semith-lovin - the strength of weak identities - social structural sources of self, situation and...

7/30/2019 Semith-Lovin - The Strength of Weak Identities - Social Structural Sources of Self, Situation and Emotional Experie

1/20

The Strength of Weak Identities: Social Structural Sources of Self, Situation and EmotionalExperienceAuthor(s): Lynn Smith-LovinSource: Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 70, No. 2 (Jun., 2007), pp. 106-124Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20141775 .

Accessed: 02/01/2011 19:28

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=asa. .

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

American Sociological Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

Social Psychology Quarterly.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=asahttp://www.jstor.org/stable/20141775?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=asahttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=asahttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/20141775?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=asa


2/20

Social Psychology Quarterly_2007, Vol. 70, No. 2, 106-124

The Strength of Weak Identities:Social Structural Sources of Self, Situation and Emotionalxperience*LVNNMITH-LOVIN

Duke University

Modern societies are highly differentiated, with relatively uncorrelated socially salientdimensions and a preponderance of weak, unidimensional (as opposed to strong, multiplex)ties. What are the implications of a society with fewer strong ties and more weak ties for theself? What do these changes mean for our emotional experience in everyday life? I outlinea structural view of self, situated identity, and emotion. It is an ecological theory in whichinterpersonal encounters are the link between the macro-level community structure and the

micro-level experience of self conception, identity performance, and emotion. In this ecology of encounters, multiple-identity enactments (especially of salient s elf identities) arequite rare. But where they occur, they are important indicators of potential social change.

The central theme of this address is theimpact of changing social structures onthe self, its constituent identities, the

ecology of interactions, and the resulting emotional experiences. As a structural symbolicinteractionist, I argue that the person webecome depends profoundly on the networksin which we are embedded. The actions wetake and the emotions we experience dependon these networks. These networks are, inturn, shaped powerfully by the social settingsthat we occupy. Social change occurs, veryrarely, when these forces operate to change thecultural meanings of identity labels.

Throughout my career, I have been interested in how social settings influence theexperiences of actors within them. My disser

tation measured the affective meanings thatcultures have for settings, and what actionsoperated to sustain those meanings (SmithLovin 1979, 1987b). I was fascinated byGoffman's (1963) description of the expressive order of public places and by psychologistRoger Barker's (Barker 1968; Barker and

Wright 1951, 1959) careful description of thebehavioral settings in a small Midwesterntown. Goffman described how people wereobligated to sustain the character of institutionalized settings. Barker and his colleaguesrecognized that what we do depends much

more on where we are and who we are withthan who we are.While many sociologists ofthe era were concentrating on personal attitudes and values, Barker noted that placedetermined the patterned elements of an interaction, including its participants, actions, andpossible outcomes.

These scholars had a sense of settings asconstraining occupants' activities, explaining

much of the taken-for-granted variance ineveryday interaction. They recognized that anactor's socially structured environment deter

mined more about what he or she did thanwhat was inside him or her. The person whowas a quiet worshipper at church could be aboisterous extrovert at a party the nightbefore. I still think that Goffman and Barkerwere correct in their assessment of settings'impacts. In this address, I return to some of

* This Cooley-Mead address was presented to theSocial Psychology section of the American Sociological

Association on August 13, 2006, at the Association'sannual meetings inMontreal. Address correspondence toLynn Smith-Lovin, Department of Sociology, Box 90088,Duke University, Durham, NC 27708-0088; smithlov?soc.duke.edu. The National Science Foundation has supported my research program throughout my career. Grantsthat supported specific findings mentioned in this addressinclude National Science Foundation Grants SES9008951 and SES-0347699.1 thank David R. Heise, NeilJ. MacKinnon, Miller McPherson, Timothy J. Owens,

Dawn T. Robinson, Sheldon Stryker, Allison K. Wisecup,and members of my Sociology 229 seminar at Duke

University for comments on earlier drafts of this address.Allison K.Wisecup provided valuable help with the analyses renorted here. 106


3/20

S LFANDSITUATEDDGNTITV07their themes. I develop a theory of how com

munity structure affects selves, interactions,and emotions.

I began this work six years ago inresponse to a review of Identity Theoryresearch (Stryker and Burke 2000). Thereview argued that we (1) needed to furtherdevelop the conceptualization of the self as aset of multiple identities, and (2) needed tofurther specify how commitment to networksof relationships were related to internalizedidentities. The next year, I received an invitation to attend a conference honoring SheldonStryker (Burke, Owens, Serpe and Thoits2003; Stryker 2003). This opportunity ledmeto think about the concepts of self and identity as they related to networks of interaction. Ideveloped an ecological theory of the structural conditions under which complex selvesdevelop (Smith-Lovin 2003). I tried to predictwhen multiple identities are likely to operatein the same setting. In this address, I developmy new ideas on the topic with a little background on why they have changed. Imake sixarguments:1. Current social systems?with their high

differentiation, their relatively uncorrelated social statuses, and their technolo

gies thatfree usfrom limitations of timeand space- have resulted in complexselves but unidimensional (weak tie)relationships.

2. Such a weak tie system will make selvesless stable as well as more complex.

3.Complex

but unstable selves are morelikely to be characterized by attributesand less likely to be characterized byinstitutionalized role identities.

4. Simultaneous engagement with two ormore self-identities is most likely tooccur either when ruminating about dif

ferent parts of the self or in situationswith multiple audiences.5. Mixed emotions are elicited by thoserare situations where an actor simultaneously enacts identities with very dif

ferent meanings.6. While rare, interactions in simulta

neously held self-identities and themixed emotions that they evoke are

important precursors of culturalchanges in meaning.

I titled this address "the strength of weakidentities," with a bow toGranovetter's (1973)classic paper that outlined the life-shapingimpact of information carried by weak ties.

Weak ties are the simple, less intense, moreunidimensional ties thatwe are likely to havewith those who are far from us in social space.My argument is that the structure of modernsocial systems leads us to spend much time in

these weak-tie interactions. These interactionsresult in complex, fluid selves, but relativelysimple interactional situations.

The ecology of our encounters dependsmore on the structure of our environment thanon individual volition. To repeat the title ofone of my own papers, "You are who youknow" (Smith-Lovin and McPherson 1993).But who you know depends profoundly on thestructure of organizations and institutions thatsurround you. Symbolic interactionists haveoften stressed the choices thatwe make amongidentity enactments (e.g., if "professor" is

high in the salience hierarchy of our selfstructure, we will start lecturing at the drop ofa hat). I emphasize here that social structuresaround us often lead us to enact identities thatare not central to our self-structure. Who

wants to be a "traffic violator" when driving?Those "weak" identity enactments, while notcentral to our definitions of self, still influenceour emotional lives in a profound way. Themost common situation that evoked anger inthe 1996 Module on Emotions in the GeneralSocial Survey was waiting in line at the grocery store.In a sense, I argue formodifying Stryker's(1980) classic statement of structural symbolic interaction: that society shapes self whichthen shapes social interaction. Society doesshape selves. It also shapes interactionsthrough the ecology of encounters. But in

much of everyday life, selves do not dominateas the central mediators that they were inStryker's formulation. Instead, I proposebelow that the social environment (especiallyits network connections) shapes both the selfand social interaction, and creates a somewhatspurious correlation between the two.I hasten to qualify my revision ofStryker's venerable statement. Stryker onlyasserted that selves influenced interaction in


4/20

108 SOCIAL SYCHOLOGYUfiRTRLYcases where choice of identity was possible. Iam suggesting that the glass of "choice" ismore than half empty?that the majority ofencounters in actors' lives are shaped not byself-structures, but by the social environmentsinwhich they are embedded. These environments may be determined to some degree bypast choices (e.g., the choice to marry, thechoice towork at a given job). But, as sociologists, we know that those "choices," too, areinfluenced by many factors other than identitystructures. As actors, our menu of opportunities and the information accumulated frompast network contacts strongly affect our current social position. So, as experienced ineveryday life, selves are probably more important to how we think and feel about ourselvesthan to our interaction probabilities. We spendmuch time in identities that are not central toour self-structure. When we are enacting identities that are central to the self-structure, it is

more likely to be a function of the institutional environments in which we are embeddedthan any immediate choices we make.The fact that somany of our modern institutional settings segregate us into single-identity environments?we live in a Gesellschaftrather than a Gemeinschaft world?makes

multiple identity enactments quite rare. Oneof the reasons thatAffect Control Theory, as atheory of situations rather than selves, hasbeen so successful in describing role behaviors (Heise 1979, 2007; Smith-Lovin and

Heise 1988; MacKinnon 1994) is that thereare relatively few situations in which actorsoccupy multiple identities with strikingly different meanings. That said, it is on those rareoccasions when the ecology of encountersdoes lead to parts of the self being activatedthat are both simultaneously enacted andimportantly different in meaning that, whenexperienced by multiple individuals, lead tocultural change. Understanding this mechanism of multiple-identity occupancy mayshow how micro-level interactions can lead to

macro-level changes in cultural meanings(and the structures that they both generate andrepresent). I hope this perspective contributesto the much-neglected pathway from self tothe reshaping of society.

