seventh division -...

Republic of the PhilippinesS andi ganb ay an

Quezon City***

SEVENTH DIVISION

MINUTES of the proceedings held on 9 March 2018.

Present:

Justice MA. THERESA DOLORES C. GOMEZ-ESTOESTA ChairpersonJustice ZALDYVTRESPESES- Member

Justice BAYANIH. JACINTO*- Member

The following resolution was adopted:

Crinu Case No. SB-17-CRM'2094 - People vs. GERONIMO BUENA VENTURA ̂ JERRY" P.TREfiAS.

This resolves the following:

1. Accused Geronimo Buenaventura Trenas' "MOTION TO

DISMISS" dated February 14,2018;^

2. The prosecution's "OPPOSITION [TO MOTION TO DISMISSDATED 14 FEBRUARY 2018]" dated February 26,2018.2

3. Accused Geronimo Trenas "MOTION FOR LEAVE OF COURT

TO FILE A SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION (To the Motion to Dismiss Dated14 February 2018)" dated February 27,2018 and received by mail on March5,2018.

For resolution is accused Geronimo Buenaventura P. Trenas' Motion to

Dismiss dated 14 February 2018.

Accused's Motion to Dismiss

Accused prays that the case against be dismissed on the ground that hisconstitutional right to speedy disposition of cases had allegedly been violated.Accused cites Sec. 16, Art. Ill of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy dispositionof their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

♦Sitting as Special Member per Administrative Order No. 284-2017 dated 18 August 2017.pp. 307-319. V'-.2 Id. at 330-335. ^ (y

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To buttress his arguments, accused invokes the cases of LuzAlmeda v. Officeof the Ombudsman (Mindanao), et al? and Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan,^

In Almeda, it was held that a person's right to speedy disposition of casesincludes within its contemplation the periods before, during and after trial; such asthe preliminary investigations and fact-finding investigations conducted by theOffice of the Ombudsman. It was further held that the objective of the right to speedytrial is to assure that an innocent person may be free firom the anxiety and expenseof litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortestpossible time, compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoeverlegitimate defense he may interpose.

On the other hand, in Coscolluela^ the Supreme Court discussed the reasonfor the protection of the right to speedy trial, to wit:

(T)o prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety andconcerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his defense willbe impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of adefendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately theevdnts of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, heis still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud ofanxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained, hisassociation is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.

Accused outlined the timeline of the pertinent events and facts of the case, asfollows:

Date Case Event Notes

June 3,2003 Special Allotment Release Order(SARO) No. ROVI-2003-028 was issuedby the Department of Budget andManagement (DBM) with the City ofIloilo as the Implementing Agency forfinancial support for the construction ofthe Multi-Purpose Building of the IloiloPress Club (IPC).

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July 1,2003 "Advise of SARO Issued" was released

by the DBM Regional Office VI of theDBM.

This document informs

Accused Trefias that SARO

No. ROVI-2003-028 is

chargeable firom the PriorityDevelopment AssistanceFund of Senator Loren

Legarda.

3 G.R. No. 204267,25 July 2016.'*714 Phil. 55-69(2013).

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July 7, 2003; andAugust 14,2003

Two (2) "Notice of Funding CheckIssued" were released by the DBM,respectively.

Bach document states that an

amount of Php250,000.00 hasbeen deposited as the cashrequirement for SARO No.ROVI-2003-028, totaling toPhp 500,000.00.

December 3,2003 Iloilo City Sangguniang Panlungsodissued Resolution No. 2003-1181.

This Resolution authorized

accused Trenas to enter into a

Memorandum of Agreement(MOA) with the IPC.

December 17,2003

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Iloilo City Sangguniang Panlungsodissued Resolution No. 2003-1264.

This Resolution confirmed the

MOA between the Iloilo CityGovernment and IPC for the

implementation as financialassistance for the construction

of the IPC Multi-Purposebuilding.

December 30,2003 Disbursement Voucher No. 300-03-12-

614 covering the financial assistance tothe IPC was issued.

