TEIMUN 2011 11th July – 17th July

SECURITY COUNCIL (SC)

Topic I:

Instability in the Yemen

Introduction

The southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula is host to one of the most

destabilised regions in the Middle East. It is also host to a country that has

been modelled on western-style institutions, yet cannot hope to enfranchise most of its subjects. With a territory that includes over 200

islands in the Gulf of Aden as well as a relatively sizeable population, the Republic of Yemen is a key strategic country in the region, as well as

being the only one with a purely Republican constitutional model.1

To understand the problems of today’s Yemen, we must first seek to understand its history. Yemen proved to be one of those Cold War hot

spots whose East-West contestation continued to structure future events.

The inability of Yemen’s Republican government in Sana’a to exercise

state-control beyond the capital is historically contingent on the

difficulty of nation-state building in

the course of the twentieth century. The lack of accountable and effective

government in the territory of the Yemen has produced an amalgam of

terror-ridden areas and continues to destabilize the security of the Gulf of

Aden. Recently, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called instability

in the Yemen ‘a global threat that required the full attention of the

international community’.2

Yemen presents a combination of potent problems for domestic and international policy-makers. As one of the poorest nations in the Arab

world with mass unemployment and rapidly dwindling stocks of oil and

groundwater, social unrest among poorer social classes breeds extremist discontent. The unrelenting socio-economic difficulties are further

compounded by foreign interference in domestic affairs by various transnational actors. President Saleh currently faces an intermittent civil

war in the north, a southern separatist rebellion and the continued prevalence of violent Islamist groups with an allegiance to global jihadism.

International efforts to aid the Yemeni government, to offset extremist

1 Although lacking accountable institutions, Yemen is the only nation state in the Arabian Peninsula to have

introduced universal suffrage for multi-party parliamentary and presidential elections. Most other states in the Persian Gulf region are Kingdoms that base their political custom on Islam and derive their legitimacy from deeply held traditional values. Note that unlike the history of other countries in the Gulf, the Yemeni state has been deeply influenced by the modern ideologies of Marxist-Leninism, authoritarianism and nationalism. 2 BBC News, Yemen’s Instability Poses a Global Threat, 4 January 2010, Online available at

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8440404.stm.

trouble spots and put a stop to the activities of insurgents, drug traffickers

and pirates, have been meek at best, as most efforts are put into fighting the symptoms rather than the breeding ground of the problem.

The following guide will serve to better your understanding of Yemen’s regional significance and to outline the problems associated with

maintaining stability in the territory of the Yemen. Detailed in this guide are Yemen’s unhappy experiences during the Cold War and the manner in

which various ideologies, loyalties and fanaticisms have upset the balance that held this territory together for many years. Further to this narrative,

the section on the actions of the international community will serve to inform you on all that has been attempted to resolve this topic by means

of collective international action. This guide should be read as a modest introduction to the problem of instability in the Yemen, and as such, the

reader is encouraged to fully research the stances of individual stake holders in this complex part of the world. In the end, it will be the resolve

and the thoughtfulness of the United Nations Security Council to establish an effective approach and contemplate the measures necessary to combat

state failure in this important Red Sea country.

Yemen in the Cold War

Lying at the crossroads of a versatile region, the historic territory of South

Arabia or Yemen has been a mosaic of different cultures, ethnicities and

religions. Like the sands of the Arabian peninsula, the origins of the Yamani tribes are fluid. Yet, the confluence of such diverse populations in

Yemen became only destabilizing in the dawn of the age of modernity and nation state building in the Middle East. The country that we know today

as the Republic of Yemen was previously composed of two autonomous entities, both shaped by their experiences in the Cold War. The Yemen

Arab Republic and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen were unified in May 1990, after having followed a distinct path of development for

most of the twentieth century. Creation of the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen)

In the course of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire held only partial control over Yamanese lands and tacitly allowed various indigenous tribes

with diverse sectarian allegiances to settle their own affairs. In the rugged mountains of north Yemen, the Shia Zaydi tribes were a cohesive

community of Yamanese who shared close cultural and linguistic ties.3 The Shia Zaydis totalled significant numbers in the overall population of

northern Yemen, and were able to establish centralized authority as one of

the first in the land. At the head of this authority stood the Zaydi Imam, who managed to pacify the internal rivalries. The Imams formally

proclaimed a hereditary dynasty in 1918, after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, further modelling their Kingdom on the Saudi

example. It was granted full independence in the aftermath of the Peace Conferences and the Kingdom became a founding member of the Arab

