ship pms
TRANSCRIPT
-
8/19/2019 Ship PMS
1/11
Future energy efficiency improvements within the US department of defense:
Incentives and barriers$
Ryan J. Umstattd
National Laboratories Technologies Fellow, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, USA
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 6 August 2008
Accepted 3 March 2009Available online 21 April 2009
Keywords:
Energy efficiency
Military
Financing
a b s t r a c t
The present work describes the military impact of improved efficiency and then highlights existing
technological, political, and financial barriers for improving overall energy efficiency. As the largest user
of energy within the US government, the Department of Defense (DOD) is rightly concerned that anydisruption to the nation’s energy supply may have an extremely adverse impact on its military
capabilities. The total solution to providing energy security will be multi-faceted with progress required
on many fronts. Increasing the use of renewable energy sources and improving energy storage
capabilities are gradually creating a positive impact, but investing in improving the overall efficiency of
the military effort provides both immediate and long-lasting payback. One might suppose that a
decrease in the energy used by the DOD should lead to a decrease in military capability, but historical
data proves otherwise. It is shown that the military has additional impetus, compared to civilian
consumers, to pursue energy-efficiency improvements. Many tools are available to help the DOD along
this path, yet there remain obstacles which must first be identified and analyzed as discussed herein.
Published by Elsevier Ltd.
1. Introduction
In Fiscal Year 2006 (FY06), the Department of Defense (DOD)
was responsible for 80% of the energy used by the US government
and almost 1% of the nation’s total energy use (EIA, 2007). Thus,
the DOD has a large vested interest in maintaining a stable and
secure supply of the energy it needs to accomplish its mission.
This notable market share also translates into a unique ability to
help shape the future of how the US generates, transports, stores,
and uses various energy sources. Given the current volatility and
uncertainty in the fossil-fuel market, it is imperative that the DOD
find ways to insulate its mission-effectiveness from these energy
price fluctuations. The scale of the problem is mind-boggling
when one considers that the DOD used 844 trillion British thermal
units (Btu’s; 1 Btu¼ 1055 J) of energy in FY06 (EIA, 2007) which is
roughly equivalent to the usage of a country such as Bulgaria,Denmark, or New Zealand (BP, 2007). It is therefore useful to
examine potential energy security solutions on a more manage-
able scale. Solutions can be classified as follows: (1) develop and
field new primary energy sources that do not rely on petroleum
and are preferably renewable, (2) reduce consumption through
conservation, and (3) improve the efficiency of energy use so that
more mission is accomplished per unit of energy input.
Efforts are currently underway within the DOD in all three of
these categories. Finding new energy sources is a significantresearch and development task that is beginning to return on
investment through successes such as flying military aircraft
including B-52s and C-17s on a 50/50 blend of JP-8 and synthetic
fuel which can be made from coal or natural gas (Drinnon, 2007).
Such research will continue and is expected to change the face
of how the DOD meets its energy needs in the long run. In
contrast, conservation efforts yield a more immediate payback.
Conservation is encouraged as an important part of the mindset of
all DOD employees (DUSD(I&E), 2008), but it can only be taken so
far before it begins to have a negative impact on accomplishing
the mission; while reducing the number of training hours flown
by military pilots does indeed save fuel, it does so at the cost of
the readiness and skill of those same pilots. Finally, improving
energy efficiency provides both immediate and long-term pay-back. If a building’s heating, cooling, and lighting can be renovated
such that the building now uses half as much energy as before, the
saved energy can be either used immediately to power a second
building or placed in the bank as savings to be expended at a later
date. Best of all, these savings continue to accrue year after year
following such a renovation.
This study focuses on improving energy efficiency as part of
the total energy solution for the DOD. Over time, the energy
intensity of the US economy has improved from using 18kBtu
while generating a chained 2000 dollar of gross domestic product
(GDP) in 1970 to using less than 9 kBtu to do the same in 2006
(EIA, 2007, p. xix). While this energy-intensity improvement by
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
journal homepage: w ww.elsevier.com/locate/enpol
Energy Policy
0301-4215/$- see front matter Published by Elsevier Ltd.
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2009.03.003
$Disclaimer : The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do
not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department
of Defense.
E-mail address: [email protected]
Energy Policy 37 (2009) 2870–2880
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/jepohttp://www.elsevier.com/locate/enpolhttp://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_2/dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2009.03.003mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_2/dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2009.03.003http://www.elsevier.com/locate/enpolhttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/jepo
-
8/19/2019 Ship PMS
2/11
itself does not provide insight into possible sectoral or environ-
mental considerations, it can be stated that the economy is
literally doing more with less by increasing the energy efficiency
of doing business. This factor of two improvement serves as a role
model for potential DOD advances in energy efficiency. Of course,
the DOD is not in the business of making wealth or even a
product, so its overall efficiency is more difficult to define much
less calculate. The DOD has many tasks that require large amounts
of energy such as transporting an entire infantry division acrossthe Atlantic Ocean over the span of several days. Such energy-
intensive tasks can still be considered efficient as long as the
desired task is accomplished with only minimal waste. To further
refine this study, the scope is limited to the energy used to keep
facilities running. In FY07, buildings and infrastructure accounted
for 26% of the energy used by the DOD at a total cost of $3.4B
(DUSD(I&E), 2007). For this significant portion of the energy
budget, the calculation of efficiency becomes more straightfor-
ward: how much energy per square foot of facility space is needed
to stay in operation? The desired end state is to maximize the
productivity of the people while minimizing the energy required
to sustain their working environment.
At present, there exist many energy-efficient building technol-
ogies that when combined using a holistic system approach, have
resulted in buildings with near-zero net energy use averaged over
a calendar year (ORNL Review, 2007, pp. 2–5). By combining
technologies such as solar panels, geothermal energy, consoli-
dated utility walls, structural insulated panels, controlled ventila-
tion, and advanced exterior finishes (ORNL Review, 2007, pp. 6–7),
both office buildings and residential homes can lower their energy
needs such that they are capable of generating much of their
required energy input on-site. As the DOD looks at its current
infrastructure and plans for future facilities, how can it best take
advantage of these potential improvements in energy efficiency?
The method of the present study is to contrast a survey of DOD
energy use data and DOD energy policy documents against the
backdrop of commercial/industrial energy use and government
energy policy as presented and studied in the both the open and
technical literature. By identifying the overlaps and disparities
between the energy perspective of the DOD and other large
organizations, the aim of the study is to provide new insights that
may be of use to future military energy policy. These insights are
limited in scope to those that apply to improving energy efficiency
within DOD facilities. The paper begins in Section 2 by first
examining historical trends in DOD energy usage and looking for
relevant comparisons. Section 3 then presents the energy problem
from the particular DOD perspective and describes several key
military benefits of improved energy efficiency in areas such as
logistics and overall force effectiveness. Because of the size and
complexity of the issue, Section 4 is devoted to an examination of
the barriers that obstruct the adoption of existing energy-
efficiency improvements specifically within DOD facilities. Iden-
tifying these current impediments is a first step towards findingways to overcome them. As described herein, the development of
sustainable DOD facilities will not only reduce energy use and
external dependence, but will also diminish the total logistics tail
thereby improving military capability. Thus, sustainability
through improved energy efficiency is a force multiplier that can
enhance military effectiveness in the face of shrinking access to
conventional energy resources.
