sen. elements of a theory of human rights. 2004..pdf

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Elements of a Theory of Human RightsAuthor(s): Amartya SenSource: Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Autumn, 2004), pp. 315-356Published by: WileyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3557992 .

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AMARTYAEN Elementsf a TheoryfHumanRights

I. THE NEED FORATHEORYFewconcepts re as frequentlynvokedn contemporaryoliticaldis-cussionsas humanrights. here s something eeply ttractiven theidea that very erson nywherentheworld,rrespectivef itizenshipor territorialegislation, as some basic rights, hich others houldrespect. he moral ppealofhumanrights as been used for varietyfpurposes, rom esistingorturendarbitraryncarcerationodemand-ingtheendofhungerndofmedicalneglect.'At he ametime, hecentraldea ofhumanrightss somethinghatpeoplehave, ndhave evenwithoutnyspecificegislation,s seenbymanyas foundationallyubiousand lacking n cogency.A recurrentquestion s,Where o theserightsome from?t s notusually isputedthat he nvokingf humanrights an be politicallyowerful. ather,the worries elate o what s takento be the "softness"somewouldsay"mushiness") f theconceptualgroundingf humanrights.Manyphilosophersndlegaltheoristsee therhetoric fhumanrightss justAn earlier ersion f this rticle erved s myGilbertMurrayecture"WhynventHumanRights?")iven nOxfordn 14November002. Forhelpfuluggestions,amparticularlyratefulo the Editors fPhilosophy PublicAffairs,nd also toCatherineBarnard, osanneFlynn,akiko ukudaParr,vanHare,WillKymlicka,oMiles,MarthaNussbaum,OnoraO'Neill, iddiqOsmani,MaryRobinson, mmaRothschild,homasScanlon,Arjun engupta,rances tewart,osemary horpe,nd RosieVaughan.1. See InternationalumanRightsnContext:aw,Politics ndMorals, d. Henry .Steiner ndPhilipAlstonNewYork: xford niversityress, 000); Richard alk,HumanRights orizons: hePursuitf usticen a GlobalizingWorldNewYork: outledge,000);Jack onnelly, niversal umanRightsn Theorynd Practice,nd ed. (Ithaca:CornellUniversityress, 003).See also Micheline . shay, heHumanRights eader:MajorPolit-

icalWritings,ssays, peeches,nd Documentsrom heBible tothePresentNewYork:Routledge,1997).? 2004byBlackwellublishing,nc.Philosophy PublicAffairs2,no.4

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316 Philosophy PublicAffairs

loose talk-perhaps kindlynd wellmeaningforms f locution-butloose talknevertheless.The contrast etween hewidespread se of he deaofhumanrightsand the ntellectualkepticismbout itsconceptual oundness s notnew.The U.S. Declaration f ndependence,n1776, ook t to be "self-evident" hat veryones "endowed y heir reator ith ertainnalien-ablerights,"nd thirteenearsater,heFrench eclaration f the ightsofman" sserted hat men reborn ndremain ree ndequalinrights."But it did nottakeJeremyentham ong, n his Anarchical allacieswrittenuring791and1792 (aimedagainst heFrenchrightsfman"),toproposethetotaldismissal fall such claims.Bentham nsisted hat"naturalightsssimplenonsense:naturalnd mprescriptibleightsanAmerican hrase), hetoricalonsense, onsense ponstilts."2hat us-picionremains ery livetoday, nd despitepersistentse of the deaofhumanrightsnpracticalffairs,here remanywho see the dea ofhumanrightss no more han bawling pon paper," o use another fBentham's arbedportrayalsfnatural ightlaims.The dismissal fhumanrightss often omprehensivend is aimedagainst nybeliefnthe xistence frightshat eoplecan have uncon-ditionally,imply yvirtue ftheir umanityratherhanhaving hemcontingently,n thebasisofspecific ualifications,uch as citizenshipor egalentitlements).omecritics, owever,roposea discriminatingrejection:hey ccept hegeneraldea ofhumanrightsut xclude, romtheacceptable ist, pecific lasses ofproposedrights,nparticularheso-calledeconomic and social rights,r welfare ights. hese rights,which resometimes eferredo as secondgenerationights,uchas acommon entitlemento subsistence r to medicalcare,have mostlybeen addedrelativelyecentlyo earlier nunciations f humanrights,thereby astly xpandinghe claimeddomain of humanrights.3hese2. Jeremyentham, narchicalallacies;Being n ExaminationftheDeclaration fRightsssuedduring heFrench evolution1792); epublishedn The Works fJeremyBentham,ol. I,ed.J.BowringEdinburgh: illiam ait, 843), .501.3. See IvanHare, SocialRightss Foundational umanRights,"nSocialand LabourRightsnGlobalContext,d.BobHepple Cambridge: ambridge niversityress, 002),andWilliam Felice,TheGlobalNewDeal: Economic ndSocial HumanRightsnWorldPoliticsLanham:Rowman Littlefield,003).See alsoCassR.Sunstein, fterheRights

Revolution:econceivingheRegulatorytateCambridge, ass.:Harvard niversityress,199o), ndThomasW Pogge,World overtynd HumanRights: osmopolitanesponsi-bilities ndReformsLondon: olityress, 002).



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317 Elementsf TheoryfHumanRights

additionshave certainlyaken hecontemporaryiteraturen humanrightswell beyondthe eighteenth-centuryeclarations hat concen-trated n a narrowerlass of"rightsfman," ncludinguch demandsas personal ibertyndpolitical reedom. hese newer nclusions avebeensubjected o more pecialized kepticism, ith hecritics ocusingon their easibilityroblems nd theirdependenceon specific ocialinstitutionshatmayormaynotexist.4Humanrightsctivists re often uite mpatient ith uchcritiques.The nvokingfhumanrightsends o comemostly romhosewho areconcernedwith hangingheworld atherhan nterpretingt touse aclassicdistinction adefamous, ddly nough, y hat verarchinghe-orist,KarlMarx). t is not hardto understand heirunwillingnessospendtimetryingo provide onceptual ustification,iventhegreaturgencyorespond o terribleeprivationsround heworld. hispro-active tancehashad itspractical ewards,ince thasallowed mmedi-ate use of the colossalappeal of the dea of humanrightso confrontintense ppression rgreatmisery, ithout aving owaitfor hetheo-retical ir to clear.However,heconceptualdoubtsmust lso be satis-factorilyddressed,f he dea ofhumanrightss to command easonedloyaltynd to establish secure ntellectualtanding. t is criticallyimportanto see the relationship etween the force nd appeal ofhumanrights,n the one hand,and their easoned ustificationndscrutinizedse,ontheother.There s, thus, eed for ometheorynd alsofor omedefense f nyproposed heory.heobjectofthis rticle s to do ustthat, ndto con-sider,nthat ontext,heustificationf hegeneraldeaofhumanrightsand also ofthe ncludabilityf economic and socialrightswithin hebroad classof humanrights.or such a theoryo be viable t s neces-sary oclarify hatkindof a claim s madebya declaration f humanrights,nd how ucha claim an be defended,nd furthermoreowthediverse riticismsf thecoherence, ogency nd legitimacyfhuman

4. The reasoning ehind uchrejection as been powerfullyresented yMauriceCranston, "AreThere Any Human Rights?"Daedalus (1983): 1-17,and Onora O'Neill,Towards usticend VirtueCambridge: ambridge niversityress, 996). ee also thecritiquefMichael gnatieff,upportingome claims o human ights hile tronglyis-puting thers,nHumanRightss Politics nd IdolatryPrinceton:rinceton niversityPress, 2001).



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rights includingeconomic and social rights)can be adequatelyaddressed. hat sthe im of his rticle.However,efore oingnto his nvestigation,shouldmakea clarifi-catory oint. he rhetoric fhumanrightss sometimesppliedtopar-ticularegislationsnspired y he dea ofhumanrights.here s clearlyno great ifficultynseeing he obvious udicialstatus fthesealreadylegalized ntitlements.o matterwhatthey recalled ("humanrightslaws" or anyother ppellation), hey tand shoulder o shoulderwithother stablishedegislations.he presentnquiry n the foundationsand cogency f humanrights oes not haveanydirect earing n theobvious egal tatus fthese humanrightsaws," ncethey avebeenproperlyegislated. s far s these awsareconcerned,herelevance,fany, f this tudywould ie, rather,n themotivationhat eads to theenacting f suchlaws,whichbuildson thepre-legislativetanding ftheseclaims.Indeed, greatmany cts of egislationnd legalconventionssuchas the"EuropeanConventionor heProtection f HumanRightsndFundamental reedoms") ave beenclearlynspired y beliefnsomepre-existingightsf all humanbeings.Thisapplieseventotheadop-tion of the U.S. Constitution,ncludingheBillofRights,inked o thenormative ision f heU.S. Declaration f ndependenceaswas notedearlier).The difficultuestions regardinghe status and standing fhumanrights rise in the domain of ideas, before uch legalizationoccurs.We also have to examinewhetheregislations thepre-eminent,or evena necessary,oute hrough hichhumanrightsanbe pursued.II. QUESTIONS OBEANSWEREDA theory f humanrightsmust addressthe following uestionsinparticular:

(1) Whatkind of a statement oes a declaration fhumanrightsmake?(2) What makes human rightsmportant?(3) Whatduties and obligationsdo human rightsgenerate?(4) Throughwhat formsof actions can human rightsbe promoted,and in particularwhether egislationmust be the principal, or even anecessary,means of mplementationof human rights?



