shelby d. hunt objectivity in marketing theory and research

Shelby D. Hunt

Objectivity in Marketing Theoryand Research

Many marketers contend that recent developments in the philosophy of science imply that objectivity inmarketing research is an illusion, a chimera, or impossible. Five arguments are customarily put forth thatsupposedly demonstrate the impossibility of objectivity: (1) linguistic relativism, (2) paradigm incom-mensurability, (3) theories are underdetermined by facts, (4) perception is theory-laden, and (5) epistem-ically significant observations are theory-laden. The author evaluates the five arguments, shows that thereis nothing in the philosophy of science that dooms objective marketing research, and puts forth the"positive case" for objectivity.

The heart of the matter is that, while it is one thingto say that certain notions are "the socio-historicalconstructs of a particular time," it is quite another toadd that they are no more than "the socio-historicalconstructs of a particular time." It cannot be right toproceed from a premise stating only that this is that,direct to the richer conclusion that this is merely that,that this is nothing but that, that this is that and noth-ing else.

—Antony Flew, "The Debunker's Fallacy" (1985)

CHURCHILL et al. (1985, p. 117) conducted ameta-analysis of the determinants of salesperson

performance and concluded: "Enduring personal char-acteristics such as aptitude variables and personal/physical traits do have some relationship to perfor-mance, but not as much as those characteristics whichare 'influenceable' through increased training and ex-perience or more effective company policies and pro-

Shelby D. Hunt is the Paul Whitfied Horn Professor of Marketing, Col-lege of Business Administration, Texas Tech University. For their help-ful comments on drafts of this article, the author thanks Larry Austin,Roy Howell, and Alex Stewart, all at Texas Tech University, and JohnGreenwood (philosophy. City University of New York), Martin Hollis(philosophy. The University of Michigan), Michael Levin (philosophy. CityUniversity of New York), and Israel Scheffler (philosophy. Harvard Uni-versity).

cedures (e.g., skill levels, role perceptions, and mo-tivation)." Is this knowledge claim objective? Ingeneral, are any such knowledge claims in marketingresearch objective? More generally yet, should themarketing research community even pursue the idealof objectivity? Marketing's traditional view on thesequestions is summarized in the following statement(Hunt 1976, p. 27).

Scientific knowledge, in which theories, laws, andexplanations are primal, must be objective in the sensethat its truth content must be intersubjectively certi-fiable. Requiring that theories, laws and explanationsbe empirically testable ensures that they will be in-tersubjectively certifiable since different (but reason-ably competent) investigators with differing atti-tudes, opinions, and beliefs will be able to makeobservations and conduct experiments to ascertain theirtruth content. "Science strives for objectivity in thesense that its statements are to be capable of publictests with results that do not vary essentially with thetester" (Hempel 1970, p. 695).

Questioning the very possibility of objective mar-keting research, some writers in marketing's crisis lit-erature review recent developments in the philosophyof science and caution, "Scientific inquiry may notdeserve the objectivity that we tend to assume to betrue of it" (Sauer, Nighswanger, and Zakman 1982,p. 19). Going much further, Peter and Olson (1983,

7 6 / Journal of Marketing, April 1993Journal of MarketingVol. 57 (April 1993), 76-91

p. 119-120) not only caution that the "aura of objec-tivity has heen steadily eroding for years across allsciences, including physics," but conclude that "sci-ence is subjective" and marketers therefore should adopttheir relativism and constructionism. Going further yet,Peter (1983, p. 385) examines the "received view ontheories," contends that "leading philosophers no longerespouse this approach," puts forth what he calls "amore current understanding of the philosophy of sci-ence literature," and concludes, albeit incoherently,"objectivity is an illusion."' Even more strongly, Mick(1986, p. 207) advocates semiotics for marketing re-search because, among other reasons, "objectivity isimpossible." Similarly, Fullerton (1986, p. 433) en-dorses historicism, claiming, "Researcher objectivityand intersubjective certifiability are chimeras—theycannot be achieved," and Hirschman (1986, p. 242)points out that "the humanist approach denies the pos-sibility of discovering objective truth." Thus, for mar-keting's crisis literature, the three questions posed atthe beginning of this article are uninformed queries.If objectivity is a "chimera," an "illusion," or "im-possible," its pursuit and all claims to its accomplish-ment are, to say the very least, naive. If all inquiryis subjective, then so is the assertion of Churchill andhis associates and all marketing research.

This article evaluates the arguments that have ledrelativists, social constmctionists, subjectivists, and(some) humanists to deny the possibility of objectivityin marketing research and puts forth the "positive case"for pursuing objectivity. Skillful rhetoricians recog-nize that many philosophies, when applied at the"workbench" level, are obviously implausible or evenbizarre, but can be made to seem reasonable or com-mendable when "argued in the abstract." Relativism,subjectivism, and constructionism are such philoso-phies (as well as Marxist utopianism—as the 20thcentury reminds us). Therefore, each argument is il-lustrated here by use of Churchill and his associates'claim (hereafter, simply "CW's claim") as a continu-ing example at the "workbench" level. Lest there beany misunderstanding, however, this article is notcritical of Churchill and his associates, their article,or their article's scholarship. CW's claim is used onlyto illustrate the implications of relativism at the levelof actual marketing research practice. Because mar-keting's current debate has its roots in an earlier de-bate on subjectivity, this predecessor debate and thelogical empiricist view on objectivity (the much ma-

'"Incoherently," because the word "illusion" implies a false per-ception of reality. But to know that a particular perception of realityis false can only be accomplished by a showing that it has been com-pared with a more veridical one. Therefore, the very claim "objec-tivity is an illusion" implies that which it rejects. That is, to be mean-ingful, "objectivity is an illusion" implies the existence of the veryobjective reality that it ostensibly contends is illusory. How else couldone know that objectivity is an illusion?

ligned "received view") are reviewed before the ar-guments for the alleged subjectivity of science are de-veloped and evaluated.

The Early Debate: Social ScienceIs Subjective

Ever since today's social science disciplines emergedin the latter half of the 19th century, a central concernhas been whether social science, like natural science,could produce objective knowledge. In the 1940s and1950s, the logical empiricists entered the debate, assummarized in the classic work. The Structure of Sci-ence, by Ernest Nagel (1961). According to Nagel (p.473-485), the "subjective categories" argument ofWeber (1947) and others concludes that social sciencecannot be objective on the grounds that the subjectmatter of social science—in contrast to that of naturalscience—involves purposive human action directed atattaining various ends. Because the language used toexplain these actions includes such terms as "mo-tives" and "goals" that refer (if they refer to anythingat all) to the private, unobservable, radically subjec-tive experiences of individuals, social science mustrely on such nonobjective techniques of inquiry asWeber's Verstehen (empathic understanding). Nagelcounterargues by first pointing out that many explan-atory categories of the social sciences are objective—for example, the publicly observable environmentalfactors that influence human action. Therefore,knowledge claims relying on such factors are also ob-jective. Second, such concepts as motives and goalscan be accessed through subjects' introspective re-ports and these verbal responses can be regarded aspublicly observable, objective data for grounding ob-jective knowledge. Third, though researchers' em-pathically projecting themselves into their subjects maybe helpful in producing hypotheses in the context ofdiscovery, such claims could rightfully constitute sci-entific knowledge only by later verification in the con-text of justification. Such verification must be on thebasis of evidence obtained from observing physicalphenomena, human behavior, or people's verbal re-sponses.

Nagel next identifies three versions of Weber's"value-bias" argument against objectivity.