November 12,2012

Private complainant Atty. Raul T.Gonzales, Jr. filed a complaint againstAccused Trefias before the Office of the

Ombudsman.

Docketed as Raul T.

Gonzales, Jr., et al. vs. Trefiasfor Fact-Finding InvestigationasFF-V-13-0224.

May 28,2015

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The Field Investigation Office of theOmbudsman, as a nominal complainant,filed a formal Affidavit complaintagainst Accused Trenas.

It took the Office of the

Ombudsman a total of 2 vears.

6 months and 16 davs to finish

its Fact-Finding Investigationand to formally chargeAccused Trefias.

July 3,2015 Accused Trenas sent letters requestingfor documents relating to the PDAF ofSenator Legarda to the following offices:

1. Iloilo City Assessor2. Iloilo City Legal Office3. Commission on Audit through

the Iloilo City Auditor4. Iloilo City Treasurer5. Iloilo City Engineer6. Iloilo City Budget Officer7. Iloilo City Accountant8. Iloilo City Council

July 6,2015 Accused Trefias executed an affidavit of

merit stating that:

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1. Only a portion of the complaintof Atty. Raul T. Gonzales, Jr.was attached to the Ombudsman

FIO Complaint.

2. There is a need to the completecopy of the complaint of Atty.Raul T. Gonzales for accused

Trenas to be able to intelligentlyand competently defend himselfagainst the charges made by theOmbudsman FIO.

July?, 2015 Accused Trenas through counsel filed anUrgent Motion for Extension of Time toFile Counter-Affidavit

Accused Trefias requested thathe be given a complete copyof the complaint of Atty. RaulT. Gonzales, Jr. so that he canprepare a competent and anintelligible defense

August 10,2015 Accused Trefias filed his Coimter-

Affidavit

Accused Trefias aside from

filing his counter-affidavit, heinsisted in this Manifestation

that he has not yet received acomplete copy of thecomplaint of Atty. Raul T.Gonzales, Jr.

February 29,2016 The Office of the Ombudsman resolved

to charge Accused Trefias for allegedlyviolating Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019.

This is notwithstanding thefact that the FIO did not

furnish Accused Trenas with a

complete copy of thecomplaint affidavit of Raul T.Gonzales, Jr.

August 14,'2016 Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Moralesapproved the Resolution dated February29,2016.

September 9,2016 The undersigned counsel received a copyof the Resolution dated February 29,2016.

September 14,2016 Accused Trenas filed a Motion for

Reconsideration.

October 14,2016 Accused Trefias filed a SupplementalMotion for Reconsideration.

May 8,2017 The Office of the Ombudsman denied

the Motion for Reconsideration and

Supplemental Motion forreconsideration in an Order on said date.

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July 21,2017 Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Moralesapproved the Order dated May 8,2017.

November 7,2017 The Office of the Special Prosecutorfiled an Information against AccusedTrenas.

A total of 4 vears. 11 months

and 26 davs have passedbetween the time that the

Complaint was purportedlyfiled by Atty. Raul T.Gonzales, Jr. and the filing ofthe Information againstAccused Trenas.

All told, 13 years, 11 monthsand 4 days have passedbetween Resolution No. 2003-

1264 confirming theexecution of the MOA

between IPG and the Iloilo

City Government and thefiling of the Information.

Accused claims that almost 14 years had elapsed fi*om the passing of thesubject Resolution before an Information was filed in Court, and that it took theOmbudsman almost five years to terminate the fact-finding investigation andpreliminary investigation. He adds that the prosecution gave no reason as to thecause of the delay of five years. He also cannot be faulted for any alleged failure toassert the right to speedy disposition since, it has long been decided that it is not theduty of the respondent to follow-up on the prosecution of their case.

Finally, accused alleges that the passage of time may have affected therecollection of the witnesses that may be presented and the documents that wouldaid his defense may have already been lost.

Prosecution's Opposition

In its Opposition, the prosecution counters that there can be no inordinatedelay when the period in question is but a product of mathematical imprecision anda mis-invocation of jurisprudence.

