THE PROSPECTS OF KOREAN UNIFICATION

AND ITS IMPLICATION TO THE PHILIPPINES

A Term Paper in AS 234

(Special Problems on East Asia)

Presented to

Professor BENITO LIM

Asian Center, University of the Philippines

Diliman, Quezon City

In partial fulfillment of the requirements in

AS 234 Summer, Academic Year 1999

By

JAIME ESCOSIO NOBLE, JR.

AS 234 / 9–11 MF

27 May 1999

Table of Contents

I. Introduction 1

II. Korean peninsula’s geography 2

III. Historical overview of Korean nation

a) Ancient history 3

b) Japanese annexation of Korea 4

c) World war II and Korean division 5

IV. The prospects of Korean unification

a) Unification by war 7

b) Unification by mutual consent 8

c) U nification by or failure to act 9

V. Factors that affects Korean unification 11

VI. Implication of Korean unification on Unified Korea

a) Economic 12

b) Socio-cultural 13

c) Military 13

d) Ideological 15

VIII. Conclusion 15

I. Introduction

The world is entering an age of uncertainty and ambiguity. In this

uncertain environment of changing world reality, Korean’s may ask what is the

likelihood of Korean unification? How? and, What will be its implication to

economy, politics, and the people? Over the past several years both the Republic

of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

(DPRK, or North Korea) have experienced a number of significant changes. In

the South, Kim Dae-jung was elected president to realize the first peaceful

transfer of power to the opposition in the republican dominated country.1

At the same time, North’s Supreme People’s Assembly was recently

called into session for the first time on four and a half years to amend the

constitution, to designate the chairman of the National Defense Commission as

the state’s supreme leader. As expected, former DPRK president Kim II Sung’s

son Kim Jong-il, who had been selected as general secretary of the Worker’s

Party in October 1997, was inaugurated as chairman of National Defense

Commission.2

1 Kwon Man-hak, “Political Changes and Inter-Korean Relations,” Korea Focus, Vol. 6, No. 5 (September-

October 1998), pp. 1.2 Also means that Kim Jung-il will be the state supreme leader as mandated by the new constitution. Ibid.,

pp. 2.

Korea in the past has been passive. As a matter of fact the peninsula

became a battleground of the fighting’s but Korean people today seem more

active and determined to take charge of their own destiny. The question of the

future prospects of Korean unification lies on the both ROK and DPRK. Likewise,

major powers play an important role in the said process. This includes United

States, China, Japan, and Russia. Because of the relative decrease of U.S.

economic power and the concomitant rise of Japan and China as economic

power. United States of America’s goal is to thwart emergence of rival

superpower to challenge U.S. supremacy3 Thus purposefully maintains its

presence in the Asia specifically on East Asia.

Korea played a sensitive role as the buffer and support in the balance of

power among the major powers especially during cold war. Koreans are pooling

their knowledge and energy to take part of the new global order. However, they

have to overcome numerous obstacles, and must settle the past to culminate

their goal of unifying Korea.

The purpose of this paper is fourfold: 1) it will examine the cause of

Korean division; 2) it will evaluate the realities in Korea related to its unification;

3) it will postulate the future prospects of Korean unification; and finally, 4) it will

assess the possible impact and the implication of Korean unification to Asia.

3 Young Whan Kihl, “Korea After the Cold War: An Introduction.” Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold

War, Ed. Young Whan Kihl, (USA: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 5.

II. Korean peninsula’s geography

The land mass of Korea covers 220,843 sq. km., bordering on Manchuria

and Russia to the north, facing China to the west across the Yellow Sea and

Japan to the east and south across the East Sea and Korea Straits. It is

approximately 1,000-km long, and 200 km wide. Extending approximately 34

degrees to 43 degrees North latitude, it falls entirely within the Temperate Zone.

However, it is sad to say that the peninsula is divided into North and South

by two opposing ideologies. North Korea occupies just over the half of Korean

peninsula, It has the area of 120,538-sq. km., and its population reached 25.5

million as of July 1998. The Yalu and Tumen rivers form its south border and with

China and Russia bordering the north. It’s southern border with South Korea

north of the 38th parallel. It is a mountainous country, three fourth of which is

forested highland. The climate is warm temperate, although winters can be cold

in the north. Most rain falls during the summer. Nearly 90% of its arable land is

farmed by cooperatives employ over 40% of the labor force and rice is the main

crop grown. North Korea is quite endowed with fuel and minerals. Deposits of

coal and hydroelectric power generate electricity, and substantial deposits of iron

ore are found in the north. 60% of labor force are employed in industry; the most

important of which are metallurgical, building, cement and chemicals.

