serious case child k review - leedsscp.org.uk€¦ · joe cocker, independent overview report...

Joe Cocker, Independent Overview Report Author

PUBLISHED ON 6TH MARCH 2012

SeriousCaseReview

Child K

Statutory review, undertaken on behalf of

the Leeds Safeguarding Children Board, of

professional practice and interagency

cooperation prior to and following the

murder of Child K

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

2 | P a g e P R O T E C T I V E L Y M A R K E D

INTRODUCTION

Child K was murdered inside the family home. The Perpetrator was a registered sex

offender with a significant history of sexual violence. He was living two doors away

from the family.

Child K had been in the UK for approximately 5 weeks. The family returned to Poland

shortly after her murder.

In 2007, the Leeds Safeguarding Children Board (LSCB) commissioned a Serious Case

Review (SCR) from the Leeds Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangement Strategic

Management Board to look at the effectiveness of interagency working in this case.

The report was accepted by the LSCB and later submitted to the Office for Standards

in Education (Ofsted) for evaluation. However, it was assessed that the review did

not comply with the statutory guidance governing the conduct of Serious Case

Reviews.

In April 2009, the LSCB agreed terms of reference for this Serious Case Review

leading to the convening of a Serious Case Panel and commissioning of an

Independent Chair and Overview Author.

This Serious Case Review was commissioned in accordance with regulation 5(2) (a)

and (b) (ii) of The Local Safeguarding Children Boards Regulations 2006 which came

into effect on 1 April 2006. Guidance issued in Chapter 8 of “Working Together to

Safeguard Children” (HM Government 2006) has been followed. The Board accepted

the review on 17 December 2010.

PROTECTIVELY MARKED 3 | P a g e

TERMS OF REFERENCE

INDEPENDENT AUTHOR/THE OVERVIEW PANEL

The Overview Panel comprised members of the LSCB standing Serious Cases Review

Panel and representatives of Agencies involved in the case.

Agencies represented:

Children & Young People’s Social Care, Leeds City Council

Education Leeds

Environments and Neighbourhoods, Leeds City Council

Foundation Housing

HM Prison Service National Offender Management Service

Humberside Police

National Probation Service – Humberside

National Probation Service – West Yorkshire

NHS Leeds

Shelter

Stonham

West Yorkshire Police

NSPCC

TERMS OF REFERENCE

The terms of reference for this Serious Case Review were considered by the Standing

SCR Panel of the LSCB and by the Independent Chair of LSCB. They addressed both

the time period to be covered by the SCR and the issues to be considered.


The period to be covered by the SCR was to be from when Child K’s father

arrived in the country, until the family’s departure from the UK after her

death.

Agencies which provided Individual Management Reviews for the first review

were requested to provide a new review and chronology, covering the new

time period, addressing these terms of reference and the agency specific

issues raised by Ofsted.

The Terms of reference for Individual Management Reviews were based on

Working Together 2006 (8.26) plus consideration of issues specific to this

case:

The adequacy of the protection provided to this family from the presence

of a known sexual / violent offender in their immediate community.

The practical help/assistance that was offered to the family (including any

emotional and psychological support services).

The communication that took place between agencies and whether child

protection procedures were implemented.

Attention was drawn to the recommendations from ‘Learning lessons, taking

action: Ofsted’s evaluations of serious case reviews 01/04/07 – 31/03/08 that

agencies completing individual management reviews should:

o Include information within their chronologies about when the child

was seen and details of that meeting.

o Explicitly address issues of race, language, culture, religion and

disability.

o Focus more attention on why procedures were not followed, as well

as identifying what procedures had not been followed or were

lacking.

The Terms of reference for the Independent Overview Report were based on

Working Together 2006 (8.28):

To construct a comprehensive chronology of involvement by the

agencies and professionals in contact with the child and family.


To prepare an overview that summarises relevant information known

to the agencies and professionals involved about the child and family

circumstances.

To incorporate lessons identified from the serious case review

undertaken by the Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangement

(MAPPA) which focused on the post release management of the

Perpetrator subsequently convicted of the murder of Child K.

To consider how best to obtain and include the views of surviving

family members.

To identify whether, with the benefit of hindsight, the death of Child K

was in any way preventable.

To provide a summary of lessons to be learnt from the case and to

identify recommendations based on the Individual Agency reviews.