League in 1945.4

Even though the Zaydi Kingdom shared both a religious and a political bond with the House of Al Saud, conflicts erupted between the Kingdom of

Yemen and its northern neighbour. In particular, several disputes over the division of resources along the extended border defined the foreign

relations. Until this very day, the border between the two countries remains ill-defined. Another source of tension in the foreign relations of

the Zaydi Kingdom lay in the posture towards Britain, as the Kingdom had

a long established claim to the Aden Protectorate, as constituting a historic part of its territory. Yet, the British Empire managed to hold on to

the rest of historic Yemen, including Aden and its hinterland, until 1967.5

The Zaydi sect in Yemen differed doctrinally from mainstream Twelver Shia thought in the question of religious authority. For Zaydis, divine and

3 Malcolm Yapp, The Making of the Modern Middle East (London: Longman, 1987), pp. 55-78.

4 Muhammad Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League: a Documentary Record (Beirut: Khayats, 1962).

5 William Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 216.

political leadership emanate directly from older times, epitomizing the

legacy of the five Imams of the Zaydis. As such, Imams are earthly representatives of such institutions of old and serve as a source of

emulation, marja-e taghlid.6 This enabled Zaydi political actors to have

spiritual authority as well as temporal authority over earthly matters. Even so, the rule of the Zaydi Imams, although based on spiritual

justifications, had to endure various temporal difficulties. The Imams were known for their religious and political repression in the domestic context

and had built up considerable tensions with the British over their presence in South Yemen and with the Saudis in the North.

The greatest threat to the Zaydi Kingdom, however, stemmed from an

Arab demagogue who proved to be one of the most intriguing individuals in Arab history. In the 1950s and 1960s, President Gamal Abdul Nasser of

Egypt was universally heralded in the Middle East as the champion of the Arab nationalist cause. His appeal of pan Arab solidarity held sway

throughout the Arab world and specifically threatened the rule of the conservative Arab monarchies in the Gulf region.7 The Zaydi Imams

attempted to resist the popular pressure for an Arab nationalist revolution

and were further opposed to closer ties with the Soviet Union. In March 1958, however, the Zaydi Kingdom of Yemen was forced to join Egypt and

Syria in the United Arab Republic, epitomizing Nasser’s influence and his pan-Arab cause. Even though this association was dissolved in 1961, the

special relationship between Yemen and nationalist pan-Arab ideals endured.

Egyptian President Nasser

embodied pan-Arab solidarity and a firm stance towards superpower interference in the

Middle East. His independent foreign policy resonated

particularly, as the memory of decades of Colonial subjugation

remained prevalent in the among the Arab peoples. The political currency of Nasserism, however,

was spent after defeat at the hands of the Israeli war machine

in 1967.

Eventually, the events took a dramatic turn in November 1962, as the

Zaydi Imam was finally deposed by republican revolutionaries and Egyptian-backed army officers and a new Yemen Arab Republic was

proclaimed in the former Kingdom of Yemen. At the time, Cold War

6 Ahmad Vaezi, Shia Political Thought (London: Islamic Centre of England, 2004).

7 William Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 284-303.

regional geopolitics dictated that the Saudi and Jordanian Kingdoms were

to undermine the newly founded Yemen Arab Republic in order to combat President Nasser’s expansionism. With the aid of royalist guerrilla actors

and the financial assistance provided by the conservative Kingdoms in the

Gulf, the deposed Zaydi Imam was able to mount a spirited counterrevolution that cost the lives of thousands of civilians and grinded

tribal life in North Yemen to a virtual standstill. In the end, the counterrevolution did not overturn the Arab nationalist tide. Saudi Arabia

recognized the Yemen Arab Republic in 1970.8 Unification of North & South Yemen

Unlike the division between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany in the aftermath of WW II - which was

artificial and dictated by Cold War logic - the division of the historic land of Yemen into two nation states evolved naturally. Following the British

military withdrawal from the Middle East (in 1967 from Aden and in 1971 from the Persian

