"sharing the faith: the building of successful media strategies by liberal and conservative...

8/12/2019 "Sharing the Faith: The Building of Successful Media Strategies by Liberal and Conservative Religious Advocacy Gr

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Journal of Communication and Religion

Vol. 34 No. 1 May 2011, pp. 158-180

Sharing the Faith:

The Building of Successful Media Strategies by Liberal and

Conservative Religious Advocacy Groups

Kate Knutson Stenger and Mikka McCracken

Abstract:Religious advocacy groups develop media strategies to influence debates

over public policy and politics but experience mixed results. Drawing on in-depth

interviews with representatives from six religious interest groups and a content

analysis of group press releases and newspaper coverage of the groups, we argue

that liberal and conservative interest groups approach media strategies in

substantially different ways. We argue that rhetorical differences in interest group

communications help account for different levels of media coverage and influenceover issue framing. This research contributes to an understanding of the processes

surrounding advocacy group approaches to media strategies, framing, and the

ideological balance in media coverage of policy debates. Keywords: Advocacy

groups, media strategy, framing

Introduction

In the summer of 2007, Washington activists focused on reauthorization of the

Farm Bill.iiiAt one House hearing in July, the line to enter the overflow room in the

Longworth House Office Building to watch the hearing on television monitorssnaked down the hall. While groups representing farmers, agribusiness, and

environmentalists staked out prominent positions on the multitude of programs

covered by the bill, a relatively unexpected set of participants joined the debate.

Leaders of religious advocacy groups such as Bread for the World and Faith in

Public Life identified work on the Farm Bill as one of their top legislative priorities.

These advocacy groups, grounded in faith and located on the left end of the political

spectrum, viewed provisions of the Farm Bill that dealt with poverty and hunger as

a moral issue that required a response from faith-based groups. Religious groups on

the left, such as Bread for the World and Faith in Public Life, have a long and active

history of political participation.iv They develop media strategies and work to

cultivate relationships with journalists. They lobby political decision-makers

directly and mobilize their members to write letters to Congress. They hold press

conferences, join coalitions, and conduct research for policy position papers.

Despite all these efforts, religious groups on the left are largely absent from media

coverage, public awareness, or scholarly research compared with their counterparts

on the right. This article explores the extent of this phenomenon and seeks to

Katherine E. Knutson, Associate Professor of Political Science, Gustavus Adolphus College

[email protected]. Mikka McCracken, Program Director, ELCA World Hunger ConstituentEngagement and Interpretation, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America [email protected]


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Sharing the Faith 159

explain its causes through an examination of interviews, press releases, and news

coverage of six prominent religious advocacy groups. The six groups represented in

the study are the Family Research Council and the Traditional Values Coalition, on

the right, and Bread for the World, Call to Renewal /Sojourners, the Center of

Concern, and Faith in Public Life, on the left.

Founded in 1983 by Dr. James Dobson, the Family Research Council is aconservative Christian organization focused on policy issues surrounding marriage,

family, and the sanctity of human life.v Reverend Louis Sheldon founded theTraditional Values Coalition in 1980 to be a non-denominational representative of

individual Christian churches. The TVC is involved in a diverse array of issues

including marriage and family, religious liberties, education, and tax policy.vi

On the left, a group of Catholics and Protestants founded Bread for the World

in 1974 with the intent of influencing U.S. policies concerning hunger. Bread is one

of the largest religious advocacy groups on the left and is comprised of individual

and congregational members.vii Sojourners began as an intentional Christian

community and, later, a magazine led by Jim Wallis. In 1995, the organization

founded the group Call to Renewal to focus on mobilizing churches and other faith-

based organizations to alleviate poverty. The two groups merged in 2006, but

separated in 2007, though strong ties between them remain. Both groups target an

ecumenical audience and focus on a variety of issues ranging from poverty to war toenvironmental justice.viii Several members of the U.S. Conference of Catholic

Bishops founded the Center of Concern in 1971. Despite strong connections to the

Catholic Church, the Center is ecumenical and focuses primarily on global issues

such as peace, economics, the environment, international trade, technology, and thestatus of women.ixFaith in Public Life is the newest of the groups included in this

study. Founded in 2006, the purpose of the group is to serve as a central

clearinghouse and organizer for progressive religious groups. Much of the groups

work focuses on garnering public attention through media strategies and serving as a

resource for other religious advocacy groups.x

Because advocacy groups like these so frequently depend on the media to

achieve political goals, we focus on the nexus between the creation of messages by

these groups, as reflected in their press releases, and the transmittal of those

messages through the print news media. Our argument rests on the premise that

advocacy groups actively and strategically seek to construct and deliver a messageabout particular political issues. The mass media transmits these messages to the

public and to policymakers. Thus, advocacy groups are successful when they

generate coverage on an issue that is important to them and when they are able to

frame the issue in ways that favor their preferred position.

We find three key differences between the religious advocacy groups on the

left and right in our sample that help explain the different levels of coverage. First,

media coverage we analyzed paired conservative religious groups with secular

liberal groups when identifying competing sides in a debate, which functions toexclude religious voices on the left. Interviews with group leaders confirmed this

pattern. Second, unlike the groups on the left, the groups on the right avoided usingexplicitly religious language in their press releases, which makes their arguments

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160 Kate Knutson, Mikka McCracken

the left issued relatively long press releases, which make it difficult for journalists to

easily sort through and package the arguments in news stories. We argue that

rhetorical decisions made by religious advocacy groups on the left coupled with a

lack of awareness of the religious left on the part of the mass media creates a cycle

that results in advocacy groups on the left receiving less coverage and fewer

opportunities to influence the framing of political issues than religious groups on theright.

Our findings contribute both to our growing understanding of the role of

religious groups in the political processparticularly understudied groups on the

leftand to our understanding of the ways in which groups use rhetorical strategies

of framing and the mass media to influence political debates. In the first section of

this article, we draw together the literature on religious advocacy groups and

communication strategies. Next, we outline a series of hypotheses and explain the

methods used to collect the data presented in this paper. Finally, we present our

results, focusing first on the differences in media success between religious groups

on the left and right, and second on explaining the cause of the difference.

