Security KSecurity K.....................................................................................................................................................1

Links.........................................................................................................................................................2

Infrastructure......................................................................................................................................3

Hegemony...........................................................................................................................................6

Terror...................................................................................................................................................8

Policy.................................................................................................................................................13

Economy............................................................................................................................................15

Impacts..................................................................................................................................................19

Destruction of Other..........................................................................................................................20

Self-fulfilling Prophecy.......................................................................................................................23

Serial Policy Failure............................................................................................................................25

Alternative.............................................................................................................................................26

Framework............................................................................................................................................29

Realism..................................................................................................................................................31

At: threats exist.....................................................................................................................................37

A2: Extinction........................................................................................................................................39

Perm......................................................................................................................................................42

AT: cede the political.............................................................................................................................44

Links

Infrastructure

Critical infrastructure constructs a ‘new’ terrorismDr. Myriam Dunn Cavelty, head of the New Risk Research Unit at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, and Kristian Søby Kristensen, researcher in security policy and strategy at Copenhagen University, 6-18-2008, “Securing the homeland: critical infrastructure, risk and (in)security” //eRThe establishment of CIP as one focal point of the current national security debate of Western states can be seen as a confluence of two interlinked and at times mutually reinforcing factors: 1 the perception that modern societies are – by their very nature – exposed to an ever-increasing number of potentially catastrophic vulnerabilities (Beck 1992);2 the perception of an increasing willingness of dangerous actors to brutally exploit these vulnerabilities (Ackerman et al. 2006: x).It has been noted that in all of the recent cases of Muslim extremism, the perpetrators both exploited and targeted elements of what can be called the civilian infrastructure for the purpose of their attacks. This seems to show a propensity of the ‘new’ terrorism for targeting the soft underbelly of liberal, open and increasingly networked societies, which are both held together and empowered by their critical infrastructures

(Barry 2001: 12ff.) and reciprocally made vulnerable due to dependence on them. As the sophistication of these infrastructures increases, so does the potential risk of sophisticated boomerang effects (Beck 1992: 37) as exemplified by recent terror attacks.

Critical infrastructure protection programs are rooted in security, it overreacts to risk and doesn’t understand the differences between accident and attack, It is rooted in the inability to understand the future. Myriam Cavelty, lecturer and head of the new risks research unit at the Center for Security studies, and Kristian Kristensen, PhD candidate working with the Research Unit on Defense and Security at the Danish Institute for International Studies, 2-19-8, “Securing ‘the Homeland’ Critical infrastructure, risk and (in)security” pg 2-3 , JFThe establishment of CIP as one focal point of the current national security¶ debate of Western states can be seen as a confluence of two interlinked and at¶ times mutually reinforcing factor s :¶ 1 the perception that modern societies are – by their very nature – exposed to ¶ an ever-increasing number of potentially catastrophic vulnerabilities (Beck¶ 1992);¶ 2 the perception of an increasing willingness of dangerous actors to brutally¶ exploit these vulnerabilities (Ackerman et al. 2006: x).¶ It has been noted that in all of the recent cases of Muslim extremism, the perpetrators both exploited and targeted elements of what can be called the civilian infrastructure for the purpose of their attacks. This seems to show a propensity of the ‘new’ terrorism for targeting the soft underbelly of liberal, open and increasingly networked societies, which are both held together and empowered by their critical infrastructures (Barry 2001: 12ff.) and reciprocally made vulnerable due to dependence on them. As the sophistication of these infrastructures increases, so does the potential risk of sophisticated boomerang effects (Beck 1992: 37) as exemplified by recent terror attacks. The combination of these two factors has proven to be a key condition for promoting CIP to the forefront of current strategies for providing security . It seems to correspond to the zeitgeist at a time when ‘fear of the future has become a significant feature of contemporary political life’ (Bigo 2006a) and in which ‘the principle of deliberately exploiting the vulnerability of modern civil society replaces the principle of change and accident’ (Beck 2006) – while the notion of the ‘normal accident’ (Perrow 1984) is still lingering in the techno- logical conception of CIP. Narratives about security in connection with CIP are articulated in terms of an ability (or inability) to control the future . Risk is the underlying logic and rationale of CIP , due to its

historical development as well as the instruments and tools used for evaluating vulnerabilities. As such, CIP belongs to a set of security issues linked to the emergence of a ‘rationale of risk management’ in security after the Cold War, a development that is tied in with a discursive shift from threats of identifiable enemies to risks (see also Aradau and van Munster 2006; Castel 1991; Power 2004; Rasmussen 2001, 2004; Dunn Cavelty 2007).

CIP is just another form of security, It creates vulnerabilities in order to protect it, and locks us into an institution of control. Myriam Cavelty, lecturer and head of the new risks research unit at the Center for Security studies. Kristian Kristensen, PhD candidate working with the Research Unit on Defense and Security at the Danish Institute for International Studies,2-19-8, Securing ‘the Homeland’ Critical infrastructure, risk and (in)security pg 5-6Thus, CIP approaches the threat of terrorism not through surveillance and interdiction, but through a different form of security that is oriented toward ensuring the continuous functioning of critical systems.1 The second, broader perspective sees CIP as an important subset of homeland security and counter-terrorism (Part II). In this understanding, CIP is also about technology of control, constituting both a threat and a means of protection, and technological developments within a broader social and political frame, including surveillance. In this view, CIP functions as a framework for the establishment of new degrees and techniques of control over the properties and processes of life. The important point here is the conflation of the human body, of technology and of knowledge in the practice of CIP. This view introduces a double or ‘reflexive’ aspect of CIP: its focus on technologies shows how some critical infrastructures, most often in the form of information technologies, are used to

protect other critical infrastructures and how the information infrastructure is used to protect itself. This view also stresses the danger of the creation of inside/outside spaces or zones of marginalisation through CIP practices , by asking who is protected and who is not; and eliciting who is in fact becoming a potential target of CIP practices. The representation of both viewpoints is of central importance for understanding, on the one hand, how CIP is situated in the wider discourse of homeland security and counter-terrorism (Part II) and, on the other hand, how this wider discourse is affected by the way in which CIP is conceptualised as part of it (Part I). In order to capture this interrelation, the first part of this volume focuses on CIP as a security practice emerging at a specific point in time, clearly linked to what we look at in the second part: the perception of terrorism as the prime threat in today’s security environment and how this perception influences security practices in a broader sense. When focusing on the first view, one key aspect of CIP practices is to create greater resilience, commonly defined as the ability of a system to recover from adversity and either revert to its original state or to assume an adjusted state based on new requirements (McCarthy 2007: 2f.). As previously mentioned, most precautionary and response measures can be employed as protection against unexpected deliberate or natural events, except perhaps for the activities of the intelligence services and certain police and military responsibilities (such as physical protection of facilities), which are all geared toward actor-induced threats. Such practices, even though established and propagated by security professionals,

seem to be rather unappealing as topics for security studies scholars, judging from the small amount of publications on them. One reason might be that none of these practices are exceptional. Even though an ‘existential threat’ (Wæver 1995) is frequently invoked, and the politics of security are often said to depend on the exeptional (Jabri 2006; Dillon 2003; Agamben 2002), much of the actual practice of CIP is very commonplace in character. Another explanation is the clear division between domestic and international scholarship that underpins the discipline, a cleavage that has often prevented the study of concepts situated in both arenas or in between (cf. Abrahamsen and Williams 2006: 45). Clearly, security studies have focused predominantly on discursive and institutional practices ‘that rely upon national

security and the sphere of the international’ (Jabri 2006: 146). If we look at the threat rhetoric behind CIP and at the measures that are envisaged for protection, we can argue that the history of CIP is littered with failed securitisation moves (cf. Bendrath 2001). But we can also look at CIP from a ‘French’ point of view. This school of thought perceives security not only as ‘exceptional’, but also as being concerned with the everyday routines and technologies of security professionals (Bigo 1996, 2002) or as a ‘technique of government’ (Foucault 1994a). Such an understanding shifts the focus of attention from ‘utterances referring to dangerous futures’ to the technologies and strategies by means of which security is sought and produced (C.A.S.E. Collective 2006: 469). To see CIP as belonging to the ‘politics of protection’ (Huysmans et al. 2006) helps to let security analysis ‘run more flexibly across traditional and less traditional security agencies’ and ultimately serves to open up security studies ‘to the importance of everyday practices and routines in security practices’ (Huysmans 2006: 14). ‘Protection is different from security’, writes Bigo (Bigo 2006b: 93), and, in this book, we will investigate just how different it is. This is also the approach taken by Andrew Lakoff and Stephen Collier in Chapter 1. They present CIP as a central example of what is called ‘vital systems security’ and enquire about the origins of the distinctive concept that views security threats as problems of system vulnerabilities. Using a Foucaultinspired study of problematisations, they track the emergence of CIP as an object of expert reflection in the early 1980s, with ties to far older issues, namely the emergence of strategic bombing after the First World War, and Cold War civil defence programmes. By uncovering a series of important moments, their chapter lays the foundation for understanding many of the later developments. The specific way of providing security by means of vulnerability mapping and other techniques has led to a certain amount of path-dependency or institutional ‘lock-in’.

Hegemony

Hegemony is predicated off of the threat of insecurity, we always find new “monsters” to destroy thus militarizing the American people into a cycle of endless conflict and violence, but this will inevitably backfires as it is the root cause of violence in the first place. Ira Chernus, Professor of Religious Studies and Co-director of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Colorado-Boulder, 9-6, “Monsters to Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and Sin” , http://www.colorado.edu/ReligiousStudies/chernus/4550ReligionWarPeace/Monsters%20to%20Destroy/TableOfContents.htm//JFThe end of the cold war spawned a tempting fantasy of imperial omnipotence on a global scale. The neocons want to turn that fantasy into reality. But reality will not conform to the fantasy; it won’t stand still or keep any semblance of permanent order . So the neocons’ efforts inevitably backfire. Political scientist Benjamin Barber explains that a nation with unprecedented power has “unprcedented vulnerability : for it must repeatedly extend the compass of its power to preserve what it already has, and so is almost by definition always overextended .” , as Gary Dorrien see insecurity coming at the neoconservatives in another way, too explains: “For the empire, every conflict is a local concern that threatens its control . However secure it may be, it never feels secure enough . The [neocon] unipolarists had an advanced case of this anxiety. … Just below the surface of the customary claim to toughness lurked persistent anxiety. This anxiety was inherent in the problem of empire and, in the case of the neocons, heightened by ideological ardor.”[40]¶ If the U.S. must control every event everywhere, as neocons assume, every act of resistance looks like a threat to the very existence of the nation . There is no good way to distinguish between nations or forces that genuinely oppose U.S. interests and those that don’t . Indeed, change of any kind, in any nation, becomes a potential threat. Everyone begins to look like a threatening monster that might have to be destroye d.¶ I t’s no surprise that a nation imagined as an implacable enemy often turns into a real enemy. When the U.S. intervenes to prevent change, it is likely to provoke resistance. Faced with an aggressive U.S. stance, any nation might get tough in return. Of course, the U.S. can say that it is selflessly trying to serve the world. But why would other nations believe that? It is more likely that others will resist , making hegemony harder to achieve . To the neocons, though, resistance only proves that the enemy really is a threat that must be destroyed. So the likelihood of conflict grows, making everyone less secure.¶

Moreover, the neocons want to do it all in the public spotlight. In the past, any nation that set out to conquer others usually kept its plans largely secret. Indeed, the cold war neocons regularly blasted the Soviets for harboring a “secret plan” for world conquest. Now here they are calling on the U.S. to blare out its own domineering intentions for all the world to hear. That hardly seems well calculated to achieve the goal of hegemony. But it is calculated to foster the assertive, even swaggering, mood on the home front that the neocons long for.¶ Journalist Ron Suskind has noted that neocons always offer “a statement of enveloping peril and no hypothesis for any real solution.” They have no hope of finding a real solution because they have no reason to look for one. Their story allows for success only as a fantasy. In reality, they expect to find nothing but an endless battle against an enemy that can never be defeated . At least two prominent neocons have said it quite bluntly. Kenneth Adelman: “We should not try to convince people that things are getting better.” Michael Ledeen: “The struggle against evil is going to go on forever.”[41]¶ This vision of endless conflict is not a conclusion drawn from observing reality. It is both the premise and the goal of the neocons’ fantasy . Ultimately, it seems, endless resistance is what they really want. Their call for a unipolar world iensures a permanent state of conflict, so that the U.S. can go on forever proving its militarily supremacy and promoting the “manly

virtues” of militarism. They have to admit that the U.S., with its vastly incomparable power, already has unprecedented security against any foreign army. So they must sound the alarm about a shadowy new kind of enemy, one that can attack in novel, unexpected ways. They must make distant changes appear as huge imminent threats to America, make the implausible seem plausible, and thus find new monsters to destroy .¶ The neocons’ story does not allow for a final triumph of order because it is not really about creating a politically calm, orderly world. It is about creating a society full of virtuous people who are willing and able to fight off the threatening forces of social chaos. Having superior power is less important than proving superior power. That always requires an enemy.¶ Just as neocons need monsters abroad, they need a frightened society at home. Only insecurity can justify their shrill call for a stronger nation (and a higher military budget). The more dire their warnings of insecurity, the more they can demand greater military strength and moral resolve. Every foreign enemy is, above all, another occasion to prod the American people to overcome their anxiety, identify evil, fight resolutely against it, and stand strong in defense of their highest values. Hegemony will do no good unless there is challenge to be met, weakness to be conquered, evil to be overcome. The American people must actively seek hegemony and make sacrifices for it, to show that they are striving to overcome their own weakness.¶ So the quest for strength still demands a public confession of weakness, just as the neocons had demanded two decades earlier when they warned of a Soviet nuclear attack through a “window of vulnerability.” The quest for strength through the structures of national security still demands a public declaration of national insecurity. Otherwise, there is nothing to overcome. The more frightened the public, the more likely it is to believe and enact the neocon story.

