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5. Srurunrry f'r.e¡tared tur tlre f¡ÊBåflürs¡tl ût $fåte' WåshinBtan. uftdåtÊd, SUMh{ÀRY OF ÁMEåSSADTR BADEITU's LETTER OF IåNUARY 3. T9É4 TO THE PRESIDENT 1. Efi¡Ft is the prramoürt Eâsbern .*.rr.b srätÊ änd the leeder of the nqtianålilt reforu¡ mov€Ereilt Although the d¡ive for á,rab unity hre slownd,Naæct ¡ælrlains flËnlust widely repcctod .Anb leøder. Thj+ $ves the UAR É sigrrífierlt furdepÈridert dàtÉÉiif tö tffect American intere,sb in the s¡ffi, 2. Our i¡l¡ere+s áÊr to blunt Soviet pmeeafion; to p'reser',,e West- €m accsls ûo sea ¡nd air ruutw and lo å,rab oiÙ ard üo ¡rromote peace and progress in thc arca. I Our poliey fu+ feetured: sxtension of ffpflornic asistånce; w€ß- h¡núedmss in a¡ea disputar; and neadiness lo Ëomfiit our prlwer and pr€stige bo the dÉf€flËe of our inte¡estc- 4. The r+isdorn cf thÊsÊ policiee h¡s bê€n shown by an ùncreøee in Amedc¡n inlluerce +t the exp+nçe of SoviEt inflr¡ena+ sinne ITFÉ. In clÉ¡¡ns äre elo+ly b*ing edfudicated; Itlçtçr¡¡ äccÊss to th+ Sur¿ Cerrel seems ¡csund (baning AraÞ.lsræil lrretilities); and the Egyptianå hflr¡Ê sho+¡n an increasing appredation oI the advantage of cloe€r csqpÊr¡,- tÍon witlr the Weeu 5. The remaining prublemr beha¡eff Cai¡a and Washingon are 6t The U.dR rßrnqirs heavily dependent c¡n Sot'iat military aid, but ftbstem aid.-+rpecialty PL atl}-hns helped prËssnr'e nonallgn- menÊ; the U.{R. stitl hnetile to lsrael, but leans tor,."ard <pnlsinment. Ttnre may hml enren this r\¡çund. 7- In cg¡rclusisn, ceåsatifir of U.5, Áid to the UÀR would not ¡nod- cr¡te their policie+. r,rrould nullify the gair+ siÍft 1956 and þpardize ørr intelegE, The guillotine can oarly be Èled snce p€r suble,rf-

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5. Srurunrry f'r.e¡tared tur tlre f¡ÊBåflürs¡tl ût $fåte'

WåshinBtan. uftdåtÊd,

SUMh{ÀRY OF ÁMEåSSADTR BADEITU's LETTER OFIåNUARY 3. T9É4 TO THE PRESIDENT

1. Efi¡Ft is the prramoürt Eâsbern .*.rr.b srätÊ änd the leeder ofthe nqtianålilt reforu¡ mov€Ereilt Although the d¡ive for á,rab unityhre slownd,Naæct ¡ælrlains flËnlust widely repcctod .Anb leøder. Thj+$ves the UAR É sigrrífierlt furdepÈridert dàtÉÉiif tö tffect Americanintere,sb in the s¡ffi,

2. Our i¡l¡ere+s áÊr to blunt Soviet pmeeafion; to p'reser',,e West-€m accsls ûo sea ¡nd air ruutw and lo å,rab oiÙ ard üo ¡rromote peaceand progress in thc arca.

I Our poliey fu+ feetured: sxtension of ffpflornic asistånce; w€ß-h¡núedmss in a¡ea disputar; and neadiness lo Ëomfiit our prlwer andpr€stige bo the dÉf€flËe of our inte¡estc-

4. The r+isdorn cf thÊsÊ policiee h¡s bê€n shown by an ùncreøeein Amedc¡n inlluerce +t the exp+nçe of SoviEt inflr¡ena+ sinne ITFÉ. In

clÉ¡¡ns äre elo+ly b*ing edfudicated; Itlçtçr¡¡ äccÊss to th+ Sur¿ Cerrelseems ¡csund (baning AraÞ.lsræil lrretilities); and the Egyptianå hflr¡Êsho+¡n an increasing appredation oI the advantage of cloe€r csqpÊr¡,-tÍon witlr the Weeu

5. The remaining prublemr beha¡eff Cai¡a and Washingon are

6t The U.dR rßrnqirs heavily dependent c¡n Sot'iat military aid,but ftbstem aid.-+rpecialty PL atl}-hns helped prËssnr'e nonallgn-menÊ; the U.{R. i¡ stitl hnetile to lsrael, but leans tor,."ard <pnlsinment.Ttnre may hml enren this r\¡çund.

7- In cg¡rclusisn, ceåsatifir of U.5, Áid to the UÀR would not ¡nod-cr¡te their policie+. r,rrould nullify the gair+ siÍft 1956 and þpardizeørr intelegE, The guillotine can oarly be Èled snce p€r suble,rf-

3E NationalIntelligenceEstimate¡

NIE 3ó{4 1

MAIN TREND€ IN TFIE AR.{E WORLEP

The Problern

To egtim¡te geræral trends in the Arab wortd over the ner¡t sev-e¡al )'e¡¡S.

tonclusionE

- .{. Foliticåt tursroil in thertrab world appea:*fikely tocontinunfqr

tive hætiie actioårìd thê pÕrsiÞilpolitical changeo'pen warfirt wptubøÞly bÈ cürtàined by grear pöwer FrrßÉureÉ, trara+ ?å-26,Aï, #I

D. Àrab ¡el,ntion¡ with the Wfft re-rnain heavily irrfluæced byhatred sf "irÈperíalisrn* and byltfestern support of trsrael,The possibil-ity cf a srrddefl detrriar¿tion +f l¡rtecÈém rÊladons with the Arabs over

