set 1 of cases (full text)

8/11/2019 Set 1 of cases (Full Text)

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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-33006. December 8, 1982.]

NICANOR NACAR, petitioner , vs. CLAUDIO A. NISTAL as Municipal Judgeof Esperanza, Agusan del Sur; PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of Agusan del Sur,ILDEFONSO JAPITANA and ANTONIO DOLORICON , respondents .

Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioner.

Ildefonso Japitana and Antonio Doloricon for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

To recover a sum of money, r espondent Japitana filed a complaintentitled, "Claim against the Estate of the Late Isabelo Nacar with Preliminary

Attachment" against the petitioner before the Municipal Court of Esperanza,Agusan del Sur. On the basis of the said complaint, the provincial sheriff wasordered to attach seven (7) heads of cattle in possession of the petitioner, althoughactually only four (4) carabaos were attached. Claiming ownership of the attachedcarabaos, Antonio Doloricon filed a complaint in intervention. Petitioner's motionto dismiss, to dissolve writ of attachment and to order the return of the seizedcarabaos, was, upon opposition of the private respondent, denied by therespondent court. Hence, the instant recourse. Upon posting a P1,000.00 bond, apreliminary mandatory injunction was issued by t he Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that since respondent Japitana has no cause ofaction against the petitioner because the debts were actually incurred by t he lateIsabelo Nacar, the respondent Court's denial of the motion to dismiss thecomplaint and its issuance of a writ of attachment based thereon, are improper.

Petition granted. Preliminary mandatory injunction made permanent.

1.REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; MOTION TO DISMISS; LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION;CASE AT BAR. It is patent from the portions of the complaint earlier cited that theallegations are not only vague and ambiguous but downright misleading. The secondparagraph of the body of the complaint states that the defendant (hereinpetitioner Nicanor Nacar) at various dates since the year 1968 incurred debts to t heplaintiff in the total sum of P2,791.00. And yet, in the subsequent paragraphs, one clearlygathers that the debts were actually incurred by the late Isabelo Nacar, who died severalmonths before the filing of the complaint. The complaint which the respondent judge readsas one for the collection of a sum of money and all the paragraphs of which are incidentallyunnumbered, expressly states as a material averment: . . . That plaintiff herein file (sic) aclaim against the estate of the late Isabelo Nacar to recover the aforementioned sum of12,791.00; . . . U nder the circumstances of this case, respondent Japitana has no cause ofaction against petitioner Nacar. Although respondent Japitana may have a legal right to

recover an indebtedness due him, petitioner Nicanor Nacar has no correlative legal duty topay the debt for the simple reason that there is nothing in the complaint to show that heincurred the debt or had anything to do wish t he creation of the liability. A s far as the debtis concerned, there is no allegation or showing that the petitioner had acted in violation ofMr. Japitana's rights with consequential injury or damage to the latter as would create acause of action against the former. The respondent court's reason for not dismissing thecase is contrary to applicable precedents on the matter. We ruled in Mathay v.Consolidated Bank and Trust Company (58 SCRA 559): "Section I, Rule 16 of the Rules ofCourt, explicitly requires that the sufficiency of the complaint must be tested exclusively on

the basis of the complaint itself and no other should be considered when the ground formotion to dismiss that the complaint states no cause of action. Pursuant thereto this Courthas ruled that: 'As a rule the sufficiency of the complaint, when challenged in a motion todismiss, must be determined exclusively on the basis of the facts alleged therein.' "(Casescited) Hence, it was error for the respondent court not to dismiss the case simply becauserespondent Doloricon filed the complaint for intervention alleging that he owned thecarabaos.

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ENFORCEMENT OR DEFENSE OF RIGHTS PROVIDED FOR IN THEPROCEDURAL RULES. Moreover, even assuming that respondent Japitana had a legalright to the carabaos which were in the possession of petitioner Nacar, the properprocedure would not be to file an action for the recovery of the outstanding debts of thelate Isabelo Nacar against his stepfather, the petitioner Nacar as defendant. As we said inMaspil v. Romero (61 SCRA 197): "Appropriate actions for the enforcement or defense of

rights must be taken in accordance with procedural rules and cannot be left to the whimsor caprices of litigants. It cannot even be left to the untrammeled discretion of the courts of justice without sacrificing uniformity and equality in the application and effectivitythereof."

VASQUEZ, J., concurring :

1.REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDING; CLAIMS AGAINST ESTATE; ACTION FORRECOVERY OF MONEY SHOULD BE FILED IN ADMINISTRATION PROCEEDINGS. The filingof an ordinary action to recover money claim is not allowed in any court. Even if settlementproceedings had been taken to settle the estate of Isabelo Nacar, the suit to recover theclaim of the private respondents may not be filed against the administrator or executor ofhis estate. This is expressly provided for in Section 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, asfollows: "No action upon claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shallbe commenced against the executor or administrator; . . . ." The claim of privaterespondents, being one arising from a contract, may be pursued only by filing the same inthe administration proceedings that may be taken to settle the estate of the deceasedIsabelo Nacar. If such a proceeding is instituted and the subject claim is not filed thereinwithin the period prescribed, the same shall be deemed "barred forever." (Sec. 5, Rule 86,Rules of Court). Even if t his action were commenced during the lifetime of Isabelo Nacar,the same shall have to be dismissed, and the claim prosecuted in the proper administrationproceedings (Sec. 21, Rule 3, Ibid.).

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MUNICIPAL COURT NOT VESTED WITH PROBATE JURISDICTION. It would seem that the main purpose of the private respondents in filing Civil Case No.65 was to attach the seven carabaos owned by Isabelo Nacar. A case had to be filed inorder to justify the issuance of a writ of attachment. Unfortunately, said remedy may notbe allowed. The carabaos, if really owned by Isabelo Nacar, pertained to his estate upon hisdeath. The claim of the private respondents may only be satisfied by a voluntary act on thepart of the heirs of I sabelo Nacar, or pursued in the appropriate settlement proceedings. A


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municipal court may not entertain such a proceeding, it not being vested, under the lawthen in force, with probate jurisdiction.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:

Nicanor Nacar filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition, andmandamus with preliminary injunction to annul an order of the respondent judgeof the municipal court of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur directing the attachment ofseven (7) carabaos, to effect the return of four (4) carabaos seized under thequestioned order, and to stop the respondent judge from further proceeding inCivil Case No. 65.