1. Because researchers' selection of topics reflects theirvalues, what constitutes a desirable social order willinevitably bias their claims as to what kind of socialorder currently exists.

2. Because fact and value are fused together in social lan-guage (e.g., "murder" not only describes a behavior,i.e., to kill, but also evaluates that behavior, i.e., towrongfully kill), social science's value judgments can-not possibly be eliminated.

3. When researchers lived (see this article's epigraph) and

Objectivity in Marketing Theory and Research / 77

their social class, as in historical relativism and Marx-ism, bias social science.

Nagel counters by agreeing that the importance ofa research topic is a value "bias," but then contendsthat this innocuous bias also occurs in natural science.He continues by agreeing that many, ostensibly ob-jective, social science analyses are in fact disguisedrecommendations for social policy, but then urges so-cial scientists to state their value assumptions fully andcounsels their scholarly communities to adopt naturalscience's self-corrective mechanisms. These proce-dures, though neither infallible nor complete, can pro-gressively diminish the effects of individual research-ers' bias. Nagel then agrees that much social sciencediscourse fuses fact and value, but maintains that carefulscholarship can distinguish between statements thatcharacterize states of affairs (positive) and those thatappraise those states (normative).^ Finally, Nagel ar-gues that "social class determines knowledge" can bejustified by Marxists only if they themselves havetranscended their own social class. (How else couldthey know this?) But if Marxists can transcend theirown social class and attain a "unique privileged po-sition" to justify "social class determines knowl-edge," then why cannot other social scientists in asimilar manner transcend their social class? Thus, Na-gel argues that, as with relativism, Marxism is self-refuting. He concludes (p. 502):

In brief, the various reasons we have been examiningfor the intrinsic impossibility of securing objective(i.e., value-free and unbiased) conclusions in the so-cial sciences do not establish what they purport toestablish, even though in some instances they directattention to undoubtedly important practical difficul-ties frequently encountered in these disciplines.

The preceding review prompts four observations.First, all the debate's participants presumed that nat-ural science was objective, which to them meant"value-free" and "unbiased," and that this objectivityresulted, at least in part, from theory-free observation.For example, Nagel locates the value neutrality thatis "pervasive in the natural sciences" in its "purelyobsei-vable data" and "publicly observable subjectmatter" (p. 474, 477, 475) and his opponents groundthe objectivity of natural science in its "presupposi-tionless investigation of empirical data" (Weber 1947,p. 76). Second, some marketers ground their claimthat objectivity is impossible by using arguments par-alleling those in the Nagel-Weber debate, includingthe discussions of "value-free" knowledge by Hirsch-man (1986), historicism by Fullerton (1986), and Ver-stehen by Hudson and Ozanne (1988) and Holbrookand O'Shaughnessy (1988). Third, none of these mar-

^For a recent discussion of this issue, see Hunt (1991b), Hyman,Skipper, and Tansey (1991), and Robin (1991).

keters provide, or attempt to provide, rebuttals to Na-gel's well-known and forceful critique. By blithely ig-noring it, they ignore history. Fourth, most participantsin marketing's crisis literature reject a major under-lying premise of the Nagel-Weber debate—that nat-ural science is objective. These writers claim, osten-sibly "in line with modem philosophical positions"(Peter and Olson 1989, p. 26), that objectivity is im-possible in all the sciences.

The Modern Debate: All Science isSubjective

Marketers ground their conclusions about objectivityon the work of Hanson (1958), Kuhn (1962), andFeyerabend (1975), and to a lesser extent on that ofSapir (1949) and Whorf (1956). Understanding howthese writers conclude that objectivity is impossiblerequires a brief summary of the view they opposed,the logical empiricist position.

Objectivity: The Logical Empiricist ViewThe logical empiricists, led by Camap (1956), Hem-pel (1965), and Nagel (1961), believed that all cog-nitively meaningful statements must be either empir-ically testable or else "purely analytical," that is, trueor false by definition. For science, all other statementswould be impermissibly metaphysical "empty talk."Theories, being groups of statements, would have tobe empirically testable, which could be guaranteed byunambiguously segmenting all terms in theories into(1) logical and mathematical terms, (2) theoreticalterms, and (3) observation terms. The theoretical (un-observable) terms were not to be construed as genu-inely "referring." That is, every theoretical term wasto be tied rigorously to a unique set of observationterms through a series of definitions (correspondencerules). Contra scientific realism, because the relation-ship between a theoretical term and its associated ob-servable terms was purely analytical, a theoretical termwas just a "shorthand" way of referring to a uniquecollection of observation terms. For the logical em-piricists, objectivity in science presupposed the exis-tence of a nonproblematical, theory-free, observationlanguage. Just as a child learns the meaning of theword "chair" ostensively—by adults pointing to ex-amples of objects to which "chair" refers—the ob-servation language of science, its observation terms,was thought to be purely observable, presupposition-less, or theory-free. Thus, observation terms (mea-sures and data) would be a function only of the sen-sations that result from the retinal stimulation of theeye by light refiecting from tangible objects. In short:observation terms = f(sensations).

How would the logical empiricists have evaluatedthe objectivity of CW's knowledge claim? In review-

78 / Journal of Marketing, April 1993

ing CW's evidence, they would have paid special at-tention to the studies' measures and, no doubt, wouldhave criticized the measures of such variables as "ap-titude," "motivation," and "role perceptions." Thesevariables, which in the marketing literature are cus-tomarily presumed to be real, latent traits that imply"reflective" measures (Howell 1987), would have vi-olated the logical empiricists' belief that all theoreticalterms are only arbitrary labels given to "collections ofobservables." For the logical empiricists, only "form-ative" measures (Howell 1987) are permissible. Eventhough Nagel (1961, p. 477) accepted introspectivereports from respondents as objective data, he ad-monished researchers never to consider such reportsas "statements about private psychic states of the sub-jects," that is, they were never to be thought of asbeing reflective indicants of real, latent traits. Be-cause CW's claim relies on studies employing reflec-tive measures of hypothesized latent traits, its objec-tivity would have been questioned with much "cluckingof tongues." However, the historical relativists woulddismiss its objectivity completely.

Objectivity: The Historical Relativist View

Discussions of Kuhn's "new image of science" dom-inated philosophy in the 1960s (Laudan et al. 1986).Though all the major positions in The Structure of Sci-entific Revolutions were thoroughly discredited by themiddle of the 1970s (Suppe 1977), the book continuesto be highly influential in "he social sciences (Suppe1984). Much of Structure concerning the objectivityof science stems from Hanson's (1958) work on per-ceptual processes and scientific observation. Drawingon the psychology of perception, Hanson contendedthat the traditional empiricists' assumption that sci-ence has access to theory-free data was false becauseexperimental evidence from the psychology of illu-sions shows that what scientists "see" is determinedby their theories and prior expectations. Indeed, a per-son

. . . must learn some physics before he can see whatthe physicist sees . . . the infant and the layman cansee: They are not blind. But they cannot see what thephysicist sees; they are blind to what he sees. . . .seeing is "a theory-laden" undertaking [Hanson 1958,p. 17, 19].

Choices between theories cannot be made objectivelybecause—in reference to whether the sun revolvesaround the earth (Ptolemy) or the earth revolves aroundthe sun (Copernicus)—assuming that "Kepler and Ty-cho see the same thing at dawn just because their eyesare similarly affected is an elementary mistake" (p.8). In this view, scientific observation = f(interpretation-I- sensations). However, anyone who thinks interpre-tation is anything other than the determining factor for

scientific observation is making an "elementary mis-take."

