security for self-driving cars · braking powertrain ivi cluster adas and steal data or take over...

25
Timo van Roermund, Director Automotive Security TNO-ESI symposium 2017, Eindhoven Session 2: Security impact on connected systems SECURITY FOR SELF-DRIVING CARS

Upload: others

Post on 03-Jun-2020

5 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: SECURITY FOR SELF-DRIVING CARS · Braking Powertrain IVI Cluster ADAS And steal data or take over control (e.g. slam the brakes) 4 Find & exploit vulnerabilities in the connected

Timo van Roermund, Director Automotive Security

TNO-ESI symposium 2017, Eindhoven

Session 2: Security – impact on connected systems

SECURITY FOR SELF-DRIVING CARS

Page 2: SECURITY FOR SELF-DRIVING CARS · Braking Powertrain IVI Cluster ADAS And steal data or take over control (e.g. slam the brakes) 4 Find & exploit vulnerabilities in the connected

COMPANY PUBLIC 2

NXP – #1 GLOBAL AUTO SEMI POWERHOUSE

+60YEARS OF

AUTOMOTIVE

EXPERIENCE

~40%OF NXP’S

REVENUE IS

FROM AUTO

2400+AUTO

ENGINEERS

#1 AUTO SEMI

SUPPLIER

GLOBALLY

>30 AUTO SITES

IN ALL

REGIONS

Page 3: SECURITY FOR SELF-DRIVING CARS · Braking Powertrain IVI Cluster ADAS And steal data or take over control (e.g. slam the brakes) 4 Find & exploit vulnerabilities in the connected

COMPANY PUBLIC 3

Way ForwardIs security-by-design enough?

The Need for SecurityWhat is at stake?

Agenda

TrendsSelf-Driving, Vehicle Architectures

Page 4: SECURITY FOR SELF-DRIVING CARS · Braking Powertrain IVI Cluster ADAS And steal data or take over control (e.g. slam the brakes) 4 Find & exploit vulnerabilities in the connected

COMPANY PUBLIC 4

Autonomy Electrification Connectivity

SAFE AND SECURE MOBILITY

ENABLED BY ELECTRONICS AND SOFTWARE

INDUSTRY MEGA TRENDS

Page 5: SECURITY FOR SELF-DRIVING CARS · Braking Powertrain IVI Cluster ADAS And steal data or take over control (e.g. slam the brakes) 4 Find & exploit vulnerabilities in the connected

COMPANY PUBLIC 5

VEHICLE ELECTRONICS & CONNECTIVITY

Interaction

CollaboratingInteracting

SharingMulti customer

InterconnectedIntegrated

StandaloneAutonomous

System TypeSingle ServiceComponentEquipment

Composed ServicesComposed Systems

Super Systems

Systems of Systemsup to Eco-system

(Co-Existence)

Engine control ECU

(~1980)

CAN BUS

(~1995)

Telematics,

Bluetooth,

WiFi, V2X

(2000 - now)

Page 6: SECURITY FOR SELF-DRIVING CARS · Braking Powertrain IVI Cluster ADAS And steal data or take over control (e.g. slam the brakes) 4 Find & exploit vulnerabilities in the connected

COMPANY PUBLIC 6INTERNAL/PROPRIETARY 6

Cars are becoming self-driving robots

The potential benefits are huge:

- Drivers spend 200-300 hours in their car (annually)

- Cars are parked (unused) 95% of the time

- > 90% of road accidents caused by human mistakes

NEXT: AUTONOMY

4 50 2 31

No

Automation

Full

Automation

High

Automation

Conditional

Automation

Partial

Automation

Driver

Assistance

SYSTEM MONITORS

DRIVING ENVIRONMENT

HUMAN MONITORS

DRIVING ENVIRONMENT

Source: SAE J3016

COMPANY PUBLIC 6

Page 7: SECURITY FOR SELF-DRIVING CARS · Braking Powertrain IVI Cluster ADAS And steal data or take over control (e.g. slam the brakes) 4 Find & exploit vulnerabilities in the connected

COMPANY PUBLIC 7

TRENDS IN NETWORK ARCHITECTURES

Tomorrow: Domain-based• Upgradeability and Scalability

• Separation of Concerns

(a.o. Safety and Security)

Future: Centralized • Fewer ECUs

• Flexible use of compute power

Today: Flat networks• Direct connection between all ECUs

• Cost-effective for low # of ECUs

Vehicle networks evolve, to accommodate the ever increasing amount of electronics:

Page 8: SECURITY FOR SELF-DRIVING CARS · Braking Powertrain IVI Cluster ADAS And steal data or take over control (e.g. slam the brakes) 4 Find & exploit vulnerabilities in the connected

COMPANY PUBLIC 8INTERNAL/PROPRIETARY 8

Body & Comfort Driver ExperienceConnectivity

Driver

Replacement

Powertrain &

Vehicle Dynamics

Secure Networks & Gateways

NEXT: DOMAIN BASED VEHICLE ARCHITECTURES

More than a brain on four wheels.

