Saturday/Sunday - Work continues to filter/un-filter networks and systems.

Page 17: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

UT SSN TheftFebruary to March 2003

• Intruder accesses UT web site• Discovers SSN query design flaw• Runs script to “harvest” SSNs• Detected after 5 days (2M+ attempts)• Captures 55,000+ SSNs• Secret Service confiscates PCs in 2 cities• UT Student arrested and charged• Case being adjudicated by U.S. Attorney

Page 18: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Microsoft “RPC” Vulnerability

• 7/16: Microsoft announces vulnerability in RPC interface – attacker can run any command on unpatched systems

• 7/24: Dept of Homeland Defense issues alert

• 7/27: UTNet initial scan shows vulnerability

• 7/28: Email to all urges that patch be installed

• 7/28: Scans continue: breached systems blocked at border & closest UTNet switch

Page 19: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

More “Blaster”

• 7/29: Full scan shows X000+ vulnerable; Y00+ breached – most with attack software/tools to transfer copyrighted material

• 7/30: 2nd email to all urges immediate action

• 7/31: Remaining vulnerable computers blocked at the UTNet border

• 8/01: Massive effort to clean breached systems, remove network blocks, install patches

Page 20: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

RPC Containment Progress

7/28 7/29 7/30 7/31 8/1 8/2 8/3 8/4 8/5 8/6 8/7

Vulnerable

Compromised

Page 21: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

2nd worm: “Welchia”

• 8/18: Initially thought to be a “clean up” worm – scanned for same vulnerability, replaced 1st worm, generated massive amounts of network traffic (Internet2 backbone graph below)

Page 22: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Then “Sobig.F”

• 8/19: “A mass-mailing, network-aware virus that sends itself to all email addresses it finds …”

• Subject: Re: Details … Re: Approved … Re: My details … Re: Thank you! … Re: That movie … Re: Wicked screensaver … Re: Your application … Thank you!

• Body: See the attached file for details

• Many (!) email users clicked on the attached file

• Also installed a “trojan horse” program

• Most virulent email virus up to that time

Page 23: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Sobig.F (cont’d)

• One UT user received 5,000 copies!

• Filter on <mail.utexas.edu> stopped 30,000 copies in the first hour; 4.6 million from 8/20 through 9/1 – 32% of msg traffic

• (And there are 150+ email servers at UT)

• Scheduled to cease propagation 9/10

• When will we see Sobig.G?

Page 24: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Our Response

• Scan for vulnerabilities, breached systems • Only works with active machines, must keep scanning

• Patch impacted systems by the thousands

• Filter problem hosts & block “at risk” ports• Breached machines are removed from UT-Net until fully rebuilt• Vulnerable machines are later removed from UT-Net• NetBIOS port blocked -- ITS “white list” created

• Communicate to internal/external communities• Lessons learned from SQL Slammer last January

Page 25: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Then Students & Faculty Returned

• High proportion of Windows computers not patched vs. RPC; no anti-virus vs. Sobig.F

• Immediate impact in ResNet• Also evident in UTNet wireless & Telesys• Any laptop brought to campus is a risk• Help desk working overtime; CDs available• How to assist students off campus?

Page 26: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

What’s a User to Do?

• Here’s what Microsoft recommends:

Page 27: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Our Desktop Recommendation

• AntiVirus – Symantec avail at no charge on “Bevoware” web site – should set “auto update”

• Windows “critical” security patches – available from Microsoft.com – should set “auto update”

• Firewall – Symantec now recommended, also available in “Bevoware” suite

• Backup frequently • Similar advice for Macintosh users

Page 28: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

How Easy? How Realistic?

• Not only all computers on campus, but also– UT-owned laptops– All faculty/staff computers used at home for UT work– All student computers in ResNet– All student laptops that are ever brought to campus– All student computers connected to Telesys

• How much effort to comply? To audit? Any penalties for non-compliance?

• ITS is the test case

Page 29: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

What can be done?

• Firewall protection at the Internet border• Better tools to detect vulnerabilities & intrusions• More systematic approach, professional mgmt

for UT-owned end-user systems: – Administrative staff – Non-technical faculty– Research projects

• Required training for all users • Security campaign w/ Microsoft & h/w partners

Page 30: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Cultural changes

• UTNet & the Internet are mission-critical.• No systems can be allowed to threaten UTNet.• UT has an obligation to the Internet, too.• UT must provide minimum standards for all IT resources

PLUS higher standards for “islands of protection”.• Many users do not need/want technical responsibility; we

need to develop programs to assist them.• Connecting a computer to the network is like taking a car

on the highway: machine & user must meet minimum standards, owner & user must accept responsibility for any problems they cause.