Extending Hansen's work, Kuhn (1962) con-cluded that researchers' "paradigms" or "world views"guided the interpretive part of scientiflc observationand determined what researchers "saw." Therefore,collecting data for empirical testing could not objec-tively adjudicate disputes among researchers who holddifferent paradigms or world views because their re-spective paradigms would contaminate the data toguarantee each paradigm's truth. In short, paradigmsdetermine observations (observations are theory-laden)and are incommensurable (there exists no theory-freemeans, no "privileged position," no "higher author-ity," no "god's-eye view," for adjudicating paradigmdisputes), making objectivity in science impossible.For example, even today we are not warranted inclaiming that Ptolemy was wrong and Copernicus right,we can only say that current believers in the Coper-nican paradigm embrace the results of the most recentparadigm shift. Relying on the Gestalt theory of per-ception and laboratory experiments on reversible (duck/rabbit) figures, Kuhn (1962, p. I l l ) states, "Whatwere ducks in the scientist's world before the revo-lution are rabbits afterwards." Scientific revolutions,like Gestalt shifts, cannot be accomplished by rea-soned discourse about objective evidence (because dataare theory laden and paradigms are incommensura-ble), but must be produced by mass persuasion—muchlike religious conversions.

Kuhnian relativism dovetailed neatly with the Sa-pir-Whorf thesis of linguistic relativism. Sapir (1949)and Whorf (1956), after studying American Indianlanguages and contrasting them with English, con-cluded that each language structures thought in sucha manner that it determines the reality that speakersof that language perceive. One perceives only the realitythat is permitted or required by one's language.Therefore, according to linguistic relativism, theinterpretation inherent in scientiflc observation is the-ory-laden by each scientist's language, making objec-tivity impossible across languages.

Feyerabend (1975), Brown (1977), and others ex-tended and amplified the works of Hanson and Kuhnon objectivity. Embedded within the relativism of Kuhnand his followers are five intertwined arguments thatpurportedly defeat all claims to objectivity. Table 1presents the arguments, cites the works of philoso-phers of science that ground them, and identifies themarketing articles in which they are used to supportthe view that marketing research cannot be objective.For example, Peter and Olson (1983, p. 120) claimthat "science is subjective" because researchers can-not provide "objective, unbiased representations of thereal world" that are "independent of any theory." Theyclaim (1989, p. 26, 27):


TABLE 1Objectivity and Marketing Research

Arguments Against ObjectivityPhilosophy and History

of Science Sources" Marketing Sources'*

Oil

1. Objectivity is impossible because thelanguage of a culture determines thereality that members of that culturesee.

2. Objectivity is impossible because theparadigms that researchers hold areincommensurable.

3. Objectivity is impossible becausetheories are underdetermined by facts.

4. Objectivity is impossible because thepsychology of perception informs usthat a theory-free observation languageis impossible.

5. Objectivity is impossible because allepistemically significant observationsare theory-laden.

Sapir (1949)Whorf (1956)

Kuhn (1962)Feyerabend (1975)

Kuhn (1962)Feyerabend (1975)Goodman (1973)

Hanson (1958)Kuhn (1962)Feyerabend (1975)Goodman (1978)Churchland (1988)

Kuhn (1962)Feyerabend (1975)Brown (1977)

Moorman (1984, p. 53), Rexeisen (1984, p.329), Mick (1986, p. 198), Ozanne andHudson (1989, p. 7)

Anderson (1983, p. 22), Anderson (1986, p.158), Hudson and Ozanne (1988, p. 508),Ozanne and Hudson (1989, p. 1)

Sauer, Nighswonger, and Zaltman (1982,p. 19) Anderson (1983, p. 22, 26), Rexeisen(1984, p. 330), Hudson and Ozanne (1988,p. 515), Anderson (1989, p. 11), Ozanneand Hudson (1989, p. 2), Peter (1991, p.535)

Anderson (1983, p. 20, 26), Peter andOlson (1983, p. 188), Peter (1983, p. 385),Rexeisen (1984, p. 329), Mick (1986, p.207), Holbrook (1986, p. 238), Jaworskiand Maclnnis (1987, p. 163), Peter andDacin (1991, p. 279)

Sauer, Nighswonger, and Zaltman (1982,p. 380), Anderson (1983, p. 20, 26), Peterand Olson (1983, p. 121-122), Mick (1986,p. 207), Jaworski and Maclnnis (1987, p.164), Olson (1987, p. 388), Hudson andOzanne (1988, p. 515, 518), Holbrook andO'Shaughnessy (1988, p. 401), Firat (1989,p. 95), Peter and Olson (1989, p. 26),Thompson (1990, p. 29), Peter and Dacin(1991, p. 280)

"These philosophical and historical sources contain the foundational arguments that have led many writers to conclude that ob-jectivity in science is impossible or problematic.''These marketing sources either claim that objectivity is impossible on the basis of the arguments in the first column or imply thatobjectivity is impossible or problematic by citing and discussing the sources in the second column.

It is impossible to collect data that are "theory neu-tral," since at least some implicit theory is needed tocreate measures and attach a meaning to them. . . .[W]e know that well-trained researchers can con-struct empirical data and results to support or refutealmost any theory without violating "accepted stan-dards" of research in a field. In fact, we have pointedout that the creation of empirical data and empiricalresults is a process that is controlled by the re-searcher. . . . [E]mpirical data and research do notand cannot "test" hypotheses or theories. Rather theytypically provide demonstrations of the researcher'spredilections or skill at post hoc rationalization.

Similarly, for Hudson and Ozanne (1988, p. 515),"observations are value-laden, theory-laden and in-terpreted." Mick (1986, p. 198, 207), after favorablydiscussing the linguistic relativism of Sapir (1949) andWhorf (1956), asserts, "Objectivity is impossible:theories precede facts and interpretation precedes per-ception." Therefore, for Mick, researchers are mis-guided when they believe "what we are studying is'out there' [in the real world] rather than 'in here' [inthe mind]."

Relativism would hold that CW's knowledge claim

cannot be objective because all the studies underlyingthe meta-analysis were theory-laden—that is, thefindings were determined by the researchers' theories,perceptual processes, world views, paradigms, or lan-guage. In short, objectivity in marketing research isimpossible because it is a "rigged game" (Olson 1987,p. 388). Greenwood (1990, p. 553) points out thatrelativist views on objectivity have become dogmas,for "many contemporary philosophers of science ap-pear to accept them uncritically." Similarly, market-ing researchers who do not accept relativist views areoften derided as "backwards country bumpkin[s]," la-ment Calder and Tybout (1989, p. 203). Though theimpossibility of objectivity is accepted uncritically bymany philosophers of science, marketers, and othersocial scientists, this uncritical acceptance is unwar-ranted—as we shall show.

Objectivity and MarketingResearch: An Evaluation

Table 1 summarizes the five primary arguments os-tensibly implying the impossibility of objective mar-


keting research. The counterarguments discussed hereprovide the grounds for the scientific realist theory ofempirical testing (see Hunt 1992, Figure 1).

Linguistic Relativism

The first argument maintains that the language of aculture determines the reality its members will see.CW are members of the English language communityand hence the fact that they speak and think in Englishdetermines what they observe. Consequently, theirknowledge claim cannot be objective, as it could nothold for other language communities. To think oth-erwise, so the argument goes, simply betrays the "eth-nocentrism" of speakers of English in believing theyhave "privileged access" to the world. If the thesis oflinguistic relativism were true, objective inquiry acrosscultures (languages) would indeed be problematic.Fortunately, a host of studies on a large number ofdifferent languages strongly implies that language doesnot determine perceived reality. The works on per-ceptions of color are typical.