To provide comment on the adequacy of the individual reviews

provided by participating agencies.

MANAGEMENT REPORTS

Management reports and chronologies were requested from agencies involved with

family of Child K. The authors were independent of the operational management of

the case.

COMPLETION OF THE SERIOUS CASE REVIEW

The LSCB have been in consultation with Regional Government Office about the

timescale for completing this SCR.

The LSCB has accepted the SCR overview report, an executive summary has been

prepared and each agency affected was required to prepare an action plan to ensure

implementation of the overview report recommendations. LSCB Performance

Management sub group will monitor the composite action plan.

AUTHOR


Joe Cocker is an independent social work consultant and has chaired and authored

Serious Case Reviews for Local Safeguarding Children Boards.

Mr Cocker has been employed as a Safeguarding Children Board Business Manager

since 2003 and has no current professional interests with the Leeds Safeguarding

Children Board or any of the constituent agencies.


1. CHILD K’S FAMILY

1.1. Very little is known of Child K’s family history other than that the family

are Polish nationals and that her father, a computer software engineer in

Poland, came to work in the UK. After initially moving to the Castleford

area in 2006 he relocated into a two‐bedroom property rented from a

private landlord in Leeds and was later joined in Leeds by his wife, (a

physiotherapist), daughter Child K and 10 year old son.

1.2. Prior to Child K’s murder the only contact between the family and relevant

agencies related to applications for the children to attend local schools.

1.3. Applications were made by Child K’s parents for the children to attend

local schools. Child K accompanied her parents and brother to visit her

brother’s school. She was later described by the head teacher as ‘chatty’.

Child K’s brother was successful in his application to attend a local junior

school. However, Child K’s application, whilst being accepted for a place at

a secondary school, was put on hold due to requests from a high number

of children to the school who did not have English as their first language.

1.4. Child K’s brother attended his first day at an English school on the day of

his sister’s murder.

1.5. It is understood that following Child K’s murder offers were made to the

family for the organisation of support from the Polish community

although the offer was declined. Crisis support was offered by the health

service and was accepted.

1.6. The family returned to Poland shortly after the murder.

1.7. The parents’ cooperation with the review was sought via a West Yorkshire

Police Family Liaison Officer. However, whilst there was an initial

agreement by them to contribute to the review subsequent

communications indicated that they did not wish to do so.


2. THE PERPETRATOR

2.1. The Perpetrator is a white British national.

2.2. He described his childhood to a psychiatrist in 1997 as ‘unhappy’. His

parents divorced when he was three years old and he was brought up by

his mother and stepfather from whom he witnessed domestic violence

with his mother frequently using physical punishment. He describes being

bullied at school and later expelled from his junior school before attending

a school for the deaf.

2.3. He suffers from a significant hearing impairment although from the

information available it is not possible to comment on the quality of

services or sensitivity shown towards his disability.


3. SUMMARY

3.1. Child K (15), a Polish national, was raped and murdered at the family

home in Leeds in October 2007. Her parents discovered her body on their

return from a day seeking work. They were subsequently arrested on

suspicion of her murder. At the time of the parents’ arrest, Child K’s

brother was completing his first day at school in England. The parents

were released in the early hours of the following day after the arrest of

the Perpetrator, a neighbour and known violent sexual offender.

3.2. The Perpetrator had a long history of offending, with his offences being

primarily violent and sexual towards women. Between the age of 20 and

40 he received a total of 22 years custody. The Perpetrator was made

subject to a lifetime sex offender notification in 1998 after being convicted

of a violent indecent assault which was witnessed by the victim’s young

son.

3.3. In 1997, a psychiatrist at the request of his solicitor assessed the

Perpetrator. He was diagnosed with a Dissocial Personality Disorder, a

psychopathic disorder that predisposed him to antisocial behaviour

including violence.

3.4. Whilst he had not been convicted of an offence against a child, he had

previously been charged with a sexual offence against children having

being caught masturbating outside a children’s play area. His name was

placed on the Sex Offender Register in 2004.

3.5. The Perpetrator was released from Prison in November 2006, from

outside the Leeds area, eleven months before committing the murder of

Child K. He had completed a three‐year sentence for the serious assault of

a woman (he had originally been charged with rape). During his sentence

he had been released on licence on two occasions although he was

recalled on both due to breaching the conditions of his licence.