SVM?OLICNT6RACTIONUITHTRUCTUR6:HISTORICOOTSThe structural symbolic interaction uponwhich I build began with Sheldon Stryker's

(1980) linking of symbolic interactionist ideaswith role theory. In his Identity Theory,Stryker rejected a symbolic interaction thatfocused only on creative, atypical behavioralproductions in ill-defined, unconstrainingbehavioral settings. Instead, he concentratedon the stable, recurring interactions in oursocial system. By linking role behavior to theinternalized meanings that roles had for individuals, he provided the connection betweensocial structure, meaning, and action that drives structural symbolic interaction today.

Especially relevant is research conductedby Stryker and Richard Serpe (1982; Serpe1987; Serpe and Stryker 1987, 1993) that

developed an ecological understanding of theself. This work showed how the change in setting from high school to college led to tworelated processes. First, self-identities motivated students to seek out groups in the newenvironment that would allow the expressionof salient, long-held roles. Individuals recreated themselves in the new environment.Second, the social structure of the new environment had an impact on the selves thatcould be sustained in that setting. Whengroups were not available to reaffirm old roleidentities, those identities withered and

decreased in salience. This dynamic ecologyof actor choice and social structural resourcesgives us a powerful picture of how selves andsocial environments shape one another.

We have not seen substantial developmentin this very productive line of work in the pastthree decades. The focus of work in structuralsymbolic interaction shifted to a control-system view of identity and action. This controlsystem focused on one identity at a time andhow itwas maintained in interaction (Strykerand Burke 2000). Affect Control Theory ledthis movement with amathematical model ofthe relationship between identity and action(Heise 1979, 2007; Smith-Lovin and Heise1988;MacKinnon 1994; Robinson and Smith

Lovin 2006).


5/20

S6LF iND SITU?TD ID6NTITV09Affect Control Theory had no model ofthe self. Social situations determined what

identities would be enacted (although actorscould seek out situations with a predispositionto enact an identity, as when a person enters adoctor's office in a desire to become aPatient1). The theoretical argument focused onthe behaviors and attributions that occur onceactors define a situation and have determined

what the relevant self-identities are within it.Affect Control Theory was a theory of socialsituations, not of the relationship betweenindividuals and the social structures inwhichthey

were embedded.Just as many of us turned to the interrela

tionship of emotion, identity, and action in thelate 1980s (Smith-Lovin 1990; see review inSmith-Lovin 1995), it seems that it is time toput identity, self, and social structure backtogether again. I join MacKinnon and Heise(forthcoming) and Stryker's recent work(Stryker, Serpe and Hunt 2005) in tackling thequestion of the social structural sources of selfand social interaction. This structural emphasis will connect our symbolic interactionismto important substantive issues like socialmovement participation (Heise 1998; Heiseand Britt 2000; Stryker 2000) and the impactof identity occupancy on mental health(Thoits 2003; Simon 1995, 1998; MacKinnonand Golbournne 2006). At a more structurallevel, it allows us to link the impressive workon the dynamic evolution of social groups(e.g., McPherson 1983; McPherson and

Ranger-Moore 1991) to the epidemiology ofindividual experience. Like Stryker (1980), Ihope to reintegrate symbolic interactionistthought with the mainstream concerns of

more macro-level thinkers.In this address, I partition the broad issue

of themultiple-identity self into a set of morespecific theoretical questions. This dissectionallows me to use some well-formed ideas fromother research traditions to link social structure and individuals into an ecology ofencounters and identities. I present some

data?from an experiential sampling studyand from a nationally-representative surveythat illustrate some features of modern identity structure. I then make some rather straightforward arguments, based on Affect ControlTheory, about how the rare, simultaneousexperience of multiple identities with substantively different cultural meanings can produceemotions and actions that create socialchange.

QUESTIONS,6FINITIONS,NDSCOP6I focus on five basic questions. First, what

social structures determine available identities? Second, how do these identities combineinto selves as individuals internalize themthrough personal biography? Third, when dopeople occupy two or more identities withinthe same social situation? Fourth, how dothose simultaneously held identities producelines of social action and emotional response?Fifth, what does the experience of multipleidentity occupancy imply for social change?

Iuse the term identity in a broader sensethan Stryker's (1980) definition. In his integration of symbolic interaction and role theory, Stryker (1980) focused on role-identities,the internalized meanings of roles for the individual. Instead, I adopt themore comprehensive image that Neil MacKinnon and DavidHeise (forthcoming) use in their new book onidentity.MacKinnon and Heise define "cultural theories of people" as the set of categoriesthat a culture provides for labeling types ofpeople, as well as the logical implicationsamong those categories. For example, theidentity Supreme Court Justice implies

Lawyer, which implies College Graduate, andeventually implies more abstract levels like

Adult and Human. Notice that these culturaltheories of people can change. Thirty yearsago the same identity, Supreme Court Justice,

might have implied themore abstract identityMan. While that might still be a part of theprototypical Justice, the strength ofthat implication has softened in the past three decades.

In the theoretical argument here, I dealwith identities that operate at the same level ofthe perceptual control system, rather thanthose that represent higher or lower levels of

1 Iwill use the Affect Control Theory convention thatcapitalization indicates identity, behavior, and emotionlabels that carry affective meaning within a culture thatmust be maintained by interactions.


6/20

110 SOCIAL SYCHOLOGYUART6RLYreference signal (see McClelland and Fararo2006 for amore complete treatment of controlsystems in sociology). Control theorists knowthatmultiple levels of control exist, with shiftsat higher levels effectively resetting the reference levels that are operative at lower levels.For example, if I come to view a Friend as a

Rival for a romantic interest, Imight reinterpret earlier actions in this new framing, whilenot changing my view of what had physicallyoccurred in those earlier interactions (a lowerlevel of processing), nor changing my view of

my Friend/Rival as a normal, human memberof my social group (a higher level of judg

ment).Here, I attempt to analyze the relation

ships among those identities whose meaningsdirectly generate lines of action and emotional responses to the actions of others in interpersonal situations. An operational criterion isthe nouns that people might use spontaneously (orwhen asked) to name themselves or others within a situation. So, both Friend and

Rival would be identities, because they areways in which I could label someone withwhom I have an interaction. They make sensewithin my culture, and the act of labelingsomeone communicates much to others in theculture who share those words and their social

meanings.Cultural identity labels include: (1) the

role-identities indicating positions in thesocial structure, (2) the social identities indicating membership in groups, and (3) the category memberships that come from identification with some characteristic, trait, orattribute (Smith-Lovin 2003). For example,

when we asked 38 members of the universitycommunity atArizona about their identities ina 1995 experiential sampling study, theyreported 328 distinct identities. These rangedfrom role-identities with clear role alters (e.g.,Bartender, Landlord, Sister), to activity-basedidentities with ambiguous alters (e.g., Artist,

Camper, Music lover), to social identitiesbased on group membership (e.g., ChurchMember, Greek), to salient personal characteristics (e.g., African American, Responsible

Person).I argue that this wide range of sociallabels should be studied together because they

represent the ways that people think aboutthemselves and others in situations. Cognitivelabeling and affective meaning are inextrica

bly intertwined (Heise 1979; MacKinnon1994). Labeling someone (including oneself)leads inevitably to control processes of identity maintenance. Since identity labels carrycultural meaning and guide social action, Ifirst ask what features of social structuredetermine the availability of potentialidentities.