Religious Advocacy Groups in American Politics

The prevalence of religious beliefs among the American public as evidenced by

mass surveys and the increased visibility of religious groups in political debates

indicates the importance of studying the presence and influence of religious groups.

Religious advocacy groups are organized groups of citizens with policy interests

that result from a shared set of religious and political beliefs. These groups are animportant presence in American political life, because they potentially represent

non-elite, broad constituencies and offer the prospect of articulating previously

underrepresented values and concerns of many citizens (Hertzke, 1988, p.14).

These groups may take the form of a lobbying office of a national religious

denomination, a coalition of religious organizations or denominations (like the

Traditional Values Coalition) or a think tank or research organization (such as the

Center of Concern or the Family Research Council). Religious groups may also be

issue-based and comprised of individual citizen members (like Bread for the World)

or they may simply be a religious organization or movement that has a mailing list

rather than official members (like Call to Renewal/Sojourners or Faith in PublicLife).

In practice, the lines between these categories blur. Research organizations

such as the Family Research Council maintain active mailing lists of donors and

supporters to mobilize on behalf of their policy preferences. Similarly, individual

churches or denominations often play an important role within groups such as Bread

for the World, which also recruits individual members from within churches and

denominations. What these various groups representing all aspects of the religious

and political spectrum share in common is that they are all active participants in

political debates and they operate based on underlying commitments to religious

principles.


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A growing body of research specifically addresses the role of religious

advocacy groups in the political process (Ebersole, 1951; Adams, 1970; Hertzke,

1988; Dillon, 1995; Hofrenning, 1995; Yamane, 1999; Olson, 2002). Some scholars

of religious groups point to successes enjoyed by religious advocacy groups in

electoral politics (Adams, 1970; Rozell & Wilcox, 1995, 1997; Green, Rozell, &

Wilcox, 2004) and policy debates (Hertzke, 1988; Wood & Davis, 1991). Thesestudies of religious group lobbying are helpful in that they demonstrate that

religious groups actively attempt to shape public policy and they begin to categorize

the ways in which these groups differ in success and strategy from non-religious

groups. Like many mainstream studies of advocacy groups, these studies of

religious group lobbying tend to focus on traditional, insider lobbying strategies

that involve direct contact with key decision-makers.xi This is limiting, however,

because scholars note that religious advocacy groups are unlikely to have the type of

insider connections that secular lobbies have and, therefore, experience less success

when using insider strategies (Hofrenning, 1995).

Some research focuses on the ways in which religious groups use media

strategies to influence policy debates and politics. Hofrenning (1995) discovered

that religious lobbyists rely on outsider strategies, such as using the mass media,more exclusively than do leaders of non-religious advocacy groups. He concludes,

however, that religious groups are marginalized in these attempts, particularly in

their attempts at framing issues. Several studies have looked at specific issue

debates and reached similar conclusions. Terkildsen, Schnell, and Ling (1998)

found that the media had more influence in the framing of the abortion debate than

did religious groups. McCune (2003) found that religious groups were unsuccessfulin framing news coverage of a debate over a Tennessee proposal regarding teaching

evolution in public schools. Similarly, several studies of media coverage of religious

groups conclude that these groups often receive negative coverage by the

mainstream media (Lichter, Rothman, & Lichter, 1993; Graham & Kaminski, 1993;Kerr, 2003).

In contrast, other studies conclude that religious groups experience success

when pursuing media strategies (Wilcox, Merolla, & Beer, 2006; Tadlock, Gordon,

& Popp, 2007). Hertzke (1988) devoted a small portion of his study of religious

advocacy groups in Washington to their attempts at mass constituency mobilization

and creating staged events such as marches and protests. Other scholars also focuson the success of religious groupsparticularly the Religious Rightin

establishing media outlets to communicate their messages to group members (Guth,

Green, Kellstedt, & Smith, 1996; Diamond, 1998). Conservatives rely on few

[specialized religious] sources dominated by a clear ideological message, whichfosters issue consistency, a certain militancy, and sense of political direction,

(Guth, Green, Kellstedt, & Smidt, 1996, p.80). In contrast, Guth et al. claim that

liberal groups use public media like network TV, secular radio news,

newspapers, news magazines, and opinion journals, to disseminate their

information and positions on a wider range of issues (1996, p.80). As Moen

concludes, the Christian Right has become much more successful in their attemptsto frame issues to maximize support both in religious-owned media and in the

l di (1994 352) Si il l t t d f di f


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religious groups finds that journalists and media organizations have become much

more sensitive to religion and more willing to cover stories related to religion (Dart

& Allen, 2000).

These studies point to the fact that religious advocacy groups are active

participants in contemporary American politics. However, these studies reach

conflicting conclusions regarding the effects of their attempts to influence politics,particularly through media strategies. Thus, the question of whether religious

advocacy groups are successful in their attempts to influence media coverage of

public debates over policies and politics is still an important one to ask.

Furthermore, while many of these studies provide a direct comparison of religious

and non-religious groups, few address any differences among religious groups,

which may help explain the conflicting findings.

The Religious Left

Much existing research on the topic of religion and politics addresses the rise

of the religious right over the past twenty years (Hill & Owen, 1982; Moen, 1994;Rozell & Wilcox, 1995; Rozell & Wilcox, 1997; and Diamond, 1998). The

historical activity of the religious left is documented in several reviews which focus

mainly on specific issues or movements (Roof & McKinney, 1987; Craig, 1992;

Alpert, 2000; Olson, 2002; Djupe, Olson, & Gilbert, 2005; Lattin & Underhill,

2006). However, surprisingly little research directly compares both sets of groups in

terms of their strategies and successes.

The religious left encompasses a wide variety of religious individuals andinstitutions, including many mainline Protestant denominations, progressive Jews,

historic peace churches such as Mennonites and Quakers, and Roman Catholics and

Protestant evangelicals who focus on issues of peace and justice (Roof &McKinney, 1987; Nash, 1996; Hertzke, 1998). For many observers, the growing

visibility of progressive evangelicals is one of the most surprising elements of this

group. Author and activist Jim Wallis is one example of this new movement on the

religious left, though as Lattin and Underhill (2006) point out, Wallis frames his

vision as transcending traditional ideological boundaries of left and right.