On the other hand, South Korea occupies the southern half of the

peninsula. It has the population of 45.9 million as of July 1998. It is predominantly

mountainous with the highest ranges running north to south along the East

Coast. The extreme south has a humid warm temperate climate while farther

north is more continental. Most rain falls in summer because of its proximity to

East Asian monsoon belt. Cultivated land only represents 23% of the country’s

total area and the main crop is rice. The country has few natural resources but

flourishing manufacturing industry and worlds leading supplier of ships, electronic

equipment, electrical goods, petrochemicals, and steel. Its people enjoy a

reasonably high standard of living than in the North.

III. Historical overview of Korean nation

a) Ancient history

Historians trace the origin of the Korean nation to the prehistoric peoples

who inhabited not only the Korean peninsula but also a wide region north of the

Yalu and Tumen rivers. Known by such names as Puyo, Old Choson, Ye, Maek,

Okcho, Chin, and others, they evolved over a period of centuries into the three

kingdoms of Koguryo (conventionally dated 37 B.C.-A.D. 668), Paekche (18B.C.-

A.D. 660), and Silla (57B.C.-A.D. 668), Koguryo, astride today’s northwestern

Korea and southern Manchuria, was a powerful military power in its heyday and

had close contacts, including frequent military conflicts with the expanding

empires in China proper. Paekche occupied the southwestern part of the

peninsula. Silla, isolated from China in the southeastern corner of the peninsula,

was the last to benefit from the advance Chinese civilization. 4

For many years, the three kingdoms were in a state of constant warfare

against one another until Silla manage to defeat first Paekche and then Koguryo. 4 Han-Kyo Kim, “Korean Unification in Historical Perspective.” Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War,

Ed. Young Whan Kihl, (USA: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 17.

Unified Silla ruled for nearly 300 years, all of the former Paekche land and a

southern portion of Koguryo or roughly two thirds of the Korean peninsula. Thus,

Unified Silla’s success laid the foundation for the formation of a Korean nation.5

b) Japanese annexation of Korea

When newly westernizing Japan chose to challenge China, a Sino-

Japanese war resulted entailing many battles fought on Korean soil in 1894 and

1895. China’ s defeat invites Japan’s appetite to colonized Korea. Ten years later

Japan took on Russia and was again victorious. Unrestrained by competition,

Japan completed its conquest on Korea by forcing to sign treaty of annexation in

1910, the first time the entire nation had to submit to foreign colonial power.

For thirty-six years, Japan imposed harsh militarist rule that totally

exploited and maltreated Koreans. The Japanese colonial government seized

legitimate lands. Thus, farmers were deprived and accepted the status as

tenants. In area of commerce and finance, laws regarding the establishment of

commercial enterprises were written and interpreted to favor Japanese firms.

Koreans are only allowed to own small-scale industries.6 Koreas natural

resources were also diverted into Japanese hands. Timber resources were

exploited, excessive quantities of rice were exported to Japan. The Korean

people were completely excluded from their own economy.

5 Ibid., pp., 17.

6 Han Woo-keun, The History of Korea, Trans. Lee Kyung-shik, Ed. Grafton K. Mintz, Seoul: The Euloo Publishing,

1979. pp. 468.

In matters of education and religion the Japanese used a combination

strict control and suppression to prevent the growth of nationalism and of

democratic ideas. As a consequence, religious organizations were carefully

watch and Koreans were prevented from receiving higher education. Fighters for

Korean independence both home and abroad planned a nationwide

demonstration and protest for freedom from Japanese rule. In March 1, 1919

simultaneous demonstration from Seoul and other part of Korea was carried out.