Respondent Ildefonso Japitana filed the complaint in Civil Case No. 65and entitled it "Claim Against the E state of the Late Is abelo Nacar With PreliminaryAttachment:" On the basis of this complaint, including an allegation "thatdefendant are (sic) about to remove and dispose the above-named property (sevencarabaos) with intent to defraud plaintiff herein", and considering that Mr. Japitanahad given security according to the Rules of Court, Judge Nistal issued the ordercommanding the provincial sheriff to attach the seven (7) heads of cattle in thepossession of petitioner Nicanor Nacar. Actually only four (4) carabaos wereattached because three (3) carabaos had earlier been slaughtered during the ritespreceding the burial of the late Isabelo Nacar.

Nicanor Nacar filed a motion to dismiss, to dissolve writ of preliminary

attachment, and to order the return of the carabaos. Private respondent Japitanafiled an opposition to this motion while intervenor Antonio Doloricon filed acomplaint in intervention asserting that he was the owner of the attached carabaosand that the certificates of ownership of large cattle were in his name.

The respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss promptingMr. Nacar to come to the Supreme Court.

In a resolution dated January 12, 1971, this Court, upon the posting of abond in the amount of P1,000.00, directed the issuance of a preliminary mandatoryinjunction. The respondents were enjoined from further enforcing the writ ofattachment and to return the seized carabaos. The judge was restrained fromfurther proceeding with Civil Case No. 65.

We find the petition meritorious.

The pertinent portions of the complaint filed by Mr. Japitana with themunicipal court read as follows:

"ILDEFONSO JAPITANCivil Case No.65Plaintiff,FOR: Versus CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATENICANOR NACAROF THE LATE ISABELO NACARDefendant.WITH PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT

x-----------------------x

C O M P L A I N T

COMES NOW the undersigned plaintiff and before thisHonorable Court, respectfully avers:

xxx xxx xxx

"That at various dates since the year 1968, thedefendant have (sic) incurred indebtedness to the plaintiff in thetotal sum of TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY ONE(P2,791.00) PESOS, which said amount had long been overduefor payment, and which the defendant up to this date have (sic)not been able to pay, despite repeated demands from theplaintiff;.

"That the defendant Isabelo Nacar died last April, 1970leaving among other things personal property consisting seven

(7) heads of carabaos now in the possession of thedefendant Nicanor Nacar;

"That plaintiff herein file a claim against the estate ofthe late Isabelo Nacar to recover the aforementioned sum ofP2,791.99;

"That defendant are (sic) about to remove and disposethe above mentioned property with intent to defraud plaintiffherein;

"That plaintiff is willing to put up a bond for theissuance of a preliminary attachment in an amount to be fixed by

the Court, not exceeding the sum of P2,791.00 which is theplaintiff's claim herein;

"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that pendingthe hearing of this case, a writ of preliminary attachment beissued against the properties of the defendant to serve assecurity for the payment or satisfaction of any judgment thatmay be recovered herein; and that after due hearing on theprincipal against the defendant for the sum of P2,791.00 withlegal interest from September 15, 1970 plus costs of this suit."(Annex "A", p. 7 rollo).

In his motion to dismiss, the petitioner raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction and absence of a cause of action. Mr.Nacar averred that theindebtedness mentioned in the complaint was alleged to have been incurred by t helate IsabeloNacar and not by Nicanor Nacar. There was, therefore, no cause ofaction against him. The petitioner also stated that a municipal court has no

jurisdiction to entertain an action involving a claim filed against the estate of adeceased person.

The same grounds have been raised in this petition. Mr. Nacar contends:

xxx xxx xxx

"9.That the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction. The municipal courts or inferior courts have NO jurisdiction to settle the estate of deceased persons. The properremedy is for the creditor to file the proper proceedings in thecourt of first instance and file the corresponding claim. Butassuming without admitting that the respondent judge had jurisdiction, it is very patent that he committed a very graveabuse of discretion and totally disregarded the provisions of the


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Rules of Court and decisions of this honorable Court when heissued an ex-parte writ of preliminary attachment, when there isno showing that the plaintiff therein has a sufficient cause ofaction, that there is no other se curity for the claim sought to beenforced by the plaintiff; or that the amount claimed in theaction is as much as the sum for which the order is prayed forabove all legal counterclaims; There was no bond to answer forwhatever damages that herein petitioner may suffer; (Rollo, pp.3-4).

xxx xxx xxx

The respondent judge tried to avoid the consequences of the issuesraised in the motion to dismiss by stating that although the title of the complaintstyled it a claim against the estate of the late Isabelo Nacar, the allegations showedthat the nature of the action was really for the recovery of an indebtedness in theamount of P2,791.99.

The rule cited by the judge is correctly stated but it is hardly relevant tothe contents of the complaint filed by Mr. Japitana.

It is patent from the portions of the complaint earlier cited that theallegations are not only vague and ambiguous but downright misleading. Thesecond paragraph of the body of the complaint states that the defendant (hereinpetitionerNicanor Nacar) at various dates since the year 1968 incurred debts to the

plaintiff in the sum of P2,791.00. And yet, in the subsequent paragraphs, oneclearly gathers that the debts were actually incurred by the late Isabelo Nacar, whodied several months before the filing of the complaint. The complaint which therespondent judge reads as one for the collection of a sum of money and all theparagraphs of which are incidentally unnumbered, expressly states as a materialaverment:

xxx xxx xxx

That plaintiff herein file (sic) a claim against the estateof the late Isabelo Nacar to recover the aforementioned sum ofP2,791.00;

xxx xxx xxx

Under the circumstances of this case, respondent Japitana has no causeof action against petitioner Nacar. Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and TrustCompany (58 SCRA 559) gives the elements of a valid cause of action:

"A cause of action is an act or omission of one party inviolation of the legal right of the other. Its essential elementsare, namely: the existence of a legal right in the plaintiff, (2) acorrelative legal duty in the defendant, and (3) an act or omissionof the defendant in violation of plaintiff's right withconsequential injury or damage to the plaintiff for which he maymaintain an action for the recovery, damages or otherappropriate relief. (Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. vs. Barrios, etal., 79 Phil. 666, 667; Ramitere, et al. vs. Montinola Vda. de Yulo,et al., L-19751, February 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 251, 255). On the

other hand, Section 3 of Rule 6 of the Rules of Court providesthat the complaint must state the ultimate facts constituting the

plaintiff's cause of action. Hence, where the complaint statesultimate facts that constitute the three essential elements of acause of action, the complaint states a cause of action;(Community Investment and Finance Corp. vs. Garcia, 88 Phil.215, 218) otherwise, the complaint must succumb to a motion todismiss on that ground."