SOCIALTRUCTUR?NDCOMPL6X6LV6SWhat social structural features determine

the "cultural theory of people" available toactors? All three types of identity?role-identities, group memberships, and differentiatingcharacteristics?have networks as theirsource. In the case of role-identities, a networkrelation with an alter defines a position withina social structure. That position has rights,responsibilities, and behavioral expectationsvis a vis some other position (Merton 1957;Stryker 1980). In the case of group membership, the network tie is a connection to anamed group of alters (Breiger 1974;

McPherson 1983). In the case of personalcharacteristic identities, interactions with people different from us create salient social categorizations (Berger, Fisek, Norman, andZelditch 1972). We only know we are intelligent if we compare ourselves with someonewe think is less smart. Our social context (inparticular, who we are in contact with) influences themeaning of our category occupancy(Hogg and Abrams 1988). The meaning of ourcategory membership (e.g., what itmeans tobe British) is influenced by the context towhich we compare ourselves. If the Britishcompare themselves to Americans, traditionalism and reserve may be most salient. If comparison to new immigrant groups from oldercivilizations (e.g., the Middle East) is moreproximate, distinctions like patriotism or tolerance may be highlighted.

Given that network ties generate identitylabels, we know that affective meanings (likestatus) will almost inevitably follow (Mark,

Ridgeway, and Smith-Lovin unpublished).Once there is a noticeable difference among


7/20

S LFFIND ITUATEDD6NTITV11actors that allows people to be categorized,then the category label acquires status value(e.g., evaluative meaning or influence) withina culture with remarkable regularity.2 Evencharacteristics with no relationship toresources or other salient status distinctions

will become imbued with evaluation andinfluence potential. Social systems can createevaluative meaning almost out of thin air. Thesmallest human groups have age and sex variations, and these distinctions inexorably leadto "cultural theories of people," with implications about the relationships among categoriesand evaluative meaning.3

The clear dependence of identities on network relations is very useful, for there is asubstantial literature about network features ofsocial systems. The first principle upon whichIdraw is the relationship between size and differentiation (e.g., Mayhew, Levinger,

McPherson, and James 1972; Mayhew 1974).In virtually any domain?from the entiresocial system to a voluntary association?larger size leads to increased internal differentiation. Relations between actors shift from

Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft. In larger systems, we interact with those who are functionally interrelated but different from us; insmaller systems, we interact with those whoare similar. More differentiation means morerole identities, more membership groups, andmore salient distinctions among those whointeract within the system.

Miller McPherson (2004) has made aclosely related argument about the dimensionality of the salient socio-demographic space,which he calls "Blau space." He notes thatthere are few characteristics distinguishingindividuals in small, technologically simple

societies (primarily age, sex and physicalcapabilities). As society grows in size andscope, the scale of the system acquires otherdimensions, such as wealth and education, toorganize social interaction. More importantly,

McPherson (2004) argues that salient dimensions of social differentiation become less correlated in large systems. This unfolding of the

multi-dimensional social space leads not justto greater diversity in the system as awhole; italso allows the development of many moredistinctive regions (niches) within the socialsystem. McPherson (1983; McPherson and

Rot?lo 1996) has shown that these niches haveprofound implications for the shape and composition of membership groups within thelarger social structure. The composition of

groups and their social environments, in turn,have profound implications for the networkties of theirmembers (McPherson and SmithLovin 1981, 1986, 1987,2002). Most theoristshave focused on the information that suchdiverse ties bring (Granovetter 1983;

McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987). Here, Ifocus on the consequences for self-identities.Both the size-differentiation principle and theunfolding of Blau space in larger, technologically advanced systems lead us to the sameprediction.

Proposition 1: System size will be positivelyrelated to the number of identities in the system.

Having established the opportunity structure for creating selves within society, we nowturn to the question of how actors occupy andinternalize identities to create a self-structure.

ID6NTITI6SNTO6LV6S:TH6INT6RNAUZATIONf STRUCTURE

Now that I have described the resourcespace within which selves are formed, I canproceed to the next question: what determinesthe complexity and stability of selves? Thedifferentiation in larger systems creates lowerdensity of interactions among actors andgreater segmentation of that interaction. Thislower density of interactions has profoundimplications for the selves of social actors

within the system.

2More formally, evaluative differentiation of categories is an attractor. If one iswilling tomake a couple ofsimple assumptions about the diffusion and loss of statusbeliefs, only very specific social conditions will preventconsensual status beliefs from forming.3Because I am an Affect Control Theorist, I expect thatpotency (powerfulness vs. weakness) and activity (liveliness vs. quietness) meanings would be created in the sameway. However, the Mark, Ridgeway, and Smith-Lovin(forthcoming) paper is developed within the status construction paradigm and deals only with evaluative meaning.


8/20

112 SOCIALSVCHOLOGVUART6RLVIdevelop a somewhat more nuanced set of

predictions by using more of the ecologicalframework developed by those who study theinterplay of population distributions, net

works, and social groups. McPherson (1983)developed an ecological theory that shouldapply to any social entity that (1) spreadsthrough homophilous network contacts and(2) involves some level of competition for thetime or energy of actors. We know that socialsystems are characterized by homophily, theincreasing probability of interaction as actors

become more similar on almost any character

istic, from physical distance to socio-demographic features to information (McPherson,Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). Birds of afeather flock together. When social entities(like groups, cultural tastes, or occupations)compete for people's energy in thishomophilous resource space, they becomelocalized in that space. Different kinds of people do different kinds of things. Entities as

wide ranging as voluntary group memberships, occupations, musical tastes, and religious practices have been successfully analyzed using this framework (Mark 1998,1999;

Rot?lo and McPherson 2001; Chaves 2004).An ecology of identity allows us to exam

ine the relationship between system-levelcharacteristics and the range, diversity, andoverlap of identity occupancy (Smith-Lovin2003). For example, McPherson (2000) usedsimulations to analyze the relationshipbetween the level of homophily in a systemand some outcomes that are directly related toidentity?the number of distinct groups, theheterogeneity within groups, and themembership overlap (the extent towhich actors in thesystem aremembers of multiple groups simultaneously). Remembering that "group" herecan represent any social entity that spreadsthrough homophilous networks and competesfor time and energy, all of these featuresshould be related to the self-complexity ofactors within the system. In the simulations, ahigh level of homophily suppresses the extentto which groups overlap and the diversity ofpeople within those groups. Effects on groupsize and the number of groups (net of systemsize) are minimal, primarily becausehomophily has countervailing direct and indi

rect forces. The direct effect of homophily isto create more, smaller groups. But homophily also has an effect on tie stability;homophilous ties are more likely to survivefor longer periods. Recall that the effect of tiestability is tomake groups less numerous andlarger. When homophily's direct effects ongroup size and number and its indirect effectsthrough tie stability are taken into account, the

net effect is near zero.Therefore, any impact on the complexity

of self structures from homophily comes fromthe overlap of groups or the diversity ofgroups, both of which should make for amorecomplex self. Homophily within a social system is likely to be created when socio-demographic dimensions are more correlated, sincehomophily on multiple dimensions can beoptimized simultaneously in such a system.

Under such conditions, groups (and othersocial entities like communities that hold similar tastes, engage in similar activities, etc.)

will tend to be small and less diverse, leadingto a simpler self.

Proposition 2: Complexity of self structures willbe positively related to system size.

Proposition 3: Complexity of self structures willbe negatively related to the correlation of salientsocial distinctions within the social system.

Proposition 4: Complexity of self structures willbe negatively related to the level of homophily ina social system.