Thousands of national flag appears and many joined what was called today as

“March 1 movement.”7

As a result, Japanese reacted with violence. Japanese soldiers arrested,

tortured and fired into unarmed crowds killing and wounding many. Furthermore,

Japanese resorted to burning houses and churches indiscriminately, unlawfully

tried and convicted Korean protesters. The March 1 movement was a failure

because the Japanese were not moved to grant Korea’s freedom, nor did other

nation offer a practical support. However, the movement was of great

significance because it climaxed the formation of national consciousness and in

essence it did succeed.

c) World war II and Korean division

While intensifying her oppression of Korea, Japan was initiating a series of

military conquests that brought her into World War II and finally resulted in her

defeat and liberation of Korea. The tremendous destruction of the atomic bombs

dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki resulted from unconditional surrender of

7 Ibid., pp. 476.

Japan on August 15, 1945. The provision of Potsdam and Cairo declarations

immediately came into effect, and after forty years of struggle against the

oppression of Japan who had tried to eliminate their identity, Korea was finally

free. But only in about three weeks the Korean people lived in a state freedom.8

Their happiness was soon overshadowed with domestic and political differences

and the collision of the United States and Russia. The primary differences were

between the Nationalists, who were awaiting the return of Provisional

Government leaders, and the Socialist and Communist, who wished to set up a

socialist state.

Meanwhile, arrangements made among the victorious Allies were

developed to have grave consequences for Korea. One of the agreements was

that after Russia’s entry into the war against Japan, upon Japanese surrender,

Russian troops should occupy Korea north of the thirty eight parallel, while the

United States should occupy the area south of it.9 With the Russian forces

already occupying the north and American forces occupying the south.

The division of the country was widely resented. Unfortunately, Allied

Powers had decided that Korea was to be ruled by trusteeship system for a

maximum of five years to be formed under United States, Britain, Russia, and

China.10 Resistance was practically unanimous, in so far that Koreans are

longing for independence. They could not accept the idea of foreign rule.

8 Ibid., pp. 497.

9 Ibid., pp. 499.

10 Ibid., pp. 500.

However, Communist troops in Korea on Russian instruction, suddenly came out

in favor of trusteeship.11

In June 1950 without any declaration of war, North Korean troops crossed

the thirty-eighth parallel and swept down upon the South inferior forces. The

South immediately protested to the United Nations who passed a resolution

ordering the north to withdraw to the thirty-eight parallel and encourage member

nations to give military support. Joint forces of U.S., Britain, France, Canada,

Australia, the Philippines, and Turkey pushed the Communist out of South Korea.

But the communist Chinese intervened and sent forces to aid North troops. Seoul

once again fell into Communist hands in January 4, 1951. The joint UN forces

mounted a counter-attack, which re-took Seoul on March 12. A standoff was

reached in the area along the thirty-eighth parallel, where the conflict had

begun.12 On July 27, 1953 both Koreas agreed to pull back forces behind a

demilitarized zone.

The war had resulted in loss of life and property. But the gravest damage

was to the Korean dream of unification.

IV. The future prospects of Korean unification

a) Unification by war

There are two general variants of war scenario we can conceive. The first

refers to a deliberate war, a process whereby war is deliberately chosen from the 11 Ibid., pp. 501.

12 Ibid., pp. 506.

beginning as the means to achieve unification. North Korea (1950-1953)13

attempted this example, if that was successful, it would refer to this strategy of

Korean unification.

The second is war by escalation scenes, triggered by retaliations either by

North or South Koreas. This type of scenario entails several instances of conflict

that may result into this setting. One example was the incidence of Korean Airline

bombing that leads to retaliations by the South. If the conflict escalates into full-

scale war that eventually culminates in a unified Korea under the means of either

Korea. But unless terrorist acts are extraordinary in terms of scale of target, both

Koreas are unlikely to retaliate with military actions on a level that would lead to a

full-scale war between them.14

Another instance of escalation scenario that poses a hypothetical situation

is North Korea’s military operations aimed at occupation of a limited portion of

South Korea’s territory. If this action provokes full-scale war that will results in

Unification of Korea. However, this hypothetical situation of North Korea’s first

successfully occupying a part of South Korean territory (whether the islands, the

area of Seoul, or even Seoul), then stopping military operations and calling for a

cease-fire. Some Korean analysts assume the U.S. might be inclined to explore

the possibility of a negotiated settlement rather than commit to war automatically.