É, ThÊ So,Ti€ts pruùahly Þelieve tIÉt thÉ tide is ruruiilg agaln*rtheltþstinrhnA¡abworld qnd that úeycan cepítalize on theunreftledpq,liticql gifuatio,n ând upon rarisus tënÉiûrËr herwren thn ^&¡ab* a¡dVìftst, Lf ¡.,rS-¿¡ab rclations st¡ould dÆterÍqrèfÊ $h+rp¡+ tlære wquldprnbrhly be a nqHçÊåhle ttrengttmning af Soviet inft¡ençe, 1,\b do notbelieve hanever, that thislr¡tt¡ld ¡Eäult in on*alded rell¡ncr on th¿SOviets ff ff rnone ¡acomrnodating eltitude tær¡ard IOCEI Connmuni¡tFÊrties, (Par¿a. 16-3Ël

lHerc fallowa the Dipcussicn ffion of thÉ e+tir¡at+.I

Vúrshirgbøn, Ápril S, 1964,

I Ttlr {s¡tÊute d{É Hùt ôûve[ sedån ând tfie ilra6hnü. [Foo{nore in th* rouÉq t*rtl

7+" Memurrndu¡m of Conver¡qliqnr

Washir'tgton, Iune 29, l9ó{, 12:{,5 p.m.

$u8JÞCr

U.g-U.rrr.R. Rthtioqs

PARtrflPÀ¡ITS

the ftedd¿nt't''hc Hononbh John S. &rdeau, r4.dìhÀJÉådËr tr lÀÊ Uûitëd Árrb RcpnrblÈhqF.*-ührllip+ T¡tbot, ¡\¡çis$¡rt Serrun¡y +f $lrf+ Bques¡ r¡f l¡+¡¡ &rrt *ndSou¡h À,ciln A,lfuirc

Arnbasssdû Badtilu wfls t€{eiv€d by the President at 12:45 PMfor hh ffnrl rall ptior to his rerignation from EovÊÌnfleflt *ÊrviËe,

The [twident opened the çonversation by enpressing warrn aFprcciation for the.årnb¡ssüdrr's 6nn work in Cåiro and rcgret that her.¡¿s teí¡T¡nàting hís servica The Amba+s¡dor reeponded þ expres*inghk or,¡n rregret that unavoidablepersonal responsibilitig had mdde hisrusignation nÊÊessary, HE håd found the poet in Cairo chatlengingüId rti$qlatì¡E, qrtd fêtt thåt significant proEruss tud bear mede infurtlrering Arnerican interests in tfie .{rsb wffld a¡ these rtlåtÆ to tlteUnited årab Repuhllc. The Amhaseadu,r parüorlarly not€d rhc strungsuppcc't acaorded him Þy the tlepettnent of sråteard the Adm{nistrâ.tian a¡d Fflid that, in whclsr,€r pr{gress hs been m*de this wqs achiaf factor,

The foe+idenl lhen inquired as to lIé cu¡rent stät€ of .{merican-Ég¡rptian rc,lations. The,{ulbâs€ådor ans$rcred that b¡nic ¡elatiorw con-¡ir,rued to be gcod. thrgughrut hi+ 35 mmrthe of serrrtroe tn Calro,President NqssÉr hEd received him ftequentþ änd lhe dialogue thurdeveloped had proved highly useful, both in retti4g forth thr Aincricnrviewpctnt ¡:nd ln avp(dfng indplent conlltcta. In recnnt rn+nlhs. how.el/Êrr thë E$.ptitn Gorsnment h¿d been somÊwhf,t suspici.+us thatlh'e Unitsd States might be changing ils policy. While no oorrcnte wÈdence oi *udr a changc Èxlstqd, the pmæura* of an eþction yrar andllte fqct qf a nsw Administration nrade policy-making cireleo in Egçtunusunlly sensitive to Arrwrimn actiong.

The F¡es¡drîrt then asksd wh¡t courue Amttican poliry could rnoctprufihbly hake i¡ tÏe futr¡re in relation to tlw United Àrab Republic.The Ámb iranwlrtiu¡rs

wrrlr rgïPr s¡It(E lne r¡lç of tr]e Ffeæn( {fevqlu{rçrÈry ttÊËrme ¡n ¡Ì'r¿-Þudng thls t¡ma. thr ¡lmbasoador pointed o.r.¡t, the Unitçd Stater hadfolùorved four distinct policies bowei,rl Egypt- Tho numbsr and vorietyof thr.rt policie+ indicated somelhing rrtore than changlng admink¡tre-tiqns iü the Ur¡ited Sl-åts, âltftrugh such charirges were tratu.rally afartor in thcm, Basicûlly it had been dtiflicult for the United StÊtÊ$ tÐdefirre and FursuÉ Êteâdlly a +inglc potiry torvard Egypt because therearc aertain mutual irrilants which periodically push the tu¡o nationsäpart- TwidÈ drrrìtg thû lâef 12 yeaæ Egypt and the Unitcd St¡trs h,fldapp,loached a mrþ confrsntation^ The first occasiqn wås irr 1955, åtth* tiñe of Egypf+ first am,rs purrhases frorn thr Sovist Blo{. Th€sÈcond rcsultÉd frcm the Suez Canal naticnali¿ation, ãnd çirne to irsclimax ín the landi*g of Àmarican Marines in læh¡non !n 1958.