Gulf), a new Marxist state emerged in South Yemen. The establishment of the People’s

Democratic Republic of Yemen epitomised the historic Arab grievance in relation to the legacy

of Colonialism and the quest for national self-

determination.9 Following a Marxist-Leninist reading of world politics, the new state

established close relations with the Soviet Union and the rest of the communist world entity and sought to remain intransigent to European

and US interests. Relations with its immediate neighbour, the Yemen Arab Republic, remained relatively cordial at first, but proved to be strained in

the long run. Regardless, nationalist aspirations in both states for the establishment of a Greater Yemen led to attempts for eventual unification.

In May 1988, the Yemen Arab Republic and South Yemen were able to

resolve outstanding issues, agree on shared oil exploitation ventures, demilitarize the north-south border and to allow freedom of border

passage. The collapse of the Iron Curtain in the next year added supplementary dynamics behind the unification attempts. In May 1990,

north and south formally united as the Republic of Yemen with the capital

set in Sana’a. A new constitution affirmed Yemen's commitment to free elections, a multiparty political system, the right to own private property,

equality under the law, and respect of basic human rights.10

8 Brian Whitacker, ‘The Multi Party System’ in The Birth of Modern Yemen (Al Bab E-Book, 2009), Online

available at http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/birthofmodernyemen/bmy5.htm. 9 William Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 284-303.

10 Joseph Kostiner, Yemen: the Tortuous Quest for Unity (London: Pinter, 1996).

President Saleh has managed a continues bid to political office

since the 1980s, both in the YAR as well as in the post-1990

framework. Even though elections in Yemen are nominally democratic, there is

enough credible evidence to assume the use of fraud and

other unconstitutional means by the political elite in the effort to thwart the Yemeni

opposition.

Despite growing expectations and popular frenzy in the early 1990s following the establishment of the unified Yemen nation state, the new

Republic has faced severe internal difficulties. The rush to establish democracy, in the months after unification, brought the right to vote to a

poorly prepared conservative society with low levels of literacy. The new state was characterized by rivalling political factions, further exacerbated

by diverse sectarian and tribal loyalties. Although the process of building novel state institutions was superficially successful, Yemeni political

leaders in the north and in the south proved unable to shape and manage

a democratic culture based on consensus and power sharing. Political construction in Yemen is based more on corrupt patriarchal linkages than

on an even-handed system of political due process.11 Moreover, the lack of free and fair elections and rule of law and the weakness of the state’s

elected institutions have resulted in severe economic and financial mismanagement. It was not a surprise that in the summer of 1994 a civil

war broke out between those adhering to the newly founded Republic and southern insurrectionists.12 Even though the scale of violence was limited

and the insurrection was easily suppressed by the Republic of Yemen’s first President, Ali Abdollah Saleh, the breeding ground for discontent

survives until this very day.

11

International Crisis Group, ‘Yemen: Defusing the Sa’ada Time Bomb’, Middle East Report 86 (2009), Online available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iran-gulf/yemen/086-yemen-defusing-the-saada-time-bomb.aspx. 12

Brian Whitacker, ‘The Outbreak of War’ in The Birth of Modern Yemen (Al Bab E-Book, 2009), Online available at http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/birthofmodernyemen/bmy12.htm.

Current Situation & Key Actors

Yemen currently faces three significant security challenges that threaten

the stability of its central government in Sana’a; (1) Houthi rebels in the

north that operate from Sa’ada campaign for accountable government and civil rights for the country’s neglected Zaydi Shias, (2) southern

secessionists have significantly improved their operations compared to the 1994 Civil War and strive for the reestablishment of the former People’s

Democratic Republic , and (3) terrorist elements with links to the broader Al Qaeda movement entertain destabilising activities throughout the

Yemeni territory. Combined, these threats could have significant ramifications for the Gulf of Aden, the Persian Gulf region and broader

Middle East security.