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(5) Caneconomic nd socialrightsthe o-called econdgenerationrights) e reasonablyncluded monghumanrights?(6) Last but not least, how can proposals of human rightsbedefendedrchallenged,nd how hould heir laim o a universaltatusbe assessed,especially n a worldwith much cultural ariation ndwidely iverse ractice?Thesequestions re addressed equentiallyn whatfollows. owever,sincethis s nota detectivetory,amperhaps llowedtogive wayasketch ftheproposed nswers,with hehope that hismight elpinfollowinghis ong nd notentirelyncomplicatedrticleeventhoughthere s some risk of oversimplificationnvolved n any summaryformulation).(1) Humanrights an be seen as primarilythicaldemands.Theyarenotprincipallylegal," proto-legal"r ideal-legal"ommands. venthoughhumanrights an, and oftendo, inspire egislation,his s afurtheract, atherhan constitutiveharacteristicfhumanrights.(2) The mportancefhuman ightselates o the ignificancef hefreedomshatform hesubjectmatter f theserights. oththeoppor-tunityspectand theprocess spectof freedoms an figurenhumanrights. o qualify s the basis ofhumanrights,he freedoms o bedefended r advancedmust atisfyome"threshold onditions" f i)special mportancend (ii)social nfluenceability.(3) Humanrights enerate easonsfor ctionfor gentswho are na position ohelpin thepromotingrsafeguardingftheunderlyingfreedoms.he nduced bligations rimarilynvolve hedutyogive ea-sonable onsiderationothereasons or ction ndtheir racticalmpli-cations, akingnto accountthe relevant arameters f the ndividualcase. The reasonsfor ctioncan support oth"perfect"bligations swell as "imperfect"nes,which re less preciselyharacterized.venthough hey ifferncontent,mperfectbligationsre correlative ithhumanrightsnmuchthe samewayas perfect bligationsre. npar-ticular, he acceptanceof imperfectbligations oes beyondvolun-teered harityr elective irtues.(4) The implementationfhumanrightsan gowellbeyond egis-

lation, nd a theoryfhumanrightsannotbe sensiblyonfined ithinthe uridicalmodel nwhich t s frequentlyncarcerated.orexample,public ecognitionndagitationincludinghemonitoringfviolations)



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can be part of the obligations-often mperfect-generatedy theacknowledgmentfhumanrights. lso, omerecognized umanrightsarenot deallyegislated,utare better romoted hroughthermeans,includingpublic discussion, ppraisaland advocacy(a basic pointthatwouldhavecomeas no surprise oMaryWollstonecraft,hoseAVindicationftheRights fWoman:withStricturesn PoliticalandMoral Subjectswas published in 1792).(5) Humanrights an includesignificantnd influenceable co-nomic nd social freedoms.fthey annotbe realized ecause of nad-equate institutionalization,hen, owork or nstitutionalxpansion rreforman be a partoftheobligations enerated ytherecognitionftheserights. he currentnrealizabilityfanyacceptedhumanright,which an be promoted hroughnstitutionalrpolitical hange,doesnot,by tself,onverthat laim nto non-right.(6) The universalityf humanrights elates o the dea ofsurviv-abilityn unobstructediscussion-open to participation y personsacross nationalboundaries.Partisanships avoided not so muchbytaking ither conjunction,ran intersection,ftheviewsrespectivelyheldbydominant oices ndifferentocieties crosstheworld includ-ingvery epressivenes),butthroughn interactiverocess,nparticu-lar by examiningwhatwould survive n public discussion,givenareasonablyfreeflow of information nd uncurbedopportunityodiscussdifferingointsofview.Adam Smith's nsistence hatethicalscrutinyequiresxaminingmoralbeliefs rom,nter lia,"a certain is-tance"has a direct earing ntheconnection fhumanrightsoglobalpublicreasoning.III. HUMAN RIGHTS: ETHICS AND LAwWhatkindof an assertion oes a declaration f humanrightsmake?would ubmit hat roclamationsfhumanrightsretobe seenas artic-ulations f ethicaldemands.They re, n thisrespect,omparablewithpronouncementsnutilitarianthics, venthoughheir espectiveub-stantive ontentsre, bviously,ery ifferent.ikeother thical laimsthat demand acceptance, thereis an implicitpresumption in makingpronouncementson humanrights hattheunderlying thical claimswillsurviveopen and informed crutiny.ndeed, the invokingof such an



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321 Elementsf Theory fHumanRights

interactiverocessofcriticalcrutiny,pen to informationincludingthat boutother ocieties) s wellas to argumentsomingfrom ar swell s near, s a central eaturefthetheoryfhumanrightsroposedhere. t differsoth i) fromryingo ustifyhe ethics f humanrightsin termsof shared-and alreadyestablished-universalvalues (theuncomplicated non-partisan"iew), nd (ii)frombdicatingnyclaimof dherence o universal alues and n this ense, schewingnyclaimtobeing non-partisan")nfavor f particular olitical onception hatis suitable othecontemporaryorld."These ssues,which elate o thefoundationaliscipline f thical ri-tique,willbe examinedater,nSection X, nresponse oquestion 6).But hepoint o notefor hemoment,nanswer o thefirstuestion, sthat ronouncementsfhumanrightsrequintessentiallythical rtic-ulations, nd they renot, nparticular, utative egalclaims,despiteconsiderable onfusion n thispoint,generatednot least byJeremyBentham,heobsessive layer fwhathe took o be legalpretensions.Ishall returnater n this ection o the nature fthemisapprehensioninvolved.)A pronouncementf human rightsncludesan assertionof theimportancef he orrespondingreedoms-the reedomshat re den-tified ndprivilegedntheformulationftherightsnquestion-and isindeedmotivatedythatmportance.orexample, hehumanright fnotbeing orturedpringsrom he mportanceffreedomromorturefor ll. But t ncludes, urthermore,naffirmationf heneed for thersto considerwhatthey an reasonably o to secure the freedom romtorture or nyperson. or would-be orturer,hedemand sobviouslyquite traightforward,owit, o refrainnd desist. he demand akestheclearform fwhat mmanuelKant alled a perfectbligation.6owever,for thers oo thats,those ther han hewould-be orturers)here reresponsibilities,ven though hey re less specific nd come in thegeneralformof "imperfectbligations"to invokeanotherKantian

5. There re differentariantsf hese wo ontrastingositions,nd also other lter-nativeshat ifferrom oth,which rehelpfullyiscussed nddistinguishednCharlesBeitz,HumanRightss a Common oncern,"merican olitical cience eview5 (June2001):269-82.6. ImmanuelKant,Critique fPracticalReason 1788), rans. .W.Beck NewYork:Bobbs-Merrill, 956).



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322 Philosophy& PublicAffairs

concept).'Theperfectlypecified emandnotto torturenyone s sup-plemented ythemoregeneral,nd lessexactlypecified, equirementto consider heways nd means hrough hich ortureanbepreventedandthen odecidewhatone should, hus, easonably o. Therelationsbetweenhumanrights,reedoms,ndobligations illbe furthernves-tigatednSectionsVthroughI.Even thoughrecognitionsf humanrightswiththeir ssociatedclaims ndobligations)reethical ffirmations,hey eednot,by hem-selves, eliver complete lueprintor valuative ssessment. nagree-ment n humanrights oes involve firmommitment,owit, ogivereasonable considerationo the duties that followfrom hat ethicalendorsement. ut venwith greementnthese ffirmations,here anstill e seriousdebates, articularlynthecase of mperfectbligations,on (i) theways nwhichtheattention hat s owed to humanrightsshouldbe bestpaid, ii)howthedifferentypes fhumanrightshouldbeweighed gainst achother nd their espectiveemands ntegratedtogether,iii)how theclaimsofhumanrightshouldbe consolidatedwith ther valuative oncerns hatmay lso deserve thical ttention,and so on.8Atheoryfhumanrightsan leave roomfor urtheriscus-sions, disputations nd arguments. he approach of open publicreasoning,which s central o theunderstandingf humanrights sproposedhere,can definitivelyettle ome disputesabout coverageand content includinghe identificationf some clearly ustainablerights nd others hatwould be hard to sustain),but mayhave toleave others, t least tentatively,nsettled.9 he admissibilityf a7. I have discussed, n an earlierpaper,the relevance f theKantiandistinctionbetween perfect"nd"imperfect"bligationsvenfor largelyonsequentialistrame-work. Consequentialvaluation ndPractical eason," ournalfPhilosophy7 (2000):477-502.8. Someofthecentral ssuesarediscussedbyJohnMackie, CanThereBe a Rights-basedMoral heory?"tudies nEthical heory: idwest tudies nPhilosophy,ed.PeterA.French,tal. (MorrisUniversityfMinnesota,978).ReprintednTheoriesfRights,ed.JeremyaldronOxford:xfordniversityress, 984), p.168-81.9. This ppliesnotonly o thepersistencef nterpersonalisagreements,utalso tospecificreasof unresolved isputeswithin neperson's wn reasoned ssessment. nadequate heoryfrationalityastomakeroom oruch incompleteness"f ssessment.

Thegeneralssueof dmissibilityf ncompletenesss discussed nmyCollective hoiceand SocialWelfareSan Francisco:Holden-Day,970;republished,msterdam: orth-Holland, 1979); "Maximization and the Act of Choice," Econometrica65 (1997): 745-80,



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domain f ontinued isputes noembarrassmento a theoryfhumanrights.'"Inpracticalpplicationsfhumanrights,uch debates re, f ourse,quite ommon ndentirelyustomary,articularlymonghumanrightsactivists.What is being arguedhere is thatthe possibility f suchdebates-without osingthe basic recognitionf the importance fhumanrights-isnot usta feature fwhatcan be called humanrightspractice,hey reactually art fthegeneral iscipline fhumanrightsincludingheunderlyingheoryratherhanbeing n embarrassmentothatdiscipline).An acknowledgmentf thenecessity o pay ethicalattentiono humanrights,ar rombliteratingheneedfor uchdelib-eration,ctuallynvitest.Atheoryfhumanrightsan,therefore,llowconsiderablenternal ariations, ithoutosing hecommonalityftheagreedprinciple fattachingubstantialmportanceo humanrights(andto thecorrespondingreedomsndobligations)nd ofbeing om-mitted oconsideringeriously ow that mportancehould be appro-priatelyeflected.