Heider and Oliver (1972) compared speakers ofEnglish with the Dani of West New Guinea in theirability to see different colors. After subjects had beenexposed to a color chip for five seconds, the chip wasremoved and they were asked to pick out the colorfrom an array of 40 color chips. Because the Danilanguage divides the entire color spectrum into onlytwo categories (roughly "light" and "dark"), if themantra "language determines reality" were correct theDani should differ greatly from speakers of Englishin their ability to match color chips (in this case lan-guage would limit their perception). Heider and Oliverfound virtually no differences at all; the cognitive mapsof the color spectrum of the Dani and Americans werealmost identical. Similarly, Berlin and Kay's (1969)classic work on languages and human color percep-tion, instead of finding evidence for linguistic relativ-ism, actually found support for linguistic universal-ism. As just two of their many universals, Berlin andKay found that languages having only three color termsalways contain a term for red and those with four termsalways contain a term for either green or yellow—butnever both.^ Steinfatt (1989, p. 63) reviewed the ex-tensive literature on linguistic relativism and con-cluded, "The differences between languages are notto be found in what can be said, but in what it isrelatively easy to say" (italics in original). Philoso-phers of science, using analytical (rather than empir-ical) methods, come to the same conclusion (Levin1979).

A kind of linguistic relativism seems to underliethe proposed "rhetorical turn" in social science (Si-

'For other studies on the universality of color perception, see Brownand Lenneberg (1954), Lantz and Stefflre (1964), and Stefflre, Cas-tillo-Vales, and Morley (1966).

mons 1989), as advocated in economics by Mc-Closkey (1985) and in marketing by Sherry (1990).For example. Sherry (p. 551) cites current literatureas showing that "objectivity is not generally possiblein statistics" and concludes that the "rhetoric of in-quiry replaces logic of inquiry in postmodern episte-mology" because "the theory-ladenness of scientificobservation ensures that all of consumer research isan interpretive task." However, Sherry's conclusionnotwithstanding, a deeper interpretation of the philo-sophical foundations of the "rhetorical turn" is thatrhetorical analysis presupposes objectivity. As pointedout by Keith and Cherwitz (1989), themselves schol-ars of rhetoric, if rhetorical analysis is anything, it isthe exploration of persuasive communication amonghuman beings. Communication may be either suc-cessful (persuasive) or unsuccessful (unpersuasive).Therefore:

. . . to deny objective status to the other person in acommunicative situation . . . would amount to talk-ing to oneself . . . [and] since it is clearly the casethat the vast majority of the time we understand eachother well enough to get along there must be some-thing objective about language that permits it to be amedium of exchange [p. 202].

Keith and Cherwitz show the clear implications of theobjective status of language for both rhetoricians andother researchers, tf successful communications, bothrhetorical and nonrhetorical, "entail an objective sta-tus for language and its users, it makes little sense todeny an equivalent objective status to the objects . . .of scientific inquiry." Therefore, "not only do rhe-torical views of language and communication not de-feat objectivity, they actually entail it" (p. 203).'*

In conclusion, the thesis of linguistic relativism (inany form that would pose a threat to the objectivityof science) is simply false. In fact, in a misguidedeffort to avoid "ethnocentricism," advocates of lin-guistic relativism actually embrace an extreme, if notbizarre, nihilism—for it is a truism that different lan-guage communities do, at least sometimes, success-fully communicate. As succinctly put by Dennett (1981,p. 18), "the faculty of communication would not gainground in evolution unless it was the faculty of trans-mitting true beliefs." Similarly, Jacobs (1989, p. 79,80) points out: "Awareness of propositions is not seenas a condition of their truth or validity. . . . Manypeople have never heard of botulinus or arsenic, whilemany others have; and the knowledge claim that bo-tulinus and arsenic are lethal applies equally and in-discriminately to both groups." So it is in marketing.

"Similarly, Maki (1988, p. 108) explores McCloskey's advocacy ofrhetoric in economies and concludes that "the acceptance of realismdoes not depend on the rejection of any of the major insights of therhetorical approach to studying economics, and vice versa. . . . me-tatheoretical realism is subscribed to by the rhetorical approach asformulated by McCloskey and Klamer."


Though knowing English is necessary for understand-ing CW's claim, thinking and communicating in En-glish does not determine its truth or falsity for eitherspeakers or nonspeakers of English.

Paradigms Are IncommensurableThe second argument contends that objectivity is im-possible because all knowledge claims are embeddedin paradigms that are incommensurable. Of all theconcepts that Kuhn introduced, none has been morethoroughly investigated than paradigm incommensur-ability and no one has yet developed an interpretationof it that would pose a meaningful threat to the ob-jectivity of science. Because the topic has been dis-cussed extensively elsewhere (Hunt 1991, p. 327-331),the following treatment of the three major interpre-tations of paradigm incommensurability (the mean-ing/variance, radical translation, and incomparabilityviews) is brief.

The early meaning/variance view held that sci-entific terms change meaning from paradigm to par-adigm—for example, Newtonian "mass" differs fromEinsteinian "mass"—and was critiqued by Shapere(1964; 1966), Scheffler (1967), and Kordig (1971).The incomparability view that rival paradigms simplycannot be meaningfully compared was also critiquedby Scheffler, Shapere, and Kordig and later by Lau-dan (1976) and Putnam (1981). When Kuhn, in hispostscript to the 1970 edition of Structure (p. 200-204), shifted to the radical translation interpretation,suggesting that the actual terms involved in one par-adigm cannot be translated into the language of itsrivals, it was analyzed by Kitcher (1978), Moberg(1979), and Levin (1979). Cumulatively, the critiqueswere so conclusive that Kuhn (1976) virtually aban-doned "paradigm incommensurability," claiming thatall he ever meant to say was that choices among rivaltheories could not be made on the basis of a mathe-matical algorithm or deductive proof—a view non-problematical for objectivity. In his own work on thehistory of quantum mechanics, Kuhn (1978) uses nei-ther the word "paradigm" nor the expression "para-digm incommensurability." (Kuhn is no longer a"Kuhnian.") Now, even the radical relativist Feyer-abend (1987, p. 81) concedes that incommensurabil-ity is not a problem for science but "is a difficulty forphilosophers."

The key to understanding the incommensurabilitydebate is to keep two points in mind. Eirst, the veryclaim that two paradigms are incommensurable mustimply that one can compare them—and, indeed, hascompared them (Davidson 1973). (Otherwise, howcould one know they are incommensurable?) Thus, itis simply incoherent—it makes no sense—to exten-sively discuss, compare, and contrast different so-calledparadigms in marketing and then to claim that they

are incommensurable because they are "noncompar-able" (Anderson 1989, p. 21). Second, for incom-mensurability to thwart our ability to choose objec-tively between two paradigms implies that they arerival; they must make conflicting knowledge claimsto require choice (as did Ptolemy and Copernicus).Most unfortunately, some marketers have blurred thedistinction between rival paradigms and paradigms thatare simply different (Ozanne and Hudson 1989).^ EorCW's claim, for paradigm incommensurability to posea threat to objectivity, one would have to put forth arival "paradigm" that not only resulted in a conflictingconclusion, but also resulted in a situation where thechoice could not be made on the basis of objectiveevidence. It is easy to find different paradigms in mar-keting if one uses a suitably loose interpretation of theword "paradigm," but no one has yet put forth dif-ferent paradigms that (1) make conflicting knowledgeclaims (and, thus, are rival) and (2) are in any mean-ingful sense incommensurable (objective choice is im-possible). Until someone does so, we can only con-clude that paradigm incommensurability poses no threatto objectivity in marketing research.