3.6. In the months prior to his release the Perpetrator consistently stated his

intention to move to Leeds. Whilst a number of Leeds housing agencies

had been actively involved in seeking accommodation in Leeds for the

perpetrator in the months leading up to his release, the Leeds Multi‐

Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) only became aware of

his move to the city the day before his arrival. He was allocated

temporary accommodation (where he was to remain for the period of 11

months) and registered with the police as a sexual offender. He was

monitored by West Yorkshire Police throughout his time in the city,

initially being visited monthly before the frequency was reduced to every

three months four months prior to the murder.

3.7. The Perpetrator came to the attention of the police on four occasions over

the 11‐month period. Firstly after being stopped and searched for acting

suspiciously and suspected of abusing solvents. He was then arrested

after threatening a neighbour (he was later released without charge) and

was again arrested and later charged with threatening behaviour and

criminal damage. Finally, he reported to the police that he had been

assaulted at a public house although evidence indicated that he had been

the aggressor. However, the officers responsible for monitoring him were

not informed of these contacts.

3.8. During their short period living in Leeds, the family of Child K were

‘befriended’ by the Perpetrator, which included him visiting their home

and taking the family shopping and to a fair. The family were unaware of

his offending history or that he was a registered sex offender.

3.9. On the day the parents took their son to attend his first day at school in

England, they returned home and had breakfast with Child K before

leaving to go into the city seeking work. They returned to the family home

at 15:30 and discovered their daughter’s body. The police received

multiple 999 calls and attended the home with paramedics. They found

the partially clothed body of Child K with wounds to her neck and chest

and a badly bruised face. The West Yorkshire Police’s Homicide and Major

Enquiry Team subsequently commenced a murder investigation.


3.10. The parents were arrested at the scene on suspicion of their daughter’s

murder and taken to separate police stations. The Perpetrator was

arrested later the same day.

3.11. The parents were released without being charged in the early hours of the

following day. The family returned to Poland within days of the murder.

3.12. The Perpetrator was later charged with the murder and rape of Child K

and was sentenced to life imprisonment.


4. CONCLUSION

4.1. Mr K moved to England in January 2006 seeking work with his wife and

children joining him in Leeds in September 2007. The Perpetrator, after

receiving sentences of imprisonment totalling 22 years over a period of 20

years had spent a significant proportion of his adult life in prison for

violent and sexual offences against women. He moved into the same

street on his release from prison on 17 November 2006 having been

drawn to the city by the hope of employment.

AGENCY INVOLVEMENT WITH THE K FAMILY

4.2. The management reports and chronologies provide little information or

insight into the lives of the K family beyond Mr K’s move to England and

his family’s move to be with him in Leeds the following year. Whilst in

Leeds Child K appears to have only been seen by one agency; Child K’s

brother’s school who described her as ‘chatty’.

4.3. Press reports stated that the Perpetrator ‘befriended’ the K family, giving

them lifts to the shops and on one occasion to a fair and that he offered

them the use of his computer.

4.4. The K family applied for Child K and her brother to attend local schools.

Child K’s brother quickly secured a placed at a local primary school.

However, although Child K was allocated a place it was put on hold by the

school due to the high number of children having been admitted where

English was not their first language.

4.5. It is noted that, Child K as a European Union national had a right to be

treated in the same way as an English child. Consequently, the action of

the school breached the national school admissions code by discriminating

against her on the basis of her language.

4.6. On the day of her murder, Child K remained at home whilst her parents

took her brother to school before going into the city centre to look for


work. Child K was murdered in the family home and was found by her

parents on their return.

4.7. The fact that Child K was not in school has raised questions as to whether

this factor was causal to her murder; simply, had Child K been allocated a

place in school on that day she would not have been murdered. However,

considerable caution needs to be taken in evaluating the significance of

this. Ultimately, it is reasonable to assert that a person should be safe

from harm within their own home. Child K was murdered by a man who

had been assessed as posing a risk to members of the public, and in

particular to women. Whilst it may be true that had Child K not been

home she would not have been murdered at that time and place; this

does not exclude harm to either Child K or someone else at another time

or place.

