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    Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

    Issues Paper Series

    Shaping Urban Futures:Challenges to Governing

    and Managing Afghan Cities

    Jo Beall and Daniel Esser

    Funding for this study wasprovided by the World Bank. March 2005

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    2005 Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). All rights reserved. Thisissues paper was prepared by independent consultants with no previous involvement in theactivities evaluated. The views and opinions expressed in this report do not necessarily reflectthe views of AREU.

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    About the Authors

    Dr. Jo Beall is a reader in development studies at the Development Studies Institute of theLondon School of Economics and Political Science. She is a development policy and managementspecialist, with expertise on urban social development and urban governance. Her otherinterests include gender, social policy and international development, social exclusion andlocal responses to crisis and conflict. Dr. Beall has conducted extensive research in southernAfrica and South Asia and has advised and consulted for a range of international developmentagencies, national governments and non-governmental organisations. She is co-author of thebooks Uniting a Divided City: Governance and Social Exclusion in Johannesburg and FundingLocal Governance: Small Grants for Democracy and Development.

    Daniel Esser is a Ph.D. candidate and scholarship holder of the German National AcademicFoundation and the Economic and Social Research Council in the Development StudiesInstitute at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Previously, he was a Fellowof the Special Programme for Urban and Regional Studies in the Department of Urban Studies

    and Planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He also has worked as a consultantand trainer for the International Labour Organization and CARE International, as well as inthe private sector. He has published and presented papers on urban governance, violenceand forced migration in conflict cities, local economic development in Asia and the applicationof ethics in strategic management.

    About the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

    (AREU)The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) is an independent research organisationthat conducts and facilitates action-oriented research and learning that informs and influencespolicy and practice. AREU also actively promotes a culture of research and learning bystrengthening analytical capacity in Afghanistan and by creating opportunities for analysisand debate. Fundamental to AREUs vision is that its work should improve Afghan lives. AREUwas established by the assistance community working in Afghanistan and has a board ofdirectors with representation from donors, UN and multilateral organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

    Current funding for AREU is provided by the European Commission (EC), the United NationsAssistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the UK Department for International Development(DFID), the World Bank, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),Stichtung Vluchteling, and the governments of Sweden, Switzerland and Denmark. Fundingfor this study was provided by the World Bank.

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    Appendix C: Interview Guide for Household-Level Informants............................65

    Appendix D: Distribution and Location of Household-Level Interviews .................68

    Abbreviations and Acronyms.......................................................................70

    Figures, Boxes and Tables

    Figure 1. Methodology: triangulation of primary and secondary data collection.............9

    Box 1. Vulnerability on the urban periphery: examples from Herat District 9 ...........15

    Box 2. An example of intra-district inequalities: Hazaras in Mazar District 10 ..........31

    Box 3. Insecurity of tenure among the Kuchis of Shadayee Refugee Camp...............40

    Box 4. Insecurity of tenure on the part of vulnerable family members ...................42

    Box 5. Post-conflict land management: lessons from Kosovo and Timor-Leste ..........43

    Box 6. Connecting the "urban village": Chahar Asyab and Shawaki in Kabul'sDistrict Seven..............................................................................47

    Table 1. Areas of concern and sequencing of recommendations...............................3

    Table 2. Formal municipal relations in Afghanistan ............................................22

    Table 3. Sample responsibilities of municipalities ..............................................23

    Table 4. Current NRC land dispute cases in Kabul ..............................................41

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    Map of Afghanistan

    Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) i

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    gozar neighbourhoodjihad holy warkalantar elder

    Kuchis nomadic peopleloya jirga grand council similar to shuras, or consultative assembliesmujaheddin fighters in the jihad, or holy warqanoon madari civil lawrawaj customary lawsafayi municipal service charge and property taxSharia/Shariat Islamic jurisprudencesharwali wolayat provincial municipalityshura local/community counciltashkeel staffing establishment or list of sanctioned postswakil-e gozar (wakil) neighbourhood representative

    wasita personal relationships through which political/other favours maybe obtained

    Glossary of Dari terms

    Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)ii

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    Afghanistan is facing tremendous challenges

    on its way to peace, democracy and

    prosperity. Its fast-growing and vibrant cities,

    which host roughly a quarter of the countrys

    population, pose particular development

    problems but also carry significant potential

    for advancing social and economic well-being

    if they are diligently managed and inclusively

    governed. Against a background discussion

    of widespread urban vulnerability inAfghanistan, this paper explores the critical

    challenges for urban governance and urban

    management. The analysis draws on research

    conducted in three Afghan cities the capitalcity, Kabul, in the central east; Herat City

    near the western border with Iran; and Mazar-

    i-Sharif, close to the northwestern borderwith Uzbekistan as well as on interviews

    with informants from Afghan ministries,

    municipalities, international development

    agencies and local and international non-

    governmental organisations (NGOs) involved

    in urban programmes and projects.

    The overall analysis suggests that there is anacute need for a more coordinated approach

    to urban management and greater focus on

    urban governance. Both require flexible

    approaches as well as enhanced cooperation

    between government departments as well as

    between those departments and cityresidents. This is particularly critical in the

    context of land administration and housing.

    Insecurity and inaccessibility of tenure are

    currently very important causes of urbanvulnerability. Housing shortages and high

    land prices, strict building standards and

    regulations deriving from the days of master

    planning, as wel l as burdensome

    administrative procedures based on ideal

    norms rather than the realities of local

    circumstances have made a rise in informal

    construction inevitable. Informal settlements

    now account for the larger part of houses in

    Executive Summary

    Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 1

    Shaping Urban Futures: Challenges to Governing and Managing Afghan Cities

    Afghanistans urban centres. High rents,

    diminished housing stock and the influx of

    returnees, internally displaced people and

    expatriate development workers all

    exacerbate the problem. The absence of an

    effective and coherent land management

    system in growing urban centres has provided

    opportunities for illicit dealings, whether by

    politicians, government officials, private

    militias or unscrupulous land developers.

    Vast service delivery backlogs exist, alongside

    gaps between serviced and unserviced

    households and areas. These need to beurgently closed, with a particular focus on

    the interconnection between water supply,

    sanitation and solid waste management but

    also electricity, education and health

    facilities. Community management of informal

    service provision needs to be acknowledged

    and the potential of community participation

    strengthened to ensure greater involvement

    of and responsiveness to local demand and

    to ensure better downward accountability,

    particularly in the face of local-levelcorruption. Furthermore, government

    institutions need to increase their capacity

    to work with civil society organisations and

    to coordinate and regulate initiatives by non-

    governmental actors. However, cooperation

    with municipal employees and coordination

    with government and other actors is essential

    not only for urban community development

    but citywide development strategies as well.

    When this works well, NGOs can be a linchpinin urban management, helping to combat

    corruption, promoting information exchange

    and communication and fostering local

    empowerment in urban governance.

    The urgency of addressing urban vulnerability

    is underscored by the alarming degree of

    horizontal social disintegration in cities. This

    is evidenced by fragile networks and lack of

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    Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)2

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    trust, conditions that make issue-basedgrassroots level collective action difficult.This works against citizen involvement inurban management. Similarly, local structuresof representation vary in terms of their

    effectiveness and the extent to which theyare representative, particularly of womenand younger people. Lastly, the researchsuggests that there is still much to be donebefore Afghan ownership of current urbanreform processes is achieved.

    Policy implications in brief

    Local policymakers and officials clearly facea difficult challenge to change both their

    mindsets and practices in a fast changingcontext and within a system where for many,skills are outdated and where investmentcomes primarily from sources other thangovernment. Government departmentsresponsible for urban development need toknow the amount of financial support theycan expect and have at their discretion andwhich areas and services will be prioritisedby funders and to be consulted in both. Thissuggests in turn increasing the degree of

    donor coordination and of the urban sectormore generally. A wider range of skillsassociated with urban planning andmanagement are also required in a contextwhere the future of urban development inAfghanistan is likely to rest less with a narrowperspective on urban design and more withstrategic urban management, driven by multi-sector partnerships involving not onlygovernment and the private sector but alsorepresentatives of communities and donors.

    This can be addressed immediately in thecontext of area-based urban developmentand in the medium and longer term throughrelated capacity building efforts that createthe basis for sustainable urban managementcapacity and inclusive and accountable urbangovernance.