This treatment of self structure is morestructural and cultural than social psychological. I argue that this approach is useful inorder tomove us back to a serious consideration of the social structures inwhich individuals are embedded and inwhich their selves areformed. Some niches in social space imply

more complex selves than others. Without taking the broader system-level phenomena intoaccount, we risk viewing complex selves assomething akin to a personality characteristic(an individual attribute). Instead, I view themhere as a reflection of the social system and anindividual's location within it.

By focusing on the dependence of selveson network ties, I can generate some relatively straightforward predictions, based on what


9/20

S LFANDSITUAT6DDCNTITY13we know about the density and diversity ofnetworks in different regions of social space.For example, we know from Peter Blau's(1977) structural analysis that numericallysmaller categories of people will have moreout-group ties than those in larger categories(e.g., African Americans have more ties with

Anglos than Anglos do with AfricanAmericans). Actors higher in the stratification system are more likely to have diversenetworks that range further through the socialsystem than those who are lower in the stratification system (Lin 2001). Each of these

well-established empirical facts leads to acorresponding proposition about self complexity:

Proposition 5: Individuals occupying numerically smaller categories will have more complexselves than individuals from numerically largercategories.

Proposition 6: Higher status actors will havemore complex selves than lower status actors.4

Above, I have repeated my argument foran ecology of identities (from Smith-Lovin2003), and have suggested a number ofpropositions about what such an ecologywould look like. Hypotheses could use surveymethods to locate respondents in social structural space and to measure their self structures. Further, these structural phenomenacould be linked to self-concepts held byrespondents in different social niches. I lackthe space to develop these ideas fully, but here

is one example. Turner (1976) argued thatsociety was undergoing a shift from the perception of self as an institutionally motivatedactor toward a more impulsively, personallymotivated one. Pescosolido and Rubin (2000)noted similar processes of self-perception in apostmodern world when actors were moreoften found at the center of a spoke structureof relationships, rather than in overlappinggroup affiliations. When people serve as asingle bridge between different groups, theyare more likely to perceive themselves in anindividuated, autonomous way. They are lesslikely to be collective, institutional, and sub

merged in the social. I suggest that structuralpositions directly influence how people seethemselves and their motivations.

Proposition 7: People with more complex selveswill be more likely to self-describe in attributeterms and less likely to self-describe usinggroup-membership or role-occupancy terms.

Now, Iwill turn to the domain of interaction tosuggest how these system level properties willbe reflected in actual social interactions.Complexity of Situated Encounters

A complex self is a necessary conditionfor multiple identities to be enacted simultaneously in a situation. Increasing self-complexity may make such multiple identityenactment more likely by chance. Inmy earlier chapter on the ecology of identity, Imadesuch a base-rate argument (Smith-Lovin2003). I suggested that having a complex selfwould make one more likely to enact multipleidentities in the context of a single situation.Some new data and a reconsideration of othertheoretical ideas have changed my thinking. Ibelieve that Ihad underestimated the extent to

which modern interactions are segregated.This segregation leads complex selves to beplayed out in relatively simple single-identityinteractions.

Two types of data, one on network ties andone on interactional encounters, made mereassess my base-rate argument. The first is anational survey of close confidant ties collectedwith Miller McPherson in the 2004 GeneralSocial Survey. The fact that these close ties arerarer in 2004 than they were in a 1985 survey

4 Many readers are disturbed by this proposition,because it seems to imply that lower status people areinferior in some way. I have two reactions to that concern.First, like expectation states theory (Berger et al. 1972),the proposition is about position within the structurerather than any intrinsic characteristic of people. It is notracist or sexist to say that if people hold lower status position for which people have competence expectations, thenthis fact has implications for collective task interaction.

Neither is it racist or sexist to say that occupying a position higher in a hierarchy gives one a more diverse set ofnetwork contacts. Second, we tend to assume that "complexity" is good. But, in this case, the contrast to complexity is not simplicity, but rather a gemeinshaft integration of community and identity. This state is more oftenthe focus of amythic yearning than an object of scorn. Itmay not be a negative state for people or for social systems.


10/20

114 SOCIAL SYCHOLOGYURRT6RLYreceived much attention (McPherson, SmithLovin, and Brashears 2006). What strikes meabout these data, however, is how few multiplex (multiple relationship) ties we found.5Weknow that these data measure very, very closeties (McPherson et al. 2006: 354-6). Therespondents and the confidants with whomthey "discuss important matters" have knowneach other for an average of seven years andinteract almost five times aweek (McPhersonet al. 2006:360). Close ties are more likelythan more distant ones to be multiplex.Indeed, multiplexity is one part of

Granovetter's (1974) definition of a close tie.Yet when we look at the very close tie ofspouse in the 2004 data, we find that 58 percent of the spouses mentioned do not shareany other structural link with their partners.These spouses are not also designated ascoworker, comember of a voluntary group orother kind of relation. Of the 42 percent thatdid have some serious multiplexity in theirrelationship with their spouse (that is, otherthan labeling their spouse a "friend"), only 13percent had more than two types of relations

with their spouse. Of the 1467 respondentsthat we surveyed, only 33 had a spouse who

was also a friend, advisor, coworker, andgroup comember?the kind of complex, multiplex relationship that I have with my husband, Miller McPherson, and which many academic couples assume is typical.

Non-kin ties were even simpler. Amongnon-kin relations, very few people in the 2004data were neighbors and coworkers, orcoworkers and comembers in a voluntarygroup. Only about six percent of the non-kinties were multiplex in a seriously structural

way, linking more than one institutional orgroup context.6 The unidimensional nature ofthese very close relationships led me to lookback at experiential sampling data collected in1995.

The experiential sampling study measured the self-structure of individuals in a traditional way. We asked respondents to list upto 10 "more important" and 10 "less important" self-identities in a questionnaire. Wethen assessed the identities that they enacted

within the context of situations sampled atrandom during an eight-day period. Here, Ifocus on two features of our respondents'identities. First, of the 224 identities thatrespondents mentioned in the self-structureassessment, only 105 appeared in the situations thatwere sampled in the study. Almost as

many identities (104) appeared only as situated identities, but did not appear in the selfstructure. Clearly, respondents were spending

much of their time (roughly 50 percent) inidentities thatwere elicited by their situationalcontexts, but were not an expression of "whothey were." This picture of the interactionalenvironment is somewhat at odds with our traditional views of self-structure enactment,which would lead us to expect a large numberof self-identities in interactional situations(Stryker 1980; Thoits 2003).

When we turn our view to the situationlevel, this tension is reinforced. Of the 578 sit

uations observed, 261 involved no self-structure identities at all (see Table 1).The majority of situations (378 of 578 or 65.4 percent)involved only a single identity. Over half ofthose (192 of the 378) involved a single identity that was not central to the respondent'sself structure. While multiple-identity situations were not rare (200 out of 578), they wereas likely to involve two non-self-structureidentities or a self-structure identity and apurely situational identity as they were toinvolve the combination or clash of two salientidentities that were a part of the core selfstructure.

These empirical findings, generated byvery different methodologies, lead me toreconsider my earlier view of an increasinglydifferentiated social system leading to increasingly complex social interactions. Multiplex(multiple identity) relationships do not seemextremely common, even in the context ofvery close ties. In fact, our experiential sampling data indicate few situations where multiplex relationships lead to multiple-identity

5 The data are publicly available at http://sda.berkeley.edu/archive.htm, for those who would like toexplore this issue in greater depth.6Almost all non-kin ties were labeled as "friends," butI do not consider the addition of this relationship label to

make a tie multiplex. Instead, it seems almost synonymous with the meaning of the question, which askedabout "discussing important matters."


