sis safety requirements specification specific...
TRANSCRIPT
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
PAGE 1 OF 38
Prepared
Checked
Approved
Statoil Rev. Code
Linde Version
Status
Date
Description
ORIGINATOR
COMPANY
TITLE
SIS Safety Requirements Specification Specific Part
DOCUMENT NUMBER
System/ Area 11/0000
DFO
E066-AB-S-SD-0009.011 B
Project No.
Orig Code
Area System
Disc Code
Doc. Type
Seq. No.
Statoil Rev.Code
´
Page 2 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
11-PT-1100 A/B/C (high presure)....................................................................................4
11-PT-1100 (pressure low)..............................................................................................5
11PDT1168 (previous 1095) ...........................................................................................6
11PT1026 A/B/C .............................................................................................................7
11PT1053 A/B/C .............................................................................................................8
11PDT1116 .....................................................................................................................9
11PDT1080 ...................................................................................................................10
11PDT1153 (previous 1081) .........................................................................................11
11PDT1057 ...................................................................................................................12
11PDT1056 ...................................................................................................................13
11LT1068 A/B/C............................................................................................................14
11LT1069 A/B/C............................................................................................................15
11LT1081D (previous 11LT1085 ) ................................................................................16
11LT1082D (previous 11LT1086 ) ................................................................................17
11LT1083 (previous 11LDT1087) .................................................................................18
11LT1083 ......................................................................................................................19
11LT1084 (previous 11LDT1088) .................................................................................20
11LT1084 ......................................................................................................................21
11LT1083 (previous 11LDT1089) .................................................................................22
11LT1084 (previous 11LDT1090) .................................................................................23
11LT1083 (previous 1091) ............................................................................................24
11LT1084 (previous 1092) ............................................................................................25
11PDT1109 ...................................................................................................................26
11PDT1023 ...................................................................................................................27
11PDT1121 ...................................................................................................................28
11PDT1151 ...................................................................................................................29
11PDT1055 ...................................................................................................................30
11PDT1024 ...................................................................................................................31
11PDT1037 ...................................................................................................................32
Page 3 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
11PDT1038 ...................................................................................................................33
11PT1138 A/B ...............................................................................................................34
11PT1139 A/B ...............................................................................................................35
11TT1181......................................................................................................................36
11PDT1014 ...................................................................................................................37
11ZSL1007....................................................................................................................38
Page 4 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11-PT-1100 A/B/C (high pressure) voting 2 out of 3
Process Unit: 11 inlet facilities P+ID no.: 11-PE-1001-001
Equipment under control pipeline Safe state of the process no packing of pipeline Protected system environment (flaring) and operation Description of the SIS function prevent pipeline packing and subsequent flaring Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H HH 120 barg closing the subsea wing valve L LL
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 1 no impact Exposure Time Risk
-
Environment 2 Flaring for more less than 1 week including depressuring the pipeline and start-up of the plant. Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
2 packing the pipeline, when the inlet to the LNG onshore plant is closed. production downtime of main product is less than 1 week
Averting of hazard
yes Operator interaction is possible because packing of pipeline is a slow process. There is sufficient indication that the inlet is closed. ESD has position alarm, 11-PSHH-1026 and 11-PSHH-1053 gives alarm. All gives 1 IPL
Frequency/ Demand Rate
3 Closing the ESD beach valve, ESD inlet at slugcatcher and/or the HIPPS valves
Remarks:
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 0 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) 0 Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
revealed failure (spurious trip) : Review date : 29/01/2003
Page 5 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11-PT-1100 (pressure low) voting 1 out of 1
Process Unit: main feed gas pipeline P+ID no.: 11-PE-1001-001
Equipment under control pipeline Safe state of the process shut-down all Xmas tree valves subsea and depressurize the pipeline (via process and later via flare) Protected system environment sea and atm. Description of the SIS function leak detection
prevent major leaks of gas/liquid entering the sea in case of a rupture Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
rupture of main feed gas pipeline
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
HH L LL 50 barg
(35 barg) 1) a) automatic action: close sub sea wells b) operator action as follows: depressurize the pipeline (via process and later via flare e.g. close the main feed gas control valve unit 12 or the ESD outlet valves at the slugcatcher and finally open the BDV at the slugcatcher by remote manual interaction)
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 5 if major vapor cloud occurs, personnel on the sea may be exposed Exposure Time Risk
0.1 low exposure time risk
Environment 5 major leak in the flow line and /or connectors into the sea Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
5 loss of reputation loss of main production
Averting of hazard
yes
yes yes
1. deviation of several pressure indicators (this well and other wells) and flow indication subsea control system (PCDA) is dual (deviation alarms are available) leak detection possible via the offshore flow measurement including back-up, onshore flow measurement,. finally operator interaction (e.g. ESD closing all valves) is possible. (1 IPL) 2. there is sufficient experience in operating and maintenance of pipelines, proper material selection and the endangered part of pipeline is trenched. (1 IPL) subsea 18-UT 1125 B (pressure low) (1IPL)
Frequency/ Demand Rate
1 major leak is expected to happen less than once in 20 to 100 years, which is very conservative consideration
Remarks: Team agreed on an alarm only and have operator interaction. Verification by Statoil will be done. Comparison with other plant needs to be done.
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 0 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) - Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility operator interaction to activate the ESD system is required. Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
1) During initial start-up of pipeline the set point needs to be lowered to 35 barg. (comment from HAZOP team recommendation 720.)
revealed failure (spurious trip) : Review date : 29/01/2003
Page 6 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11PDT1168 (previous 1095) voting 1 out of 1
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1001-001
Equipment under control ESD-Valve 11ESV1001 Safe state of the process ensure low pressure difference before ESD-Valve is opened. Protected system Pig receiver and slug catcher and connected piping Description of the SIS function avoid pressure shock and connected piping Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H 1 barg 1) inhibit to open ESD-Valve HH L LL
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Refer to E066-AB-S-RE-0018 SIL Allocation for HIPPS and PSV, as SIF is part of HIPPS.
Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel (4)
Refer to E066-AB-S-RE-0018 SIL Allocation for HIPPS and PSV, as SIF is part of HIPPS. Release at Flanges
Exposure Time Risk
(0.1)
Refer to E066-AB-S-RE-0018 SIL Allocation for HIPPS and PSV, as SIF is part of HIPPS. Operator is present at the ESD valve, but leakage further and thus not exposed
Environment Refer to E066-AB-S-RE-0018 SIL Allocation for HIPPS and PSV, as SIF is part of HIPPS. Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
(4)
Damage the line from pig receiver to slug catcher due to pressure shock, resulting into leakage Damage to both slug catchers at the same time
Averting of hazard
(Yes
)
Refer to E066-AB-S-RE-0018 SIL Allocation for HIPPS and PSV, as SIF is part of HIPPS. prior to opening of ESD valve after a pipeline shutdown the operator is warned to repressurise the equipment in the field ( limit switch and operating procedure is provided ) that reduces the frequency by one step. Closing the ESD valve is not seen as an option, because only limiting the consequences.
Frequency/ Demand Rate
(1) (2)
Refer to E066-AB-S-RE-0018 SIL Allocation for HIPPS and PSV, as SIF is part of HIPPS. Pig receiver open and high pressure upstream the valve Operator failure at restart of pipeline at high pressure
Remarks: The ranking is done to compare the fault tree analysis of the HIPPS. The same range of PFD is reached.
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 1 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) 1 Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
Revealed failure : at high differential pressure trip shall not open the valve, if it is closed at high differential pressure trip shall not close the valve, if it is open, Thus no high availability is necessary Review date : 26/09/2002
Page 7 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11PT1026 A/B/C voting 2 out of 3
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-001
Equipment under control Transfer Line from ESD Beach Valve to Slug catcher Safe state of the process Pressure Control Protected system Slug catcher Description of the SIS function Prevent overpressure of the slug catcher Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H HH 120 barg close ESD-Valve upstream Pig receiver L LL
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Refer to E066-AB-S-RE-0018 SIL Allocation for HIPPS and PSV, as SIF is part of HIPPS.
Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel Refer to E066-AB-S-RE-0018 SIL Allocation for HIPPS and PSV, as SIF is part of HIPPS. Exposure Time Risk
Refer to E066-AB-S-RE-0018 SIL Allocation for HIPPS and PSV, as SIF is part of HIPPS.
Environment Refer to E066-AB-S-RE-0018 SIL Allocation for HIPPS and PSV, as SIF is part of HIPPS. Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
Overpressurise slug catcher ; above the burst pressure and finally damage to slug catcher . This is covered by the safety criteria used in the HIPPS study.
Averting of hazard
Refer to E066-AB-S-RE-0018 SIL Allocation for HIPPS and PSV, as SIF is part of HIPPS.
Frequency/ Demand Rate
Refer to E066-AB-S-RE-0018 SIL Allocation for HIPPS and PSV, as SIF is part of HIPPS.
Remarks: According to HIPPS study, SIL 1 was sufficient, a SIL 2 can be reached without additional cost and team agreed for AIL2 , because there is no impact
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 2 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) 2 Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
stroke test is sufficient, no leak test Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Repressurazation Bypass required at ESD-Valve, which is LC Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
revealed failure (spurious trip) : trip of plant and pipeline and stop of main production thus high availability is required Review date : 26/9/2002
Page 8 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11PT1053 A/B/C voting 2 out of 3
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-001
Equipment under control Transfer Line from ESD Beach Valve to Slug catcher Safe state of the process Pressure Control Protected system Slug catcher Description of the SIS function Prevent overpressure of the slug catcher Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H HH 125 barg close HIPPS valve downstream Pig receiver L LL
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Refer to E066-AB-S-RE-0018 SIL Allocation for HIPPS and PSV, as SIF is part of HIPPS.
Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel Refer to E066-AB-S-RE-0018 SIL Allocation for HIPPS and PSV, as SIF is part of HIPPS. Exposure Time Risk
Refer to E066-AB-S-RE-0018 SIL Allocation for HIPPS and PSV, as SIF is part of HIPPS.
Environment Refer to E066-AB-S-RE-0018 SIL Allocation for HIPPS and PSV, as SIF is part of HIPPS. Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
Overpressurise slug catcher ; above the burst pressure and finally damage to slug catcher . This is covered by the safety criteria used in the HIPPS study.
Averting of hazard
Refer to E066-AB-S-RE-0018 SIL Allocation for HIPPS and PSV, as SIF is part of HIPPS.
Frequency/ Demand Rate
Refer to E066-AB-S-RE-0018 SIL Allocation for HIPPS and PSV, as SIF is part of HIPPS.
Remarks: According to HIPPS study, SIL 2 was required and team agreed for AIL2 , because there is no impact on cost
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 2 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) 2 Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval 3 times per year / Leak test shall be done acoustically. Two end flanges at the HIPPS are provided to
be able to remove one HIPPS (which is leaking) and operate on the other HIPPS. To set the end flange, depressuring of the pipe section is required, but quick restart is possible.
Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements 3" bypass for pressurisation with locking device full flow testing bypass is equipped with HIPPS
Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
revealed failure (spurious trip) : trip of plant and pipeline and stop of main production thus high availability is required Review date : 26/9/2002
Page 9 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11PDT1116 voting 1 out of 1
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-001
Equipment under control 11-QSV-1053 A/B Safe state of the process ensure low pressure difference before QSV valves are opened. Protected system slug catcher and connected piping Description of the SIS function avoid pressure shock Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H 1 barg 1) inhibit to open QSV-Valves HH L LL
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 4 possible leakage of gaseous HC at flange connections no full rupture is expected Exposure Time Risk
1 no credit is taken for exposure time risk
Environment 2 Flaring for restart Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
3 3
damage to piping and to two slug catchers due to pressure shock ; leakage at flanges downtime more than one week
Averting of hazard
yes prior to opening of QSV valve after activation the operator is warned to repressurise the equipment in the field ( limit switch and operating procedure is provided ) that reduces the frequency with one step
Frequency/ Demand Rate
1 high differential pressure is given only after activation of HIPPS
Remarks: 1) pressure A must not be higher than 1 bar than pressure B
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 1 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) - Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
Revealed failure : at high differential pressure trip shall not open the valve, if it is closed at high differential pressure trip shall not close the valve, if it is open. Thus no high availability is necessary Review date : 26/09/2002
Page 10 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11PDT1080 voting 1 out of 1
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-001
Equipment under control 11-ESV-1065 Safe state of the process ensure low pressure difference before ESV valves are opened. Protected system slug catcher and connected piping Description of the SIS function avoid pressure shock Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H 1 barg 1) inhibit to open ESV-Valves HH L LL
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 4 Possible leakage of gaseous HC at flange connections no full rupture is expected Exposure Time Risk
1 no credit is taken for exposure time risk
Environment 2 Flaring for restart Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
3 3
Damage to piping and to two slug catchers due to pressure shock ; leakage at flanges Downtime more than one week
Averting of hazard
yes Prior to opening of ESV valve after shutdown the operator is warned to repressurise the equipment in the field ( limit switch and operating procedure is provided ) that reduces the frequency with one step
Frequency/ Demand Rate
2 High differential pressure is given only after shutdown
Remarks: 1) pressure A must not be higher than 1 bar than pressure B
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 1 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) 0 Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