Page 31: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

University Leadership Response

• We want you to take a strong leadership role in university security!

• We want you to create a plan for improving information security.

• We want you to coordinate the university’s information security planning.

Page 32: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

The Information Security Improvement Plan

(the sales pitch)

Page 33: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Our Security ChallengeA secure, yet open environment

• Best usability/security balance – “islands of protection”.

• The right solution in the right place – “defense in depth”.

• Hard to know what is occurring in UTNet.• Need to secure the data wherever it may go.• Want a more secure desktop.• Scale = complexity & cost.• Proper value proposition:

– “Don’t build a $50 fence for a $5 horse …– Unless the horse can escape and cause $500 in damage.”

Page 34: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Holistic Approach to SecuritySeven Security Layers

• Network/Internet Security

• Server/Systems Security

• Applications/Data Security

• Desktop/Workstation Security

• Mobile Security

• Physical Security

• Security Management

Page 35: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

ITS approaches to date (1)

• Network/Internet Security– Port and service filters at the UTNet edge– Virtual Private Network (VPN) Service (pilot)

• Server/Systems Security– More aggressive scanning and communication of potential

issues

• Applications/Data Security– “Pad Lock” System to augment EID for high risk transactions– Enhancements to increase EID security– Scan for private/sensitive/confidential data– Assess identity management processes

Page 36: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

• Desktop/Workstation Security– ITS E-Mail Services Spam Filtering– Desktop Anti-Virus– Desktop Firewalls– Desktop Auto-update

• Mobile Security– Public Network Access (PNA) System

• Physical Security– Building Access Control System (BACS) Upgrades

• Security Management– Create security policies– ISRA Risk Assessment project– ITS Disaster Recovery Plan

ITS approaches to date (2)

Page 37: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

New strategies (1)

Network/Internet Security• Improve internet and network filtering• Provide secure outside access to UTNet by approved off-

campus users.• Enhance detection/prevention of intrusions & malicious activity.

Server/Systems Security• Better identify and disable/re-enable “problem” hosts.• Minimum standards for ALL IT resources.

Page 38: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Applications/Data Security• Secure the external and internal transfer of

confidential/sensitive/private data.• Improve web user access controls.• Create identity management goals.

Desktop/Workstation Security• Provide unobtrusive desktop security.

Security Management• Security Awareness and Training• IT Security Policies, Guidelines, Procedures (better standards)

New strategies (2)

Page 39: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Network/Internet SecurityImprove internet and network filtering• FIREWALLS

– Special purpose software/hardware for separating un-trusted networks from trusted networks (automated pass/block).

– Flexible rule sets to accommodate various department missions.

– Several firewalls in use on campus.

• Deployment– Phased Approach

• High Bandwidth Segments to Buildings/Depts.

– Lifecycle Support

• Firewall Administrators, Firewall Management System

– Implementation

• 2 + year project with 1 to 2? additional ITS FTEs

Page 40: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Network/Internet Security Provide secure outside access

• VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS– Special purpose software/hardware for permitting trusted outside

users to safely access resources inside UTNet.

– ITS TN is piloting VPN Services.

• Deployment– Special Purpose Hardware/Software or Part of Firewall

– VPN Clients to support campus user platforms

– Lifecycle Support

• Helpdesk Support & User Training

Page 41: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Network/Internet SecurityEnhance detection/prevention

• INTRUSION SYSTEMS– Software/hardware to identify real-time security events.

– Some only alerts, new systems alert AND block intrusions.

– ISO has been testing Intrusion products.

• Deployment– Phased Approach

• High Bandwidth Segments to Buildings/Depts.

– Lifecycle Support

• Intrusion Event Correlation System

– Implementation

• 2 + year project with 1 to 2? additional ITS FTEs

• Outsource?

Page 42: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Server/Systems SecurityBetter identify “problem” hosts

• DISTRIBUTED VULNERABILITY TESTING– Software/hardware to improve proactive testing capability.– ISO has campus scanning tools, few tools used by

departments.– Near future goals include:

• Scanning users upon connection for compliance.• Automatically blocking & unblocking problem hosts.