The prosecution avers that the timeline presented by accused is misleading.The supposed inordinate delay was reckoned firom the date of issuance of S ARC No.ROVI-2003-028 on 3 June 2003 or the date of the issuance of Iloilo SangguniangPanlalawigan Resolution 2003-1264 on 17 December 2003. However, at that time,there was no investigation to speak of where inordinate delay may be reckoned from.

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It further contends that the period to be considered in counting the length oftime to establish inordinate delay should instead be reckoned from the date of thefiling of the last pleading, which was on 10 August 2015 up to the issuance of theOmbudsman Resolution on 14 August 2016.

The prosecution claims that accused has filed an extension of ten days from 6July 2015 within which to file his counter-affidavit. However, his counter-affidavitwas only filed on 11 August 2015. Any perceived delay was with the participationof accused.

The prosecution cites the following cases to show what inordinate delaymeans: Torres v. Sandiganbayan^ - it took the Ombudsman 16 years before findingprobable cause against the accused; Almeda v. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao)and People^ - the case took more than 11 long years to resolve; People v.Sandiganbayan^ - the Supreme Court held that the Ombudsman dillydallied forabout six (6) years; and in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan^ - the delay of close to three yearswas held to be not reasonable, since the case involves only failure of the filing of aStatement of Assets and Liabilities, and therefore did not necessitate a gruelingscrutiny of evidence.

Moreover, accused has already been arraigned and thereafter soughtaffirmative relief from the Court to admit his Supplement to the Pre-trial Brief dated18 December 2017. Therefore, the filing of the instant motion to dismiss was alreadytoo late.

Accused's Motion for leave of court

TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION

In his motion, accused prays for leave of court to allow him to file hissupplemental motion to dismiss.

Accused avers that the allegations and discussions in the Motion to Dismissare repleaded, re-affirmed, and re-alleged, in the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss.Accused further alleges that pursuant to Sec. 6 Rule 10 of the Rules of Court,^ thecourt may permit the filing of a supplemental pleading upon reasonable notice andupon just terms. Also, the filing of Ae Supplemental Motion to Dismiss is not amongthose prohibited under AM No. 15-06-10-SC.

5 G.R. Nos. 221562-69,5 October 2016.® Supra note 3.'723 Phil. 444-494(2013).8 242 Phil. 563-577(1988).^ Section 6. Supplemental pleadings. — Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon suchterms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events whichhave happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The adverse party may plead thereto withinten (10) days from notice of the order admitting the supplemental pleading. »

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Our Ruling

We deny the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion for Leave of Court to FileSupplemental Motion for lack of merit.

A, On the Motion to Dismiss

Art. Ill, Sec. 16 of the Constitution guarantees that all persons shall have theright to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, oradministrative bodies.

It bears stressing that although the Constitution guarantees the right to thespeedy disposition of cases, such speedy disposition is a flexible concept. A meremathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Therefore, particularregard must be given to the facts and circumstances surrounding each case.^^ Thisright is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious,capricious, and oppressive delays.

In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan,^^ the Supreme Court emphasized that:

The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of thecase against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holdingcriminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to preventdelays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed withreasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and aspeedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended byvexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not anaccused has been denied such right is not susceptible by precise qualification.The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily bea flexible concept, (emphasis supplied)

Recently, in Remulla v. Sandiganbayan and MaliksiJ"^ the Supreme Court intackling the issue on how to determine if there is inordinate delay, made thispronouncement:

The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like tlie right to a speedy trial, isdeemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious,and oppressive delays; or when xmjustified postponements of the trial are askedfor and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of timeis allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable isthe balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his rightto a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which theconduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed.

Ombudsman v. Jurado, 583 Phil. 132-157 (2008)." Almeda v. Ombudsman^ G.R. No. 204267,25 July 2016.

Supra note 10. ." 484 Phil. 899-927 (2004).

Remulla v. Sandiganbayan (SecondDivision), G.R. No. 218040, 17 April 2017.