Religious advocacy groups on the left tend to believe in and emphasize broad

moral principles that are very close to secular, progressive, liberal ideals (Hertzke,1998, p.181). Peace and justice are two of the most common principles advocated

by liberal religious advocacy groups (Olson, 2002, p.55). These ideals manifest

themselves through work on human rights at home and abroad, working topreserve the environment, questioning U.S. use of military force, and [] fighting

for the disadvantaged (Olson, 2002, p.55). Observers of the religious left note that

these groups have not been particularly successful in terms of reaching their desired

policy goalsespecially in recent years (Hofrenning, 1995). There are several

explanations for this lack of success raised in the literature.

The first explanation given in the literature for the policy failures of religious

advocacy groups on the left is structural in that it involves the disconnectionbetween many religious advocacy groups and their affiliated church bodies and

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physical location, most denominational offices are not located in the Washington

metropolitan area, however, most liberal religious advocacy groups and lobbies

operate from Washington D.C. (Olson, 2002). Therefore, these groups are

geographically separated from both the top levels of the denominational hierarchy

and their grassroots (Olson, 2002, p.56). Ideologically, Fowler et al. (1999) argue

that the biggest problem for most liberal Protestant groups is that they have oftenfailed to convince their own lay members of the value of their agenda. Additionally,

since these denominational Washington Offices are not high priorities for most

denominations, they often suffer deficiencies in staff and funding (Hofrenning,

1995). Religious advocacy groups on the left may employ only a handful of

employees who have many other time and position commitments to fulfill other than

lobbying or who may not have formal advocacy training (Hertzke, 1998). These

findings point to structural resources as a key factor explaining the difference

between advocacy groups on the left and right.

A second theory explaining the lack of success on the part of religious groups

on the left is ideological in that it emphasizes a growing secularity in American

mainline religions (Roof & McKinney, 1987; Hofrenning, 1995; Hertzke, 1998;

Alpert, 2000). Due to this apparent secularization, it is increasingly difficult for

liberal religious advocacy groups to separate and distinguish themselves from the

secular liberal position (Nash, 1996). This ideological explanation has implications

for media coverage. Hofrenning argues that liberal groups have been ignored by the

secular media in part because the secular liberal establishment has seemed to

banish religion from their politics (1995, p.81). Other scholars also point to a

failure of the media to understand or accurately represent religious voices,particularly those on the left (Lichter, Rothman, & Lichter, 1986; Stenger, 2005;

Media Matters for America, 2007).

In contrast, other scholars suggest that one of the strengths of liberal religious

advocacy groups is, in fact, that liberal activists share the same community of

political discourse as their secular counterparts [and] appeal to powerful themes in

the social theologies of mainline [religions] (Guth et al., 1996, p.82). The secular

sources may produce more political sophistication, and ultimately, greater

effectiveness, because they tend to reach a larger number of possible constituents

and members (Guth et al., 1996, p.80). These arguments suggest that ideological

factors and the way in which the news media perceives (or fails to perceive)religious groups on the left might explain differences in media coverage of thereligious left and right.

A third theory developed in the literature to explain the ineffectiveness of

religious groups on the left involves strategic rhetorical choices that contribute to

the ability of groups on the left to advance their preferred messages. Hofrenning

finds that religious groups on the right are better at using condensational symbols,

which create a more []abstract, ambiguous, and emotionally charged framing of

political issues, than are groups on the left (1995, p.138-139). Framing is the

process by which a communication source constructs and defines a social or

political issue for its audience (Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997, p.221). Framinginvolves the strategic packaging of information to communicate a preferred versionof problems policies or potential sol tions The framing of an iss e affects polic


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outcomes in that it helps to set the terms of debate and establishes guidelines for

acceptable and unacceptable policy outcomes (Entman, 2003; Nelson, Oxley, &

Clawson,1997; Terkildsen, Schnell, & Ling, 1998).

While groups on the left attempt to create broadly appealing issues, Hofrenning

argues that []the definitions of issues used by liberal groups are not as powerful

or as socially significant (1995, p.139). These findings suggest that groups onthe left might make strategic choices in framing or packaging that make their

messages less appealing to journalists. This process is not merely a question of how

much money or time a group can spend, but rather a question of how adept a group

is at making arguments that will be heard and repeated by the media. Since a large

part of the political debate is essentially a linguistic battle of frames (Edelman,

1988), successful groups will be able to craft frames that resonate with the public

and elected officials, and they will respond to changes in the political environment

by eliminating unsuccessful frames and crafting new argument frames. Furthermore,

successful groups will package their framed messages in ways that appeal to

journalistic biases for easily digestible and timely information (Bennett, 2009).

The religious left has a long history of active involvement in American politics,

though it does not always receive attention from scholars or the news media.

Research on the religious left suggests competing explanations that may account for

the failure of the religious left to gain widespread media attention or command

influence in politics. Our research attempts to test these explanations empirically

through a comparison of religious advocacy groups on the left and the right.

Hypotheses and Methodology

A preliminary glance at news media coverage of the religious advocacy groups

in our sample indicates that groups on the right are more successful at gaining

coverage in the New York Times and the Washington Post. Thus, the primary

question at stake is what factors explain the difference we see between religious

advocacy groups on the right and those on the left? To answer this question, we

examine three possible factors developed in the literature that might explain

differences between groups on the left and right. First, groups on the left and right

may display structural differences, particularly in terms of the level of sophistication

of their media operations. Aspects of sophistication might include their professionalexpertise in both politics and communications, the resources devoted to mediaoperations, or their understanding of the professional needs of journalists. Second,

differences may be ideological as the result of bias on the part of the mass media,

which may favor conservative religious groups as sources for news stories or may

fail to distinguish between religious and secular voices on the left. Third, the groups

may have rhetorical differences in terms of the framing, content, or presentation of

the press releases they issue.