    Achieving effective urban management inAfghanistan means balancing and prioritising

    limited resources against overwhelming needs.This is largely a political process and onethat requires attention to re-building trustin the mechanisms and structures of urbangovernance. Above all, channels of

    communication between governmentagencies, international and bilateral donors,and agents and organisations of civil societyneed to be reviewed and improved. It isimportant to work with what exists, as iteasier to destroy than to build institutions.Thus a fine balance needs to be struckbetween challenging and capitalising onexisting organisations and systems of delivery

    and accountability. Towards this end, thevisibility and responsiveness of government-

    administered services needs to bestrengthened; grassroots level collectiveaction needs to be fostered; andinstitutionalised platforms need to be

    developed to increase the voice and leverageof citizens.

    Recommendations

    Key recommendations brought forward onthe basis of this comparative analysis have

    been divided into city-specific priorities andmore holistic longitudinal measures.

    In Kabul, security of tenure should begiven first priority. A second key concernis to clarify the relationship betweenKabul Municipality and the Ministry ofUrban Development and Housing (MUDH)and to enhance communication andcoordination between them.

    In Mazar, large sections of the city waitto be connected to water and seweragesystems and rely on private generatorsfor energy. Furthermore, employment

    generation is critical in a provincial capitalwhere years of conflict saw thedecimation of industrial production andin a province where poppy production isa profitable alternative to limited legaleconomic opportunities.

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    Area ofConcern

    Immediate Measures IntermediateApproaches

    Forward-lookingStrategies

    Planning (Local) Work with and build onexisting master planning skills(but not the master plan);encourage risk-taking behaviour.

    (National) Introduceparticipatory and collaborativeplanning through a learning bydoing approach in the contextof project development/NUP.

    (National) Ensure all urbanprojects, programmes and plansare harmonised within thecontext of the NUP, guided bya strategic urban policyframework.

    SkillsDevelopment

    (Provincial/Inter-city) Worktowards updating practice andcreating experience throughexisting area-baseddevelopment programmes.

    (Provincial/Inter-city) Promoteeducational visits to othercountries and demonstrationprojects.

    (Provincial/Inter-city) Developskills in working with informalityin housing, infrastructure andservice provision in the contextof projects and programmes.

    (Supranational) Ensureinvestment in skilled staff,equipment, advisors to MUDHand other ministries.

    (National) Integrate on-the-jobcapability enhancement withcurriculum development inuniversities and technicalcolleges, with a focus on urbanplanning and management butwhere relevant, still locatedwithin existing architecture/engineering faculties.

    Access toHousing

    (Local) Work towards immediatesecurity of tenure for vulnerable

    urban dwellers, alongside largerland titling exercises.

    (Local) Begin to harmoniseinformal security of tenure

    measures at the neighbourhoodlevel or in the context ofprojects with formal land titlingexercises.

    (Local) Introduce and monitorinfringements or violation of

    land titles and security of tenurewithin an ongoing process ofland titling.

    Cooperation (Provincial/Inter-city) Fosterurban partnerships throughissue-based workshops.

    (Provincial/Inter-city) Conductcapacity-building workshops oncitywide imperatives.

    (Provincial/Inter-city) Developintegrated area-based projectsinvolving multi-sector partnersand with tangible skillsdevelopment and capabilitybuilding dimensions.

    (Provincial/Inter-city) Extendintegrated area-based projectapproaches to citywidedevelopment strategies withlocal authorities coordinating awider array of urbandevelopment partners.

    National UrbanProgramme(NUP)Implementation

    (Provincial/Inter-city) Createcommitment to and ownershipof the NUP through facilitateddiscussion, workshops and

    application to real-lifeproblems.

    (National) Operationalise theNUP through concreteinterventions; implementthrough government

    departments with clearmilestones and performancebenchmarks.

    (National) Work towards asustainable resource base forthe implementation of the NUPin all provincial centres; ensure

    institutionalisation ofperformance improvement.

    Citizen Dialogue (Local) Set in placeorganisational mechanisms formore extensive involvement oflocal representatives.

    (National) Ensure governmentstaff awareness of IndependentAdministrative Reform and CivilService Commission.

    (Local) Create structures forregular consultation/communication with urbandwellers about priorities andbudgets.

    (Local) Strengthen andinstitutionalise structures forregular consultation/communication betweengovernment and urban dwellers.

    (National) Strengthen citizensability to engage proactivelywith NUP/ planning processesthrough continuous civiceducation.

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    Table 1. Areas of concern and sequencing of recommendations

    Conversely, in Herata hard look needsto be taken at the dominance of privatised(re)construction and the potentialexclusion of minorities and the lowestincome echelons from improvements in

    infrastructure, services and economicgrowth. The implication here is the needfor a more cautious and inclusive urbandevelopment strategy.

    In addition to city-specific issues, a set ofcohesive and sequenced recommendationsapply across all large urban centres inAfghanistan. Actions are divided intoimmediate measures, intermediate

    approaches and forward-looking strategies.

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    Area ofConcern

    Immediate Measures IntermediateApproaches

    Forward-lookingStrategies

    Corruption (National) Build on publicawareness of corruption bysetting up an effective urbanmonitoring group.

    (National) Assessgrowth/effectiveness of theurban monitoring group oncorruption via appraisals andconsultation with agencies.

    (National) Enforce anti-corruption measures throughsufficient funding, consultationand monitoring accountabilityto citizens.

    Coordination (Supranational) Work to avoidthe worst excesses of politicisedfunding of infrastructure andservices by continuing toprioritise and institutionaliseproper consultation andcoordination.

    (Supranational) Strengthen thecoordinating function of MUDH;clarify the role of the MUDH vis-a-vis municipalities, especiallyin Kabul; ensure compatibilityof NUP implementation withlocal priorities, focusing onurban vulnerability.

    (National) Streamline MUDH andmonitor the effectiveness ofnew structures through peerreviews and citizen satisfactionsurveys.

    RevenueGeneration

    (Supranational) Strengthenrevenue generation andcollection through the Ministryof Finance.

    (Provincial/Inter-city)Encourage local revenuegeneration activities on the partof municipalities to foster fiscalsustainability.

    (National) Extend local revenuegeneration activities for someenhanced fiscal autonomy onthe part of municipalities whileensuring returns to centralgovernment and cohesion withnational policies throughcoordination by a streamlined

    MUDH.

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    Urban centres are increasingly characterised

    by rising poverty, vulnerability, environmentalhazards and health risks. This gives rise toinsecurity and lack of safety on the part ofurban dwellers. These problems areexacerbated in post-war contexts. In conflictcities, urban citizens are often doubtful ofthe ability of municipalities and governmentsto provide them with a safe, secure andaffordable living and working environment.The disenchantment and exclusion of urbanresidents, particularly the most vulnerableamong them, is often reinforced byinefficiency and corruption. For example, inconflict situations tight control over accessto resources and decision-making by minorityelites can be greater. This issues paper focuseson urban vulnerability in Afghanistan, exploredin the context of challenges to urban

    management and governance. Research for

    this study was conducted across three cities.They included the capital city, Kabul, as wellas two provincial capitals: Herat City, closeto the Iranian border to the west and Mazar-i-Sharif to the north, close to the border withUzbekistan.1 Urban vulnerability incontemporary Afghanistan derives above allfrom the physical legacy of war. This includesdestruction of infrastructure and housing andlack of investment in services. Also evidentis the social legacy of war in cities, involvingthe displacement of people, fragmentationof support and social networks, as well asthe exclusion of particular groups of peoplefrom full participation in urban life. Urbanvulnerability is framed by a broad institutionallandscape that embraces not only governmentinstitutions, such as municipalities and line

    1. Introduction and Background

    PhotoD

    anielEsser

    1 Originally a southern city was also to be included, either Kandahar or Jalalabad. However, the deteriorating securitysituation in the run up to the 2004 presidential elections, during which time the field research was conducted, made thisimpossible.

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    ministries concerned with urban issues, butalso what are termed socially embeddedinstitutions such as households, community-level organisations, as well as customaryinstitutions such as the shura and loya jirga.Important as well are wider networks andinterest groups that influence or areinfluenced by urban processes and outcomes,such as international development agenciesand non-governmental organisations (NGOs)involved in the urban sphere, profiled in thisreport.

    Against this background, this paper analysesthe critical challenges for urban managementin Afghanistan. Important among the issuesto be tackled is poor access to urban land

    and insecurity of tenure, experienced by awide spectrum of urban residents. Anotherchallenge is the need to move beyond datedforms of master planning towards strategicdevelopment at the city level. This is renderedurgent by service backlogs and the demandson city management posed by the growth ofinformal and new unserviced areas in mosturban centres. However, urban managementis not simply a technical exercise and thechallenge of accountability is paramountacross all these areas.