Indeed, although respondent Japitana may have a legal right to recoveran indebtedness due him, petitioner NicanorNacar has no correlative legal duty topay the debt for the simple reason that there is nothing in the complaint to show

that he incurred the debt or had anything to do with the creation of the liability. Asfar as the debt is concerned, there is no allegation or showing that the petitionerhad acted in violation of Mr. Japitana's rights with consequential injury or damageto the latter as would create a cause of action against the former.

It is also patent from the complaint that respondent Japitana filed thecase against petitioner Nacar to recover seven (7) heads of carabaos allegedlybelonging to Isabelo Nacar which Japitana wanted to recover from the possessionof the petitioner to answer for the outstanding debt of the late Isabelo Nacar. Thismatter, however, is only ancillary to the main action. The ancillary matter does notcure a fatal defect in the complaint for the main action is for t he recovery of anoutstanding debt of the late Isabelo Nacar due respondent Japitana, a cause ofaction about which petitioner Nacar has nothing to do.

In fact the fatal defect in the complaint was noticed by the respondentcourt when it advised respondent Japitana to amend his complaint to conform withhis evidence and from the court's admission that it was inclined to dismiss the casewere it not for t he complaint in intervention of respondent Doloricon. RespondentDoloricon filed his complaint for intervention on the ground that the four carabaos,subject of the writ of attachment, were actually his carabaos. Thus, the respondentcourt in its Order denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss, to dissolve writ ofpreliminary attachment and to order the return of the carabaos said:

". . . A ntonio Doloricon manifested before this Courtthat he is filing a third-party complaint alleging that he is the trueand lawful owner of the carabaos in questions.

"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court for theinterest of both parties will not for the meantime dismiss thiscase. Antonio Doloricon is hereby given 10 days from receipthereof within which to file his third-party complaint. The plaintiffwho in his opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss pray (sic)for the custody of the carabaos. This Court further requiresplaintiff to put up the additional bond of P1,000.00 after whichthe latter may be entitled of (sic) the custody of the carabaossubject of litigation pending final termination of this case."(Rollo, pp. 18-19).

The respondent court's reason for not dismissing the case is contrary toapplicable precedents on the matter. We ruled in Mathay v. Consolidated Bank andTrust Company, supra :

"Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, providing in

part that:


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EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-15388. January 31, 1961.]

DORA PERKINS ANDERSON, petitioner-appellee , vs. IDONAH SLADEPERKINS, oppositor-appellant .

Ponce Enrile, S. Reyna, Montecillo & Belo for petitioner-appellee.

Lazaro A. Marquez for oppositor-appellant.

1.WILLS AND TESTAMENTS; EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; SPECIAL ADMINISTRATORS;POWER TO SELL NOT LIMITED TO PERISHABLE PROPERTY. Since Sec. 2, Rule 81, Rules of Courtspecifically provides that "the special administrator may sell such perishable and other propertyas the court orders sold ," the power of the special administrator to sell is clearly not limited to"perishable" property.

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; SALE MADE PRIOR TO LIQUIDATION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PREMATURE. While the law empowers the special administrator to sell certain personal property belonging tothe estate, yet until the issue of the ownership of the properties sought to be sold is heard anddecided, and the conjugal partnership liquidated, or at least, an agreement be reached with

appellant as to which properties of the conjugal partnership she would not mind being sold topreserve their value the sale would be premature.

REYES, J.B.L., J p:

Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceedings No. 29636authorizing the special administrator of the testate estate of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins tosell at public auction certain personal properties left by the deceased.

It appears that said special proceedings were commenced on May 10, 1956, by a petitionpresented by Dora Perkins Anderson for the probate of t he supposed last will and testament ofthe late Eugene Arthur Perkins, who died in Manila on April 28, 1956 allegedly possessed ofpersonal and real properties with a probable value of P5,000,000. On the same date of the filingof the aforesaid petition, petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson also filed an urgent petition for theappointment of Alfonso Ponce Enrile as special administrator of the estate, and on the sameday, the court issued an order appointing Alfonso Ponce Enrile as such special administratorupon his posting of a bond in the amount of P50,600. On July 9, 1956, Idonah Slade Perkins,surviving spouse of the deceased, entered an opposition to the probate of the will presented bypetitioner Dora Perkins Anderson. On September 28, 1956, the special administrator submittedan inventory of all the assets, which have come to his knowledge as belonging to the deceasedEugene Arthur Perkins at the time of his death.

About two years later, or on September 4, 1958, the special administrator submitted to thecourt a petition seeking authority to sell, or give away to some charitable or educationalinstitution or institutions, certain personal effects left by the deceased, such as clothes, books,gadgets, electrical appliances, etc., which were allegedly deteriorating both physically and invalue, in order to avoid their further deterioration and to save whatever value might beobtained in their disposition. When the motion was heard on September 25, 1958, the courtrequired the administration to submit a specification of the properties sought to be sold, and in

compliance therewith, the special administrator, on October 21, 1958, submitted to the court, inplace of a specification, a copy of the inventory of the personal properties belonging to theestate with the items sought to be sold marked with a check in red pencil, with the statementthat said items were too voluminous to enumerate.

On July 9, 1956, Idonah Slade Perkins filed an opposition to the proposed sale. Reasons for theopposition were that (1) most of t he properties sought to be sold were conjugal properties ofherself and her deceased husband; and (2) that unauthorized removals of fine pieces of furniturebelonging to the estate had been made.

The opposition notwithstanding, the lower court, on December 2, 1958, approved the proposedsale, authorizing the Sheriff of Manila to conduct the same. Oppositor Idonah Slade Perkinsmoved to reconsider this order on the grounds (1) that said order in effect authorized the specialadministrator to sell the entire personal estate of the deceased, contrary to Rule 81, sec. 2, Rulesof Court; (2) that said order was issued without a showing that the goods and chattels sought tobe sold were perishable, pursuant to Rule 81, section 2, Rules of Court; (3) that the personalitysought to be sold represented the lifetime savings and collections of oppositor; (4) that there isevidence on record showing unauthorized withdrawals from the properties of the estate, a ndthe sale of the inventoried lot would prevent identification and recovery of the articles removed;and (5) that there is also evidence showing oppositor's separate rights to a substantial part ofthe personal estate.

On February 23, 1959, the lower court denied the above motion for reconsideration.Whereupon oppositor Idonah Slade Perkins appealed to this court.

Appellant first claims that the personal properties sought to be sold not being perishable, thespecial administrator has no legal authority to sell them. This argument is untenable, becausesection 2, Rule 81, of the Rules of Court, specifically provides that the special administrator "maysell such perishable and other property as the court orders sold" which shows that the specialadministrator's power to sell is not limited to "perishable" property only.