To test these factors, we conducted interviews with representatives from six

religious advocacy groups in their Washington, D.C. offices during the summer of

2007.xii

We selected these groups because they represent a broad spectrum ofreligious groups and are active participants in public debates over policy. Interview

bj t f h f th h d i ti t k l d f th di


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and communication strategies and held job titles such as Director of

Communication, Communication Assistant, and Chief Operations Officer. Each

tape-recorded interview lasted between forty and eighty minutes and was

transcribed shortly after the interview. We conceal the names of the subjects due to

the sensitive nature of media strategies discussed during the interviews.

To supplement the data provided through the interviews, we collected pressreleases issued by these groups using the press release archives on each groups web

page through December 31, 2007. Most advocacy groups with national policy

interests have media centers on their websites and devote considerable resources

to press offices. Additionally, there is a growing tendency of journalists to rely on

internet-based press releases and research (Davis, 1999; Garrison, 2001). Each of

the groups in this study maintained a frequently updated website and posted press

releases on the site.

As indicated in Table 1, the groups differed considerably in terms of the

number of archived press releases, ranging from a low of 25 (Call to Renewal /

Sojourners) to a high of 238 (Traditional Values Coalition). Press releases without

specific dates of release were not included in the final analysis. We collected all

archived press releases because the existence of a deep archive of press releases is

an indication of the sophistication of a groups media strategy, both in terms of the

ability of journalists to access past information and the years the group has devoted

to making this type of access for journalists possible.

Table 1: Advocacy Groups and Press Releases Issued

Group Name First Archived Release Press ReleasesBread for the World 9/6/2005 43

Call to Renewal (Sojourners) 6/30/2005 25

Center of Concern 1/1/2002 37

Faith in Public Life 3/24/2006 29

Family Research Council 9/2/2005 238

Traditional Values Coalition 1/15/2002 141

Total 513

We collected newspaper articles mentioning each group using the LexisNexis

Academic database to search The New York Times and The Washington Post

between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2007. We selected these newspapers

because they are popular with many policymakers and have a national audience

(Entman, 2003). In interviews, group leaders also mentioned these newspapers as

important targets for their media strategies. The search resulted in a total of 1,004

articles, with a great deal of variation in coverage of each group (see Table 2).

Because of the large volume of press releases and newspaper articles collected,we randomly selected 25% of the press releases gathered from each of the six

groups. Using these press releases as a reference point, we searched our database for

newspaper articles mentioning the group, covering the same topic as the press

release, and published within five days of the issuance of the press release. Table 3reports the total number of press releases issued by each group, the number of press

releases sampled for each group, and the number of newspaper articles published


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within five days of the sampled press releases. This method allowed us to connect

specific news articles with the press releases that influenced them. Through this

process, we were able to connect eleven press releases to twelve news articles

addressing the same topic. A closer review of these articles revealed that three of the

news articles were on the same general topic as the press release, but were unrelated

to the specific issue discussed in the press release.

Table 2: Media Articles Mentioning Advocacy GroupsGroup Name Newspaper Articles

Collected

Total Articles

Collected

Bread for the World New York Times 14 58

Washington Post 44

Call to Renewal (Sojourners) New York Times 15 45

Washington Post 30Center of Concern New York Times - 0

Washington Post -

Faith in Public Life New York Times 1 2

Washington Post 1

Family Research Council New York Times 249 778

Washington Post 529

Traditional Values Coalition New York Times 48 121

Washington Post 73

Total 1004

After identifying the sample of press releases and related news articles, we

undertook an analysis of both sets of documents. Reading each article and press

release independently, we looked for evidence of media sophistication on the part of

the advocacy group, we searched for evidence of media bias, and we compared the

language used in both documents.

This method of study results in some limitations in terms of our ability to

generalize our results, but it also presents many advantages. First, this method

allows us to analyze the language and arguments used by groups and the media.

Rather than simply comparing general topic areas, we are able to examine nuancedpolicy positions and political maneuvering. Second, this method allows us to tracethe effects of a particular press release. This can help us to better understand how

the media use (or do not use) groups as sources. Finally, this method allows us to

compare the intentions of group leaders with the results of their media efforts. By

using information gleaned from interviews with group leaders, texts from the groups

themselves, and coverage of those messages, we gain a more complete picture of

how groups work to influence media and the extent to which they are successful


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Table 3: Sampled Press Releases and Related Media MentionsGroup Name Press Releases Sampled Press

Releases

Related News

Articles

Bread for the World 43 11 1

Call to Renewal (Sojourners) 25 6 1Center of Concern 37 9 0

Faith in Public Life 29 7 1

Family Research Council 238 59 7

Traditional Values Coalition 141 35 2

Total 513 127 12

.

Findings and Discussion

The results clearly indicate that the religious advocacy groups on the right were

much more likely to be mentioned in media coverage of politics. Despite theimbalance in our sample of groups (only two groups on the right versus four on the

left), the ratio of coverage was nearly 9:1 in favor of groups on the right. Oursample of press releases offers similar results. Though we sampled press releases

proportionately from groups across the ideological spectrum, all but three of the

related articles were associated with groups on the right. This finding demonstrates

how infrequently religious advocacy groups on the left are mentioned in media

coverage of political debates. As a result, they have a limited ability to influence

media framing of political issues. Given the imbalance in coverage, what factors

explain this difference?

Structural Differences

Resources are not evenly distributed among advocacy groups (Schattschneider,

1960). Scholars often focus on the unequal distribution of financial resources, but

other types of resources also might affect the success a group experiences. Among

the resources that might affect group success are the political and media experience

of staff as well as the allocation of staff and financial resources to media strategies.

As one theory explaining the failures of the religious left suggests, groups on the left

often have fewer financial and staff resources devoted to pursuing lobbying

strategies. We use data collected from interviews with group leaders, coupled with

our content analysis of press releases and newspaper articles to identify potential

differences in structural resources groups on the left and right possess.