    These management challenges can only berealistically and effectively addressed in thecontext of improved urban governance, withthe latter understood as statesocietyrelations at the city level. The challenge ofurban governance has two sides. The first isto create a sense of urban citizenship. Inother words, there is a challenge to createamong urban dwellers a sense of belongingin and responsibility towards the city and theurban environment. This is only possible if

    all people feel as if they have a stake andvoice in urban policy and planning or thatthey can hold local government to account.The second challenge of urban governanceis to build accountable and responsive

    government both within cities and withinthose higher tiers of government responsiblefor urban development. The report seeks toidentify opportunities and constraints forpursuing this agenda within Afghanistansurban centres. The paper concludes byidentifying some forward-looking strategiesfor addressing urban vulnerability andstrengthening and reforming institutions.

    1.1 Rationale and relevance

    In the most recent Human Development Index,Afghanistan was reported to have the secondlowest life expectancy in the world (43.1years), the second lowest adult literacy rate(36 percent), by far the highest infant and

    under-five mortality rate (165/257 per 1,000live births) and the second largest proportionof under-nourished people (70 percent). Thisstatus is among those countries not evenlisted in the main ranking due to an overallscarcity of data.2 Indeed, the absence ofreliable data and meaningful indicatorsconstitutes a real handicap in efforts tomonitor progress. In the past, poor socialindicators were seen as problems mainly ofthe countryside. Increasingly, however, social

    disadvantage and urban vulnerability arebeing recognised as key components ofAfghanistans contemporary experience. Inaddressing these issues a critical startingpoint must be the baseline data needed totrack urban recovery.

    While accurate statistics remain elusive, itis generally agreed that the urban populationhas increased dramatically since the fall ofthe Taliban, with the current urban populationof Afghanistan estimated to be between 5.6

    and 6.4 million, constituting from 23.3 to 30percent of the total population of thecountry.3 Urbanisation has been largelyprompted by refugees and internally displacedpersons (IDPs) returning to the cities. This

    2 UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). Human Development Report. 2003. Available online:http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003 (accessed on 25th March 2004); 339.

    3 The first figure derives from UNDESA (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs). World UrbanizationProspects: The 2003 Revision, Population Division 1. New York: UN. 2004, while the upper numbers were estimates providedby Government of Afghanistan (GoA). Securing Afghanistans Future. Urban Technical Annex. January 2004.

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    they do to reclaim their assets or to takeadvantage of the perceived benefits andlivelihood opportunities offered by urban life.Under such conditions it is misleading to thinkof Afghanistan only as a rural country.However, around 70 percent of urban dwellerslive in only six cities: Kabul, Kandahar, Herat,Mazar-i-Sharif, Jalalabad and Kunduz. Henceurbanisation is concentrated, which placestremendous pressure on urban land, shelterand services.4

    In Afghanistans cities urban infrastructurehas been under strain for some time due toservice backlogs in previously planned areasand the destruction wrought by decades ofwar. Political conflict also meant limited

    investment in infrastructure and services andled to deterioration in the urban environmentand housing stock. Together these factorsmean that informal dwellings now constitutethe bulk of Afghanistans urban housing stock.If ignored and if services are left unattended,the quality of life and human developmentof growing numbers of urban Afghans will beadversely affected. Ignoring informalsettlements can also have a wider impact oncity management. In the face of inefficientand unresponsive government departments

    people seek solutions for themselves. Whenthese relate to goods such as water supplyand sanitation, a level of coordination isnecessary for the good of the city at large,something that is usually absent when localdo-it-yourself approaches prevail.Moreover, when people lose their trust ingovernment and opt out of the responsibilitiesof citizenship, for example by not payingtaxes, this can adversely affect revenuegeneration and ultimately official deliverycapacity and potential.

    Afghanistan is moving from an immediatepost-war situation, in which interventionsaimed at relief and rehabil itationpredominate, towards a situation where afocus on reconstruction and development isincreasingly appropriate. The former Minister

    of Finance, Ashraf Ghani, said not long beforethe study was conducted that he did not wantpeople to talk any longer about post-conflictreconstruction but rather development.It is advisable in most war-torn regions,including Afghanistan, to see reconstructionand development taking place in a contextof conflict management rather than post-conflict given that factional and othertensions continue to prevail and that in anycase, development is necessarily a contestedand sometimes conflictual process as peoplenegotiate priorities and resource distribution.In this context it is important to addressurban issues alongside rural rehabilitationand development.

    Urban management is one of the twelvepillars of the National Development Plan ofthe Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.Increasingly the Afghan government is turningits attention to urban reconstruction anddevelopment and donors are beginning torespond to these challenges in a far moreconcerted manner. A critical focus is on thesupply of infrastructure. Important thoughthis is, unless urban management is effectiveand governance systems are sound,investments in physical development will not

    be sustainable or evenly spread. To this endit is important that clarity is achieved overthe functional responsibilities of differentlevels of government and governmentdepartments. This in turn necessarilyprefigures effective revenue generation andexpenditure at and for the local level, aswell as the implementation of evolvingpolicies, plans and practices that emerge outof the post-war political and developmentcontext.

    In Afghanistan as elsewhere, cities are hostto competing interests, many of whichcommand excessive power. As in any post-war context, such interests are inextricablylinked to the scramble for the spoils ofreconstruction, often at the expense ofweaker and more vulnerable urban dwellers.

    4 UNDESA, op cit.; Government of Afghanistan (GoA). National Priority Programmes the National Urban Programme. Kabul,May 2004. Available online: www.afghanistangov.org/npp (accessed on 12th August 2004).

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    5 See for example: ACF (Action Contre la Faim). Kabul Vulnerability Mapping. Kabul: ACF. January 2004; Alden Wily, L. LandRights in Crisis. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. March 2003; d'Hellencourt, N. et al. Preliminary Studyof Land Tenure Related Issues in Urban Afghanistan with Special Reference to Kabul City. Kabul: UN Habitat. March 2003;Grace, J. 100 Households in Kabul: A Study of Winter Vulnerability. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.August 2003; Hunte, P. Some Notes on the Livelihoods of the Urban Poor in Kabul, Afghanistan. Kabul: Afghanistan Researchand Evaluation Unit. February 2004; Schuette, S. Urban Vulnerability in Afghanistan: Case Studies from Three Cities. Kabul:Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. May 2004; Stigter, E. IDP families in Herat City, Afghanistan Displacementhistories and intra-household decision-making with regard to departure, stay and return. Forthcoming in InternationalMigration Review. 2004; World Bank. Poverty, vulnerability and social protection in Afghanistan. Washington, D.C.: HumanDevelopment Unit South Asia Region. May 2004 (draft).

    6 Nevertheless, this was ultimately a small study and data are illustrative and indicative rather than allowing for generalisation.7 The interview guide for household- and community-level interviews can be found in Appendix C.8 ACF, op cit.

    Critical to the present investigation and topost-war conflict management are theconditions, opportunities and challenges thatface ordinary urban citizens in Afghanistan.Also central to this analysis is how theinstitutions operating in and on cities payattention to including vulnerable urbandwellers in access to resources and decision-making.

    1.2 Study methodology

    The research for this study was built primarilyon qualitative data gathering techniques,notably structured and semi-structuredinterviews, observations and some focus groupdiscussions. This methodological approach

    was appropriate given the size of the study,which did not allow for investigation of theextent of urban issues, challenges andopportunities so much as their nature, aswell as how they were understood by differentgroups of urban actors. The research hasbeen situated and contextualised throughreference to and review of reports fromearlier studies, policy documents and one ortwo surveys.5 The authors were able tocapture the perspectives of a wide range ofrespondents and interlocutors from local and

    national government departments,international development agencies andadvisory organisations, local NGOs, as wellas urban residents and their representatives.Findings and perspectives from differentgroups of informants and across the threecities were systematically triangulated.These were integrated into the three keyarenas of investigation: urban governance,urban management and vulnerability, asrepresented in Figure 1.6

    A total of 84 semi-structured interviews wereconducted with informants from Afghanministries, municipalities, internationaldevelopment agencies and local andinternational NGOs involved in urban

    programmes and projects. Informants wereidentified through initial advice and a processof snowball sampling. The final interviewguide is provided in Appendix A, while thecomplete list of respondents is provided inAppendix B. Semi-structured interviews werealso employed when talking to members ofurban households and communities acrossKabul, Mazar and Herat.7 Every effort wasmade to ensure the voices of both men andwomen were heard as well as those of boththe elders and younger members of a

    particular community. Respondents wereasked to describe their personal situationand the challenges they faced that wereassociated with urban life. These includedmovement and mobility, livelihoods andincome generation, access to housing andservices, security and safety, the nature ofsocial networks and social cohesion, contactwith governmental and municipal andinstitutions, and local representation...........