Facts Underdetermine TheoriesThe third argument contends that our theories aboutthe world are underdetermined by our facts; no con-ceivable number of facts conclusively proves a the-ory's truth. Because theories contain lawlike gener-alizations (e.g., Newton's Laws), even though thepredictions of theories are validated every time theyare tested empirically (the facts for 200 years sup-ported Newton), new facts could invalidate the theoryat some future time in some domain (tests on sub-atomic particles after 1900). Therefore, objectivity isimpossible. Eor example, there may well be other the-ories that could account for the same evidence (facts)marshalled by CW to support their claim, and the suc-cess of past empirical tests does not necessarily implythe success of future tests. Therefore, CW's claim, sothe argument goes, cannot be objective.

Humean skepticism, which underlies the "factsunderdetermine theories" argument, maintains that,though genuine knowledge of the extemal world canbe had through observation, only deductive logic ispermissible (Watkins 1984). As Calder, Phillips, andTybout (1983, p. 113) put it, "An inductive argument. . . has no basis in logic."^ Therefore, we cannot knowany of our theories about the world because any pro-cess that reasons to the truth of a theory from its suc-cessful predictions is improperly inductive. Note that

'See Hunt (1989) for an evaluation of Ozanne and Hudson's treat-ment of incommensurability.

'Calder, Phillips, and Tybout, though embracing Humean skepti-cism, do not conclude that objectivity is impossible. Rather, they con-clude that falsificationism is required for objectivity.


Hume's "problem of induction" presupposes the fol-lowing standard for knowledge claims: "One must notclaim 'I know' unless one knows with the certaintyof deductive logic." The logical empiricists thoughtHumean skepticism was problematic for science andtried to solve it by developing a system of inductivelogic (Camap 1950). Popper (1972, p. 88), claiminginduction is not "a justifiable way of reasoning," alsoaccepted Humean skepticism as potentially defeatingobjectivity in science and attempted to locate the ob-jectivity of science in its ability to deductively falsifytheories rather than inductively confirm them. Kuhn(1977, p. 332) reveals the source of his own flirtationwith relativism by explaining that "I make no claimto have solved the problem of induction." Similarly,even some defenders of objectivity in marketing have(unfortunately) been influenced by Humean skepti-cism (Anderson and Gerbing 1988; Calder, Phillips,and Tybout 1983; Calder and Tybout 1989; Stemthal,Tybout, and Calder 1987).

Scientists and science differ from philosophers andphilosophy in many ways. Since the Enlightenment,one striking difference has been that many philoso-phers have embraced "foundationalism," holding that(1) all knowledge claims have "foundations" and (2)the foundations of science must be known with cer-tainty (McMullin 1985). Thus, Schlick (1934, p. 223,226), the founder of logical positivism, believed sci-entific knowledge must be "absolutely certain," with"absolute fixed points" and an "unshakable point ofcontact between knowledge and reality." For Humeand countless philosophers thereafter, "to know" meantto know with the certainty of the deductive logic ingeometry and mathematics. However, Hume's "prob-lem" of induction has seldom been viewed as seriousby most practicing scientists. Most assuredly, allknowledge claims have foundations and some claimshave firmer grounds than others. But restricting"knowing" to "knowing with certainty" is not just beingprudently conservative or cautious. Rather, because itdenies even the possibility that we can leam or "know"on the grounds of accumulated experience, such a re-striction amounts to nothing less than nihilism. Theevolutionary success of human kind as perceiving andthinking beings implies the possibility of learning fromexperience and strongly suggests its realization.Therefore, marketing science should reject founda-tionalism and Humean skepticism while embracingfallibilism: "In science all knowledge claims are ten-tative, subject to revision on the basis of new evi-dence. The concept 'certainty' belongs to theology,not science" (Hunt 1983, p. 372). Similarly, Suppe(1977, p. 726) urges philosophers of science to adoptfallibilism, because it "appears to accord most closelywith the actual means whereby science evaluates pu-

tative knowledge claims in the attempt to undergo theobjective growth in scientific knowledge."

The preceding discussion warrants three conclu-sions. First, objectivity in marketing research is notdoomed by Hume's problem of induction (the fact thatfacts underdetermine theories), except to persons whomisguidedly insist that one can never "know" without"knowing with certainty." Though we do not knowthe truth of CW's claim with certainty, we neverthe-less have good reasons for believing CW and actingon the basis of that belief. Second, because scientificrealism specifically rejects Humean skepticism in itsadoption of "inductive realism" (Hunt 1990, p. 9),scientific realism provides grounds for objectivity inmarketing research. Third, Bunge's (1967, p. 324)metaphor of "weighing the evidence" is most appro-priate for marketing. Because empirical tests do notimply certainty, the community of marketing re-searchers can provide its clients with no more than areasoned "weighing" of the evidence. As fiduciaryagents, we should provide no less.

Psychology of Perception

The fourth argument claims that, because the psy-chology of perception implies that our cognitively heldtheories determine what researchers perceive, theory-neutral observations in science are impossible. Be-cause researchers see what their theories tell them isthere, scientific observation is theory-laden. In short,scientific observation = perception = f(sensations in-terpreted by theories). Because the perceptions (ob-servations) of the researchers on which CW's claimrelied were "laden" by their theories (or world views,paradigms, etc.), the claim is not objective. At theoutset, note the implausibility of the argument on apriori grounds. If researchers' theories determined inany strong manner what they perceived, or saw, wouldthey not always find strong support for their theories?If so, why are most correlation coefficients so smallin social science? Why do goodness-of-fit indices inLISREL usually reject the very models researchers areproposing? That is, if researchers' theories determineperception, why are there so many disappointing sur-prises, or even surprises at all? Though Scheffler (1982,p. 44) points out that to accept the "theories determineperceptions" view is "absurdly, to deny the commonphenomena of surprise, shock, and astonishment, aswell as the reorientations of belief consequent uponthem," the crisis literature claims that the psychologyof perception tells us just that.

Are researchers' perceptions "laden" with cogni-tively held theories? Fodor (1984, 1988), a philoso-pher of psychology, explores the psychological groundsfor the argument and points out that all supporters ofthe "theory-ladenness" of observation rely on exper-


iments from the psychology of perception, such as theMuUer-Lyre figures:

The MuUer-Lyre illusion is, of course, that even thoughline b is perceived to be longer, it in fact is exactlythe same length as line a. Thus, perception necessarilyinvolves interpretation by our theories of the world.As Kuhn (1962, p. 113) put it, "The rich experimen-tal literature [in psychology] . . . makes one suspectthat something like a paradigm is prerequisite to per-ception itself." However, Fodor points out that Kuhnand his followers completely misinterpreted the find-ings of perceptual psychology.