Variabilityfthiskind s notonlynot an embarrassment,ttendstobe standardly resent n all generaltheoriesof substantive thics.Indeed, similar iversityan be foundwithin tility-centeredthics,eventhough hisfeature fthat argeethicaldiscipline ften eceiveslittle rnorecognition.nthecase ofutility-basedeasoning,ariationscan arisenotonly rom hedifferentays n which tilitiesan be inter-pretedaspleasures,ulfillmentfdesires,rrealization f hoices),"noronlyfrom heacknowledgedeterogeneityfutilitieshemselveswellreprintednRationalitynd FreedomCambridge, ass.:Harvard niversityress, 002);and also"Incompletenessnd ReasonedChoice," yntheseforthcoming004).See alsoIsaac Levi,Hard Choices:DecisionMakingunder Unresolved onflictCambridge:CambridgeUniversityress, 1986), nd HilaryPutnam, Ober die RationalittitonPriiferenzen,"llgemeine eitschriftfiirhilosophie21 1996):204-28, Englishversion,"OntheRationalityfPreferences,"nhisTheCollapse f he act/Value ichotomyndOtherEssaysCambridge, ass.:Harvard niversityress, 002).to. Also, sJeremyaldron asargued, isagreementboutrightsis a sign-thebestpossible ign nmodern ircumstances-thateopletakerightseriously."ee Law andDisagreement Oxford:OxfordUniversity ress,2001),p. 311.11. SeeJeremyentham, n ntroductiono thePrinciples fMorals nd Legislation(London: ayne, 789; epublished,xford: larendon ress);Henry idgwick,heMethodofEthics London:Macmillan, 874);A. C. Pigou,TheEconomics fWelfareLondon:MacMillan,920); rank Ramsey,oundations:ssaysnPhilosophy,ogic,Mathematics



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324 Philosophy& PublicAffairs

recognized ybothAristotlendJohn tuartMill).12 hey an also arisefrom hediversityfways nwhich tilitiesan beused,whetherymereaddition, rbymultiplicationafteruitablenormalization),rthroughthe ddition f oncave ransformationsfutilityunctions,ll ofwhichhave beenproposed ndpursued,within hediscipline futility-basedevaluation.13 urther,hediscipline f nterpersonalomparison futil-itiesmay tselfllow lternativeroceduresfquantificationfutilitiesandgo comfortablyith ccommodatingermissibleariations ithinspecified lassesof"partial omparability."l4he existence f differentwaysofmaking se ofutility-basedeasoningndalternativetilitarianprocedures oes not nvalidaterevenundermine hegeneral pproachofutility-centeredthics.And, imilarly,he ethicsof humanrightssnot nullified r thwarted y internalvariations hat it allows andincorporates.Thus, he nalogy etween rticulationsfhumanrightsnd utilitar-ian pronouncementsas considerable erspicacity,ven though hegreat ounder fmodernutilitarianism,eremyentham,managedtomissthatconnection ltogethern his classic hatchetob on naturalrightsngeneral ndon the rightsfman" nparticular.entham ookand EconomicsLondon:Routledge,978);RichardM.Hare, reedomndReason Oxford:Clarendon ress,1963);J.C.B.Gosling, leasure nd Desire Oxford: larendonPress,1969);DerekParfit, easons nd PersonsOxford: larendon ress, 984);R. E. Goodin,"Launderingreferences,"nTheFoundationsf ocialChoiceTheory,d.Jon lsterndAanundHyllandCambridge:ambridgeniversityress, 986), p.75-101; ames riffin,Well-beingOxford: larendonPress,1986);JohnBroome,Weighing oods (Oxford:Blackwell,991);mongmany ther ontributions.

12. SeeAristotle,heNicomacheanthics,rans. avidRoss, ev. d. (Oxford:laren-donPress, 980), ndJohntuartMill,UtilitarianismLondon, 861; epublishedondon:Collins/Fontana,962). havediscussed he ssues nvolvedn "Plural tility,"roceedingsoftheAristotelian ociety 1 198o-81):193-215.13. See JohnE Nash, "The BargainingProblem,"Econometrica18 (1950):155-62;JohnC. Harsanyi,CardinalWelfare,ndividualisticthics,nd InterpersonalomparisonsfUtility,"ournalfPolitical conomy3 (1955): 09-21;James .Mirrlees,An xplorationof heTheoryfOptimumncome axation,"eviewf conomictudies8 1971): 75-208.14.These ssues rediscussednAmartyaen, Interpersonalggregationnd PartialComparability," conometrica38 (1970): 393-409, and Choice,Welfare nd Measurement(Oxford: lackwell,982; epublished,ambridge, ass.: Harvard niversityress, 997);Charles lackorby,Degrees fCardinalityndAggregateartial rderings,"conometrica43 1975): 45-52; enJ. ine, ANoteon InterpersonalggregationndPartial ompara-bility',"conometrica3 1975): 69-72;nterpersonalomparisonsfWell-beings,d.JonElster ndJohn oemerCambridge:ambridge niversityress, 991).



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theappropriateomparison o be thatbetween he egalsignificance,respectivelyf: 1)declarationsfhumanrights,nd (2) actuallyegis-lated rights.Not surprisingly,e foundthe former o be essentiallylackingn legalstatus n thewaythe atter, bviously nough,wouldhave. Bentham's ismissal fhumanrightsame, thus,with mazinglyswiftness.Right,hesubstantiveight,s thechildof aw;from eal aws comerealrights;utfrommaginaryaws,fromlaw ofnature" cancomeonly] imaginary ights."'5It seasyto see thatBentham'sejection fthe dea ofnatural rightsofman"dependssubstantiallyn the rhetoricfprivileged se oftheterm f rights,"eeingt n ts pecificallyegal nterpretation.owever,insofars humanrightsre meant o be significantthical laims, hepointer o thefact hat hey o notbythemselves ave egalor nstitu-tional orce sobvious nough, utalsoquite rrelevantothedisciplineofhumanrights.'6heappropriateomparisons,surely,etween:(1) a utility-basedthics championed yBentham imself),whichsees intrinsicthicalmportancenutilities utnone n humanrightsrhuman freedomsanyrole thatthe latter an have in the utilitariansystems,thus, ntirelynstrumental),nd(2) an ethics hatmakesroom for he fundamentalignificancefhumanrightsas the advocatesof"rightsf man"did),linkedwithdiagnosis fthebasic importancef human freedoms nd theobliga-tionsgenerated ythatdiagnosis.'715.Jeremyentham,narchicalallacies,nCollectedWorks,ol. I,p.523.16.Accepting generalontrast etween herespectiveategoriesf thical ssertionsand egalpronouncementsoesnot, f ourse, eny hepossibilityhat thical iewsmaycontributeothe nterpretationnd, thus, he ubstantiveontent f aws.Therecogni-tionofthatpossibilitymay go against strictlyositivistheory f aw (onwhich eeRonaldDworkin,Matterf rincipleCambridge,ass.:Harvard niversityress, 9851).Thisunderstandingoes not,however,bliteratehemotivationalnd substantiveis-tinction etween rimarilythical laims ndprincipallyegalproclamations.17.The mportancefrightsndfreedomsan,of ourse, e combinedwithncorpo-

ratinghe ignificancefutilityrwell-beingn ethical easoning,ut f uch "combined"systems to be pursued, omeconsistency roblemswillhaveto be faced n devisinga coherent nd integratedocial choice procedure; n this see Amartya en, "The



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Justs utilitarianthical easoningakes heform f nsistinghat heutilities f herelevant ersonsmustbe taken nto ccount ndecidingon what houldbe done,thehumanrights pproachdemands hat heacknowledgeduman ightsmust egiven thical ecognitiontheformand the nformationalasisof hat ecognition illbe discussed urtherinthenext wosections). herelevantomparisonies nthis ontrast,not in differentiatinghe legal forceof legislatedrights forwhichBentham'shrase the hild f aw" s an appropriate escription)romthe bsence of ny egal tanding enerated y n ethical ecognitionfrightswithoutny egislationr egalreinterpretation).ndeed, venasBenthamwasbusy n1791nd1792writingownhis dismissal f rightsofman," hereach and rangeof ethical nterpretationsfrightswerebeingpowerfullyxplored yThomasPaine'sRights fMan, ndbyMaryWollstonecraft'sVindicationftheRightsfWoman:with tricturesnPolitical nd MoralSubjects, othpublishedduring heperiod1791 o1792though either eemedtoarouseBentham'suriosity).'"An ethicalunderstandingf humanrights oes not onlyagainstseeingthem as legal demands and againsttaking hem to be, as inBentham'siew, egalpretensions),utalso differsrom law-centeredapproach ohumanrightshat ees them s if hey rebasically roundsforaw, lmost laws nwaiting." thical nd legalrights o,ofcourse,have motivational onnections. n a rightlyelebrated article "AreThereAnyNaturalRights?" erbert arthas argued hatpeople"speakof theirmoralrightsmainlywhenadvocating heirncorporationn alegalsystem." e added thattheconceptofa right belongsto thatbranch fmorality hich s specificallyoncerned odetermine henoneperson's reedommaybe limited yanother'snd so todeterminewhat actionsmay appropriatelye made thesubjectof coercive egalImpossibilityfa Paretian iberal," ournal fPolitical conomy8 (1970): 52-57,ndRationalitynd FreedomCambridge, ass.:Harvard niversityress, 002), ssays 2-14and 20-22. ee also Robert ozick, narchy,tate ndUtopiaNewYork:asicBooks, 974),and the pecialnumber fAnalyse Kritik8 1996) n "the iberal aradox,"articularlyKotaro uzumura,Welfare,ightsndSocialChoiceProcedures,"p.20-37.18. ThomasPaine,TheRights fMan:Being n Answero Mr Burke's ttack n theFrenchRevolution1791);econdpart,Combiningrinciplend Practice1792); epub-lished, The Rightsof Man (London: Dent, and New York:Dutton,1906). MaryWollstonecraft,VindicationftheRightsfWoman1792); epublished,heRights fWomanLondon:Dent, nd NewYork: utton,929).