11/20

SC-LFNDSITUATEDDENTITY15Table 1. Situations from an Experiential Sampling Study (N = 578)_Of 200 Mulitple Identity Situations

69 had no self-structure identities77 had one self-structure identity and one purely situational identity54 had two self-structure identities

Of 378 Single Identity Situations:181 involved self-structure identities192 involved purely situational identities

interactions with a significant other. Whenmultiple-identity situations did occur in ourexperiential sampling study, they seemedmore

likely (1)to result from unusual situa

tions with multiple audiences (in a group ofseveral people), (2) as the result of enacting asituationally elicited non-salient identity while

mentally occupying a salient self-structureidentity, or (3) as the result of ruminating over

non-interactional identity conflicts. For example, a Student reports worrying about a testwhile he is lunching as a Friend with someassociates. A respondent reports worryingabout which family member to stay with on anupcoming trip while she is interacting withstrangers in a laundromat. Stryker's pointabout the central importance of selves mayhave more force when predicting our elicitation of cognitive sch?mas (networks of infor

mation about our central self-identities) inthinking about our lives, rather than acting inthem.

Complex selves did not seem to comefrom complex relationships. Nor did they leadto complex situations. Instead, they were

mostly features of the mind?the process ofruminating about our lives, making plans,being "out of" the current situation and cognitively (or emotionally) in "another place"that is important to us.

R6THINKINGH SITUATIONAL6LF:COMPL6X6LV6S NDSIMPL6ITUATIONSNeil MacKinnon's and David Heise's

(forthcoming) book begins with an extensivediscussion of the postmodern self. Inmuch ofthis literature, the self is a local, experientiallybased one. Postmodernists argue that we arenow many people tomany audiences, but notnecessarily at the same time. While

MacKinnon and Heise (forthcoming) developthese ideas in an institutional context,Pescosolido and Rubin (2000) echo

McPherson's (1983, 2004) more structuralargument in interpreting large-scale historicchange in the relationships between self andidentity. Pescosolido and Rubin argue that historical social network patterns progressed

beyond an unfolding of salient dimensions toa postmodern society where individuals mostly bridge structural holes, connecting

nonoverlapping groups. In such a postmodernworld, where most network ties are bridgingties, individuals would have complex selvesbut would seldom encounter situations inwhich multiple salient identities were relevant.

Pescosolido and Rubin suggest that theprimary mechanism driving the postmodern"spoke" network structure, where individualactors act as bridging ties between otherwiseunconnected groups, is the declining stabilityof ties. If ties are stable, long-term relations,the fact that most group memberships arerecruited through network ties should lead onebridging tie to become many. Social groupswill become cross-cutting social circles if tiespersist long enough for new ties to build onthe old connection. Indeed, McPherson's(2000; see also McPherson and Smith-Lovin2002) simulation studies of system-level parameters and their effects on group structureshow a strong positive relationship between tiestability and the membership overlap ofgroups. These simulations also show that tiestability fosters larger, more diverse groupsthat survive longer, although in smaller numbers. The simulation results from these system-level relationships lead tomy first situation-level predictions. Ties that persist forlonger periods of time aremore likely to evoke

multiple, overlapping group memberships


12/20

11 ? SOCIRL SYCHOLOGYURRT6RLYand, net of other social forces, to result in thesimultaneous operation of multiple identities.

Proposition 8: Interactions with alters withwhom one has a longer history of interaction aremore likely to involve multiple identities than

interactions with those with whom one has ashorter term relationship.

Proposition 9: Interactions between alters with amultiplex relationship will more likely evokemultiple identity standards than interactionsbetween alters who are connected by only a single relation.

An example from the experiential sampling study helps to illustrate this point. Therespondent is an administrative assistant withthree children. She is polled while in her university office, where she is "speaking with asoccer mother." She occupies the identities ofCoach, Mother, and Friend in the conversation(she volunteers the third identity, when thequestionnaire only gives room for two). She isthe coach of her neighborhood friend's child'ssoccer team, and all three of these identitiesare part of her self-structure (as recorded inthe survey at the beginning of the study). Herembeddedness in this multiplex relationship,spawned in neighborhood, voluntary association, and family institutional contexts, haspotential for discomfort. There are differentexpectations and cultural meanings for eachrole-identity.But such multiplex ties are increasinglyrare, as our recent paper indicates (McPhersonet al. 2006). Instead, we are increasingly ableto segregate our audiences. The implicationsof the increasing proportion of weak ties, andthe scarcity of deep, embedded ties and crosscutting social circles is actually quite profound. Consider the McPherson, Popielarz,and Drobnic (1992) research that shows howweak and strong ties influence our stability ofmemberships in groups. Strong ties sharedwith those in a group dramatically lengthenour stay in that group. Multiplex relationshipstend to become more multiplex, as theirshared information increases and people pulltheir friends into shared activities. Dense net

works inside a group make the meanings ofidentities shared within the group move

together (Keeton 1999). These processesincrease the clarity of group boundaries.

Interacting in sparser, less interconnectednetworks of weak ties exposes us to new information, and makes us more likely both toleave current groups and to join new ones.

Relating these patterns directly to identity,Robinson, Keeton, and Rogalin (2002) showthat people who interact in less dense net

works adopt more identities with more diversemeanings in an experimental computer chatsituation. If our world has a higher proportionof weak ties, we also have more complex, lessstable selves?but not necessarily more complex situations.

Social situations must involve relationships that are multiplex or involve multipleactors who have different relationships inorder to evoke multiple identities simultaneously. While Pescosolido and Rubin (2000)argue that a postmodern world leads toincreasingly segmented, segregated audiencesfor a limited slice of the self, having severalpeople in a setting increases the chances thatan actor will occupy a different identity fordifferent alters in the situation.

Proposition 10: Interactions with more than onealter are more likely to evoke multiple identitystandards than interactions between alters whoare connected by only a single relation.

Again, a brief example from the experiential sampling study illustrates the process suggested by P10. A university administrativeassistant finds herself inmultiple identities ata meeting "working with a professor on the

Minority Retention Committee to provideinput as aminority and support as a staff person." There are five people in the situation (2

males and 3 females?both males are whiteand the females are of various ethnicities). Sheinteracts with all of the individuals present,"teaching" the others about the racial/ethnicclimate on campus, but only knows and interacts with one of themen (hermentor, the professor) on a regular basis. She indicates thesituationally relevant identities she occupiesinclude Teacher (a self-structure identity) andStudent (a non-self identity, elicited in this


13/20


14/20

118 SOCIRLSYCHOLOGYURRT6RLYNot surprisingly, when the attribute close

lymatches the identity inmeaning, the identitymeaning is not changed significantly by theaddition of a qualifier (e.g., a Rich CEO). Inthis case, the qualifying characteristic isalready included in the prototypical meaningof the identity. When the qualifier is significantly different inmeaning (e.g., a GenerousCEO), the resulting composite is a predictablefunction of the two distinct meanings (themeaning of being a Generous person and themeaning of occupying the position CEO). So,aGenerous CEO seems nicer and more potentthan the average CEO. INTERACT, the simulation program based on Affect Control

Theory (available at http://www.indiana.edu/~socpsy/ACT/), does the calculations forresearchers.

When identities are relatively close inmeaning, they can be maintained simultaneously by similar actions. Since it is themeaning in the three-dimensional (evaluation,

potency, and activity) space that determinesthe actual processing of the event in AffectControl Theory, two identities that are veryclose in themeaning space are effectively thesame identity. Consider, however, the relatively unusual case where two identities are quitedifferent in meaning, but simultaneouslyevoked by the situation. In this case, actionsthatmaintain one identity will be disruptive tothe other. In the conceptual language of AffectControl Theory, "deflection" will result.A connectionist model, which allows the

parallel processing of multiple understandingsof the situation, is consistent with the newchallenges introduced by multiple identitystandards. The distributed representations thatare possible within the connectionist model(Kashima, Foddy, and Plakow 2001) are wellsuited to characterizing a multiple-identityself. Multiple aspects of the self can be activated by a situation. Events can be perceivedand processed simultaneously from the pointof view of multiple identities (Smith-Lovin2001).

If identities rather disparate in meaningare processed in parallel, maintenance in onewill result in deflection for the other. Sincedeflection is experienced psychologically as asense that the world is unpredictable or dis

turbing, one would expect stress to result.There also might be a heightened probabilityof leaving the interaction. Our experimentsshow that people are more likely to selectaway from interactions with those who fail toconfirm their identities (even when thoseidentities are negative in evaluation)(Robinson and Smith-Lovin 1992).