    Choice of neighbourhoods was deliberate andinformed by survey data,8 consultation withthe Ministry of Urban Development andHousing (MUDH), UN-Habitat and CAREInternational. Houses were chosen from anumber of streets that together appeared torepresent the full range of residents in asettlement. Decisions were informed by takinginto account the quality and size of housing,its design, location and distance fromamenities and the settlement centre. Houses

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    were then randomly picked and their residentsasked for an interview. Contrary to prior

    advice and the practice of studies conductedin similar environments elsewhere, theresearchers chose not to consult with localauthorities, community organisations orneighbourhood representatives in advanceof arrival in the neighbourhood, in order toavoid bias. Nevertheless, their presence wassoon noted and if further consultation wasrequired return visits were arranged with thewakil-e gozar (appointed neighbourhoodrepresentative) or other community leaders.

    In Kabul interviews were conducted in Districts1 (11), 3 and 13 (7),9 16 (11) and 17 (9). InMazar, the research team interviewedresidents in Districts 2 (5), 7 (4) and 10 (4).Finally, in Herat interviews were conductedin Districts 6 (5), 7 (2) and 9 (5). The

    distribution and the location of interviewareas are visualised in Appendix D.

    The methodology was also designed tofacilitate a reporting approach wherebyinformants were allowed to speak forthemselves, through the use of quotationswhen views expressed represent widely heldopinions in a particular place or among aparticular group. Short illustrative case studieswere also compiled and are presented asboxed text. Those on urban Afghanistan derivefrom the research and information gathered

    during household level and key informantinterviews. Lastly, drawing on the authorsown experience, international case studiesare also included where challenges and policyresponses are of special relevance toAfghanistan.

    Figure 1. Methodology: triangulation of primary and secondary data collection

    9 The district boundaries were partially overlapping; however the characteristics of both neighbourhoods investigated weresimilar in terms of location (hillside), income (low), ethnicity (predominantly Tajik), and migration history (urban).

    Urban governance

    Mazar-i-Sharif

    Urban management Vulnerability

    Herat

    Kabul

    Existingquantitativeand qualitativedata fromsurveys andreports

    84 semi-structuredinterviews withkey informantsin Kabul, Mazarand Herat

    63 semi-structuredinterviewswith residentsin Kabul, Mazarand Herat

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    The more than two decades of conflict thatbegan in the late 1970s in Afghanistan gaverise to urban destruction and social

    fragmentation on an unprecedented scale.Displacement, the disintegration ofcommunities and the destruction of trust andsystems of support were all consequences ofthe war years.

    Security continues to preoccupy many peoplein Afghan cities.10 Interestingly, however, itwas not perceived as the primary urbanchallenge faced by many of the poorest urbandwellers interviewed for this study. A blind

    man interviewed in Mazar put it like this:

    I make a bit of money assisting peoplein the municipality, but all of my childrenare beggars. So the only thing thats goodhere is security we have nothing sothieves dont come here, because theyknow there is nothing they couldsteal....We have to move to anotherhouse soon because the owner wantsmore money. This house has noelectricity, no water, no toilet how

    can anyone live here? The war is over,but also in peace surviving is difficult.

    Indeed, discussions with people living inKabul, Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat showed thatwhile respondents acknowledged the crucialrole of security from violence for enhancingeconomic and social development, moreimmediate concerns prevailed. These weresustainable shelter solutions as well as theprovision of basic services such as water,sewerage, and waste collection. The demandfor housing and services is reflective ofdramatic population increase andconcentration in and around Afghanistansmain urban centres, including the three studycities.

    Currently, 23.3 percent of Afghanistanspopulation is estimated to live in urbanagglomerations although some sources see

    this as an underestimate, putting theproportion of urban dwellers closer to 30percent. Projected annual changes inpercentage urban (1.982.34 percent forAfghanistan) are above regional averages(1.161.42 percent for Asia).11 Thisdevelopment is put down to three trends:self-generated growth (urban naturalincrease);12 net in-migration fuelled byeconomic scarcity, unemployment andenvironmental hazards (mainly droughts) in

    rural areas;13

    as well as refugee return flows(both assisted and spontaneous). Respondentsfrom the United Nations High Commissionerfor Refugees (UNHCR) as well as internationalagencies and NGOs dealing with refugees andIDPs, such as the International Organizationfor Migration (IOM), emphasised that refugeesand IDPs returned to their villages of origin.However, the qualitative evidence suggeststhat due to a lack of livelihood and otheropportunities in the countryside, a significantnumber of assisted returnees immediatelyleft the countryside for the city. This impliesthat Afghanistans urban population may beunderestimated, constituting an importantarea of further research.

    A male English teacher who lived with histwo brothers and their families in KabulDistrict 17 illustrated the incentives for urbansettlement:

    We live in here because it is close to

    Parwan where we are from originally.Still, we are not planning to go back toParwan due to the risk of droughts andfloods. We also chose to live in Kabulbecause here we have a school for ourchildren and better job opportunities.

    2. The Urban Context in Contemporary Afghanistan

    10 The situation may have been exacerbated by heightened security problems associated with the pre-election period, duringthe summer of 2004, when the field research for this paper was conducted.

    11 UNDESA, op cit., 26,103.12 That is, urban births exceeding urban deaths.13 Urban in-migration exceeding urban out-migration.

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    Similarly, a father of six in Herat District 6explained:

    It is two months that we have been livingin this district; originally we are fromPushton Zarghon, a village in HeratProvince...I had been going back andforth for years because there were nojobs in Pushton Zarghon. We used to workin agriculture, but because there was ashortage of water we had bad harvests.Now we are renting this house for 2,000Afghanis [US$40] per month. We live herewith 12 people, but fortunately startedbuilding a newhouse for which wehad bought the

    land before wecame from thevillage.

    S u c h a c c o u n t srepresent the history and experience of manyAfghans. They also indicate how rural andurban vulnerability and livelihood systemsare crucially intertwined in patterns that aredynamic and connected rather thandisconnected and fixed. A humanitarian aidspecialist suggested that in Afghanistan,disaster drives urban growth.14 The findingsof this study suggest that it also drives theagency, resilience and self-help strategies ofv u l n e r a b l e p e o p l e . T h u s , t h erecommendations are concerned to point toways of facilitating and supporting theirefforts rather than undermining or exploitingthem.

    2.1 Kabul capital city challenges

    Kabul is by far the largest city in the countryand one of the fastest growing cities in theregion. The population is estimated to haveincreased from around two million in 2001to around 3.5 million people today.15 This isunprecedented in recent history, even when

    compared to fast-growing cities such as Dhaka,Lagos, Karachi, Jakarta, or Mumbai.16 It wasestimated by a number of key informantinterviewees that over 60 percent of peoplelive in informal areas, with many underconstant threat of eviction due to insecurityof tenure. This might be because they do notpossess title deeds or because steadily risingrents lead landlords to seek better-off tenantsor members of their own families to occupytheir houses.

    Planning for such a fast-changing urbanenvironment is clearly a challenge. The master

    plan for Kabul wasdeveloped in the mid-1970s and approved in

    1978. It caters for acity of 700,000 peoplerather than 3.5 millionand has now beenofficially suspended

    through a presidential decree.17 However,its legacy remains on the walls and in theheads of many planners and implementers.Neighbourhoods within the city are stillclassified as formal or informal accordingto the parameters of the master plan, withthe effect that infrastructure provision, suchas a citywide water project funded by abilateral donor, neglects the most needyareas. Adherence to the master plan and thetendency to only recognise developmentwithin it has allowed political factions andelites who control access to opportunitieswithin the master plan area to determinethe direction of urban development in Kabul.

    Kabul Municipality has the status of a ministryand reports directly to the president.

    However, it has recently lost all authority toapprove plans to the MUDH. This has causeda great deal of frustration among municipalbureaucrats. They argue that they themselvesshould be in charge of the city and havedemanded a massive increase in funding in

    14 Personal communication in April 2004. See also UN-Habitat, op cit., 4.15 Hunte, op cit. and ACF, op cit.16 Growth rates in these cities vary between 6.17 and 3.13 percent; UNDESA, op cit., 8.17 Personal communication, UN-Habitat Kabul, July 2004.