On cach occaËion it seemed as though both caunhies $¡ere p,re-par,ed to thmw their weight into a n:raþ confrrntatio.n. However, just.äE this hÊÊåmc innminerl both partÍes stopped, being unwitling to takeÈlæ final sbep. ln effuct they sâid: 'A\,Þ csrinfft do tlús to mch other; tretus plcft up thr pirrces and try egain:"

The A¡nbressadqr sðid thst thé ¡eason fur this l+y in the mutualcàFãcítr tÕ hurt c¡ch oürer's inteËsts, which both Eg¡rpt and the UnitedStates possessed- tVere Egypl de¡errn¡n€d to do so it csuld cau¡e congid-eraÈle ircublc for thc ünite,d Stflte.s in flne€g uf the Nsar East wheæ thereq¡e basic ¿{msican iûterefH---ês witn€ss thFrosHent Naeecr's call fnr the abolition ofthe UniH $htË had the cåFacity t'r hüYernen, Syri+ and fordan if she were determjned tc do so- NeitherFÉrfy p瀀essed ås grûât a capacr'ty to hurt ar it profesard, hr¡t thecapanity u'as sufficiently large to imperil certain basir naH,onal interests,

lt rì¡äÉ this Íêcl tlËt had prevent'ed e maþr confrontalion in thepatt. Th€ Ambss,sadsr b€lisved that it wqdd pontinue to ¡nåke a rnaþoûltfftntitiÞn unlikely in ths futurr unless the U./r,R, should thrsüteflan Årnerican inteæst of so ba¡ic a char¿cter tÌ¡at thê Unitêd, Stateswould b+ willlng to risk impedlirrg iç posiricn in adþcent.{rab l*nds.This was to say that American-Egyptian relations might rvell contitrueto fluctuah bctçv€efl coadiality and oppoeition* but always avoidingthe fÏnal step +f maþr confrunlalioo-

If thÍs analysiÉ wascoffÊct, the Ârnbqssadorsaid, it s'rggested thatthe two cçuntrie¡ strryuld ekive to develop an +n-golng relatlon similarlo thät in txìst€noe betwern urany(çuntrits.'t hl*s relationrhip sssumeda cwrhlnuing bqnd befed upan rnutual inte¡ests but allowcd room fordircct oppoeitiÞfl on specific issues, To illurtr¡te this the Ambatsadorcited thê ,4.merican-Frendr rel¡tio¡rsh¡p, /ìt thc trtoment there we¡es{trerül a"lpettr of French poliry rvith ¡i'hich the United StatqÉ. s1fir¡tltditâÊrËed, i,c., thc indcpendcnt nucle¿r d.aterenL cerl¿in øttiludes to-

lbì_oqr Jllosrç frnrn l:t? ro l:ló p.m. (fÞid-l

v¡ard NATO, opposition Ìo British participation irr the Corrrmsû M¡rketand policy toward Communist Chin¡ and Southeast Asiå. lt coutd beer<pected thär .A.ñel¡ca rvould o¡4>ose France on all these lssues, butneithe¡ the United States nor Fr¿nce açsumed that ruch opp.ositioncalled. i:r¡o qu€Étion the baaic and longstanding Fraaro,{merícan tie.

The Ambessador suggested thåt this approarh could be takÊntoward tfrc U,A,R, Iì r,/as inevitahle that borh the United $tater andthe U.A.R, would flnd It ncÈÈÈsaryto oppû€+ *pecillc pollctes adoptedþ the other- Egypt had long oppu'sed A¡nerica¡ policy toward Israel,rvhile in ¡ecent months the Unit€d States h¿d Uåefl Ín oppc*ifion toUá-R. policl co foretrgnbæe+and the BaiHsh positlon inSouttr lr¡Uie.But oppocifion on such specific isçuec need nàt coatinuously call intoquestion the basic mutual and continuing ¡nterËts on n'hich a leslingArnerican-Egyptian polþ could be built-

hriog Èhe pasl" threc years a good beginning had been made inidçnt¡qrint aúd supportíng thesp'.ric ând tftutuât iîtcrÊÊE. tf this

,ffii^i1i"x f HåHJ

The ltesident inquired as tc $¡helher Prcsident Na¡eer wouldufld_erstând such a soph¡ÊtlçâtÊd p+liqy. The Ämbaæador replied thathe thought the chåffes were reaxrnaÞly good for íts accephrwe, Þuringa long and cordial fa¡e$¡el} tisit wilh Þner¡¿ent Nasser bn June ?,2 thËAmb¿sÉådod h¡d edvanced tlrb vtew fn detåil. .{fter discusciqg sonreasp+ch of lt President NEseer had reFhed that lhi¡ wes, probebly 'theonly poesible policy between the tr¡¡o (puntrie¡,,, ftre. nmtajsfldorrecognta+d t¡,at it 1Ärüuld be diftrult for sÉûïe ^ÀfiËriffiflt ¡o undenstandthin approa'ch---and evÈn rnore dif{ifiilt for some Egyptiâns. Net/Êrth+.

þ jt was_ !h1 onl¡r alternalive to the ,'off-ngain, onä[*in, gon*,agair"

reletio¡n which had vÐ(Êd the tl$s oountrt€B durirrg ltre palt lZ y-eare.

_ln mnduding the intervíen, Ftesident fohnson ruggested that hernight l+ish tû cûÍirnunlËätû with Fr¿sident NasEÉT asï ttÉult of tftjÉtalk with Arnb*rsador Badear¡. With thiå, intÊreisvr,cloced-

¡ 9oe Dc<urnenl 7l *nd fuotn.ot* ¡{ tlr+rt{p,

{. LGttErI'romltrflItrtf,oÉyBrn t,otìt|ldfirfüì'lroill fnEy nllÊ ÊxEfEutrnB flnfl{ !'E fy'ÍÞ rÉnors, rnE}r oo n{lr $ElÍr å. mut¡ûry c)(m,ftict"

Of couroe, ú thesho+¡ld be us€d, thisShould ts¡¡el Êffi1rËttwe will rtrd€r f,id ùo tlræe munhie*i that are zubþÞd to ag6rrseio,n-

Rrsprtfully.A. K+ry¡tn

fr¡øiirynnn of ltc C+lttraï of Mr¡¡rslcrsdf ftr LIssR

Moe<orv.lvlay 27,l$t7.feax hÍr. Presid€fih

Á.rt'rding to infoarratio'n bein6 ruceived þ the Soviet Gonunnrenrre 5taendytfltÊs.