Revealed failure : at high differential pressure trip shall not open the valve, if it is closed at high differential pressure trip shall not close the valve, if it is open. Thus no high availability is necessary Review date : 26/09/2002
Page 11 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11PDT1153 (previous 1081) voting 1 out of 1
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-001
Equipment under control 11-ESV-1063 Safe state of the process ensure low pressure difference before ESV valves are opened. Protected system slug catcher and connected piping Description of the SIS function avoid pressure shock Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H 1 barg 1) inhibit to open ESV-Valves HH L LL
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 4 Possible leakage of gaseous HC at flange connections no full rupture is expected Exposure Time Risk
1 no credit is taken for exposure time risk
Environment 2 Flaring for restart Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
3 3
Damage to piping and to two slug catchers due to pressure shock ; leakage at flanges Downtime more than one week
Averting of hazard
yes Prior to opening of ESV valve after shutdown the operator is warned to repressurise the equipment in the field ( limit switch and operating procedure is provided ) that reduces the frequency with one step
Frequency/ Demand Rate
1 High differential pressure is given only after shutdown
Remarks: 1) pressure A must not be higher than 1 bar than pressure B
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 1 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) 0 Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
Revealed failure : at high differential pressure trip shall not open the valve, if it is closed at high differential pressure trip shall not close the valve, if it is open. Thus no high availability is necessary Review date : 26/09/2002 (number changed 15.20.03)
Page 12 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11PDT1057 voting 1 out of 1
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-002
Equipment under control 11-ESV-1077 Safe state of the process ensure low pressure difference before ESV valves are opened. Protected system slug catcher and connected piping Description of the SIS function avoid pressure shock Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H 1 barg 1) inhibit to open ESV-Valves HH L LL
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 4 Possible leakage of gaseous HC at flange connections no full rupture is expected Exposure Time Risk
1 no credit is taken for exposure time risk
Environment 2 Flaring for restart Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
3 3
Damage to piping and to one slug catcher due to pressure shock ; leakage at flanges Downtime more than one week
Averting of hazard
yes Prior to opening of ESV valve after emergency depressurisation the operator is warned to repressurise the equipment in the field ( limit switch and operating procedure is provided ) that reduces the frequency with one step
Frequency/ Demand Rate
1 High differential pressure is given only after emergency depressurisation of one section of the slug catcher
Remarks: 1) pressure A must not be higher than 1 bar than pressure B and the opposite way (intermediate valve)
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 1 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) - Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
Revealed failure : at high differential pressure trip shall not open the valve, if it is closed at high differential pressure trip shall not close the valve, if it is open. Thus no high availability is necessary Review date : 26/09/2002
Page 13 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11PDT1056 voting 1 out of 1
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-003
Equipment under control 11-ESV-1076 Safe state of the process ensure low pressure difference before ESV valves are opened. Protected system slug catcher and connected piping Description of the SIS function avoid pressure shock Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H 1 barg 1) inhibit to open ESV-Valves HH L LL
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 4 Possible leakage of gaseous HC at flange connections no full rupture is expected Exposure Time Risk
1 no credit is taken for exposure time risk
Environment 2 Flaring for restart Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
3 3
Damage to piping and to one slug catcher due to pressure shock ; leakage at flanges Downtime more than one week
Averting of hazard
yes Prior to opening of ESV valve after emergency depressurisation the operator is warned to repressurise the equipment in the field ( limit switch and operating procedure is provided ) that reduces the frequency with one step
Frequency/ Demand Rate
1 High differential pressure is given only after emergency depressurisation of one section of the slug catcher
Remarks: 1) pressure A must not be higher than 1 bar than pressure B and the opposite way (intermediate valve)
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 1 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) - Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
Revealed failure : at high differential pressure trip shall not open the valve, if it is closed at high differential pressure trip shall not close the valve, if it is open. Thus no high availability is necessary Review date : 26/09/2002
Page 14 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11LT1068 A/B/C voting 2 out of 3
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-007
Equipment under control 11-VL-101A Safe state of the process Level Control Protected system Downstream feed gas system Description of the SIS function Prevent overfilling of 11-VL-101A and liquid carry-over to LNG process Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H HH 1) mm Close ESD-valve at the inlet - L LL
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 4 Overfilling of slugcatcher during pigging and releasing the liquid to flare via the safety valves, which are designed for vapour. Risk of serious leaks and risk of damage to flare system
Exposure Time Risk
1 Not taken into account
Environment 2 Flaring at restart Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
3
Liquid condensate , excluding MEG/H20, carry-over to filter separator 12-CB-101. Resulting in high pressure drop over filter separator with damage of internals. Finally liquid carry-over to C02 wash column, resulting in foaming. Main production out of service, more than 1 week
Averting of hazard
yes Both slugcatchers work in parallel; if one LSHH fails, the other LSHH will still give an alarm and the operator has sufficient time to interact (slow process)
Frequency/ Demand Rate
1 2
Personnel : Volume of max. slug is less than volume in slugcatcher, according to pipeline simulations Asset : Liquid carry-over due to operation close to HHlevel
Remarks: 1) Refer Mechanical Data Sheet
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 1 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) 1 Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
The two block valves in the equalisation line must be LO locked open to ensure that the instrument will work.
revealed failure (spurious trip) : closure of the inlet of one slug-catcher, which is designed for 100%, but more risk of carry-over to downstream system. High availability is required. Review date : 02/04/2003
Page 15 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11LT1069 A/B/C voting 2 out of 3
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-008
Equipment under control 11-VL-101B Safe state of the process Level Control Protected system Downstream feed gas system Description of the SIS function Prevent overfilling of 11-VL-101B and liquid carry-over to LNG process Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H HH 1) mm Close ESD-valve at the inlet - L LL
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 4 Overfilling of slugcatcher during pigging and releasing the liquid to flare via the safety valves, which are designed for vapour. Risk of serious leaks and risk of damage to flare system
Exposure Time Risk
1 Not taken into account
Environment 2 Flaring at restart Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
3
Liquid condensate , excluding MEG/H20, carry-over to filter separator 12-CB-101. Resulting in high pressure drop over filter separator with damage of internals. Finally liquid carry-over to C02 wash column, resulting in foaming. Main production out of service, more than 1 week
Averting of hazard
yes Both slugcatchers work in parallel; if one LSHH fails, the other LSHH will still give an alarm and the operator has sufficient time to interact (slow process)
Frequency/ Demand Rate
1 2
Personnel : Volume of max. slug is less than volume in slugcatcher, according to pipeline simulations Asset : Liquid carry-over due to operation close to HHlevel
Remarks: 1) Refer Mechanical Data Sheet
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 1 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) 1 Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
The two block valves in the equalisation line must be LO locked open to ensure that the instrument will work.