Formal Training

Though formal training in politics or communications is not a prerequisite for

crafting a successful media strategy, training may provide practitioners with a

clearer understanding of how to frame issues and create events to successfully

attract the attention of the print news media. In the interviews with group leaders

responsible for media strategies, we asked whether they had formal training in

politics or communications. Of the four leaders from groups on the left, few had


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such training. One had undergraduate degrees in English and Religion as well as a

Masters of Divinity, another had an undergraduate degree in community organizing,

and a third had a background in computer system operations. Only one of the four

had experience working in political campaigns.

In contrast, one leader from a group on the right had an undergraduate degree

in Political Science and English, a doctorate in Political Science, and experienceworking at the White House. The other had an undergraduate degree in English,

worked as a professional journalist, a spokesperson for a member of Congress, and

for a public relations firm. These experiences with both government and

communications may contribute to differences in the level of media sophistication

between groups on the left and groups on the right.

Media Savvy

Despite differences in formal training, groups on both the left and right seemed

to have a strong sense of the needs of the news media. Many maintain sophisticated

records of journalists, which allow the groups to target journalists more specifically

with particular policy alerts. Said one group leader on the left, we actually track

who is writing what, so we really tailor press lists by issue and by theme. I have an

entire press list of reporters who have written in the last year sympathetic articles

about religious progressivesand also, when we send to reporters, I never just blast

a release to reporters without some kind of note at the top about why theyd be

interested. This group pays for a service that provides a national directory of

reporters, but also does a lot of manual organizing to be sure that our lists are astailored as possible.

A second group on the left said, We target the journalists that we think are already

writing about something rather than trying to get journalists to write about

something and making a new story for them.

Groups on the right also use these techniques. Said the leader of one group on

the right, We use directories and if there are people who have called uswhat

happens is if you call us as a reporter, we keep your name and if its on a particular

subject, we keep it by that subject. And any time that we generate a press release on

something dealing with that subject area, you get a copy of that.

In pointing out the reasons why the group may be successful in gaining mediaattention, a leader on the left noted the desire journalists have for new or novelangles for stories. Weve been pretty successful on the Farm Bill because were

new in that debate. The farmers have been talking for a long time, the environmental

groups have been talking for a long time. The church really has not weighed in on

the Farm Bill until this year. So thats a new voice in the debate which journalists

are always looking for. Leaders on the right echoed this need to present a different

message. One leader remarked, I think if they [journalists] call us and get the usual

stuffyou know, the standard sort of replythat discourages them. I think if they

get something thats really defensive, that discourages them. And thats why we try

to be as accommodating as we can be without appearing to become gullible..Another leader on the right pointed out that, You need to make their [journalists]life eas Thats o r n mber one job is to make s re that its eas to get a q ote


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from us. So we have a hotline that they can call. You can reach our media guybasically 24 hours a day, and an awful lot of them do. Most of the groups reportedtracking media coverage of their groups, particularly coverage in print media. Onlyone group does not either pay for a tracking service or track mentions in-house. Inthis left-leaning group, tracking of media coverage happens much more informally.

Despite differences in formal training between leaders in groups on the leftand right and differences in resources devoted to media strategies, groups on bothends of the spectrum seem to have clear understandings of the needs of journalists.These groups all work to communicate with specific journalists in ways that grabthe attention of those journalists. They all understand the medias tendency to valuenew angles, conflict, and controversy. Finally, almost all of the groups areconcerned enough with understanding the effectiveness of their media strategies totrack media coverage of their group.

Financial Resources

In addition to experience, groups might also differ in terms of the number ofstaff and the amount of financial resources devoted to pursuing media strategies.Groups who invest heavily in media strategies should be more successful in gainingaccess to the media compared with groups that do not devote financial or staffresources to media needs. Results from the interviews indicate that the groups withthe largest budgets did issue more press releases and were mentioned in newsarticles more frequently. Similarly, the group reporting the smallest devotion of

group resources to media strategies issued few press releases and received fewmentions in media coverage.While this general pattern held, no significant ideological patterns emerged

from the interviews in terms of the allotment of resources to media strategies. Twoof the group leaders on the left estimated their groups devoted about 10% of its timeand resources to media strategies. Another leader on the left estimated the groupsdevoted less than 5% of its resources to pursuing media strategies. The final groupon the left was unique among all six groups in that its primary focus is to affectmedia coverage of religious groups and therefore, all of its resources were devotedto its media strategy. On the right, one group leader estimated the group devoted

10% of its resources to a media strategy (which, for this particular group, amountedto approximately $1.2 million annually), while the other estimated that a third of itsresources were targeted towards media strategies.

Despite the appearance of similarity in terms of estimated expenditures onmedia strategies, there were clear differences among the groups. Some groupsemployed teams of media specialists, while others relied on an ad-hoc approach togenerating media coverage. In general, those groups with more staff, expertise, andresources tend to receive more media coverage, regardless of whether they areliberal or conservative.However, even those groups on the left with an infusion of resources devoted to

media strategies do not receive the same level of coverage as do groups on the right.Clearly, there is more to this problem of underrepresentation than simply a

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Ideological Differences

Some research points to an anti-religious bias in the news or a failure of the

religious left to differentiate itself from the secular left. Leaders of the religious

advocacy groups we studied, however, did not report feeling this. Group leaders on

the right noted that journalists often tend to be more liberal, but seemed convinced

that they did not suffer as a result of this. For the most part, if we have something

interesting to say about a policy and we say it in a timely and interesting way, we

can get the same amount, and sometimes even better coverage, because people are

surprised when we are funny or when we are controversial in an interesting way.

One leader on the right explained, Reporters do tend to be liberal because theyre

motivated by a particular worldview, which is very idealistic. Thats why you get

into the news business, and thats okay. Were pretty idealistic too, which is why I

think we tend to get along. I would rather be around somebody who is motivated by

issues than somebody that doesnt care. So we connect on that level but we also

connect because we love the news, we love politics, we love debate. And I am nevergoing to shy away from a debate. So the fact the [group] is willing to engage, we

make their life easy.