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    Adherence to the master plan and the tendency toonly recognise development within it has allowed

    political factions and elites who control access toopportunities within the master plan area todetermine the direction of urban development inKabul.

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    order to develop neighbourhood byneighbourhood. In this they would be guidedby the old master plan or, as they argue, anew plan that has yet to be developed.

    Private investment exists but is largelyunrestricted by municipal regulation.Construction rules and regulations are notenforced. This suggests that governmentinstitutions will have to gradually build upthe capacity to provide incentives, andcoordinate and regulate initiatives by non-governmental actors. The need for flexibleapproaches as well as cooperation andcoordination between governmentdepartments and between government andresidents is particularly acute in the context

    of land administration and housing, wherelocal commanders, some allegedly with thebacking of central government, have beeninvolved in large land grabbing operations inthe west and the north of the city.

    None of this is helpful to Kabuls vulnerablecitizens. Provision of safe drinking water,sanitation systems and sewage canals werethe services that respondents in all Kabuldistricts prioritised over alternatives such as

    electricity, education, and even the creationof more susta inable employmentopportunities. For instance, in some districtswater has become a commodity and itspurchase absorbs a large proportion of theincomes of low-income households. Privatelyowned tankers currently provide it, withresidents paying around 60 Afghanis(approximately US$1.20) per drum. As ashopkeeper in District 17 said:

    The water tanker comes every four days.

    They arent from the government; richpeople own them. You can see somemodern houses around here [pointstoward some large construction sites anda recently finished two-story buildingnearby]; these are the houses of the

    people who own the water tankers. Theyearn 1500 Afs [US$30] per day and tanker.

    Housing and service delivery shortages haveattracted considerable attention frominternational donors and agencies, and a

    number of projects have been initiated andcompleted during the past three years. Theyhave included projects for water andsanitation rehabilitation and projects helpingthe citys residents cope with health risksand a volatile employment situation.However, donors and NGOs alike complainabout the low degree of coordination amongthemselves with regard to reconstruction,upgrading and service provision. The extentto which the National Urban Programme,developed with assistance from UN-Habitat,can achieve this goal remains to be seen.18

    2.2 Mazar-i-Sharif provincialcapital and service centre

    Mazar-i-Sharif (hereafter Mazar) is acommercial centre that serves as a hub forsmall and larger traders, with a populationbetween 500,000 and 700,000 inhabitants.19

    The master plan for Mazar is based on 16,000families, yet because of insecurity and

    unemployment in the surrounding rural areas,current informal estimates suggest a city ofup to 80,000 families, including IDPs andlabour migrants who commute betweencountryside and city. Hence, as with Kabul,the master plan bears little relationship tothe urban reality of Mazar. Displacement hasgiven rise to an above-average representationof a nomadic group (Kuchis) who live mainlyin two of the ten districts making up the city.Profoundly vulnerable, they co-exist withlocal communities but have no formal orinformal relationship with them. Employmentopportunities in the city are neverthelesslimited. Although once a thriving centre ofproductive activities no factories remain, asentrepreneurs left the country, dismantlingtheir plants and production sites in the face

    18 GoA, National Priority Programmes, op cit.19 The Afghanistan Information Management Service places Mazars population at around half a million residents, but several

    others, included those interviewed for this study, stated that 700,000 was a more likely estimate.

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    of the Soviet invasion and subsequenthostilities. What was left was destroyed duringthe Taliban regime. Likewise, ongoinginsecurity as a result of commander activitystands as a disincentive to economic

    investment. As a result, it is generally believedthat about half the population is unemployed,although reliable statistics are not available.

    Contrary to Kabul with its large numbers ofpeacekeepers, the potential for an outbreakof large-scale violenceis significantly higherin Mazar where thereis less oversight andwhere the city ischaracterised as a

    regional centre withtwo competing commanders. One of them,Atta Mohammed, has recently become theprovincial governor, a move apparentlyapproved by the other, Rashid Dostum, whostood in the recent presidential elections andsecured 10 percent of the overall vote.Although they have developed a modusoperandi between them, the security situationremains tense, with occasional clashesbetween factions working with or alongside

    these two or other local military commanders.Such conflicts affect urban life not only byrestricting freedom of movement but also inrising prices for basic foodstuffs every timethere is an outbreak of violence. Landgrabbing in Mazar is also more concentratedthan in the capital city. At the time of theresearch a large area just outside the citycentre was in the news. Here a localcommander was in dispute with 498 claimantsover a piece of land he occupied during the

    war against the Taliban in late 2001. Acrossthe city it is estimated that about 90 percentof property development is in private handsand totally unregulated.20 Respondentsexpressed frustration over the lack ofbureaucratic accountability and the highlevels of corruption in the city.

    Atta Mohammed, along with his close ally,the mayor, has failed to ensure significantinvestment in municipal service provision, sothat it is even worse in Mazar than in Kabul.The municipality has only a limited number

    of engineers, administrators and planners,all of whom operate without resources. Dueto budget limitations the number of workersis equally constrained; for example, municipalwaste collectors were reduced from 150 tenyears ago to 60 today. During this time the

    urban population hasnearly tripled.21 AMazar shopkeeper fromDistrict 10 reportedthat:

    The waste collectorsfrom the municipality

    come here once per month and take awaythe litter, but they would have to comemore often every ten days or so. Butbecause they dont ask us, they dontknow that we want them to come heremore often.

    A young woman in Mazar explained furtherthe impact of poor service delivery on ordinary

    people:

    There is nobody to collect the waste ofthis neighbourhood. Only when there iselectricity there is water, otherwisewater stops. I dont know why. We haveelectricity but it is not reliable; duringwinter we use gas and wood for heating.

    UN-Habitat introduced into Mazar a wastecollection system known as the KarachiSystem. Based on experience elsewhere in

    Asia the system involves communitycontracting of a micro-entrepreneur to engagein house-to-house waste collection and streetcleaning, leaving secondary waste collectionand removal to the municipality. However,when the funding ceased, this was notsustained. This is indicative of a widely held

    20 Personal communication, Eng. Radyar, UN-Habitat Mazar, July 2004.21 Ibid.

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    Contrary to Kabul with its large numbers ofpeacekeepers, the potential for an outbreak oflarge-scale violence is significantly higher in Mazarwhere there is less oversight and where the city ischaracterised as a regional centre with twocompeting commanders.

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    attitude among local officials in Mazar thatin the absence of resources from the centre,investment in urban infrastructure andservices should be the responsibility ofinternational donors. It is difficult to discern

    why this might be. One possible explanationis that certain donors have circumventedefforts at donor coordination in the urbansector and have made individual approachesto the municipality in Mazar, for instance inrelation to road construction. Anotherexplanation is the very success of earlierdonor-funded initiatives in the city andpossible resentment at the withdrawal offunding, for example in relation to thecommunity development councils or theKarachi system of primary waste collection.

    Another explanation might relate to relationsbetween the centre and Mazar and the factthat any surplus generated locally is requiredto be transmitted to Kabul, with littlereturning from the centre.

    2.3 Herat the Dubai ofAfghanistan

    The third city analysed in this study in Herat.It is the main Afghan border city with Iran

    and Turkmenistan and a bustling provincialcentre. It is a key entry point into the countryand straddles important trade routes, as wellas being the countrys most active borderpoint in terms of trade interactions. As a keyentry point for imported and exported goods crucial to consider in the context of nationalrevitalisation customs revenues areestimated at US$1 million a day. Cross-borderflows are not restricted to goods and manyof the massive influx of returning refugeesfrom Iran right after the fall of the Talibancame through Herat. Although this has nowalmost reached a halt, according to informantsworking with refugee populations, thousandsof people still pour into Herat during thewinter from the two neighbouring countriesin order to find shelter, food and employment.

    Foreign, local and returnee investment intocommunications, transport and property isremarkable. There are now more than 25

    industrial plants in the greater urban area,mainly producing cement and textiles. Themayor at the time of the study, a visionaryand close ally of the suspended formergovernor, Ismail Khan, exhibited a clear focuson grand projects in line with his long-termvision of Herat as the Dubai of Afghanistan.This he hopes to achieve through investmentin income-generating initiatives that willrender municipal finances more sustainable,for example, wedding halls, hotels and otherpremises for rent. The municipal bureaucracyfunctions comparatively well. Here it is helpedby a strong regional resource base. For a cityroughly the same size of Mazar, the numberof municipal staff about 700 plus 400 daylabourers is impressive, made possible bythe fact that the city, under Khans reign,did not submit any significant resources tothe centre.

