sharad joshi monterey institute of international studies ...dec 06, 2013 · agni iii, v, long...

Nonproliferation Challenges in South Asia

Sharad Joshi

Monterey Institute of International Studies

December 6, 2013


Introduction

Why is this such a crucial issue?

Nuclear weapons on both sides + deep rooted conflict

Prospect of horizontal proliferation

Nuclear weapons Terrorist groups

Rationale for nuclear weapons

Security threat perceptions

India vis-à-vis Pakistan and China

Pakistan vis-à-vis India

Crucial to consider conventional military balance

How it is connected to nuclear strategies

Proliferation optimism/pessimism debate


Why did India and Pakistan pursue

nuclear weapons?

Also: What factors drove specific

decisions?

Security considerations

territorial disputes

deterrent

Nationalism

Domestic politics

Scientific-bureaucratic complex

Strategic enclave

Indira Gandhi

Z.A. Bhutto

Stability/Instability Paradox

Strategic stability

at highest levels; i.e., no full-scale conventional war

Strategic instability

Increased violence at

sub-strategic level; i.e.,

insurgency and terrorism in

Kashmir

Helps link non-state violence and

nuclear postures in South Asia

contrast current situation with 1965 war



Currently Nuclear weapons deployed/operationalized by both

Deterrence posture (stable/unstable?)

Periodic crises (e.g. 2001/02) involved nuclear threats

Crises have influenced decisions on nuclear and conventional strategies

Relevant issue: missile defense

Nonproliferation regime positions

Both India and Pakistan outside Nuclear Nonproliferation

Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Varied positions on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT):

Pakistan main hurdle toward FMCT discussions

Key trend: Expansion of specific capabilities

Continued production of fissile material

Continued development of more lethal delivery systems

Introduction of cruise missiles, longer-range ballistic missiles,

submarine launched ballistic missiles

Consideration of tactical nuclear weapons (especially in

Pakistani case – Hatf II/Abdali missile)

Highlights importance of

considering nuclear and

conventional military strategy

Strengthening of command

and control



Capabilities and doctrine

India

Tests in 1974, 1998

Fissile material for 100-130

nuclear warheads

Ballistic missile capability – Prithvi, Agni I, II, III

Agni V under development (tested in 2012; <5000 km range)

Acquisition of cruise missiles (BrahMos)

Credible minimum deterrence strategy

No first use doctrine

Triad of delivery systems

Command and control in civilian hands

Prithvi (India)


Capabilities and Strategies

India

Quest for ‘credible minimum deterrent’

Agni III, V, long range ballistic missiles

Submarine launch capability sought

Nuclear submarine (INS Arihant)

Sagarika SLBM (700 km range)

Testing of missile defense systems

Issue: what constitutes credible minimum

deterrent?

Launch of Sagarika/K-15, Feb. ‘08

Agni-III test, May ‘08


Capabilities

Pakistan

Little indication of doctrine; emphasis on command and control

Tests in 1998

Refusal to adopt a no-first use policy

Credible minimum deterrent doctrine

Estimated 90-110 nuclear warheads

Missile capability covers most of India – Ghauri, Shaheen

Development of cruise missiles – Babur nuclear delivery role

Tactical nuclear weapons; Short-range missile (Hatf IX/Nasr)

In response to India’s “Cold Start” strategy

Concern about India’s missile defense program

Quest for nuclear equivalence with India

November 16, 2006 photo showing

then Pakistani PM Shaukat Aziz in front of the Ghauri V (Hatf) missile just before it was test fired.


Source: CNS Source: Dept. of Atomic Energy,

Government of India



Both countries:

Fissile material production Newer facilities commissioned

Ballistic missile production

Development of cruise missiles

Pakistan – Babur, Ra’ad (nuclear capable)

India – BrahMos, Nirbhay

Implications for military strategy How do cruise missiles fit into broader thinking

on security and deterrence issues in South Asia?