Group leaders on the left also did not sense a bias against religious voices. As

one leader provocatively stated, I dont see a bias against religious groups. I see,

right now, a hunger for religious voices in the media. Were sexy. I dont know how

long were going to be sexy. Probably no more than ten years, but right now,

politics is interested in religion in a way they werent [in the past] and media isinterested in what politics is interested in.

Groups on the left were, however, more likely to point to a more subtle bias in

media coverage of religious groups: the tendency to ignore religious groups on theleft. Said one leader, The bias were always trying to fight is the conservative

Christian bias. The sense that we get is that theres a fair amount of coverage of

Christians influencing politics, but because of a lot of different reasons, theres been

this rising political influence of the Christian right. In response, We see a lot of

what we do as just educating the media about who we are and why were important

politically and culturally. Another leader on the left noted that groups on the right

seem to take pride in their ability to gain the attention of the media by playing intothis dichotomy saying, theyre [groups on the right] happy fueling those culture

wars. And were not about the culture wars. But, she concluded, the culture wars

make news. So again, we just have to get more creative. Group leaders on the leftview the absence of the religious left in the media as a result of ignorance of the

religious left on the part of journalists rather than an intentional bias.

The news coverage associated with sampled press releases revealed no

evidence of an anti-religious bias. Groups on both the right and left were treated

well in news coverage and there was only one case in which the groups position

seemed to be slightly taken out of context. In this case, the position of the group

articulated in the press release was presented as more moderate in the news article.While journalists did not reflect a hostile view of religious groups in their news

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as sources rather than religious groups on the left. For example, the article about the

Alito confirmation hearings pitted the Family Research Council and the

conservative American Center for Law and Justice against the secular liberal group

Naral Pro-Choice America. Given the decision of the journalists to focus on the

abortion angle and the reluctance of left-leaning religious groups to stake out a

position on this issue, this finding is not particularly surprising. However, anotherarticle focused on the attempts by religious conservatives to reenergize their base of

voters in anticipation of the 2006 elections. This article included mention of

religious conservative groups such as the Family Research Council, Focus on the

Family, and the American Family Association. The counterpoint was represented by

the secular group Americans United for Separation of Church and State despite the

fact that many religious groups on the left were interested in reclaiming the values

debate from the religious right and issued many press releases articulating that

position.

Leaders of religious groups on the left expressed conflicting views of how

recent developments affect the medias awareness of the religious left. Said one

leader, Particularly since Jim [Wallis] wrote Gods Politics in 2004, the media

has just become increasingly aware of the progressive Christian constituency.

However, another leader on the left said, My take on the secular coverage of

religious groups right now is that, for the most part, journalists dont seem to get

that there are any Christians besides evangelicals. Youve got Jim Wallis and the

evangelical left, and youve got the Family Research Council and the evangelical

right, and thats kind of who they think is in the conversation.

Thus, one challenge facing religious advocacy groups on the left seems to involve atendency on the part of the news media to overlook most of the religious left in

favor of using secular left groups as sources.

Rhetorical Differences

While the allocation of resources plays a role in media access, the strategic

rhetorical choices made by groups might also matter. Evidence suggests that

journalists are likely to favor certain types of frames over other types. Journalists

particularly seem to favor frames that emphasize conflict or controversy (Bennett,

2009). Additional evidence suggests that the media associate groups with particularframes and may be likely to cite those groups only when the groups use the

particular frame or when the journalist needs a group to use a particular frame to

complement a storyline (Stenger, 2005). In this section we explore potentialdifferences in the content of press releases that might help explain the difference in

coverage between religious groups on the left and right.

General Framing

Group leaders offer different opinions regarding the importance of press

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right said, I dont really believe in press releases. Theyre pretty much useless,

which is a message that Im trying to communicate to people in the building. But

you cant stop doing them, so I guess theyre [press releases] not 100% useless.

Similarly, a leader on the left said, I imaging that theyre [journalists] not really

looking much at our wording but are trying as quickly as possible to figure out if

there is some event or other thing thats worth covering.While these leaders tended to view press releases and the content of press

releases as only peripherally important, other leaders viewed them as more

significant. A leader from one group on the left said, What always appeals to the

press is controversy or interesting wording. Theyre artists too and theyre trying to

have their stories be interesting to read. So it cant be so wonky that nobody wants

to read it. How to be controversial when youre trying to go right up the middle is

always our challenge. A leader from a group on the right also pointed out the

importance of crafting good arguments in press releases. We think they perceive us

as being reasonable, professional, even when they dont agree with uswhich is

probably 90% of the time. We try to make arguments that are sophisticated, that are

well crafted. We understand what their business is about and so we try to play on

that terrain. But, noted the same leader, Its very easy to get quoted, but getting

them to talk about what we want them to talk about is challenging. In other words,

this group leader perceived groups as having a stronger role in framing than in

agenda setting.

We identified five cases within our sample in which advocacy groups

successfully framed messages. Two of the five cases involved the Family Research

Council, one involved Bread for the World, one involved Faith in Public Life, andone involved Call to Renewal. In only two of these cases were direct quotations

from the press release used in the news article. In one, the Family Research Council

urged government action in a case of an Afghani citizen sentenced to death for

converting to Christianity. The dominant frame emphasized the hypocrisy of

American pride in liberating Afghanistan when decisions by the Afghani

government still rely on Islamic law. The news article, published in the Washington

Post, was written one day after the press release and mirrored the frame of the

release. The topic of this press release and the frame developed within were

particularly appealing to the news media because they reflected the values of

conflict and controversy. The case pitted a conservative Christian group against aRepublican president, who espoused conservative Christian viewpoints and wasusually an ally of the FRC. The unique storyline and strong frame developed in the

press release were perfectly designed for the media.

A second successful press release was issued by Bread for the World

concerning a decision by the U.S. Department of Agriculture to change the word

hunger to food insecurity in its annual report. This press release and the related

article were unique in that the debate over framing was overtly the focus of both.