AGENCY INVOLVEMENT WITH THE PERPETRATOR

4.8. It was to counter such crimes that the Multi Agency Public Protection

Arrangements were introduced. However, it should be recognised that no

system can eliminate risk. Rather it has to be managed and the harm

reduced either through the reduction of the likelihood of a risk occurring or

the reduction of its impact should it occur1.

4.9. The MAPPA Guidance states that the management of risk requires

defensible decisions, rigorous risk assessment, risk management plans

that match the public protection need and the evaluation of

performance2. Whilst each element is essential, good risk management

depends upon effective interagency working and, where a case is

transferred across an administrative boundary the public protection

arrangements must employ the same rigour to protecting those living

outside an agency’s boundaries as would be afforded to those living within

the local area.

1 Kemshall (2003)

2 MAPPA Guidance (2003)


4.10. Protecting the public from violent and sexual offenders is an area where

considerable progress has been made. However, there are significant

limitations especially when, as in this case, there are no additional

external constraints (beyond offender registration) to manage a person’s

behaviour. Consequently, in the absence of statutory controls, additional

importance is placed upon the way in which agencies and practitioners

work together and across boundaries.

4.11. In this matter there were missed opportunities in relation to the inter and

intra agency and cross boundary working including a lack of active

cooperation between the Humberside and Leeds MAPPAs, engagement of

housing providers within the Leeds MAPPA and a breakdown within West

Yorkshire Police to communicate vital information to the officers

responsible for the Perpetrator’s supervision. Consequently, within the

limited public protection measures available, the core principle of

effective inter and intra‐agency working was absent at key points.

4.12. In autumn 2006 the Perpetrator was facing the end of his period of

custody with the professional attention focussed on his post release

management. Until the decision of the Parole Board in September 2006

(not to further release the perpetrator under licence but to detain him in

custody until his sentence expiry date), the plan was for a managed

release making use of the limited remaining period of sentence for his

supervision in the community. Consequently, once the Parole Board had

taken the decision, it appears the Multi Agency Public Protection Panel

(MAPPP) focussed its attention on supporting the Perpetrator to find

accommodation and the formality of notifying West Yorkshire Police prior

to his release.

4.13. It has not been possible to reach a judgement regarding the level and

nature of communication between the two police forces. However,

irrespective of who notified whom and when, the Leeds MAPPA only

became aware of the Perpetrator’s intention to move to the city the day

before his release. Whilst there had been electronic contact between the

Police forces, receipt of the notification does not appear to have been

confirmed or followed up with direct communication. Consequently, the

Perpetrator arrived in Leeds without a locally agreed Risk Management

Plan and unknown to the public protection agencies.


4.14. The ineffective communication resulted in a lack of formal engagement of

the Leeds MAPPA prior to the Perpetrator’s move. Notwithstanding the

involvement of several Leeds based housing services prior to the

perpetrator’s release, the formal involvement of the Leeds MAPPP at this

stage may have assisted the search for suitable accommodation.

4.15. Once alerted to the Perpetrator’s arrival the Leeds MAPPA Coordinator

expressed concern and agreed to an ‘emergency’ MAPPP. However, it

took almost a month to be convened. Despite this West Yorkshire Police

made contact with the Perpetrator, undertook an assessment and agreed

to a regime of visits in excess of the frequency outlined in local and

national guidance.

4.16. Whilst there are questions regarding the adequacy of the assessment

processes, the actions of West Yorkshire Police’s Child and Public

Protection Unit’s (CPPU) level of monitoring accorded with good practice.

However, the diligence shown by the Unit was not matched by the

shortcomings in the performance of West Yorkshire Police’s information

and intelligence processes which ensured that information relating to the

Perpetrator’s resurgent offending was not transmitted to the officers

charged with his monitoring.

4.17. The decision to reduce contact with the Perpetrator to every three

months came at the end of a period of perceived stability. However, the

dynamic factors considered in the CPPU officer’s assessment represented

only minor aspects of the Perpetrator’s offending behaviour when set

against an (adult) life of serious violent and sexual offending. Focussing on

such factors was overly optimistic although the decision to reduce contact

was mitigated by the absence of more detailed current clinical

assessments and the fact that the reduction in visits accorded with local

guidance.