14¡þ undeÉtår¡d thât in mucheperds upÈn rhÉ United y, h{r.lesid€riLæ towhether lgtael in this:sp€ct thÈft ËärrÉt b *ty _orhsr oiq", tf th+re will b€ fló dfiËÉuËâg+re.nt o'n the part fif th'G llS, ûrff Isr¡Æl will not dnrc e.tep oraet the t¡¡Ë.

hr your letìtu of lvtay t2l ycu called upor u¡ to exerçiæ ou¡ inJlu-nce along wilh Tüurs l4r ttre dtr*ction of rrafajnt lrrþ a¡e for feftråint

ThaHr why n¡e e¡e in farnqt ûd ¡ [ÊåÈ¡ining influrnrce, hu4 of courraot hû thÊ dehírnent of ttæ lsürfuI inttxçst¡ o,f the å¡sb S,tltÊs" Ttr€irÉioqç s¡€ of E deferudr¡s nr¡ftuÊ. f¡tûfÉsvsr, it b predcely reÊEriftt thät

¡ Ë+,c foornott S. Doc¡¡ncnt {1.

Mêr$âge From Prurief KffÍEkr lo Preatdmtfofncorrt

Moscow. f unc 5, 196Ì, 7=47 tnDearMr. tìesldmÇ

Hauing received info¡rnation corrcernin¡ fte ñil¡trrl¡ ctashesbehvem Is¡ael and theuniM Arab Repoblþ th¿SovietGowrnment íscçnviriftd thât thÊ duty of aII gnât por{srs is bo çecuæ thc l¡r*nedtatecessatíon of thr military cunflict.

The Sor"iet CovefifiEnl has acted and will art ín thb dfurctioü. Wehope lhat the tovcrnrnent of the United $taree lûill ¡lso rÈt ¡n the eämemânn¡r and will exert appropriste inlluefice tR the C'oyernmeilt sfIsrad p*rticularly since you havc all o,Fporhrnilies of dolng sÕ. This Isrequied ln the highcs't iÍÞrÉ6t d p¿rc".

RcspfftfüXÍÀ Koelçln

I57- M+t¡¡€t Froor lfit XtIhlüc Hoüæ 1o F¡¿ry,Lcr Koq¡BIrt

%

Striel

Tel Aviv, fue 5, 1967, lãHZ,3935. L Following messate from Frirne Minists tu the Fhesident

hrs þt bcen hr¡rdcd to m+ 6or delirrcrlt*De¡r Mr. Prrsddmt: ^Afte¡ rveeks in whirh our peril lrae grown

placing of more thät 900 Ank* agaÍnst öur ËóuthÊtn ffirntiefi ttÉ ¡fiäss-ing of 4fl0 tankx oppo+ite Elath r,r'ith theobþt of sundrring thetoutlr-Êrn NegÊv hp¡n Israel; the ilqgåI blockEde in thê Stråits of Tir¿ru thei¡rsolcrtt defi¡nce ofpolæy of stranglingintimidati+n sf ]ord¡Floope and Egyptiantinn of MIG 2I slrr.afr under Þaqt cçmmand ln Mafraq; Nass+r'+irrursunËsïrsnt of 'tolal wlr against lsrüel' ¡nd of his hasic aim to

rxtraord.inary catflJogue ofrorld o,pinion äfld in youring nalions,

As yuu knnrv. Mr. hesident, nothing effoctivs llad büen dcne s¡Itteüpted Þy the UN ageinst a rutlrless de*ign bo destrcy ttre st¡te ofIsrad rvhich cmbodles lhe memo,rlee, sacrlfiæs and tropes +f an anclcnt

i "¿eæ¿

ln a Cagedy-r+it}out parall+l irr t iEtory.

Mr. Prlsifqn¡. I lm gntehrl far tle friardahfp e*prrssrd in yuur lct-

taking to prurare vigmous frrÊã,st¡rE$ to kÊÊp the gtraltr öf Ti¡år å,rrd thêGulf of .dqrba açmasaninlmraüo'nel wrimraytn rhfp+of all n¡tln¡+

ThesÊ are impræsive cummifmenÞ, You¡ lettr¡ mËntiolls thsobstr,cles whlch ftarre eo far mgde artìnn dfffiurft F,h æly oa tlle æur+ge arddetsrnination nf orr eoldiÊrs and cíti¡ens" Indeed maxímum sell'

. My infumaHoñ ietlËt

äiËåä'"l#-ffi*iïrh oeek nothing but peanefuI lìfe within +ur terrilo{r, a¡rd lhe ener-

ck+ of orrr tegitimate marlfure riglrts"

.¡1.t th¡e ff¡Hcal ütgtrIsfit I elwuld u¡dËorÊe tfte closert coqrsultatlonttÉtrueen our ErïEfluuents at all levels.

Lrrael appeals, lvl¡, Pres¡denL lo yuur friendship, ¡rour fidelity andyour l+adershfp,"

nr¡bour

159. Me*r¡gr From hc¿IdtntJohnøc,n tn Frtmlu Kcryglnf

Washington" fur¡e 5, 1967, 8:52 a.rn.

Dear lvf¡. Kosygin:

I welcome your rne,s*r ge. Irfa fed thd I it ls t¡ e düty oI all grrn t s tabee

to ¡mræe s@y end to the nilitary cfnflict, ar indic¡ted in$eadaryRusHa earlier fteõ$gË to ftælgn Mini¡tar Grmrylao ltdr mornhg üÈârÈ shrüfflf suppartiag action to thÍs end irr the United Natis¡rsSonrrity Cauncil whlrlr meræ within the h+Irr ¡nd trr¡st yqu w¡ll do th+$arne. I have already urade a personal appeat lt all tìe gorernrnenh* inthc am¡ concnmerl and you mry be æilrtd ws will arurcis+ ell ou¡i¡fluence to brÍng hoetilitis lo en end. l4lh are PleâÐed bo leârn ftumyuur mÊes.rgc that you are dcing the e¡me

Respectfull¡

þndon û.Johnson

IHwsage Fmm Þremlcr Harygln 1o PreddentJûhnsunt

Mos+ow. June 6. 19671 5r3{ a,nr-

DearMr. Frm,ident

Militt¡Ï ¡rtivities in tha Nem Få$t ççnltnue, ürûrÉwÊr ttreir scopeis spea.dfn6.