Bread argued that the use of the new term served to conceal the social problem of

hunger. As with the previous case, the related article was almost entirely focused on

the perspective articulated by Bread for the World in their press release. Unlikemost of the press releases issued by Bread, this release included no overtly religiouslang age


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In contrast to these examples of successful framing, several press releases

did generate coverage, but the groups were not successful in framing the issue. The

best example of this involves a Family Research Council press release concerning

the confirmation hearings of Samuel Alito, who was at the time a nominee for the

U.S. Supreme Court. The press release focused exclusively on the confirmation

process and emphasized the need for a fair and swift confirmation hearing.However, though the article clearly referenced the press release and even included a

direct quotation from the release, the article primarily focused on the issue of

abortion and its relation to Alitos nomination. The article labeled the FRC as an

abortion opponent, and while the label is true, it was not the primary message

communicated in the groups press release.

The evidence from these analyses of press releases and news articles suggests

that groups on the left and right both experience successes and failures in their

attempts to frame issues. Overall, groups on the right may be more successful at

getting more issues framed, but it is because they receive substantially more

coverage than do groups on the left.

Morality Frames

Surprisingly, given existing research suggesting otherwise, groups on the left

are much more likely than groups on the right to use language that references

morality or religion in their interactions with the secular press. Said one leader from

the left, It is my job to try to reclaim the values debateWhy should we not be

speaking those terms? Theyre powerful terms. They resonate with people. Letstake them back. Another leader on the left said, We couch it [arguments about the

policy] in more moral terms. The David and Goliath frame is a really popular one

for us. Youve got big agriculture and they want to do this and then youve got poor

people. You have to remember the poor people because its moral. Thats our

consistent message. A third leader from a left-leaning group said, In a lot of ways,

thats the point of what were trying to do is to show that there is a moral

component and an appropriate faith-based component to our messaging, and that

theres a Christian theology to back those viewsIt would be hard to imagine us

not using the language of morality and values and faith in our messaging.

In contrast, leaders from groups on the right expressed exactly the oppositesentiment. We try to use secular language. We also make sure that all of thevarious code words for evangelical people are in it, but we dont quote a lot of

Scripture because we just dont think thats very convincing to a world that doesnt

accept it. We use mostly secular arguments. Another leader on the right said, We

tend to go more secular unless were talking to a religious audienceyou speak the

language that the audience hearing you usesI dont think you would see any real

God talk at all coming out of our press releases or any of our statements.

While several of the sampled press releases connected to news articles used

religious language, mentioning prayer or Christianity, two developed arguments

with explicit reference to morality. Faith and Public Life and Call to Renewal issuedthese two and they were virtually identical. Both focused on the issue ofcomprehensi e immigration reform and dre pon the biblical mandate to care for


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strangers. Both included several references to specific portions of the Bible and

advocated legislation that was consistent with biblical principles. The related

newspaper article included few of the biblical references raised in the press releases.

The article did emphasize the moral frames developed in the press releases and

articulated the position of group leaders that immigration is a religious issue, a

biblical issue for those groups.

Length

We found substantial differences between groups on the right and groups on

the left in terms of the lengths of their press releases. Table 4 displays the average

length of each groups press releases.

Table 4: Length of Advocacy Group Press ReleasesGroup Average

Number of Words

Minimum

Words

Maximum

Words

Bread for the World 408 164 1347

Call to Renewal (Sojourners) 584 178 1185

Center for Concern 620 361 1148

Faith in Public Life 598 209 1828

Family Research Council 226 84 411

Traditional Values Coalition 372 97 942

The Family Research Council and the Traditional Values Coalition consistently

issued concise press releases, while the Center of Concern, Faith in Public Life, andCall to Renewal issued longer press releases. When we place the groups in order of

shortest to longest average press releases, it corresponds identically to the list of

advocacy group mentions in news articles. The groups that issue the shortest press

releases are the groups that get mentioned most often in the news. The groups that

issue the longest press releases are rarely, if ever, mentioned in news coverage of

political debates. In terms of political ideology, groups on the right issue the shortest

press releases and groups on the left issue the longest press releases.

Press releases from groups on the left tend to be longer because they include a

great deal of background and contextual information that groups on the right do not

include. Groups on the left use press releases to explain their interest in a givenpolicy debate and to connect their position to specific religious beliefs by citing

religious texts or leaders. Other times, the groups use the medium to explain

potentially unfamiliar concepts or movements such as the New Sanctuary

Movement, Red Letter Christians, or Jubilee. While both groups on the left

and the right include direct quotations in press releases, groups on the left tend to

include more quotations from a greater number of people. For example, a typical

press release from a group on the right like the Family Research Council, might

include several sentences of direct quotations from a single group leader or

spokesperson. In contrast, a typical press release from a group on the left like Faithin Public Life might include several sentences of direct quotations from several


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different individuals. This trend results in groups on the left issuing longer press

releases than groups on the right.

Conclusion

Though religious advocacy groups of all types are active participants in debates

over public policy, one glaring trend is the tendency of religious groups on the right

to be much more prominent in media coverage of these debates than their

counterparts on the left. In our study of religious advocacy groups, we found that

religious groups on the right consistently gain more media attention and, as a result,

experience more success in framing issues in ways that benefit their policy goals.

The data suggest that there are several important and systematic differences between

religious groups on the left and religious groups on the right that impact both level

of coverage and influence over framing.

Some research points to structural factors affecting the success of groups on the

left, but our analysis of interviews, press releases, and media coverage does not

support this claim. Leaders of religious groups on the left and the right havedifferent background experiences and levels of formal training, but there are no

significant differences between their understandings of the needs of journalists or

financial resources devoted to media strategies. In general, the groupsregardless

of ideologywith a clear understanding of what journalists need and a well-

developed and well-financed media strategy garner more mentions in news stories

than those with a lower degree of media sophistication. Some groups on the left do

face structural disadvantages in terms of a lack of media expertise or adequatefunding for media strategies, but many groups on the left are well prepared and

funded. As more groups on the left become more sophisticated in their structural

media operations, the left will likely experience more success in gaining access tothe news media and framing policy debates.