Terror

Terrorism is the height of security logic; it fails to recognize that America is the true terrorist state. Noam Chomsky, is an Institute Professor and Professor (Emeritus) in the Department of Linguistics & Philosophy at MIT, 5-2, “Who are the Global Terrorists?”, Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order, http://www.chomsky.info/articles/200205--02.htm, JFWashington waged its "war on terrorism" by creating an international terror network of unprecedented scale, and employing it worldwide, with lethal and long-lasting effects. In Central America, terror guided and supported by the US reached its most extreme levels in countries where the state security forces themselves were the immediate agents of international terrorism. The effects were reviewed in a 1994 conference organized by Salvadoran Jesuits, whose experiences had been particularly gruesome. NOTE{Juan Hern ndez Pico, _Env¡o_ (Universidad Centroamericana, Managua), March 1994.} The conference report takes particular note of the effects of the residual "culture of terror...in domesticating the expectations of the majority vis-a-vis alternatives different to those of the powerful," an important observation on the efficacy of state terror that generalizes broadly. In Latin America, the 11 September atrocities were harshly condemned, but commonly with the observation that they are nothing new. They may be described as "Armageddon," the research journal of the Jesuit university in Managua observed, but Nicaragua has "lived its own Armageddon in excruciating slow motion" under US assault "and is now submerged in its dismal aftermath," and others fared far worse under the vast plague of state terror that swept through the continent from the early 1960s, much of it traceable to Washington. NOTE{_Env¡o_, Oct. 2001. For a judicious review of the aftermath, see Thomas Walker and Ariel Armony, eds., _Repression, Resistance, and Democratic Transition in Central America_ (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 2000).}¶ It is hardly surprising that Washington's call for support in its war of revenge for 11 Sept. had little resonance in Latin America. An international Gallup poll found that support for military force rather than extradition ranged from 2% (Mexico) to 11% (Venezuela and Colombia). Condemnations of the 11 Sept. terror were regularly accompanied by recollections of their own suffering, for example, the death of perhaps thousands of poor people (Western crimes, therefore unexamined) when George Bush I bombed the barrio Chorillo in Panama in December 1989 in Operation Just Cause, undertaken to kidnap a disobedient thug who was sentenced to life imprisonment in Florida for crimes mostly committed while he was on the CIA payroll. NOTE{_Env¡o_, Oct. 2001; Panamanian journalist Ricardo Stevens, NACLA _Report on the Americas_, Nov/Dec 2001.}¶ The record continues to the present without essential change, apart from modification of pretexts and tactics. The list of leading recipients of US arms yields ample evidence, familiar to those acquainted with international human rights reports.¶ It therefore comes as no surprise that President Bush informed Afghans that bombing will continue until they hand over people the US suspects of terrorism (rebuffing requests for evidence and tentative offers of negotiation). Or, when new war aims were added after three weeks of bombing, that Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, chief of the British Defense Staff, warned Afghans that US-UK attacks will continue "until the people of the country themselves recognize that this is going to go on until they get the leadership changed." NOTE {Patrick Tyler and Elisabeth Bumiller, _NYT_, Oct. 12; Michael Gordon, _NYT_, Oct. 28, 2001; both p. 1.} In other words, the US and UK will persist in "the calculated use of violence to attain goals that are political... in nature...": international terrorism in the technical sense, but excluded from the canon by the standard convention. The rationale is essentially that of the US-Israel international terrorist operations in Lebanon. Admiral Boyce is virtually repeating the words of the eminent Israeli statesman Abba Eban, as

Reagan declared the first war on terrorism. Replying to Prime Minister Menachem Begin's account of atrocities in Lebanon committed under the Labor government in the style "of regimes which neither Mr. Begin nor I would dare to mention by name," Eban acknowledged the accuracy of the account, but added the standard justification: "there was a rational prospect, ultimately fulfilled, that affected populations would exert pressure for the cessation of hostilities." NOTE{_Jerusalem Post_, Aug. 16, 1981.}¶ These concepts are conventional, as is the resort to terrorism when deemed appropriate. Furthermore, its success is openly celebrated. The devastation caused by US terror operations in Nicaragua was described quite frankly, leaving Americans "United in Joy" at their successful outcome, the press proclaimed. The massacre of hundreds of thousands of Indonesians in 1965, mostly landless peasants, was greeted with unconstrained euphoria, along with praise for Washington for concealing its own critical role, which might have embarrassed the "Indonesian moderates" who had cleansed their society in a "staggering mass slaughter" (_New York Times_) that the CIA compared to the crimes of Stalin, Hitler, and Mao. NOTE{For extensive review, see my _Necessary Illusions_ and _Deterring Democracy_ (London: Verso, 1991) (Nicaragua); _Year 501_ (Boston: South End, 1993) (Indonesia).} There are many other examples. One might wonder why Osama bin Laden's disgraceful exultation over the atrocities of 11 Sept. occasioned indignant surprise. But that would be an error, based on failure to distinguish their terror, which is evil, from ours, which is noble, the operative principle throughout history . ¶ If we keep to official definitions, it is a serious error to describe terrorism as the weapon of the weak. Like most weapons, it is wielded to far greater effect by the strong. But then it is not terror; rather, "counterterror," or "low intensity warfare," or "self-defense"; and if successful, "rational" and "pragmatic," and an occasion to be "united in joy."¶ Let us turn to the question of proper response to the crime, bearing in mind the governing moral truism. If, for example, Admiral Boyce's dictum is legitimate, then victims of Western state terrorism are entitled to act accordingly. That conclusion is, properly, regarded as outrageous. Therefore the principle is outrageous when applied to official enemies, even more so when we recognize that the actions were undertaken with the expectation that they would place huge numbers of people at grave risk. No knowledgeable authority seriously questioned the UN estimate that "7.5 million Afghans will need food over the winter -- 2.5 million more than on Sept. 11," NOTE{Elisabeth Bumiller and Elizabeth Becker, _NYT_, Oct. 17, 2001.} a 50% increase as a result of the threat of bombing, then the actuality, with a toll that will never be investigated if history is any guide. ¶ A different proposal, put forth by the Vatican among others, was spelled out by military historian Michael Howard: "a police operation conducted under the auspices of the United Nations...against a criminal conspiracy whose members should be hunted down and brought before an international court, where they would receive a fair trial and, if found guilty, be awarded an appropriate sentence." NOTE{_Foreign Affairs_, Jan/Feb 2002; talk of Oct. 30. See Tania Branigan, _Guardian_, Oct. 31, 2001.} Though never contemplated, the proposal seems reasonable. If so, then it would be reasonable if applied to Western state terrorism, something that could also never be contemplated, though for opposite reasons.¶ The war in Afghanistan has commonly been described as a "just war," indeed evidently so. There have been some attempts to frame a concept of "just war" that might support the judgment. We may therefore ask how these proposals fare when evaluated in terms of the same moral truism. I have yet to see one that does not instantly collapse: application of the proposed concept to Western state terrorism would be considered unthinkable, if not despicable. For example, we might ask how the proposals would apply to the one case that is uncontroversial in the light of the judgments of the highest international authorities, Washington's war against Nicaragua; uncontroversial, that is, among those who have some commitment to international law and treaty obligations. It is an instructive experiment.¶

Similar questions arise in connection with other aspects of the wars on terrorism. There has been debate over whether the US-UK war in Afghanistan was authorized by ambiguous Security Council resolutions, but it is beside the point. The US surely could have obtained clear and unambiguous authorization, not for attractive reasons (consider why Russia and China eagerly joined the coalition,

hardly obscure). But that course was rejected, presumably because it would suggest that there is some higher authority to which the US should defer, a condition that a state with overwhelming power is not likely to accept. There is even a name for that stance in the literature of diplomacy and international relations: establishing "credibility," a standard official justification for the resort to violence, the bombing of Serbia, to mention a recent example. The refusal to consider negotiated transfer of the suspected perpetrators presumably had the same grounds.¶ The moral truism applies to such matters as well. The US refuses to extradite terrorists even when their guilt has been well established. One current case involves Emmanuel Constant, the leader of the Haitian paramilitary forces that were responsible for thousands of brutal killings in the early 1990s under the military junta, which Washington officially opposed but tacitly supported, publicly undermining the OAS embargo and secretly authorizing oil shipments. Constant was sentenced in absentia by a Haitian court. The elected government has repeatedly called on the US to extradite him, again on September 30, 2001, while Taliban initiatives to negotiate transfer of bin Laden were being dismissed with contempt. Haiti's request was again ignored, probably because of concerns about what Constant might reveal about ties to the US government during the period of the terror. Do we therefore conclude that Haiti has the right to use force to compel his extradition, following as best it can Washington's model in Afghanistan? The very idea is outrageous, yielding another prima facie violation of the moral truism.¶ It is all too easy to add illustrations. NOTE{For a sample, see George, _op. cit._. Exceptions are rare, and the reactions they elicit are not without interest.} Consider Cuba, probably the main target of international terrorism since 1959, remarkable in scale and character, some of it exposed in declassified documents on Kennedy's Operation Mongoose and continuing to the late 1990s. Cold War pretexts were ritually offered as long as that was possible, but internally the story was the one commonly unearthed on inquiry. It was recounted in secret by Arthur Schlesinger, reporting the conclusions of JFK's Latin American mission to the incoming President: the Cuban threat is "the spread of the Castro idea of taking matters into one's own hands," which might stimulate the "poor and underprivileged" in other countries, who "are now demanding opportunities for a decent living" -- the "virus" or "rotten apple" effect, as it is called in high places The Cold War connection was that "the Soviet Union hovers in the wings, flourishing large development loans and presenting itself as the model for achieving modernization in a single generation." NOTE{_FRUS_, 1961-63, vol. XII, American Republics, 13f., 33.}¶ True, these exploits of international terrorism -- which were quite serious -- are excluded by the standard convention. But suppose we keep to the official definition. In accord with the theories of "just war" and proper response, how has Cuba been entitled to react? It is fair enough to denounce international terrorism as a plague spread by "depraved opponents of civilization itself." The commitment to "drive the evil from the world" can even be taken seriously , if it satisfies moral truisms -- not, it would seem, an entirely unreasonable thought.

Terrorism is just another way to securitize the public, turning the situation into a “life or death” “existential risk” scenario, which justifies “any means necessary” to solve, causing insecurity and threatening basic human rights.Shofwan Al-Banna Choiruzzad¶ Graduate of the School of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University, 11-17-10, GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR, SECURITIZATION AND HUMAN SECURITY:INDONESIA’S CASE, http://ritsumei.academia.edu/ShofwanAlBannaChoiruzzad/Papers/434199/Global_War_on_Terror_Securitization_and_Human_In_Security_Indonesias_CaseINTRODUCTION¶ Needless to say, the attack against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, had been an important historical event. Always protected by “vast sea”, US had never beenexperiencing an attack in Washington’s own soil. The buildings were destroyed and many people losttheir lives, but the greatest impact was the response on the tragedy itself: the emergence of the “globalwar on terrorism.”Soon after, the President declared a “war against terrorism of global

reach.” Subsequentlyand repeatedly, Bush and other US administration officials used the terms “global war on terrorism,”“war on terrorism,” “war on terror,” and “battle against international terrorism.” The “global war onterrorism,” complete with its acronym, GWOT, soon became the most often used term. [1] Using US power, the GWOT became a global discourse which affected many parts of the world.[2]Indonesia,in this context, was placed in a special spotlight: at the heart of the second front of the “global war onterrorism”.This paper argues that in Indonesia the “global war on terrorism” discourse was used as the base for securitization by state apparatus. Securitization justified extraordinary measures, which arefrequently threatening human security . In sum, the global war on terrorism discourse was used for securitization, which in the end had led to ‘human insecurity’ .¶ Securitization and Human Security¶ Before we go further, it will be useful to take a brief overview on the concept of ‘securitization’ and its relationship with ‘human security’. The term “securitization” could be traced back to the Copenhagen School.¶ ¶ The basic idea of securitization theory is that security is speech act.Securitization refers to a speech act by a “securitizing actor” to elevate an issue from the realm of low politics (bounded by democratic rules and decision-making procedures) to the realm of high politics(characterized by urgency, priority and a matter of life and death). [3]By uttering “security”, a state-representative moves a particular development into a specificarea, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means necessary to block it.[4] By stating thata particular referent object is threatened in its existence, a securitizing actor claims a right toextraordinary measures to ensure the referent object’s survival.[5]Then, what is the relationship between an act of securitization and human (in)security? Asnoted above, securitization means an attempt to elevate an issue into a security matters that needextraordinary measures outside the “normal” measures (bounded by democratic rules and decision-making procedures). As a consequence, it is very possible that securitization could lead to abuse of power by the securitizing actor against other actors (which labeled as “existential threat”). Withoutfollowing the normal rules, everything is justified –including measures that are threatening and¶ ¶ eroding human security.However, “human security” here refers to the “human security” in Canadian approach asexemplified in the¶ Human Security Report ¶ , which is based on “freedom of fear”. It is grounded intraditional liberal conceptions of human rights that based on the belief that all individuals are seen as possessing inalienable and fundamental rights to ‘life, liberty and property’ by virtue of their commonhumanity.[6] This approach is chosen in order to focus the analysis on the impacts of securitizationusing the “global war on terrorism” discourse in Indonesia.¶

The aff’s narrative of terrorists as the antithesis of rational civilization dichotomizes them as the “other” and labels them as enemies, while ignoring their diverse political motivationsMark Neocleous, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy, Politics and History, 2011, “The Police of Civilization: The War on Terror as Civilizing Offensive” International Political Sociology issue 5, pp. 144-159 //eRThis was part and parcel of the liberal distinction between civilized and barbarian forms of society, and fed into the wider narrative of liberal internationalism that became the foundation of international law (Schwarzenberger 1955; Koskenniemi 2001:176). The connection lies in the links made within the liberal mind between peace and security, law and order, and civilization: law, as the ‘‘gentle civilizer of nations,’’ brings peace, security and order. The wider backdrop to this is the danger of ‘‘uncivilized’’ (‘‘primitive,’’

‘‘savage,’’ ‘‘barbaric’’) communities, to be policed through the introduction of Western law and administration. ‘‘Civilization’’ thereby connected international law not just with assumptions about peace and security, but also with the political economy of human labor and free trade, liberal political institutions, and certain bourgeois standards of material conduct. In so doing, it became the main

criterion by which the place and status of different human groups would be judged. The standard of

‘‘civilization’’ could be conceived only by reference to a diverse group of others, understood as enemies, and was used to distinguish those that belong to international society from those that do not (Stocking 1987:30–36; Federici 1995:65; Young 1995:32). Those who fulfill the requirements of the standard are brought inside a circle of ‘‘members,’’ while those who do not conform are left ‘‘outside.’’