EVENTS FOLLOWING CHILD K’S MURDER

4.18. It is difficult to comprehend the scene confronted by Mr and Mrs K on the

1st October 2007. However, their trauma was compounded by their

subsequent arrest and detention on suspicion of their daughter’s murder.

As a society we have to accept that parents are capable of such crimes,


although in this case, whilst also accepting the difficult role the police

have to undertake on our behalf, the arrest of Child K’s parents appeared

overly cautious, and raises questions about the rationale provided to the

review.

4.19. Child K’s brother’s school learned of Child K’s murder at the end of his first

day when his parents failed to collect him. In the circumstances the school

and the attending police officer demonstrated a commendable sensitivity

and humanity in their breaking the news to him of his sister’s death and in

the support they gave to him in the absence of his parents. Although there

are questions in respect of the professional practice in accommodating

Child K’s brother following his parent’s detention, the support provided by

the school and the Polish speaking non‐teaching assistant in caring for him

was outstanding.

CONCLUSION

4.20. The causes of Child K’s murder lay within the Perpetrator’s psyche; a man

defined by a history of violence and sexual abuse perpetrated on women;

crimes for which he had spent a significant proportion of his adult life in

prison. However, the questions for this review are whether all reasonable

actions were taken by those agencies with a responsibility for protecting

the public and whether Child K’s murder could have been prevented.

4.21. Child K’s murder was not foreseeable although the review has identified

deficiencies across many of the agencies in their practice and processes.

More should have been done to effectively manage the risk posed by the

Perpetrator and, had everything been done that should have been done,

the outcome may have been different. However, the review also identifies

limitations in the processes employed to manage such offenders, such

that, even had everything been done fully under the current system, it is

highly probable that the Perpetrator would have murdered or seriously

harmed someone.


5. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations arise from the analysis and findings reached within

the report.

OVERALL

Finding 1. It is assessed as highly probable and foreseeable, based on the

information available during the period under review that the

Perpetrator would have seriously harmed a female and that the harm

would have included physical and sexual violence. However, Child K’s

murder was not foreseeable, although it:

Was potentially preventable had there been mechanisms in place

restricting or denying the liberty of persons known to pose a high

risk of harm to the public.

May have been prevented had the agencies (according to their

role and level of responsibility) charged with protecting the

public from high risk offenders worked more effectively within

the mechanisms available.

HUMBERSIDE MAPPA AREA

Finding 2. It is assessed that the Humberside MAPPA’s planning was overly

restricted to the Perpetrator remaining in the Humberside area and

paid insufficient attention to his consistent intention to move to

Leeds. This represented a missed opportunity to formally engage the

principal Leeds public protection agencies in the planning required to

resettle a high‐risk offender in an area with which he had no ties.

Finding 3. It is assessed that there was a missed opportunity by Humberside

MAPPA to engage their counterparts in Leeds, which was contrary to


national MAPPA Guidance. It is further assessed that engagement of

the Leeds MAPPA would have benefited the Leeds MAPPP’s planning.

Recommendation 1. (Findings 2 & 3) The Humberside Strategic

Management Board Chairperson must ensure continuity of planning

whenever a high‐risk offender moves to a different MAPPA area.

HUMBERSIDE POLICE

Finding 4. It is assessed that the transfer via the Violent and Sex Offender

Register (ViSOR) on the 10th November 2006 without an auditable

alert or secondary communication was not proportionate to the risk

posed by the Perpetrator.

Recommendation 2. (Finding 4) The Chief Constable of Humberside Police

should ensure that all notifications, to another police area, of a high‐

risk offender’s intention to move outside the area are acknowledged

by the receiving area either in writing or, where undertaken verbally,

recorded on file.

HUMBERSIDE PROBATION SERVICE

Finding 5. It is assessed that Humberside Probation Service’s delay in providing

Stonham’s Offender Accommodation Service with information

relating to the risk posed by the Perpetrator was contrary to good

information sharing practice.

HM PRISON HULL

Finding 6. There was a missed opportunity by Her Majesty’s Prison Service and

Humberside Probation Service to share with local and cross boundary

colleagues a psychiatric report on the perpetrator, prepared at the

request of his defence solicitor in 1997, in which he was diagnosed as

having a Dissocial Personality Disorder. Despite the fact that this was

an old report, its value as a professional assessment may have helped

to inform a more complete understanding of the perpetrator had it

been made available to the Leeds MAPPP. However, it is also

accepted that the report was not considered at any stage by the

Humberside MAPPP, before his release from custody.