    Relative to other Afghan cities the physicalinfrastructure of Herat is extremely good,with asphalted roads and increasingly reliableelectricity from Iran and Turkmenistan servingthe better-off neighbourhoods. The publictransportation system works well, assistedby donations from the Indian government andIran. With the help of donors and theprovincial government, the municipality has

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    purchased a dozen well-maintained second-hand vehicles for solid waste collection fromGermany. However, the emphasis is onsecondary collection and cleaning of mainroads, commercial centres and better off

    neighbourhoods. Lower-income areas andless influential communities remain under-serviced. For instance, an unemployed malerespondent in District 6 explained:

    Waste is piling up and the streets aredirty, but the municipality does not doany work in this area; the centre is sobeautiful but they dont pay attentionto District 6 where the poor live! We alsohave nothing to do with the shura; theydont listen to us. There is a wakil but

    we dont have any communication withhim because he does not work.

    Despite major achievements with regard toservice provision, services such as education,health and water are not yet adequate tocope with present growth. The same holdstrue for housing, in particular in the outskirtsbut also in the centre where housing priceshave risen substantially over the last twoyears.22 If urban investment and growth are

    reaching the vulnerable citizens of Herat itis only slowly. To the extent that poverty isbeing addressed, this is through confiningvulnerable groups to the villages and to

    peripheral settlements surrounding HeratCity (see Box 1).

    The municipality has rehabilitated parks inan attempt to create public spaces andemphasises a policy of including andprotecting women in public life and discourse,yet both womens rights groups and humanrights activists reported abuses andintimidations backed by local authorities.Another area of concern underlined by severalrespondents was severely restrained freedomof expression. There has been a particularlyarms length relationship between Herat Cityand Province and the centre that saw variousepisodes of brinkmanship between Kabul andthe former governor. It remains to be seen

    the extent to which the formerly tight linkbetween local bureaucracy and the provincialauthority under Ismail Khan will loosen underthe new governorship of Sayed MohammadKhairkhah. It also remains to be seen whetherthe latter will be able to better encouragepowerful interests in Herat towards a widerprocess of nation-building, for examplethrough more assiduous resource flows fromthe city towards the centre and vice versa.Localcentral power relations are likely toremain tense until the local political situation

    is stable, while the citys future cannot beconsidered without taking into accountregional geo-politics, particularly in relationto Iran.

    22 See, for example, Schuette, op cit. and Stigter, op cit.

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    Box 1: Vulnerability on the urban periphery: examples from Herat District 9

    Herat is rightly lauded as the most livable city in Afghanistan due to the rapid speed of reconstruction

    financed by both local and international capital. However, some of the citys areas continue to harbor

    poverty and social exclusion. District 9, located in the southwest of the city, is a mixed area with modern

    dwellings and mud houses next to each other. The street that leads to the district is not asphalted, eventhough promises have been made recently that the municipality would act on this issue, a decision mainly

    informed by the districts glorious history as the place where the jihad against the Soviet occupants

    broke out.

    Malika (name changed) had moved to her new house from Islam Qala (on the border between Iran and

    Afghanistan) only two days before being interviewed in July. As a response to the Soviet retaliation to

    insurgency operations in this area, her family had migrated to Iran and stayed there for 14 years. After what

    Malika called Ismail Khans victory against the occupation they came back to Herat in the mid-1990s. Yet

    during the reign of the Taliban, the family decided to again flee to Iran. The Taliban then martyred her

    husband on the HeratKandahar road in 1999 after he had joined a mujaheddin commander earlier that

    year. Now they have come to Herat because we had no shelter in Iran anymore. The Iranian government

    forced us to leave.

    The widow and her four children lived in a small mud brick house with three rooms, constructed on top of

    the leftovers from another building. The rent for this place with no windows, no water, no electricity and

    no sanitation was 700 Afghanis [US$15], but Malika did not know whether she would be able to pay this

    much. She hoped to make some money with tailoring and doing the laundry for neighbours, which could

    earn her about 2030 Afs [US$0.400.60] per day. In Iran she was doing some carpet weaving, but her

    fingers began to hurt, her eyes got weaker, and she was increasingly unable to concentrate. Her oldest son

    was 14; he used to work part-time in a tailoring shop, making the equivalent of 15 Afs [US$0.35] per garment.

    He had yet to find better employment in Herat. If it turned out that she could not pay the rent, then Malika

    said, We will have to move into one of the ruins because we have no other alternative.

    Malika herself had five brothers and three sisters. Three of her brothers had been jailed under the Taliban;

    two of them were now drivers travelling the road between Kabul and Herat. They dont help us because

    they are poor themselves, said Malika. But we hope they will invite us to their houses sometime so we

    can eat together. Malika was also very concerned about the health of her children. Her daughters nose

    was often bleeding. Before she arrived in Herat Malika went to the hospital in Mashad. The doctor told her

    to come back after two months, but now I am here and I cannot go back to Mashad. So I went to the clinic

    in Herat yesterday, but it wasnt of any use. They refused to treat my daughter when I said I couldnt pay.

    I wish I had a good life again with my husband, she said, but everything was destroyed when he died.

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    3.1 The physical and social impact

    of conflict

    More than two decades of war have left adaunting footprint on Afghanistans cities. InKabul, 63,000 private homes were ravagedby fighting and about 60 percent of its roadsdestroyed.23 Mazar-i-Sharif suffered lessphysical destruction but certain groups ofcitizens suffered particularly badly. Heratwas heavily affected during the early 1980swhen the mujaheddin insurgency forces

    started their activity on its outskirts; its roadnetworks are in need of reconstruction, andbasic services have not been extended to alldistricts.24 To varying degrees, in each ofthe cities the provision of urbaninfrastructure, housing and services poses animportant challenge in reconstruction and

    the demands being made on local authorities

    in this regard are enormous.

    Few countries can claim a history of forcedmigration that would be comparable to thatof Afghanistan. Some respondents living inKabul Districts 1 and 3 had moved up to seventimes in five years, across both rural andurban settlements. Armed conflicts in bothcities and rural provinces have led todisplacement and disintegration of a societyin which local networks have conventionally

    been the backbone and guarantee ofindividual security and social support.However, an unemployed male refugee inHerat District 6 stated:

    I know only one of my neighbours here;he is a relative. I cannot rely on the

    3. Urban Development and the Legacies of War

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    23 GoA, Securing Afghanistans Future, 2.24 See, for example, World Bank, op cit.

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    Our own house was completely destroyedduring the war so we moved into thishouse. The owner of this house lives inKarte Naw. He is not asking us for therent; he is a kind man to us. We alsoreconstructed some parts ourselves.

    Other residents in the same neighbourhoodwere less fortunate: I had not been payingmoney but one month ago the owner cameand asked me to pay 400 Afs [US$8] said a42-year-old woman who was living in adestroyed building protected by plastic covers.We had our own private house in this locationbut during the last war it was burnt.

    Respondents to the field research frequently

    stated as their single most importantchallenge the need for a place to stay thatwas well serviced and recognised by the localauthorities. However, informal dwellings nowconstitute the bulk of Afghanistans urbanhousing stock and many people interviewedexpressed doubt as to whether municipalitiesand the central government would be in theposition to provide them with safe, secureand affordable l iving and workingenvironments. A male respondent from MazarDistrict 7 speaking for a group of eleven Kuchinomads said:

    You know, we have nothing to do withthe government people, we are not givinganything to the government and thegovernment has never done anything forus except for vaccinating our children...We dont feel close to the government;we have had nothing in 35 years and wewill never have anything. The only thingwe really want from the government is

    electricity and nothing else! All we needis electricity.

    Service priorities varied. Of particular concernto female respondents was health care. Saida 45-year-old mother of four children, oneof them chronically ill, who lived in KabulDistrict 17:

    There is neither a clinic nor any hospitalnear to where we live, and I have to take

    my daughter far away to the city centre,where I have to pay 50 Afs [US$1] toreceive advice and treatment for her.Sometimes I have to wait for hours.

    Unavailability of medical services isundeniably a more severe problem in ruralareas. However, research suggests that formany migrants to the city, urban in-migrationmight increase proximity but it does notnecessarily improve access to health services,something that should remain a priority inurban areas.