2. DOD energy use and concerns
In recent years, the DOD has become increasingly concerned
with energy security, for modern US warfare relies heavily upon
the force multiplier of being able to access and deliver vast
quantities of energy. This concern is demonstrated through a
Defense Science Board (2001) report on reducing the DOD’s fuel
consumption, through a variety of service-level studies on energy
topics (Air Force Science Advisory Board, 2006; Navy Research
Advisory Council, 2005; Army Corps of Engineers, 2005), through
several individual studies by various service members (Amidon,
2005; Blackwell, 2007; Hornitschek, 2006; Kuntz, 2007; Lengyel,
2007), and, most recently, by the Defense Science Board (2008)
report on DOD Energy Strategy. This subject has also beenexamined in the technical literature (Hadder et al., 1989; Hall,
1992; Vallentin, 2008). The purpose of these studies, as with the
present study, is to illuminate the path forward for a secure
energy future. Before looking to this future, let us first examine
how historical DOD energy use and budget compare to the
traditional concept of economic energy intensity.
In personnel, budget, and energy use, the DOD is equivalent to
a small nation. In 2006, the DOD employed over 2 million people,
executed a budget of $499B, and used 840 TBtu of energy
(Historical Tables, 2008; EIA, 2007, p. 25). Thus, one might expect
to see a correlation between DOD energy use and DOD budget
that is similar to the correlation often observed between a nation’s
energy use and GDP. If such a correlation exists, then perhaps a
causality relationship can be determined to help shape future
DOD policy. Mozumder and Marathe (2007) summarized over 25
different studies from around the world of the causal relationship
between energy usage and economic growth and found no
consistent result that could be applied across countries, so
causality must still be investigated on a case-by-case basis.
We look for this possible correlation in Fig. 1 which shows DOD
budget (labeled according to the president that submitted that
year’s budget request) and total energy use.
The story told by Fig. 1 is more complicated than the linear
relationship often observed when examining a nation’s GDP and
energy usage. For the DOD, energy use and income do not appear
to be correlated. It is encouraging to see that total energy use has
generally been declining since 1990, but the reduction is not
directly in response to a declining budget. Since the energy use
per person was relatively flat, the decrease in total energy use is
attributed to the sharp drawdown in the number of DOD
personnel that occurred in the 1990s following the end of the
cold war. While both budget and energy use increased dramati-
cally following September 2001, the energy use per person has
recently returned to a more typical value near 400 MBtu per
person (average US citizen energy use is approximately 340 MBtu
per person (EIA, 2007, p. xix)). Since energy use and income do not
share the same correlation seen at the national level, one must
scrutinize carefully any models, strategies, or policies designed to
improve national economic energy intensity before applying them
to the DOD. Fig. 1 also serves to point out another key difficulty in
analyzing the DOD’s energy efficiency: what is the appropriate
metric? For a nation, it seems reasonable to expect a relationship
between wealth generation and energy use. For the DOD, onewould like instead to tie mission accomplishment to energy use.
Ideally, there would be a straightforward measurement of military
effectiveness per unit of energy used, but no such metric exists. In
spite of this difficulty, we can still use the data that we do have to
take a closer look at DOD energy use and search for potential
efficiencies to reap.
In FY07, the DOD used 865 TBtu of energy at a total cost of
$13.2B (DUSD(I&E), 2007). Given the $530B DOD budget that year
(Historical Tables, 2008), the energy cost equates to roughly 2.5%
of the total budget. Over the last 30 years, US national energy
expenditures averaged 8% of the GDP (EIA, 2007, p. 13), so the DOD
fraction of income that is spent on energy costs is significantly less
than the national average. In this aspect, the DOD looks more like
an average US household where residents spent roughly 2.4–4.0%
ARTICLE IN PRESS
R.J. Umstattd / Energy Policy 37 (2009) 2870–2880 2871
-
8/19/2019 Ship PMS
3/11
of their household income on energy during the years between
1987 and 2004 (Buildings Energy Data Book, 2006). This
comparison is flawed, however, considering that a typical house-
hold does not have multi-million dollar acquisition programs as
line items on the budget—the DOD makes such purchases
routinely without incurring the energy usage that is required for
the contractors to build the systems.
To draw a comparison between the DOD and the US business
sector, let us compare energy use in facility space (transportation
fuel costs are excluded). While commercial office space averaged
$1.80 in 2004 for energy expenditures per square foot (Buildings
Energy Data Book, 2006), the DOD spent $1.75 per square foot inFY07 for its 2B square feet of floor space (DUSD(I&E), 2007). Thus,
in facility space energy use, the DOD compares favorably to the
commercial US market. Credit for this standing is largely due to a
federally mandated program that led to a 30% improvement in
government facility energy efficiency between 1985 and 2005. As
a follow-on to this program, President Bush issued Executive
Order (EO) 13,423 in January 2007. This EO requires that every
federal agency, including the DOD, improve their facility energy
efficiency by 3% annually or by 30% total by 2015 (relative to a
2005 baseline). This goal attempts to accelerate by a factor of two
the improvements seen in the previous 20-year program. To
encourage development of additional renewable energy resources,
this EO also requires that at least 50% of renewable energy
purchases be from sources commissioned after 1 January 1999.
Thus, the DOD has incentive to improve facility energy efficiency
not just to potentially save money but also to comply with federal
mandate. As will be discussed further below, there are other
reasons, even more significant, for the DOD to pursue energy
efficiency.
Many past and on-going efforts seek a long-term solution to
assured fuel (see references at the beginning of this section), so
the present study has elected to focus instead on the $3.4B spent
powering DOD facilities. This facility space is spread across more
than 400 sites throughout the US in over 500,000 separate
buildings; almost one third of these buildings are greater than
50-years old (Environmental Security Technology CertificationProgram, 2008). We examine the energy supply and relative cost
mix to power these DOD facilities in Fig. 2.
The energy usage mix in DOD facility space is not notably
different from the mix within the US commercial building sector.
While electricity accounted for 47% of the energy needed by DOD
facilities, it accounted for 63% of the expenditures—electricity
is a ‘high fidelity’ energy source that provides on-demand
versatility at a premium price. Conversely, natural gas accounted
for 32% of facility energy needs, but accounted for only 18% of the
expenditures—a relative bargain that is leveraged mostly for
heating facility space. Electricity and natural gas combined
account for roughly 80% of both DOD energy needs and
expenditures, so these are the two most attractive source targets
for improving overall facility energy efficiency.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
DOD Budget & Energy Use vs Time
250
300
350
400
450
500
1970
B u
d g e
t ( F Y
2 0 0 0 $ B )
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
E n e r g y
U s
e d ( Q B t u )
$B
QBtu
~ 3.1 Million
~ 2.1 Million
# of DODPersonnel
Gulf War IRecovery /Reconstitution
DOD per capita Budget & Energy Use vs Time
50
70
90
110
130
150
170
190
210
230
B u
d g e
t ( F Y 2 0 0 0 $ k / p e r s o n
)
300
320
340
360
380
400
420
440
460
480
E n e r g y
U s e
d ( M B t u / p e r s o n
)
Budget
Energy
Ford ClintonCarter
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
BushReagan Bush
Ford ClintonCarter BushReagan Bush
Fig. 1. (a) Total and (b) per capita DOD Energy Use & Budget (chained 2000 $). Sources: data from EIA (2007, p. 25); Historical Tables (2007); conversion to chained 2000
dollars from the consumer price index, available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/.
R.J. Umstattd / Energy Policy 37 (2009) 2870–28802872
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/http://www.bls.gov/cpi/
-
8/19/2019 Ship PMS
4/11
3. Motivation for improved efficiency within the DOD
Since both homeowners and commercial companies are
heavily influenced by financial bottom-lines, energy-efficiency
investments often require a fairly rapid net positive return. The
DOD, however, is in the business of delivering military effective-
ness. While cost savings from energy efficiency are beneficial, the
true driver for DOD efficiency improvements should be the
enhanced ability to meet the objectives of the National Defense
Strategy including defending the external physical security of the
US While measuring total military effectiveness may not bestraightforward, there are several key enhancements to military
effectiveness that result from improving energy efficiency as
shown in Table 1.