revealed failure (spurious trip) : closure of the inlet of one slug-catcher, which is designed for 100%, but more risk of carry-over to downstream system. High availability is required. Review date : 02/04/2003
Page 16 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11LT1081D (previous 11LT1085 ) voting 1 out of 1
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-007
Equipment under control 11-VL-101A Safe state of the process Level Control Protected system Downstream condensate system Description of the SIS function Prevent gas breakthrough into condensate system Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H HH - LL 1) mm Close HV valves in upper condensate draw off line (4 valves) LLL 1) mm Close ESD valves in the common line
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 5 Gas breakthrough results in overpressurisation of 12-VA-101; exceeding burst pressure Exposure Time Risk
NA
Environment 2 Flaring more > 1 day (start-up) Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
5 3 2
Gas breakthrough into condensate separator 12-VA-101 downtime of side product >1 week and downtime of main product >1week
damage of internals of condensate separator and of filter 11-CA-101 (but spare is provided) Averting of hazard
yes Asset damage of interals: PSHH in the 12-VA-101, acting on 11-ESV-1072 (1 IPL) Personnel: Safety valves are designed for the scenario ( 3 IPL’s, reducing the consequence)
Frequency/ Demand Rate
2 control loop failure or operator failure (selector failure)
Remarks: 1) Refer Mechanical Data Sheet
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 0 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) 0 Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
revealed failure (spurious trip) : Unwanted closure of the flow to the condensate system. Storage in slugcatcher is possible. No high availability is necessary. Review date : 02.04.2003
Page 17 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11LT1082D (previous 11LT1086 ) voting 1 out of 1
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-008
Equipment under control 11-VL-101B Safe state of the process Level Control Protected system Downstream condensate system Description of the SIS function Prevent gas breakthrough into condensate system Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H HH - LL 1) mm Close HV valves in upper condensate draw off line (4 valves) LLL 1) mm Close ESD valves in the common line
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 5 Gas breakthrough results in overpressurisation of 12-VA-101; exceeding burst pressure Exposure Time Risk
NA
Environment 2 Flaring more > 1 day (start-up) Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
5 3 2
Gas breakthrough into condensate separator 12-VA-101 downtime of side product >1 week and downtime of main product >1week
damage of internals of condensate separator and of filter 11-CA-101 (but spare is provided) Averting of hazard
yes Asset damage of interals: PSHH in the 12-VA-101, acting on 11-ESV-1073 (1 IPL) Personnel: Safety valves are designed for the scenario ( 3 IPL’s, reducing the consequence)
Frequency/ Demand Rate
2 control loop failure or operator failure (selector failure)
Remarks: 1) Refer Mechanical Data Sheet
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 0 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) 0 Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
revealed failure (spurious trip) : Unwanted closure of the flow to the condensate system. Storage in slugcatcher is possible. No high availability is necessary. Review date : 02.04.2003
Page 18 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11LT1083 (previous 11LDT1087) voting 1 out of 1
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-007
Equipment under control 11-VL-101A Safe state of the process Level Control Protected system Downstream condensate system Description of the SIS function Prevent MEG/H20 into condensate system Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
HHH 1100 mm Close inlet ESD valve to slugcatcher HH 1) mm Alarm if condensate valve is not closed H 1) mm Close HV valves in condensate draw off line (4 valves) - LL
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 1 No impact, Exposure Time Risk
NA
Environment 2 Flaring more > 1 day (start-up) Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
2 2
MEG/H20 into condensate separator 12-VA-101, which can then be sent to the MEG system; operational upset fouling of 20-HA-101, which needs cleaning : Downtime of side product >1 day, less than 1 week and downtime of main product > 1 day, as condensate can be stored in slugcatcher, but storage capacity is limited
Averting of hazard
yes Asset : 12-LDT-1084 and 12-LDT-1058 give alarm
Frequency/ Demand Rate
2 control loop failure or operator failure (selector failure)
Remarks: 1) Refer to PID 11-PE-1002-007 and Mechanical Data Sheet 2) 11LT1083 B or A can be used as control. When one is selected as control the other must be used as trip signal.
Control and trip signal must be independent.
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 0 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) 0 Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
revealed failure (spurious trip) : Unwanted closure of the flow to the condensate system. Storage in slugcatcher is possible. No high availability is necessary. Review date : 02.04.2003
Page 19 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11LT1083 voting 1 out of 1
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-007
Equipment under control 11-VL-101A Safe state of the process Level Control Protected system slugcatcher Description of the SIS function Prevent overfilling of stand-pipe for level measurement with MEG while slugcatcher is filled with
condensate. Prevent wrong level measurement. Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
HHH 1100 mm Close inlet ESD valve to slugcatcher time delay H 1) mm Close HV valves in condensate draw off line (4 valves) - L LL
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 3 Overfilling of slugcatcher, no risk for personnel, as liquid will enter the process first. Exposure Time Risk
0.1 operator not present
Environment 2 Flaring at restart Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
3
Liquid condensate , excluding MEG/H20, carry-over to filter separator 12-CB-101. Resulting in high pressure drop over filter separator with damage of internals. Finally liquid carry-over to C02 wash column, resulting in foaming. Main production out of service, more than 1 week
Averting of hazard
yes Both slugcatchers work in parallel; if one LSHH fails, the other LSHH will still give an alarm and the operator has sufficient time to interact (slow process) There are sufficient alarms.