Last scenario might effect in so far as the North Korea’s imminent success

in developing nuclear weapons. The probability of U.S. and South Korea to

13

14 Young Kim, “Prospects for Korean Unification: An Assessment,” Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War,

Ed. Young Whan Kihl, (USA: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 254.

undertake appropriate action against North Korea is more apparent. There are

number of reasons for this. One was North refusal to sign nuclear safeguards

with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Without such an agreement

the IAEA was unable to inspect the North’s nuclear facilities to verify the

manufacture of Nuclear weapons. Added to this, U.S. claimed that North Korea’s

nuclear fuel reprocessing plants which uses plutonium as a fuel and was testing

a nuclear bomb detonator. However, the U.S. has not produced any evidence.15

If both U.S. and South Korea agreed to initiate preventive military strikes to North

Korean target, it will result to full-scale war and eventual unification of either side.

Again, because of probable adverse nuclear repercussions of war,

International community will be against U.S. military strikes.

b) Unification by mutual consent or non-violent unification

These can be effected by prior consent of the existing authorities of both

North and South, can also be called non-violent or peaceful unification in

conformity of international law that disputes are supposed to be settled,

conformably to one of the basic principles of the United Nations “by peaceful

means in such manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not

endangered.”16

For example, by mutual consent a joint committee should be established

to draft a Constitution, and the formula for unification must be accepted by both

parties. One formula might be general nationwide election based on population to

15 Sharif Shuja, “The DPRK’s Nuclear Program and Polic

16

elect a chief executive or to compose a national assembly. In any event, the

emergence of state is in accordance with international law. As a matter of fact,

President Kim Dae-jung of South Korea proclaimed his North Korean policy by

“advancing non-use of force by either party, the promotion of reconciliation and

cooperation between two Koreas, and the assurance that South Korea will not try

to absorb the North.”17

It is important to note that Democratic West Germany in its desire to

achieve German unification displayed the wisdom of broadening the base for

peaceful unification by adhering to peaceful coexistence, exchanges and

cooperation instead of merely displaying unification slogan. The Korean people

should keep in mind that German unification pursued a peace policy first rather

than extending premature unification overtures.18

c) Unification by default or failure to act

This type of unification entails collapse of the regime of one side when it

becomes unable to perform effective government function. The disintegration

enables the other side to extend effective control to the collapsing side being

absorbed.19

The problem North Korea facing today is the ongoing food crisis. In 1995,

about 500,000 people died of hunger. In 1996 hunger hits some 1 million deaths

17

18

19 ssment,” Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War, Ed. Young Whan Kihl,

(USA: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 256.

from starvation.20 And if food shortages persist, more North Koreans will die,

while survivors specifically the children will suffer much from malnutrition and

deformity. Therefore, the issue of North Korea’s food difficulties has might be

prelude to advancing Korean unification. Likewise due to accumulation of

adverse condition at home and abroad, North Korea may suddenly compromise

with the South.

The absorption scenario foresees a serious economic dislocation in North

Korea involving acute and widespread shortages of food and other basic

necessities of life. It is therefore an essential strategy to use food aid that will

lead to unification.

Prevailing opinion in Japan and the United States holds that North Korea

will be unable to survive and will ultimately collapse, though some maintain that

North Korea will somehow manage to muddle through. Opinion in China and

Russia, on the other hand, despite its present difficulties, North Korea will not

collapsed easily and in fact will overcome its problem and move forward with

national development.21 These differences of opinion among influential external

forces in unification play a critical role and both Koreas should seek workable

objectives and appropriate unification policies with each of the countries

concerned.

20 Hwang Jang-yop, Strategy for Peaceful Korean Unification,” Korea Focus, Vol. 7, No. 1 (January -February

1999), 39.21 Park Young-ho, “International Perceptions of Korean Unification Issues,” Korea Focus, Vol. 6, No. 1 (January-

February 1998), pp. 75.

V) Factors that affects Korean unification

The Korean peninsula is exposed to the immediate impact of tensions

among the major world powers. The geopolitical location of the peninsula which

is at the center of world politics, also means an opportunity for Koreans to

contribute to world peace.

Both external and internal factors should be regarded in working with the

Issue of Korean unification. The four key players in Korean unification are China,

Japan, Russia, and United States. They are expected to continue their respective

spheres of influence with regard to the question unification because of traditional

interests in the Korean peninsula and the impact of change on the peninsula

would alter their respective influences.

China will play a vital role in Korean Unification; China has now the third

largest economy in the world and enjoyed the fastest economic growth during the

last three years. It has successfully carried out economic reform without

changing its basic communist rule.