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rules."'9Whereas enthamawrightss a "child f aw,"Hart's iew akestheform,neffect,f eeing omenatural ightss parents f aw:theymotivatend inspire pecificegislations. lthough artdoesnot makeanyreference hatever o humanrightsn his article, he reasoningabouttheroleofnatural ightss inspirationoregislationan be seentoapply otheconcept fhumanrightsswell.20Therecan, in fact, e little oubt thatthe dea of moralrights anserve, nd hasoftenerved npractice,s thebasis ofnew egislation.thasfrequentlyeenutilized nthisway, ndthis s indeedan importantuseofhumanrights.hat, or xample,spreciselyhewaythediagno-sisof nalienable ights asinvoked ntheU.S.Declaration f ndepen-denceand reflectedubsequentlyntheBillofRights, route hathasbeenwell-troddenn the egislative istoryfmanycountriesn theworld.21Providingnspiration or egislation s certainlyne way inwhich the ethical force of human rightshas been constructivelydeployed.However, o acknowledgehat such a connection xists s not thesame as takingherelevance fhumanrightso ieexclusivelyn deter-mining hat hould appropriatelye madethe ubject f oerciveegalrules."t s mportantoseethat he deaofhumanrightsanbe,and s,actually sed inseveral therways s well. ndeed, fhumanrightsreseen as powerfulmoral laims, ndeedas "moral ights"touse Hart'sphrase), hen urelywehave reasonfor omecatholicitynconsideringdifferentvenues forpromotinghese claims. This questionwillbepursued nSectionVII.)Thewaysand meansofadvancing nd imple-menting umanrights eednot, hus, e confined nly omaking ewlaws eventhoughometimesegislationmay ndeed turn ut to be therightway to proceed). For example,monitoringnd otheractivistsupport, rovidedbysuch organizationss HumanRightsWatch or19.H. L. A.Hart,Are hereAnyNatural ights?"hePhilosophical eview 4 (1955),reprintednTheoriesfRights,d.JeremyaldronOxford:xford niversityress, 984),p.79.20. On this ee MauriceCranston,Are hereAnyHumanRights?"21. TheframersftheUniversal eclarationfHumanRightsn1948hoped, nfact,that his eclaration ould erve s a template or ills frightsndifferentations,with

national ourts aking lead in their nforcement.ee MaryAnnGlendon'swonderfulaccount f hat emarkableistory,WorldMadeNew:EleanorRooseveltnd theUniver-salDeclarationfHumanRightsNewYork: andomHouse,2001).



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AmnestynternationalrOXFAMrM6dicinsansFrontiers,anthem-selveshelp to advance the effectiveeach of acknowledged umanrights.22nmanyontexts,egislation aynot,nfact,e involved.IV. RIGHTS, FREEDOMS AND SOCIAL INFLUENCEWhyrehuman ightsmportant?ince eclarationsfhumanightsreethicalffirmationsf heneed opay ppropriatettentiono the ig-nificanceffreedomsncorporatedntheformulationfhuman ights(aswasdiscussedn heast ection),nappropriatetartingointmustbe the mportanceffreedomsfhuman eings o be so recognized.Note hatwhile ightsnvolvelaimsspecifically,laims n others hoare na positiono make difference),reedoms,ncontrast,repri-marilyescriptiveharacteristicsf he onditionsfpersons.23Bystartingrom he mportanceffreedomss theappropriatehuman onditionn whichoconcentrate,atherhan n utilitiesasBenthamid),we geta motivatingeasonnotonlyfor elebratingourownrightsnd iberties,ut lsofor ur akingn interestnthesignificantreedomsfothers,ot ust ntheir leasuresnddesire-fulfillmentasunder tilitarianism).entham'snsistencenchoosingutilitys thebasisofethical valuation an be contrasted ith hereasons or ocusingnstead nfreedoms.havediscussed lsewherewhyhose easonsreweightyndhow he ocus nfreedomsan voidsome f hemajor itfallsf oncentratingnly nutilitynthe orm fpleasurerdesire ulfillment.or xample,heutilitarianalculus ansufferromaluational istortionsesultingrom heneglectf sub-stantiveeprivationf hosewho re hronicallyisadvantagedutwholearn, yforce f ircumstances,otake leasurensmallmerciesnd

22. SincetheGilbert urrayecture iven t OxfordnNovember002, in which hisarticleriginated,asarrangedyOXFAMGilbert urray as one ofOXFAM'sounders),itwasalsoa suitable ccasion o discuss his roader onnection fhumanrights ithpluralityfways fpursuinghem.23.However,heethical orce ffreedoms anhelptogeneratelaimson others. ndifferentspects f he entanglements"etween escriptivend evaluativeoncerns,eeHilary utnam, heCollapse f he act/ValueDichotomynd Other ssaysCambridge,Mass.:Harvard niversityress, 002).See alsoWilliam anOrmanQuine, TwoDogmas,OfEmpiricism,"nhisFrom Logical oint fViewCambridge, ass.:Harvard niversityPress,1961),pp. 20-46, and VivianWalsh,"Philosophyand Economics," in The New Pal-grave:A Dictionary fEconomics,d. John atwell,MurrayMilgate nd PeterNewman(London: Macmillan,1987),pp. 861-69.



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329 Elementsfa TheoryfHumanRights

getreconciled o cutting owntheirdesires o "realistic roportions"(therebyppearing obe notparticularlyeprivedn the pecialmetricofpleasures rdesire-fulfillment).24Before oing nto he difficultssue of dutiesrelated orights, hichwillbe examined n SectionVI, some explorationfthe connectionbetween ightsndfreedomssnecessary,o which devote he rest fthis ection s wellas SectionV.Freedoms anvarynimportancendalso n terms f he xtentowhich hey anbe influencedy ocialhelp.For a freedom o countas a partof the evaluative ystem fhumanrights,t clearlymust be importantnoughto justify equiring hatothers houldbe ready opaysubstantial ttentionodecide what heycanreasonablyo toadvance t. talso hastosatisfycondition fplau-sibilityhat thers ouldmake material ifferencehroughakinguchan interest.Therehavetobe some "thresholdonditions"f i) importancend(ii) social influenceabilityor freedomo figure ithin he nterper-sonal and interactivepectrumf humanrights.nsofar s the dea ofhumanrights emandspublicdiscussionand engagement,whichInotedearlier ndwillfurtheriscuss n Section X,theagreementhatwouldbe sought s notonlyon whether ome specific reedom faparticular ersonhas anyethical mportancewhatsoeverthat ondi-tioncan be easyto satisfy),ut also whethertssignificancend itsinfluenceabilityeet hethresholdonditions or nclusion mongthehumanrightsn which he ocietyhouldfocus.Thethreshold onditionsmayprevent,or varietyfreasons,par-ticular reedoms rom eingan appropriate ubjectmatter f humanrights.oillustrate,t s nothard oargue hat ome mportancehouldbe attached o all four fthefollowingreedoms:

(1) a person's reedom ottobe assaulted;(2) herfreedomo receivemedical arefor serioushealth roblem;(3) herfreedomot o be calledupregularlyyherneighbors homshedetests;(4) herfreedom o achieve ranquillity.24.The evaluative rameworkf substantive reedoms an provide more robustappreciationf person'snabilityo achievewhat hey ave reason ovalue.Onthis ee

my Well-being,gencynd Freedom: heDeweyLectures984,"ournalf hilosophy2(1985):169-220; InequalityReexamined;and Developmentas Freedom (New York:Knopf,1999).



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However,venthough llfourmaybe importantn onewayoranother,it s notaltogethermplausible oargue hat hefirstfreedomottobeassaulted) s a good subjectmatter or humanright,nd so is thesecond (freedom o receivenecessarymedical care),25 ut the third(freedom ot to be calledup bydetestedneighbors)s not, ngeneral,importantnough ocross he hreshold f ocialsignificanceoqualifyas a humanright. lso, hefourth,hile uitepossiblyxtremelympor-tant or heperson,s too nward-looking-andoohard o be influencedbyothers-to be a good subjectmatter orhumanrights.heexclusionof a "rightotranquillity"elatesnot to anyskepticismbout thepos-sible importance f tranquillitynd the significance f a person'sbeingfree oachieve t,but to thedifficultyfguaranteeingtthroughsocialhelp.There an be fruitfulebateson thethresholdsnd their se,and inparticularn whether specific ase offreedommeets the thresholdconditionsrnot.Aswasbrieflyiscussed nSectionsI and II (andwillbe furtherxaminednSectionX), uchdiscussions repartofthedis-cipline fhumanrights.heanalyses fthresholds,elated othto theseriousness nd to thesocial influenceabilityfparticular reedoms,cannotbuthave a significantlace inthediscipline fhumanrights.V. PROCESSES, PPORTUNITIESNDCAPABILITIESI turn ow oa closercrutinyf he ontentsffreedomnd tsmulti-plefeatures.have rguedlsewherehat opportunity"nd"process"are wo spectsf reedomhat equireistinction,ith hemportanceofeachdeservingpecificcknowledgment.26nexampleanhelptobringut he eparatethoughotnecessarilyndependent)elevanceofboth ubstantivepportunitiesndfreedomf rocesses.Considern adult erson,etus callherRima,whodecides hat hewouldike ogoout nthe vening.otake are f ome onsiderations

25. However,nthe econd ase that s, he ntitlementonecessarymedical are),weshallhave todiscusswhether his ype f "welfareight,"r moregenerally,conomicandsocialrights,an be seen as humanrights,ndthis xamination illbe taken p inSection III.26. SeeRationalitynd FreedomCambridge, ass.: Harvard niversityress, 002),particularly yArrowectures"FreedomndSocialChoice") ncluded here: ssays20through 2.



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that re not central othe ssues nvolved ere butwhichcould makethediscussionmore omplex),t sassumedthat here renoparticularsafetyisksnvolvednhergoing ut, nd that he hascriticallyeflectedon this ecision nd udged hat oing utwouldbe the ensible,ndeedthe ideal,thing o do. Now consider he threat f a violation fthisfreedomf ome authoritarianuardians f ociety ecidethat he mustnotgoout ntheevening"it s mostunseemly"),nd if hey orce er,in onewayoranother,ostayndoors. o see that here re twodistinctissues involved n thisone violation, onsider n alternative ase inwhich he uthoritarianossesdecidethat hemust-absolutelymust-goout "you reexpelled or heevening:ust obey").There s clearlyviolationffreedom ere ven hough ima sbeing orced o doexactlywhat he wouldhave chosen o do anyway,nd this sreadilyeen whenwecompare hetwo lternativeschoosing reelyogoout" and"beingforced o go out." The latter nvolves n immediateviolationoftheprocessspect fRima's reedom,incean action sbeingforced nher(eventhought s an action he wouldhavefreelyhosenalso).The opportunityspect may also be affected,ince a plausibleaccountingfopportunitiesan includehaving ptions nditcan interalia includevaluing ree hoice.However,heviolation ftheopportu-nity spectwouldbe more ubstantialnd manifestf he werenotonlyforced o do somethinghosenbyanother, ut in fact, orced o dosomethinghe herself ouldnot otherwise hooseto do.Thecompari-sonbetween beingforced ogo out" when hewould havegoneoutanyway,ffree) nd,say, beingforced opolishthe hoes ofothers thome" notherfavoritectivity)rings ut this ontrast, hich s pri-marilyne oftheopportunityspect, ather han heprocess spect. nbeingforced o stayhomeand polishthe shoes ofothers,Rima osesfreedomntwo differentays,related espectivelyo (1)beingforcedwithno freedom fchoice,and (2) being obliged n particularo dosomethinghe would notchoosetodo.27Bothprocesses ndopportunitiesanfigurenhumanrights. denialof dueprocess" nbeing, ay,mprisoned ithout proper rial an bethe ubjectmatter fhumanrightsnomatter hat he outcome fthe

27. More complexfeatures f the opportunityspect and the processaspect offreedoms re also discussed n myArrow ectures"Freedom nd Social Choice") nRationalityndFreedom,ssays 0through2.