It should be noted that all of these enhancements are possible
without sacrificing other militarily-prized attributes such as
speed, stealth, or precision. Each of these characteristics may
require a financial investment, but with a clear benefit to military
effectiveness. Thus, the DOD, unlike residential or commercial
energy consumers, has strong motivation to pursue increased
energy efficiency even if there are additional costs involved. Recall
that the entire DOD energy bill was only 2.5% of the DOD budget
in FY07, so the dollars at stake in the energy portion of the DOD
budget should not be the most significant factor in efficiency
decisions. While efficiency improvements may lead to returning
some portion of this 2.5% as savings, the true enormous potential
for savings is apparent when one looks beyond the energy portion
of the DOD budget as in the following example.
In 1944, the 1 million US troops in the fields of WWII
consumed an average of 1.8 million gallons of fuel per day. Sixty
years later in Gulf War II, 150,000 US troops used 4.1 million
gallons per day (DiPetto, 2008). Not only has the total fuel usage
grown by over a factor of two, but the fuel use per soldier has
skyrocketed from 1.8 gallons per day to 27 gallons per day! In
supporting a deployed Army unit today, 70% of the resupply
tonnage is fuel (Defense Science Board, 2001, p. 13). This fuelpowers not only the vehicles and weapons systems in the field,
but also much of the electronics at the most forward-deployed
locations via fuel-driven generators. To reliably deliver this fuel,
the DOD has developed an extensive and expensive infrastructure.
As of late 2007, approximately 80 military-guarded convoys were
continuously on the road between destinations in Iraq and Kuwait
(Defense Science Board, 2008, p. 15). From the thousands of troops
trained specifically for the petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL)
career fields, to fleets of air and ground fuel tankers, to the force
protection, care, and feeding of these assets, secure fuel delivery is
an expensive undertaking. Estimates for the true cost of fuel
in the field range from 10 times greater than the purchase
price (for air tanker delivered fuel) to over 100 times greater
than the purchase price (for fuel delivered to deep forward
ARTICLE IN PRESS
FY2007 DOD Facility Energy Use
32%
10%
3%7%
47%
1%
Electricity
Natural Gas
Fuel Oil
Purch.Steam
Coal
LPG/Propane
As a percentage of 220 TBtu
FY2007 DOD Facility Energy Expenditures
18%
10%6% 2%
63%1%
Electricity
Natural Gas
Fuel Oil
Purch.Steam
Coal
LPG/Propane
As a percentage of $3.4B
Fig. 2. (a) Energy usage and (b) cost by source for DOD facilities in FY 2007. Source: data from DUSD(I&E) (2007).
Table 1
Military benefits of improved energy efficiency.
Benefit Impact
Simplicity (Defense Science Board, 2001, p. 10) Decreased complexity and frequency of resupply and logistics planning.
Surprise (Defense Science Board, 2001, p. 10) I mpr oved s tealth th ro ugh r educed h eat s igna tu re (les s waste he at).
Reduced logistics tail Reduced vulnerability; frees combat forces from force protection mission.
Force mu ltiplication E ach syste m/so ldier is more effective (e .g. c arryin g mo re ammu nition rathe r tha n res erve en erg y) .
Increased resilience (Defense Science Board, 2008, p. 35) Total force is resistant to energy catastrophe and able to recover rapidly.Increased endurance (Defense Science Board, 2008, p. 35) Ability to provide sustained operations between fewer replenishments.
R.J. Umstattd / Energy Policy 37 (2009) 2870–2880 2873
-
8/19/2019 Ship PMS
5/11
operating bases) (Defense Science Board, 2001, p. ES-3). When
the system as a whole is considered, the potential financial
gains at stake through reduced fuel use become significantly
more than just the 2.5% of the DOD budget that goes towards
energy.
The total forecast savings from improving energy efficiency is
thus much more than simply the reduction in the energy
purchased. Over time, significant savings accumulate through
reductions in required infrastructure. While using less energy mayalso help extend the life of limited fossil-fuel-based energy
reserves, the greater impact will be the improvement to military
effectiveness through enhanced endurance, a reduced logistics
tail, force multiplication, and increased resilience. In his analysis
of military energy efficiency, Hornitschek (2006, p. 44) noted,
‘‘The military has always valued capabilities and effective-
ness (such as speed, mass, stealth, and so forth) over efficiency
for good reason—restraint when national survival is at risk is
illogical. However, this is a short-term perspective and in an
energy-constrained environment, efficiency becomes its own effect ,
enabling the sustained application of other desired military
effects.’’ [Emphasis added] For the DOD, improvements in energy
efficiency should be pursued not simply because they make
defense cheaper or because they are mandated by Executive
Order, but because they make for a more effective fighting force.
Rather than evaluate potential efficiency investments based only
upon near-term cost savings, the DOD should recognize and be
willing to pay for these military benefits of improved energy
efficiency.
4. Impediments: classification and analysis
While improving energy efficiency can very often quickly
become a winning financial investment in the commercial and
residential sectors, we have seen that the DOD has an even
stronger impetus to pursue efficiency as a path to increased
military effectiveness. A variety of technological, political, and
financial tools are currently available to help improve energy
efficiency, and yet there still remains much inefficiency within
DOD facilities. An important first step towards progress is to first
identify and understand the barriers that presently prevent the
DOD from rapidly adopting such tools.
As energy efficiency has been receiving increasing attention as
one of the cornerstones of energy security; many studies by
authors of very different backgrounds have provided a variety of
perspectives on what prevents us from becoming more efficient
(Brown, 2001; Gan et al., 2007; Lovins, 2005; Rohdin et al., 2007;
Sola and Xavier, 2007; Wilbanks, 1994). These studies have
identified barriers in all sectors (commercial, residential, and
industrial) and at all scales from national economies down to
individual household members. In addition to the studies of
specific barriers above, significant theories on the benefits andlimitations of performing barrier analyses are also available ( Jaffe
and Stavins, 1994; Sorrell et al., 2000; Sorrell et al., 2004; Weber,
1997). It should be recognized that barrier models alone do not
successfully determine an optimal level of efficiency ( Jaffe and
Stavins, 1994), but they can nevertheless illuminate areas that
may warrant intervention via public policy (Sorrell et al., 2000).
The categorization of these barriers differs somewhat from author
to author and includes areas such as financial, behavioral,
organizational, policy, awareness, institutional, market imperfec-
tions, cultural, technological, and regulatory issues. While the
overlap and dividing lines amongst these categories are nearly
impossible to prescribe definitively, let us here attempt to refine a
list for the DOD through consolidation. Regulation or policy can
influence many institutional, organizational, or awareness bar-
riers, so these considerations are here addressed in a single
political category. Individual behavior and cultural barriers can be
significant challenges when attempting to reduce energy use
through conservation. The goal of this study, however, is to
improve energy efficiency rather than increase conservation
efforts. For the purposes of improving energy efficiency, wasteful
individual behavior and group culture often change or may be
nullified when presented with new technologies that come along
at the right time and right price. As an example, since its inceptionin 1992 in the US, over 2B ENERGY STAR qualified products across
more than 50 different product categories have been purchased
resulting in an estimated $14B in energy cost savings in 2006
(ENERGY STAR, 2006). Thus, these behavioral and cultural
impediments may be treated in the technological category. For
the present study then, the barriers have been focused into three
main groupings: technological, political, and financial. In some
cases, a particular barrier bleeds over into more than one of
these categories, which is a characteristic of barriers noted
previously by Weber (1997) and Sorrell et al. (2000). In addition,
because improving facility energy efficiency is such a large-scale
problem, many of these barriers and potential solutions reach
beyond the normal realm of DOD responsibility—the DOD will
need the assistance of other federal offices, organizations and US
industry if they are to truly maximize their energy efficiency. Let
us now examine several impediments in each of these three
categories.