It is true that the function of a special administrator is only t o collect and preserve the propertyof the deceased until a regular administrator is appointed (sec. 2, Rule 81; De Gala vs. Gonzales,53 Phil., 104; Collins vs. Henry, 118 S. E. 729, 155 Ga. 886; Sqydelko vs. Smith's Estate, 244 M. W.149, 259 Mich. 519). But it is not alone the specific property of the estate which is to bepreserved, but its value as well, as shown by the legal provision for the sale by a specialadministrator of perishable property (Gao vs. Cascade Silver Mines & Mills, et al., 213 P. 1092, 66Mont. 488). It is in line with this general power of the special administrator to preserve not onlythe property of the estate but also its value, that section 2, Rule 81, also empowers suchadministrator to sell "other property as the court ordered sold."

There is, however, a serious obstacle to the proposed sale, namely, the vigorous oppositionpresented thereto by the appellant, the surviving spouse of the deceased, on t he ground that sheis allegedly entitled to a large portion of the personal properties in question, either because theywere conjugal property of herself and the deceased, or because they are her own exclusive,personal property. Indeed the records show that up to the time the proposed sale was asked forand judicially approved, no proceedings had as yet been taken, or even st arted, to segregate thealleged exclusive property of the oppositor-appellant from the mass of the estate supposedlyleft by the deceased, or to liquidate the conjugal partnership property of the oppositor-appellantand the deceased. Until, therefore, the issue of the ownership of the properties sought to besold is heard and decided, and the conjugal partnership liquidated; or, at least, an agreement be

reached with appellant as to which properties of the conjugal partnership she would not mindbeing sold to preserve their value, the proposed sale is clearly premature. After all, most of the


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items sought to be sold pieces of furniture, kitchen and dinner ware, electrical appliances,various gadgets, and Books can easily be protected and preserved with proper care andstorage measures in either or both of the two residential houses (in Manila and in Baguio City)left by the deceased, so that no reasons of extreme urgency justify the proposed sale at this timeover the strong opposition and objection of oppositor-appellant who may later be adjudgedowner of a substantial portion of the personal estate in question.

The special administrator claims in his brief that the oppositor- appellant should have indicatedthe alleged "fine furniture" which she did not want s old and that her refusal to do so is anindication of her unmeritorious claim. But it does not appear that appellant was given areasonable opportunity to point out which items in the inventory she did not want sold. In fact,her opposition to the proposed sale and later her motion for reconsideration to the orderapproving the same were overruled by the court without so much as stating reasons why thegrounds for her opposition were not well- founded; the records do not even show that aninquiry was made as to the validity of the grounds of her opposition.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of December 2, 1958 authorizing the special administratorto sell certain personal properties of the estate is set aside, with costs against the specialadministrator Alfonso Ponce Enrile and petitioner-appellee Dora Perkins Anderson.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador; Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez David, J., took no part.

||| (Anderson v. Perkins, G.R. No. L-15388, January 31, 1961)


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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 92436. July 26, 1991.]

MARIA VDA. DE REYES, EFREN REYES, ELVIRA REYES-TIMBOL, ERLINDAREYES-VALERIO, ERNESTO REYES, ELIZABETH REYES, ALEX, RAFAEL II,EMELINA and EVELYN, all surnamed REYES, represented by theirmother, MARIA VDA. DE REYES , petitioners , vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

AND SPOUSES DALMACIO GARDIOLA and ROSARIOMARTILLANO, respondents .

De Lara, De Lunas & Rosales for petitioners.

Santos, Pilapil & Associates for private respondents.

||| (Vda. de Reyes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92436, July 26, 1991)

1.CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; ORAL PARTITION AMONG HEIRS, VALID AND BINDING; NO LAWREQUIRING WRITTEN PARTITION AMONG HEIRS. The Court of Appeals correctly held that thepartition made by the children of Gavino Reyes in 1936, although oral, was valid and binding.There is no law that requires partition among heirs to be in writing to be valid.

2.ID.; ID.; PARTITION; OBJECT OF REQUIREMENT THAT A PARTITION BE PUT IN PUBLICDOCUMENT AND REGISTERED. InHernandez vs. Andal, this Court, interpreting Section 1 ofRule 74 of the Rules of Court, held that the requirement that a partition be put in a publicdocument and registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same timethe protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serveas constructive notice to others.

3.ID.; ID.; ID.; HEIRS OF AN ESTATE MAY ENTER INTO AN AGREEMENT IN ANY MANNER ANDUPON A PLAN DIFFERENT FROM THOSE PROVIDED BY LAW WHERE NO RIGHTS OF CREDITORSARE AFFECTED. The intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalitiesdoes not come into play when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected.Where no such rights are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into anagreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from t hose provided by law.

There is nothing in Section I, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court from which it can be inferred that awriting or other formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the partition.

4.ID.; ID.; REASON FOR THE VALIDITY OF ORAL P ARTITION. Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, etal., 100 Phil. 251 provides the reason why oral partition is valid and why it is not covered by theStatute of Frauds: partition among heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by some of them isnot exactly a conveyance of real property for the reason that it does not involve transfer ofproperty from one to the other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right ofproperty by the heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance.

5.ID.; ID.; RIGHTS TO SUCCESSION TRANSMITTED FROM THE MOMENT OF DEATH OF DECEDENT. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Theestate of the decedent would then be held in co-ownership by the heirs. In Ramirez vs. Bautista ,this Court held that every co-heir has the absolute ownership of his share in the community

property and may alienate, assign, or mortgage the same, except as to purely personal rights,

but the effect of any such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to him uponthe partition of the property.

6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ONLY SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS RECEIVED MAY BE TRANSMITTED; SUCCESSIONALRIGHTS NOT RECEIVED CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED BY EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT NOR BYERRONEOUS ISSUANCE OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE. Petitioners, as mere successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., son of Rafael Reyes, Sr., can only acquire that which Rafael,

Jr. could transmit to them upon his death. The latter never became the owner of Lot No. 1-A-14because it was sold by his father in 1943. The issuance of TCT No. T-27257 in the name of RafaelReyes, Jr., in so far as Lot No. 1-14-A is concerned, was clearly erroneous because he neverbecame its owner. An extrajudicial settlement does not create a right in favor of an heir. As thisCourt stated in the Barcelona case, it is but a confirmation or ratification of title or right toproperty. Thus, since he never had any title or right to Lot No. 1-14-A, the mere execution of thesettlement did not improve his condition, and the subsequent registration of the deed did notcreate any right or vest any title over the property in favor of the petitioners as heirs of RafaelReyes, Jr. The latter cannot give them what he never had before. Nemo dare potest quod nonhabet .