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fair rialmightbe), and so can be the denial ofthe opportunityfmedicaltreatment,r theopportunityf ivingwithout hedanger fbeingassaulted goingbeyond he exactprocessthroughwhich heseopportunitiesre madereal).Fortheopportunityspectoffreedom,he dea of"capability"thatis,theopportunityo achievevaluable combinations f humanfunc-tionings: hat persons abletodoorbe) cantypicallyrovide helpfulapproach.28t llows stodistinguishppropriatelyetween1)what hevalues doingor being, nd (2) the means she has to achieve whatshe values.By shiftingttention,nparticular,owards heformer,hecapability-basedpproach esists n overconcentrationnmeans suchas incomes ndprimaryoods)that an be found nsome theories fjustice for xample,ntheRawlsian ifferencerinciple). hecapabil-ity pproach ancapture hefact hat wopersons an havevery iffer-ent ubstantialpportunitiesvenwhenthey aveexactlyhe amesetofmeans:for xample, disabledpersoncan do far ess thanan able-bodiedpersoncan,with xactlyhe same income and other primarygoods."The disabledpersoncannot, thus,be judged to be equallyadvantaged-with hesame substantivepportunities-as hepersonwithoutnyphysical andicapbutwith he ame setofmeans suchasincome nd wealth nd other rimaryoods).The capability erspec-tive concentrates n what actualopportunities personhas,notthemeansoverwhich hehas command.Moreparticularly,hecapabilityperspectivellowsus to take ntoaccounttheparametric ariabilityntherelation etween hemeans, ntheonehand, nd the ctualoppor-tunities,ntheother.29

28. On theconceptofcapability,ee my"Equality fWhat?"n Tanner ectures nHumanValues, ol. ,ed.Sterling . McMurrinCambridge: ambridge niversityress,and Salt LakeCity:UniversityfUtahPress,1980),pp. 197-220, nd Commodities nd Capa-bilitiesAmsterdam:orth-Holland,985),ndalso,ointlyditedwithMarthaNussbaum,TheQualityfLifeOxford:larendonress, 993). heapproachspowerfullyevelopedand appliedbyMarthaNussbaum,Womennd HumanDevelopment: heCapabilitiesApproachCambridge:ambridge niversityress,000). See alsotherelated heories fsubstantialpportunitieseveloped yRichard rneson,EqualityndEqualityfOppor-tunity orWelfare," hilosophical Studies56 (1989): 77-112;G. A. Cohen, "On the CurrencyofEgalitarianustice,"thics 9 (1989): 0o6-44;ndJohn .Roemer, heoriesfDistribu-tive usticeCambridge, ass.:Harvard niversityress, 996),mong thers ontributors.29.The mportancef his ariabilityor theoryfustice s discussednmy Justice:Means versus Freedoms,"Philosophy& Public Affairs 9 (1990): 111-21. ifferences n thecapabilityofunctionan arise venwith he ame etofpersonalmeans such sprimary



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Thecapabilityerspectivean alsohelp nbringingut theneed fortransparentaluational crutinyf ndividual dvantages nd adversi-ties, ince hedifferentfunctioningsave tobe assessedandweightednrelationo eachother,ndtheopportunitiesfhaving ifferentombi-nations ffunctioningslsohave tobe evaluated."3herichness fthecapability erspectiveroadlynterpreted,hus, ncludes ts nsistenceon theneedfor penvaluationalcrutinyormakingocial udgments,and nthis ense, tfitsnwellwith he mportancefpublic easoning.31Thisopennessoftransparentaluation ontrasts ith uryingheeval-uative exercise n some mechanical, nd valuationally paque, con-vention for xample,by takingmarket-evaluatedncometo be theinvariabletandard f ndividualdvantage,hereby ivingmplicit or-mative riorityo nstitutionallyeterminedmarket rices).

goods)for varietyfreasons,uch s (1)personal eterogeneitiesrelated,or xample,odisability,rpronenessoillness),2) environmentaliversitiessuchas climatic ondi-tions, rvaryinghreats rompidemicdiseasesor from ocal crime),3) variationsnnon-personalesourcessuch s thenature fpublichealth are, r socialcohesion), r 4)differentelativeositions is-a-vistherswell llustratedyAdamSmith'siscussion,nthe Wealth fNations, fthe fact hat heclothingnd other esources ne needs "toappear npublicwithouthame" epends nwhat ther eople tandardlyear nd howthey ypicallyive nthat ociety).30.The need for n explicitaluationalxercises,thus, een as an advantage,atherthan limitationf he apabilitypproach. or rgumentsn differentirectionsnthisissue, eeCharlesR.Beitz,Amartyaen'sResources,alues ndDevelopment,"conom-ics andPhilosophy (1986):282-90; BernardWilliams,TheStandard fLiving:nterestsandCapabilities,"nAmartyaenetal.,TheStandard fLiving,d. Geoffreyawthorn(Cambridge: ambridgeUniversityress,1987),pp. 94-102;Amartya en, InequalityReexamined,nd"CapabilityndWell-being,"nTheQuality fLife, d. Nussbaum ndSen, pp. 31-53.31.The capability pproach an allowconsiderable ifferencen application. or asomewhat ifferenterspective,eeMarthaNussbaum,Nature,unction,ndCapabil-ity:Aristotlen Political istribution,"xfordtudiesnAncienthilosophy,upplemen-tary olume 1988), p. 145-54,nd Women nd HumanDevelopment:heCapabilitiesApproach. ussbaum as discussed he mportancef dentifyingn overarchinglist fcapabilities," ith iven riorities,na moreAristotelianay.Myownreluctanceo ointhe earch or uch canonicalist rises artlyrommydifficultynseeinghow he xactlists ndweights ouldbechosenwithoutppropriatepecificationf he ontextf heiruse (which ouldvary), ut alsofrom disinclinationoaccept ny ubstantive iminu-tion f hedomain fpublic easoning.he frameworkf apabilities,s I see it,helpstoclarifynd lluminatehe ubjectmatter fpublicreasoning, hich an nvolve pistemicissues includinglaims fobjectivemportance)s wellas ethical ndpolitical nes. tdoesnot-and cannot-displace heneedfor ublic easoning.



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Therehas,however,een some serious riticism fdescribinghesesubstantivepportunities-toiveonekind f life ranother-as "free-doms," nd ithas beenargued hat hismakesthe dea offreedom ooinclusive. orexample,n her lluminatingnd sympatheticritique fmyDevelopments Freedom,usanOkinhas presented rgumentsosuggesthat tend tooverextendheconcept ffreedom."32heargues:"It shard o conceive f omehumanfunctionings,r thefulfillmentfsomeneedsandwants, uch as goodhealth ndnourishment,s free-domswithouttretchinghe term ntil tseems to refero everythingthat s ofcentral aluetohumanbeings" p.292).There s indeedscope for rgumentn howbroadly heconceptoffreedomhouldbe used.But heparticularxample onsiderednOkin'scounterarguments, I think, ased on a misinterpretationfthe deaof freedomunderlyinghe concept of capability.t has not beensuggestedt all that functioningfor xample, eing ngoodhealth rbeingwell-nourished)houldbe seen as freedom fanykind.Rather,freedom,nthe form fcapability,oncentrates n theopportunityoachievecombinationsffunctioningsincluding,nter lia,theoppor-tunityobewell-nourishedr ngoodhealth, s inthisparticularase):theperson sfree o use this pportunityrnot.Acapabilityeflectshealternative ombinations ffunctioningsverwhich thepersonhasfreedomfeffectivehoice.It s,therefore,otbeing uggestedt all that eingwell-nourishedringoodhealth sto be seenas a freedomn tself.33apability,s a kindoffreedom,eferso theextent o whichtheperson s able tochooseparticular ombinations f functioningsincluding,nteralia, suchthings s beingwell-nourished),o matterwhat theperson actuallydecides to choose. Mahatma Gandhi famouslydid not use thatopportunityobe well-fed henhe chose tofast,s a protestgainst he

32. SusanOkin, Poverty, ell-beingnd Gender:WhatCounts,Who'sHeard?" hilos-ophy& PublicAffairs1 2003): 280-316.On related ssues see also Joshua Cohen, "ReviewofSen's InequalityReexamined,"Journalof Philosophy92 (1994):275-88, esp. 278-80, andG. A. Cohen, "Review:Amartya en's Unequal World,"TheNew LeftReview 1995): 117-29,esp. 120-25.33. I havediscussed his ssue n"Well-being,gencynd Freedom: heDeweyLec-tures 984."t is also importanto examinehow theconceptof"freedom"inkswithbroadlyefineddeaof"interest,"hich nderlies oseph az's easoned iagnosis:Rightsground equirementor ction nthe nterestf ther eings." eeTheMoralityf reedom(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1986),p. 18o.