The core of safe and secure mobility.

COMPANY PUBLIC 8

Page 9: SECURITY FOR SELF-DRIVING CARS · Braking Powertrain IVI Cluster ADAS And steal data or take over control (e.g. slam the brakes) 4 Find & exploit vulnerabilities in the connected

COMPANY PUBLIC 9INTERNAL/PROPRIETARY 9

NXP LEADS DOMAIN BASED

VEHICLE ARCHITECTURES

COMPLETE

SOLUTIONS FASTER TIME TO MARKET

FULL SCALABILITY

Bod

y &

Com

fort

Dri

ver

Exp

eri

en

ce

Con

nectivi

tyD

rive

r

Rep

lacem

en

t

Pow

ert

rain

&

Veh

icle

Dyn

am

ics

SENSE THINK ACT

V2X

Broadcast Radio

Cellular

NFC

Smart Car Access

Radar

Camera

Lidar

Motion & Pressure

Speed

Ultrasonic

Smart Light

Access, Door Ctrl

eCockpit

Amplifiers

Powertrain &

Vehicle DynamicsEngine

TransmissionBrake

Battery Cell Management

Steering

AirbagSuspension

Infotainment

Fusion

WiFi, BT, GNSS,

TPMS

Powertrain

Domain

Controller

Connectivity

Domain

Controller

Body

Domain

Controller

Connectivity

Driver Replacement

Powertrain & Vehicle Dynamics

Body & Comfort

Driver Experience

4

5

1

2

3

COMPANY PUBLIC 9

Page 10: SECURITY FOR SELF-DRIVING CARS · Braking Powertrain IVI Cluster ADAS And steal data or take over control (e.g. slam the brakes) 4 Find & exploit vulnerabilities in the connected

COMPANY PUBLIC 10

Way ForwardIs security-by-design enough?

The Need for SecurityWhat is at stake? Is it real?

Agenda

TrendsSelf-Driving, Architectures

Page 11: SECURITY FOR SELF-DRIVING CARS · Braking Powertrain IVI Cluster ADAS And steal data or take over control (e.g. slam the brakes) 4 Find & exploit vulnerabilities in the connected

COMPANY PUBLIC 11

DID YOU KNOW?

>25

Vehicle hacks

published since 2015

1.4M

Vehicle recalled

in the largest

incident to date

SECURITY IS A MUST-HAVE FOR CONNECTED & AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES

Why now?

Wireless Interfaces

enable scalable attacks

250M connected

vehicles on the

road in 2020

Why is it possible?

High System Complexity

implies high vulnerability

Up to 150 ECUs per car,

up to 200M lines of

software code

Why hacking?

Valuable Data

attracts hackers

Car-generated data

may become a USD

750B market by 2030

Page 12: SECURITY FOR SELF-DRIVING CARS · Braking Powertrain IVI Cluster ADAS And steal data or take over control (e.g. slam the brakes) 4 Find & exploit vulnerabilities in the connected

COMPANY PUBLIC 12

BLUEPRINT FOR TYPICAL (REMOTE) ATTACKS

Thereby gain

access to the

CAN network

3

Connect to modem (cellular / internet)

1

OBD

Body

TCU

Braking Powertrain

ClusterIVI

ADAS

And steal data or

take over control

(e.g. slam the brakes)

4

Find & exploit

vulnerabilities in the

connected ECU(e.g. Telematics module)

2

Security is often ignored, or applied as an after-thought!No (or weak) security countermeasures, no (domain) isolation, etc.

Page 13: SECURITY FOR SELF-DRIVING CARS · Braking Powertrain IVI Cluster ADAS And steal data or take over control (e.g. slam the brakes) 4 Find & exploit vulnerabilities in the connected

COMPANY PUBLIC 13

WHAT IS AT RISK, AND WHOM IS AFFECTED?