7.ID.; PROPERTY; RECOVERY OF POSSESSION; ACTION BARRED BY LACHES. Petitioners'immediate predecessor-in-interest, Rafael Reyes, Jr., never took any action against privaterespondents from the time his father sold the lot to the latter. Neither did petitioners bring anyaction to recover from private respondents the ownership and possession of the lot from thetime Rafael Reyes, Jr. died. As categorically admitted by petitioners in their complaint andamended complaint, it was only in or about September 1969 when, after the delivery of TCT No.27257 by Candido Hebron to them, that they definitely discovered that they were the owners ofthe property in question. And yet, despite full knowledge that private respondents were inactual physical possession of the property, it was only about thirteen and one-half (131/2) yearslater that they decided to file an action for recovery of possession. The original complaint wasfiled in the trial court on 14 March 1983. There was then absolutely no basis for the trial court toplace the burden on private respondents to bring an action for reconveyance within four (4)years from their discovery of the issuance of the transfer certificate of title in the name of RafaelReyes, Jr.

DAVIDE, JR., J p:

Assailed before us in this appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the decisionof the respondent Court of Appeals in C.A .-G.R. CV No. 11934, promulgated on 20 October

1989 , 1 reversing the decision of 1 October 1986 of Branch 21 (Imus, Cavite) of the Regional TrialCourt of the Fourth Judicial Region in Civil Case No. RTC-BCV-83-17 entitled Maria vda. de Reyes,et al. vs. Spouses Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano and Spouses Ricardo M. Gardiolaand Emelita Gardiola , 2 and the resolution of 1 March 1990 denying the petitioner's motion forreconsideration.

As culled from both decisions and the pleadings of the parties, the following facts have beenpreponderantly established:

During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land of approximately 70 hectares,more or less, located at Sangayad, Ulong-Tubig, Carmona, Cavite. He sought to bring said landunder the operation of the Torrens System of registration of property. Unfortunately, he died in1921 without the title having been issued to him. The application was prosecuted by his son,Marcelo Reyes, who was the administrator of his property.
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In 1936 the above property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino's heirs (Exh. "6"). In thesubdivision plan, each resultant lot was earmarked, indicated for and assigned to a specific heir.It appears therein that two lots, one of which is Lot No. 1-A-14 (Exh. "6-A"), were allotted toRafael Reyes, Sr., one of Gavino's children. Per testimony of Juan Poblete, the children thereaftersecured tax declarations for their respective shares.

In 1941, or about twenty (20) years after the death of Gavino, the original certificate of t itle forthe whole property OCT No. 255 was issued. It was, however, kept by Juan Poblete, son-inlaw of Marcelo Reyes, who was by then already deceased. The heirs of Gavino were not awareof this fact.

On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land with an area of 23,431 squaremeters, more or less, to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola (Exh. "5"). According to thevendee, this parcel corresponds to Lot No. 1-A-14 of the subdivision plan aforestated. The deedof sale, however, did not specifically mention Lot No. 1-A-14. The vendee immediately tookpossession of the property and started paying the land taxes therein. Cdpr

In 1945 or thereabouts, Juan Poblete "revalidated" the original Certificate of Title. Asreconstituted, the new title is OCT (O-4358) RO-255 (Exhs. "4" to "4-A").

On 21 October 1967, when the heirs of Gavino Reyes executed a Deed of ExtrajudicialSettlement of Estate (Exh. "D") based on the aforestated subdivision plan (Exh. "6"), the lot thatwas intended for Rafael Reyes, Sr., who was already deceased, was instead adjudicated to hisonly son and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr. (the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners herein).

Private respondent Rosario Martillano signed the deed in representation of her mother, MartaReyes, one of the children of Gavino Reyes.

As a result of t he Extrajudicial Settlement, OCT RO-255 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, severaltransfer certificates of title covering the subdivided lots were issued in the names of therespective adjudicatees. One of them is TCT No. 27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr. coveringLot No. 1-A-14. The Transfer Certificates of Title were, however, kept by one Candido Hebron.On 10 January 1969, some of the heirs of Gavino Reyes filed a case of Annulment of Partitionand Recovery of Possession before the Court of First Instance of Cavite City, which was docketedtherein as Civil Case No. 1267. One of the defendants in said case is herein private respondentRosario Martillano. The case was dismissed on 18 September 1969, but Candido Hebron wasordered by the trial court to deliver to the heirs concerned all the transfer certificates of title inhis possession . 3

After obtaining the Transfer Certificate of Title for Lot No. 1-A-14 from Hebron, pursuant to theaforesaid order in Civil Case No. 1267, petitioners herein, as successors-in-interest of RafaelReyes, Jr., filed on 14 March 1983 with the Regional Trial Court the above-mentioned Civil CaseNo. RTC-BCV-83-17 against private respondents (defendants therein) for recovery of possessionor, in the alternative, for indemnification, accounting and damages. They allege therein thatafter "having definitely discovered that they are the lawful owners of the property," (Lot No. 1-A-14), they, "including Rafael Reyes, Jr., during his lifetime, made repeated demands to (sic)defendants to surrender the possession of and vacate the parcel of land belonging to t heformer, but defendants refused to vacate and surrender the possession of the said land toherein plaintiffs;" the last of the demands was allegedly made on 8 October 1982. They furtherallege that they have been deprived by said defendants of the rightful possession and enjoymentof the property since September 1969 which coincides with the date of t he order in Civil CaseNo. 1267. 4 In their answer, private respondents deny the material averments in the complaint

and assert that they are the owners of the lot in question, having bought the same from RafaelReyes, Sr.; that the issuance of TCT No. 27257 is null and void, for such sale was known to Rafael

Reyes, Jr.; that they have been in possession of the property and have been paying the landtaxes thereon; and that petitioners are barred by prescription and/or laches. 5

Petitioners amended their complaint on 21 March 1985 to implead as additional defendants thespouses Ricardo M. Gardiola and Emelita Gardiola, on the basis of the following claims:

xxx xxx xxx

"9.Meanwhile, during the presentation of the defendants spousesDalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano's evidence the former testifiedthat they mortgaged the subject land to the Rural Bank of Carmona Inc.For their failure to redeem the mortgage the same was foreclosed by thebank.