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policiesoftheBritish aj n ndia. nterms ftheactualfunctioningfbeingwell-nourished,hefasting andhidid not differrom starvingfamine ictim,ut hefreedomsndopportunitieshey espectivelyadwere uitedifferent.he reedomohave nyparticularhing anbedis-tinguishedromctually aving hat hing.What person s free ohave,not ustwhathe or heactually as, srelevant,haveargued,oa theoryof ustice.34similar oint an be made abouttherelevance f ubstan-tive reedomsna theoryfhumanrights.The fact hatmany f the terrible eprivationsn theworld eem toarise from lackof freedom o avoid thosedeprivationsratherhanfromhoice, ncluding hoosing o be "indolent": classic ssuein thehistoricaliteraturen poverty)s an importantmotivationaleasontoemphasize heroleoffreedom. his edMarx oarguepassionately ortheneedtoreplace thedominationfcircumstancesnd chance overindividuals ythe domination f ndividuals ver hanceand circum-stances."35hegeneraldea offreedom, ith tsmanydistinctompo-nents, eemsparticularlyelevant o normativeocialchoicetheory,ngeneral,nd tothetheoryf ustice,nparticular.heargument ere sthat t an alsofigureowerfullynthenormative oundationsfhumanrights.To take a differentypeofexample, onsider he freedom f newimmigrantso WestEuropeor NorthAmerica o conserve he ancestralcultural ustomsand life-stylesrom heircountries f origin.Thiscomplex ubject annotbe adequately ssessed without istinguishingbetween oing omethingndbeing ree o do that hing. strong rgu-ment an be constructedn favor f n immigrant'saving hefreedomto retain t eastparts fher ncestralife-style,ut hismustnotbe seenas an argumentnfavor fherpursuing er ncestralife-stylehethershechoosesto do this r not.The centralssue, nthis rgument,s thefreedomo choose how she should ive, ncluding heopportunityo

34.G.A.Cohenhaspresented rgumentsn favor ffocusingn achieved unction-ings-related o his conceptof "midfare"-ratherhanon capability;ee his "On theCurrencyf Egalitarian ustice,"nd "Equality f What?On Welfare, esources ndCapabilities,"n TheQuality fLife, d. Nussbaum ndSen,pp.125-41.ee also RichardArneson,Equalitynd Equality fOpportunityorWelfare,"hilosophical tudies 6(1989):77-112.35.KarlMarx,TheGermandeology, ithFriedrichngels, n KarlMarx: SelectedWritings,d.David McLellanOxford:xford niversityress, 977), .190.



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pursue ncestralustoms,nd tcannotbe turned nto n argumentorher pecificallyursuinghose ustomsnparticular,rrespectivefthealternativeshe has and thechoices he wouldmake." Theimportanceofcapability,eflectingpportunities,s central o thisdistinction."3I have beenconcentratingn what hecapability erspectivean dofor theoryf usticeor ofhumanrightsnthe mmediately recedingdiscussion, ut nowto turn o what tcannotdo.Althoughhe dea ofcapability as considerablemeritnthe assessment ftheopportunityaspectoffreedom,t cannotpossibly eal adequatelywith heprocessaspect offreedom,ince capabilities re characteristicsf individualadvantages,ndthey all hort f elling senough boutthefairnessrequityof theprocesses nvolved, r aboutthefreedom f citizens oinvoke ndutilize rocedureshat reequitable.Letmeillustratehecontrastfperspectives ith somewhat arshexample. t is nowfairly ell established hatgiven symmetricare,womentendto live onger hanmen. f one wereconcerned nlywithcapabilitiesand nothing lse),and in particularwithequality fthecapabilityo ive ong,twouldhave beenpossible o constructn argu-ment or ivingmenmoremedical ttentionhanwomen o counteractthe naturalmasculinehandicap.Butgivingwomen essmedicalatten-tionthan menfor hesame healthproblemswouldclearly iolate nimportantequirementfprocessequity,nd it seems reasonabletoargue,ncases ofthiskind, hatdemandsofequitynprocessfreedomcouldsensiblyverride single-mindedoncentrationn theopportu-nity spectoffreedomandtherequirementsfcapability qualitynparticular). hilet s mportantoemphasize herelevance f hecapa-bility erspectiven udging eople's ubstantivepportunitiesparticu-

36. Though his s nottheoccasion oprovide criticalssessment f multicultural-ism" s a socialpolicy,t sperhapsworth oting ere hat here sa bigdifferenceetween(1)valuingmulticulturalismecauseof heway,nd tothe xtenthat,t nhances hefree-domsof hepeople nvolvedochoose o ive s theywould ike andhavereason o ike);and 2)valuingulturaliversityer e,which ocuses n thedescriptiveharacteristicsfa societal attern,ather han n thefreedomsf hepeople nvolved.37. Capabilitysalsocentral otherelationshipetweenmulticulturalismndgenderequity.he mportantuestion hat usanOkin sks n herointbook, s MulticulturalismBadforWomen?,d.J.Cohen,M.Howard ndM.C. NussbaumPrinceton, .J.: rince-tonUniversityress, 999), urns,oa great xtent,n possible ensions etweenmulti-culturalism nd the freedom f individual ersons in thiscase, women)withincommunityofreelyonsiderndchoosehowtheywould ive.



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larlyncomparisonwith lternativepproaches hat ocus n incomes,or primary oods,or resources),hatpointdoes not, n any way,goagainst eeing hesimultaneous elevance lso oftheprocess spectoffreedomn a theoryfhumanrights,r,for hatmatter,na theory fjustice.Related o this ssue, shouldperhapstake theopportunityere tocorrect misinterpretationftheplace ofthecapability erspectivena theory f ustice.A theory f ustice,or moregenerallyn adequatetheoryfnormativeollectivehoice,hastobe aliveboth othefairnessof theprocesses nvolved nd to theequity nd efficiencyfthesub-stantivepportunitieshat eoplecanenjoy.38ndealingwith he atter,capabilityan indeedprovide very elpful erspective,ncomparisonwith, ay, heRawlsian oncentrationn "primary oods."Butcapabil-ity anhardlyerve s the ole nformationalasisfor heother onsid-erations, elated to processes,that must also be accommodated nnormative ollective hoicetheory.Perhaps hepoint anbe seen mosteasilyby consideringhediffer-ent omponentsfRawls's heoryfustice.His "firstrinciple"fusticeinvolves hepriorityf iberty,nd thefirst artof the "secondprinci-ple"involves rocessfairness,hrough emanding hat positionsndoffices eopento all."Even houghheconcerns hat eadRawls otheseparticularormulationsan be dealtwith ndifferentays,notonly nthewaythatRawlshimself ddresses hem, he force nd cogency fthese Rawlsianconcernscan neitherbe ignorednor be adequatelyaddressed hrough elyingnly he nformationalase ofcapabilities.39Incontrast,apabilityomes nto tsown ndealingwith heremain-derofthe econdprinciple,iz."theDifferencerinciple"withtscon-

38. Thepluralityfconcerns,nvolvingrocesses s wellas opportunities,hich sinescapablynvolvedn normativeollective hoice includingheories f ustice),s dis-cussedinmyCollective hoice nd SocialWelfare1970) nd "Well-being, gency ndFreedom: The Dewey Lectures1984,"JournalofPhilosophy82 (1985).Since I have seen itasserted hat propound "capability-basedheoryfustice,"shouldmake t bsolutelyclear hat his ouldbe true nlyntheratherimited enseofnamingomethingccord-ingto a principal artof t (comparablewith, ay,usingEngland orGreatBritain,rHolland or heNetherlands).39. SeemyCollectivehoice nd SocialWelfare,articularlyhapters through,and"Well-being,gencynd Freedom: heDewey ectures984."he ssues nvolvedremorefullyddressednmyforthcomingookFreedom ndJustice,o be published yHarvardUniversityress.



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centration n "primaryoods").40TheterritoryhatRawlsreserved ortheaccounting fprimaryoods,as used in his Differencerinciple,would indeedbe, I argue,better ervedbythecapability erspective.Thatdoesnot,however,bliteratenanyway herelevance f herest fthe erritoryfustice,nwhich rocess onsiderations,ncludingibertyandproceduralquity, igure.he samepluralityf nformationalaselinkswith hemultiplicityf considerations hatcan be invoked n atheory fhumanrights. apabilities nd the opportunityspect offreedom,mportants they re,have tobe supplemented yconsidera-tionsoffair rocesses nd the ack ofviolation fthe ndividual's ightto nvoke nd utilize hem.VI. DUTIES,REASONABLEONSIDERATIONND MPERFECTBLIGATIONSI turn owfromightso correlativeuties.Wecan,again,proceedfromthe mportanceffreedoms nd their ifferentspects. incefreedomsareimportant,eoplehavereason to ask whatthey hould do tohelpeach otherndefendingrpromotingheir espectivereedoms. inceviolation, r non-realization,f the freedoms nderlying ignificantrightsre, nthis valuativeystem, ad things ohappen, ven otherswhoarenot hemselvesesponsibleor ausing heviolation avea goodreason o considerwhat heyhoulddo tohelp.41 evertheless,hemovefrom reason or ction ohelpanother erson,which s easyto see ina consequence-sensitivethicalsystem, o an actual dutyto give

40. Itwas ndeed nthecontextf dentifyingninadequacyntheRawlsian ocus nprimaryoods ntheDifferencerinciple,orudging istributionalquity,hat heuse ofthe apabilityerspectiveasproposednmy 979 anner ectures,ublisheds "Equal-ity fWhat?"198o).n udging istributionalquity,hecapability erspectivelsohas,believe, dvantagesver heconcentrationn whatRonaldDworkin alls"resources"n"What s Equality? art2: Equality fResources,"hilosophy PublicAffairso (1981):185-243. workin as recentlyrgued hat n one interpretation,heres no substantialdifferenceetweenmyfocus n capabilitynd hisfocus n resources, hile n anotherinterpretation,e s ustrightnd amplainwrongSovereignirtue: heTheorynd Prac-tice fEqualityCambridge, ass.: Harvard niversityress, 000]). resist hetempta-tion,which must onfess sfairlytrong,o ointhat ebate nthis rticle.41.The rationale nd reachof a consequence-sensitiverameworkor histypeofethical easoning avebeen nvestigatednmy ssays RightsndAgency,"hilosophyPublicAffairs1 1982):3-39,"PositionalObjectivity,"hilosophy& PublicAffairs 2 (1993):126-45,nd "Consequentialvaluationnd Practical eason,"Journal fPhilosophy7(2000).