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More th^ a decade after the 1972 leading U.S. case of Barker v.Wingo was promulgated, this Court, in Martin v. Ver, began adopting the"balancing test" to determine whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial and aspeedy disposition of cases has been violated. As this test necessarily compels thecourts to approach such cases on an ad hoc basis, the conduct of both theprosecution and defendant are weighed apropos the four-fold factors, to wit: (1)length of the delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to defendant resulting from the delay. Noneof these elements, however, is either a necessary or sufficient condition; they arerelated and must be considered together with other relevant circumstances. Thesefactors have no talismanic qualities as courts must still engage in a difficult andsensitive balancing process.

Thus, in determining whether the right to speedy disposition has been violated,these factors may be considered and balanced as follows: (1) the length of the delay;(2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by theaccused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.

Based on the factors mentioned, we will now examine the instant case indetermining whether there was inordinate delay:

I. Length of Delay

There was no lengthy delay inthe preliminary investigation

In the instant case, record shows that the subject transaction took placesometime in December 2003 to January 2004.^^ However, the complaint of Atty.Raul T. Gonzales, Jr. (Gonzales), where this case had its genesis, was filed againstthe accused only on November 12,2012 or almost nine (9) years after the transactiontook place. Thereafter, a fact-finding investigation was conducted.

After the termination of the fact-finding investigation, the Field InvestigationOffice (FIG) of the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Affidavit-Complaint againstaccused on 28 May 2015, which implied that there was a need to conduct apreliminary investigation. It was at this point in time where accused became awareof the case against him.

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Thereafter, accused filed his counter-affidavit on 10 August 2015. In theResolution dated 29 February 2016, the Ombudsman found probable cause againstaccused. The said Resolution was approved by Ombudsman Conchita CarpioMorales (Ombudsman) on 17 August 2016. Accused filed a motion forreconsideration on 14 September 2016 and a supplemental motion forreconsideration on 14 October 2016. In the Order dated 8 May 2017, the

Rollo^ Vol. 1, p. 1 (Information dated 9 October 2017).

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Ombudsman denied accused's motion for reconsideration and supplemental motionfor reconsideration. The said Order was approved by the Ombudsman on 21 July2017. Finally, the Information was filed with this Court on 7 November 2017.

It should be noted that what the Constitution protects is the right to speedydisposition of the cases. This contemplates a situation where a case should havealready been filed against a respondent/accused. Thus, the period of almost nineyears, that is, fi*om the date of the commission of the offense in December 2003 orJanuary 2004 until the filing of the complaint of Gonzales on 12 November 2012should not have been included in the computation for purposes of alleging that therewas inordinate delay.

We point out that accused was charged with violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA No.3019, which prescribes in fifteen years. Record shows that the case against accusedwas initiated within the prescriptive period.

Also, the period fi*om the filing of the complaint of Gonzales on 12 November2012 until the filing of the affidavit-complaint by the FIO for preliminaryinvestigation on 28 May 2015, or the period spent in the fact-finding investigation,cannot be included in the computation since accused was not yet aware of thecomplaint filed against him.

It bears to stress that the fact-finding investigation entailed a "no contactpolicy" such that it was conducted without yet the appearance of the respondents,but merely through the issuance of subpoena to various agencies. It is simply a casebuild-up process to determine whether or not a complaint should proceed topreliminary investigation. Thus, the subject of the investigation is not yet in jeopardyof being held for trial and punishment. Prior to the report and recommendation ofthe fact-finding investigator that accused be criminally charged, he was neitherinvestigated nor charged.

Therefore, it was only on 28 May 2015 when the complaint-affidavit was filedthat necessitated the conduct of a preliminary investigation. It was only whenaccused was subsequently directed to submit his counter-affidavit that the formalpreliminary investigation began. Prior thereto, any delay fi*om the filing of thecomplaint would have no effect; given the fact that accused was not formally awareof the existence of the case against him or even if he was aware, accused could nothave known of the action that was undertaken by the Ombudsman on the outcomeof the case build-up.

