sirena 3 procurement management
TRANSCRIPT
Paper on Procurement Management Attention Karl Croswhite, UW Project Management Extension Class Date: April 7th 2010 Author: Philip Corsano Procurement Management Process for IBM Project Company Sirena 3.
Background: Sirena 3 a special purpose Project company was established in 1991, by Aeroflot, the monopoly Russian Airline system, at the time the largest airline system in the world. My role was to substitute the Project Manager in 1998 as the project had run into substantial difficulties and to restructure the Project so as to be able to deliver the required service within budgetary constraints. The objective of the “Project” company, [Project] was to provide a new IATA compatible airline reservation system to cover both, domestic [internal to the Former Soviet Union] and international flights. The total project costs at the time were estimated to be in region of $450 million, making this the largest single investment made in the Former Soviet Union in 1991. The Project Sponsors were:
IBM for the System 390 backbone; ATT satellite infrastructure to link all the remote areas of the Soviet Union to
the central data base run on a satellite farm outside Moscow;1 Sabre reservation system software, an American Airlines Company; The whole operations were to be project managed by IBM.
The financing for the procurement of the equipment and man-‐hours necessary for the $450 million estimate was to be US EXIM bank financed. This required an overall project procurement guarantee by the Government of the Russian Federation. In addition the Project would be “Project Financed” by means of a $2.50 1 The ATT international operations were purchases by GE Spacenet in 1997, GE Spacenet became the supplier of the satellite infrastructure, still based on the AT&T architecture.
per ticket reservations charge which would flow directly to the Sirena 3 Project company. The estimated transactions volume of flights internal to the Former Soviet Union [FSU] and internationally in 1990 were in the region of 110 million, Change in the Economic Environment in FSU 1991 -1998 In 1998 was asked by the IBM project manager at the time to turn the project around. The business environment in the FSU had changed substantially since 1991, as the FSU had experienced a very severe contraction in output as a result of the break-‐down of the FSU and amongst other issues, the establishment of the Central Asian republics of Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikstan and Kyrgystan, as well as the seccesion of the Caucasus republics of Georgia, Azerbajan, Armeian, and several other smaller republics including Ossetia. The graph below show the impact of the economic crisis on GDP experienced by the FSU from 1991 to 1995. By 1998 the Russian Federation had also experienced a default and massive devaluation. Hence many of the assumptions underlying the economics of the ticket reservation charge were found to be severely wanting. Most domestic flights were run by regional carriers, following a “balkanization” and deregulation of the domestic airlines. There was no “Central” Aeroflot purchasing decision maker. Rather there were at least 20 regional airlines, all which had their own ticket reservations plans, and they had to be convinced to buy into the Sirena 3 reservation system. Also by this stage, most of the infrastructure for a 150 million/ticketing reservation system for the airlines in FSU had been committed to. GDP in USSR & Former Soviet Union.
GDP went from $1,600 billion in 1990 to just over $300 billion in 1999.
Procurement Management Plan Issues.
The above chart shows how the various suppliers into the Sirena 3 project company sourced the procurement process. Up to 1998 IBM Services [IBM] was in charge of dealing with all suppliers of the Project company, at least all suppliers who were non Russian. IBM then had to ensure the delivery of the procured items, [from the complete installed system 390, to the equipment for the point to point satellite network, to the Sabre data base that was the engine of the real time reservation system]. The funding of the procurement would be dealt with through the Sirena 3 management, in particular the funding which was covered by US Exim Bank and the Russian Federation Guarantee.
Sirena 3 Project Co
Russian Govt Guaranty V
US Exim Bank
Sabre Information Services
IBM Services
GE Spacenet Satellite Services
How we dealt with Specific Problems of the Procurement Process:
1. Make or Buy: The make or buy decision for Sirena 3 was a dynamic and complex process. The Project was established in 1991 at the time of the break up of the FSU. The technological solution at that time was to deliver a real time central data base, based in Moscow at the Satellite Farm run by the ex military. Hence although the satellite receivers were US built, much of the infrastructure used was domestic Russian manufacture. This required a substantial amount of integration effort between the Russian engineers of the former military facility and engineers from GE Spacenet. As the Project progressed, we witnessed more tension in terms of the systems integration of the base station infrastructure [in Severni Aziori] and the regional sites for linking to Moscow, [Moscow was linked in real time to 89 regional satellite links to ensure complete coverage of all the main flight hubs of the FSU]. We also witness a complete change in terms of the “cheapest to deliver solution”. The internet protocol [IP] revolution in the travel booking system was a very real alternative to the central data base system envisaged on the Sabre system. Hence the make or buy decision was an extremely dynamic process that required substantial intellectual effort to ensure that the product lines that were planned to be delivered were in fact appropriate for the Project. In particular, once the IBM system 390 was installed in the central data base location in Severni Aziori, the Project Company was locked into the central data base mode. There was no alternative then, but to deliver on the central data-‐base architecture run on Sabre. The procurement make or buy decisions did shift in terms of the following aspects, the choice for the satellite to be used:
Astra Geostationary, satellite, which reached mainly European Russian; Northern Russian Ex military satellite, which covered most of Siberia,
Northern regions and Russian Far East; The decision was made to use the Russian Northern satellite, for the remainder of its expected useful life, [expected 5 years but these satellites have shown far longer expected useful lives]. The decision was supported both by the reach of the satellite and the cost of the satellite. This reduced the overall Project operating costs substantially, but required a major investment in terms of the integration of the GE Spacenet equipment to ensure continuous service coverage. Russian Northern satellite is not Geostationary. It has an elliptical orbit over the Northern Hemisphere that requires adjustment to the ground station tracking equipment. The Present Value of this investment, when compared to that of the alternative Geostationary equipment justified the “Make” decision. However there was a substantial risk of delivery, as this was a “new” technical solution and one that had not been planned for in the original project plan. Nevertheless, the solution proved
be effective and was able to be integrated into the system 390 and Sabre proprietary airline data base. This is a classic case of the Project Team exercising expert judgement in conjunction with technical experts who were able to certify that the system would be able to integrated into the GE Spacenet infrastructure, even though we were dealing with unknown ex military Russian suppliers in terms past performance and reputation.