4.1. Technological
4.1.1. Insufficient energy storage
Lack of affordable, efficient energy storage hinders our ability
to decouple real-time energy supply from real-time energy
demand. To take full advantage of solar, wind, or other localized
distributed energy systems, we must be able to store excess
energy whenever instantaneous input exceeds instantaneous
demand so that it can be used later. Greater energy storage
capacity also improves the ability of an energy supply network to
respond to fluctuations in supply or demand. Fig. 3 is an
illustration of the dichotomy faced when selecting among many
presently available energy storage options.
Our man-made attempts to create energy storage media such
as batteries, flywheels, compressed air, or pumped hydro are
orders of magnitude more heavy and costly compared to the fossil
fuels that nature has provided; a notable exception is the candy
bar which has an energy density and energy cost near that of
hydrogen. We also see that delivered electricity is over 1000 times
cheaper than the cost to store this energy for later use. One might
pay only half a cent for the electricity needed to power a computer
for 4 h, but if one wants this computer to be a portable laptop, one
must pay $100 for the luxury of having a battery that makes this
amount of energy available where and when it is needed. Withsuch a large disparity between the cost of generating versus
storing electrical energy, it will be extremely difficult for
intermittent renewable energy sources such as solar and wind
power to realize their full potential. An increasing ability to
manufacture biofuel may help displace some of the need for fossil
fuels, but generating electricity from biofuel will likely suffer the
same dismal 30–35% delivery efficiency typically seen when
burning fossil fuels. Hydrogen is a promising energy storage
option—it can be used both as a combustion fuel (generating only
water vapor as exhaust) or as a source for electricity (if feeding a
fuel cell). However, significant hurdles still face a potential
hydrogen economy including improving the affordability and
efficiency of hydrogen production, transport, and storage (Sims
et al., 2007).
ARTICLE IN PRESS
R.J. Umstattd / Energy Policy 37 (2009) 2870–28802874
-
8/19/2019 Ship PMS
6/11
4.1.2. Tunnel vision
When applying technological solutions to improve energy
efficiency, one always receives the most benefit by stepping back
to view the larger system rather than just the specific gadget. Bypursuing an overall system-level perspective, we can minimize
the chance that we will implement an incremental improvement
while overlooking a revolutionary one. Lovins (2005, p. 16) uses
his home in Colorado as an example:
In outdoor temperatures down to 44 1C, it is feasible to grow
bananas at 2200 m elevationy with no heating system, yet
with reduced construction cost, because the superwindows,
superinsulation, air-to-air heat exchangers, and other invest-
ments needed to eliminate the heating system cost less to
install than the heating system would have cost to instally
optimizing a house as a system rather than optimizing a
component in isolation, and optimizing for lifecycle costy can
make a superefficient house cheaper to build, not just to run,by eliminating costly heating and cooling systems.
One can apply this same principle to the efficiency of a
facility’s electricity supply system. At present, nearly all electricity
generation occurs at massive generation plants. Fuel is shipped in
and expended, then waste heat and electricity are sent out.
Centralized generation makes sense because the economy of scale
reduces the cost of the fuel delivery and helps safely manage any
hazardous wastes or otherwise dangerous parts of the process.
When fuel supply and environmental safety can be otherwise
ensured, then distributed electricity generation can be employed
instead with huge potential efficiency gains. A combined cooling,
heating and power system is an example of how incoming natural
gas can be used to locally generate the desired comforts whilepreventing the losses associated with waste heat at a central
power plant or electricity transmission losses. Overall system
efficiencies can reach 70–80% compared to the present 30%
delivery efficiency of the US electrical grid (EIA, 2007, p. 221).
Finally, the principle of taking a systems-level view should be
used when it appears the efficiency ceiling has been hit. If the
science and engineering will not allow the efficiency of a part or
process to increase, can the waste of the system be put to good
use? Combined cooling, heating and power systems and com-
bined solar photovoltaic/thermal panels both take advantage of
what would otherwise be waste heat in order to boost their
overall efficiency. As a further example, when organic waste
decomposes at a landfill, the biogas that is generated can either be
released into the atmosphere or processed rather simply yielding
fuel equivalent to natural gas—by looking at the landfill as a
whole system, one can take what was a greenhouse gas emission
and transform it into a renewable energy solution. There are
doubtless many DOD facilities (and systems within these facil-ities) that could benefit from this sort of analysis. Getting this
analysis, however, will not be easy:
Such system design requires a diverse background, deep
curiosity, often a transdisciplinary design team, and meticu-
lous attention to detail. Whole-system design is not what any
engineering school appears to be teaching, nor what most
customers currently expect, request, reward, or receive. But it
represents a key part of the ‘overhang’ of practical, profitable,
unbought energy efficiency that so far remains missing from
virtually all official studies. (Lovins, 2005, p. 19)
4.1.3. Missing data
In management, you pay attention to what you measure.
Conversely, it becomes quite difficult to focus useful attention on
an issue if you cannot measure its features. Remarkably, many of
the buildings within the federal government do not even have an
electricity meter! To remedy this problem, Section 103 of the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 requires that all federal buildings have
metered electricity by 1 October 2012. At the end of FY07, only
34% of the DOD’s electricity was metered at the building level
(DUSD(I&E), 2007). As the DOD closes this gap, they have an
opportunity to leap forward by installing advanced metering that
can provide daily updates and break out hourly consumption. If
preparing for future on-site electricity generation, installed
meters should not be simply two-way (i.e., rolling backwards or
forwards depending on net electricity flow), but rather the meters
should measure gross electricity consumption and productionseparately and simultaneously. Such data may be critical in a
future where more utility companies may charge separately for
the delivered electricity and for the ability to transport energy
over their network.
Individual metering of buildings is critical not just to achieving
better facility efficiencies but also to maintaining this perfor-
mance. The Air Force and Department of Energy have recently
collaborated on energy audits geared at improving the energy
efficiency at various Air Force facilities (Lalley, 2007). To receive
the largest possible benefit from an energy-efficiency expert
evaluation, one must have accurate building-by-building data.
This data becomes even more important when building occu-
pancy or function changes and energy use creeps up, at which
point a ‘re-commissioning’ may be in order. Another data tool that
ARTICLE IN PRESS
1000000
100000
10000
1000
100
10
1
E n e r g y
D e n s i t y ( k J / k g )
0.1 1 10 100 1000 10000 100000
Energy Cost (kJ / $)
more affordable
m o r e p o r t a b l e
petroleum fuels, hydrogen,biofuels, candy bars
batteries, flywheels,
compressed air,pumped hydro
c o s t o f e l e c r i c i t y
a t $ 0 . 1 0 p e r
k W / h r
Fig. 3. Energy density versus cost for various energy storage options. Source: numbers are approximates averaged from several vendor web sites.
R.J. Umstattd / Energy Policy 37 (2009) 2870–2880 2875
-
8/19/2019 Ship PMS
7/11
has proven useful during facility-efficiency evaluations has been
the thermal imaging camera. Commercially available relatively
affordable cameras now allow inspectors to clearly see even very
small temperature differences that may indicate improper seals or
interior insulation.