Policy

Policy options leads to violent geopoliticsMichael Dillon, PHD; researches the problematisation of politics, security and war & PhD in Politics, 2000, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emerge” Alternatives: Local, Global, Political Vol. 25 Issue 1 Jan-Mar 2000 JSTOR http://www.jstor.org/stable/40644986, JFAlready, then, discourses concerned to elucidate the practices ¶ and dynamics of ¶ interagency cooperation have emerged, opera- ¶ tional concepts ¶ and doctrines are formulated and disseminated, ¶

and manuals of good practice ¶ are officially adopted. Accounts of ¶ the bureaucratic politics ¶ that characterize the intense ¶ interagency ¶ competition ¶ and rivalry that accompany the formation and oper- ¶ ation of such ¶ strategic complexes ¶ are also ¶ emerging. These relish ¶ the failure and confusion that abounds in such circumstances, but ¶ simultaneously ¶ also ¶ appeal ¶ to it in order to fuel demands for yet ¶ better governance, early warning of ¶ incipient conflicts, and more ¶ adaptive military might to deal with them. ¶ No political formulation is therefore innocent. None refers to ¶ a truth about the world that preexists ¶ that truth's entry ¶ into the ¶ world through discourse. Every formula is instead a clue to a ¶ truth. Each is crafted in the context of a wider discursive economy ¶ of meaning. Tug ¶ at the formula, the pull ¶ in the fabric begins ¶ to ¶ disclose the way ¶ in which it has been woven. The artefactual design of the truth it proclaims ¶ then ¶ emerges. We are therefore ¶ dealing with ¶ something much more than a mere matter of geo- ¶ political fact when encountering the vocabulary of complex ¶ emer- ¶ gency ¶ in the discourse of global governance ¶ and liberal peace. We ¶ are not ¶ talking ¶ about a discrete class of unproblematic ¶ actions. ¶ Neither are we discussing certain forms of intractable conflicts. ¶ The formula complex emergency does of course address certain kinds ¶ of violent disorder. That disorder is not our direct concern. Recall ¶ with Foucault and many other thinkers that an economy of mean- ¶ ing ¶ is no mere idealist ¶ speculation. ¶ It is a material political pro- ¶ duction ¶ integral to a ¶ specific political economy of power.

Policy action creates a market for problemsMichael Dillon, PHD; researches the problematisation of politics, security and war & PhD in Politics, 2000, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emerge” Alternatives: Local, Global, Political Vol. 25 Issue 1 Jan-Mar 2000 JSTOR http://www.jstor.org/stable/40644986, JFMore ¶ specifically, where there is a policy problematic ¶ there is ¶ expertise, ¶ and where there is ¶ expertise there, too, a policy prob- ¶ lematic will emerge. Such problematics ¶ are detailed and elabo- ¶

rated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge ¶ as well as interlock- ¶ ing policy domains. Policy domains reify ¶ the problematizatiòn of life in certain ways by turning these ¶ epistemically ¶ and politically ¶ contestable orderings of life into ¶ "problems" ¶ that require ¶ the con- ¶ tinuous attention of policy ¶ science and the continuous resolutions ¶ of policymakers. Policy ¶ "actors" develop ¶ and compete on the basis ¶ of the ¶ expertise ¶ that grows up ¶ around such problems or clusters of ¶ problems ¶ and their client populations. Here, too, we may ¶ also dis- ¶ cover what might be called ¶ "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the ¶ market for discourse is prescribed ¶ and policed ¶ in ways ¶ that Fou- ¶ cault indicated, bidding ¶ to formulate novel problematizations they ¶ seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. ¶ In ¶ principle, ¶ there is no limit to the ways ¶ in which the management ¶ of population may be problematized. All ¶ aspects of human con- ¶ duct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problemati- ¶ zation is capable of becoming ¶ a policy problem. Governmentality ¶ thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy ¶ sci- ¶ ence, in which problematizations

go looking for policy sponsors ¶ while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored ¶ problematizations

Economy

Their “rational economic” theory leads to patriarchy, destruction of nature and extinctionJytte Nhanenge, Masters @ U South Africa,2007,, “ECOFEMINSM: TOWARDS INTEGRATING THE CONCERNS OF WOMEN, POOR PEOPLE AND NATURE INTO DEVELOPMENT, http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/570/dissertation.pdf?sequence=1, JFGeneration of wealth was an important pan of the Scientific Revolution and its modem society. The¶

scientific discipline of economics therefore became a significant means for wealth creation. However,¶

since it is founded on similar dualised premises as science, also economics became a system of¶ ¶ ¶ domination and exploitation of women, Others and nature. The following discussion is intended to¶

show that. The way in which economics, with its priority on masculine forces, becomes dominant¶ relates to web—like, inter-connected and complex processes, which are not always clearly perceived.¶

The below discussions try to show how the dualised priority of the individual over society, reason over¶

emotion, self—interest over community-interest, competition over cooperation, and more pairs, generate¶ domination that leads to the four crises of violence and war, poverty, human oppression and¶

enviromnental degradation. The aim in sum is to show how the current perspective of economics is¶ destroying society (women and Others) and nature.¶ The following discussion is consequently a critique of economics. It is meant to highlight some¶ elements that make economics a dominant ideology, rather than a system of knowledge. It adopts a¶ feministic view and it is therefore seen from the side of women, poor people and nature. The critique¶ is extensive, but not exhaustive. It is extensive because economics is the single most important tool¶ used by mainstream institutions for development in the South. Thus if we want to understand why¶ development does not alleviate poverty, then we first need to comprehend why its main instrument,¶ economics, cannot alleviate poverty. A critical analysis of economics and its influence in development¶ is therefore important as an introduction to next chapter, which discusses ecofeminism and¶ development. However, the critique is not exhaustive because it focuses only on the dualised elements¶ in economics. It is highly likely that there are many more critical issues in economics, which should be¶ analyzed in addition to the below mentioned. However, it would exceed this scope.¶ Each of the following l0 sections discusses a specific issue in economics that relates to its dualised¶ nature. Thus, each can as such be read on its own. However, all sections are systemically inter-¶ connected. Therefore each re-enforces the others and integrated, they are meant to show the web of¶ masculine forces that make economics dominant towards women, Others and nature.¶ The first three sections intend to show that economics sees itself as a neutral, objective, quantitative¶ and universal science, which does not need to be integrated in social and natural reality. The outcome¶ of this is, however, that economics cannot value social and environmental needs. Hence, a few¶ individuals become very rich from capitalising on free social and natural resources, while the health of¶ the public and the environment is degraded. It also is shown that the exaggerated focus on monetary¶ wealth does not increase human happiness. It rather leads to a deteriorating quality of life. Thus, the¶ false belief in etemal economic growth may eventually destroy life on planet Earth. The next section¶ shows that economics is based on dualism, with a focus solely on yang forces. This has serious¶ ¶ ¶ consequences for all yin issues: For example, the priority on individualism over community may in its¶ extreme form lead to self-destruction. Similarly, the priority on rationality while excluding human¶ emotions may end in greed, domination, poverty, violence and war. The next section is important as a¶ means to understanding "rationa1" economics. Its aim is to clarify the psychological meaning of¶ money. In reality, reason and emotion are interrelated parts of the human mind; they

cannot be¶ separated. Thus, economic "rationality" and its focus on etemal wealth generation are based on¶ personal emotions like fears and inadequacies, rather than reason. The false belief in dualism means¶ that human beings are lying to themselves, which results in disturbed minds, stupid actions with¶

disastrous consequences, The focus on masculine forces is consequently psychologically unhealthy; it¶ leads to domination of society and nature, and will eventually destroy the world. The following three¶

sections are intending to show that the new global capitalism is doing just that. First, the neo—liberal¶ economical scheme is presented. Secondly, its application in the Third World as Structural¶ Adjustment Programmes and as the New Economic Partnership for African Development is critiqued.¶ Thirdly, the extreme application of the disturbed "rational" human mind, manifested in the form of an¶ institutional psychopath "the corporation", is discussed. After concluding that economics is a¶ patriarchal system of domination, alternative economic models, which can support women, Others¶ and nature, are presented.

Economic growth and fear of collapse are tied intrinsically with security and allows the capitalists to make the world match the map via intervention, that perpetrates a system of endless war and violenceMark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008, “Critique of Security”, 101-105, JFIn other words, the new international order moved very quickly to reassert the connection between economic and national security: the commitment to the former was simultaneously a commitment to the latter, and vice versa. As the doctrine of national security was being born, the major player on the international stage would aim to use perhaps its most important power of all – its economic strength – in order to re-order the world. And this re-ordering was conducted through the idea of ‘economic security’.99 Despite the fact that ‘economic security’ would never be formally defined beyond ‘economic order’ or ‘economic well-being’,100 the significant conceptual con sistency between economic security and liberal order-building also had a strategic ideological role. By playing on notions of ‘economic well-being’, economic security seemed to emphasise economic and thus‘human’ needs over military ones. The reshaping of global capital, international order and the exercise of state power could thus look decidedly liberal and ‘humanitarian’. This appearance helped co-opt the liberal Left into the process and, of course, played on individual desire for personal security by using notions such as ‘personal freedom’ and‘social equality’.101 Marx and Engels once highlighted the historical role of the bour geoisie in shaping the world according to its own interests. The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere . . . It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them . . . to become bourgeois in themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.102 In the second half of the twentieth century this ability to ‘batter down all Chinese walls’ would still rest heavily on the logic of capital, but would also come about in part under the guise of security. The whole world became a garden to be cultivated – to be recast according to the logic of security. In the space of fifteen years the concept ‘economic security’ had moved from connoting insurance policies for working people to the desire to shape the world in a capitalist fashion – and back again. In fact, it has constantly shifted between these registers ever since, being used for the constant reshaping of world order and resulting in a comprehensive level of intervention and policing all over the globe. Global order has come to be fabricated and administered according to a security doctrine underpinned by the logic of capital accumulation and a bourgeois conception of order. By incorporating within it a particular vision of economic order, the concept of national security implies the interrelatedness of so many different social, economic, political and military factors that more or less any development anywhere can be