Leaders of advocacy groups expressed a unanimous belief that the news media

are not overtly biased against religious groups, as some research suggests. Rather,

groups on the left, in particular, noted that the problem with the media is more

closely related to an ignorance of the diversity of religious perspectives and the

failure to incorporate the voices of religious groups on the left as the counterpart to

religious groups on the right. Journalists seeking balance pair religious groups onthe right with secular left groups rather than with religious left groups. Thus, unless

the religious left group was able to make news on its own terms, it was not included

in the story. In contrast, religious right groups are often included in stories as aresponse to something a secular left group said or did.

The lack of awareness or understanding of religious groups on the left on the

part of the news media seems to be a major component of the puzzle. The news

media are unfamiliar with the religious left, so it makes sense that they would not

turn to these groups when writing news stories. Groups on the left perceive this

unawareness and work to communicate a fuller explanation of their positions

through longer, more detailed press releases. They also work to highlight their roleas a religious counterpart to groups on the right through their use of morality-based

t f Wh th i ht f l l th


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left constantly emphasize their religious convictions in their rhetoric. While some

scholars suggest that religious advocacy groups on the left are indistinguishable

from the secular left, the messages communicated by these groups indicate the

opposite. If anything, religious groups on the left might not be secular enough to

appeal to journalists covering policy debates who are uncomfortable or unfamiliar

with religion. Attempts by groups on the left to explain their positions fully and toground them in religious beliefs backfire as journalists seek out easily digestible

information.

Groups on the right issued short, succinct, vivid messages and primarily relied

on secular arguments to make their points. Groups on the left issued press releases

that were much longer and the releases they issued included more references to faith

and morality. The press releases of groups on the left did abide by the needs of the

media for information that is timely and pegged to government action, but they did

it in a way that was unnecessarily bulky and difficult for journalists to digest easily.

Groups on the left correctly observe that journalists do not understand the religious

left, but their response to this perpetuates their marginalization.

These fundamental differences in how these groups on the left and the right

package information designed for the media coupled with the tendencies of

journalists to focus on pairing the religious right and the secular left helps explain

why groups on the left are largely absent from media coverage of political debates.

Strategically speaking, leaders of advocacy groups who wish to gain the attention of

the public via media coverage should work to package their messages in ways that

appeal to the news media using succinct, vivid language framed in secular terms. It

is clear from our research that some groups on the left are moving in this direction.As the leader of one group remarked, theres so much great work going on in the

progressive religious community, but its not always well executed. I think overall

that our problem has been that weve been active, done our media work, like we

exist in a vacuum. This leader, as well as leaders of other groups on the left,

pointed to the need to make strategic decisions about messages and timing. As

religious advocacy groups on the left continue to alter their rhetorical strategies to

better appeal to the demands of the news media, their media coverage will likely

improve.

Despite this, most of the religious groups on the left we studied appeared

unwilling to abandon their use of religious language and appeals to morality in favorof more secular language. Religious groups on the left view these rhetorical choicesas something that makes them distinctive and effective. Because the religious left is

unfamiliar to many, their use of religious language helps them to carve out an

identity, maintain connections with religious members, and stake out moral claims

with policymakers.

In many ways, the rhetoric religious left today resembles the rhetoric of the

religious right twenty years ago. Religious advocacy groups on the right emerged as

prophetic voices in the public realm, citing Bible passages as justification for policy

positions on issues like the Equal Rights Amendment and abortion. As many

scholars note, and as our research confirms, religious groups on the right alteredtheir rhetorical strategy to confiorm to a more secular political environment. This

hift h l l d h d th ff ti Wh th li i


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groups on the left will eventually follow this pattern remains to be seen, but for the

foreseeable future, it appears as though these groups prefer to stake out their

positions on religious and moral grounds regardless of the consequences for media

coverage.

With these trends in mind, many of the implications of this research fall on the

shoulders of the news media. Though media organizations have made significantprogress in their coverage of religion and religious groups, there is room for

improvement. Most importantly, journalists should make an effort to include a

broad range of religious voices when attempting to highlight a religious viewpoint

rather than relying on a handful of frequently consulted sources. The use of religious

voices from the left can provide a novel twist on coverage of policy debates rather

than relying on the standard storyline featuring the usual suspects.

As with all research, our findings raise as many questions as they answer. In

particular, our claim that studies of advocacy group influence need to account for

differences within religious groups raises several questions for future research. Are

there other key differences besides ideological differences? How might theological

differences or differences in religious tradition factor into the levels of success

experienced by groups? How do group members affect both the development of

rhetorical strategies and lobbying success? Our findings and these questions point to

the continued importance of the study of religion in the field of communication and

politics.

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iiiThe bill, passed in 2008 as the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act (P.L. 110-246), was the mostrecent reauthorization of omnibus legislation passed since the 1970s to address a variety of agricultural

and food issues.ivMany religious groups organized on the left end of the political spectrum self-identify asprogressive as opposed to liberal or left. Their preference for this term reflects their desire to

appeal to a wide swath of religious citizens and their attempt to form coalitions representing various

religious groups. For example, a spokesperson for one national membership organization noted, [ourgroup] doesnt consider itself on the left. [Our group] considers itself in the center. Religious groups

on the right end of the spectrum often refer to themselves as conservative or traditional, thoughthere does not seem to be the same level of sensitivity to terms such as right as their counterparts on

the other end of the political spectrum. We use the terms left and right for the sake of clarity and

simplicity recognizing that many of the groups would resist the term.vhttp://www.frc.org/about-frcvihttp://www.traditionalvalues.org/about.phpvii

http://www.bread.org/about-us/viii http://www.sojo.net/index.cfm?action=about_us.historyixhttp://www.coc.org/about-us


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xhttp://www.faithinpubliclife.org/about/xiThe interest group literature differentiates between inside and outside lobbying strategies. Insidestrategies involve direct communications between advocacy groups and policymakers, while outside

strategies involve indirect efforts to influence policymakers by activating group members and thepublic. Groups often rely on the mass media to communicate their messages to the public, group

members, and policymakers as part of an outside strategy. See Berry and Wilcox (2009) for a summaryof these strategies.xiiGustavus Adolphus College Institutional Review Board approval #200720. Research funded by aGustavus Adolphus College Research, Scholarship, and Creativity Grant.


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