By gathering the right data, one may even come to surprising
conclusions regarding energy efficiency that can help guide future
actions. In a Netherlands study of energy use versus personal
values, Vringer et al. (2007) found that households sorted byextremely different value patterns (categorized as caring faithful,
conservatives, hedonists, balanced, materialists, professionals,
broad minded, and social minded) all used nearly the same
amount of energy—to within75%! A much better discriminator
for energy use was found to be the household income—high-
income households on an average used twice as much energy as
low-income households. Thorough analysis empowered by being
able to ask and answer the right questions may yet lead to further
facility-efficiency improvements.
4.2. Political
4.2.1. Wrong driver
Near-term energy cost savings is the wrong basis for making
most DOD efficiency improvement decisions. Any policy to use
18–36 month projected energy cost savings as the primary driver
for such decisions severely limits the scope of what can be
accomplished through efficiency improvements. Recall that the
entire DOD energy bill in FY07 was only 2.5% of the total DOD
budget, so even if energy efficiency magically improved and cut
energy use in half, the total energy cost savings would amount to
only 1.25% of the DOD budget. This miniscule potential savings
tends to reduce the priority of improving DOD energy efficiency
during the decision-making process. The calculation of the true
benefit of energy-efficiency improvements must also include cost
savings in other arenas such as logistics, transportation, person-
nel, etc. With fuel being 70% of the resupply tonnage to deployed
Army units (Defense Science Board, 2001, p. 13), the cost savings
reaped by cutting this tonnage in half is orders of magnitude
greater than the cost of the saved fuel. DOD policy is starting to
move in the right direction to correct this oversight; the Under
secretary of Defense for Acquisition, technology and logistics
initiated a pilot program in April 2007 that will develop the best
business practices to enable acquisition programs to account for
the fully burdened cost of fuel in their program calculations and
decisions (Krieg, 2007). While burdened calculations will not have
a large direct impact on the cost of fuel figures for DOD facilities
within the continental US, the lesson learned is valuable and
applicable nonetheless: one must look further than simple 18–36
month energy cost savings for accurate assessments of potential
energy-efficiency savings.
Ideally, the calculation of the benefits of improving energyefficiency would also take into account the benefits of force
multiplication, increased resilience, and increased endurance.
While these attributes may be difficult to observe or calculate
when looking at a single system, their effects quickly become
apparent during large-scale exercises. Many war games and other
simulation packages do incorporate system efficiencies during
their execution, but they would be of higher utility if they also
allowed the user to easily adjust efficiency numbers to perform
quick trade-off studies, particularly in support of acquisition
program decisions. Along a similar vein, the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council has agreed to ‘‘selectively apply an Energy
Efficiency Key Performance Parameter as necessary’’ for some
acquisition programs (Giambastiani, 2006). It is certainly a step in
the right direction, but it is doubtful that this policy alone can
fully capture the benefits that improved energy efficiency can
bring to military effectiveness.
4.2.2. Inadequate metrics
The DOD does not have a metric that measures military
effectiveness per unit of input energy. Lacking such a metric, they
cannot establish a clear goal and then measure their progress
towards that goal. Lacking such a metric, they cannot determine
when they have cut too deeply and started to actually reducemilitary effectiveness. Perhaps such a metric is an impossibility,
but there certainly remains progress to be made towards that
ideal.
With regards to facilities, what is done at present is measure
energy usage per square foot. This energy-intensity metric is
common within the commercial industry and is used by federal
agencies to track their progress towards meeting facility efficiency
goals such as the 30% energy-intensity reduction required
between 2005 and 2015 according to Executive Order 13,423. In
delivered energy per square foot, the DOD and US commercial
sector are quite comparable: the DOD used 112kBtu per square
foot averaged over their 2B square feet of facility space in FY07
(DUSD(I&E), 2007), while the US commercial sector used 110kBtu
per square foot averaged over their 75B square feet of space in2004 (Buildings Energy Data Book, 2006, Summary Sheet 9). Since
much of the DOD facility space is office space identical to the
commercial sector, the energy source (electricity, natural gas, etc.)
and end-use (lighting, heating, cooling, etc.) breakouts are also
quite comparable. Thus, looking for best practices from the
commercial industry is an excellent strategy for improving DOD
facility energy efficiency. The Air Force is actively pursuing this
strategy through events such as the expert panel discussion that
took place at the USAF Energy Forum II; panel members included
facility energy executives from CB Richard Ellis, IBM Corporation,
Biswanger Advisory Services, Inc., General Motors, Jones Lang
LaSalle, and the Air Force (Energy Forum II, 2008).
Even this seemingly appropriate metric of energy use per
square foot must be used with some caution, however. Whatpeople truly desire is to have a space that is comfortable in terms
of temperature, humidity, lighting, and ability to power our
appliances and electronics. Thus, arbitrarily continuing to reduce
the target for energy use per square foot will eventually have a
deleterious effect on occupants’ ability to perform normal duties
unless we find innovative ways to supply these same comforts
using less energy per square foot. As the DOD continues to
improve its facility efficiency, it will become necessary to
reevaluate the goals and the metrics used to measure progress
towards those goals. They must design and select metrics that
measure progress towards the truly desired end state.
4.2.3. Inconsistent backing
Political support for various paths towards improved energyefficiency has suffered from spotty, and sometimes nonexistent,
backing from the federal government and DOD. As this support is
often in the form of financial incentives, we see here an example
of a barrier that is both political and financial in nature. Adding
wind or solar renewable energy sources to the power grid is an
effective efficiency gain because this energy reduces the amount
of electrical energy and waste heat that would otherwise be
produced at a conventional fossil-fuel-burning plant. Yet two
critical US incentives to develop more wind and solar energy
are presently being allowed to expire at the end of 2008: the
Production Tax Credit (PTC) and the Investment Tax Credit. The
Production Tax Credit stimulates the creation of new wind energy
plants by supplying utility companies with a 2 cent credit for
every kilowatt-hour of wind energy produced during a facility’s
ARTICLE IN PRESS
R.J. Umstattd / Energy Policy 37 (2009) 2870–28802876
-
8/19/2019 Ship PMS
8/11
first 10 years of operation. Since it is inception in 1992, the PTC
has been provided off-and-on via various 1 and 2 year extensions.
In fact, it has even been allowed to lapse during three separate
years. The catastrophic effect of these lapses is seen clearly in
Fig. 4.
Installation of new wind energy nearly came to a stand still in
2000, 2002, and 2004 because of these lapses. Conversely, the
consistent incentive available from 2005 through 2007 is almost
certainly a key ingredient in the explosive growth seen in 2007.
The expiration of the PTC due to occur at the end of this year is
likely already resulting in reduced wind investment as these
projects often take many months to become operational. The
Investment Tax Credit (ITC) provides for up to a $2000 credit on
residential installation of solar energy and will expire at the same
time. One current proposal on the table is to extend both credits
for 8 years, double the ITC credit, and make the ITC credit
available also to utility companies. At the time of this writing, it
remains to be seen whether or not Congress will find a way to
make the commitment to long-term support for these renewable
energy sources. [Post-submission update: On 3 October, 2008,
Congress extended the PTC by only 1 year but the ITC by 8 years.
In addition, the $2000 cap for residential installation credit has
been lifted on the ITC so that it will provide a true 30% tax credit,
and utility companies are no longer prohibited from benefiting
from the credit.]
Within the DOD, there are also fluctuations regarding support
for efficiency improvement tools. Several financial vehicles have
been available to federal agencies now for more than two decades.