Frequency/ Demand Rate
2 failure of level high control causes wrong measurement for 11LSHH1068, (trip will be too late)
Remarks: 1. Refer to PID 11-PE-1002-007 and Mechanical Data Sheet
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 0 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) 0 Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
revealed failure (spurious trip) : Unwanted closure of the flow to the condensate system. Storage in slugcatcher is possible. No high availability is necessary. Review date : 19.04.2004
Page 20 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11LT1084 (previous 11LDT1088) voting 1 out of 1
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-008
Equipment under control 11-VL-101B Safe state of the process Level Control Protected system Downstream condensate system Description of the SIS function Prevent MEG/H20 into condensate system Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
HHH 1100 mm Close inlet ESD valve to slugcatcher H 1) mm Close HV valves in condensate draw off line (4 valves) - L LL
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 1 No impact, Exposure Time Risk
NA
Environment 2 Flaring more > 1 day (start-up) Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
2 2
MEG/H20 into condensate separator 12-VA-101, which can then be sent to the MEG system; operational upset fouling of 20-HA-101, which needs cleaning : Downtime of side product >1 day, less than 1 week and downtime of main product > 1 day, as condensate can be stored in slugcatcher, but storage capacity is limited
Averting of hazard
yes Asset : 12-LDT-1084 and 12-LDT-1058 give alarm
Frequency/ Demand Rate
2 control loop failure or operator failure (selector failure)
Remarks: 1) Refer to PID 11-PE-1002-007 and Mechanical Data Sheet 2) 11LT1084 B or A can be used as control. When one is selected as control the other must be used as trip signal.
Control and trip signal must be independent.
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 0 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) 0 Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
revealed failure (spurious trip) : Unwanted closure of the flow to the condensate system. Storage in slugcatcher is possible. No high availability is necessary. Review date : 02.04.2003
Page 21 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11LT1084 voting 1 out of 1
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-008
Equipment under control 11-VL-101B Safe state of the process Level Control Protected system slugcatcher Description of the SIS function Prevent overfilling of stand-pipe for level measurement with MEG while slugcatcher is filled with
condensate. Prevent wrong level measurement. Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
HHH 1100 mm Close inlet ESD valve to slugcatcher time delay H 1) mm Close HV valves in condensate draw off line (4 valves) - L LL
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 3 Overfilling of slugcatcher, no risk for personnel, as liquid will enter the process first. Exposure Time Risk
0.1 operator not present
Environment 2 Flaring at restart Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
3
Liquid condensate , excluding MEG/H20, carry-over to filter separator 12-CB-101. Resulting in high pressure drop over filter separator with damage of internals. Finally liquid carry-over to C02 wash column, resulting in foaming. Main production out of service, more than 1 week
Averting of hazard
yes Both slugcatchers work in parallel; if one LSHH fails, the other LSHH will still give an alarm and the operator has sufficient time to interact (slow process) There are sufficient alarms.
Frequency/ Demand Rate
2 failure of level high control causes wrong measurement for 11LSHH1069, (trip will be too late)
Remarks: 1) Refer to PID 11-PE-1002-007 and Mechanical Data Sheet
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 0 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) 0 Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
revealed failure (spurious trip) : Unwanted closure of the flow to the condensate system. Storage in slugcatcher is possible. No high availability is necessary. Review date : 19.04.2004
Page 22 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11LT1083 (previous 11LDT1089) voting 1 out of 1
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-007
Equipment under control 11-VL-101A Safe state of the process Level Control Protected system Downstream MEG/H20 system Description of the SIS function Prevent condensate breakthrough into MEG/H20 system Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H L 1) mm Switch condensate draw off valve - LL 1) mm Alarm MEG/H2O level low LLL 1) mm Close MEG/H20 draw off line
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 1 No impact Exposure Time Risk
NA
Environment 1 No impact Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
3
Condensate breakthrough into MEG/H20 system into MEG storage tank, from where finally condensate is used as MEG to pipeline downtime of main product >1 week
Averting of hazard
yes Asset : 13-VA-101, where separation is done, with Level indication and alarms; collection in the bottom of 13-TA-101, where it can be removed (1AIL) Lean MEG is buffered in the tank 13-TA-102, so pipeline does not need to be stopped (1 AIL)
Frequency/ Demand Rate
2 control loop failure or operator failure (selector failure)
Remarks: 1) Refer Mechanical Data Sheet
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) - Asset Integrity Level (AIL) - Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
revealed failure (spurious trip) : Unwanted closure of the flow to the MEG/H20 system; operator has time to react. No high availability is necessary. Review date : 02.04.2003
Page 23 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11LT1084 (previous 11LDT1090) voting 1 out of 1
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-008
Equipment under control 11-VL-101B Safe state of the process Level Control Protected system Downstream MEG/H20 system Description of the SIS function Prevent condensate breakthrough into MEG/H20 system Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H L 1) mm Switch condensate draw off valve - LL 1) mm Alarm MEG/H2O level low LLL 1) mm Close MEG/H20 draw off line
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 1 No impact Exposure Time Risk
NA
Environment 1 No impact Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
3
Condensate breakthrough into MEG/H20 system into MEG storage tank, from where finally condensate is used as MEG to pipeline downtime of main product >1 week
Averting of hazard
yes Asset : 13-VA-101, where separation is done, with Level indication and alarms; collection in the bottom of 13-TA-101, where it can be removed (1AIL) Lean MEG is buffered in the tank 13-TA-102, so pipeline does not need to be stopped (1 AIL)
Frequency/ Demand Rate
2 control loop failure or operator failure (selector failure)
Remarks: 1) Refer Mechanical Data Sheet
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) - Asset Integrity Level (AIL) - Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
revealed failure (spurious trip) : Unwanted closure of the flow to the MEG/H20 system; operator has time to react. No high availability is necessary. Review date : 02.04.2003
Page 24 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11LT1083 (previous 1091) voting 1 out of 1
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-007
Equipment under control 11-VL-101A Safe state of the process Level Control Protected system Downstream MEG/H20 system Description of the SIS function Prevent gas breakthrough into 13-VA-101 MEG/H20 system Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H L 1) mm Switch condensate draw off valve - LL 1) mm Alarm MEG/H2O level low LLL 1) mm Close MEG/H20 draw off line
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 5 Gas breakthrough results in overpressurisation of 13-VA-101; exceeding burst pressure Exposure Time Risk
NA Not taken into account
Environment 2 Short Flaring from safety valve relief, > 1 day Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
5 Gas breakthrough results in overpressurisation of 13-VA-101, exceeding burst pressure, damage to vessel
Averting of hazard
yes Safety valves are designed for the scenario ( 3 IPL’s, reducing the consequence)
Frequency/ Demand Rate
2 control loop failure or operator failure (selector failure)
Remarks: 1) Refer Mechanical Data Sheet
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 0 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) 0 Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
revealed failure (spurious trip) : Unwanted closure of the flow to the MEG/H20 system; operator has time to react. No high availability is necessary. Review date : 27/9/2002