Proposition 12: Interactions involving disparateidentity meanings simultaneously held by oneactor will create more stress than interactionsinvolving a single identity standard.

Proposition 13: Actors will terminate interactions in which they simultaneously enact dis

parate identity meanings at a higher rate thaninteractions involving a single identity.

One phenomenon that this parallel multipleidentity processing could explain is the common experience of mixed emotions. If ourcontrol models are correct, emotions are experienced primarily as the result of the confirmation or disconfirmation of identities. If anactor is occupying more than one identitysimultaneously, and experiencing events fromthose multiple perspectives, it is natural that amixture of emotions would result from events.For example, a directive action that wouldsupport the identity of Judge might produce

negative deflection on the evaluation and positive deflection on the potency dimension fortheWoman who occupies that position. Thismight produce amixture of feelings of beinghumble (the Judge) and being contemptuous(theWoman).

Proposition 14: Emotions experienced in interactions with multiple-identity meanings simultaneously held by one actor will be more variablein their affective meaning than emotions experienced in interactions while occupying a singleidentity.

I note that in thisAffect Control Theory basedformulation, P12 and P14 are quite distinctpropositions. InAffect Control Theory, deflections can create emotions that are positive ornegative, empowering or deflating, enliveningor quieting (Smith-Lovin and Robinson 2006;Robinson, Rogalin and Smith-Lovin 2005).The prediction in P14 is that our responses insituations where we are acting simultaneouslyin two ormore identities will be characterized


15/20

SELF NDSITUATEDDENTITY19by mixes of quite different emotions, ratherthan a consistently positive or negative emotion. The sense of disquiet created by deflection inAffect Control Theory is quite different(and analytically separate) from the emotionsexperienced as the result of events.Iwill note that the connectionist representation of identity processing is also quiteconsistent with Affect Control Theory's viewof the relationship between individuals and theculture from which they derive identity meanings. Consider the view that each individualrepresents a variety of self-conceptions (identities) within a parallel distributed processingsystem. The meanings associated with theseself-conceptions are shared with other individuals and represented symbolically by culturalartifacts like books, films, and language use.This distributed cognition model captures several features that are central toAffect ControlTheory and other sociological theories thatgrew out of Meadian symbolic interactionism.First, the model accurately represents the relationship between the individual and the collective. Individual meanings are developed outof contact with society (in both personal andartifactual forms). Furthermore, individualsact as both learners, carriers, and (within limits) innovators of cultural meanings.

Therefore, the ideas laid out here come backup to the system level at both ends. I call foran ecology of identity to discover the connections among identities that are created by thecomplex selves that individuals create undervarying social structures. Then, I suggest aconnectionist model of individual processingthat I think more accurately represents howindividual actors operate as part of an interconnected cultural system. They process multiple parts of that system simultaneously intheir own interactions. At the same time, theycarry partial representations of a larger interconnected cultural system in their self structures.

S IVS, ?MOTIONS,NDSOCIALHANG?One important feature of our return to the

system level is the potential of individualexperience for creating societal change. Associological social psychologists, we aremuch

stronger on describing how society shapesselves than on describing how selves andinteractions shape society. This bias is appro

priate, since it is the stability of social interaction that allows society to have its recognizable, extra-individual character. Still, socialpatterns do change, and we need to explainhow these changes occur.

My suggestion is that cultural meaningsassociated with identity labels change whenrepeatedly deflected in the same direction.

Major events that simultaneously affect largepopulations can cause such change. For exam

ple, MacKinnon and Luke (2002) find that alarge number of false accusation and wrongfulconviction cases in the Canadian newsbetween 1981 and 1995 led to a decline in theevaluation and potency of criminal justiceidentities like Judge, Juror, Policeman, and

Mountie among Canadian undergraduates.But another important mechanism is the cooccurrence of identities and the meaningmaintenance problems that this co-occurrenceimplies. When an actor is faced with supporting two inconsistent identity meanings simultaneously, deflections of meaning are bound tooccur. Ifmany actors face the same problemroutinely (e.g., because of changing organizational demography), repeated deflections cancreate cultural change. When our cultural

meanings change, patterns of action and emotional distributions change as well (under theassumptions of structural symbolic interactionism).

Many of the multiple-identity situationsin our experiential sampling study are focusedon work or family settings where people haverelatively little control over their (multiple)audiences. These are institutional domainsthat have undergone major demographicchanges in the last decades, as women haveentered the labor force and families have beenreshaped through divorce and non-maritalchildbearing.

For example, one situation with a largedistance between two simultaneously occupied identities thatwe observed in the experiential sampling study occurred in theMinorityRetention Committee meeting describedabove. The young Latina staff memberdescribes her situationally relevant identities


16/20

120 SOCIAL SYCHOLOGYUARTERLYthat she occupies as Teacher (a self-structureidentity) and Student (a non-self identity). Thesituation causes considerable tension, becausethese identities are quite different (as rated bythe respondent) on both the evaluation(good-bad) and potency (powerful-powerless) dimensions. She is feeling quite goodand powerful in her role as an instructor in the

Minority Retention effort and advisor to theothers on racial sensitivity, but this role-identity sits uneasily with the status relationshipthat she occupies with the other person who isleading the seminar with her (her former mentor). If this situation leads only to local change(e.g., a shift in the staff person's relationship toher mentor), it will have only local importance. But if such situations occur over a largeinstitutional scope, itmight change the position of minority employees and their identitiesmore generally (e.g., they have a type ofexpertise that has organizational usefulness).

Another situation with substantial distance between two identities occurs in a family setting where a woman readies her familyfor church attendance. The distance betweentheWife and Mother identities occurs almostentirely on the potency dimension and is substantial. She feels quite powerless as aWife,but relatively powerful as aMother. The interesting thing about both of these situations isthe inability of the actors to segregate audiences, given themultiple roles present withinthe institutional setting. I suggest that thesesituations are themost likely to lead to cultural change in a postmodern society. Mixedemotions, when experienced over a large number of actors and interactions, signal thischange.If it is the tension between identity enact

ments that drives change, where does thechange occur? Do Women become more powerful, or Judges less so? Do ethnic minoritiesreceive higher evaluation and potency inemployment settings, or do they get resegregated in new organizational roles? Do Wivesbecome more powerful, or Mothers less so,when these role-identities can no longer beinteractionally isolated?A straightforward prediction is self

enhancement. People may change the meaning of the identity thatmoves them upward on

the evaluation, potency, or activity dimensions. As anAffect Control Theorist, I assumemeaning maintenance ismuch stronger than

self-enhancement. In addition, new evidencesuggests that people are as willing to moveself-conceptions in a negative direction as in apositive direction (Cast and Cantwell, forthcoming). Therefore, I am not convinced thatself-enhancement will provide directionalityto social change.

MacKinnon and Heise (forthcoming)focus on fundamental self-feelings (the fundamental affective meaning of "myself as I real

ly am") as the force that creates continuity inthe complex, postmodern self. To extrapolate

from their argument, one might change identitymeanings in a direction that ismost consistent with self-meaning. Ifmost people thinkwell of themselves, thiswould effectively convert to a self-enhancement motive. If there is a

wider distribution of self-meanings, thisprocess would produce individual change in

meaning but not accumulate to larger social,cultural change.I tentatively propose a more structuralsolution. Ibuild again on Stryker's conceptionof commitment, the degree to which a selfidentity is implicated in many relationshipsthat are important to an actor. Some identitiesare more embedded in our cultural systemthan others. When many other role relationships depend on a focal identity, it will be

much harder to change itsmeaning. When anidentity is rich in connections (cognitive andaffective) to other concepts within our cultural system, itwill be difficult tomove in affective space. Too many other terms would havetomove with it.When power structures have astrong vested interest in the maintenance of anidentity's meaning (e.g., the derogation of

workers by capitalists), itwill be more difficult to change. When actors that are experiencing local change are more in contact withone another, they aremore likely to develop asubcultural understanding that can withstandthe inertia of mainstream cultural meanings.