• Deployment– Phased Approach

• Central Distributed Scanning• Critical/Other Departments

– Lifecycle Support• Vulnerability Correlation System

– Implementation• 1 + year project with 1 additional ITS FTE

Page 43: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Applications/Data Security Improve web user access controls

• APPLICATION FIREWALL– Protects web-enabled services– Identifies suspicious activity– Can take automated actions

• Alert, Log, Block

• Deployment– Central Web Services– Lifecycle Support

• Coordination with firewall management systems– Implementation

• 1 year project with 1 additional ITS FTE

Page 44: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Applications/Data Security Secure transfer of data

• Identify best methods to achieve in our environment

– Improve data transmission security for sensitive and confidential data.

– Replace insecure protocols with secure methods for transmission of sensitive data.

– Identify methods and technology to eliminate “clear-text’ passwords.

– Reduce compliance risk from privacy regulations (emerging HIPAA/GLB/SOX requirements).

Page 45: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Desktop Environment

• Computer vendors aim for easy “out of the box” experience – no need for manuals, security info.

• No effective market pressure on Microsoft – risk of a worldwide, technical “monoculture”.

• Dark side of the “always-connected” Internet– Home broadband is a new, serious security risk– So is wireless, at home, in kiosks, in enterprises– Laptops can bring worms, viruses with them– Worm & virus creators are more sophisticated

Page 46: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Desktop/Workstation Security Unobtrusive desktop security

• Identify best ways to improve desktop management

– Configuration standards -- lower costs?

– Better training for TSCs/users

– Tools for ITS and TSC management• Patch automation• Desktop security and A/V management• Remote administration of campus computers• Backups

– Personally-owned computers that use UTNet need some level of management/control (Concern is 45,000 university-owned plus 75,000? personally-owned computers)

Page 47: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Security Management

• Improve Security Awareness and Training– User based on their role(s)– Technical Staff

• Create Appropriate IT Security Standards– Top-level policies– Operational policies and guidelines– Security procedures– Measures for risk management– Materials for awareness and training

Page 48: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Sample Security Standards

• Top Level Policies– IT Security– Appropriate Use– Privacy– Internet/Network Use– Email Use

• Operational Policies– Security Management– Incident Management– Security Awareness– Disaster Recovery

• Procedures/Standards

– Minimum Platform Standards– Server Security– Password Policy– Account Management– Back-up & Recovery– Patch/Change Management– Authorized Software– System Blocking– System Monitoring– Software Development

Page 49: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Higher EducationEmbracing security strategies

Source: EDUCAUSE (ECAR) IT SECURITY RESEARCH STUDY; SEPTEMBER, 2003

STATUS OF SECURITY STRATEGIES USED IMPLEMENTED

IN PROGRESS PILOTING

IN 12 MONTHS

IN 24 MONTHS

NOT BEING CONSIDERED

NET/INTERNET SECURITY:Limit types of protocols through the firewall 75.8 10.3 2.4 4.3 2.4 4.8

APPLICATION SECURITY:Limit access to servers/applications 72.4 11.6 2.1 4.5 3.5 5.9

APPLICATION SECURITY:Timeout access 68.0 9.9 2.7 3.4 3.7 12.3

SECURITY MANAGEMENT:Recovery plan in case of disaster 48.5 31.4 2.6 7.6 7.4 2.6

DESKTOP SECURITY:Install closed desktop system 36.2 14.0 6.5 3.9 8.2 31.2

NET/INTERNET SECURITY:Limit URLs through firewall 30.5 7.5 4.6 3.1 6.3 47.9

SYSTEMS SECURITY:Install directory inventory system to detect change 13.0 11.2 6.9 7.9 20.9 40.2

APPLICATION SECURITY:Use security devices for authentication 12.3 3.5 4.9 3.4 21.4 54.5

Page 50: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Research institutionsAdopting security strategies

 SECURITY STRATEGIES ADOPTEDIMPLEMENTED

(OVERALL)DOCTORAL (EXT)

ADOPTIONDOCTORAL (INT)

ADOPTION

NET/INTERNET SECURITY:Limit types of protocols through the firewall 75.8 59.2 82.9

APPLICATION SECURITY:Limit access to servers/applications 72.4 62.3 71.4

APPLICATION SECURITY:Timeout access 68.0 64.9 74.3

SECURITY MANAGEMENT:Recovery plan in case of disaster 48.5 50.0 54.3

DESKTOP SECURITY:Install closed desktop system 36.2 27.6 40.0

NET/INTERNET SECURITY:Limit URLs through firewall 30.5 17.6 20.0

SYSTEMS SECURITY:Install directory inventory system to detect change 13.0 11.8 14.3