Page 25 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11LT1084 (previous 1092) voting 1 out of 1
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-008
Equipment under control 11-VL-101B Safe state of the process Level Control Protected system Downstream MEG/H20 system Description of the SIS function Prevent gas breakthrough into 13-VA-101 MEG/H20 system Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H L 1) mm Switch condensate draw off valve - LL 1) mm Alarm MEG/H2O level low LLL 1) mm Close MEG/H20 draw off line
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 5 Gas breakthrough results in overpressurisation of 13-VA-101; exceeding burst pressure Exposure Time Risk
NA Not taken into account
Environment 2 Short Flaring from safety valve relief, > 1 day Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
5 Gas breakthrough results in overpressurisation of 13-VA-101, exceeding burst pressure, damage to vessel
Averting of hazard
yes Safety valves are designed for the scenario ( 3 IPL’s, reducing the consequence)
Frequency/ Demand Rate
2 control loop failure or operator failure (selector failure)
Remarks: 1) Refer Mechanical Data Sheet
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 0 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) 0 Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
revealed failure (spurious trip) : Unwanted closure of the flow to the MEG/H20 system; operator has time to react. No high availability is necessary. Review date : 10/10/2002
Page 26 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11PDT1109 voting 1 out of 1
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-003
Equipment under control 11-ESV-1074 Safe state of the process ensure low pressure difference before ESV valve is opened. Protected system 11-CA-102 A/B and connected piping Description of the SIS function avoid pressure shock Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H 1 barg 1) inhibit to open ESV-Valve HH L LL
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 4 Full rupture of 4” piping; liquid MEH/H20 leakage Exposure Time Risk
0.1 Rare to more often exposure in the endangered zone (~ 10% of the time), e.g. only during supervision rounds or maintenance. Operator may be present at the ESD-Valve but not in the endangered area thus frequency is reduced by one step (area is outside the barge and at large distance). Exposure time risk needs not to be taken into account
Environment 2 Flaring for restart and spill of liquid MEG/H20 in not curbed area : risk of soil contamination Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
4 3
Liquid hammering : Damage to common piping and to 11-CA-102 A or B Downtime for main and by-product more than one week
Averting of hazard
yes Prior to opening of ESV valve after shutdown the operator is warned to repressurise the equipment in the field ( limit switch and operating procedure is provided ) that reduces the frequency with one step Personnel : In case of leak the ESV valve can be closed again (stopping already the flow of water in MEG) (1 SIL)
Frequency/ Demand Rate
2 High differential pressure is given only after shutdown
Remarks: 1) pressure A must not be higher than 1 bar than pressure B
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 1 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) 1 Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
Revealed failure : at high differential pressure trip shall not open the valve, if it is closed at high differential pressure trip shall not close the valve, if it is open. Thus no high availability is necessary Review date : 27/09/2002
Page 27 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11PDT1023 voting 1 out of 1
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-005
Equipment under control 11-ESV-1075 Safe state of the process ensure low pressure difference before ESV valve is opened. Protected system 11-CA-102 A/B and connected piping Description of the SIS function avoid pressure shock Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H 1 barg 1) inhibit to open ESV-Valve HH L LL
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 4 Full rupture of 4” piping; liquid MEH/H20 leakage Exposure Time Risk
0.1 Rare to more often exposure in the endangered zone (~ 10% of the time), e.g. only during supervision rounds or maintenance. Operator may be present at the ESD-Valve but not in the endangered area thus frequency is reduced by one step (area is outside the barge and at large distance). Exposure time risk needs not to be taken into account
Environment 2 Flaring for restart and spill of liquid MEG/H20 in not curbed area : risk of soil contamination Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
4 3
Liquid hammering : Damage to common piping and to 11-CA-102 A or B Downtime for main and by-product more than one week
Averting of hazard
yes Prior to opening of ESV valve after shutdown the operator is warned to repressurise the equipment in the field ( limit switch and operating procedure is provided ) that reduces the frequency with one step Personnel : In case of leak the ESV valve can be closed again (stopping already the flow of water in MEG) (1 SIL)
Frequency/ Demand Rate
2 High differential pressure is given only after shutdown
Remarks: 1) pressure A must not be higher than 1 bar than pressure B
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 1 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) 1 Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
Revealed failure : at high differential pressure trip shall not open the valve, if it is closed at high differential pressure trip shall not close the valve, if it is open. Thus no high availability is necessary Review date : 27/09/2002
Page 28 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11PDT1121 voting 1 out of 1
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-003
Equipment under control 11-HV-1093/1094/1098/1099 Safe state of the process ensure low pressure difference before group of HV valve is opened. Protected system 11-CA-101A/B and connected piping Description of the SIS function avoid pressure shock Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H 1 barg 1) inhibit to open group of HV-Valves HH L LL
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 4 Full rupture of 8” piping; condensate leakage Exposure Time Risk
0.1 Rare to more often exposure in the endangered zone (~ 10% of the time), e.g. only during supervision rounds or maintenance. Operator may be present at the ESD-Valve but not in the endangered area thus frequency is reduced by one step (area is outside the barge and at large distance). Exposure time risk needs not to be taken into account
Environment 2 Flaring for restart and spill of condensate in not curbed area : risk of soil contamination Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
4 3
Liquid hammering : Damage to common piping and to 11-CA-101 A or B Downtime for main and by-product more than one week
Averting of hazard
yes Prior to opening of ESV valve after shutdown the operator is warned to repressurise the equipment in the field ( limit switch and operating procedure is provided ) that reduces the frequency with one step Personnel : In case of leak, the ESV valve, could be closed again, which limits gas leakage at 115 barg and also 11-ESV-1072 can be closed again, which limits the consequences (1 SIL)
Frequency/ Demand Rate
2 High differential pressure is given only after shutdown
Remarks: 1) pressure A must not be higher than 1 bar than pressure B
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 1 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) 1 Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
Revealed failure : at high differential pressure trip shall not open the valve, if it is closed at high differential pressure trip shall not close the valve, if it is open. Thus no high availability is necessary Review date : 27/09/2002
Page 29 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11PDT1151 voting 1 out of 1
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-005
Equipment under control 11-HV-1070/1071/1095/1096 Safe state of the process ensure low pressure difference before group of HV valve is opened. Protected system 11-CA-101A/B and connected piping Description of the SIS function avoid pressure shock Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H 1 barg 1) inhibit to open group of HV-Valves HH L LL
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 4 Full rupture of 8” piping; condensate leakage Exposure Time Risk
0.1 Rare to more often exposure in the endangered zone (~ 10% of the time), e.g. only during supervision rounds or maintenance. Operator may be present at the ESD-Valve but not in the endangered area thus frequency is reduced by one step (area is outside the barge and at large distance). Exposure time risk needs not to be taken into account