ThßSflvlÊt G+venr¡neat IsËÉttr¡û.¡Éetl tlat * decigirædemÀftd for an

Evuything po+rible shüuld be done so t¡át po+itive deciríCIn b€taknn today 0n thi$ rråtterbT th€ S€Ëurig Counril.

Respactfully

Á"Kwygin

if5. Me+*age Froan P¡,esident fohnmn to Fnmler Koayght sðge or rne 3{¡flr1, ttes$¡sfillllaasers ûrrlárauofi ûf IYlây:¿z ú|åt ne u¡oulddosc thÊ stralt nrrrs squâ¡Ely intq a eomrnítmert we undertook whjtesuppo*tíag Egryt, quiÞ apart Êom our intËÉfH as¿ ffár¡tiÉrÉ nåtio.r-I.

cllsËÊd ábovs- l\re earnestþ hoFe l¡ru cangive il yourzupport.For your cunvFnl,snrÊ, the kef ¡uragraph in this Resolutioa¡ is th.e

folluwing;

Respectfully

Lyrdun E. Johrrson

Washingforu ]ure d, 1967.1ù21 r.m.vfr lúosygÍn,

on the Stråit qfte Rusü,'s let[er

he prúlem of cbtaining tl¡e vdthdr¿r,¡flI ûf krqÈlf fo,¡c++ ftqm SinâL trtl'"åsinE for a wl¡¡¿6$¡-wfrirh r.+as earneslly desirEd hy EgïpthcÉtdát Eisenhø+u cmn¡nitt¿d rhe UÍirËd Sra¡es ø h'remaHi"rl"pä

-_- j. fr¿¡*.S rÉFû¡tÉd It+.9 p.rn met*ing lflth FedüEnht ln rrlep.am SffA fnom

LIE{.IF¡. Iur$ É. (¡'¡d-$o{¡¡l Árgfúvi:c ¡nd R¿<ords Âdnlnkrruûon xc 3b, Cmlr¡l fuc+t967-4F, ftl l7 Á,RrrF-l5R/tN)

.8.È blcscqge Fm¡:r F¡enier Kocygin to hr¡trdent foh.n+ont

Morcorç, Iune 6,1967,6ú7 p-m.

)€üM¡. P¡esident

lb h¿ve cofisidm€d yoru pro¡rceals, Vijb har¡eissued the neceasr4trt3tructionÉ tû thê Sô4,iët R€pæ*ntativê in ûeSéffnRCû¡fidt WeÉ'(-¡n*s the trope that you will also iaeue corres¡mnding in*trudioru to.at¡r rÊprrts€fitâtive aÞout ttre adoption todÂy of rcsûlutions eoonemlnghc inmediate cere¿tlon of military actioms wilh the withdr¡wal oiroops hehind thearmistice lhe,

EÈspÈ'ctfuXfr

å- Kæ1^gln

lffi Wr+lqh4an-+f€ffirÀ,' Sourtel Jolt¡t€ofi il,tf.üy, HådffåI S.ffrtÌ.T Ftli. I{Ê¡d È{ St¡¡È CofiríDcft!ËÍreË,I W¡shlfiraon-f,|trûrÀ,'t¡ôt'tl$¿a F¡rhrnc*-d/11ûlú,I- lrlo¿l¡gt6ariì ru*inoÉrß w¡*lilqg!0n{rl€ffirÀ, .Iüocll¡¡r ErdwAi É/Flû/úI. t'lo clårûtfcârfori

ï:ffi:k¡¡rrE-erlt.lghjl3.rr.erlt.lgh

:lqE.d-lf{tl4{r-c++r ceff +f ttrc ¡rïÊt{.tË-t¡ R¡årirr¡ #rtËr rh*t tÍ r+r* -"*ttffË

Mcá$åEe Froûr P¡ËsidefltJohnson to F¡rrrier Hoeygirt!

warhlngtoo, June 6, tgÉ?.8:?B p,m.

Mr, Kosygir,r;

Ou¡ two Ambassadors in tÌ,re Serurity Counril have bee¡r in closÊcnnsu-ltåtion rhroughrur thc da¡n fthur¡derstând that ourdmbass*don

as a fìrst step,ê un¡t4dstát#thie rËÐlutlür

{".ni1""-1T.r V'b ehall do our be+t rn áefiltt thÈ S€curify CourríI.+ fur-ther ef,forts tç reslóre peaæ in the Neflr F¡st on a lastiftg bfis¡s.

I tnrst we farr rvork togtther in tfe days ahead to help solve theprablenu bçfqrc us in the Nrar Errt and +ÎsefirhÈr+,

RespertfullX

Lyndon E-John*an

ÀtÊ.{E-r5R/UMo¡5ct Malinh rt 6ff p,m.-ind n<.eived þ:US, hidinl r! 6rtt p,sr. {lbidJ

188. Meeragc Fmn Fmmier Koeygln lo Pæridnnt lohruo'Ilr.l

Moecow, fune Z, 19É7.8:18 a¡n.

Dear Mr. lte€ident/

.A.c:oo

Re*oluriocerned lofire and cessation of alt mllitatÏ a+l¡a,rç ln thfg êteä.

Such a eitu¡Hqn calls for the S4arrity Çorrncil tp u+e ib authority togrxrantee lhe impleure;niatifit sf its ûim desisioør.

In this <pnnectiö& 1+É hrvepm¡msed an ùnmedi¡telÉeurrverrirq ofthe S+curíty Councll to +ake efJecüse rneä,srrres fua an hnmedläts E{i$ã,.iian of rnilitary acti+¡rs and tfte ¡ffshhlfuhm€nt of peace.