    Education did not arouse much attentionamong older interviewees, especially men.However, younger male respondents regularly

    emphasised their desire to continue schooling.Their experience of education was often oneof years of interrupted study and patchyattendance in different locations. An 18-year-old male respondent in Kabul District 17pointed out:

    Our income is just enough for us and wecannot save anything for our future.However, if the situation in our countrygets better in terms of security and

    education I am going to finish myschooling, and then I am going to studyat the university.

    Female respondents were more reticent aboutdiscussing educational opportunities buteagerly discussed the acquisition of additionalskills. Most sought training in weaving, sewingand office work.

    A comprehensive urban development strategyrequires addressing the challenges of physical

    reconstruction and development alongsiderecognition of social and other services, aswell as the social support networks thatcharacterise the daily struggle of ordinaryAfghans. This is critical to strengthening thetrust between those who govern and thosewho are governed and in improving theresponsiveness of government to urbancitizens, as well as the effectiveness of urbaninterventions.

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    3.2 The political and bureaucraticinheritance

    Important in understanding the urban politicallandscape in Afghanistan is to recognise that

    it includes people and institutions acting bothin and on the city. In other words, politicalalliances and economic partnerships do notonly include actors within cities themselves.Supra-urban political and economic arenas,whether at the provincial, national or evenregional level can be influential in determiningurban politics and can have consequencesfor urban development. There are manypeople poised to take advantage of theopportunities presented by reconstructionand development, and some with sufficientinfluence or leverage to do so. Rapidurbanisation, the physical legacy of war,rising land prices and inflated rents havegiven rise to a variety of actors withcompeting interests that share common goals.These are often antithetical to the needs oraspirations of vulnerable urban dwellers.Hence cities in Afghanistan as elsewhere aresites in which political and economic powerare constantly being sought, maintained anddefended.

    Official or bureaucratic institutions alsoinclude those acting in the city, namelymunicipalities, as well as national levelgovernment departments acting on the city.Competing interests are pertinent here aswell, with different government organisationsseeking to increase or maintain their influenceand assert their competence over citymanagement. Such goals are undermined ina number of ways.

    First, the influence and expertise of allgovernment departments tends to beeroded by dated approaches to planning,alongside practices and procedures thatare inappropriate to the demands ofcontemporary Afghan cities.

    Second, official influence is compromisedby the need to constantly struggle toreconcile limited resources with the

    yawning need for investment in urbandevelopment in the wake of war.

    Third, in post-war Afghanistan urbanbureaucracies have suffered from arelative lack of attention and resourceswhen compared to the kind of investmentoffered in the form of humanitarian aidand for rural rehabilitation anddevelopment.

    Fourth, lines of responsibility in relationto departmental and organisationalresponsibilities are not sufficiently clear.While sub-national government inAfghanistan and its relationship with thecentre is clear on paper it is often opaque

    in practice.

    Fifth, a great deal of information is keptoutside the public domain and there isinsufficient information sharing andtransparency on the part of municipalitiesand other organisations involved in urbandevelopment.

    One of the greatest challenges facing theurban sector in Afghanistan is the lack ofcommunication, coordination and cooperation

    between the different organisations andinstitutions involved in urban developmentand governance. The formal or official divisionof labour between the policy and planningfunctions of national government and themanagement functions of municipalities isnot evident in practice. In terms ofgovernance, there are few effective structureslinking the wealth of locally generatedinformation and experience to the level ofurban planners and policymakers. In theory,socially embedded institutions for communitymanagement and local governance such asthe shuras should constitute the conduit,either directly or through the loya jirga. Inpractice this rarely happens. Hence, a priorityfor government and donor agencies is tofoster communication and cooperationbetween the various actors operating in andon urban development and between theseagencies and representatives of a wide rangeof community interests. This is a prerequisite

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    26 Evans, A. et al. A Guide to Government in Afghanistan. Kabul: The World Bank and Afghanistan Research and EvaluationUnit. 2004: 7-9.

    27 The new Constitution was adopted by all 502 delegates of the Loya Jirga (Grand Council) on 3 Jan 2004.28 The Law was translated from Dari by Eng. M. Sharif and Eng. Y. Safar and the English version was compiled and edited by

    Dr. Pushpa Pathak, UN-Habitat, Kabul, 2004.29 Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, Ministry of Justice, Electoral Law for Municipalities, Official Gazette No. 814,

    December 2003.30 Article 11-1, Municipal Law of Afghanistan, Decree No. 29, 1379 (2000).

    for more coordinated urban management andeffective urban governance. With thesepolitical and bureaucratic constraints in mind,the following sections cast light on the areasof government impinging on urbandevelopment.

    3.3 Municipalities and urbanmanagement

    Afghanistan is a unitary state with ultimatepolitical authority vested with the centralgovernment in Kabul. However, municipalitiesare de jure self-sustaining autonomous bodies,responsible for providing services andcollecting revenues from local taxes, fees,licenses, rents and proceeds from sale of

    properties.26 Article Six of the Municipal Lawstates that Kabul Municipality is part of thenational government. Each province has aprovincial municipality (sharwali wolayat),which in principle constitutes a separate levelof government, with provincial municipalitiesbeing part of local (provincial) administrationunder the overall control of the Ministry ofthe Interior (MoI).

    Towns and cities function within the limited

    mandate provided by the 1964 Constitutionand more recently under Article 141 of the2004 Constitution,27 which states that:

    To administer city affairs, municipalitiesshall be established. The mayor andmembers of municipal councils shall beelected through free, general, secret anddirect elections.

    This is in line with government commitmentto install democratically elected governments

    at the national and local levels. The legislativeframework for municipal government is theIslamic Emirate (Government) of Afghanistan,

    Ministry of Justice, Decree No. 29, 1369(1990) amended in 1379 (2000).28 In addition,the Electoral Law for Municipalities waspassed in 2003 in order to manage theelectoral affairs of the municipalities andtheir districts. According to this law, mayors,members of municipal councils and districtassociations are to be elected for a term ofthree years, with the mayor being electedindirectly from among municipal councilmembers on the basis of a secret ballot.29

    Municipalities are largely self-sustainingfinancial entities in that all revenues belongto the municipality (see Table 2). As suchthey are the only government entities outsideof central government with some measure

    of fiscal autonomy. However, municipalrevenue collection is regulated by the Ministryof Finance (MoF) and rates for all taxes andfees collected are set in Kabul. Both ordinary(operational) and development expendituresare based on revenues collected by themunicipality, with 45 percent of municipalrevenues meant to fund the ordinary oroperational budget and 55 percent thedevelopment budget.30 In reality in the citiescovered by this study almost all revenue wastaken up with the ordinary budget.

    A range of local revenues finance municipalbudgets. Potential revenues are significantand include, for example, the safayi (a servicecharge and property tax), a rental tax (KabulMunicipality takes the equivalent of onemonths rent per year), other property andbusiness taxes, license and other fees andfines. In Herat various innovations have beenintroduced to swell the municipal coffers andpromote municipal financial sustainability,

    for example, investment in the constructionof wedding halls and hotels to generatemunicipal revenues. By contrast, in Mazar,

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    31 Adapted from Evans et al., op cit.,10.32 Ibid, 7-9.33 GoA, Securing Afghanistans Future, 5.

    little effort has been made to engage inrevenue enhancement measures .Municipalities, while having some limitedautonomy in budget preparation andexecution, are dependent on the MoI forapproval of the budget and staffingestablishments32 and in Mazar complaintsfocused on this oversight function of the MoI.

    Despite the relative autonomy of municipalfinance and the potential for revenue

    generation at the local level, resourceconstraints prevail. Demand on resources alsogrows as urbanisation increases andmunicipalities appear unable to provideadequate infrastructure and services to theirresidents within existing means. Investmentfrom central government or other sourcescannot be ruled out, particularly for citiesthat are less able to generate significantrevenue. Nevertheless, rates and taxes requirereview. For example the last time propertieswere valued for the safayi was in 1978 andthe highest property tax currently paid isequivalent to US$4 per annum.33 In addition,not all municipalities have an equivalentresource base and few are able to enforcesanctions in relation to non-payment.

    In provincial cities municipal expenditurerequires the approval of the provincial governorand provincial governors exercise informalcontrol over municipalities and municipalfinances. This studys research suggests thatthere was some confusion on the part of anumber of interviewees about the boundarybetween municipal and provincial financesand fiscal relations and greater clarity isnecessary not only in the rule books but inday-to-day practice.