10.However, within the period of one (1 ) year from such foreclosure thequestioned land was redeemed by the original defendants' son in theperson of Ricardo M. Gardiola, who was knowledgeable/aware of thependency of the above captioned case. The corresponding redemptionwas effected through a deed of conveyance, . . ." 6

The prayer of the amended complaint now contains the alternative relief for indemnification forthe reasonable value of the property "in the event restitution of the property is no longerpossible." 7

In its decision of 1 October 1986, 8 the trial court concluded that petitioners' "title over thesubject property is valid and regular and thus they are entitled to its possession and enjoyment,"and accordingly decided thus:

"WHEREFORE, the defendants or anyone acting for and in their behalfare hereby ordered to relinquish possession or vacate the property inquestion which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 infavor of the plaintiffs.

All other claims and/or counterclaims of the parties relative t o this caseare dismissed for lack of proper substantiation."

The conclusion of the trial court is based on its finding that (a) there is no evidence that the heirs

of Gavino Reyes entered into any written agreement of partition in 1936 based on thesubdivision plan; (b) there is no identity between Lot No. 1-14-A and the land sold to privaterespondents by Rafael Reyes, Sr., or otherwise stated, the description of the latter as indicatedin the deed of sale (Exh. "5") does not tally with t he description of the former; and (c) moreover:

"Granting, arguendo , that the sale made by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to thedefendants covered the land in question Lot No. 1-A-14 and thatTransfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 was obtained by means of fraud,the claim of the defendants over the said property is already barred.Action for reconveyance prescribes in four (4) years from the discoverythereof. If there was fraud, the defendant could have discovered thesame in 1967 when the partition was made in as much as defendantRosario Martillano was a party to that partition. Let us grant further thatthe issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 to Rafael Reyes,Jr. created a constructive or implied trust in favor of the defendants,again, the claim of the defendants is also barred. From 1967 to the filing
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=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=&q%5Bissue_no%5D=G.R.+92436&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote8_0http://www.online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/18767?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=18767&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=&q%5Bissue_no%5D=G.R.+92436&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote7_0http://www.online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/18767?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=18767&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=&q%5Bissue_no%5D=G.R.+92436&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote6_0http://www.online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/18767?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=18767&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=&q%5Bissue_no%5D=G.R.+92436&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote5_0http://www.online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/18767?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=18767&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=&q%5Bissue_no%5D=G.R.+92436&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote3_0


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of their answer (let us consider this as an action for reconveyance) to thiscase sometime in July, 1983, a period of about sixteen (16) years hadalready elapsed. Prescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based onimplied or constructive trust is ten (10) years.

The trial court further held that the continued possession by private respondents, which it foundto have started in 1943, did not ripen into ownership because at that time, t he property wasalready registered, hence it cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. 9 Privaterespondents appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals which docketed the appeal asC.A.-G.R. CV No. 11934. In its decision of 20 October 1989, the respondent Court of Appealsformulated the issues before it as follows:

"I

Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring that the property ofthe late Gavino Reyes consisting of 70 hectares was partitioned only in1967 by his grandchildren after discovery of the existence of O CT No. 255and that no actual partition was made in 1936 by the decedent'schildren.

II

Whether or not the lower court erred in concluding that the parcel ofland sold by the appellees' predecessor-in-interest, the late Rafael Reyes,

Sr. to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola was not the same parcel of land underlitigation." 10

and resolved such issues, thus:

"On the first issue, We believe that the lower court committed areversible error when it declared that t he landed estate of the lateGavino Reyes was partitioned only in 1967 by the latter's grandchildren;and that no actual partition was made in 1936 by the decedents' (sic)children. The evidence on record bears out the existence of a subdivisionplan (Exh. 6) which was not controverted nor denied by the appellees. Inlike manner, the lower court itself recognized the fact that the propertyof the late Gavino Reyes consisting of 70 hectares was surveyed andsubdivided in 1936 as evidenced by the said subdivision plan (Exh. 6).With the existence of a subdivision plan, and from the uncontrovertedtestimony of appellants' witness, We can only infer that at least an oralpartition, which under the law is valid and binding, was entered into bythe heirs of Gavino Reyes regarding his properties in 1936. As held in along line of decisions, extrajudicial partition can be done orally, and thesame would be valid if freely entered into (Belen v. Belen, 49 O.G. 997,March 1953). The reason for this is because a partition is not exactly aconveyance for the reason that it does not involve transfer of propertyfrom one to the other but rather a confirmation by them of theirownership of the property. It must also be remembered that whenGavino Reyes died on March 7, 1921, his property was admittedly not yetcovered by a torrens title, as it was only in 1941 when said propertieswere brought into the application of the torrens syst em. With this factualmilieu, it can also be concluded that his heirs have indeed settled,

subdivided and partitioned Gavino Reyes' landed estate without formalrequirements of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court when a parcel of land is

covered by a torrens title. As told earlier, the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6)undisputedly showed on its face that the 70 hectares of land belongingto the late Gavino Reyes was subdivided and partitioned by his childrenin 1936. On this score, t he partition of the said property even withoutthe formal requirements under the rule is valid as held in the case ofHernandez vs. Andal, 78 Phil. 176, which states:

xxx xxx xxx

Moreover, in the Deed of Sale dated December 3, 1943 (Exh. 5) executed

by Rafael Reyes, Sr. in favor of appellant Dalmacio Gardiola, the land soldtherein was described as 'na aking minana sa aking ama.' This alonewould confirm the contention of the appellants that there was alreadyan actual partition (at least an oral partition) of the property of GavinoReyes in 1936. As aforestated, the presence of the Subdivision Plan (Exh.6) is an (sic) evidence of such partition which appellees failed tocontrovert not to mention the fact that t he lower court itself recognizedthe existence of said plan, in the same manner that it concluded that theproperty was already surveyed and actually subdivided in 1936 (page 3,pars. 3 and 4, Decision).

From the foregoing considerations it is evident that the Deed ofExtrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Exh. D) executed by the grandchildrenof the late Gavino Reyes in 1967 is of no moment considering that theproperty subject of the partition in the deed was already partitioned in1936 by the children of Gavino Reyes. It is for this reason that the lotssupposedly inherited by the grandchildren named in the deed of 1967were the same lots inherited and given to their respective fathers ormothers in 1936 while the land was not yet covered by the torrenssystem. Hence, in the case of Rafael Reyes, Sr., the land inherited by himwas two (2) parcels of land known as Lots Nos. 1-A-3 and 1-A-14described in the Subdivision plan of 1936 (Exh. 6), which were the sameparcels of land allegedly inherited by Rafael Reyes, Jr. from Gavino Reyesin representation of his father, pursuant to the Deed of ExtrajudicialSettlement of Estate for which TCT No. 27257 was issued.