B.P. Big. 195 amending RA No. 3019.SECTION 4. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 3019 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 11. Prescription of offenses. — All offenses punishable under this Act shall prescribe in fifteen years."Supra Note 10.

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Accordingly, this Court only considers the period from the filing of theaffidavit-complaint by the FIO for purposes of preliminary investigation on 28 May2015 until the filing of the Information in Court on 7 November 2017 for purposesof evaluating whether there was inordinate delay. Thus, only two (2) years and six(6) months had lapsed. This period is not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive.

Nevertheless, even if accused would argue that the period spent for the fact-finding investigation be included in the computation, and We would-therefore startcounting from the filing of the complaint by Gonzales on 12 November 2012 untilthe filing of the Information with this Court on 7 November 2017, that would onlymake a total of almost five years or, according to accused, four (4) years, 11 monthsand 26 days. This period is not capricious, oppressive and vexatious to accused.

In several cases involving the issue of speedy disposition, the Court takes noteof the period of delay. In AlmedaJ^ the preliminary investigation was completedafter 10 years; in CoscolluelaJ^ where the preliminary investigation was terminatedafter six years, in Torres v. Sandiganbayan (First Division) the preliminaryinvestigation was completed after 10 years; in Remulla v. Sandiganbayan^^ the fact-finding lasted for three years and the preliminary investigation lasted for six years',in Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsmanf^ it took the Ombudsman six years to terminatethe preliminary investigation; and in Roque v. Ombudsman, the preliminaryinvestigation was terminated after six years.

In Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,^^ the preliminary investigation was completedafter 3 years but the Supreme Court held that the period was inordinate not becauseof the delay but because of the finding that "political motivations played a vital rolein activating and propelling the prosecutorial process" and further held that "delayof close to three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable in the light of thecircumstances obtaining in the case at bar."

Comp^ed to the above cited cases, the period spent for the preliminaryinvestigation in determining probable cause against accused Trenas was not lengthyand/or capricious, oppressive and vexatious.

II. Reason for the delay

There was justifiable reasonfor the alleged delay

" Supra note 3.Supra note 4.

2° G.R. Nos. 221562-69,5 October 2016.G.R. No. 218040,17 April 2017.

22 335 Phil. 766-772 (1997). *'

2''242 Phil. 563 (1988). . Y23366 Phil. 568,576-577 (1999).

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The length of delay is only one of the factors to be considered in determiningwhether the right of accused to speedy disposition has been violated. It is also worthyto examine the reason or justification for the alleged delay.

Record shows that in the course of the fact-finding investigation, pertinentdocuments on the subject transaction cannot be located. In the Resolution of theOmbudsman, it even stated that "(t)he project remains a mystery for it could not beaccounted for due to the absence of the Accomplishment Report and Certificate ofCompletion arid Acceptance as stated by CCA. That the IPC did not secure Buildingand Occupancy permits casts further doubt on the actual implementation of theproject."^^ Thus, correspondences were sent to different government agenciesconcerned to secure documents, which necessarily consumed a considerable amountof time.

In addition, when accused was required to file his Counter-Affidavit throughthe 26 June 2015 Order by the Ombudsman,^^ he instead filed a motion for extension,which lengthened the process. The accused filed his Counter-affidavit only on 11August 2015.

The Supreme Court also recognized the number of cases being handled by theOmbudsman. In Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan, it was held that the Court takesjudicial notice of the fact that the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsmanencourages individuals who clamor for efficient government service to lodge freelytheir complaints against alleged wrongdoing of government personnel. As a result,thereof, a steady stream of cases is being filed with the Ombudsman. Consequently,disposition of those cases would take some time.^^

III. ASSERTION BY ACCUSED OF

fflS RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION

Accused's assertion or non-assertion

of his right to speedy disposition isinconsequential

This Court is of the view that accused need not irivoke his right to speedy trialfollowing the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in People v. Sandiganbayan^^,citing Barker v. Wingo, to wit:

Being the respondents in the preliminary investigation proceedings, itwas not the petitioners' duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case.

Rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 12 (Resolution of the Ombudsman dated 29 Februaiy 2016),2«iJo//o,Vol.5,p.8.Mendoza-Ong V. Sandiganbayan, 483 Phil. 451-459 (2004).People V. Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division), G.R. Nos. 199151-56,25 July 2016 /■

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Conversely, it was the Office of the Ombudsman's responsibility to expedite thesame within the boimds of reasonable timeliness in view of its mandate to

promptly act on all complaints lodged before it. As pronounced in the caseof Barker V. Wingo.

A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has thatduty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with dueprocess.

IV. Prejudice to the Accused

There is no substantial prejudiceon the accpsed from the allegedviolation of his right to speedy trial

As for the prejudice caused by the alleged delay, accused claims that thepassage of time may affect the recollection of the witnesses he may present to rebutthe charges against him. He also claims that some of the documents may have beenlost due to the calamities that struck the City of Iloilo.

However, other than his bare allegations, there is no showing that accusedindeed suffered undue prejudice caused by the alleged delay. It is settled that theclaim of impairment of defense because of delay must be specific and not by mereconjecture. Vague assertions of faded memory will not suffice. Failure to claim thatparticular evidence had been lost or had disappeared defeats speedy trial claim.^^

Accused's claim of prejudice is, therefore, without basis.

Applying the balancing test, the Supreme Court in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayanstated that

While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is that itshould be orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be definitely measuredhow long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift, butdeliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances. Itsecures the rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice.Also, it must be borne in mind that the ri^ts given to the accused by theConstitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are togive meaning to that intent.^® (Italics supplied.)

And while the right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed to him by theConstitution, the same shall not be utilized to deprive the State of a reasonableopportunity of fairly indicting criminals. A party's individual rights should not workagainst and preclude the people's equally important right to public justice.^^

29 Bps. Uy V. Adriano, 536 Phil. 457-510 (2006). / , rJ20 Supra note rs. / I2* Guiani v. Sandiganbcyan, 435 Phil. 467-481 (2002).

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In sum, there is nothing in the records that would show that the period spentin the preliminary investigation was characterized by delay that was vexatious,capricious or oppressive. There was no inordinate delay and thus, the assertion byaccused of the alleged violation of his right to speedy disposition of the case againsthim must necessarily fail.

B. Motion for Leave of Court to File Supplemental Motion

As regards accused's Motion for Leave of Court to File a SupplementalMotion (To The Motion to Dismiss dated 14 February 2018), this Court holds thatits filing is procedurally infirm.

Sec; 6, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 6. Supplemental pleadings. — Upon motion of a party the courtmay, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve asupplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events whichhave happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Theadverse party may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the orderadmitting the supplemental pleading, (emphasis supplied)

While a supplemental pleading is meant to supply deficiencies in aid of theoriginal pleading,^^ the Rule provides that it must state transactions, occurrences orevents that took place since the time the pleading sought to be supplemented wasfiled.^^

In the instant motion for leave, the requirements under Sec. 6 of Rule 10 werenot met. Accused merely alleged in his motion that the allegations and discussionsin his earlier Motion to Dismiss are re-pleaded, re-affirmed, and re-alleged in theSupplemental Motion to Dismiss. These allegations are far from being compliant tothe requirement of the mentioned rule and thus, must be denied.

Even if this Court brushes aside the procedural technicalities of the rules andconsider the supplemental motion in its substantive allegations, we still find itinadequate to salvage the motion it seeks to supplement. A perusal of thesupplemental motion reveals that it only added jurisprudential basis to accusedsupplications. However, we still maintain that there was no inordinate delay on thepart of the Ombudsman.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused Geronimo BuenaventuraP. Trenas' "MOTION TO DISMISS" and "MOTION FOR LEAVE OF COURT

TO FILE A SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION (To the Motion To Dismiss Dated 14February 2018)" are DENIED for lack of merit.

Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil. 530-557 (2000).De Rama v. Court of Appeals, 405 Phil. 531 -556 (2001).

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SO ORDERED.

GOMEZrESTOESTA, J. Chairperson

TRESPESES, J.

JACINTO,J.

seventh division -...

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