Environment 2 Flaring for restart and spill of condensate in not curbed area : risk of soil contamination Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
4 3
Liquid hammering : Damage to common piping and to 11-CA-101 A or B Downtime for main and by-product more than one week
Averting of hazard
yes Prior to opening of ESV valve after shutdown the operator is warned to repressurise the equipment in the field ( limit switch and operating procedure is provided ) that reduces the frequency with one step Personnel : In case of leak, the ESV valve, could be closed again, which limits gas leakage at 115 barg and also 11-ESV-1073 can be closed again, which limits the consequences (1 SIL)
Frequency/ Demand Rate
2 High differential pressure is given only after shutdown
Remarks: 1) pressure A must not be higher than 1 bar than pressure B
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 1 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) 1 Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
Revealed failure : at high differential pressure trip shall not open the valve, if it is closed at high differential pressure trip shall not close the valve, if it is open. Thus no high availability is necessary Review date : 27/09/2002
Page 30 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11PDT1055 voting 1 out of 1
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-003
Equipment under control 11-ESV-1072 Safe state of the process ensure low pressure difference before ESV valve is opened. Protected system 11-CA-101A/B and connected piping Description of the SIS function avoid pressure shock Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H 1 barg 1) inhibit to open ESV-Valve HH L LL
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 4 Full rupture of 8” piping; condensate leakage Exposure Time Risk
0.1 Rare to more often exposure in the endangered zone (~ 10% of the time), e.g. only during supervision rounds or maintenance. Operator may be present at the ESD-Valve but not in the endangered area thus frequency is reduced by one step (area is outside the barge and at large distance). Exposure time risk needs not to be taken into account
Environment 2 Flaring for restart and spill of condensate in not curbed area : risk of soil contamination Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
4 3
Liquid hammering : Damage to common piping and to 11-CA-101 A or B Downtime for main and by-product more than one week
Averting of hazard
yes Prior to opening of ESV valve after shutdown the operator is warned to repressurise the equipment in the field ( limit switch and operating procedure is provided ) that reduces the frequency with one step Personnel : In case of leak, the ESV valve, could be closed again, which limits gas leakage at 115 barg and also the group 11-HV-1093/1094/1098/1099 valves can be closed again, which limits the consequences (1 SIL)
Frequency/ Demand Rate
2 High differential pressure is given only after shutdown
Remarks: 1) pressure A must not be higher than 1 bar than pressure B
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 1 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) 1 Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
Revealed failure : at high differential pressure trip shall not open the valve, if it is closed at high differential pressure trip shall not close the valve, if it is open. Thus no high availability is necessary Review date : 27/09/2002
Page 31 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11PDT1024 voting 1 out of 1
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-005
Equipment under control 11-ESV-1073 Safe state of the process ensure low pressure difference before ESV valve is opened. Protected system 11-CA-101A/B and connected piping Description of the SIS function avoid pressure shock Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H 1 barg 1) inhibit to open ESV-Valve HH L LL
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 4 Full rupture of 8” piping; condensate leakage Exposure Time Risk
0.1 Rare to more often exposure in the endangered zone (~ 10% of the time), e.g. only during supervision rounds or maintenance. Operator may be present at the ESD-Valve but not in the endangered area thus frequency is reduced by one step (area is outside the barge and at large distance). Exposure time risk needs not to be taken into account
Environment 2 Flaring for restart and spill of condensate in not curbed area : risk of soil contamination Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
4 3
Liquid hammering : Damage to common piping and to 11-CA-101 A or B Downtime for main and by-product more than one week
Averting of hazard
yes Prior to opening of ESV valve after shutdown the operator is warned to repressurise the equipment in the field ( limit switch and operating procedure is provided ) that reduces the frequency with one step Personnel : In case of leak, the ESV valve, could be closed again, which limits gas leakage at 115 barg and also the group 11-HV-1070/1071/1095/1096 valves can be closed again, which limits the consequences (1 SIL)
Frequency/ Demand Rate
2 High differential pressure is given only after shutdown
Remarks: 1) pressure A must not be higher than 1 bar than pressure B
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 1 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) 1 Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
Revealed failure : at high differential pressure trip shall not open the valve, if it is closed at high differential pressure trip shall not close the valve, if it is open. Thus no high availability is necessary Review date : 27/09/2002
Page 32 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11PDT1037 voting 1 out of 1
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-004
Equipment under control ESD-Valve 11ESV1066 Safe state of the process ensure low pressure difference before ESD-Valve is opened. Protected system 12-HA-102 and connected piping Description of the SIS function avoid pressure shock to 12-HA-102 and connected piping Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H 1 barg 1) inhibit to open ESD-Valve HH L LL
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 4 possible leakage of gaseous HC at flange connections no full rupture is expected Exposure Time Risk
1 no credit taken
Environment 2 minor effects because non environmental hazardous products are released Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
4 3
damage to piping and equipment due to pressure shock and explosion or fire, > 1% plant value downtime not more than one week
Averting of hazard
yes prior to opening of ESD valve after a depressurisation the operator is warned to repressurise the equipment in the field ( limit switch and operating procedure is provided ) that reduces the frequency with one step ( 1 IPL) Personnel : ESD valve can be closed again, limiting the consequences; no credit is taken
Frequency/ Demand Rate
1 high differential pressure is given after shutdown and an operator failure at the same time
Remarks: 1) pressure A must not be higher than 1 bar than pressure B, and the opposite way
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 1 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) 1 Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
revealed failure (spurious trip) : at high differential pressure trip shall not open the valve, if it is closed at high differential pressure trip shall not close the valve, if it is open. Thus no high availability is necessary Review date : 27/9/2002
Page 33 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11PDT1038 voting 1 out of 1
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-004
Equipment under control ESD-Valve 11ESV1067 Safe state of the process ensure low pressure difference before ESD-Valve is opened. Protected system 12-HA-102 and connected piping Description of the SIS function avoid pressure shock to 12-HA-102 and connected piping Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H 1 barg 1) inhibit to open ESD-Valve HH L LL
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 4 possible leakage of gaseous HC at flange connections no full rupture is expected Exposure Time Risk
1 no credit taken
Environment 2 minor effects because non environmental hazardous products are released Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
4 3
damage to piping and equipment due to pressure shock and explosion or fire, > 1% plant value downtime not more than one week
Averting of hazard
yes prior to opening of ESD valve after a depressurisation the operator is warned to repressurise the equipment in the field ( limit switch and operating procedure is provided ) that reduces the frequency with one step ( 1 IPL) Personnel : ESD valve can be closed again, limiting the consequences; no credit is taken
Frequency/ Demand Rate