Coming to the second issue, the lower court likewise erred when itconcluded that the parcel of land sold by appellee's predecessor-in-interest to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola was not the same parcel of landunder litigation. It must be pointed out that the identity of the parcel ofland which the appellees sought to recover from the appellants wasnever an issue in the lower court, because the litigants had alreadyconceded that the parcel identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257was the same parcel of land identified as Cadastral Lot No. 1228 and1235 described in Tax Declaration No. 4766. Despite this admission,however, the lower court declared that 'as described in the deed of sale(Exh. 5), the land's description does not tally with the description of LotNo. 1-A-14, the land in litigation.' As correctly pointed out by theappellants however, the discrepancy in the description was due to thefact that the description of the land sold in the Deed of Sale wasexpressed in layman's language whereas the description of Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257 was done in technical terms. This was so because,when Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold the property in dispute to appellant Dalmaco
http://www.online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/18767?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=18767&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=&q%5Bissue_no%5D=G.R.+92436&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote9_0http://www.online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/18767?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=18767&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=&q%5Bissue_no%5D=G.R.+92436&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote9_0http://www.online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/18767?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=18767&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=&q%5Bissue_no%5D=G.R.+92436&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote9_0http://www.online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/18767?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=18767&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=&q%5Bissue_no%5D=G.R.+92436&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote10_0http://www.online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/18767?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=18767&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=&q%5Bissue_no%5D=G.R.+92436&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote10_0http://www.online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/18767?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=18767&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=&q%5Bissue_no%5D=G.R.+92436&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote10_0http://www.online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/18767?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=18767&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=&q%5Bissue_no%5D=G.R.+92436&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote10_0http://www.online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/18767?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=18767&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=&q%5Bissue_no%5D=G.R.+92436&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote9_0


10/40

Gardiola on December 3, 1943, the only evidence of t itle to the land t henavailable in so far as Rafael Reyes, Sr. was concerned was Tax DeclarationNo. 4766, because at that time, neither he nor appellant DalmacioGardiola was aware of the existence of OCT No. 255 as in fact TCT No.27257 was issued only in 1967. Consequently, the land subject of theDeed of Sale was described by the vendor in the manner as described inTax Declaration No. 4766. However, the description of the landappearing in the Deed of Sale (Exh. 5) was exactly the same landidentified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) of 1936.Accordingly, the assumption of the lower court that 'if the land sold byRafael Reyes, Sr. was the one now in litigation, he could have easilyindicated Lot No. 1-A-14' is bereft of merit under the foregoingcircumstances. Interestingly enough, the appellees never denied theidentity of the subject lot during the hearing at the lower court. Whatthey were denying only was the sale made by Rafael Reyes, Sr. toappellant Dalmacio Gardiola which does not hold true because of thedocument denominated as Deed of Sale (Exh. 5)." 11

It concluded that the trial court erred when it ordered the private respondents or anyone actingin their behalf to relinquish the possession or vacate the property in question. It thus decreed:

"WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment is ordered REVERSED and SETASIDE and a new one is rendered declaring appellants to be the lawfulowners of the lot identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257. Nocosts." 12

Their motion to reconsider the above decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in itsresolution of 1 March 1990, 13 petitioners filed the instant petition on 6 April 1990 after havingobtained an extension of time within which to file it.

The petition does not implead original new defendants Ricardo Gardiola and Emelita Gardiola.

As ground for their plea for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioners allegethat said court has decided questions of substance in a way not in accord with law or applicable

jurisprudence when it held that "the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate (Exh. "D")executed by the grandchildren of the late Gavino Reyes in 1967 is of no moment considering

that the property subject of the partition was already partitioned in 1938 by the children ofGavino Reyes." In support thereof, they claim that (a) TCT No. 27257 covers two parcels of land;the lot described in paragraph 1 thereof is owned by petitioners and that ownership wasconfirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 79882, hence, the Court of Appeals should have affirmed thedecision of the trial court; (b) private respondent Rosario Martillano was a party to theextrajudicial settlement of estate which was duly registered in the Registry of Deeds in 1967;said registration is the operative act t hat gives validity to the t ransfer or creates a lien upon theland and also constituted constructive notice to the whole world. The court cannot disregard thebinding effect thereof. Finally, the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals that privaterespondents are the lawful owners of the lot in question "militates against the indefeasible andincontrovertible character of the torrens title," 14 and allows reconveyance which is not tenablesince the action therefor had already prescribed, as stated in the decision of the trial court.

In the resolution of 7 May 1990, We required respondents to comment on the petition. But evenbefore it could do so, petitioner, without obtaining prior leave of the Court, filed on 29 May

1990 a so-called Supplemental Arguments in Support of The Petition For Review OnCertiorari 15 wherein they assert, among others, that: (a) the findings of facts of respondentCourt are contrary to those of the trial court and appear to be contradicted by the evi dence onrecord thus calling for the review by this Court ; 16 (b) it also committed misapprehension of thefacts in this case and its findings are based on speculation, conjecture and surmises; (c) privaterespondents' attack on petitioners' title is a collateral attack which is not allowed; even if it isallowed, the same had already prescribed and is now barred. prcd

It was only on 15 June 1990 that private respondents filed their Comment. 17 We requiredpetitioners to reply thereto, which they complied with on 8 August 1990. 18 A rejoinder wasfiled by private respondents on 29 August 1990.

We gave due course to the petition on 19 September 1990 and required the parties to submitsimultaneously their respective memoranda which they complied with.

Attached as Annex "A" to private respondent's Memorandum, which was filed on 10 December1990, is the Resolution of this Court (Third Division) of 20 August 1990 in G .R. No. 92811entitled Spouses Artemio Durumpili and Angustia Reyes vs. The Court of Appeals and SpousesDalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano , which also involves the property of Gavino Reyes, thepartition thereof among his children in 1936, and the ext rajudicial settlement in 1967.

In said resolution, this Court held:

". . . The partition made in 1936, although oral, was valid. The

requirement in Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have fortheir object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment ofreal rights over immovable property must appear in a public instrumentis only for convenience and not for validity or enforceability as betweenthe parties themselves. [ Thunga Hui vs. Que Bentec , 2 Phil. 561 (1903)]The subsequent execution by the heirs of t he Extrajudicial Partition in1967 did not alter the oral partition as in fact the share pertaining toAugustia Reyes corresponded to that previously assigned to her father.Considering that Angel Reyes sold this property to Basilio de Ocampowho, in turn, sold the same to respondents, we agree with the Court ofAppeals that the latter lawfully acquired the property and are entitled toownership and possession thereof."