SHELTER

Finding 7. It is assessed that although Shelter worked correctly within the

framework of their contractual requirements there was a wider issue

with a lack of clarity regarding Shelter’s responsibilities in the context

of the wider public protection arrangements. The result being there

was insufficient clarity around how the information about the risk

posed by the Perpetrator to the public and professionals was shared

throughout the referrals to housing providers.

Recommendation 3. (Finding 7) The Chief Executive of Shelter must ensure

that personnel who provide advice or advocacy to high risk offenders

must always consider the risk posed to professionals or the public.

Specifically, Shelter should:

Have a process for identifying risk and ensuring effective

information sharing with public protection agencies and other

relevant providers of services to offenders.

Provide training to all personnel providing advice or advocacy to

high‐risk offenders on their role and responsibilities within the

public protection system and the assessment of risk.

LEEDS MAPPA AREA

WEST YORKSHIRE POLICE

Finding 8. Although the risk management plan implemented by the supervising

police officers was appropriate to what was known and understood

about the risk posed by the perpetrator, it is assessed that this was

based on a limited approach to risk assessment used by the Police.

This overly focused on static factors, with an insufficient regard for

and understanding of dynamic risk factors.. It is also noted that police

officers are not trained in the use of comprehensive risk assessments

and do not have routine access to specialist assessors.

Finding 9. It is assessed that weaknesses of West Yorkshire Police’s electronic

systems, relating to the introduction of NICHE (a record management

system), contributed to a failure to communicate crucial information


to the responsible officer. The impact of the weakness resulted in the

Perpetrator’s risk assessment and management not being amended

in light of his renewed offending.

Finding 10. It is assessed that the failure of the Divisional Intelligence Unit to

place a ‘flag’ onto NICHE resulted in officers attending the incidents

involving the Perpetrator not being aware of his status as a high risk

offender with the consequence that they were not prompted to pass

the crucial information to the CPPU.

Finding 11. In the absence of the CPPU’s knowledge of the Perpetrator’s

escalating offending behaviour, it is assessed that the risk

management plan was appropriate to what was known of his risk

with examples of good and diligent practice. Specifically, reviews

exceeding the frequency recommended in guidance, the involvement

of housing agencies in the planning and the pursuing of the

Perpetrator’s relationship with other known offenders.

Finding 12. The arrest of Mr and Mrs K, based on the information provided,

appears overly cautious. There is no indication of consideration being

given to the detrimental impact of the arrest on the welfare of the

family or of the use of other more sensitive options to preserve the

crime scene including treating Mr and Mrs K as ‘significant witnesses’.

Finding 13. The Homicide and Murder Investigation Team’s Senior Investigating

Officer responsible for the enquiry along with the Family Liaison

Officers attached to the K family are to be commended for their

sensitive and compassionate response to the family which acted to

secure the family’s cooperation and confidence in West Yorkshire

Police.

Recommendation 4. (Findings 9 & 10) The Chief Constable of West

Yorkshire Police should ensure that changes made to NICHE and

related processes introduced both prior to and subsequent to the

death of Child K are effective in managing intelligence in relation to

Registered Sex Offenders.

Recommendation 5. (Finding 12) The Chief Constable of West Yorkshire

Police should ensure that whilst it is critical that the effective


investigation of a serious crime is not compromised, the police should

reflect upon the impact of their actions when making an arrest and

fully consider the range of alternative options available.

LEEDS CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE’S SOCIAL CARE

Finding 14. Whilst the placing of Child K’s brother with his Polish Teaching

Assistant demonstrated sensitivity and good expedient practice, his

accommodation without the permission of his parents, a legal order

or being taken into Police Protection, was not compliant with good

practice or guidance.

Finding 15. It is assessed that Children and Young People Social Care did not

assert their statutory role with West Yorkshire Police in respect of the

placement of Child K’s brother. Consequently, professional roles

became confused with the police assuming the local authority’s legal

responsibility in assessing Child K’s brother’s discharge from care.

Recommendation 6. (Findings 14 & 15) The Leeds City Council’s Director

for Children should ensure a protocol exists with West Yorkshire

Police governing the relationship between the police and Children and

Young People’s Social Care in cases where parents have been

arrested. The protocol should address issues relating to the

accommodation and welfare of children, the respective roles of each

agency and the importance of parental participation.