Consider when students in a psychology course findout that the Muller-Lyre lines are an illusion or whenothers (the reader?) are simply told the truth about thelines' lengths. Even armed with this piece of knowl-edge, this background "theory" about the world, peo-ple (you?) still perceive line b to be longer than a.How can this be so if our cognitively held theoriesdetermine perception? As an everyday example, con-sider the little words on the bottom of the mirror onthe passenger's side of our cars: "Objects in mirrorare closer than they appear. "̂ Even after we read (andbelieve) the cautionary message, the cars behind usstill look deceptively distant. Fodor points out, "Allthe standard perceptual illusions exhibit this curiouslyrefractory character: knowing that they are illusionsdoesn't make them go away" (p. 34). Though per-ceptual psychology implies that perception =f(interpreted sensations), it manifestly does not implythat perception = f(sensations interpreted by cognitivetheories):

[The psychology of perception does not tell us thatperception is] saturated with cognition through andthrough. On the contrary, it suggests just the reverse:that how the world looks can be peculiarly unaffectedby how one knows it to be. . . . Because the wayone sees the world is largely independent of one'stheoretical attachments, it is possible to see that thepredictions—even of theories that one likes a lot—aren't coming out. . . . [T]herefore belief in the best[of] science is rational because it is objective [Fodor1984, p. 34].

Not only does a proper reading of the implicationsof perceptual psychology for objectivity yield exactlythe opposite of Kuhn's conclusion, but so do properinterpretations of Kuhn's duck/rabbit and "sunrise"examples. Ambiguous "reversible figure" drawingsfrom Gestalt psychology do not imply that theory de-termines perception. Theorizing that an ambiguous

'I thank Roy Howell, Texas Tech University, for the example.

drawing can be seen as either a duck or a rabbit doesnot enable one to effect a Gestalt switch, nor doesbelieving that the task can be accomplished. Indeed,many subjects see only one figure, despite their firmconvictions that it is possible to see two. Similarly,to Kuhn and Hanson's (now famous) question as towhether Kepler and Brahe "saw" the same thing atdawn, we should answer "yes." Both "saw," or per-ceived, a "sunrise." Kepler perceived a "sunrise" and,on the basis of his cognitively held theory of the cos-mos (Copernicus), correctly believed it to be an il-lusion. Brahe perceived a "sunrise" and, on the basisof his cognitively held theory of the cosmos (Pto-lemy), incorrectly believed it to be true. Why do nei-ther paradigms, nor theories, nor beliefs, nor even firmconvictions determine or "laden" perception? The hu-man brain is not "programmed" for it. Recent workin neurobiology on the brain's "wiring" reveals theabsence of efferent nerves connecting higher braincenters (wherein reside our theories) with our percep-tual mechanisms:

We do not seem to understand any general and wide-spread class of cases in which higher brain centersappear to alter the character of empirical information.. . . As we know it, the wiring of the brain does notseem to suggest, either very strongly or otherwise, arole for beliefs or theories in perception [Gilman 1991,p. 499].

The preceding discussion does not imply that theresults of scientific observations—that is, "measures"or "data"—do not rely on human perception. Indeed,the accuracy or veridicality of perception is essentialto science.^ On a continuum from total veridicality tocomplete illusion, where does human perception lie?Evolutionary theory suggests that it is substantiallyveridical. The fact of human species survival impliesthat early humans were capable of veridically distin-guishing (at least more often than not) alligators from

"How human beings leam to veridically apply language (both verbalutterances and written words) to the world we see is complex. (Len-neberg's 1967 work is considered seminal. See also MacCormac 1985,especially p. 80-85, for a useful introduction to the semantic markertheory.) One thing is clear, however, contra Kuhn and his followers—cognitively held theories about the world, i.e., beliefs about how theworld is structured, do not determine perceptual recognition. Suchtheories or beliefs are neither necessary nor sufficient for "seeing."People can veridically identify and label as a "unicorn" a picture ofa horse with a horn without believing in unicorns. (Theories aboutwhat exists in the world are not necessary for perception.) Likewise,in Kuhn's duck/rabbit example, people can believe in ducks and, in-deed, believe that others can see a duck in the duck/rabbit drawing,but may never be able recognize, see, or perceive the drawing as aduck. (Theories about what exists in the world are not sufficient forperception.) Finally, though one would need to know English to applythe label "duck" to what one perceives, one need not know Englishto "see" Kuhn's duck. (Linguistic relativism is false.) Even Whorf'sfamous example (supposedly illustrating linguistic relativism) was in-correct. Rather than the Eskimos having seven or more words for thesingle English word "snow," they have several words that equate withseven or more English words, such as "blizzard," "dusting," and"avalanche" (Martin and Pullman 1991).

84/Journal of Marketing, April 1993

logs, solid earth from quicksand, tigers from domesticcats, wolves from dogs, and human friend from hu-man foe. In fact, the success of human evolution givesus confidence in the veridicality of perception unlessour cognitively held theories of the world warn us ofan illusion.'

The psychology of perception poses no threat tothe objectivity of CW's claim. On the contrary, thepsychology of perception explains how human per-ception enabled the researchers on whom CW reliedto be objective, if in fact they were. The extraordinaryrecalcitrance of human perception to researchers' the-ories of the world enables them to strive (and, thus,perhaps attain) objective knowledge about that world.

Epistemically Significant Observations

The fifth argument contends that all epistemically sig-nificant observation in science is theory-laden, mak-ing objectivity impossible. This fifth, much more so-phisticated, argument must be carefully distinguishedfrom the fourth.'° Kuhn's mistake, so argument fivegoes, was to deny that researchers observe or see thesame things. He erred by denying that human percep-tion allows medical researchers to see the same fourinches of mercury in a cylindrical tube, physicists tosee the same four degree deflection of a needle on ameter, or social science researchers to see the samefour checkmarks on a questionnaire. What Kuhn shouldhave argued is that such observations are not epistem-ically significant in research. To be epistemically sig-nificant and play their designated role in empiricaltesting, such "percepts" (Hunt 1992, Figure 1), or"raw" observations, must be interpreted by cognitivetheories—for example, four inches of mercury means40 degrees centigrade, a four degree needle deflectionmeans 40 volts, and four checkmarks on a question-naire mean a score of 40 on a brand attitude scale. Itis not perceptual psychology that informs us that ob-servation ("measures" or "data") is theory-laden, it isthe undisputed, actual practice of science itself. In brief,epistemically significant observation = f(observationsor "percepts" interpreted by theory). Therefore, be-cause all epistemically significant observation in re-search is theory-laden, objectivity is impossible. ForCW's claim, advocates of the theory-ladenness of ep-istemically significant observation would point out thatit was only through the application of theory thatcheckmarks on questionnaires became measures of"aptitude," "motivation," and "role perceptions."

'See Giere (1988) and Harr^ (1986) for applications of evolutionarytheory to science.

'°It is unsurprising that the marketing literature conflates argumentsfour and five. As pointed out by Shapere (1982), they are seriouslyconflated throughout even the philosophy of science literature. For arecent example, see Churchland's (1988) discussion of "perceptualplasticity" and Fodor's (1988) reply, especially pages 197-198.

Therefore, all studies on which CW relied were the-ory-laden, defeating objectivity.

Shapere (1982) and Greenwood (1990) point outtwo crucial mistakes in the theory-laden argument thatprevent it from being compelling, or even moderatelypersuasive. First, advocates of the theory-laden ar-gument fail to distinguish between two very differentkinds of theories that are involved in empirical test-ing. On one side are theories that specify relationshipsamong our concepts. These explanatory theories arethe ones we test empirically. For example, CW com-pare the explanatory theory: salesperson performance= f(skills, role perceptions, and motivation) with itsrival: salesperson performance = f(personal and phys-ical traits). On the other side, testing CW's explana-tory theories required accessing a great amount ofbackground information, or what we will call "mea-surement theory."" Just as studying cells in biologypresumes measurement theory related to the use of amicroscope, studying sales performance, motivation,and so on requires theories related to questionnaires,Likert scales, factor analysis, and so forth. Quiteclearly, testing CW's explanatory theories presumeda great amount of measurement theory. Therefore, un-questionably, epistemically significant observations("data") in science are not theory-free.