    There is also a need for greater clarity on thefunctions and responsibilities of municipalities.Chapter Four, Article 16 of the Municipal Lawof 1379 (2000) l i sts wide-rangingresponsibilities and competencies ofmunicipalities. These relate to infrastructuredevelopment, including for example:construction of physical facilities such ascanals and ditches, public latrines andbathhouses; and construction and maintenanceof public roads, markets, commercial, cultural

    and civic centres (see Table 3).

    Some of these functions are recognisable ascrucial municipal responsibilities, for example,environmental protection and public healthand land and property management. When

    Structure

    The municipalstructure (departmentsand numbers of staff)is set by the MoI withthe agreement of theprovincial governor

    Table 2. Formal municipal relations in Afghanistan31

    Administrative Arrangements Fiscal Arrangements

    Personnel

    The appointment ofjunior staff is approvedby the governor,middle ranking staff bythe relevant minister,while senior staff areappointed by thepresident

    Revenue

    All tax and fee ratesare set in Kabul.However, municipalrevenues are collectedand remain in themunicipality and fundall municipalexpenditures

    Expenditure

    The ordinary (oroperational) anddevelopmentbudgetary allocationsfor the municipality areprocessed by themunicipality andapproved by the MoIwith agreement of thegovernor

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    viewed comparatively, other responsibilitieslisted are competencies less commonlydevolved to the municipal level. Whether ornot this is the case it is clear that the rangeof responsibilities is extensive. Moreover, incooperation with other government lineministries, municipalities can also becomeindirectly involved in the construction ofsewerage and water supply systems, housing,energy supply, communications, public health,

    education and sports facilities, usually in animplementing role. Capacity at the local levelis insufficient to rise to the challenge of suchwide-ranging responsibilities.

    There is a tension between the de jureoversight of municipalities and municipalmayors by the MoI and the de facto autonomy

    of many activities and actors at the locallevel. Provincial municipalities requireapproval from the MoI, via the governor, notonly for their budget but also theirorganisational structure and tashkeel (staffingestablishment of approved posts). This is apoint of contestation between Kabul and thelarger provincial municipalities. Herat, forexample, is not only relatively self-sufficientbut itself oversees surrounding ruralmunicipalities even to the extent that allrevenues are often turned over to theprovincial municipality, which in turn paysall expenses.34 Although the municipalitiesin the five largest secondary cities areexpected to implement infrastructure, landand housing programmes in collaborationwith line ministries, capacity is variable and

    34 GoA, Securing Afghanistans Future,108.

    Table 3. Sample responsibilities of municipalities

    Service delivery Public health and environmental protection,notably sanitation and sewage treatmentand solid waste management

    Street lighting and planting greenery

    Provision and maintenance of parks andrecreational amenities

    Assisting in the maintenance of law andorder

    Planning activities Implementation of master plans Management of land and buildings Distribution of plots for residential and

    commercial purposes Expropriation of land for development Prevention of informal buildings

    Revenue generation and management Collection of revenues from municipalproperties and taxes from shops, marketsand residential buildings

    Complaints and redressal Setting and controlling prices Licensing Data collection Providing legal support

    Governance Promoting public involvement in city services Strengthening capacity in society

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    there is competition over roles andresponsibilities between them.

    Thus far the discussion has related by andlarge to provincial cities. As the capital andprimate city of Afghanistan, Kabul Municipalityconstitutes a special case. Article Six of theMunicipal Law clearly states that Kabul ispart of the national government. It has muchgreater autonomy than the provincialmunicipalities and its mayor has ministerialstatus. Without the involvement of the MoIthe mayor of Kabul and senior staff areappointed directly by the president and thebudget is approved not by the MoI but theMoF. Kabul Municipality has greater capacitythan other municipalities and indeed is

    expected to implement upgrading projects,the construction of roads, canals and drainsand solid waste management programmesusing guidelines from the relevant lineministry. It is precisely its anomalous positionwith the status of a ministry that sometimesputs Kabul Municipality in competition withline ministries also responsible for urbandevelopment.

    Overlapping responsibilities, competitionbetween agencies operating in the urban

    environment and poor communication andinformation flows to ordinary citizensincreases urban vulnerability. There was asignificant degree of confusion amongrespondents about where to turn to in orderto address service delivery shortcomings. Forexample, in Kabul the fact that the CentralAuthority for Water Supply and Sewerage(CAWSS), which is part of the MUDH, isresponsible for water provision and sewagesystems (and not the municipality) was largely

    unknown. One recently arrived refugee inBagh Ali Mardan in Kabul said:

    After arriving here I went to themunicipality to submit the documents toget a tap in my house. I even paid themsome money, but they have not doneanything so far.

    Another example from a hillside communityin Kabul District 17 saw residents approached

    by officials [they did not know whichministry these men were working for] andasked to pay 1,000 Afs [US$20] so that cablesfor electricity could be provided. Two monthslater electricity was only available to a fewresidents at the foot of the hill. A secondapproach was made, this time for 2,000 Afs[US$40], to extend the cable network tohigher levels. The informant who recountedthis incident was unable to afford the paymentat that time and eventually ended up buyinga generator.

    There is something of a gap between thelegislation governing the roles andresponsibilities of municipalities and therealities of urban management on the ground.

    There is also some considerable variety fromone urban centre to the next. Much dependson both adherence to and interpretation ofthe Municipal Law, the resources at thedisposal of or utilised by local authorities,and the extent to which these aresupplemented by funds from the centre(apparently rarely) or provincial coffers(seemingly significantly in the case of Herat).

    3.4 National government and

    urban policy and planningThe vision for the urban sector as articulatedin the National Development Framework(Physical Reconstruction and NaturalResources) is to:

    Invest in a balanced urban developmentprogramme across the country to createviable cities that are hubs of economicactivity, and organically linked to ruralareas; and

    Develop urban areas in a balanced mannerthrough housing and infrastructureinvestments, thereby reducing over-crowding, improving access to basicservices and generating employment andeconomic growth.

    A number of government line ministries alsohave responsibilities for urban policy andplanning. These include the MUDH, the MoI

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    35 Ibid, 5.36 The issue of land is taken up in more detail in Section 4.

    (which controls municipal administration andtraffic management, except in Kabul), CAWSS,the Ministry of Transportation (MoT) and theDepartment of Public Works. Confirmed ininterviews and as pointed out in the TechnicalAnnex on Urban Development of Securing

    Afghanistans Future: Functionalresponsibilities and roles remain unclear orinappropriate and, as a result, there is a lackof appropriate urban policy.35 This wasunequivocally confirmed by the presentresearch.

    An urban policy is beginning to take shapethrough the development of the NationalUrban Programme (NUP). The NUP isambitious in scope and was conceived largely

    in Kabul. A number of interviewees outsidethe capital had not heard of the NUP althoughthis may be because it was only beginning tocome together in June 2004, not long beforeresearch for the study took place. The NUPalso constitutes an attempt to provide aframework for informing the wide range ofongoing urban activities and initiatives at thecommunity or neighbourhood level that arelargely uncoordinated and without cleardirection from the centre. The NUP has six

    priority sub-programmes to achieve itsstrategy of sustainable, secure, prosperousand inclusive urban centres in Afghanistan.These are focused on areas such asgovernance, land, urban revitalisation andinfrastructure.

    The NUP is clearer in terms of its goals thanin guidance as to how its sub-programmesmight realistically and practically beimplemented. Moreover, a number ofconstraints exist that relate to the current

    management structure of the urban sectorthat threaten to retard the admirableintentions for the urban sector contained inthe combined vision of the NationalDevelopment Framework and the NUP.

    While municipalities are primarily responsiblefor implementation of the policies and plansof line ministries operating in the urbansector, the following are the somewhatcontradictory responsibilities of the MUDH:

    Formulation and implementation of urbandevelopment policy;

    Development of master plans;

    Development of rules for the preparationand implementation of urban projects forthe construction of industrial and civilbuildings;

    Improvement and control of quality ofconstruction;

    Construction supervision;

    Renovation of public buildings; and

    Construction of public buildings throughits construction enterprise.

    There is also potential confusion over landregistration, which is implemented by anumber of agencies. For example,municipalities distribute land and maintain

    records for tax purposes, but the registrationof ownership has to be formalised by theSupreme Court or District Courts, dependingon the case, as well as the national surveyingand mapping agency (Afghanistan Geodesyand Cartographic Head Office) that historicallyhas undertaken cadastral mapping.36

    An expatriate engineer engaged in urbanreconstruction in Kabul spelt out theimplications of poor communication and

    coordination for day-to-day delivery:We do not have sufficient staff in theministries and municipalities. The