Rnspectfuþ

Á.I(n+ygftt

Itrta*ftington.Junc 7. 1967, l1:I8 ¡.m.

d¡. Ch¡irman;

United Natio¡n to åglËêr cil when one ir rugge+t-d

tstES,

his pointthÉir ätti-

t thÈ ru$ùlutiûr af theSecurityCsuxcilltfearcprepared to wurlcrvith atl oth.the regíon.

Tft* wholly fake reports +nd tr¡vmted ctuqge+ rhat Urdted Statesitcrnlt pariicipafrd in rttadrs on Eg¡rpt hrte reøulhd 1n mob ¡cd+n

Ra*pectfunp

L¡ndo'n E, fohnson

-

794" Merrorandum fo¡ the Re€ûrdl

Washirt6lon, Jvne 7, l9{'l, I 2;ûÉ-l p,rn

sr.fElEcl

Nadorul Security C+uncil M+cdqg, lllodnrsda¡ [uue 7. I9tZ

The folloraring is a recçnd frorr rny fioÌer ûledc dudng the meeting.bul because of thÊ fast nroving events in the Middle Eãslr fl+t trÁn-s{rÏH until today,

$mrel-.rry Rusk opened thê discl¡sslan of the situ¡tion in the MÍddleEant hy reporttng thet Nass€r had guffeled å FstururiqË loos." Hr hadd+calcr¡lated the rnilitary È¡tuát¡Én and Sosiet s'uprport There warwídespread duillu.ctûnrfldnt lr¡¡lh Nass€r ín rtre ÈIitldle E¡d.r ThÊSorvr-ds scemsC to haw been guilty d encouraging him, The^åtåÞÊ hthç LIN felt that the USSÊ hâd tcf them dtr¡rtr. Israel ïiìás rfding h¡ghâtd Ibs darn¡nds wiÏ b€ suhstqntial. Isr¿pl will protably desr¡nd apeace freaty with the ArÈb6 with thc lollowing oÞie#irs:

t"oükiqg alread" the S€{rEtarT spoke cf the impo*ance to us ufer¡ovi¡g dghþ refufltin$ inlfrnâtiûnÊI guaranleesn andugi*,rI ercnornic snd so{iål developmenb tt äb'sófb intrt-Arab and\raÞ!ff¡tll quantla If we do not malie ourselytÉ "atl,umeys f+rsrael,/' 11¡s carurot recoup ou¡ losses. Hle do harre s€firêflhing tobargainv¡th itl thÊt Isrå+l mu$t bê grâtdul to the US and lerael requÍ¡e* mrrtin-dng US zupporb

TTre Seit*ary ncrtewÊd thË quêsHoü od "r,rho dJd what?" Hc såidve had a ¡niurary o$ligltion to ourselvff to rnaintaín pence, Wlrat we

'rould hâve doa¡e had r+Ê bÉtrr ifl FrtrnÈ Mird+ter Éshko,l's +hoce lsrnotht't que*tion- Ebån tud l^rid bå¡'Ê Is¡seli thiriking and we urder-tood it, In any *se, I EiÊte rnahäffq-rbtre rhenfivr days oa d b€en sigdfi-'ãnt,

Mr. Heüns s+id th¡ät the RÊsdu¡s had bodly misçalçula¡cd, evtnnone so lhffi in tht Cuhan missilË crigis.

Mr, Kateenb¡ch seid thål ålrårtgÊmêntË fsf êvaflratiûft ÐfLtærJcans w€felfi pffisresi eyerprhur ercept in fordsn- We atill wtl,enlding off in Huw¿it and S¿udi Arabía.

Mr.Gaud rrelorted üratvË had häd sid pm'grff$ ünsi{ ûf tlæ fflrr-eÊit Afrb ftu¡rkiÈs (pfus Israell-Sudary foodan. Tuní*ie. the UÁR,

t sorled iþelf out.

ThE F¡esident ¡aid "he w¡s nÐt flüE wG wErE out nf our hürblÉ$."{e muld n0É eisuáli¿e the L}56R sa¡'rng ¡t häd rffsëakulåtÊd, åTrd rhÉritalktng awa¡ Õur +l¡iectlve shffilú be to -develn'p as f+w hrrffB å¡ds few heels ¡s wc can " It b ianFqfilünt Ior everybody to lnow r'tE årËtot fÞr äfiÊres$i+n" We äre sorlr thls hÈs tâkrn ptåÉe, l{h are ln +s goodt p+'silicn a¡ we could be given the comple:Jttea of the ctluatioru l4,b

hâttberr+g:¡dthËrÈi eñd b¡nd É¿rord+

in srÀak¿ verry quJckly. The Ilreridant e*i-¿ ttrat by thÊ tlrfle *e g*,tthry*Sh ra¡ith atl the festering prublerrre wÊ ûrE ga¡lrg to wish the warhad nÉl happf-nrd.

.¿rnrbas*qadorThompsonsaid he coul.d figure out ¡rc erphnationforttre Sovier ruhjudgrrurt The Rusdans shûuld have lmown the _{ntc'capability. He felt the end of bellignrmce s,trould be relatively easy tohandle with thÉtl35R Barringr dlÌeüt flrrBättûCä¡ff, hÊ felttlesûtrier5wwuld probably stay out of war.