As with the tax credits above, though, there have been occasional
lapses in the federal authority to use some of these tools. Perhaps
the most powerful of these tools, the Energy Savings Performance
Contract (ESPC) is presently authorized for initiation through
2016 by the Energy Policy Act of 2005. In an ESPC, efficiencyimprovements implemented by the contractor are paid for using
the majority of the energy cost savings, a process which can take
10–25 years to complete the payback. Since 1998, several Super
ESPCs, designed to serve either a large geographic region or a
specific-energy technology, have been in place to help streamline
the challenging contracting process. In addition, the Federal
Energy Management Program offers assistance to all federal
agencies in utilizing these Super ESPCs to accomplish their energy
use goals and upgrade their energy infrastructure. According to
the Department of Energy’s Federal Energy Management Program,
as of 2007 over 400 ESPC projects had been awarded in 46 states
by 19 different federal agencies resulting in a total savings of
16TBtu per year—enough energy to supply city of 450,000 for one
year. While the DOD has regularly taken advantage of this
program (10 new ESPC tasks were awarded in FY07 (DUSD(I&E),
2007), in October of 2007 the Air Force increased the burden of
the ESPC approval process and centralized the oversight (Eulberg,
2007). In fact, across the DOD in 2007, the use of ESPCs declined
enough that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations
and Environment) issued a policy memo in January 2008
requiring the services to include ESPCs in their plans for reducing
energy consumption (DUSD(I&E), 2008). In response, the Decem-
ber 2008 Air Force Energy Program Policy Memorandum requiresthat each ESPC be evaluated ‘‘to ensure it provides the best return
on investment for the Air Force’’ (Donley, 2008). Thus, while the
DOD is encouraging the use of ESPCs as part of an energy savings
strategy, the Air Force instead is emphasizing cost savings in their
selection of ESPCs, thereby limiting the application of these long-
term investment tools.
Another missing piece of energy-efficiency policy is the
stimulation that would be provided by federal legislation that
enables a cap and trade market for carbon dioxide emissions.
While the present study does not address reducing greenhouse
gas emissions, it should be noted that any serious effort to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions will include a large component
dedicated to energy-efficiency improvement. Though the US
withdrew from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change in
March of 2001, other countries around the world embarked on
their efforts to meet the terms of the Protocol. In fact, Europe has
had carbon caps in place since 2005 and is well on their way to
establishing a well regulated and profitable carbon trading
market. The lethargy of the US is even more puzzling in the face
of the enormously successful role that the sulfur dioxide emission
market has played herein eliminating the problem of acid rain
ever since this market was born out of the emission restrictions
imposed by the Clean Air Act of 1990. According to Richard Sandor
(2008), the Chicago Climate Exchanges chairman and CEO, the
idea of a sulfur dioxide exchange market ‘‘attracted a surprising
number of environmentalists, because it called for large and
specific reductions; conservatives who usually oppose regulation
approved of the market-driven solution.’’ Through the use of the
sulfur dioxide exchange market, emissions have successfully been
reduced from 18 million tons to 9 million tons and are expected to
be below 5 million tons by 2010. This was accomplished because
there was money to be made while addressing the mandatory
emission reductions; when there is real money at stake,
innovative solutions have a way of surfacing. Sandor (2008)
continues: ‘‘The lesson is important: price stimulates inventive
activity. Even if you think the price is too low or ridiculous. Carbon
has to be rationed, like water and clean air. But I absolutely
promise that if you design a law and a trading scheme properly
you are going to find everyone from professors at M.I.T. to the guys
in Silicon Valley coming out of the woodwork. That is what we
need, and we need it now.’’ Legislated carbon dioxide emission
caps and the money at stake in the subsequent trade market
would almost certainly stimulate energy-efficiency improve-ments, thereby potentially killing two birds with one stone.
4.2.4. Fragmentation
One further notable hurdle facing facility energy-efficiency
improvements is the extreme fragmentation of the US building
industry. When a new technology is demonstrated to be both
energy efficient and affordable, it still remains extremely difficult
to achieve market penetration because there is no short list of
major players in construction. Instead, new technologies are
adopted painfully slowly, if at all, in one small pocket after
another. This fragmentation is not unique to the US as it has also
been observed in the UK (Sorrell, 2003). The residential building
sector is even more fragmented than the commercial sector; in
ARTICLE IN PRESS
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
U . S . A n
n u a
l W i n d C a p a c
i t y
I n s
t a l l e
d ( M W )
1999
Years with no Production Tax Credit
9 3 %
d e c r e a s e
7 3
% d e c r e a s e
7 7
% d e c r e a s e
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Fig. 4. Impact of lapses in the production tax credit for wind energy. Source: data
from American Wind Energy Association, http://www.awea.org/legislative/ac-
cessed 20 March, 2008.
R.J. Umstattd / Energy Policy 37 (2009) 2870–2880 2877
http://www.awea.org/legislative/http://www.awea.org/legislative/
-
8/19/2019 Ship PMS
9/11
2005, the top 5 residential homebuilders together accounted for
only 15% of homes built, and the top 100 together accounted for
only 37% (Buildings Energy Data Book, 2006, Summary Sheet 22).
A solution to this fragmentation problem perhaps lies in the
efforts of groups like the National Institute of Building Sciences,
the American Institute of Architects, the National Association of
Home Builders, and the Alliance to Save Energy—organizations
that can rally the critical mass needed to adopt a new technology
or policy by bringing people together, recognizing best practicesalongside outstanding performers, and spreading the word.
4.3. Financial
4.3.1. Disincentives
Perhaps the most insidious barriers to improving facility
energy efficiencies are the financial disincentives that are
intertwined with the way we presently do business. Let us borrow
a simple illustration from Lovins (2005, p. 19): ‘‘In a typical US
office, using one-size-fatter wire to power overhead lights would
pay for itself within 20 weeks. Why wasn’t that done? Because:
(1) The wire size was specified by the low-bid electrician, who
was told to ‘meet code,’ and the wire-size table in the [US]
National Electrical Code is meant to prevent fires, not to save
money. Saving money by optimizing resistive losses takes wire
about twice as fat. (2) The office owner or occupant will buy the
electricity, but the electrician bought the wire. An electrician
altruistic enough to buy fatter wire is not the low bidder and
won’t win the job.’’ Similarly, the owner versus tenant disin-
centive plays a crucial role in many commercial and residential
buildings. An owner who leases or rents the property has no
incentive to install energy-efficient features because they typi-
cally cost more; likewise, a tenant lacks incentive because short-
term energy cost savings will not likely repay the investment.
A related disincentive lurks in the way most US utility
companies supply energy. With most commodities, the profits
increase with sales volume—if you sell less product, you will reap
less profit. Why would utility companies want to help their
customers improve their energy efficiency if the improvements
result in reduced profits? To address this issue, several states have
started decoupling utility company profits from sales volumes.
One way to accomplish this decoupling is to charge separately for
energy usage versus energy transmission—if customer energy
usage falls such that the utility company does not recoup its costs
for maintaining or upgrading the transmission infrastructure,
then the transmission fees can be raised. Utility company profits
are thus protected even if energy usage falls, and while customers
see little if any cost savings from their reduced energy usage, they
benefit indirectly by not having to pay for the increased energy
infrastructure that would otherwise be needed if overall usage
increased. Led by California, which decoupled profits from sales
volume in 1982, many other states have taken similar stepsincluding Oregon, Maryland, Idaho, New York, and Minnesota,
but the vast majority of utilities across the nation have yet
to be decoupled. There are several variations on how to
accomplish this decoupling; in each market, the implementation
must be tailored carefully to avoid unintended consequences. To
encourage the growth of efficient distributed energy systems,
such decoupling should be designed to allow utility companies to
charge transmission fees for energy either downloaded from or
uploaded to the grid. Under such a model, utility companies can
encourage the growth of point-of-use, small-scale electricity
generation without suffering a severe profit loss. Both the utility
company and customers then benefit from a more robust energy
source network enhanced by additional generation and storage
capacity.