EDUCATION LEEDS

Finding 16. It is assessed that the school’s decision to delay allocating Child K a

place on the basis of their difficulties in accommodating a high

number of non English speaking children amounted to discrimination

and contravened the School Admissions Code.

Finding 17. The action of the Non‐Teaching Assistant and Head Teacher

demonstrated a level of outstanding practice that was above and

beyond their professional duty and must be strongly commended.

Recommendation 7. (Finding 16) The Leeds City Council Director for

Children should ensure that maintained schools within the city comply


fully with the School Admissions Code. Specifically, schools should be

directed to not discriminate against children on the basis of language.

LEEDS HOUSING DEPARTMENT

Finding 18. It is assessed that Leeds Housing Department, as an agency with a

duty to cooperate, did not undertake timely checks as to the

Perpetrator’s sex offender status with the Leeds MAPPA Coordinator

after receiving information from Shelter on the 9th November 2006.

Recommendation 8. (Finding 18) The Leeds City Council’s Director for

Housing should ensure that checks are undertaken by housing

personnel with the MAPPA Coordinator whenever a suspected high

risk offender applies for accommodation in local authority housing.

EXTERNAL AGENCIES

NATIONAL OFFENDER MANAGEMENT SERVICE

Recommendation 9. (Findings 2, 3 & 4) The Chief Executive of the National

Offender Management Service should take steps to ensure all cases of

high and very high risk offenders who move across MAPPA boundaries

are subject to the same degree of planning as afforded to cases that

remain within the local area. Specifically, a review of guidance should

cover:

The need for the MAPPA coordinator within the receiving area to

be informed by the transferring area of the likelihood of a high or

very high risk offender moving to their area.

The desirability for representatives of the receiving MAPPA to

attend MAPPPs within the transferring area where it has been

established that there is a strong likelihood of an offender

moving to the receiving MAPPA’s area.

The need to transfer a copy of all relevant documents to the

receiving area at the point where the case becomes managed by

that area. The documents should always include medical and

psychiatric reports, past and present risk assessments along with


a single document containing full details of past and present

offences.

Recommendation 10. (Findings 6 & 8) The National Offender Management

Service should ensure that MAPPA Guidance promotes consistency of

practice across the region in respect of the assessments of MAPPA

offenders and the need to consider all relevant information including

medical and treatment reports. Assessments should include a

prognosis of change in respect of the person’s offending behaviour

alongside predictors of risk.

Recommendation 11. (Finding 6) The National Offender Management

Service should ensure national consistency of practice by issuing

guidance in relation to the transfer to the police of all relevant

information relating to a MAPPA offender’s prognosis where a case is

closed to the Probation Service, and where a case is no longer subject

to MAPPP meetings.

Recommendation 12. (Finding 5) The National Offender Management

Service should ensure national consistency of practice by issuing

guidance in the sharing of information to non‐statutory providers of

services to offenders. Specifically, consideration should be given to

establishing in each MAPPA Strategic Management Board area

directory of approved non‐statutory service providers to whom

sensitive information can be provided.

Recommendation 13. (Finding 7) The Chief Executive of the National

Offender Management Service should ensure that when

commissioning external providers of services to offenders in Her

Majesty’s Prison Service, the contracts must, where appropriate,

include requirements to comply with public protection arrangements.

Specifically, providers of housing, advice and advocacy services should

be required to consider risk and the wider public protection interest

when acting on behalf of an offender.

THE MINISTRY FOR JUSTICE


Recommendation 14. (Finding 1) The Home Secretary should review the

adequacy of current controls on persons assessed as posing a high or

very high risk of serious physical or sexual harm to the public and who

are not subject to statutory supervision by a criminal justice agency.

THE LEEDS SAFEGUARDING CHILDREN BOARD

Recommendation 15. It is recommended that within three months the

Independent Chair of Leeds SCB ensures that a review of the process

and decisions made whilst undertaking this SCR is undertaken to

identify key lessons that may inform the future practice as regards the

commissioning and execution of future SCRs in Leeds.

serious case child k review - leedsscp.org.uk€¦ · joe cocker, independent overview report...

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