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reasonable onsiderationoundertakinguch an actionmightppear,at leastat firstight,o be a rather iganticump.However, hat sense ofdistance s largely llusory. he differencewould ndeed nvolve n immense scalationf hedutynquestionwerenot one ofgiving easonable onsideration o a possible ction,butanabsoluteobligation o undertake hataction,no matterwhat othervaluesone hasand what ther ommitmentsnehas reason o consider.Butthatwayof eeingone's duties-as compulsoryction-is notonlyatsome distance rom he cknowledgmentfreasonsfor ction, ut talso lackscogency,nd even nternal oherence. herearemanyfinedeedsfor achofwhich reasonfor ction xists, ut twouldtypicallybe impossible ocarryut the otalityf llthosedeeds.There sa needfor he assessment fprioritiesnd fordiscriminationn thewaytheobligation o givereasonable considerationmaybe followedup bysensible hoicesof ction.To acceptthatone has a duty o givereasonableconsideration omanydifferentypes factions s not an agreementotie oneself p inhopelessknots. nd t sparticularlymportantn thepresent ontext oemphasize heconverse: hedeterminationot toget nto pandemo-niumofpractical easonings not a ground ordenyinghatone doeshave a duty ogivereasonable onsideration o whatone can sensiblydo for herights,nd theunderlyingignificantnd influenceableree-doms,of others. he demandsofreasonable onsideration ouldvarywith greatmanyparametershatmaybe relevantoa person's racti-calreasoning.42ven houghhe cknowledgmenthat ertain reedomsqualifys humanrights lready eflectsn assessment f their eneralimportancend their ossible nfluenceabilitydiscussednSectionV),a personhas togo beyond hesepervasive eaturesnto more pecificcircumstancesngiving easonable onsideration o whathe orshe, nparticular,houlddo ina specificase.Thepersonhas to udge,for xample,howimportanthefreedomsandrightsre n the ase inquestion omparedwith ther laims ntheperson's ossible ctions involvingther ightsndfreedoms,utalso

42.Making dequateroomfor arametricariationss a general eature f rationalassessment,nd nota characteristicnly f ethical easoningnparticular.havedis-cussed his ssue nRationalitynd FreedomCambridge, ass.:Harvard niversityress,2002), essays1through .



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altogether ifferentoncernsthata person may, nter lia, sensiblyhave). Furthermore,hepersonhas to udgethe extent o whichhe orshe can make a differencen thiscase, either cting lone or in con-junctionwith thers.twillbe relevant lsotoconsiderwhatothers anbe expected o do, and theappropriatenessf how therequired up-portive ctionsmaybe sharedamongpossible agents.A greatmanyparametriconsiderations f these and otherkindswill inescapablyfigurenthereasoned valuation fwhat person houlddo,evenaftertheneed to undertake uchan evaluation as beenfullyccepted.Also,sincedetailed eflectionnwhat ne shoulddo isitselfime onsuming(andcannot venbe actually ndertakenor llthe llsof heworld), heduty freasonable onsideration illnot, na greatmany ases,trans-late nto n obligation otakeon an elaborate crutiny-only willing-ness todo ustthat,when t seems relevantnd appropriate.Therecognitionfobligationsnrelationo therightsndfreedomsof all humanbeingsneednot,thus,be translatedntopreposterouslydemanding ommands.Andyet,despitetheparametric ariabilityfthe reach and force freasonableconsideration,herequirementogive uchconsiderations notby nymeansvacuous.The basicgeneralobligations thatone mustbe willing o consider eriouslywhat oneshould easonablyo,taking oteof herelevantarametersf he asesinvolved. henecessityo askthat uestion ratherhanproceeding ntheassumption hatweowenothingoothers, nlesswe haveactuallyharmed hem)can be thebeginningf a morecomprehensiveine ofethical easoning.43heterritoryfhumanrights irmlyelongs here.Thereasoningannot,however,ndthere.Given ne's imited bilitiesandreach, nd theneed for rioritiesnvolvingifferentypes foblig-ations s well s thedemands fothermoral oncerns,here re seriousexercisesfpractical easoningo beundertaken,n which ne'svariousobligationsincludingimperfectbligations")must igure,nanexplicitor mplicit orm.Therecognitionfhumanrightss not an insistence hat veryoneeverywhereises ohelppreventvery iolation f very umanright omatter here toccurs. t s,rather,n acknowledgmenthat f ne is ina plausible positiontodo something ffectivenpreventing heviolation43.Thecentralityf hat eneral uestionspowerfullyiscussed yThomas canlon,WhatWeOwe toEach OtherCambridge, ass.:Harvard niversityress, 998).



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of uch a right,hen ne does have an obligationo consider oingustthat. t is stillpossiblethatother bligations rnon-obligationalon-cernsmayoverwhelmhe reasonfor heparticularction nquestion,but that easoncannotbe simply rushed wayas being noneofone'sbusiness." oosely pecified bligationsmustnot be confusedwithnoobligationst all.Rather,hey elong, s was mentioned arlier,o theimportantategory fdutiesthat mmanuel Kant called "imperfectobligations"andtowhichhe attached reatmportance).It s tobe noted hat,n this nderstanding,mperfectbligationsreethical equirementshat tretcheyond hefullyelineated uties, theperfect bligations,"hat pecific ersonsmayhave toperform articu-lar acts.Theynvolve hedemand hat erious onsiderationegiven yanyone n a position o provide easonablehelpto thepersonwhosehumanrights threatened.hese"imperfectbligations" irmlyorre-late, n thesame wayas fully pecified perfectbligations" o,withtherecognitionfrights.he differenceies in the nature nd form ftheobligations,ot nthegeneral orrespondenceetween ightsndobligations, hich pply nthe ameway o mperfects well s perfectobligations.Itmaybe useful o llustrate,ith concrete xample, hedistinctionbetweendifferentinds fobligationshat, espite heir ifferencesncontent,elatena similar ay ohumanrights.onsider real-lifeasethat ccurrednQueens,NewYork,n1964,whena woman,Kitty en-ovese,was fatallyssaulted n fullviewofmanyotherswatching heevent rom heirpartments,ho didnothingohelpher. t splausibletoargue hat hree erriblehings appenedhere,which re distinct utinterrelated:

(1) thewoman's reedom-andright-not o be assaulted ndkilledwas violated this s clearlyheprincipal astinessnthis ase);(2) the murderer iolated heimmunityhatanyoneshould haveagainst ssault ndkillinga violation f "perfectbligation");nd(3) the otherswho did nothingwhatever o help the victim lsotransgressedheirgeneral-and "imperfect"-obligationo seriouslyconsider rovidinghehelpwhich hey ouldreasonablye expected oprovide.These distinctfailings bring out a complex pattern of rights-dutiescorrespondence in a structured thics,which can help to explicate the



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evaluativerameworkfhumanrights, hichyields mperfectswell sperfectbligations.44The presumedprecisionof legal rights s oftencontrastedwithinescapable mbiguitiesnthe thical laims fhumanrights.hiscon-trast, owever,s not n itself great mbarrassmentor thical laims,includinghoseof mperfectbligations,ince a frameworkf norma-tive easoningansensiblyllowvariationshat annot e easily ccom-modated nfullypecified egal requirements.s AristotleemarkedntheNicomachean thics,we have "to ook for recisionneach class ofthingsustso far s thenature fthesubject dmits."45As thappens,however,nthe awsof omecountries,heres evenalegaldemand,which an hardly ave extreme recision, orprovidingreasonablehelpto third arties. orexample,n France here s provi-sion for criminaliabilityfomissions"n thefailure oprovide eason-ablehelpto others ufferingrom articularypes f ransgressions.otsurprisingly,mbiguitiesntheapplication f uch aws haveproved obequite arge nd havebeenthe ubject f onsiderableegaldiscussioninrecent ears.46 heambiguityfduties fthis ype,whethern ethicsor n aw,wouldbe difficultoescape if hird-partybligationsfothersin general re given ome room,and thiscannotbe avoidedfor nadequatetheoryfhumanrights.VII. RECOGNITION,AGITATION NDLEGISLATIONWhile heprecedingnalysis as been concernedwith ivingeasonableconsiderationoactions ngeneral hat eoplecan undertakendefend-ingor advancing he humanrights f others,t is the legislation fhumanrights,longwith heirnstitutionalization,hathas tendedto

44. In this nalysis do notgointo he distinctionetween gent-specificndagent-neutralmoral valuations.hepresentineof characterizationan be furtherxtendedthrough akingoom orpositionpecific"ssessments,nways hat have ried o nves-tigaten"RightsndAgency,"nd "Positional bjectivity."45.Theadmissibilityf nescapablembiguities ithin frameworkfrational ssess-ment s discussed inmy"InternalConsistencyofChoice,"Econometrica61 1993):495-521,and "Maximizationnd theAct fChoice," conometrica5 1997): 45-79, othreprintedinRationalitynd Freedom.ee also nequality eexamined,p.46-49, 31-35.46. See, for xample,Andrew shworthnd Eva Steiner,Criminal missions ndPublic Duties: The FrenchExperience,"Legal Studiesto (1990): 153-64;GlanvilleWilliams,"CriminalOmissions:The ConventionalView,"Law QuarterlyReview107 1991):86-98.



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receive he ion's hare ofattentionn the theoreticaliteraturen thisfield.t s this egislativeutlook hathas also beenfirmlyncorporatedinmuchofthe nstitutionalnderstandingf humanrights. owever,while egislations an important omain ofpublic action,there reotherwaysand means which realso importantnd often ffectivenadvancinghecause ofrecognized umanrights.First, nderwhatcan be called the"recognitionoute"tobe distin-guished rom he"legislativeoute"), here s acknowledgmentutnotnecessarily ny egalization r institutionalnforcementf a class ofclaims that are seen as fundamental uman rights.47he UniversalDeclaration fHumanRights,ponsored ytheUnitedNationsn1948,which was perhapsthe most mportantmove thatpromotedglobalactivitiesn humanrightsnthe astcentury,alls olidlynto his ate-goryeventhough,s was discussed arlier,heframersftheDeclara-tionhad also hoped that t would lead to specificbillsof rightsndifferentountries). ubsequently,herehas been a sequence ofotherinternationaleclarations, ften hrough he UnitedNations,givingrecognition,atherhan a legaland coercive tatus, o variousgeneraldemands, or xample he "Declaration n theRightoDevelopment,"signedn1986.48 hisapproach smotivatedythe dea that he ethicalforce fhumanrightssmade morepowerfulnpractice hrough ivingit ocialrecognitionnd anacknowledgedtatus,venwhenno enforce-ment s instituted.A second ineof dvancegoesbeyond ecognitiono active gitation.There an be organized dvocacy rgingompliancewith ertain asicclaims f ll humanbeings hat re seen as humanrights,nd there an

47.AsCharlesBeitzhas pointed ut,humanrights lay therole ofa moral ouch-stone-a standard fassessment nd criticism ordomesticnstitutions,standard faspirationor heir eform,nd ncreasinglystandard fevaluation or hepolicies ndpracticesf nternationalconomic ndpolitical rganizations."ee "HumanRightss aCommon Concern,"p. 269.48.Analysesf he ontentf he ightodevelopmentavebeenpresentedn UnitedNationsDevelopment rogramme,umanDevelopment eport 000 (NewYork:UnitedNations, 000);S. R.Osmani, HumanRightsoFood,Health, nd Education,"mimeo-graphed, NDP and theUniversityfUlster, ooo;Arjun engupta,Developmentolicyand theRight o Development,"rontline,ebruary-March , 2001;Arjun engupta,Asborn ide, tephenMarks,nd BArd nders ndreassen,TheRightoDevelopmentndHumanRightsnDevelopment,"resentedt theNobelSymposiumnOsloonRightoDevelopment,October2003.