said to impact on liberal order in general and America’s core interests in particular. Not only could bourgeois Europe be recast around the regime of capital, but so too could the whole international order as capital not only nestled, settled and established connections, but also‘secured’ everywhere. Security politics thereby became the basis of a distinctly liberal philosophy of global ‘intervention’, fusing global issues of economic management with domestic policy formations in an ambitious and frequently violent strategy. Here lies the Janus-faced character of American foreign policy.103 One face is the ‘good liberal cop’: friendly, prosperous and democratic, sending money and help around the globe when problems emerge, so that the world’s nations are shown how they can alleviate their misery and perhaps even enjoy some prosperity. The other face is the ‘bad liberal cop’: should one of these nations decide, either through parliamentary procedure, demands for self-determination or violent revolution to address its own social problems in ways that conflict with the interests of capital and the bourgeois concept of liberty, then the authoritarian dimension of liberalism shows its face; the ‘liberal moment’ becomes the moment of violence. This Janus-faced character has meant that through the mandate of security the US, as the national security state par excellence, has seen fit to either overtly or covertly re-order the affairs of myriads of nations – those ‘rogue’ or ‘outlaw’ states on the ‘wrong side of history’.104 ‘Extrapolating the figures as best we can’, one CIA agent com mented in 1991,‘there have been about 3,000 major covert operations and over 10,000 minor operations – all illegal, and all designed to disrupt, destabilize, or modify the activities of other countries’, adding that ‘every covert operation has been rationalized in terms of U.S. national security’.105 These would include ‘interventions’ in Greece, Italy, France, Turkey, Macedonia, the Ukraine, Cambodia, Indonesia, China, Korea, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Bolivia, Grenada, Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Philippines, Honduras, Haiti, Venezuela, Panama, Angola, Ghana, Congo, South Africa, Albania, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and many more, and many of these more than once. Next up are the ‘60 or more’ countries identified as the bases of ‘terror cells’ by Bush in a speech on 1 June 2002.106 The methods used have varied: most popular has been the favored technique of liberal security – ‘making the economy scream’ via controls, interventions and the imposition of neo-liberal regulations. But a wide range of other techniques have been used: terror bombing; subversion; rigging elections; the use of the CIA’s ‘Health Alteration Committee’ whose mandate was to ‘incapacitate’ foreign officials; drug-trafficking;107 and the sponsorship of terror groups, counterinsurgency agencies, death squads. Unsurprisingly, some plain old fascist groups and parties have been coopted into the project, from the attempt at reviving the remnants of the Nazi collaborationist Vlasov Army for use against the USSR to the use of fascist forces to undermine democratically elected governments, such as in Chile; indeed, one of the reasons fascism flowed into Latin America was because of the ideology of national security.108 Concomitantly, ‘national security’ has meant a policy of non-intervention where satisfactory ‘security partnerships’ could be established with certain authoritarian and military regimes: Spain under Franco, the Greek junta, Chile, Iraq, Iran, Korea, Indonesia, Cambodia, Taiwan, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Turkey, the five Central Asian republics that emerged with the break-up of the USSR, and China. Either way, the whole world was to be included in the new ‘secure’ global liberal order. The result has been the slaughter of untold numbers. John Stock well, who was part of a CIA project in Angola which led to the deaths of over 20,000 people, puts it like this: Coming to grips with these U.S./CIA activities in broad numbers and figuring out how many people have been killed in the jungles of Laos or the hills of Nicaragua is very difficult. But, adding them up as best we can, we come up with a figure of six million people killed – and this is a minimum figure. Included are: one million killed in the Korean War, two million killed in the Vietnam War, 800,000 killed in Indonesia, one million in Cambodia, 20,000 killed in Angola – the operation I was part of – and 22,000 killed in Nicaragua.109 Note that the six million is a minimum figure, that he omits to mention rather a lot of other interventions, and that he was writing in 1991. This is security as the slaughter bench of history. All of

this has been more than confirmed by events in the twenty first century: in a speech on 1 June 2002, which became the basis of the official National Security Strategy of the United States in September of that year, President Bush reiterated that the US has a unilateral right to overthrow any government in the world, and launched a new round of slaughtering to prove it. While much has been made about the supposedly ‘new’ doctrine of preemption in the early twenty-first century, the policy of preemption has a long history as part of national security doctrine. The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves . . . To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre emptively.110 In other words, the security policy of the world’s only superpower in its current ‘war on terror’ is still underpinned by a notion of liberal order-building based on a certain vision of ‘economic order’. The National Security Strategy concerns itself with a ‘single sustainable model for national success’ based on ‘political and economic liberty’, with whole sections devoted to the security benefits of ‘economic liberty’, and the benefits to liberty of the security strategy proposed.

Impacts

Destruction of Other

Securitization leads to the destruction of the “other” to make the world match the map, this transcends any sort of normal war. Karsten Friis, UN Sector at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1998, “From Liminars to Others: Securitization Through Myths,”, http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/pcs/Friis72PCS.htm, JFThe problem with societal securitization is one of representation . It is rarely clear in advance who it is that speaks for a community. There is no system of representation as in a state. Since literately anyone can stand up as representatives, there is room for entrepreneurs. It is not surprising if we experience a struggle between different representatives and also their different representations of the society. What they do share , however, is a conviction that they are best at providing ( a new) order . If they can do this convincingly, they gain legitimacy. What must be done is to make the uncertain certain and make the unknown an object of knowledge. To present a discernable Other is a way of doing this . The Other is represented as an Other -- as an unified single actor with a similar unquestionable set of core values (i.e. the capital “O”). They are objectified, made into an object of knowledge, by re-presentation of their identity and values. In other words, the representation of the Other is depoliticized in the sense that its inner qualities are treated as given and non-negotiable.¶ In Jef Huysmans (1998:241) words, there is both a need for a mediation of chaos as well as of threat. A mediation of chaos is more basic than a mediation of threat, as it implies making chaos into a meaningful order by a convincing representation of the Self and its surroundings. It is a mediation of “ontological security”, which means “...a strategy of managing the limits of reflexivity ... by fixing social relations into a symbolic and institutional order” (Huysmans 1998:242). As he and others (like Hansen 1998:240) have pointed out, the importance of a threat construction for political identification, is often overstated. The mediation of chaos, of being the provider of order in general, is just as important. This may imply naming an Other but not necessarily as a threat.¶ Such a dichotomization implies a necessity to get rid of all the liminars (what Huysmans calls “strangers”). This is because they “...connote a challenge to categorizing practices through the impossibility of being categorized”, and does not threaten the community, “...but the possibility of ordering itself” (Huysmans 1998:241). They are a challenge to the entrepreneur by their very existence. They confuse the dichotomy of Self and Other and thereby the entrepreneur’s mediation of chaos. As mentioned, a liminar can for instance be people of mixed ethnical ancestry but also representations of competing world-pictures. As Eide (1998:76) notes: “Over and over again we see that the “liberals” within a group undergoing a mobilisation process for group conflict are the first ones to go”.¶ The liminars threaten the ontological order of the entrepreneur by challenging his representation of Self and Other and his mediation of chaos, which ultimately undermines the legitimacy of his policy. The liminars may be securitized by some sort of disciplination, from suppression of cultural symbols to ethnic cleansing and expatriation. This is a threat to the ontological order of the entrepreneur, stemming from inside and thus repoliticizing the inside/outside dichotomy. Therefore the liminar must disappear . It must be made into a Self, as several minority groups throughout the world have experienced, or it must be forced out of the territory. A liminar may also become an Other, as its connection to the Self is cut and their former common culture is renounced and made insignificant. In Anne Norton’s (1988:55) words, “The presence of difference in the ambiguous other leads to its classification as wholly unlike and identifies it unqualifiedly with the archetypal other, denying the resemblance to the self.”¶ Then the liminar is no longer an ontological danger (chaos), but what Huysmans (1998:242) calls a mediation of “daily security”. This is not challenging the order or the system as such but has become a visible, clear-cut Other. In places like Bosnia, this naming and replacement of an Other, has been regarded by the

securitizing actors as the solution to the ontological problem they have posed. Securitization was not considered a political move, in the sense that there were any choices. It was a necessity: Securitization was a solution based on a depoliticized ontology.[10]¶ This way the world-picture of the securitizing actor is not only a representation but also made into reality. The mythical second-order language is made into first-order language, and its “innocent” reality is forced upon the world. To the entrepreneurs and other actors involved it has become a “natural” necessity with a need to make order, even if it implies making the world match the map. Maybe that is why war against liminars are so often total; it attempts a total expatriation or a total “solution ” (like the Holocaust) and not only a victory on the battlefield. If the enemy is not even considered a legitimate Other, the door may be more open to a kind of violence that is way beyond any war conventions, any jus in bello.¶ This way, securitizing is legitimized: The entrepreneur has succeeded both in launching his world-view and in prescribing the necessary measures taken against it. This is possible by using the myths, by speaking on behalf of the natural and eternal, where truth is never questioned.

Securitization leads to the destruction of the “other” to make the world match the map, which transcends any sort of normal war. Karsten Friis, UN Sector at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1998, “From Liminars to Others: Securitization Through Myths,”, http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/pcs/Friis72PCS.htm, JFThe problem with societal securitization is one of representation . It is rarely clear in advance who it is that speaks for a community. There is no system of representation as in a state. Since literately anyone can stand up as representatives, there is room for entrepreneurs. It is not surprising if we experience a struggle between different representatives and also their different representations of the society. What they do share , however, is a conviction that they are best at providing ( a new) order . If they can do this convincingly, they gain legitimacy. What must be done is to make the uncertain certain and make the unknown an object of knowledge. To present a discernable Other is a way of doing this . The Other is represented as an Other -- as an unified single actor with a similar unquestionable set of core values (i.e. the capital “O”). They are objectified, made into an object of knowledge, by re-presentation of their identity and values. In other words, the representation of the Other is depoliticized in the sense that its inner qualities are treated as given and non-negotiable.¶ In Jef Huysmans (1998:241) words, there is both a need for a mediation of chaos as well as of threat. A mediation of chaos is more basic than a mediation of threat, as it implies making chaos into a meaningful order by a convincing representation of the Self and its surroundings. It is a mediation of “ontological security”, which means “...a strategy of managing the limits of reflexivity ... by fixing social relations into a symbolic and institutional order” (Huysmans 1998:242). As he and others (like Hansen 1998:240) have pointed out, the importance of a threat construction for political identification, is often overstated. The mediation of chaos, of being the provider of order in general, is just as important. This may imply naming an Other but not necessarily as a threat.¶ Such a dichotomization implies a necessity to get rid of all the liminars (what Huysmans calls “strangers”). This is because they “...connote a challenge to categorizing practices through the impossibility of being categorized”, and does not threaten the community, “...but the possibility of ordering itself” (Huysmans 1998:241). They are a challenge to the entrepreneur by their very existence. They confuse the dichotomy of Self and Other and thereby the entrepreneur’s mediation of chaos. As mentioned, a liminar can for instance be people of mixed ethnical ancestry but also representations of competing world-pictures. As Eide (1998:76) notes: “Over and over again we see that the “liberals” within a group undergoing a mobilisation process for group conflict are the first ones to go”.¶ The liminars threaten the ontological order of the entrepreneur by challenging his representation of Self and Other and his mediation of chaos, which ultimately undermines the legitimacy of his policy. The liminars may be securitized by some sort of

disciplination, from suppression of cultural symbols to ethnic cleansing and expatriation. This is a threat to the ontological order of the entrepreneur, stemming from inside and thus repoliticizing the inside/outside dichotomy. Therefore the liminar must disappear . It must be made into a Self, as several minority groups throughout the world have experienced, or it must be forced out of the territory. A liminar may also become an Other, as its connection to the Self is cut and their former common culture is renounced and made insignificant. In Anne Norton’s (1988:55) words, “The presence of difference in the ambiguous other leads to its classification as wholly unlike and identifies it unqualifiedly with the archetypal other, denying the resemblance to the self.”¶ Then the liminar is no longer an ontological danger (chaos), but what Huysmans (1998:242) calls a mediation of “daily security”. This is not challenging the order or the system as such but has become a visible, clear-cut Other. In places like Bosnia, this naming and replacement of an Other, has been regarded by the securitizing actors as the solution to the ontological problem they have posed. Securitization was not considered a political move, in the sense that there were any choices. It was a necessity: Securitization was a solution based on a depoliticized ontology.[10]¶ This way the world-picture of the securitizing actor is not only a representation but also made into reality. The mythical second-order language is made into first-order language, and its “innocent” reality is forced upon the world. To the entrepreneurs and other actors involved it has become a “natural” necessity with a need to make order, even if it implies making the world match the map. Maybe that is why war against liminars are so often total; it attempts a total expatriation or a total “solution ” (like the Holocaust) and not only a victory on the battlefield. If the enemy is not even considered a legitimate Other, the door may be more open to a kind of violence that is way beyond any war conventions, any jus in bello.¶ This way, securitizing is legitimized: The entrepreneur has succeeded both in launching his world-view and in prescribing the necessary measures taken against it. This is possible by using the myths, by speaking on behalf of the natural and eternal, where truth is never questioned.