Conventional military issues crucial

Cold Start doctrine (India)

Babur cruise missile

(Pakistan)

BrahMos cruise missile

(India)



Missile defense

Tests by India since 2006

Tactical nuclear weapons

Nuclear Confidence Building Measures

Missile test notification

does not include cruise missile tests

Agreement for reducing risk of nuclear accidents

Exchange of nuclear facilities lists

India’s Endo-atmospheric

interceptor test, Dec. 2007


International Civilian Nuclear Cooperation

U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement

Benefits for India Nuclear technology, materials from external suppliers

Domestic sources of uranium can be diverted to military

Enhanced energy supply

U.S. goals Strategic partnership with India

Some regulation of India’s nuclear facilities

Business incentives for U.S. nuclear industry

Will lessen India’s dependence on fossil fuels

Unstated objective: Building India as a regional counterweight to China

IAEA Board of Governors

meeting in Vienna on August 1,

2008, to consider the Indian

safeguards agreement.


since November 2010:

India’s quest for NSG, MTCR membership

U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement

Negative Consequences

Breaks the nonproliferation regime

Bad precedent

More difficult to stop DPRK and Iran

Pakistan’s quest for similar agreement China’s proposed nuclear assistance to Pakistan

2010: 2-3 reactor deals for Chashma complex

NSG issues


Proliferation From South Asia

A.Q. Khan network

Evolution from an import role to an export role also

Unanswered questions:

Has the network (or similar networks) been rounded up?

Pakistan political and military establishment involved?

Important implications

What all was transferred?

Introduction of more stringent export controls by Pakistan in recent years


Country Transfers or negotiations for transfers Period In exchange for

Iran 1. Agreement on training scientists, transfer of P1

centrifuge and enrichment plant diagrams, P1

machine components

2. Diagrams of P1, P2 centrifuges, 500 used

centrifuges; manual related to fabrication of nuclear

weapons components

1987

1994-95,

possibly

till 2003

Possible agreements on oil

supplies, conventional

weaponry, political support,

and cash.

Libya 1. 20 L1 centrifuges; components for 200 other

centrifuges

2. L2 centrifuges; 1.7 tons UF6

3. Nuclear weapon design manuals, blueprints

4. L2 centrifuge components

1997

2000

2001-02

2002

Cash

North

Korea

1. Transfers of P1 centrifuges and technology and

possible P-2 centrifuges

2. Training of personnel

1994-95

Possibly

till 2002

In exchange for missile

components at a later stage

(earlier missiles had been

procured from NK for cash)

Iraq 1. Offers from Khan to help establish enrichment

program and provide nuclear weapon designs

1991

Export side of the A.Q. Khan proliferation network


Security of Pakistan’s Nuclear weapons

Growing Pakistani nuclear arsenal + expansion of delivery systems

Political instability and violence

Implications for security of nuclear weapons and materials.

E.g., meetings in 2001 between Pakistani scientists and Al Qaeda leadership

Technological hurdle towards a workable nuclear device, i.e., intent does not necessarily equal capability

But, dirty bomb possible

Psychological effect of nuclear materials use

Source: McClatchy

Security of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons

Source: The New York Times


Striking at ungoverned spaces

and weak states

Increasing attacks in vicinity

of nuclear facilities

Instances of kidnapping of

nuclear personnel in 2007-08

Unclear about motivations

Signifies potential inadvertent

or deliberate access to nuclear

personnel and facilities


Conclusions Expansion of nuclear capabilities on both sides and changes

in Indian position in nonproliferation system

South Asian proliferation also has to be seen in context of Asia-Pacific power dynamics, especially the rivalry between China and the U.S.

India-Pakistan nuclear stalemate leading to changes in conventional strategies? – e.g., “Cold Start”

Importance of Confidence Building Measures in other areas of contention, e.g., Siachen glacier. Can facilitate Nuclear CBMs.

Security of nuclear materials and facilities from terrorist and proliferation networks remains a key problem.

sharad joshi monterey institute of international studies ...dec 06, 2013 · agni iii, v, long...

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