However, the theory-informity of data by mea-surement theories does not doom objectivity. Advo-cates of theory-ladenness have failed to identify thecharacteristics of an observation language that arenecessary for objectivity—their second critical error.Recall that empiricist philosophers of science thoughtthat objectivity required a theory-free observation lan-guage. We now understand that objectivity requires atheory-neutral language, not a theory-free one. Ourdata, measures, or observations need not be theory-free, but only neutral. Neutral to what? Neutral to thetheory or theories being tested. Our measurement the-ories must not presume the truth of our explanatorytheories; they must not "beg the question." In mul-tiple regression terms, one must not have the same"thing" on both sides of the equals sign. In LISRELterms, our measurement model must not guarantee ourstructural model. For CW's claim, do the measure-ment theories bias the analysis toward finding that ap-titude, skills, and motivation are more important thanpersonal characteristics in explaining sales perfor-mance? If so, such theory-informity compromises ob-jectivity. If not, then objectivity is not threatened. Ob-viously, it is within our capabilities to examine CW's

"Greenwood (1990) uses the term "exploratory theory." However,in marketing and other social sciences, "measurement theory" seemscloser to describing what Greenwood is referring to. As Greenwoodpoints out, the background information constituting a measurementtheory in one context may be an explanatory theory one desires totest in another context.


measures for such threats to objectivity. Moreover,good researchers do precisely that.

The preceding discussion warrants not only thatthe theory-informity of epistemically significant ob-servation does not make objective research impossi-ble, but, much more strongly (surprisingly?), it im-plies that (measurement) theory-informity actually helpsensure objectivity:

[Science] leams how to observe nature, and its abilityto observe increases with increasing knowledge.. . .In the process of acquiring knowledge, we also learnhow to learn about it, by learning (among other things)what constitutes infonnation and how to obtain it—that is, how to observe the entities we have found toexist, and the processes we have found to occur[Shapere 1982, p. 513-514].

As our measurement theories progress, our epistem-ically significant observations improve and, thus, thetheory-informity of observation helps ensure researchobjectivity. Kepler and Brahe's problem was that theirmeasurement technology was primitive (in compari-son with ours). Since then, fortunately, science hasprogressed in both its explanatory and measurementtheories. Only after the development of X-ray dif-fraction techniques, a new "measurement theory," couldresearchers confirm the double helix structure of DNAby making epistemically significant observations(Greenwood 1990). In marketing, objectivity has beenfurthered by the introduction and development of mul-tidimensional scaling (Green and Carmone 1969),conjoint analysis (Green and Rao 1971), true scoremeasurement theory (Churchill 1979), causal model-ing procedures (Bagozzi 1980), and item responsetheory (Singh, Howell, and Rhoads 1990). By suchtheories, marketing's "theory-laden" research be-comes more objective, not less.

The Impossibility of Objectivity:An Alternative View

It was plausible to believe that the sun revolved aroundthe earth in Galileo's time; today it is not. Given thepreceding discussion, it was plausible to believe in the1960s that Kuhn and his adherents had shown objec-tivity to be impossible; today it is not. However, phi-losophy's "charity of interpretation" (Quine 1960) en-courages the search for altemative interpretations ofothers' works when one interpretation shows others'works to be so wrong-headed. Here, one such alter-native view may be found in the works attacking "ob-jectivism." For example, Bernstein (1983, p. 8) con-trasts relativism not with absolutism, its usual opposite,but with objectivism, which he defines as:

. . . the basic conviction that there is or must be somepermanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to whichwe can ultimately appeal in determining the nature

of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness, orrightness.. . . Objectivism is closely related to foun-dationalism and the search for an Archimedean point.

Similarly, Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 187) discussthe "myth of objectivism," which they maintain is thebelief that:

There is an objective reality, and we can say thingsthat are objectively, absolutely, and unconditionallytrue and false about it.. . . Science provides us witha methodology that allows us to rise above our sub-jective limitations and to achieve understanding froma universally valid and unbiased point of view. Sci-ence can ultimately give a correct, definitive, andgeneral account of reality, and, through its method-ology, it is constantly progressing toward that goal.

Seeking knowledge that is absolutely true, universallyvalid, absolutely correct, definitive, known with cer-tainty, or known from a unique privileged position isnot only impossible, it is undesirable. Such objectivistviews "inevitably turn into vulgar or sophisticated formsof ethnocentricism" (Bernstein 1983, p. 19).'^ Thus,Sapire (1988, p. 497) asks: "Is it possible to believethat science as it has developed mainly in the Westreigns supreme among the systems intended to pro-vide knowledge of the world, yet not be committedto derogatory views about other cultures and societ-ies?" And he answers: "Orthodoxy . . . [holds that]all such comparisons are invidious and are to beavoided."

Stemming from the belief that objectivism is im-possible (because knowledge with certainty is beyondhuman capability) and undesirable (because believingin the knowledge claims and method of science is nec-essarily ethnocentric), one might argue that objectivityis impossible and its pursuit undesirable. This appearsto be Holt's (1991, p. 60-61) argument that (contraWallendorf and Belk 1989) interpretivist researchersshould not report the use of checks, audits, triangu-lation, and purposive sampling because such proce-dures constitute adopting the "objectivist evaluativebanner" of "positivist-inclined researchers" and

'^Ethnocentrism, a major sin according to "postmodernist" socialphilosophy and a highly pejorative label in sociology, is "the beliefthat our ways, because they are ours, must be closer to the truth,goodness, and beauty than are the ways of others" (Shweder 1989,p. 99). Unfortunately, marketing's "consumer ethnocentrism" has beendefined and measured as the belief that "purchasing imported productsis wrong because . . . it hurts the domestic economy, causes loss ofjobs, and is plainly unpatriotic . . ." (Shimp and Sharma 1987, p.280). Though ethnocentric consumers would support "buy Ameri-can," those who "buy American" because of such factors as the fearof "loss of jobs" are not exhibiting ethnocentrism, for "loss of jobs"would be superfluous to ethnocentric consumers. (Such consumerswould believe that domestic products are obviously superior to for-eign-made ones.) Therefore, the CETSCALE seems closer to mea-suring a belief in "protectionism" than genuine "ethnocentrism." Moregenerally, whenever marketing borrows concepts that have pejorativeconnotations, we have a special responsibility to exercise caution.


"Western ways of thinking."'^ Similarly, Thompson(1991, p. 63-64) cites Bernstein as showing that thepursuit of "objective knowledge" is misguided be-cause it stems from "objectivism" and "foundation-alism," which reflect a "Western view of knowl-edge."