Self-fulfilling Prophecy Security requires the existence of insecurity, it never delivers it promise which is why it is so attractive to the state, If the state were to succeed in security projection, then it would cease to exist. Josefina Echavarría Alvarez, PhD in Peace, Conflict and Democracy, 2006, “Re-thinking (in)security discourses from a critical perspective”, http://echavarria.wissweb.at/fileadmin/echavarria/Rethinking_insecurity_Asteriskos_01.pdf, JFAs indicated by traditional IR, the problem of security is a matter of not having achieved greater levels of it in order to provide human collectivities with safety. Well, what if the problem of security was that it has to remain a promise since, as pointed by Buzan himself, achieving total security would result in the withering of the state? What if security’s main condition for possibility would be its own impossibility? The impossibility of security is one of the reasons why Michael Dillon (1996) has coined the term (in)security. He draws attention to the fact that “we stand too uncritically under the prejudice of the opposition between security and insecurity”: Because we can never think security without insecurity, and vice versa, there is an essential co nflict, which the word itself bears within itself, at the heart of security that is overlooked by the traditional study of security. This conflict is a conflict of unequal opposites which are rooted and routed together […] a unified agonal relationship of mutual definition rather than a dialectical relationship in which one term overcomes the other. It is evident, if we pause to think about security for a moment, that any discourse of security must always already, simultaneously and in a plurality of ways, be a discourse of danger too (Dillon, 1996:120-121). Josefina Echavarría Alvarez, Re-thinking (in)security discourses... * 79 In this light, the questions about security policy should be posed in an active voice, not taking for granted what security is, but problematizing it and questioning its supposedly foundation : Security does not reflect what a ‘people’ are, and seek to protect it. R ather, it discloses how, in tragic denials of the (in)security of mortal life, people – and a ‘people’ – are actually formed by attempts to extirpate the ‘foreign, strange, uncanny [and] outlandish’ which inevitable constitute their very own free [(in)secure] mortal existence (Dillon, 1996:35). Dillon (1996) situates security’s attempts at extirpating the other as

part of the modern Cartesian subject’s striving for certainty, for securing a stable ground for itself. But these attempts fail, for there is no stable ground that security can disclos e. Instead, security betrays “its own essence as an insistent demand for such a foundation” (78). The author partly bases his claim via analysing the word security, which “discloses that insecurity is always already folded into security, that it is impossible to have one without the other”. The re-presentation of security as being secured “proposes that there is a state of affairs – insecurity – and the negation of that state – security – and by doing so thoroughly represses the complexity not only of the act of securing but also of the inextricable relation between security and insecurity ” . The character of security as a process is erased and, instead, being secured is presented as “a simple dialectical opposition together with the implied promise that insecurity can always be mastered in principle if not in current practice”

(Dillon, 1996:122). An assumption that security policies take up entirely when they portray insecurity as the opposite of security without making explicit how both are embedded and intertwined with each other at all times and in all stages. In contrast to these uses of security, Dillon (1999:124-125) takes us back to the ancient meanings of the word. The Greek word for security, asphaleia, always pointed at the present relation between security and insecurity, both at once3 . This fundamental duality was also present in the Latin word sine cura4 , from where the English word security is derived. The word “security can therefore, only be thought by incorporating the trace of insecurity in the very articulation of security itself […] in short, security and insecurity are unequally co-determined” (Dillon, 1996:127). Hence Dillon’s coining of the term (in)security is a way of making visible and, therefore, a matter of consideration and contestation, the ambivalence of (in)security in

itself which “provides the very dynamic behind the way in which security operates as a generative principle of formation for the production of political order” (Dillon, 1996:127). Thought this way (in)security is the very impossibility of achieving the promise of security. Security’s impossibility to deliver is actually what makes the promise of security so attractive, for it can never be fulfilled and, therefore, constantly provides the state with its Hobbesian function s . In this line of argument, the impossible promise of (in)security would not be a paradox, but its own dynamic. In the case of state security discourses, it is then the unfeasibility of (in)security which, together with the state’s performative identity, makes possible the state’s own permanent reproduction as sovereign. Should the state project of security be successful in the terms in which it is articulated, the state would cease to exis t . Security as the absence of movement would result in death via stasis. Ironically, then, the inability of the state project of security to succeed is the guarantor of the state’s continued success as an impelling identity (Campbell, 1998:12). To sum up this last challenging perspective about the impossibility of (in)security, we can say that its impossibility is “not a threat to a state’s identity or existence: it is its condition of possibility [and, therefore] while the objects of concern change over time, the techniques and exclusions by which those objects are constituted as dangers persist” (Campbell, 1998:13).

Serial Policy Failure

Policy action fails, they refuse to understand they cant control everything and leads to serial policy failureMichael Dillon, PHD; researches the problematisation of politics, security and war & PhD in Politics, 2000, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emerge” Alternatives: Local, Global, Political Vol. 25 Issue 1 Jan-Mar 2000 JSTOR http://www.jstor.org/stable/40644986, JFReproblematization ¶ of problems ¶ is constrained by ¶ the institu- ¶ tional and ¶ ideological ¶ investments surrounding accepted "prob- ¶ lems," and by ¶ the sheer difficulty of challenging ¶ the ¶ inescapable ¶ ontological ¶ and epistemological assumptions ¶ that go ¶ into their ¶ very formation. There is nothing ¶ so fiercely contested as an epis- ¶ temological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing ¶ so ¶ fiercely ridiculed as the ¶ suggestion ¶ that the real problem with ¶ problematizations ¶ exists precisely ¶ at the level of such ¶ assumptions. ¶ Such ¶ "paralysis of ¶ analysis" ¶ is precisely what policymakers ¶ seek to ¶ avoid since they ¶ are compelled constantly ¶ to respond ¶ to circum- ¶ stances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less ¶ control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely ¶ the ¶ control that they want. Yet serial policy failure - the fate and the ¶ fuel of all policy ¶ - ¶ compels ¶ them into a continuous search for the ¶ new analysis ¶ that will extract them from the ¶ aporias ¶ in which they ¶ constantly find themselves enmeshed.35 ¶ Serial policy failure is no ¶ simple shortcoming ¶ that science and ¶ policy ¶ - and policy ¶ science - will ultimately overcome. Serial policy ¶ failure is rooted in the ontological ¶ and epistemological assumptions ¶ that fashion the ways ¶ in which global governance ¶ encounters and ¶ problematizes ¶ life as a process of emergence through fitness land- ¶ scapes ¶ that constantly adaptive ¶ and changing ¶ ensembles have con- ¶ tinuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, ¶

global governance promotes ¶ the very changes ¶ and unintended out- ¶ comes that it then serially reproblematizes ¶ in terms of policy failure. ¶ Thus, global ¶ liberal governance ¶ is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems ¶ simply by bringing better information and knowledge ¶ to bear ¶ upon ¶ them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, ¶ it deliberately ¶ installs ¶ socially specific ¶ and radically inequitable distributions ¶ of wealth, opportunity, ¶

and mortal danger both ¶ locally ¶ and glob- ¶ ally through the very detailed ways ¶ in which life is variously (pol- ¶ icy) problematized by ¶ it

Alternative

Reject the affirmative’s security logic, only resistance to discourse can generate genuine political thought, and conceptualize politics Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008, “Critique of Security”, 185-6, JFThe only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life . The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this ; worse, it remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve ' security ', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language wh ich takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state . That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths . For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics . To situate ourselves against

security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word . What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition , and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties , ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human ; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'

Critiquing institutions to unmask political violence is the most effective way to fight them, other action failsBent Flyvbjerg, professor of Planning at Aalborg University Denmark and chair of Infrastructure Policy and Planning at Delft University of Technology, 2002 “Planning and Foucault: In Search of the Dark Side of Planning Theory,” Planning Futures: New Directions for Planning Theory http://flyvbjerg.plan.aau.dk/DarkSide2.pdf, JFAccording to Foucault, Habermas’s (undated, 8) ‘authorisation of power by law’ is inadequate¶

(emphasis deleted). ‘[The juridical system] is utterly incongruous with the new methods of power,’¶

says Foucault (1980a, 89), ‘methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond¶ the state and its apparatus... Our historical gradient carries us further and further away from a¶ reign of law.’ The law, institutions - or policies and plans - provide no guarantee of freedom,¶ equality or democracy. Not even entire institutional systems, according to Foucault, can ensure¶ freedom, even though they are established with that purpose. Nor is freedom likely to be achieved¶ by imposing abstract theoretical systems or ‘correct’ thinking. On the contrary, history has¶ demonstrated--says Foucault--horrifying examples that it is precisely those social systems which¶ have turned freedom into theoretical formulas and treated practice as social engineering, i.e., as an¶ epistemically derived techne, that become most repressive. ‘[People] reproach me for not¶ presenting an overall theory,’ says Foucault (1984b, 375-6), ‘I am attempting, to the contrary, apart from any totalisation - which would be at once abstract and limiting - to open up problems¶ that are as concrete and general as possible’.¶ What Foucault calls his ‘political task’ is ‘to criticise the working of institutions which appear to¶ be both neutral and independent; to criticise them in such a manner that the political violence¶ which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight¶ them’ (Chomsky and Foucault 1974, 171). This is what, in a Foucauldian interpretation, would be¶ seen as an effective approach to institutional change, including change in the institutions of civil¶ society. With direct reference to Habermas, Foucault (1988, 18) adds:¶ ‘The problem is not of trying to dissolve [relations of power] in the utopia of a perfectly¶ transparent communication, but to give...the rules of law, the techniques of management, and also¶ the ethics...which would allow these games of power to be played with a minimum of domination.’

The alt is a pre-req to understanding threats and properly responding, if we assume there is always danger, then there is always something to do, James Der Derian, Professor at Brown University, International Studies, 1998, "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard," Ciaonet, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html,JFWhat if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is, other than us ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities.¶ The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it clear that I am not in search of an "alternative security." An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought." 9 Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security:¶ I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative . My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. 10¶ The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference.

Framework

Reps come first, What begs the question of why Jayan Nayar, Ph.D from the University of Cambridge, 1999, “SYMPOSIUM: RE-FRAMING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: Orders of Inhumanity” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems Fall, JFThe description of the continuities of violence in Section II in many ways is familiar to those who adopt a critical perspective of the world. "We" are accustomed to narrating human wrongs in this way. The failures and betrayals, the victims and perpetrators, are familiar to our critical understanding. From this position of judgment, commonly held within the "mainstream" of the "non-mainstream," there is also a familiarity of solutions commonly advocated for transformation; the "marketplace" for critique is a thriving one as evidenced by the abundance of literature in this respect. Despite this proliferation of enlightenment and the profession of so many good ideas, however, "things" appear to remain as they are, or, worse still, [*620] deteriorate . And so, the cycle of critique, proposals for transformation and disappointment continues . Rightly, we are concerned with the question of what can be done to alleviate the sufferings that prevail. But there are necessary prerequisites to answering the "what do we do?" question . We must first ask the intimately connected questions of "about what?" and "toward what en d ?" These questions, obviously, impinge on our vision and judgment. When we attempt to imagine transformations toward preferred human futures, we engage in the difficult task of judging the present. This is difficult not because we are oblivious to violence or that we are numb to the resulting suffering, but because, outrage with "events" of violence aside, processes of violence embroil and implicate our familiarities in ways that defy the simplicities of straightforward imputability. Despite our best efforts at categorizing violence into convenient compartments--into "disciplines" of study and analysis such as "development" and "security" (health, environment, population, being other examples of such compartmentalization)--the encroachments of order(ing) function at more pervasive levels. And without doubt, the perspectives of the observer, commentator, and actor become crucial determinants. It is necessary , I believe, to question this, "our," perspective, to reflect upon a perspective of violence which not only locates violence as a happening "out there" while we stand as detached observers and critics, but is also one in which we are ourselves implicated in the violence of ordered worlds where we stand very much as participants. For this purpose of a critique of critique, it is necessary to consider the "technologies" of ordering.

Communicative actions are key to promote changeBent Flyvbjerg, professor of Planning at Aalborg University Denmark and chair of Infrastructure Policy and Planning at Delft University of Technology, 2002 “Planning and Foucault: In Search of the Dark Side of Planning Theory,” Planning Futures: New Directions for Planning Theory http://flyvbjerg.plan.aau.dk/DarkSide2.pdf, JFHabermas does not provide a detailed vocabulary of power, or a theory of its workings, whichmight facilitate the close understanding of how power shapes policy making and implementation,and rationality itself. Healey recognises the risk that the focus on the analysis of communicativeacts 'could render the researcher myopic to the power relations among planners, municipalcouncils and clients' (Healey 1992, 10). She, like others, addresses the problem by emphasisingthe permeation of power into communication: 'Communicative acts contain assumptions andmetaphors, which by conveying meaning, affect what people do. These assumptions and meaningsmay carry power relationships or structure within them. In turn, the way communicative acts are

created and used help sustain or challenge power structures' (1992, 10). This argument seems toacknowledge the importance of an understanding of power, but then turns away from it, towards apreoccupation with the mechanics and dynamics of communication.

Realism

New studies disprove biological realism, that mindset leads us to our own violent extinction Jeremy Rifkin, Senior Lecturer @ Wharton, 1-11, 10, “The Empathic Civilization': Rethinking Human Nature in the Biosphere Era”, Huffington post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeremy-rifkin/the-empathic-civilization_b_416589.html//JFThe problem runs deeper than the issue of finding new ways to regulate the market or imposing legally binding global green house gas emission reduction targets. The real crisis lies in the set of assumptions about human nature that governs the behavior of world leaders--assumptions that were spawned during the Enlightenment more than 200 years ago at the dawn of the modern market economy and the emergence of the nation state era. The Enlightenment thinkers--John Locke, Adam Smith, Marquis de Condorcet et. al.--took umbrage with the Medieval Christian world view that saw human nature as fallen and depraved and that looked to salvation in the next world through God's grace. They preferred to cast their lot with the idea that human beings' essential nature is rational, detached, autonomous, acquisitive and utilitarian and argued that individual salvation lies in unlimited material progress here on Earth . The Enlightenment notions about human nature were reflected in the newly minted nation-state whose raison d'être was to protect private property relations and stimulate market forces as well as act as a surrogate of the collective self-interest of the citizenry in the international arena. Like individuals, nation-states were considered to be autonomous agents embroiled in a relentless battle with other sovereign nations in the pursuit of material gains. It was these very assumptions that provided the philosophical underpinnings for a geopolitical frame of reference that accompanied the first and second industrial revolutions in the 19th and 20th centuries. These beliefs about human nature came to the fore in the aftermath of the global economic meltdown and in the boisterous and acrimonious confrontations in the meeting rooms in Copenhagen, with potentially disastrous consequences for the future of humanity and the planet. If human nature is as the Enlightenment philosophers claimed, then we are likely doomed . I t is impossible to imagine how we might create a sustainable global economy and restore the biosphere to health if each and every one of us is , at the core of our biology, an autonomous agent and a self-centered and materialistic being . Recent discoveries in brain science and child development, however, are forcing us to rethink these long-held shibboleths about human nature. B iologists and cognitive neuroscientists are discovering mirror- neurons--the so-called empathy neurons -- that allow human beings and other species to feel and experience another's situation as if it were one's own . We are, it appears, the most social of animals and seek intimate participation and companionship with our fellows. Social scientists , in turn, are beginning to reexamine human history from an empathic lens and, in the process, discovering previously hidden strands of the human narrative which suggests that human evolution is measured not only by the expansion of power over nature, but also by the intensification and extension of empathy to more diverse others across broader temporal and spatial domains . The growing scientific evidence that we are a fundamentally empathic species has profound and far-reaching consequences for society, and may well determine our fate as a species. What is required now is nothing less than a leap to global empathic consciousness and in less than a generation if we are to resurrect the global economy and revitalize the biosphere. The question becomes this: what is the mechanism that allows empathic sensitivity to mature and consciousness to expand through history? The pivotal turning points in human consciousness occur when new energy regimes converge with new communications revolutions, creating new economic eras. The new communications revolutions become the command and control mechanisms for structuring, organizing and managing more complex civilizations that the new energy regimes make possible. For example, in the early modern age, print communication became the means to organize and manage the technologies, organizations, and infrastructure of the coal, steam, and rail revolution. It would have been impossible to administer the first industrial revolution using script and codex. Communication revolutions not only manage new, more complex energy regimes, but also change human consciousness in the process. Forager/hunter societies relied on oral communications and their consciousness was mythologically