Serretary Rr.rsk felt thal in M¡sæ¡v, thoseadvising cqutiùfl rftay þsirengthcned,

air war. noting that ttreâir frrËeüû the pound.hs Isr¡el.i *ucÉËs re,llect-

ed gæarcupe¡ionty íri m+intmaru*" l*aderrhip trai*irrg and dirciplÍne¡a ther than nunrerlcal supefi ority,

The the*ident th.en went on to rmd ¡ *tatement l¡ûer relefis€d bo t}¡epæ+s (attached),t of thÈ NÊliüÍálSecr¡ritT Council with McGeor.geEundy tÕ seflë as eonsr¡ttánt tÕ thÉFresident ¡nd wit

Secreba¡y Fowler discr¡ssËd bùiefly the effect of hosÈilities on ttremr$Ël rnarkets d.f thë $¡oqld. trn sufii. he feXt fherE r+as nnthing tú indi*cahe any m¡ssive mcvemrr.ll oJ funds. [Iesald wË w€rÊ not interfering,

_ Sccretary Rnsk condudrd by +uggerting lhal there be a mecting afthe trerv ÊqÌilmitHe at É:30 p.¡¡,

H.HÉ.

t Fc" k*t,

Eoo*, l, p.599,tlon ts Rusk ¡nd Bundy. r,rrould be FoórlÉË td(Rrlrtqtá- t{+ +tåtd ttdt h4 H¡É{J¡d Íifit rrilft lhË CbsrûritùË¡c *ç n¡æ*rr} rî r,óquld v¡{eË"ftñid{fl t I tu m Fhrey ¡ûd ôoldhrg,

zrJrÍ lYlÊtrrorãnrurlr troln ult rrtüllranrs ÞpÊ{1il rt8stF[en[lEoåtûw) tfl PrË$JdÊfit Isft¡isnl

üIashtugtorr, fun+ 8. tffif, Lft 1l) a¡n,

Mr. Preside¿re

It lo+!n *s th{ugh Kosygín may lnve cantemptuted ur fu,ne 6 sffd-rng additûonrt ûi¡cråft to Ë¡rypt-but he Is obvioruly rÉlilrtä¡rt and try-ing te u*e a ce¿ge-fli¡e to awid th¡t urcve.l

l4telt

lû9- Mcar*g,e Ftom ScËErler Xo+ygfur t+ FrcrldenlJotur.ronr

Moecow, June 8, 1967, 9:4t a.m.

Defihfr. FæsidenÇ

Two d¡ Hot¡ çr¡tt.cernìag the ús showtftåt Isrilcl, afkr thethåt Ls.ril.clf afkr the SÉcnrit¡ CauneiÏs åppeal. seired con=ídsable ter-ritnry of tIË.Afüb Slilt€u-I.Jnifed .ê¡ÊÈ Fepubtúe a¡d lo¡d+n-ln¡ori¡ratÏe ftctr*ty Cor¡ncil's Hesrlution, Á sih¡¡tion h¡s deyelop€d

ftepubtúe arrd foad+n-16¡oringu¡tion h¡s developed whl$, in

(stl¡r€r{ion with thÊ$e kæ+E ¿¿tiolrç, dernands rrot sirnply a ceEse-fi¡e,Éul als+ e witftdrawal af I¡racli truopabehlnd ihe ¡rmisÈce tine. lsraefe

XtL Mercage From Fresident |ohnuon ta he¡nier Ko+yglnl

rnôt lrÈ en$u¡r:cl-

!\¿s þ¡1,9 irrsh¡s4¡*.-i llreSoviel Reprr.'sentativri in thè Ur"-nrr to placci qucÞ-liorr bcfore the Security CÓurrcil for tlre rrrlopliolr c)f an appro_ate I'rsaluliolr.

lVc wouÌ1 like to cxpnrs+ tll¡lt ltoFe, Mr- h:e_qiclent, lhat you per-rally,rnd yoïr gLì'clrulìe^l nfîl] takc a pa+ition çvlriclr rvitì respond rointere$tÊ of cessation of rs¡r in the Nr.'ar Ëirst, ancl k> f he interesls ol

rce in the Near Ea_st, .-rË ).ou luve ¡lreadv stnted.ResPecttultY'

A. Hosygi'

I,ïhshingtôil, Jrrne S. 1967, ll:17 arn,

D€ff ¡rfr, KocyCnr

dlspatclt alrrafr _to the peenE to inrest¡gâtÊ, Ytjb r+ish y*u to kftÞw thåtinveetigation is the sole FurFqse of lhis flight of airøafl. and hopethåt you will r¡ke aFPrûpriâte steps to sêê thât Fffip+r pûrtiêÊ qÌEi.nfor¡red,

Hb hEve Fãssed this rneesage to Chunyak+v hüt f€Êl that yuuehould luow of this devel+p'r¡tstt uryrîrlÍ-

Respectfully,

l¡aldon E, lohnso.n

mÉgs¡EÊ hfìûrr !'rerrd.cnt f onnson r(} r¡ÊIIÌxGÎ ruÌrlBln+ IríLEs$¡gÊ Éiom frÊEldrnt f o.tlfiso,rr tû fÏ{mler l[aeyglÍt

lftshingtun, [uneß, 1967,3.58 p.m.

Ëear lrdr. Horygin,

I detply appeciateIt[agser, l4b lo'$t 10 mEn"ffsult of ler¡efi altarþ to

Re+pe*fully.

Lyndon B. fo,hn*on

l4rhshingtorç Jure I, 1967, 12:01 p,m.

ÞÃr Mr. Korygin,

thstherhe

n¡t dthër

'''#HLrt

lrat the UnitÊd Slates ¡,lcne canfue_

d ffiT#ffitffiffirÉ

_l arn glad to h¡rne had yuur rnessåËE and h¿v+ instn¡ctpd ourmÞassådor ln New York tn ¡n¡int¡in rlose oontact with thernbassador of the Éöviet Unton and trust ïou wIIl wlnt to do Hke-'ise.

Eespeetful!',

Lyndurt E,|uhn*on

7.1Ë* Mesrage Frour hemier Korygfn to Pretldtnt fohrænl

Moscuw, June I, 1967, 12É0 p.m,

Dear ì¡f¡- tleÉ¡der¡t,

Your telegram t}e incidelt with lhe AmeriËân l.lhertyTlpe Ship lor¡redoed near Port Said h¡s becn reneived by us and irnme'diately transmilted for information tô President Nassef.t

Re+pecttuIly,

"4* Koeygln

.¡3. Mcænge Frum P¡ÊTrier Kaeygln to hË*idfitlóhilsûnl

Mo+csr+t, Iun+ I0; 196?, 8:48 e.¡n,

le*r Mr Presirlent

The eqents of the l¡st da¡.e have foa*d ¡ne to €"rFre+s tÞ yntr wíthIl Èankne*s our r¡iew. As the 6ürual ffi Ëho$¡+, tho rc+clutiolrs of thÊ+rurity Ccuncil a¡e inuulid. lsrâel håç completely ignffEd thefl. Ásür can und:etstilrd, åfter thÉ mäny aÊtffrpts teÌcfi IlI rhi9 diÉctinn andhe re*olutio¡rs of the Semrity Çe+rncit rulrcrrning the teq¡nination ofg$ÌËsâ¡ürr oil thÈ pËrt of Israel in lh* NÊÉr East-th*e ålt['rnpts håTÈrm.ed ineffective.