4.3.2. Missing local rewards
When residential or commercial consumers manage to save
money through energy-efficiency improvements, they can enjoy
this savings by using it however they see fit. Within the DOD,
however, this same flexibility does not exist. In most cases, money
that is intended to pay for energy bills must pay for energy
only—if a base saves money by reducing their energy costs, the
base commander cannot use the savings to reward the commu-
nity. While commanders have been given the flexibility to locallyspend energy savings on other energy-related projects, it requires
extreme creativity to find ways to otherwise motivate people to
improve their energy efficiency.
Another unfortunate reality within the DOD is that money
not spent during the year often becomes money lost the next
year. Leaders are thus concerned that showing a cost savings
now will result in a reduced budget in the future. This effect
should not be a concern if the leader is convinced that the savings
are true and will continue year after year, but this effect
does inhibit energy-efficiency experiments that might work one
year because of a particular weather pattern or personnel
priorities. If energy costs rise the next year, the scramble to cover
the increase will likely result in having to cut other programs or
services.
4.3.3. Unfunded requirements
Unfunded requirements often become unaccomplished re-
quirements. When a requirement to improve energy efficiency is
levied without the identification of additional funding to support
the effort, success becomes an unlikely outcome. In the interest of
saving money, some leaders would like to accomplish such
efficiency improvement using organic resources, but which team
member has the expertise and time to devote to the project? And
how will any capital costs be paid? Within the US federal
government, several financial tools are available to help save the
project. Energy Savings Performance Contracts and Utility Energy
Service Contracts can provide the expertise, manpower, and
capital to accomplish efficiency improvements with little or no
investment from the federal agency. As the DOD struggles with
how to take the next steps to improve energy efficiency, there are
perhaps novel combinations or applications of these financial
tools that can be applied to maximize their impact. The Air Force
is currently examining options for offering Enhanced Use Leases
on base to companies willing to build, own, and operate solar and
nuclear energy plants; adding a Power Purchase Agreement
between the Air Force and the company can then help to ensure
the profitability of such a venture (Air Force Real Property Agency,
2008). Given the Air Force’s current interest in domestically
produced fuel, can an on-base nuclear plant be collocated with a
renewable fuels plant that utilizes the nuclear plant’s waste heat
for processing the fuel?
To address the manpower aspect of unfunded requirements,some bases have begun to employ resource-efficiency managers
(REMs). These contractors are energy experts who provide their
services by covering their salaries year-to-year using a portion of
the savings they generate. Taken to the limit, REMs should
eventually work themselves out of their jobs, leaving in their wake
a vast number of facility-efficiency improvements. In general, an
organization should have approximately $3M or more of annual
energy expenditures for the hiring of a dedicated REM to be cost
effective. Smaller facilities, though, can still benefit from a REM by
sharing the cost of the REM with other small facilities. As of July
2004, only 25 REMs were in place servicing approximately 40
federal facilities (Federal Energy Management Program, 2004).
Given that DOD facility energy costs were $3.4B in FY07, such
expenditure could justify employment of closer to 1000 REMs.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
R.J. Umstattd / Energy Policy 37 (2009) 2870–28802878
-
8/19/2019 Ship PMS
10/11
This self-funding expert manpower has yet to be fully utilized to
improve DOD facility energy efficiency.
While the foundational pillars of technology, policy, and
financing must each be in place and strong for an energy-
efficiency improvement to take hold, within the DOD there is a
further requirement. As noted by the recently retired commander
of the Air Force’s Air Combat Command (Keys, 2008), ‘‘only
mission drives long-term commitment.’’ Thus, as the DOD moves
forward with removing or circumventing the efficiency barriers
described here, they must do so with the understanding that their
efforts are doomed to fail unless the end result improves their
ability to get the job done. Table 2 is a summary of the 10 key
obstacles identified in this study along with recommended action
agents that either are or could be pursuing remedies.
5. Conclusion
While improving efficiency saves energy, an even more
significant benefit of improved efficiency for the DOD is the
resulting increase in military effectiveness. Efficiency improve-
ments bring with them many military enhancements worthpaying for such as simplicity, surprise, a reduced logistics tail,
force multiplication, increased resilience, and increased endur-
ance. Thus, energy cost savings should not be a principle factor
when deliberating over proposed energy-efficiency improve-
ments. The true savings incurred through efficiency improve-
ments are often many times greater than the simple cost of the
energy, so there is much more at stake than the $3.4B of the DOD
budget that is presently consumed by facility energy costs. While
a plethora of tools exist to help the DOD on the path towards
improved energy efficiency within its facilities, there are still
many roadblocks that must be overcome. To assist in focusing
future efficiency improvement efforts, the 10 obstacles discussed
herein were assigned to 3 general barrier categories, and lead
agencies were proposed for resolving each of these impediments.
By addressing these technological, political, and financial barriers
that stand in the way of DOD facility energy-efficiency improve-
ments, the DOD can deliver a secure energy future while
simultaneously improving both their sustainability and military
effectiveness.
Acknowledgements
The author performed this study as a National Technologies
Laboratory Fellow supported by the US Air Force’s Air University
and the Department of Energy’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
Additional financial support was provided by the USAF Institute
for National Security Studies. The author gratefully acknowledges
the knowledge, guidance, and time of the following individuals:
T. Vane, K. Meidel, S. Thomas, R. Hawsey, P. Hughes, D. Stinton,
T. King, T. Wilbanks, D. Greene, and A. Desjarlais at the Oak Ridge
National Laboratory; S. Hearne, D. Sheets, and J. Fittipaldi at the
Army Environmental Policy Institute; G. Doddington and J. Snook
at the Air Force Civil Engineering Support Agency; J. Barnett
and J. Dominick at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory;
R. Rude at Minot AFB; G. Denslow at Dyess AFB; and W. Turner atFairchild AFB.
References
Air Force Real Property Agency, 2008. Enhanced Use Leasing Solicitation nos.AFRPA-08-R-0005, -0006 and -0007.
Air Force Science Advisory Board, 2006. Technology Options for Improved AirVehicle Fuel Efficiency.
Amidon, J.M., 2005. America’s Strategic Imperative: A National Energy PolicyManhattan Project. Air University, February 2005.
Army Corps of Engineers, 2005. Energy Trends and Their Implications for US ArmyInstallations.
Blackwell, K.E., 2007. Department of Defense and Energy Independence: OptimismMeets Reality. Air University, April 2007.
BP, 2007. BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2007, p. 40.Brown, M.A., 2001. Market failures and barriers as a basis for clean energy policies.
Energy Policy 29, 1197–1207.Buildings Energy Data Book, 20 06. US Department of Energy, Energy Efficiency and
Renewable Energy, Tables 4.2.7, 4.3.2.Defense Science Board, 2001. Task Force on Improving Fuel Efficiency of Weapons
Platforms, More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden (Wa-shington, D.C.: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisitions,Technology and Logistics, January 2001).
Defense Science Board, 2008. Task Force on DOD Energy Strategy, More Fight–LessFuel (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisi-tions, Technology and Logistics, February 2008).