This is the study of social movements. Iapplaud recent attempts by structural symbolic interactionists to enter this domain (HeiseandBritt 2000; Stryker2000)


17/20

S6LFRNDSITURT6DD6NTITY21CONCLUSIONS

I argue here for an ecological theory ofself and identity, where large-scale socialstructures (population distributions, correlation of social dimensions, homophily) influence the availability and occupancy of identities. These identities get incorporated intoselves as they are enacted in networks of stable, recurring relationships. But they also getelicited by situations, even when they are notpart of a self-structure. The decline of stable,long-term, multiplex relationships over theevolution of human society, added to theincreasingly differentiation and expansion ofsocial space, has led tomore complex selvesbut simpler situations. Our complex selves areavailable mostly in introspection, as we ponder autobiographical narrative and conflictingrole obligations. Weak ties pull us into and outof institutional and group settings at a higherrate. Selves are complex but fluid.

On the other hand, situations are largelysimple. Our traditional models of meaning

maintenance within the context of a welldefined situation do a remarkably good job ofhandling everyday interaction. Only institutions that restrict our ability to segregate audiences (like family and work) confront us withsituations in which multiplex relationships,

multiple interaction partners, or other featuresforce the simultaneous occupancy of identitiesthat have distinctly different meanings.

While rare, these complex situations arekey for social change, if they are experiencedby many people over a substantial time period.Since maintaining themeaning of one identity

will necessary create systematic deflections inthe other, we expect shifts in one or both cultural identity meanings. Physiological stressand mixed emotions will accompany thissocial change, as an individual-level manifestation of the interactional source of the cultural tension (Robinson, Smith-Lovin, andRogalin 2004). This is the mechanism throughwhich self and interaction can affect society.

R F R NCSAverett, Christine P. and David R. Heise. 1987.

"Modified Social Identities: Amalgamations,

Attributions, and Emotions." Journal ofMathematical Sociology 13:103-132

Barker, Roger G. 1968. Ecological Psychology:Concepts and Methods for Studying theEnvironment of Human Behavior. Stanford, CA:Stanford University Press.

Barker, Roger. G. and Herbert F. Wright. 1951. OneBoy s Day New York: Harper & Row.

Barker, Roger G. and Herbert F Wright. 1959.Midwest and Its Children: The PsychologicalEcology of an American Town. Evanston, IL:Row, Peterson and Co.

Berger, Joseph, M. Hamit Fisek, Robert Z. Norman,and Morris Zelditch Jr. 1972. StatusCharacteristics and Social Interaction.: AnExpectation States Approach. New York:Elsevier.

Blau, Peter M. 1977 Inequality and Heterogeneity.New York: Free Press.

Breiger, Ronald L. 1974. "The Duality of Persons andGroups." Social Forces 53: 181-89.

Burke, Peter J., Timothy J. Owens, Richard T. Serpe,and Peggy A. Thoits, eds. 2003. Advances inIdentity Theory and Research. New York:Kluwer/Plenum.

Cast, Alicia D. and Allison M. Cantwell. Forthcoming."Identity Change: Effects of Positive and

Negative Feedback." Social PsychologyQuarterly.

Chaves, Mark. 2004. Congregations in America.Boston, MA: Harvard University Press.

Goffman, Erving. 1963. Behavior in Public Places:Notes on the Social Organization of Gatherings.Glencoe, IL: Free Press of Glencoe.

Granovetter, Mark S. 1973 "The Strength of WeakTies." American Journal of Sociology 78:1360-80.

Heise, David R. 1979. Understanding Events: Affectand the Construction of Social Action. New

York: Cambridge University Press.Heise, David. R. 1998. "Conditions for Empathie

Solidarity." Pp. 197-211 in The Problem ofSolidarity: Theories and Models, edited byPatrick Doreian and Thomas Fararo.Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach.

Heise, David R. 2007. Expressive Order: ConfirmingSentiments in Social Actions. New York:Springer.

Heise, David R. and Lori Britt. 2000. "From Shame toPride in Identity Politics." Pp. 252-270 inIdentity, Self and Social Movements, edited bySheldon Stryker, Timothy J. Owens, and Roger

W. White. Minneapolis, MN: University ofMinnesota Press.Heise, David R. and Lisa Thomas. 1989. "Predicting

Impressions Created by Combinations ofEmotion and Social Identity." Social PsychologyQuarterly 52: 141-148.

Hogg, Michael A. and D. Abrams. 1988. SocialIdentifications: A Social Psychology of


18/20

122 SOCIALSYCHOLOGYUARTERLYIntergroup Relations and Group Processes. New

York: Routledge.Kashima, Yoshihisa, Margaret Foddy, and M. Platow,

eds. 2001. Self and Identity: Personal, Socialand Symbolic. New York: Erlbaum.

Keeton, Shirley. 1999. To Thine Own Self (And One'sAssociates) Be True: The Strategic Managementof Competing Identities Among Academic

Women. Unpublished doctoral dissertation.Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA.

Lin, Nan. 2001. Social Capital: A Theory of SocialStructure and Action. New York: CambridgeUniversity Press.

MacKinnon, Neil J. 1994. Symbolic Interactionism asAffect Control. Albany, NY: State University ofNew York Press.

MacKinnon, Neil J. and David R. Heise. Forthcoming.Identities, Selves, and Social Institutions. Unpublished manuscript.

MacKinnon, Neil J. and Michelle M. Goulbourne.2006. "The Affect Control Theory of Emotions:The Case of Depression." Pp. 237-266 inPurpose, Meaning, and Action: Control SystemsTheories in Sociology, edited by Kent A.

McClelland and Thomas J. Fararo. New York:Palgrave Macmillan.

MacKinnon, Neil J. and Alison Luke. 2002. "Changesin Identity Attitudes as Reflections of Social and

Cultural Change." Canadian Journal ofSociology 27: 299-337.

Mark, Noah P. 1998. "Birds of a Feather SingTogether." Social Forces 11: 455-85.

Mark, Noah P. 1999. "Beyond Individual Differences:Social Differentiation from First Principles"

American Sociological Review 63: 309-30.Mark, Noah P., Cecilia Ridgeway, and Lynn Smith

Lovin. Unpublished manuscript. "TheFormation of Consensual Status Beliefs."

Mayhew, Bruce H. 1974. "Baseline Models of SocialStructure." American Sociological Review 39:137?43.

Mayhew, Bruce H., Roger L. Levinger, J. MillerMcPherson and T.F. James. 1972. "System Sizeand Structural Differentiation in FormalOrganizations: A Baseline Generator for TwoMajor Theoretical Propositions." AmericanSociological Review 37: 629-633.

McClelland, Kent and Thomas Fararo. 2006. Purpose,Meaning, and Action: Control Systems Theories

in Sociology. New York: Palgrave-MacMillan.McPherson, Miller. 1983. "An Ecology of Affiliation."

American Sociological Review 48: 519-532.McPherson, Miller. 2000. "Modeling Change in Fieldsof Organizations: Some Simulation Results."

Pp. 134-44 in Computational Modeling ofBehavioral Processes in Organizations, editedby Daniel Ilgen and Charles Hulin. Washington,D.C.: American Psychological AssociationPress.

McPherson, Miller. 2004. "A Blau Space Primer:

Prolegomenon to an Ecology of Affiliation,"Industrial and Corporate Change 13: 263-280.

McPherson, Miller, Pamela A. Popielarz, and SonjaDrobnic. 1992. "Social Networks and Organizational Dynamics." American Sociological

Review 57:153-170.McPherson, Miller and James Ranger-Moore. 1991.

"Evolution on a Dancing Landscape:Organizations and Networks in Dynamic BlauSpace." Social Forces 70: 19-42.

McPherson, Miller and Tomas Rot?lo. 1996. "Testinga Dynamic Model of Social Composition:

Diversity and Change in Voluntary Groups."American Sociological Review 61: 179-202.