Car User Car Owner Insurers OEM &

Suppliers

Service

Providers

STAKEHOLDERS

IMPACT

Privacy

Safety

Financial

Claims,

Brand Damage

Claims,

Brand Damage

Claims,

Brand Damage

Insurance

Claims

Loss of

Personal Data

(PII)

Injuries

Vehicle Theft IP TheftLoss of Income

(Fraud, DoS, …)

Damage

Page 14: SECURITY FOR SELF-DRIVING CARS · Braking Powertrain IVI Cluster ADAS And steal data or take over control (e.g. slam the brakes) 4 Find & exploit vulnerabilities in the connected

COMPANY PUBLIC 14

Way ForwardIs security-by-design enough?

The Need for SecurityWhat is at stake?

Agenda

TrendsSelf-Driving, Architectures

Page 15: SECURITY FOR SELF-DRIVING CARS · Braking Powertrain IVI Cluster ADAS And steal data or take over control (e.g. slam the brakes) 4 Find & exploit vulnerabilities in the connected

COMPANY PUBLIC 15

AUTOMOTIVE SECURITY – WAY FORWARD

Essential element:

Defense-in-Depth approach

• Multiple layers of protection,

at different levels in the system

• To mitigate the risk of one component of the

defense being compromised or circumvented

Domain Isolation

Secure Network

Secure Interfaces

Secure Processing

TODAY FUTURE

APPLY BEST PRACTICES:

• Security-by-design & Privacy-by-Design

(as opposed to being an afterthought)

• Lifecycle Management (incl. FOTA)

Page 16: SECURITY FOR SELF-DRIVING CARS · Braking Powertrain IVI Cluster ADAS And steal data or take over control (e.g. slam the brakes) 4 Find & exploit vulnerabilities in the connected

COMPANY PUBLIC 16

CORE SECURITY PRINCIPLES

Secure

Domain

Isolation

Secure

External

Interfaces

Secure

Internal

Communication

Secure

Software

Execution

They need to be in place in any E&E network

• Regardless of the actual architecture and implementation

···010110···

···010110···

Page 17: SECURITY FOR SELF-DRIVING CARS · Braking Powertrain IVI Cluster ADAS And steal data or take over control (e.g. slam the brakes) 4 Find & exploit vulnerabilities in the connected

COMPANY PUBLIC 17

APPLYING THE CORE SECURITY PRINCIPLES

Securing the Vehicle’s E&E Architecture

using a Defense in Depth approach

Prevent

access

Detect

attacks

Reduce

impact

Fix

vulnerabilities

M2M authentication

Firewalls (isolate

access points)

Secure Messaging

(e.g. SecOC)

Separate functional

domains

Isolated TCU & OBD-II

Code Authentication

(secure boot)

Resource control

(virtualization)

Intrusion detection

systems (IDS)

Secure OTA updates

(firmware, policies, …)

Run-Time

Integrity Protection

Firewalls (context-aware

message filtering)

ve

hic

le a

rch

ite

ctu

re a

xis

time axis

secure

software

execution

secure

external

interfaces

secure

domain

isolation

secure

internal

communication

Message Filtering,

Rate Limitation

Page 18: SECURITY FOR SELF-DRIVING CARS · Braking Powertrain IVI Cluster ADAS And steal data or take over control (e.g. slam the brakes) 4 Find & exploit vulnerabilities in the connected

COMPANY PUBLIC 18

4 LAYERS TO SECURING A CAR

Layer 3: Secure NetworkMessage authentication, filtering, distributed intrusion detection (IDS)

OBD

TCU IVISafety domain

Comfort domain

Body

Braking Powertrain

Cluster

ADAS

Gateway

Layer 1: Secure InterfaceSecure M2M authentication, secure key storage

OBDBody

TCUBraking Powertrain

ClusterIVI

ADAS

Layer 2: Secure GatewayDomain isolation, firewall/filter, centralized intrusion detection (IDS)

OBD

TCU

Gateway

Safety domain

Comfort domain

IVI

Body

Braking Powertrain

Cluster

ADAS

Layer 4: Secure ProcessingSecure boot, run time integrity, OTA updates

OBD

TCU

Gateway

IVISafety domain

Comfort domain

Body

Braking Powertrain

Cluster

ADAS

Page 19: SECURITY FOR SELF-DRIVING CARS · Braking Powertrain IVI Cluster ADAS And steal data or take over control (e.g. slam the brakes) 4 Find & exploit vulnerabilities in the connected

COMPANY PUBLIC 19

4 LAYERS TO SECURING A CAR (VIDEO)

Available online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cclydY87a1E

Page 20: SECURITY FOR SELF-DRIVING CARS · Braking Powertrain IVI Cluster ADAS And steal data or take over control (e.g. slam the brakes) 4 Find & exploit vulnerabilities in the connected