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also be monitoringfviolations f theserightsnd attemptsogener-ate effectiveocialpressure. he globalNGOshave increasinglyeeninvolved n advancinghumanrights,hrough ublicdiscussionandsupport,ntheonehand, ndpublicizingndcriticizingiolations,ntheother. heseeffortsave omenotonly rom edicatedhumanrightsorganizations,uchas HumanRightsWatch ndAmnestynternational,butalso from roaderorganizations,uch as OXFAM,M6dicinsSansFrontibrs,he RedCross, ave theChildren,ndActionAid.The rightsinvokednthis agitationoute"mayormaynothaveany egal tatusnthecountrynquestion, utadvocacy nd support renotnecessarilyrendered selessbythe absence of egalbacking.49urthermore,venwhen ome dentifiedumanrights ave egalstatus, oodenforcementofthe relevantegislationmay lso callfor ublicactivism, hich s tobe distinguishedrom heprocessof egislationtself.Thethirdpproachs,of ourse, hat f legislation."swas discussedinSection II,eventhough heethics fhumanrightsmustnotbe seenmerelys "parents"f"humanrightsaws," t s certainlyhe case thatmany uch egislationsavebeenencouraged r nspired yconsidera-tionsofhumanrights.Many ctual aws havebeen enactedby ndivid-ual states, rbyassociations fstates,whichgave egalforce o certainrightseen as basichumanrights.orexample, heEuropeanCourt fHumanRights,stablished n1950followingheEuropeanConvention,can considercases brought y individuals rom he signatorytatesagainst iolations fhumanrights.hishas been supplementedytheHumanRights ctof1998, imed at incorporatinghemainprovisionsoftheEuropeanConventionntodomesticaw,with n overseeingoleof theEuropeanCourt o see "justsatisfaction"ftheseprovisionsn

49. It salsoworth otinghat venwhen he gentsnvolvedn activistromotionfhuman ightso nothave ny pecial egal tatus,hey an stillmake differenceopolit-ical,social and administrativeracticehroughhe use ofexistingaws,combinedwithseeking ublicdisclosures ndcritical ebates. or xample, nlike he ndian nd SouthAfrican umanRightsommissions,hich rerecognizednthe espectiveationalaws,thePakistan umanRightsommissionsbasicallyust nNGO, ndyet nder hevision-ary ndcourageouseadership fAsmaJahangir,. A.Rehman,ndothers,t has beenremarkablyffectiven dentifyingndresistingiolations fhuman ights,nd ndefend-ingvulnerable ersons, ncludingeligiousminoritiesnd ill-treatedomen.For gooddiscussion f some ofthesesupportivectivities,ee The StateofHumanRights,001(Lahore:HumanRights ommissionfPakistan,002).



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domesticudgments.Manyother xamples an be given rom ifferentparts f heworld. he"legislativeoute" ashadmuchactiveuse.There s an interestinguestion bouttheappropriateomainof helegislativeoute. t wouldbe a mistake, wouldargue, o presume ngeneral hat f humanrights important,hen tmustbe ideal toleg-islate t nto a preciselypecifiedegalright. orexample, ecognizinganddefending wife'smoralrightobe consultednfamily ecisions,even na traditionallyexist ociety,maywell be extremelymportant,and canplausibly atisfyhethresholdonditions eededtoqualifysa humanright.50ndyet he dvocates f hishumanright, hoempha-size,correctly,tsfar-reachingthical ndpolitical elevance,an quitepossibly greethat t s not sensible o makethishumanrightnto, nHerbert art'sanguage, "coerciveegalrule" perhapswith he resultthat husbandwouldbe takenncustodyfhewere ofail o consult iswife).Thenecessary hangewould have to be broughtboutin otherways.Because of he mportancef ommunication,dvocacy, xposureand informed ublic discussion,human rights an have influencewithout ecessarily epending n coerciveegislation.Similarly,hemoral rpolitical ntitlement,hich an easilybe seenas a humanright,fa somewhat low peakernot tobe snubbed n anopenpublicmeeting ya rudelyrticulateprintermaywellbe impor-tant oth or he elf-respectf he eisurelypeaker ndfor ublicgood,but t s not ikelyo be a good subjectfor unitive egislation.hepro-tection f thathumanrightwould have to be sought lsewhere. heeffectivenessf the humanrights erspective oes notreston seeingthemnvariablys putative roposals oregislation.5"VIII. ECONOMICANDSOCIALRIGHTSI turnnow to criticismshathave been particularlyimed againstextendinghe idea ofhumanrights o includeeconomicand socialrights,uchas theright otto behungry,r therighto basic educationor tomedicalattention.venthough heserights idnotfiguren the

50.The mportancend socialreach fwoman's articipationnfamilyecisionssdis-cussed nmyDevelopments Freedom,h.8,"Women's gencyndSocialChange."51.For nearly dvocacy f much roaderpproach,eeMaryWollstonecraft,Vin-dication f heRightsfWoman:with tricturesnPolitical nd Moral ubjects1792).



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classicpresentationsfrightsfhumanbeings n, ay, heU.S. Declara-tionof ndependence, r French rightsfman," hey reverymuchapart f hecontemporaryomainofwhatCass Sunstein alls the rightsrevolution."52he egitimacyf ncludinghese laimswithin hegeneralclass ofhumanrights as beenchallenged hroughwo pecificinesofreproach, hich shall all,respectively,he nstitutionalizationritiqueandthe easibilityritique.The institutionalizationritique, hich s aimedparticularlyt eco-nomicand socialrights,elates o thegeneralssue ofthe exact corre-spondencebetween uthentic ightsndpreciselyormulatedorrelateduties. ucha correspondence,t sargued,wouldexist nlywhen rightis institutionalized.noraO'Neillhas presented his ine of criticismwith orce:Unfortunatelyuchwritingnd rhetoric n rights eedlessly ro-claims universalrights o goods and services, nd in particular"welfare ights,"s well as to other ocial,economic and culturalrightshat reprominentn nternationalharters ndDeclarations,withouthowingwhat onnects achpresumed ight-holdero somespecific bligation-bearer(s),hich eaves the content f thesesup-posed rightswholly bscure.... Some advocates ofuniversal co-nomic, ocial and cultural ights ono furtherhan oemphasize hatthey anbe institutionalized,hich s true. ut hepoint fdifferenceisthat heymust e institutionalized:f hey renot heresnoright.53In responding o thissignificantriticism, e have to invoketheunderstanding,lready iscussed, hatobligationsan be bothperfectand mperfect.ven heclassical firstenerational"ights,ikefreedomfromssault, an be seenasyieldingmperfectbligationsnothers,swas illustrated ith he xample f hecase of ssaultonKitty enoveseinpublicview nNewYork.epending n nstitutionalossibilities,co-nomic nd socialrightsmay imilarlyall for othperfectnd mperfectobligations.here s a large rea offruitfulublicdiscussion ndpossi-blyeffectiveressure, oncerning hatthesociety nd thestate, ven52. Sunstein, fterheRights evolution:econceivingheRegulatorytate.53.OnoraO'Neill,TowardsusticendVirtue,p.131-32.eealso herBounds fJustice(Cambridge: ambridge niversityress, 000).



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an impoverishedne,can do toprevent iolations fcertain asiceco-nomicorsocialrightsassociatedwith, ay, heprevalence ffamines,or chronic ndernourishment,rabsence ofmedical are).Indeed,the supportivectivities f social organizationsre oftenaimedpreciselyt nstitutionalhange, ndthese ctivities an be seenas partof mperfectbligationshat ndividuals nd groupshave in asocietywherebasichumanrightsre violated.Onora O'Neill s rightoemphasize he mportancef nstitutionsor herealizationf welfarerights"and evenfor conomicand social rightsn general), ut theethical ignificancef theserights rovidegood grounds or eekingrealization hroughnstitutionalxpansionand reform. his can behelpedthrough varietyf pproaches,ncluding emanding nd agi-tatingforappropriateegislation,nd the supplementationf legaldemandsbypolitical ecognitionnd socialmonitoring.o denytheethical tatus f hese laimswouldbe to gnorehereasoninghatmoti-vates heseconstructivectivities.Thefeasibilityritique roceeds romhe rgumenthat venwith hebest ofefforts,tmaynotbe feasible oarrangeherealizationfmanyoftheallegedeconomic nd socialrights or ll. This would have beenonly nempiricalbservationof ome nterestf tsown),but t smadeinto n allegedly owerfulriticism f theacceptanceoftheseclaimedrightsn thebasisofthepresumption,argely ndefended,hatrecog-nizedhumanrightsmust, fnecessity,ewholly ccomplishable.f hispresumption ereacceptedthatwouldhave the effectf mmediatelyputtingmany o-called conomic nd socialrightsutside hedomainofpossiblehumanrights,speciallynthepoorer ocieties.MauriceCranston utstheargumenthus:The traditionalolitical nd civilrightsrenotdifficulto institute.Forthemostpart, hey equire overnments,nd other eople gen-erally,o eavea man alone. .. Theproblems osedbyclaims o eco-nomic nd socialrights,owever,reof nother rder ltogether.owcan governmentsf thosepartsofAsia,Africa,nd SouthAmerica,wherendustrializationashardly egun,be reasonablyalledupontoprovideocialsecurityndholidayswith ayformillions fpeoplewho inhabit those places and multiply o swiftly?"4

54.Cranston,Are hereAnyHumanRights?".13.

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