2. Procurement Statement of Work: By the time of my involvement with Sirena 3, in January 1st 2008, the Project company had at least had two or three statements of work, which had evolved from the inception of the Project in early 1991. The initial statement of work had been based on the assumption of a 110million/passenger year volume. The Russian Federation guarantee for the entire foreign procurement of the Project company was back-‐stopped by US EXIM bank, so the statement of work and documentation elements of this Project were extensive. As discussed in the section on the change in economic environment of the FSU, the economic basis of the Project changed substantially from 1991 -‐1998. When I was elected to become the Project manager, the Project was severely behind in its payments to the three main suppliers, IBM, GE Spacenet and Sabre. Many of the statements of work had to be completely revisited to be made congruent with the new economic reality the Project company operated in. In the first three weeks of my assignment, I had to read all the agreements between the parties, and it became clear that the main statement of work that needed extensive revision was the Sabre component. This was in part because the IBM System 390 had been delivered and installed as per contract, as was for the main part the GE Spacenet equipment, save for the modifications on the Satellite tracking system as described above. With Sabre the problem was complex. Without the Sabre software engine, [a proprietary development of American Airlines], the system was dead. Yet the very premises upon which the software architecture was based appeared to be obsolete. There was no monolithic purchaser in Aeroflot. There was Aeroflot international, and at least 40 baby Flots, which included several sovereign airlines, like those of Kyrgyzstan, Uzebekistan, as well as Sibir Air, Bashir Avio and many such smaller airlines which had begun to operate in a newly unregulated competitive environment. The Sabre architecture and software solution did not have multiple buyers. Hence I had to request Sabre to completely rewrite whole sections of the software. The new solution would be targeted to the requirements of the independent and competitive airlines. This was a complex matter both from an economic and negotiation standpoint, [Sibir Air competed directly with some airlines on routes to say Khanty Mansysk in Siberia] as well as from a contracting and procurement standpoint. The
Project was substantially behind schedule, and Sabre had not been paid for its last delivery of work, because the Project had no more funds. The contracting also included a clear “Project Completion”2 clause, and Sabre had not completed its part of the work. This was not entirely attributable to a Sabre failure as has been discussed. Hence I had to call a Sponsor meeting in which we agreed the following:
That Sabre would run a pilot for one of the domestic Baby Flot airlines, [Bashkir Avio], with the objective of proving the system’s effectiveness;
That the debts that had been incurred with all suppliers would be pro-‐rated and extended, such that each of the three suppliers would share in the economic pain resulting from extending the time horizon of their payments.
The meeting was highly contentious as can be imagined. The two suppliers who had completed their project requirements were understandably reluctant to take any further risk and delay. Especially because Sabre was the only supplier to be in substantial delay relative to the Project schedule. However, given the Project Completion clause, all suppliers were jointly and severally liable for non completion. Hence the alternative was either walk away, litigate and bankrupt the Project, or accept the extension of payment terms, until the Sabre delivery of the Bashkir Avio pilot. In the end we reached agreement, and I was not the most popular person for a while. The project was safe for a few more months and extensive and expensive litigation was averted.
3. Procurement Documents:
These included amongst others anti-‐bribery clauses in compliance with the WTO directives on anti corruption in public procurement, as well as the usual technical statements of need, in Russian and English. There was a substantial intellectual property element in all the procurement documents which covered among other things, the Sabre software license, the IBM System 390 operating system license, the GE Spacenet proprietary technology for the Satellite uplink, as well as the Russian satellite procurement contracts with the Russian military regarding use of bandwith in the FSU. All these documents required substantial updating and revisions as a result of what is described in 2 above.
2 Project completion is a legal term in Project Finance Management. It states that the risk of the project, if not complete and tested in accordance with requirements of the Project Manager, rests with the suppliers. This is a very effective discipline for managing complex procurement processes in large projects like Sirena 3.
PROJECT PROCUREMENT DIAGRAM FOR SIRENA 3.
4. Source Selection Criteria: The source selection for the Sirena 3 Project was determined for the main part when the three main suppliers and Sponsors of the Project, [IBM. GE Spacenet, and Sabre] underwrote the project and the assumption behind the Project, which at the time [1991] was the largest single direct investment in the infrastructure of the FSU. There was substantial work though in the selection and sourcing of Russian suppliers. We had to establish a system for performance reporting for these suppliers, together with inspections and audits of the work performed, and compliance with IATA standards. There was also a procurement closure process which was common to all suppliers. One of the main problems we had was the anti-‐bribery clauses in our contracts which were required under US Statute, because of US Exim bank involvement. We had to obtain special VAT exemptions for the equipment imported, given the that Russian Federation was ultimate guarantor.
Sirena 3 IBM Quality Control
Human Resouces
Schedule Project Cost Management
Risk Management
Project Scope Definitions 1998 Revised
Integration Russian Suppliers
Satcom Communications