COMPANY PUBLIC 20

SECURITY TOOLBOXMIX OF TECHNOLOGIES AND BEST PRACTICES

Cryptography – an important basis, but not a substitution for security

• Crypto algorithms like AES, RSA, SHA2 are ‘basic building blocks’

(Please don’t invent your own crypto algorithm…)

Restricting Access – e.g. using:

• Physical Isolation (e.g. separate networks and “air gaps”)

• Logical Isolation (e.g. firewalls between networks)

• Access Control (e.g. identification, authentication & authorization)

Other tools:

• Monitoring (e.g. intrusion detection systems)

• Software updates (e.g. SOTA / FOTA)

• Design, code and protocol reviews

• Defensive, secure and clean programming

• Security assessment (Pen Test, …)

• Formal proof systems, …

Most security vulnerabilities

are caused by

design & implementation

weaknesses(!)

CONFIDENTIALITY

INFORMATION SECURITY

ENCRYPTION,ACCESS CONTROL

Page 21: SECURITY FOR SELF-DRIVING CARS · Braking Powertrain IVI Cluster ADAS And steal data or take over control (e.g. slam the brakes) 4 Find & exploit vulnerabilities in the connected

COMPANY PUBLIC 21

SOLUTIONS – HARDWARE, SOFTWARE AND SERVICES

Vehicle security requires a tight integration of hardware, software and services

Hardware

Software

Services• Threat Monitoring & Response – e.g. Cloud Analytics

• Device & Identity Management – e.g. Trust Provisioning

• Performance – e.g. Crypto Accelerators

• Immutability – e.q. Hardware Enforced Isolation (HSM)

• Tamper Resistance – e.g. Sensors, Glue Logic, Shields

• Flexibility / Updateability – e.g. FOTA/SOTA For Fixing

Bugs, Vulnerabilities

Complementary strengths:

CU

ST

OM

ER

S

& P

AR

TN

ER

S

Page 22: SECURITY FOR SELF-DRIVING CARS · Braking Powertrain IVI Cluster ADAS And steal data or take over control (e.g. slam the brakes) 4 Find & exploit vulnerabilities in the connected

COMPANY PUBLIC 22

SECURITY REQUIRES A HOLISTIC

APPROACH (& ONGOING EFFORT)

Security must be an integral part of the lifecycle

• In product design, implementation and maintenance

• So from its initial conception, until its end-of-life

But also in associated processes; e.g.:

• Secure Development and Manufacturing Processes

• Risk Assessment and Management

• Security Awareness Trainings for Employees

• Threat Intelligence Feed

• Product Security Incident Response Team

• External Audits for Product / Site Security

NXP was amongst the first suppliers to join the Auto-ISAC (Aug. ‘16)

Goals of the Auto-ISAC:

• Intel Sharing & Analysis

• Best Practice Sharing

• Partnerships & Community Development

Page 23: SECURITY FOR SELF-DRIVING CARS · Braking Powertrain IVI Cluster ADAS And steal data or take over control (e.g. slam the brakes) 4 Find & exploit vulnerabilities in the connected

COMPANY PUBLIC 23

KEY TAKEAWAYS

1. What does it take to come to security-by-design?

• Holistic approach, covering a.o.:

• Mindset – e.g. pro-active vs. reactive (i.e. not an afterthought) ‘security culture’

• Solutions – e.g. changes in architectures, security & privacy by design, …

• Lifecycle management – e.g. maintenance after product release

• Way of working – e.g. secure engineering/manufacturing/… processes

• Business case – e.g. willingness to pay an ‘insurance premium’

• Education – e.g. awareness trainings

2. How do I become aware of system security issues?

• Use collective intelligence – e.g. sharing information & best practices in industry

3. How can I survive without being a security expert?

• Rely on experts (internal/external) – while understanding the basics yourself

Page 24: SECURITY FOR SELF-DRIVING CARS · Braking Powertrain IVI Cluster ADAS And steal data or take over control (e.g. slam the brakes) 4 Find & exploit vulnerabilities in the connected

COMPANY PUBLIC 24

CONCLUSION

• Automotive Innovation is changing

towards developing self-driving robots

• Security is essential –

people must be able to trust their cars

• It requires a holistic approach:

− secure technical solutions

(products and architectures)

− the application of best practices

− maintenance (continuous effort!)

− security policies and processes

www.nxp.com/automotivesecurity

Page 25: SECURITY FOR SELF-DRIVING CARS · Braking Powertrain IVI Cluster ADAS And steal data or take over control (e.g. slam the brakes) 4 Find & exploit vulnerabilities in the connected

COMPANY PUBLIC 25INTERNAL/PROPRIETARY 25

www.nxp.com/automotivesecurity