The experiment with democratic elections has allowed for the emergence of an authoritarian-patriarchal power structure in Sana’a that is wholly

unable to resolve these threats in independent fashion. President Saleh, Yemen’s first and ‘ President, has remained astutely in power throughout

the unification period, but he has been unable to remedy the grave social,

economic and political ills that threaten Yemen. Government authority in much of the country is non-existent. Tribal chiefs effectively run large

portions of Yemen, and are sometimes willing to accommodate Al Qaeda trainers and

militants. Other problems in Yemen include worsening poverty and unemployment,

already the worst in the Arab world, and various power struggles that characterize the

regime of President Saleh.13 The Houthi Rebellion in Sa’ada

As has been emphasized in this guide, the roots of Yemen's civil conflicts can be traced back to Cold War regional politics. The Republican authority

in Sana’a currently combats insurgents in the same territories where fighting occurred in the course of the 1960s between Republican forces

and Zaydi guerrilla fighters. Then, as now, a well-equipped army deployed superior military hardware against Shia insurgents, yet failing to defeat

the guerrillas effectively, or combat the underlying reasons for discontent.

Sa’ada, which is a mountainous zone on the border with Saudi Arabia, forms the lynchpin of the insurrection.14

This time, the insurgents are not energized by a fanatic religious-political

actor, but are led by members of the charismatic Houthi family. The Houthis condemn the Yemeni government for allying too closely with the

13

Joseph Kostiner, Yemen: the Tortuous Quest for Unity (London: Pinter, 1996). 14

Ginny Hill, ‘Cold War Roots of Yemen Conflict’, BBC News (2009), Online available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/8261867.stm.

West and call for freedom of worship according to ancient Zaydi traditions.

In Sa’ada, where the Zaydi power centre lies, there are further socio-economic grievances that help to explain the radicalized popular appeal.

Such discontent amounts to economic marginalization, the lack of a

regional infrastructure and the inability of many Zaydi Yamani to access the internal consumer market. It is important to note that even though

sectarian allegiance structures discontent in Yemen, it cannot serve as the sole explanation to the Zaydi problem. In fact, the Houthis stress the

cause of social justice above all and accuse the Saleh government of corruption, and of meddling with the delicate religious balance between

Zaydi Shias and Sunnis in Yemen.15

Despite the basis of popular discontent in the Sa’ada

region, there is evidence to indicate the involvement of

various external players who further fuel the conflict. In

particular, the role of Shia

Iran is murky. The Islamic Republic is suspected to

sustain the Houthis by means of financial support, by

providing combat training and supplying illegal

armaments.16 Despite the fact that the Zaydis differ

doctrinally with Iran’s Twelver Shias, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps is reported to be a frequent

visitor of the region. This would fall under the ideological premise of the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary aims, or amount to a grand scheme of

Tehran to play the role of a regional power broker. Nonetheless, the fact that there is some form of external interference in Yemen may be

undoubtedly true, even if it should not distract attention from the

domestic factors that drive the Houthi rebellion. Arguably, the existence of conflict in Sa’ada is primarily dependent on domestic factors rather than

the scheming of external players.

In February 2010, the status quo seemed to have reached a noticeable boiling point. At the time, Yemeni media reported that rebel leader Abdel

Malik Al Houthi had accepted President Saleh’s peace terms, something that the rebels had always deplored given their ideological zeal. According

to the report, the rebels agreed to surrender their strategic mountain

15

International Crisis Group, ‘Yemen: Defusing the Sa’ada Time Bomb’, Middle East Report 86 (2009), Online available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iran-gulf/yemen/086-yemen-defusing-the-saada-time-bomb.aspx. 16

Ibid.

positions and hand over all of their military hardware to Saleh’s security

forces.17 It is as of yet unclear whether this report has been based on a factual proceeding of events or whether this report falls under President

Saleh’s media strategy. Sceptics doubt whether a cessation of hostilities

will hold and suspect that the parties are in the process of rearming. The Insurrection in the South

As of April 2007, a group, called the South Yemen Movement, has begun to call for the secession of the south of Yemen. The area that is under

contestation includes all the territory of the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, as evidenced by strong separatist sentiments in the

city of Aden and its south-eastern desert hinterland.18

Claims for the establishment of an independent southern state had of course always existed, ever since the thorny process of unification reaped

meek results in the early 1990s. Still, discontent among citizens of Aden has grown in potency across parts of south Yemen, leading to an increase

in tensions and often violent clashes between rioters and security forces.19 The separatist aspirations of the South

Yemen movement are further structured by the exclusion of southerners from various

patronage networks. These patronage

networks characterize the Yemeni state and drive Yemeni social and economic life, but

they have been increasingly reserved for a small Sunni elite in the north of Yemen.