constructed. The great hydraulic agricultural civilizations were, for the most part, organized around script communication and steeped in theological consciousness. The first industrial revolution of the 19th century was managed by print communication and ushered in ideological consciousness. Electronic communication became the command and control mechanism for arranging the second industrial revolution in the 20th century and spawned psychological consciousness. Each more sophisticated communication revolution brings together more diverse people in increasingly more expansive and varied social networks. Oral communication has only limited temporal and spatial reach while script, print and electronic communications each extend the range and depth of human social interaction. By extending the central nervous system of each individual and the society as a whole, communication revolutions provide an evermore inclusive playing field for empathy to mature and consciousness to expand. For example, during the period of the great hydraulic agricultural civilizations characterized by script and theological consciousness, empathic sensitivity broadened from tribal blood ties to associational ties based on common religious affiliation. Jews came to empathize with Jews, Christians with Christians, Muslims with Muslims, etc. In the first industrial revolution characterized by print and ideological consciousness, empathic sensibility extended to national borders, with Americans empathizing with Americans, Germans with Germans, Japanese with Japanese and so on. In the second industrial revolution, characterized by electronic communication and psychological consciousness, individuals began to identify with like-minded others. Today, we are on the cusp of another historic convergence of energy and communication--a third industrial revolution--that could extend empathic sensibility to the biosphere itself and all of life on Earth. The distributed Internet revolution is coming together with distributed renewable energies, making possible a sustainable, post-carbon economy that is both globally connected and locally managed. In the 21st century, hundreds of millions--and eventually billions--of human beings will transform their buildings into power plants to harvest renewable energies on site, store those energies in the form of hydrogen and share electricity, peer-to-peer, across local, regional, national and continental inter-grids that act much like the Internet. The open source sharing of energy, like open source sharing of information, will give rise to collaborative energy spaces--not unlike the collaborative social spaces that currently exist on the Internet. When every family and business comes to take responsibility for its own small swath of the biosphere by harnessing renewable energy and sharing it with millions of others on smart power grids that stretch across continents, we become intimately interconnected at the most basic level of earthly existence by jointly stewarding the energy that bathes the planet and sustains all of life. The new distributed communication revolution not only organizes distributed renewable energies, but also changes human consciousness. The information communication technologies (ICT) revolution is quickly extending the central nervous system of billions of human beings and connecting the human race across time and space, allowing empathy to flourish on a global scale, for the first time in history. Whether in fact we will begin to empathize as a species will depend on how we use the new distributed communication medium. While distributed communications technologies-and, soon, distributed renewable energies - are connecting the human race, what is so shocking is that no one has offered much of a reason as to why we ought to be connected. We talk breathlessly about access and inclusion in a global communications network but speak little of exactly why we want to communicate with one another on such a planetary scale. What's sorely missing is an overarching reason that billions of human beings should be increasingly connected. Toward what end? The only feeble explanations thus far offered are to share information, be entertained, advance commercial exchange and speed the globalization of the economy. All the above, while relevant, nonetheless seem insufficient to justify why nearly seven billion human beings should be connected and mutually embedded in a globalized society. The idea of even billion individual connections, absent any overall unifying purpose, seems a colossal waste of human energy. More important, making global connections without any real transcendent purpose risks a narrowing rather than an expanding of human consciousness. But what if our distributed global communication networks were put to the task of helping us re-participate in deep communion with the common biosphere that sustains all of our lives? The biosphere is the narrow band that extends some forty miles from the ocean floor to outer space where living creatures and the Earth's geochemical processes interact to sustain each other. We are learning that the biosphere functions like an indivisible organism. It is the continuous symbiotic relationships between every living creature and between living creatures and the geochemical processes that ensure the survival of the planetary organism and the individual species that live within its biospheric envelope. If every human life, the species as a whole, and all other life-forms are entwined with one another and with the geochemistry of the planet in a rich and complex choreography that sustains life itself, then we are all dependent on and responsible for the health of the whole organism. Carrying out that responsibility means living out our individual lives in our neighborhoods and communities in ways that

promote the general well-being of the larger biosphere within which we dwell. The Third Industrial Revolution offers just such an opportunity. If we can harness our empathic sensibility to establish a new global ethic that recognizes and acts to harmonize the many relationships that make up the life-sustaining forces of the planet, we will have moved beyond the detached , self-interested and utilitarian philosophical assumptions that accompanied national markets and nation state governance and into a new era of biosphere consciousness. We leave the old world of geopolitics behind and enter into a new world of biosphere politics, with new forms of governance emerging to accompany our new biosphere awareness. The Third Industrial Revolution and the new era of distributed capitalism allow us to sculpt a new approach to globalization, this time emphasizing continentalization from the bottom up. Because renewable energies are more or less equally distributed around the world, every region is potentially amply endowed with the power it needs to be relatively self-sufficient and sustainable in its lifestyle, while at the same time interconnected via smart grids to other regions across countries and continents. When every community is locally empowered, both figuratively and literally, it can engage directly in regional, transnational, continental, and limited global trade without the severe restrictions that are imposed by the geopolitics that oversee elite fossil fuels and uranium energy distribution. Continentalization is already bringing with it a new form of governance. The nation-state, which grew up alongside the First and Second Industrial Revolutions, and provided the regulatory mechanism for managing an energy regime whose reach was the geosphere, is ill suited for a Third Industrial Revolution whose domain is the biosphere. Distributed renewable energies generated locally and regionally and shared openly--peer to peer--across vast contiguous land masses connected by intelligent utility networks and smart logistics and supply chains favor a seamless network of governing institutions that span entire continents. The European Union is the first continental governing institution of the Third Industrial Revolution era. The EU is already beginning to put in place the infrastructure for a European-wide energy regime, along with the codes, regulations, and standards to effectively operate a seamless transport, communications, and energy grid that will stretch from the Irish Sea to the doorsteps of Russia by midcentury. Asian, African, and Latin American continental political unions are also in the making and will likely be the premier governing institutions on their respective continents by 2050. In this new era of distributed energy, governing institutions will more resemble the workings of the ecosystems they manage. Just as habitats function within ecosystems, and ecosystems within the biosphere in a web of interrelationships, governing institutions will similarly function in a collaborative network of relationships with localities, regions, and nations all embedded within the continent as a whole. This new complex political organism operates like the biosphere it attends, synergistically and reciprocally. This is biosphere politics. The new biosphere politics transcends traditional right/left distinctions so characteristic of the geopolitics of the modern market economy and nation-state era. The new divide is generational and contrasts the traditional top-down model of structuring family life, education, commerce, and governance with a younger generation whose thinking is more relational and distributed, whose nature is more

collaborative and cosmopolitan, and whose work and social spaces favor open-source commons. For the Internet generation, "quality of life" becomes as important as individual opportunity in fashioning a new dream for the 21st century. The transition to biosphere consciousness has already begun. All over the world, a younger generation is beginning to realize that one's daily consumption of energy and other resources ultimately affects the lives of every other human being and every other creature that inhabits the Earth. The Empathic Civilization is emerging . A younger generation is fast extending its empathic embrace beyond religious affiliations and national identification to include the whole of humanity and the vast project of life that envelops the Earth. But our rush to universal empathic connectivity is running up against a rapidly accelerating entropic juggernaut in the form of climate change. Can we reach biosphere consciousness and global empathy in time to avert planetary collapse?

Realism bad-leads to and justifies violenceDavid Grondin , Assistant Professor, Member of the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies Ph.D. in Political Science (International Relations and American Studies), 2004, “Rethinking the political from a Poststructualist Stance” http://www.ieim.uqam.ca/IMG/pdf/rewriting_national_security_state.pdf, JFCommitted to an explanatory logic, realist analysts are less interested in the¶ constitutive processes of states and state systems than in their functional existence, which¶ they take as given. They are more attentive to regulation, through the military uses of force¶ and strategic practices that establish the internal and external boundaries of the states¶ system. Their main argument is that matters of security are the immutable driving forces¶ of global politics. Indeed, most realists see some strategic lessons as being eternal, such as¶ balance of power politics and the quest for national security. For Brooks and Wohlforth,¶ balance of power politics (which was synonymous with Cold War politics in realist¶

discourses) is the norm: “The result — balancing that is rhetorically grand but substantively weak — is politics as usual in a unipolar world” (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002: 29).¶ National security discourses constitute the “observed realities” that are the grist of¶ neorealist and neoclassical realist theories. These theories rely upon U.S. material power¶ (the perception of U.S. relative material power for neoclassical realists), balance of power,¶ and the global distribution of power to explain and legitimate American national security¶ conduct. Their argument is circular since they depict a reality that is constituted by their¶ own discourse, in addition to legitimizing American strategic behavior. Realists often¶ disagree about the use of force – on military restraint versus military intervention, for¶ example – but the differences pertain to strategies of power, that is, means as opposed to¶ ends. Realist discourses will not challenge the United States’ position as a prominent¶ military power. As Barry Posen maintains, “[o]ne pillar of U.S. hegemony is the vast¶ military power of the United States. […] Observers of the actual capabilities that this¶ effort produces can focus on a favorite aspect of U.S. superiority to make the point that¶ the United States sits comfortably atop the military food chain, and is likely to remain¶ there” (Posen, 2003: 7). ¶ Realist analysts “observe” that the U.S. is the world hegemonic power and that no¶ other state can balance that power. In their analyses, they seek to explain how the United¶ States was able to build and lead coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq with no other power¶ capable of offering military resistance. Barry Posen “neutrally” explains this by emphasizing the United States’ permanent preparation for war:

Realists see the world through a fantasy lens, this perpetrates endless war and violenceDavid Grondin , Assistant Professor, Member of the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies Ph.D. in Political Science (International Relations and American Studies), 2004, “Rethinking the political from a Poststructualist Stance” http://www.ieim.uqam.ca/IMG/pdf/rewriting_national_security_state.pdf, JFNeorealist and neoclassical realism offer themselves up as a narrative of the world¶ institutional order. Critical approaches must therefore seek to countermemorialize “those¶ whose lives and voices have been variously silenced in the process of strategic practices”¶ (Klein, 1994: 28). The problem, as revealed in the debate between gatekeepers of the¶ subfield of Strategic Studies (Walt, 1991), is that those analyses that contravene the¶ dominant discourse are deemed insignificant by virtue of their differing ontological and¶ epistemological foundations. ¶ Approaches that deconstruct theoretical practices in order to disclose what is hidden¶ in the use of concepts such as “national security” have something valuable to say. Their¶ more reflexive and critically-inclined view illustrates how terms used in realist discourses,¶ such as state, anarchy, world order, revolution in military affairs, and security dilemmas,¶ are produced by a specific historical, geographical and socio-political context as well as¶

historical forces and social relations of power (Klein, 1994: 22). Since realist analysts do¶ not question their ontology and yet purport to provide a neutral and objective analysis of¶ a given world order based on military power and interactions between the most important¶ political units, namely states, realist discourses constitute a political act in defense of the¶ state. Indeed, “[…] it is important to recognize that to employ a textualizing approach to¶ social policy involving conflict and war is not to attempt to reduce social phenomena to¶ various concrete manifestations of language. Rather, it is an attempt to analyze the¶ interpretations governing policy thinking. And it is important to recognize that policy¶ thinking is not unsituated” (Shapiro, 1989a: 71). Policy thinking is practical thinking since¶ it imposes an analytic order on the “real world”, a world that only exists in the analysts’¶ own narratives. In this light, Barry Posen’s political role in legitimizing American¶ hegemonic power and national security conduct seems obvious:

Realism not inevitableDavid Grondin , Assistant Professor, Member of the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies Ph.D. in Political Science (International Relations and American Studies), 2004, “Rethinking the political from a Poststructualist Stance” http://www.ieim.uqam.ca/IMG/pdf/rewriting_national_security_state.pdf, JFIn explaining national security conduct, realist discourses serve the violent¶ 6¶ purposes¶ of the state, as well as legitimizing its actions and reinforcing its hegemony. This is why¶ we must historicize the practice of the analyst and question the “regimes of truth”¶ constructed by realist discourses. When studying a given discourse, one must also study¶ the socio-historical conditions in which it was produced. Realist analysts are part of the¶ subfield of Strategic Studies associated with the Cold War era. Even though it faced¶ numerous criticisms after the Cold War, especially since it proved irrelevant in predicting¶ its end, this subfield retains a significant influence in International Relations – as¶

evidenced, for instance, by the vitality of the journal International Security. Theoretically¶ speaking, Strategic Studies is the field par excellence of realist analyses: it is a way of¶ interpreting the world, which is inscribed in the language of violence, organized in¶ strategy, in military planning, in a military order, and which seek to shape and preserve¶ world order (Klein, 1994: 14). Since they are interested in issues of international order,¶ realist discourses study the balancing and bandwagoning behavior of great powers. ¶ Realist analysts believe they can separate object from subject: on this view, it would¶ be

possible to abstract oneself from the world in which one lives and studies and to use¶ value-free discourse to produce a non-normative analysis. As Stephen Brooks and¶ William Wohlforth assert, “[s]uch arguments [about American moderation and international benevolence that stress the constraints on American power] are unpersuasive,¶ however, because they fail to acknowledge the true nature of the current international¶ system” (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002: 31). Thus it would seem that Brooks and¶ Wohlforth have the ability to “know” essential “truths”, as they “know” the “true” nature¶

of the international system. From this vantage point it would even be possible “to set asideone’s own subjective biases and values and to confront the world on its own terms, with¶ the hope of gaining mastery of that world through a clear understanding that transcends¶ the limits of such personal determinants as one’s own values, class, gender, race, or¶ emotions” (Klein, 1994: 16). However, it is impossible to speak or write from a neutral¶ or transcendental ground: “there are only interpretations – some stronger and some¶ weaker, to be sure – based on argument and evidence, which seems from the standpoint¶ of the interpreter and his or her interlocutor to be ‘right’ or ‘accurate’ or ‘useful’ at the¶ moment of interpretation” (Medhurst, 2000: 10). It is in such realist discourse that¶ Strategic Studies become a technocratic approach determining the foundations of¶

security policies that are disguised as an academic approach above all critical reflection¶ (Klein, 1994: 27-28).¶ Committed to an explanatory logic, realist analysts are less interested in the¶ constitutive processes of states and state systems than in their functional existence, which¶ they take as given. They are more attentive to regulation, through the military uses of force¶ and strategic practices that establish the internal and external boundaries of the states¶ system. Their main argument is that matters of security are the immutable driving forces¶ of global politics. Indeed, most realists see some strategic lessons as being eternal, such as¶ balance of power politics and the quest for national security. For Brooks and Wohlforth,¶ balance of power politics (which was synonymous with Cold War politics in realist¶ discourses) is the norm: “The result — balancing that is rhetorically grand but substantively weak — is politics as usual in a unipolar world” (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002: 29).¶ National security discourses constitute the “observed realities” that are the grist of¶ neorealist and neoclassical realist theories. These theories rely upon U.S. material power¶ (the perception of U.S. relative material power for neoclassical realists), balance of power,¶ and the global distribution of power to explain and legitimate American national security¶ conduct. Their argument is circular since they depict a reality that is constituted by their¶ own discourse, in addition to legitimizing American strategic behavior. Realists often¶ disagree about the use of force – on military restraint versus military intervention, for¶ example – but the differences pertain to strategies of power, that is, means as opposed to¶ ends. Realist discourses will not challenge the United States’ position as a prominent¶ military power. As Barry Posen maintains, “[o]ne pillar of U.S. hegemony is the vast¶ military power of the United States. […] Observers of the actual capabilities that this¶ effort produces can focus on a favorite aspect of U.S. superiority to make the point that¶ the United States sits comfortably atop the military food chain, and is likely to remain¶

there” (Posen, 2003: 7). ¶ Realist analysts “observe” that the U.S. is the world hegemonic power and that no¶ other state can balance that power. In their analyses, they seek to explain how the United¶ States was able to build and lead coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq with no other power¶ capable of offering military resistance. Barry Posen “neutrally” explains this by emphasizing the United States’ permanent preparation for war: I argue that the United States enjoys command of the commons—command of the¶

sea, space, and air. I discuss how command of the commons supports a hegemonic¶ grand strategy. […] Command means that the United States gets vastly more military¶ use out of the sea, space, and air than do others; that it can credibly threaten to deny¶ their use to others; and that others would lose a military contest for the commons if¶ they attempted to deny them to the United States. Command of the commons is the¶ key military enabler of the U.S. global power position. It allows the United States to¶

exploit more fully other sources of power, including its own economic and military¶ might as well as the economic and military might of its allies. Command of the¶ commons has permitted the United States to

wage war on short notice even where it¶ has had little permanent military presence. This was true of the 1991 Persian Gulf¶ War, the 1993 intervention in Somalia, and the 2001 action in Afghanistan (Posen,¶

2003: 7-9).¶ Moreover, in realist theoretical discourses, transnational non-state actors such as¶ terrorist networks are not yet taken into account. According to Brooks and Wohlforth,¶ they need not be: “Today there is one pole in a system in which the population has¶ trebled to nearly 200” (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002: 29). In their system, only states¶ are relevant. And what of the Al-Qaida terrorist network? At best, realist discourses¶ accommodate an interstate framework, a “reality” depicted in their writings as an¶

oversimplification of the complex world in which we now live (Kratochwil, 2000).¶ 7¶ In their theoretical constructs, these analysts do not address national or state identity¶ in any substantive way. Moreover, they do not pay attention to the security culture in¶ which they as individuals are embedded¶

8¶ . They rarely if ever acknowledge their¶ subjectivity as analysts, and they proceed as if they were able to separate themselves from¶ their cultural environment. From a poststructuralist perspective, however, it is impossible¶ to recognize all the ways in which we have been shaped by the culture and environment¶ in which we were raised. We can only think or experience the world through a culturalprism: it is impossible to abstract oneself from one’s interpretive cultural context and¶ experience and describe “the world as it is”. There is always an interpretive dimension to¶ knowledge, an inevitable mediation between the “real world” and its representation. This¶ is why American realist analysts have trouble shedding the Cold War mentality in which¶ they were immersed. Yet some scholars, like Brooks and Wohlforth, consciously want to¶ perpetuate it: “Today the costs and dangers of the Cold War have faded into history, but¶ they need to be kept in mind in order to assess unipolarity accurately” (Brooks and¶ Wohlforth, 2002: 30).

At: threats exist

“Threats” are simply a way to blame all our problems on everything, they are a combination of social issues. Tom Jacons, Professional Journalist for 20 Years, 3-8-10, “The Comforting Notion of an All-Powerful Enemy”, Miller-McCune, http://www.miller-mccune.com/politics/the-comforting-notion-of-an-all-powerful-enemy-10429, JFWe have seen the enemy, and he is powerful. That’s a recurring motif of contemporary political discourse, as generalized fear mutates for many into a fixation on a ferocious foe . Partisan rhetoric has turned increasingly alarmist. President Obama has difficulty getting even watered-down legislation passed, yet he is supposedly establishing a socialist state. The Tea Party is viewed as a terrifying new phenomenon, rather than the latest embodiment of a recurring paranoid streak in American politics. Osama bin Laden is likely confined to a cave, but he’s perceived as a threat large enough to justify engaging in torture. According to one school of thought, this tendency to exaggerate the strength of our adversaries serves a specific psychological function. It is less scary to place all our fears on a single, strong enemy than to accept the fact our well-being is largely based on factors beyond our control . An enemy, after all, can be defined, analyzed and perhaps even defeated. The notion that focusing our anger on a purportedly powerful foe helps mitigate our fears was first articulated by cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker in his 1969 book Angel in Armor. It has now been confirmed in a timely paper titled “An Existential Function of Enemyship,” just published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. A research team led by social psychologist Daniel Sullivan of the University of Kansas reports on four studies that suggest people are “motivated to create and/or perpetually maintain clear enemies to avoid psychological confrontations with an even more threatening chaotic environment.” When you place their findings in the context of the many threats (economic and otherwise) people face in today’s world, the propensity to turn ideological opponents into mighty monsters starts to make sense. In one of Sullivan’s studies, conducted during the 2008 presidential campaign, a group of University of Kansas undergraduates were asked whether they believed enemies of their favored candidate (Obama or John McCain) were manipulating voting machines in an attempt to steal the election. Prior to considering such conspiracy theories, half were asked to consider the truth of statements such as “I have control over whether I am exposed to a disease,” and “I have control over how my job prospects fare in the economy.” The other half were asked to assess similar statements on relatively unimportant subjects, such as “I have control over how much TV I watch.” Those who were forced to contemplate their lack of control over significant life events “reported a stronger belief in opponent-led conspiracies,” the researchers report. In another study, the student participants were randomly assigned to read one of two essays. The first stated that the U.S. government is well-equipped to handle the economic downturn, and that crime rates are declining due to improved law enforcement. The second reported the government is not at all competent to cope with the recession, and crime rates are going up in spite of the authorities’ best efforts. They were then presented with a list of hypothetical events and asked to pick the most likely cause of each: A friend, an enemy, or neither (that is, the event happened randomly). Those “informed” that the government was not in control were more likely to view a personal enemy as responsible for negative events in their lives. In contrast, those told things are running smoothly “seemed to defensively downplay the extent to which enemies negatively influence their lives,” the researchers report. These studies suggest it’s oddly comforting to have someone, or something, you can point to as the source of your sorrows. This helps explain why

Americans inevitably find an outside enemy to focus on, be it the Soviets, the Muslims or the Chinese. Given that society pays an obvious price for such illusions, how might we go about reducing the need for “enemyship?” “If you can somehow raise people’s sense that they have control over their lives and negative hazards in the world, their need to ‘enemize’ others should be reduced,” Sullivan said in an e-mail interview. “In our first study, for instance, we showed that people who feel dispositionally high levels of control over their lives did not respond to a reminder of external hazards by attributing more influence to an enemy. Any social structure or implementation that makes people feel more control over their lives should thus generally reduce (though perhaps not completely eliminate) the ‘need’ or tendency to create or attribute more influence to enemy figures. “In our third study, we showed that if people perceived the broader social system as ordered, they were more likely to respond to a threat to personal control by boosting their faith in the government, rather than by attributing more influence to an enemy. So, again, we see that the need to perceive enemies is reduced when people are made to feel that they are in control of their lives, or that there is a reliable, efficient social order that protects them from the threat of random hazards. “One could imagine, then, that circumstances which allow all citizens to be medically insured, or to have a clear sense of police protection, could reduce the tendency to seek out enemy figures to distill or focalize concerns with random, imminent threats.” Sullivan also offers two more personal potential solutions. “If people have such inherent needs for control and certainty in their lives, they should try to channel those needs as best they can into socially beneficial pursuits,” he says. “Lots of people pursue science, art and religion — just to give a few examples — as means of boiling down uncertainty about the world into clear systems of rules and engagement with reality, creating small domains for themselves in which they can exert a sense of mastery. Insofar as these pursuits don’t harm anyone, but still provide a sense of control, they can reduce the need for enemyship. “A final solution would be to encourage people to simply accept uncertainty and lack of control in their lives,” he adds. “Some meaning systems — Taoism for example — are rooted in this idea, that people can eventually accept a certain lack of control and eventually become resigned to this idea to the extent that they no longer react defensively against it.”

A2: Extinction

Extinction fears a hyped up, all claims have fail to appear and are dramatized, no in-depth analysis has been doneFrank Furedi, professor of sociology at the University of Kent, 10-9-10, “Fear is key to irresponsibility”, The Australian, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/fear-is-key-to-irresponsibility/story-e6frg6zo-1225935797740, JFIn a world rife with conspiracy theories, there's little scope for human agency¶ WHO decides our individual fate? How much of our future is influenced by the exercise of free will?¶ Humanity's destiny has been a subject of controversy since the beginning of history. So it is not surprising that, back in ancient times, different gods were endowed with the capacity to thwart our ambition or bless us with good fortune.¶ The Romans worshipped the goddess Fortuna (sometimes depicted with the blindfold of disinterest and a cornucopia) and conceded her great power over human affairs. But they still believed her influence could be contained and even overcome by men of true virtue. As the saying goes, "fortune favours the brave".¶ The belief that the power of fortune could be limited through human effort and will is one of the important legacies of humanism. Belief in the capacity of people to exercise their will and shape their future flourished during the Renaissance, creating a world where people could dream of their ability to struggle against fortune.¶ A refusal to defer to fate was expressed through an affirmation of the human potential. Later, during the Enlightenment, this sensibility would develop into a belief that in certain circumstances man could gain the freedom necessary to influence the future.¶ In the 21st century the optimistic belief in humanity's potential for subduing the unknown and to become master of its fate has given way to the belief that we are too powerless to deal with the perils confronting us. ¶ We live in an era where problems associated with uncertainty and risk are amplified and, through our imagination, mutate swiftly into existential threats. Consequently, it is rare that unexpected natural events are treated as just that.¶ Rather, they are swiftly dramatised and transformed into a threat to human survival. The clearest expression of this tendency is the dramatisation of weather forecasting.¶