The regional context of the U.S. policy towards North and South Korea is

interrelated with that of China through the U.S. - Japan security alliance and

manages to hold North Korea under its influence. Therefore, the goal of

preventing the emergence of a superpower in Northeast Asia can be more easily

achieved.22 The problem with North Korea is its attempt to cut off the flow of

22 Sung-Han Kim, “U.S. Policy toward the Korean Peninsula and ROK-U.S. Relations,” The Korean Journal of

Defense Analysis, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 138.

information from external sources by strictly regulating all contact with foreigners

thereby maintaining a high degree of isolation.23

We recognize United States as the world’s only true superpower but it is

difficult to depend upon its leadership because it lacks morality and can not lead

by force alone. U.S. carelessness was manifested in Cuba, Kosovo, the Middle

East, and recently Yugoslavia.

VII. Implication of Korean unification.

a) Economic

The implication of the unified peninsula is sound economy. Because of

unification North and South national wealth, energy, and resources will be

diverted for progress. The South’s economy, for example, grew at an average

rate of 9.2 % during 1982-92 period. However , in 1991 North Korea’s economy

contracted to 5.2 % after shrinking 3.7 percent in 1990. The South has more than

six times the per capita income of the North, $6,498 per capita as compared with

the latter is $1,038. South Korea’s gross national product totaled $280.8 billion in

1991, compared with North’s $22.9 billion.24 Looking into this unbalance

criterion It is therefore the right time for both to unify for balance and

economic strength.

23 Kim Hak-jon, “Prospects for change under Kim Jung Il regime,” Korea Focus. Vol. 6, No. 5 (September-October

1998), pp. 28.24 John Chung Hwan Oh, “The Future of Democracy and Economic Growth in Korea,” Korean Observer, Vol. 15,

No. 1 (Spring 1994), 49.

To hasten the growth of a nation is the goal of every transformation. The

unification of two Korea’s would mean a major challenge in terms of economy

among Korean people. It would interesting to speculate the blending of

communist model of command economy and capitalist pattern of market

economy. We can note that command economy was proven to be a failure, and

the market economy excels in creating wealth and elevating the average

standard of living for the whole society.25 In fact, more and more countries have

come to accept democracy and market economy as the prevailing ideology.

However, the capitalist market economy has inherent deficiencies, such as

inflation, unemployment, speculation and growing gap between rich and poor,

and growing gap between rich and poor. Likewise the democratic ideals of

human rights and dignity can easily be slighted in the blind quest for ceaseless

economic growth. Nonetheless, answers to these problems are being found in

such socialist precepts as equality, social justice, social welfare, and government

initiative.26 Unified Korea may adopt the Chinese model of economy. In fact, the

primary determinant of a nation power is seen to be its economic strength.

Indeed, economic strength is the basis of strong military power.27

b) Socio-cultural

The unification of Korea will result to enhance cultural identity. Korea is in

great need of building its self-confidence and redefining it national identity. Years

25 Ibid., pp. 4.

26 Ibid., pp. 5.

27 Hong Soon-young, “Foreign Policy Agenda of the Republic of Korea in the New Century,” Korean Observations

on Foreign Relations, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1999), pp. 5.

of dependence on external culture have robbed Korea of a clear sense of

national identity.28 Likewise, the national identity would be bolstered by a growing

awareness among Koreans of their tradition and its values. Also, Confucianism is

essential to preserve the elements of Korean culture and to accommodate

foreign culture.

Social integration is a process that resolves the active or latent conflict

stemming from cultural differences which relates to nation building.29 By this

assertion it is clear that unification is a measure for nation building.

c) Military

A unified Korea will have a powerful military to protect national interest of

the country. At present, North Korea maintains a large standing forces of more

than one million, over one and a half times that of South Korea which w It has

3,700 tanks, 2,500 armored personnel carriers, and 9,800 artillery pieces, over

two times those of South Korea in every category. The North has 740 naval

vessels, while the South has 230. The number of North Korean aircraft reaches

1,620, while the South has 1,290.30 . North Korea has 290 helicopters while

South has 290. In addition to this ground, sea and air force capacities, North

Korea is capable to build and modify the Scud missiles.31 With the military might

28 The Presidential Commission on the 21st Century, Korea in the 21 st Century , Korea: Seoul Press, 1995, pp. 90.

29 Sharif Shuja, “The Politics of Korean Unification: A case Study,” Korean Observer, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Summer

1998), pp. 310.30 Chang-Il Ohn, “South Korea’s Defense Policy and Military Strategy,” Korean Observer. Vol. 15, No. 1 (Spring

1994), 18.31 Ibid., pp. 18.

of integrated armed forces, Unified Korea will be a strong nation in terms of

military.