It is important to note in this regard that the

Yemeni economy as a whole drives on southern oil ventures and the presence of multinational organizations that invest heavily in the

exploitation of oil and other natural resources.20 As such, the conflict in the south could be understood as contestation over vital resources. On

the other hand, contestation could also have been shaped due to the political factions, as these are based on tribal and patriarchal loyalties. In

the city of Aden, there is widespread perception that the revenues of oil exploitation go to political elites in Sana’a, including the unpopular

President. Ali Abdollah Saleh has attempted to portray the South Yemen

Movement as a violent extremist group with ties to Al Qaeda, but this image may in fact be framed to suit the interests of one of the many

17

International Crisis Group, ‘Yemen between Reform and Revolution’, Middle East Report 102 (2011), Online available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iran-gulf/yemen/102-popular-protest-in-north-africa-and-the-middle-east-II-yemen-between-reform-and-revolution.aspx. 18

Ibid. 19

Ginny Hill, ‘Yemen: Fear of Failure’, Chatham House Report 08/03 (2008), Online available at http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/12576_bp1108yemen.pdf. 20

Ginny Hill, ‘Cold War Roots of Yemen Conflict’, BBC News (2009), Online available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/8261867.stm.

Yemeni political factions. Even though traditional linkages are eroding and

many Yemeni have embraced modern notions of identity and nationhood, President Saleh’s main base of support lies in the north, and this makes

the insurrection in the south ever more problematic.21

A related point of concern in the south of Yemen is the use of spasmodic

violence; it is often difficult to identify what is and what is not a terrorist activity. It is reported that political violence in Yemen is further contingent

on the activities of foreign agents that act as important stake holders to the problem. Evidently, one of these stake

holders is the already mentioned Islamic Republic of Iran. In addition, Saudi Arabia is

reported to have used its influence in Yemen to pressurize a favourable settlement of

border disputes with Saleh.22 In the long run, this kind of foreign interference has not

particularly aided the development of strong state institutions.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

Yemen-based Al Qaeda insurgents have

grown in numbers since 2009 and have

orchestrated a number of high-profile attacks across Yemen. Their activities are also increasingly outward orientated, most notably by

sending Nigerian-born Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to the United States, who attempted to detonate an explosive device aboard a Northwest

Airlines flight on 25 December 2009.23 The growth of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is most probably contingent on the success of

multilateral counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, as Iraqi Al Qaeda operatives are fleeing the scene towards a novel battleground. They have

found a new front in Yemen.

AQAP emerged as Yemeni and Saudi jihadist operatives were unified under a common banner in the effort to operate as a single regional hub,

targeting local governments and Western interests in the region. The group has dramatically increased its operational tempo, carrying out

small-arms attacks against foreign tourists and a series of mortar attacks

against western embassies in Sana’a, the Presidential Compound, and Yemeni military complexes. In September 2008, the group conducted its

21

International Crisis Group, ‘Yemen between Reform and Revolution’, Middle East Report 102 (2011), Online available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iran-gulf/yemen/102-popular-protest-in-north-africa-and-the-middle-east-II-yemen-between-reform-and-revolution.aspx. 22

Ginny Hill, ‘Yemen: Fear of Failure’, Chatham House Report 08/03 (2008), Online available at http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/12576_bp1108yemen.pdf. 23

Qantara Reports, Yemen: A Fragile Unity, January 2010, Online available at http://en.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-476/_nr-1279/i.html.

largest attack to date, targeting the US Embassy in Sana’a using two

vehicle bombs that detonated outside the compound. AQAP is based primarily in the tribal areas that lie outside of governmental

control. The inability of Saleh’s government to extend authority beyond

the capital has increasingly allowed for AQAP to grow in numbers. Even though both Yemeni and Saudi authorities have a mutual interest in

combating AQAP, the two countries lack a multilateral understanding to pursue such an approach.