Once upon a time the television weather forecasts were those boring moments when you got up to get a snack. But with the invention of concepts such as "extreme weather", routine events such as storms, smog or unexpected snowfalls have acquired compelling entertainment qualities.¶ This is a world where a relatively ordinary, technical, information-technology problem such as the so-called millennium bug was interpreted as a threat of apocalyptic proportions, and where a flu epidemic takes on the dramatic weight of the plot of a Hollywood disaster movie.¶ Recently, when the World Health Organisation warned that the human species was threatened by the swine flu, it became evident that it was cultural prejudice rather than sober risk assessment that influenced much of present-day official thinking.¶ In recent times European culture has become confused about the meaning of uncertainty and risk. Contemporary Western cultural attitudes towards uncertainty, chance and risk are far more pessimistic and confused than they were through most of the modern era. Only rarely is uncertainty perceived as an opportunity to take responsibility for our destiny. Invariably uncertainty is represented as a marker for danger and change is often regarded with dread.¶ Frequently, worst-case thinking displaces any genuine risk-assessment process. Risk assessment is based on an attempt to calculate the probability of different outcomes. Worst-case thinking -- these days known as precautionary thinking -- is based on an act of imagination. It imagines the worst-case scenario and demands that we take action on that basis.¶ For example, earlier this year the fear that particles in the ash cloud from the volcanic eruption in Iceland could cause airplane engines to shut down automatically swiftly mutated into the conclusion

that they would. It was the fantasy of the worst case, rather than risk assessment, that led to a panicky official ban on air traffic.¶ Implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, advocates of worst-case thinking justify their demand that society abandons thinking about risks in terms of a balance of probabilities.¶ Such critics of probabilistic thinking call for a radical break with past practices on the grounds that today we simply lack the information to calculate probabilities effectively.¶ This rejection of the practice of calculating probabilities is motivated by the belief that the dangers we face are so overwhelming and catastrophic -- millennium bug, international terrorism, swine flu, climate change -- that we cannot wait until we have the information to calculate their destructive effects.¶ "Shut it down!" is the default response. One of the many regrettable consequences of this procedure is that policies designed to deal with threats are increasingly based on feelings and intuition rather than on evidence or facts.¶ Worst-case thinking encourages society to adopt fear as of one of the dominant principles around which the public, its government and its institutions should organise their life. It institutionalises insecurity and fosters a mood of confusion and powerlessness.¶ By popularising the belief that worst cases are normal, it incites people to feel defenceless and vulnerable to a wide range of threats. In all but name it constitutes an invitation to defer to fortuna.¶ The tendency to engage with uncertainty through the prism of fear and therefore anticipate destructive outcome can be understood as a crisis of causality. Increasingly the question of what we should fear leads policy- makers to demand precaution.¶ When events appear to have little meaning and society finds it difficult to account for their origins and future trajectory, it is tempting to rely on caution rather than on reasoning. Human beings have always exercised caution when dealing with uncertainty. However, today, caution has become politicised and turned into a dominant cultural norm.¶ The clearest manifestation of this is the ascendancy of the idea of sustainability. The doctrine of sustainability demands that we do not take risks with our future. From this perspective, taking decisive action to promote progress is seen as far more dangerous than staying still. That is why ideals associated with development, progress and economic growth enjoy little cultural valuation. In contrast, just to sustain a future of more of the same is represented as a worthwhile objective.¶ Precautionary culture answers the age-old questions of where does fate end and where does free will begin by insisting that our fate is to sustain.¶ In Roman times and during the Renaissanace it was argued that virtus could overcome the power of fortuna. The ideals of virtue upheld ideals associated with courage, prudence, intelligence, a dedication to the public good and the willingness to take risks.¶ Petrach's remarkable The Remedies of Both Kinds of Fortune proposed the very modern and radical idea that humanity had the potential to control its destiny.¶ It was in the context of the Renaissance that the conviction that people had the power to transform the physical world began to gain ground.¶ In the present climate, where Western culture is so apprehensive in dealing with uncertainty, the aspiration to transform, develop and progress has been overwhelmed by the ethos of caution and sustainability.¶ A crisis of causality expresses a profound sense of unease towards people's capacity to know. This influences the way communities interpret the world around them. Once the authority of knowledge is undermined, people lose confidence in their capacity to interpret new events.¶ This scepticism about our inability to anticipate outcomes is often based on the argument that we do not have the time to catch up with the fast and far-reaching consequences of modern technological development. Many experts claim that since the consequences of technological innovations are realised so swiftly, there is simply no time to understand their likely effects.¶ One of the most important ways in which the sense of diminished subjectivity is experienced is the feeling that the individual is manipulated and influenced by hidden powerful forces. Not just spin doctors, subliminal advertising and the media, but also powers that have no name.¶ That is why we frequently attribute unexplained physical and psychological symptoms to unspecific forces caused by the food we eat, the water we drink, an extending variety of pollutants and substances transmitted by new technologies and other invisible processes.¶ The revitalisation of pre-modern anxieties about the workings of hidden forces testifies to a weakening of the humanist sensibility that

emerged as part of the Enlightenment.¶ The crisis of causality is experienced as a world where important events are mostly shaped and determined by a hidden agenda. We seem to be living in a shadowy world akin to The Matrix trilogy , where the issue at stake is the reality that we inhabit and who is being manipulated by whom.¶ In previous times, such attitudes mainly informed the thinking of right-wing populist movements that saw the hand of a Jewish, Masonic or communist conspiracy behind significant world events.¶ Today, conspiracy theory has become mainstream and many of its most vociferous supporters are to be found in radical protest movements and among the cultural Left. Increasingly, important events are interpreted as the outcome of a cover-up; the search for the hidden hand manipulating an unwitting public, or the story behind the story, dominates public life.¶ Conspiracy theory constructs worlds where everything important is manipulated behind our backs and where we simply do not know who is responsible for our predicament. In such circumstances we have no choice but to defer to our fate.¶ It is through conspiracy theories that fortuna reappears, but it does so in a form that is far more degraded than in Roman times. To their credit, the Romans were able to counterpose virtus to fortuna. However, in a precautionary culture fortune favours the risk-averse and not the brave. The deification of fear instructs us to bow to fate. In such circumstances there is not much room left for freedom or the exercise of free will. Yet if we have to defer to fate, how can we be held to account?¶

In the absence of freedom to influence the future, how can there be human responsibility? That is why one of the principal accomplishment of precautionary culture is the normalisation of irresponsibility. That is a perspective that we need to reject for a mighty dose of humanist courage.¶ Edited extract from a speech, The Precautionary Principle and the Crisis of Causality, by Frank Furedi at the Philosophy Festival in Modena, Italy, on September 18. Furedi is professor of sociology at the University of Kent. His latest book is Wasted: Why Education isn't Educating

Perm Inclusion of liberal approaches makes broader criticisms impossible (Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer – School of Politics and Professor of International Relations – University of New South Wales, 2007, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 3-4)These frameworks are interrogated a t the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice : in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on terror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1 It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, but also to their available (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine , Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, but also their mainstream critiques - whether they take the form of liberal policy approaches in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts , forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity. As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity , violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically wards off critique s.

Perm fails, any inclusion of the institution leads to corruption and deceptionBent Flyvbjerg, professor of Planning at Aalborg University Denmark and chair of Infrastructure Policy and Planning at Delft University of Technology, 2002 “Planning and Foucault: In Search of the Dark Side of Planning Theory,” Planning Futures: New Directions for Planning Theory http://flyvbjerg.plan.aau.dk/DarkSide2.pdf, JF

Bent Flyvbjerg’s study of planning in Aalborg is a case study of planning and policy-making in¶ practice, where rationality is malleable, and where power games are masked as technical¶ rationality. The study focuses on the Aalborg Project, a scheme designed to integrate¶ environmental and social concerns into city planning, including how to control the car in the city¶ - a cause of degradation of the historic core. The planners of Aalborg are found to be real people¶ who, like other actors in the case, engage in deception to achieve their ends, manipulating public¶ debates and technical analyses. Institutions that are supposed to represent what they, themselves¶ called the ‘public interest’ are revealed to be deeply embedded in the hidden exercise of power and¶ the protection of special interests. The project is set in Aalborg, but it could be anywhere. Aalborg¶ is to this study what Florence was to Machiavelli’s, no other comparisn intended: a laboratory for¶ understanding power. The focus is on a classic and endless drama which defines what modern¶ planning and policy-making are and can be: the drama of how raitonality is constituted by power,¶ and power by raitonality. Drawing on the ideas of Machiavelli, Nietzsche, Habermas and Foucault,¶ the Aalborg case is read as a metaphor of modernity and of modern planning and policy-making.¶ The study shows how power warps deliberation and how modern rationality can only be an ideal¶ when confronted with the real rationalities involved in planning and policy-making. Finally, the¶ study elaborates on how fruitful deliberation and action can occur by following a century-long, and¶ historically proven, tradition of empowering democracy and civil society.¶ Tim Richardson’s research has explored the construction sites of rationality: the critical stages in¶ planning processes where the frameworks and tools are crafted which will shape later decisions.¶ His study of the planning process for the trans-European transport network explores how, in a¶ heated power-play, the deployment of Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) became the¶ central instrument for achieving environmental integration. However, SEA techniques were not¶ simply taken off the shelf by policy analysts, and applied objectively in laboratories. They were constructed through contested political processes and were vulnerable to shaping by, and in favour¶ of, particular interests. The political and institutional setting of SEA clearly shaped its scope,¶ timing, methodology, and ultimately its impact. In this case SEA was shaped by the discourses of¶ the single market and political integration, by inter-institutional politics, and by the actions of¶ interest groups. Much of the policy process took place outside the public domain, and through¶ non-discursive events, rendering a purely communicative focus unuseful. Communicative actions,¶ such as the use of advocacy documents, or argumentation in committee, were tactical elements on¶ a much broader canvas of power dynamics.

AT: cede the political Your postmodernist viewpoint is exclusionary as it highlights the difference, or otherness-turns the impact and links it to the KDavid Grondin, master of pol sci and PHD of political studies @ U of Ottowa, 2004 “(Re)Writing the “National Security State”: How and Why Realists (Re)Built the(ir) Cold War,” http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/ieim/IMG/pdf/rewriting_national_security_state.pdf, JFA poststructuralist approach to i nternational r elations reassesses the nature of the¶ political . Indeed, it calls for the repoliticization of practices of world politics that have¶ been treated as if they were not political. For instance, limiting the ontological elements¶ in one’s inquiry to states or great powers is a political choice. As Jenny Edkins puts it,¶ we need to “bring the political back in” (Edkins, 1998: xii). For most analysts of¶ International Relations, the conception of the “political” is narrowly restricted to¶

politics as practiced by politicians. However, from a poststructuralist viewpoint, the¶ “political” acquires a broader meaning, especially since practice is not what most¶ theorists are describing as practice. Poststructuralism sees theoretical discourse not only¶ as discourse, but also as political practice. Theory therefore becomes practice. ¶ The political space of poststructuralism is not that of exclusion; it is the political space¶ of postmodernity, a dichotomous one, where one thing always signifies at least one thing¶ and another (Finlayson and Valentine, 2002: 14). Poststructuralism thus gives primacy to¶ the political , since it acts on us, while we act in its name, and leads us to identify and¶ differentiate ourselves from others . This political act is never complete and celebrates¶ undecidability, whereas decisions, when taken, express the political moment. It is a critical¶ attitude which encourages dissidence from traditional approaches (Ashley and Walker,¶ 1990a and 1990b). It does not represent one single philosophical approach or perspective,¶ nor is it an alternative paradigm (Tvathail, 1996: 172). It is a nonplace, a border line¶ falling between international and domestic politics (Ashley, 1989). The poststructuralist¶ analyst questions the borderlines and dichotomies of modernist discourses, such as¶ inside/outside, the constitution of the Self/Other, and so on. In the act of definition,¶ difference – thereby the discourse of otherness – is highlighted, since one always defines¶ an object with regard to what it is not (Knafo, 2004). As Simon Dalby asserts, “ It involves¶ the social construction of some other person, group, culture, race, nationality or political¶ system as different from ‘our’ person, group, etc. Specifying difference is a linguistic,¶ epistemological and, most importantly, a political act; it constructs a space for the other distanced and inferior from the vantage point of the person specifying the¶ difference” (Dalby, cited in Tvathail, 1996: 179). Indeed, poststructuralism offers no¶ definitive answers, but leads to new questions and new unexplored grounds. This makes¶ the commitment to the incomplete nature of the political and of political analysis so¶ central to poststructuralism (Finlayson and Valentine, 2002: 15). As Jim George writes,¶ “It is postmodern resistance in the sense that while it is directly (and sometimes¶ violently) engaged with modernity, it seeks to go beyond the repressive, closed¶ aspects of modernist global existence. It is, therefore, not a resistance of traditional¶ grand-scale emancipation or conventional radicalism imbued with authority of¶ one or another sovereign presence. Rather, in opposing the large-scale brutality¶ and inequity in human society, it is a resistance active also at the everyday, community, neighbourhood, and interpersonal levels, where it confronts those¶ processes that systematically exclude people from making decisions about who¶ they are and what they can be” (George, 1994: 215, emphasis in original).¶ In this light, poststructural practices are used critically to investigate how the subject¶ of international relations is constituted in and through the discourses and texts of global¶ politics. Treating theory as discourse opens up the possibility of historicizing it. It is a¶ myth that theory

can be abstracted from its socio-historical context, from reality, so to¶ speak, as neorealists and neoclassical realists believe. It is a political practice which needs¶ to be contextualized and stripped of its purportedly neutral status. It must be understood¶ with respect to its role in preserving and reproducing the structures and power relations ¶ present in all language forms. Dominant theories are, in this view, dominant discourses¶ that shape our view of the world (the “subject”) and our ways of understanding it.