It could then experiment with the idea of common security as its new

security concept. This could ease the security concerns of Korea’s neighbors in

East Asia. Likewise, these can serve to lessen the arms race and military

confrontation of the region, while advancing a more peaceful and stable security

environment.32 A Unified Korea may also consider introducing a collective

security system under which the four major powers having stakes on the

peninsula could cooperate with one another. Therefore, these can help minimize

political and military distrust of a unified Korea and create regional stability.

National security, however, includes more than what is required in the

concept of national defense. It demands the ability of a nation to preserve itself

not only against external threats but also against internal disintegration.33 In other

words, while national defense by concept puts much emphasis on a nation

capability to cope with external threats, national security means the ability of a

nation to sustain itself as a nation from either external and internal threats or

both.34 Therefore these will be the bigger challenge to Unified Korea.

d) Ideological

32 Han Yong Sup, “Unification and Inter-Korean Military Integration,” Korea Focus, Vol. 6, No. 5 (September-

October 1998), pp. 43.33 Ibid., pp. 21.

34 Ibid., pp. 21.

Despite the worldwide bankruptcy of communistic ideology, North Korea

still clings to its own idiocy under the banner of “live in our own way.” North

Korean leadership is reluctant to accept the fact that communistic ideology has

undermined the individual creativity by putting too much emphasis on the equality

of the masses and undercut the individual desire to make economic profits for

oneself and one’s associate all of which are prerequisite for increasing the

economic vitality and potentiality of a nation.35

A unified Korea will embrace an ideology which can culminate a healthy

nation. They may adopt Chinese type of socialism. Whatever the ideology a

unified Korea adopts, it has to make sure that there must be freedom and justice.

Furthermore, a unified Korea must embrace peace rather than conflict,

defense rather than offense, rapprochement rather than confrontation, these

three elements are to be merged into both North and South posture.

VIII. Conclusion

From the perspective of the author the peninsula seems to be ripe for a

unification because of Socio-economic preconditions. However, the legacy of

distrust left by Korean War makes it conducive that a non-violent pact bet the two

Koreas be effected before any serious negotiations for peaceful unification can

started. Thus for South, the peaceful co-existence of two Koreas must be

recognized as necessary first stage. On the contrary North Korea argues that

cross recognition will result to permanent division of the peninsula. Thus, North

35 Ibid., pp. 18.

demands U.S. troops withdrawal and immediate political negotiation be carried

out to hasten unification. 36

The basic difference of both Koreas in forming a unified government is the

means. South Korean government desires a free Korean general election under

the management and supervision. In contrast North Korea, argues that neutral

countries should supervise general election. This was because North Korea

fought against United Nations cannot be presumed to be unbiased. An

alternative would be an all-Korean election managed by Korean’s themselves.

However, it will be difficult to unify overnight two states that have been

hostile to each other over the past 50 years. Nonetheless, efforts should begin

with the basic issues of preventing war, establishing a lasting peace, and

narrowing the gap between two Koreas. The culmination of peaceful unification

stands the struggle among major powers namely U.S., China, Russia, and Japan

as well as progressive countries in the world. In this regard North and South must

not adopt hostile policies, no matter how minor toward any of these countries.

Instead should be conciliatory toward them all. Although it is generally assumed

that specialist from this countries would agree that present circumstances in

Northeast Asia would be favorable for facilitating Korean unification, the

Americans were more hesitant to make this claim.37

36 The author personally believes that this is a workable option. In fact the presence of U.S. forces in Korea is a

major obstacle to unification. Therefore, withdrawal was the main argument and condition for peaceful unification

by the North. Unfortunately, South authorities are against this idea. 37 Park Young-ho, “International Perceptions of Korean Unification Issues,” Korea Focus, Vol. 6, No. 1 (January-

February 1998), pp. 72.

It is important that both sides promote reconciliation and peaceful

coexistence by understanding problems thereby fostering an atmosphere ripe for

peaceful unification. After all, peace is more important than unification.

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