Policy Options

Given the problems outlined above, the fear that Yemen could eventually

fragment into a failed state seems to be quite justified. For a time now,

the international community has been preoccupied with state institutions in Yemen, having used large financial donations as a bargaining tool to

induce responsible behaviour in the domestic political context. It is safe to say that this approach has failed; Yemen lacks an effective and

accountable government which has led to discontent among Shias and Sunnis alike. Furthermore, AQAP has been allowed to gain a foothold in

the country. Still, the scenario of complete state collapse in Yemen would create an even greater potential for threats to regional and international

security. Calls have been voiced for a "comprehensive strategy" to combat Yemen’s ills, but such a hollow phrase does not particularly clarify what

the required solutions are for Yemen’s enduring problems. In January 2011, Secretary of State of the United States, Hillary Clinton noted that:

"Yemen recognises the threat AQAP poses to it and has become

increasingly committed to a broad-based counter-terrorism

strategy. At the same time, we are committed to a balanced approach towards Yemen which includes social, economic and

political assistance. We face a common threat by the terrorists in Al-Qaeda. We are focused not just on short-term threats but on

long-term challenges."24

She also signalled "a joint vision for a unified, stable, democratic and prosperous Yemen where civil society had room to operate and Al Qaeda

did not."25 Many pivotal questions remain unanswered, including (1) what such a comprehensive strategy should comprise, (2) how it should be

implemented and (3) by whom this should be done.

As a starting point, the Security Council would have to consider the continuing merits of a top down approach to combat destabilizing

elements in Yemen. In this regard, one angle could be the establishment

of a greater UN presence in the country. Such an approach might fundamentally tip the balance in President Saleh’s favour and render his

security apparatus much more effective. On the other hand, an overt military presence of the international community is perhaps politically

impossible, as Yemen remains essentially a conservative tribal society where hostility to foreign presence runs deep.

Another problem relates to the unpopularity of the regime of President

Saleh. The international community should be wary to provide unconditional support to Saleh, as the President has proven to be

24

Al Manar Online. Clinton in Yemen: We Face Common Terrorist Threat. Online available at http://www.almanar.com.lb/newssite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=169704&language=en 25

Ibid.

unreliable when it comes to the correct use of his security instruments. In

fact, strengthening security forces in Sana’a might tackle the AQAP problem in the short run, but it could also be used as a tool of intimidation

towards legitimate opposition. Backing President Saleh unconditionally

might risk alienating democratic and progressive voices that might otherwise abet the international community in the fight against violent

extremism.26 Moreover, recent history has shown that the fight against the Houthi rebellion and the fight against southern insurrectionists has

been a bigger priority for Saleh than that against Al Qaeda.

Discussions on Yemeni security should perhaps not only have a counter-terrorism relevance. The Council could also take the angle to further

strengthen the government of the Yemen with specific aid schemes that target the country’s underlying ills. In this respect, economic development

- focusing on agriculture and Yemen’s fertile grounds - coupled with institution building efforts from the bottom up might hail a new direction

in the international community’s efforts to manage events in the Yemen territory. Some have argued that the effort to solve the myriad of

problems of Yemen requires a regional approach that would involve

various states in the region as well transactional actors and give them a stake in preserving the state structure of Yemen’s.27 Finally, the Security

Council might want to consider measures to curb external interference in Yemeni affairs or, alternatively, incorporate such influences in a

transparent and open framework.

26

International Crisis Group, ‘Yemen between Reform and Revolution’, Middle East Report 102 (2011), Online available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iran-gulf/yemen/102-popular-protest-in-north-africa-and-the-middle-east-II-yemen-between-reform-and-revolution.aspx. 27

International Crisis Group, ‘Yemen between Reform and Revolution’, Middle East Report 102 (2011), Online available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iran-gulf/yemen/102-popular-protest-in-north-africa-and-the-middle-east-II-yemen-between-reform-and-revolution.aspx

Conclusion

Yemen is an archetypical "almost-failed-state". In this regard, a

combination of problems endanger the Yemeni political construction.

These include a demographic time bomb, a failing government in Sana’a, and detrimental foreign intervention. Furthermore, Yemen is being torn

apart by a tribal rebellion and it faces a secessionist movement. To add to the concerns of the international community, the tightening grip of Al

Qaeda extremism grows stronger by the day.