In answer to the charge of private respondents that petitioners deliberately failed to cite this

resolution, the latter, in their reply-memorandum dated 15 March 1991 and filed three daysthereafter, allege:

"Our failure to mention the aforementioned resolution before thisHonorable Court is not deliberate nor with malice aforethought. Thereason is that to date, we have not yet received any resolution to ourMotion For Leave of Court To Refer Case To The Honorable SupremeCourt En Banc. Moreover, we honestly feel that the resolution that willbe issued therein will not be applicable to the case before this HonorableCourt's Second Division. It should be mentioned that in the Durumpilicase before the Third Division, the Court of Appeals relied on the allegedconfirmation of the sale executed by Angustia Reyes, while in the Reyescase before this Second Division, there was no sale that was executed bythe petitioners Reyes' predecessor-in-interest, Rafael Reyes, Jr."
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11/40

The foregoing claim is not supported by the rollo of G.R. No. 92811, which reveals the following:(a) On 18 September 1990, petitioners therein, represented by De Lara, De Lunas and Rosales,who are the lawyers of petitioners in the instant case, filed a motion for the reconsideration ofthe resolution of 20 August 1990. 19 b) This motion was denied in the resolution of 1 October1990. 20 c) On 17 November 1990, petitioners therein, through the same lawyers, filed a MotionFor Leave Of Court To Refer Case To The Honorable Supreme Court En Banc and/or Motion ForReconsideration 21 wherein they specifically admit that said case and the instant petition have"identity and/or similarity of the parties, the facts, the issues raised," even going to the extent of"graphically" illustrating where such similarities lie. 22 d) This motion was denied in theresolution of 28 November 1990. Copy thereof was furnished the attorneys for petitioners. 23 e)Entry of judgment had already been made therein and a copy thereof was sent to petitioner'scounsel per Letter of Transmittal of the Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief of the Judicial RecordsOffice dated 20 December 1990.

What comes out prominently from the disquisitions of the parties is this simple issue: whetheror not respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in setting aside the decisionof the trial court. LexLib

We find none. The reversal of the trial court's decision is inevitable and unavoidable because thelegal and factual conclusions made by the trial court are unfounded and clearly erroneous. TheCourt of Appeals was not bound to agree to such conclusions. The trial court erred in holdingthat: (a) there was no partition among the children of Gavino Reyes in 1936 since there is nowritten evidence in support thereof; yet, it admits that there was a survey and subdivision of theproperty and the adjudication of specific subdivision lots to each of the children of Gavino; (b)the land sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. t o private respondents is not identical to Lot No. 1-A-14, the lotspecified for and adjudicated to Rafael Reyes, Jr. in the partition agreement; and (c) if the landsold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is indeed Lot No. 1-A-14 andthat TCT No. T-27257 was obtained through fraud, the remedy open to the vendee was an actionfor reconveyance, which should have been brought within four (4) years from the discoverythereof in 1967 when the Extrajudicial Settlement was executed since private respondentRosario Martillano, wife of Dalmacio, was a party thereto.

The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made by the children of Gavino Reyes in1936, although oral, was valid and binding. There is no law that requires partition among heirs tobe in writing to be valid. 24 In Hernandez vs. Andal, supra , this Court, interpreting Section 1 ofRule 74 of the Rules of Court, held that the requirement that a partition be put in a publicdocument and registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time

the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serveas constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition notexecuted with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when there are no creditors orthe rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such rights are involved, it is competent forthe heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plandifferent from those provided by law. There is nothing in said section from which it can beinferred that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the partition.Accordingly, an oral partition is valid.

Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra , provides the reason why oral partition is valid andwhy it is not covered by the Statute of Frauds: partition among heirs or renunciation of aninheritance by some of them is not exactly a conveyance of real property for the reason that itdoes not involve transfer of property from one to the other, but rather a confirmation orratification of title or right of property by the heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting

and receiving the inheritance.

Additionally, the validity of such oral partition in 1936 has been expressly sustained by this Courtin the Resolution of 20 August 1990 in G.R. No. 92811 . 25

But even if We are to assume arguendo that the oral partition executed in 1936 was not valid forsome reason or another, We would still arrive at the same conclusion for upon the death ofGavino Reyes in 1921, his heirs automatically became co-owners of his 70-hectare parcel of land.The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent . 26 Theestate of the decedent would then be held in co-ownership by the heirs. The co-heir or co-owner

may validly dispose of his share or interest in the property subject to the condition that theportion disposed of is eventually allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co -ownership. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:

"Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and the fruitsand benefits pertaining thereto, and he may even substitute anotherperson in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. Butthe effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him inthe division upon the termination of the co-ownership."

In Ramirez vs. Bautista , 27 this Court held that every co-heir has the absolute ownership of hisshare in the community property and may alienate, assign, or mortgage the same, except as topurely personal rights, but the effect of any such transfer is limited to the portion which may be

awarded to him upon the partition of the property. Cdpr

In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is hisshare in the estate of his deceased father, Gavino Reyes. It is the same property which waseventually adjudicated to his son and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr., represented in turn by his heirs petitioners herein in the extrajudicial settlement of 1967.

In respect to the issue as to whether the property sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. is identical to Lot No.1-14-A, the trial court based its conclusion that it is not, on his observation that the descriptionof the former does not tally with that of the latter, moreover, if Rafael did intend to sell Lot No.1-14-A, he should have specifically stated it in the deed since at that time, the property hadalready been partitioned and said lot was adjudicated to him. In addition to the contrary findingsand conclusion of the respondent Court on this issue to which We fully agree, it is to be stressedthat Rafael had this property declared for taxation purposes and the tax declaration issued was

made the basis for the description of the property in the deed of sale. Upon the execution of thedeed of sale, vendee herein private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola immediately tookpossession of the property. This is the very same property which is the subject matter of thiscase and which petitioners seek to recover from the private respondents. The main evidenceadduced for their claim of ownership and possession over it is TCT No. T-27257, the certificate oftitle covering Lot No. 1-14-A. They therefore admit and concede that the property claimed byprivate respondent, which was acquired by sale from Rafael Reyes, Sr., is none other than LotNo. 1-14-A.

The participation of private respondent Rosario Gardiola in the Extrajudicial Settlement did notplace private respondents in estoppel to question the issuance of TCT No. T-27257. As correctlymaintained by private respondents, she signed it in re presentation of her deceased mother,Marta Reyes, a daughter and an heir of Gavino Reyes. She did not sign for and in behalf of herhusband, Dalmacio Gardiola, vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes, Sr.
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set 1 of cases (full text)

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