Security flaws in existing voting systems

by Slavik Krassovsky

Introduction

HAVA $3.9 billion appropriated in states aid

DRE Vendors: Diebold ES&S MicroVote WINvote Sequoia Hart InterCivic

DRE Machine Architecture

Touch ScreenVoter

Smart Card Reader

Network

HardDrive

Certification process Is done per FEC guidelines

ITAs Ciber Wyle SysTest

Off-the-shelf hardware and software is exempt

Media reported problems

01/04, Broward County, Florida: 134 out of 10,844 votes are missing

11/03, Boone County, Indiana: 144,000 votes were cast but Boone

County contains fewer than 19,000 01/04, Hinds County, Mississippi:

Machines stayed down all day

Diebold

Analyzed by researches: Hardcoded DES key No Smart card authentication Unsecure smart card deactivation Hardcoded PIN Etc...

Attacks

Attacks on the machine

Undetectable rigging

Touch ScreenVoter

Smart Card Reader

Network

HardDrive

Other problems

No way to verify that their votes were recorded correctly

No way to publicly count the votes No meaningful recounts are possible

Conclusion

Some problems can be solved by strict certification

But some problems are inherent

It’s best to look for alternatives