McPherson, Miller and Lynn Smith-Lovin. 1981"Women and Weak Ties: Sex Differences in theSize of Voluntary Associations" American

Journal of Sociology 87: 883-904.McPherson, Miller and Lynn Smith-Lovin. 1986. "Sex

Segregation in Voluntary Associations."American Sociological Review 51: 61-79.

McPherson, Miller and Lynn Smith-Lovin. 1987."Homophily inVoluntary Organizations: StatusDistance and the Composition of Face-to-FaceGroups." American Sociological Review 52:370-79.

McPherson, Miller and Lynn Smith-Lovin. 2002."Cohesion and Membership Duration: Linking

Groups, Relations, and Individuals in anEcology of Affiliation." Advances in GroupProcesses 19: 1-35.

McPherson, Miller, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and MatthewBrashears. 2006. "Social Isolation in America:Changes in Discussion Networks over TwentyYears." American Sociological Review71:353-75.

McPherson, Miller, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and James M.Cook. 2001. "Birds of a Feather: Homophily inSocial Networks." Annual Review of Sociology27: 415^44.

Merton, Robert K. 1957. "The Role-set: Problems inSociological Theory." British Journal ofSociology 8: 106-120.

Pescosolido, Bernice A. and Beth A. Rubin. 2000."The Web of Group Affiliations Revisited:Social Life, Postmodernism and Sociology."American Sociological Review 65: 52-76.

Robinson, Dawn T., Shirley A. Keeton, and ChristabelRogalin. 2002. "Network Density and theOrganization of Social Identities." Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of theInternational Network for Social Network

Analysis inNew Orleans, LA.Robinson, Dawn T., Christabel L. Rogalin, and LynnSmith-Lovin. 2004. "Physiological Measures ofTheoretical Concepts: Some Ideas for LinkingDeflection and Emotion to Physical ResponsesDuring Interaction." Advances in GroupProcesses 21:77?115.

Robinson, Dawn T. and Lynn Smith-Lovin. 1992.


19/20

SELF NDSITUATEDDENTITY23"Selective Interaction as a Strategy for Identity

Maintenance: An Affect Control Model." SocialPsychology Quarterly 55: 12-28.

Robinson, Dawn T. and Lynn Smith-Lovin. 2006."Affect Control Theory." Pp. 137-64 inContemporary Social Psychological Theories,edited by Peter J. Burke. Stanford, CA: Stanford

University Press.Rot?lo, Thomas and Miller McPherson. 2001. "The

System of Occupations: Modeling Occupationsin Sociodemographic Space." Social Forces 79:1095-1130.

Serpe, Richard T. 1987. "Stability and Change in Self:A Structural Symbolic Interaction Explanation."Social Psychology Quarterly 50: 44-55.

Serpe, Richard T. and Sheldon Stryker. 1987. "TheConstruction of Self and the Reconstruction ofSocial Relationships." Advances in Group

Processes 4: 41-82.Serpe, Richard T. and Sheldon Stryker. 1993. "Prior

Social Ties and Movement into NewRelationships." Advances in Group Processes

10: 283-304.Simon, Robin W. 1995. "Gender, Multiple Roles, Role

Meaning, and Mental Health." Journal ofHealthand Social Behavior 36: 182-94.

Simon, Robin W. 1998. "Assessing Sex Differences inVulnerability Among Employed Parents: TheImportance of Marital Status." Journal of

Health and Social Behavior 39: 38-54.Smith-Lovin, Lynn. 1979. "Behavioral Settings and

Impressions Formed from Social Scenarios."Social Psychology Quarterly 42:31^2.-. 1987a. "Impressions from Events." JournalofMathematical Sociology 13: 35-70.-. 1987b. "The Affective Control of Eventswithin Settings." Journal of MathematicalSociology 13: 71-101.-. 1990. "Emotion as the Confirmation andDisconfirmation of Identity: An Affect ControlModel. Pp. 238-70 in Research Agendas in theSociology of Emotions, edited by Theodore D.Kemper. Albany, NY: State University of NewYork Press.

-. 1995. "The Sociology of Affect andEmotion." Pp. 118-48 in SociologicalPerspectives on Social Psychology, edited byKaren S. Cook, Gary A. Fine, and James S.House. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.-. 2001. "Role-identities, Action and Emotion:Parallel Processing and the Production of MixedEmotions." Pp. 125?44 in Self and Identity:Personal, Social, and Symbolic,

editedbyYoshihisa Kashima, Margaret Foddy, and

Michael J. Platow. New York: Erlbaum.-. 2003. "Self, Identity and Interaction in an

Ecology of Identities." Pp. 167-178 inAdvancesin Identity Theory and Research, edited by Peter

J. Burke, Timothy J. Owens, Richard T. Serpeand Peggy A. Thoits. New York:

Kluwer/Plenum.Smith-Lovin, Lynn and David. R.Heise. 1988.

Analyzing Social Interaction: Advances inAffectControl Theory. New York: Gordon and BreachScience Publishers.

Smith-Lovin, Lynn and Miller McPherson. 1993 "YouAre Who You Know: A Network Perspective onGender." Pp. 223-41 in Theory onGender/Feminism on Theory, edited by PaulaEngland. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

Smith-Lovin, Lynn and Dawn T. Robinson. 2006."Control Theories of Identity, Action, andEmotion: In Search of Testable Differencesbetween Affect Control Theory and IdentityControl Theory." Pp. 163-188 in Purpose,

Meaning, and Action: Control System Theoriesin Sociology, edited by Kent McClelland and

Thomas Fararo. New York: Palgrave MacMillanPress.

Stryker, Sheldon. 1980. Symbolic Interactionism: ASocial Structural Version. Menlo Park, CA:Benjamin Cummings.

Stryker, Sheldon. 2000. "Identity competition: Key toDifferential Social Movement Involvement." Pp.21-40 in Identity, Self and Social Movement,edited by Sheldon Stryker, Timothy J. Owens,and R. White. Minneapolis, MN: University of

Minnesota Press.Stryker, Sheldon. 2003. "A Peek Back- and Then

Ahead." Pp. 217-23 in Advances in IdentityTheory and Research, edited by Peter J. Burke,Timothy J. Owens, Richard T. Serpe, and PeggyA. Thoits. New York: Kluwer/Plenum.

Stryker, Sheldon and Peter J. Burke. 2000. "The Past,Present, and Future of an Identity Theory."Social Psychology Quarterly 63: 284-97.

Stryker, Sheldon and Richard T. Serpe. 1982."Commitment, Identity Salience and RoleBehavior: A Theory and Research Example."Pp. 199-218 in Personality, Roles, and SocialBehavior, edited by W Ickes and E.S. Knowles.New York: Spring-Verlag.

Stryker, Sheldon, Richard T. Serpe and Matthew O.Hunt. 2005. "Making Good on a Promise: TheImpact of Larger Social Structures on

Committments." Advances in Group Processes22: 93-123.

Thoits, Peggy A. 2003. "Personal Agency in theAccumulation of Multiple Role-identities." Pp.

179-194 in Advances in Identity Theory andResearch, edited by Peter

J. Burke, Timothy J.Owens, Richard T. Serpe, and Peggy A. Thoits.New York: Kluwer/Plenum.

Turner, Ralph H. 1976. "The Real Self: FromInstitution to Impulse." American Journal of

Sociology 84: 1-23.


20/20

124 SOCIALSVCHOLOGVUARTRIVLynn Smith-Lovin is the Robert L. Wilson Professor of Arts and Sciences in the Department ofSociology at Duke University. Her research focuses on the relationship between social structure,identity, interpersonal action, and emotion. Current projects include a study of justice processes,identity disconfirmation, and emotion (in collaboration with Dawn T. Robinson and Jody Clay

Warner), and a study of the coevolution of networks and voluntary group association memberships(in collaboration with Miller McPherson). Both projects are supported by the National ScienceFoundation. She has served as President of the Southern Sociological Association, Vice-President oftheAmerican Sociological Association, and Chair of both theASA Sections on Social Psychology andon Emotions. She received theASA Section on Emotions Lifetime Achievement Award in 2002.

semith-lovin - the strength of weak identities - social structural sources of self, situation and...

Documents