APPLICATION SECURITY:Use security devices for authentication 12.3 22.4 5.7

Source: EDUCAUSE (ECAR) IT SECURITY RESEARCH STUDY; SEPTEMBER, 2003

Page 51: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

HE security approaches used

Source: EDUCAUSE (ECAR) IT SECURITY RESEARCH STUDY; SEPTEMBER, 2003

STATUS OF SECURITY APPROACHES USED IMPLEMENTED

IN PROGRESS PILOTING

IN 12 MONTHS

IN 24 MONTHS

NOT BEING CONSIDERED

APPLICATION SECURITY:Secure Web Transactions (SSL) 73.2 12.9 3.1 5.0 3.1 2.6

SERVER/SYSTEM SECURITY:Centralized data backup 71.0 10.7 2.8 4.2 5.4 5.8

NET/INTERNET SECURITY:Network firewall (perimeter) 70.9 11.0 2.6 4.4 3.3 7.9

NET/INTERNET SECURITY:Network firewall (interior) 50.0 18.6 3.8 9.4 8.3 9.9

APPLICATION SECURITY:Enterprise Directory 48.2 24.1 4.9 9.1 7.6 6.1

NET/INTERNET SECURITY:VPN for remote access 45.4 17.8 8.8 12.4 8.1 7.6

NET/INTERNET SECURITY:Intrusion detection 42.8 15.1 10.4 13.7 15.6 2.4

NET/INTERNET SECURITY:Intrusion prevention tools 33.1 15.3 10.9 16.1 18.0 6.6

APPLICATION SECURITY:Encryption 31.8 19.5 9.9 9.9 16.6 12.3

NET/INTERNET SECURITY:Content monitoring/filtering 31.6 10.9 4.9 5.9 10.9 35.8

Page 52: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

HE security approaches adopted

 SECURITY APPROACHES ADOPTEDDOCTORAL (EXT)

ADOPTIONDOCTORAL (INT)

ADOPTION 25,001 + ENROLLED

APPLICATION SECURITY:Secure Web Transactions (SSL) 81.8 85.7 89.5

SERVER/SYSTEM SECURITY:Centralized data backup 61.8 77.1 63.2

NET/INTERNET SECURITY:Network firewall (perimeter) 40.3 62.9 52.6

NET/INTERNET SECURITY:Network firewall (interior) 49.4 51.4 73.7

APPLICATION SECURITY:Enterprise Directory 48.1 48.6 52.6

NET/INTERNET SECURITY:VPN for remote access 53.2 48.6 63.2

NET/INTERNET SECURITY:Intrusion detection 53.2 54.3 68.4

NET/INTERNET SECURITY:Intrusion prevention tools 34.2 42.9 47.4

APPLICATION SECURITY:Encryption 32.5 37.1 47.4

NET/INTERNET SECURITY:Content monitoring/filtering 19.5 40.0 26.3

Source: EDUCAUSE (ECAR) IT SECURITY RESEARCH STUDY; SEPTEMBER, 2003

Page 53: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Security Planning Committee

• Identify and propose strategies.

• Analyze the operational and technical environment.

• Recommend appropriate security initiatives and make the business case.

• Committee Co-Chairs – ISO/Networking Director (soon)– Committee membership from ITS, OTS, College of Engineering,

School of Business, General Libraries, Department of Computer Science, Campus Planning & Facilities Mgmt, Office of the VP and CFO, Office of the VP for Research.

• Desktop Management – User Services

Page 54: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

The Constituent Group Role

• Sounding Board

• Counsel

• Support for budget needs

• Ombudsman

• Reality Check

Page 55: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

The Next Step

• Create the plan• Put it before executive management• Get their approval for funding• Prioritize the projects• Do the work• Create the policies• Plan – Do – Check – Act Cycle

Page 56: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Questions?

Page 57: Security After Blaster (what we have been able to do that we could not have imagined beforehand) Angel Cruz, CISSP Director & University ISO The University

Contact Information

• Angel Cruz, CISSP, Director & University ISO– The University of Texas at Austin– (512) 475-9462– e-mail [email protected]

• Calvin Weeks, CISSP, CISM, Director of IT Security– The University of Oklahoma– (405) 325-8334– e-mail [email protected]