Several observations illuminate the objectivismcontroversy and its implications for objectivity. First,though many philosophers in the past, and perhapssome in the present, subscribe to the foundationalistsearch for infallible knowledge and absolute certainty,marketing's scientific realism advocates fallibilism(Hunt 1990). Hence, to the extent that Bernstein's"objectivism" and "foundationalism" are problems atall, they seem (like paradigm incommensurability) tobe problems for philosophy and some philosophers,not for science and most scientists. Second, holdingthe claims and method of science in high regard isanything but ethnocentric. Without such Eastern con-tributions as the Arabic numeral system, science mightnever have arisen anywhere, let alone in the West.'"*Third, for Western humanists and intellectuals to den-igrate science because it originated in their own cul-ture not only commits the genetic fallacy, but is per-versely ethnophobic as well, for science, no matterwhere it originated, now belongs to all of humanity—just like the Arabic numerical system.'^ Fourth, whatBernstein calls "objectivism" is better characterizedas "vulgar absolutism" (Siegel 1987, p. 163). Using"objectivism" in the manner of Beach (1984) is rec-ommended for marketing because it more accuratelydescribes the practice of science and its goal of ob-jectivity:

"Holt (1991, p. 61) further argues that, because the use of audits,triangulation, and purposive sampling does "not necessarily lead tomore trustworthy research" and does "not insure greater trustworthi-ness," researchers "should be discouraged from using them to gameradded authority in the written representation ofthe research." Instead,"interpretations should be judged on their insightfulness . . . and theirability to convince the reader, no more." Such an argument, however,self-destructs. If all procedures must necessarily lead to, or ensure,trustworthy findings before being in the written report ofthe research,then an article's method section in a research report should always beblank. On the contrary, why, except for the bogeyman fear of "ob-jectivism" and "positivism," should researchers avoid conducting (andreporting) audits, triangulation, and purposive sampling? Such pro-cedures may contribute to what Holt calls "insightfulness" or even toHolt's goal of "convince the reader."

'•^hough no such monolithic entity as "Western culture" exists (forthe individual cultures of Western nations, as well as Eastern ones,differ greatly), there is something properly labeled "Western intellec-tual tradition," one of whose central tenets is openness to the ideasof outsiders (Barchas 1989, p. 27; Short 1988, p. 13; Silber 1990, p.35). Thus, "Western ethnocentrism" is oxymoronic.

"As an example of the genetic fallacy, "The Nazis condemned thetheory of relativity because Einstein, its originator, was a Jew" (Salmon1963, p. 12). Ethnophobia, a peculiarly Western phenomenon, is thefear or hatred of ones own culture, as exemplified by the works ofrelativists such as Feyerabend (1987) and "postmodernist" writings(Barzum 1991, p. 34).

Objectivism. The thesis that there exists a systematicmethod of reasoning and a coordinate set of beliefsembodying its principles, which, despite the vicis-situdes of social psychological conditioning, are ac-cessible to knowledge and are capable of sustaininga dynamic, self-correcting belief system. These prin-ciples may contain errors or half-truths, and they maynever attain a fixed and final form. Yet insofar as (a)their consistency is publicly verifiable, (b) their de-velopment is rational, and (c) their truth-content isdemonstrably greater than that of rival contenders,they do constitute reliable criteria by which to eval-uate subsidiary beliefs and hypotheses. What countsas effectively true must include at least implicit judg-ments about the universal and objective, for it is onlyby reference to an objective system of reality thatparticular assertions function at all as coherent cog-nitive acts.

In conclusion, though objectivism in the sense ofvulgar absolutism may be impossible, this does notimply that objectivity is impossible. Nor should a par-anoid fear of ethnocentrism deter marketing from pur-suing objectivity. Bernstein, on whom marketing'scrisis literature relies, was confused on both counts.As Schwandt (1990, p. 270) explains:

The confusion over the meaning of objectivity as aregulative ideal has arisen from [Bernstein's] con-founding it with the notion of objectivism and jux-taposing the latter with relativism. Recognizing that[Bernstein's] objectivism is a bankrupt notion in noway entails rejecting the bid to be objective, neitherdoes it follow that we must slide down the slipperyslope of relativism [italics in original].

Objectivity and MarketingResearch

Should the marketing research community pursue theideal of objectivity? The preceding discussion estab-lishes the negative case that there is nothing, abso-lutely nothing, in modem philosophy of science orpsychology that makes objectivity either impossibleor undesirable.'^ Let us conclude by exploring the"positive case" for objectivity. At the outset, we ac-knowledge that, because a community's regulativeideals are fundamental values, objectivity cannot beguaranteed or even known conclusively to be achieved.To restrict a community's goals to only those that canbe conclusively achieved or guaranteed would be,misguidedly, to treat the regulative ideals of a com-munity on a par with its tangible, short-run objectives.

When should any community of inquirers pursuethe ideal of objectivity? Both Scheffler (1982) and Harr6(1986) answer this question by focusing on the extentto which a community is relied on or trusted by oth-ers. Harre even develops his argument with the aid of

"Even philosophers strongly opposed to scientific realism agree (seeLaudan 1990, especially p. vii to x).


marketing language. Almost as though he had readLevitt's "Marketing Myopia," Harre (p. 12, 13, 15,20) contends that scientific communities are "in thebusiness of producing practically reliable scientificknowledge." He asks, "Why are the products of thescientific community marketable?" And he answers,"It can be nothing but the quality of the goods." In-deed, "scientific knowledge, is itself defined in moralterms. It is that knowledge upon which one can rely."Trust, the belief that one can confidently rely on oth-ers, sometimes arises out of direct personal experi-ence. Harre points out, though, that trust is usually"role-related." The fact that people often do not relyon others on the basis of direct knowledge, but be-cause of others' roles in their communities (e.g. "pro-fessor" and "market researcher"), provides a power-ful rationale for the marketing research community topursue the ideal of objectivity. Most assuredly, thecorporate clients of commercial marketing researchersrely on them. Equally assuredly, students, academi-cians, practitioners, government agencies, and con-sumers at times rely on the output provided by aca-demic marketing researchers (Monroe et al. 1988).Hence, the marketing research community, encom-passing both commercial and academic researchers,has a moral, professional obligation to pursue objec-tivity.

What does the pursuit of objectivity imply? ForScheffler, objectivity requires the "commitment to faircontrols over assertion" (p. 2). For Harre, it requiresthe community to exercise "quality control over itsproducts" (p. 12). In short, communities producingknowledge that will be (and can be) relied on by oth-ers must have a set of norms to maintain quality con-trol over assertion. Harre aptly points out a minimumnorm: "For there to be public reliability something must

exist independently of whomsoever first found it" (p.12). The minimum norm, therefore, for a commu-nity's knowledge claims to be relied on is for the com-munity to reject reality relativism and construction-ism. Because such doctrines specifically state that theirknowledge claims do not "touch base" with any real-ity other than that "constructed" by the researchersthemselves, such doctrines self-defeat even the poten-tial for being relied on by outside clients.

It is important to recognize that the norms a com-munity develops to control assertion in no way implythat such assertions are value-free or theory-free. In-deed, the clients of the marketing research communityhave the right to expect, nay insist, that our assertionsbe thoroughly "laden" with many values, one suchbeing the ideal of objectivity. Similarly, clients havea right to expect our assertions to be informed, well-informed, by our theories—our very best theories.However, the norms that control assertion in the mar-keting research community must strike a reasoned andreasonable balance between being overly restrictiveand overly permissive. For example, the norms, asimplemented through such mechanisms as the peer re-view process, must not be so permissive that "any-thing goes" in assertion, for such a stance would bedestructive of reliability and trust. (Indeed, if "any-thing goes," peer review is unnecessary.) If the normsare so restrictive that "nothing goes," the situation isequally undesirable. Avoiding error by remaining for-ever silent is not an acceptable option. What are thecurrent norms that control assertion in marketing re-search? Where along the continuum between "any-thing goes" and "nothing goes" do these norms lie?Should these norms be modified? If so, how? Theseare questions worth investigating—objectively, thatis.

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