Donley, M., 2008. Air Force Energy Program Policy Memorandum, AFPM 10-1,Secretary of the Air Force, 19 December 2008.
DiPetto, C., 2008. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DOD EnergyStrategy. USAF Energy Forum II, Arlington, VA, 3 March 2008, p. 20.
Drinnon, R., 2007. C-17 uses synthetic fuel blend on transcontinental flight, AirForce Link. 18 December 2007.
DUSD(I&E) (Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment),2007. FY2007 Energy Management Data Report.
DUSD(I&E) (Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment),2008. Statement of Mr. Wayne Arny (DUSD(I&E)) before the Subcommittee onReadiness of the House Armed Services Committee, 13 March 2008.
EIA (Energy Information Administration), 2007. Energy Information Administra-tion/Annual Energy Review 2006, DOE/EIA-0384 (2006), p. 5, 25.
Energy Forum II, 2008. Session 1: Facility Energy Management for Competitive-ness: The Owner’s Equity, held during the United States Air Force EnergyForum II, Arlington, VA, 3 March 2008.
ENERGY STAR, 2006. ENERGY STAR Overview of 2006 Achievements, available at/http://www.energystar.govS.
Environmental Security Technology Certification Program, 2008. Program An-nouncement for FY2009 Non-DOD Federal Proposal Submission Instructions,10 January 2008, p. 14.
Eulberg, D., 2007. Energy Savings Performance and Utility Energy ServicesContracts (ESPC and UESC) Policy. Air Force Civil Engineer, HQ USAF/A7CMemorandum, 30 October 2007.
Federal Energy Management Program, 2004. Contracting for a Resource EfficiencyManager. DOE/EE-0299, 1.
Gan, L., Eskeland, G.S., Kolshus, H.H., 2007. Green electricity market development:
lessons from Europe and the US. Energy Policy 35, 144–155.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Table 2
Ten key impediments.
Impediment Solution agents
Technological
Insufficient energy
storage
Public and private research and development
funding agents
Tunnel vision Systems and electrical engineers, university
curriculum directors, utility companies
Missing data Local building managers or energy managers
Political
Wrong driver Senior DOD leadership within installations and
energy as well as within acquisitions, technology
and logistics, energy managers, acquisition
program managers
Inadequate metrics Senior DOD leadership within installations and
energy as well as within acquisitions, technology
and logistics
Inconsistent backing Executive and legislative branches, senior DOD
leadership within installations and energy as
well as within acquisitions, technology, and
logistics
Fragmentation Professional organizations within the building
industry, efficiency-oriented political action
groups
FinancialDisincentives Federal, state and local governments, utility
companies
Missing local rewards Congress and senior DOD finance officials
Unfunded requirements Federal energy management program, senior
DOD leadership within installations and energy
R.J. Umstattd / Energy Policy 37 (2009) 2870–2880 2879
http://www.energystar.gov/http://www.energystar.gov/
-
8/19/2019 Ship PMS
11/11
Giambastiani, E.P., 2006. Key Performance Parameter Study Recommendations andImplementation. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum
JROCM 161-06, 17 August 2006.Hadder, G.R., Das, S., Lee, R., Davis, R.M., 1989. Navy jet fuel production: strategies
for a Persian Gulf crisis. Energy Policy 17, 235–243.Hall, D.C., 1992. Oil and national security. Energy Policy 20, 1089–1096.Historical Tables, 2007. From the Budget of the US Government, FY2008, p. 327,
329, 74–78.Historical Tables, 2008. From the Budget of the US Government, FY2009, p. 330,
335, 79.Hornitschek, M.J., 2006. War Without Oil: A Catalyst for True Transformation. Air
University, February 2006. Jaffe, A.B., Stavins, R.N., 1994. The energy-efficiency gap: what does it mean?
Energy Policy 22 (10), 804–810.Keys, R., 2008. Moving from rhetoric to projects. United States Air Force Energy
Forum II, Arlington, VA, 3 March, 2008.Krieg, K.J., 2007. Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel Pilot Program. Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) Memorandum, 10 April, 20 07.Kuntz, G.D., 2007. Use of Renewable Energy in Contingency Operations. Army
Environmental Policy Institute, March 2007.Lalley, B., 2007. Air Force and DoE Energy Audit Partnership. United States Air Force
Energy Forum, Washington, DC, 8 March 2007.Lengyel, G.J., 2007. Department of Defense Energy Strategy: Teaching an Old Dog
New Tricks. Air University, April 2007.Lovins, A.B., 2005. Energy end-use efficiency, in: Transitions to Sustainable Energy
Systems. InterAcademy Council 2005–2006 study, 19 September, 2005.Mozumder, P., Marathe, A., 2007. Causality relationship between electricity
consumption and GDP in Bangladesh. Energy Policy 35, 395–402.Navy Research Advisory Council, 2005. Study on Future Fuels.
ORNL (Oak Ridge National Laboratory) Review 2007. A glimpse of the energyfuture, and Components of a ‘‘zero-energy’’ house. ORNL Review 40(2), 2–7.Available at /http://www.ornl.gov/ORNLReviewS.
Rohdin, P., Thollander, P., Solding, P., 2007. Barriers to and drivers for energyefficiency in the Swedish foundry industry. Energy Policy 35, 672–677.
Sandor, R., 2008. As quoted by Specter, M., in Big Foot. The New Yorker, 25 February2008.
Sims, R.E.H., Schock, R.N., Adegbululgbe, A., Fenhann, J., Konstantinaviciute, I.,Moomaw, W., Nimir, H.B., Schlamadinger, B., Torres-Martinez, J., Turner, C.,Uchiyama, Y., Vuori, S.J.V., Wamukonya, N., Zhang, X., 2007. Energy supply. In:Metz, B., Davidson, O.R., Bosch, P.R., Dave, R., Meyer, L.A. (Eds.), ClimateChange 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the FourthAssessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, USA,
p. 283.Sola, A.V.H., Xavier, A.A.P., 2007. Organizational human factors as barriers to
energy efficiency in electrical motors systems in industry. Energy Policy 35,5784–5794.
Sorrell, S., 2003. Making the link: climate policy and the reform of the UKconstruction industry. Energy Policy 31, 865–878.
Sorrell, S., O’Malley, E., Schleich, J., Scott, S., 2004. The Economics of Energy Efficiency—Barriers to Cost-Effective Investment. Edward Elgar,Cheltenham.
Sorrell, S., Schleich, J., Scott, S., O’Malley, E., Trace, F., Boede, E., Ostertag, K., Radgen,P., 2000. Reducing Barriers to Energy Efficiency in Public and PrivateOrganizations. /http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/publications/reports/barriers/final.htmlS.
Vallentin, D., 2008. Policy drivers and barriers for coal-to-liquids (CtL) technologiesin the United States. Energy Policy 36, 3198–3211.
Vringer, K., Aalbers, T., Blok, K., 2007. Household energy requirement and valuepatterns. Energy Policy 35, 553–566.
Weber, L., 1997. Some reflections on barriers to the efficient use of energy. Energy
Policy 25, 833–835.Wilbanks, T.J., 1994. Improving energy efficiency: making a ‘‘no-regrets’’ optionwork. Environment 36 (9), 16–20 (pp. 36–44).
ARTICLE IN PRESS
R.J. Umstattd / Energy Policy 37 (2009) 2870–28802880
http://www.ornl.gov/ORNLReviewhttp://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/publications/reports/barriers/final.htmlhttp://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/publications/reports/barriers/final.htmlhttp://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/publications/reports/barriers/final.htmlhttp://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/publications/reports/barriers/final.htmlhttp://www.ornl.gov/ORNLReview