Averycructlons afe ftûtlncision, 14'b n¡e ready lo do thiø. llouryer. th*e ädifis ütåy Þ'rínË rr5rttÞ å dläÉ,h, whirfr r+'I-11 þ+d tu ä frreve câtästro'phÊ. Obrrlo.usly in theuarXd lherearc porïËts to wtrm tftis ryfi¡Id be adrantageoua

We propoee that 1ûr denu¡rd frffir [sreet tlut it uncondltlanallyeas+ mIItAry acdon in th¿ ncrt lcw hqr¡¡a. ün ou¡ part, we will do the¡m+ We Furpoee to wsrn Israel thaL if thic is not fulf¡lled, necessa{fttitúË r{ill he uke¡r, i¡rcludÍng rnllltary.

Fleast 6[ve me your r,rlcr,u,s.

A. Ko+ygin

Ë47. Mesedge F¡sm F¡smler l{ns¡gln þ ftesld{rit fohnroril

È46. Mes*age Fm¡q Pre:iderrt |u,hns+n to h*urlm Itcryghr

lttaahington, iune lû, 19É7, Éf'9 a;¡lDea¡ lr,lr, Koeygin,

I h¿veSetzttary ccOrl+iderred

Sround thaance at 3 ,{M. WäshinÈtÕ{r Èrre t}åt Israd fully inttrrdtd bo sfrhieeÊacfu¡l cta*rfiru an its side.l

Íc irrformed thë ttFl SÉranritfwith Cfrrûål Butl af UI{ bo

Syna.Wc h ÉrÍrirûrt and hnpe th*t

you have

sant u* a me+çage, åttell hifir thsy bel¡eî¡E

r,trh csntinue tû i+råtch developroenH mû*t (Joeely and rvill kæp irrtouch wtú you.

Llrndan E, |ohntoar

I Docr¡mmt tü,{ Tc¡rEnm,l0Í{frçmT+Jå,vi+Jqri+lftrro{prtn¡ed,ûrlÀiloquld¡rhivp¡¡rdÊ{cordt

¡4,dmlnlstr¡lion. RG 5Ì, Crntr¡l Fil*| IÎú1-Sî, Füt ?? Án {,HSRI

Éear ftEsidentlrl'reorr hnnacow' Ju¡e lf'' lg6r' *{4 a'rn'

rutpened. I rcquns-t that you emplay all y+ur pçssibÍtidÉs for the ces-uHon of m¡Iftäry âcffiÈå a¡rd tfte fuüiürrient oJ the rtsclutíons of the;esrùíry Cftncil for wftfchwçbath vEred.

Rtfpê{ttuIly,

¡L HoEltl¡

Mes*ge Fmm Fnesldentlohncon to Prc¡nier Hotygü

Warhingtotr, June 10, l9ÉZ iü58 a-m-

]e¡r Mr. Kosygirç

I have your last mcssage and you ca¡r be a¡$¡-Ìed that *ç har*emphasized our position to [s¡ael bf *u*ry f¡TÉå$s. lrlre have iust rr-;Fated our vie¡r¡s i¡ thc strwrget tûrtns to IsrÀl¡s herc a¡d in New Ysrkurd by mes*rgB töTÊl Aviv.

Could you cdnfi.rrr lhåt yÊu have ernployed your meáns w,Jrh ricìyrians for this sane purpoae.

rtiocallanrascuç.

Yqu $.lll h¡r¡e æcn ttr¡t llreaid,ent Nae¡€r yæ{trday repeated his¡ufra,gea4r Ëon in thlsnnlïict,Sl sa totalliÊ,rea¿e would þe served if your fl,owmment éffild fuhl¡Ëtf strts thehas !Éndufir to yÉlr rn thft pofnt

Re+pcctfully;

Lyrrdon Ë. Juhnaan

,_ .i1Ï. 4jfl*q.Ttnmn*an" *re ¡nfuftniriÈfi.rÍË f¡qrn th+t+tcvl*ed pro*nJln6* ot:tc Sccudf¡ Çeuncil rneÈfiflg; E€F Dcñ¡lrrsfif l,l5.

M*ssa ge Fruu:r Frtøier l{orygtn t o Pæ+Id mt f ohnron I

Moccon', June fû. lÊdZ il;31 s'ÍrLl]çar Mr. Xlresid+flr;

Ey mf ¡nrmrcliongr s¡e h¿v+ ßËt oornÐrunlÊåted $¡ith Da¡nssrit$.From Danrascr¡s we h¡rre been inforrned that rnilitar¡ actjons arÉ lñ

ReepættuX¡,

.d, Ko+ygin

!55. Mermge Frar¡r F¡e¡ident |ohnsorr tû Fæurlçr l{66y9¡fl

Hkh¡fiSúfrÌ.Iune 1ü¡ l9É7.1198 a.m.

)e¡¡ Mr. I(æygin

I haw yorrr lart rnesæÐ+

:lxh.f-rRr+pectfuþ

Lyndon E. fuÌusøn

rrogrese in the viciaÍÈy of tlre city of Kuneibra wheru l*¡aeli trËcps ffn-inU+ tt¡eir qffrî{irc opematioors,

I corråider thåt wÊ Ëho1¡ld ffÉintdn æntáËt urith you on this mÁnÉr.

I

JSgB,ln thcJ.9 M