In the last couple of months, new events have emerged to further complicate the picture. In the aftermath of the Tunisian "Jasmin"

revolution, thousands of Yemeni have demanded democratic and social change. Protests mounted and street sit-ins have grown in numbers since

January 2011, and as the demonstrators have increasingly faced security forces, the tide for reform and change has mounted in Sa’ada, Sana’a,

Ta’if, Aden and other cities. Generally, protests in the south of the country have been more vociferous, but there are certainly signs that similar

popular demands have engulfed the hearts and minds of the broader

Yemeni population. The protests challenge President Ali Abdollah Saleh's and compare him to the ousted Tunisian President Ben Ali and former

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, citing government corruption and Yemen’s social and economic problems.

As the call for democracy and pluralism grows in Yemen, the Security

Council is faced with a number of complex stratagems. It is to the Security Council to formulate effective measures that help to strengthen

the security architecture of Yemen and abet the broader security imperatives of the region. At the same time, the Council should take note

and further review the ongoing protests of Yemen’s civil society.

Questions to Ponder

1. What measures could the Security Council employ to strengthen the

Yemeni central government? Is there a need for a bottom up approach in the effort to build viable security institutions?

2. Should the Security Council consider the poor democratic record of Yemeni politicians or focus solely on institution building and

strengthening Ali Abdollah Saleh’s authority? 3. How should the Security Council assess the possible detrimental

effects of foreign interference in the country by the various external stake holders involved?

4. How should the Security Council cope with the geostrategic meaning of the popular tide that is engulfing the Middle East at the moment?

Guide to Further Reading

Textbooks on the Modern History of Yemen

Ahmad Vaezi, Shia Political Thought (London: Islamic Centre of England, 2004)

Brian Whitacker, The Birth of Modern Yemen (Al Bab E-Book, 2009), Online available at http://www.al-

bab.com/yemen/birthofmodernyemen/bmy5.htm. Joseph Kostiner, Yemen: the Tortuous Quest for Unity (London: Pinter,

1996). Malcolm Yapp, The Making of the Modern Middle East (London: Longman,

1987). Muhammad Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League: a Documentary

Record (Beirut: Khayats, 1962). William Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Boulder:

Westview Press, 1994).

Conflict Reports on Yemen’s Political Inertia

Ginny Hill, ‘Yemen: Fear of Failure’, Chatham House Report 08/03 (2008), Online available at

http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/12576_bp1108yemen.pdf. International Crisis Group, ‘Yemen: Defusing the Sa’ada Time Bomb’,

Middle East Report 86 (2009), Online available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iran-

gulf/yemen/086-yemen-defusing-the-saada-time-bomb.aspx. International Crisis Group, ‘Yemen between Reform and Revolution’,

Middle East Report 102 (2011), Online available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iran-

gulf/yemen/102-popular-protest-in-north-africa-and-the-middle-east-II-yemen-between-reform-and-revolution.aspx.

Media Articles

Al Manar Online. Clinton in Yemen: We Face Common Terrorist Threat.

Online available at http://www.almanar.com.lb/newssite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=169704&langu

age=en BBC News, Yemen’s Instability Poses a Global Threat, 4 January 2010,

Online available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8440404.stm. BBC News, Yemen - Chronology of Key Events, March 2011, Online

available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_profiles/1706450.s

tm Ginny Hill, ‘Cold War Roots of Yemen Conflict’, BBC News (2009), Online

available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/8261867.stm. Islam Online. Yemen’s Conflict Explained. Online available at

http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&pagename=Zon

e-English-Muslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout&cid=1251021451692

Qantara Reports, Yemen: A Fragile Unity, January 2010, Online available at http://en.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-476/_nr-

1279/i.html.

Qantara Reports. Al Qaeda in Yemen, Renaissance of Terror. Online available at http://en.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-476/_nr-

1282/i.html

ANNEX A The Muslim World according to the prevailing school of Islam. Figures also

denote the different Houses within Sunni and Shia traditions.

ANNEX B A good indication of overall production and consumption patterns in

Yemen. Figures denote oil consumption specifically.