1 high differential pressure is given after shutdown and an operator failure at the same time
Remarks: 1) pressure A must not be higher than 1 bar than pressure B, and the opposite way
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 1 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) 1 Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
revealed failure (spurious trip) : at high differential pressure trip shall not open the valve, if it is closed at high differential pressure trip shall not close the valve, if it is open. Thus no high availability is necessary Review date : 27/9/2002
Page 34 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11PT1138 A/B voting 1 out of 2
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-006
Equipment under control 11-VL-101B Safe state of the process pressure control Protected system flare system and slugcatcher Description of the SIS function prevent overloading of flare by keeping the second valve closed until the pressure is below 55 barg
and the third valve until the pressure is below 15 barg Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
only in case of emergency depressurisation all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H 48 barg inhibits to open 11-BDV-1135 HH 70 barg inhibits to open 11-BDV-1134 L LL
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 4 overload of flare system and possible damage to flare header system and risk of hydrocarbon release to atm. Exposure Time Risk
0.1 rare to more often exposure in the endangered zone (~ 10% of the time), e.g. only during supervision rounds or maintenance and the removal of the dangerous situation does not require the presence of staff on the scene of action
Environment 1 overload of the flare (less than 8 hrs) Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
3 back pressure in the flare system for half hour, no potential reaching the test pressure in the flare system, risk off damage to the flare system at the tie in point of subheaders, release of HC possible. Production downtime main product, > 1 week. Risk for the BD drum damage. Risk of short fire
Averting of hazard
no
Frequency/ Demand Rate
2 in case of emergency depressurisation, which may occur once every 5 years
Remarks: 1st valve may open to blow-down without any risk
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 2 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) 1 Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
only in case of emergency depressurisation
revealed failure (spurious trip) : trip of valve does not effect main production and thus no high availability is required Review date : 27/9/2002
Page 35 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11PT1139 A/B voting 1 out of 2
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-006
Equipment under control 11-VL-101A Safe state of the process pressure control Protected system flare system and slugcatcher Description of the SIS function prevent overloading of flare by keeping the second valve closed until the pressure is below 55 barg
and the third valve until the pressure is below 15 barg Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
only in case of emergency depressurisation all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H 48 barg inhibits to open 11-BDV-1137 HH 70 barg inhibits to open 11-BDV-1136 L LL
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 4 overload of flare system and possible damage to flare header system and risk of hydrocarbon release to atm. Exposure Time Risk
0.1 rare to more often exposure in the endangered zone (~ 10% of the time), e.g. only during supervision rounds or maintenance and the removal of the dangerous situation does not require the presence of staff on the scene of action
Environment 1 overload of the flare (less than 8 hrs) Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
3 back pressure in the flare system for half hour, no potential reaching the test pressure in the flare system, risk off damage to the flare system at the tie in point of subheaders, release of HC possible. Production downtime main product, > 1 week. Risk for the BD drum damage. Risk of short fire
Averting of hazard
no
Frequency/ Demand Rate
2 in case of emergency depressurisation, which may occur once every 5 years
Remarks: 1st valve may open to blow-down without any risk
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 2 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) 1 Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
only in case of emergency depressurisation
revealed failure (spurious trip) : trip of valve does not effect main production and thus no high availability is required Review date : 27/9/2002
Page 36 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11TT1181 voting 1 out of 1
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1002-001
Equipment under control 11-HA-101 Safe state of the process temperature control Protected system slugcatcher line from 11-HA-101 to slugcatcher Description of the SIS function prevent low temperatures during pipeline depressurisation when no heating in 11-HA-101 Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
only in case of emergency depressurisation all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H HH L - 3 °C alarm (to prevent hydrate formation) LL - 5 °C alarm (close the ESD valve to stop the flow) operator action
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 4 low temp. will occur at high delta P, risk of brittle fracture may be given, depending on the ratio of temperature and pressure . there is no risk of brittle fracture if depressurisation is done from 230 bar to 70 bar. (delta T is -25°C) , design temp. is -45°C
Exposure Time Risk
0.1 rare to more often exposure in the endangered zone (~ 10% of the time), e.g. only during supervision rounds or maintenance and the removal of the dangerous situation does not require the presence of staff on the scene of action
Environment NA Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
4 damage of piping and main equipment due to low temp.
Averting of hazard
yes special operating procedure will be available and needs to be followed strictly. (1 IPL) hydrates may occur in the valve 11HV1002 and will restrict the flow.
Frequency/ Demand Rate
0 pipeline depressurisation with very high delta p (230 bar down to 1 bar), which may occur once every 10 years and failure of a control loop.
Remarks: Team agreed during HAZOP that an alarm is sufficient, as a trip function may cause problems during cold slugs and may cause unwanted trips when liquids are vaporised.
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 0 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) 0 Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
only in case of pipeline depressurisation
revealed failure (spurious trip) Review date : 01.04.03 final HAZOP
Page 37 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11PDT1014 voting 1 out of 1
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1001-001
Equipment under control Pig receiver Safe state of the process prevent opening of shut-off valves at the pig receiver when personnel are working at open door Protected system personnel working on Pig receiver Description of the SIS function inhibit to open / prevent opening of shut-off valves at the pig receiver when personnel are working at
open door and prevent gas flow to atm. Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H HH 1 barg 1) inhibit to open Shut-off -Valve L LL
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 4 Large gas release to atm. when opening of shut-off valves at the pig receiver. Personnel are working at open door. Risk of fire and explosion. One to three fatalities possible.
Exposure Time Risk
1 operator is present when opening the valves
Environment 3 large gas release Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
1 no impact, as gas jet will not be directed to the plant equipment
Averting of hazard
yes 11ZSLL1007 prevents also that the second shut-off valves are open when the pig receiver door is open. ( 1 IPL) no impact, as gas jet will not be directed to the plant equipment highly established operating procedure is available / supervised action (1 IPL)
Frequency/ Demand Rate
2 operator mistake during a highly supervised action, removing a pig is only once per year.
Remarks: 1) as long as there is a differential pressure the valves must not be opened
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 1 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) - Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
Revealed failure : on impact on production thus low availability Review date : 15.10.03
Page 38 of 38 SIS Safety Requirement Specification Specific Part
Rev.date :
D:\Daten\Safety Training\Schulung Prozess\SRS_Detail.doc
Tag 11ZSL1007 voting 1 out of 1
Process Unit: 11 Slugcatcher and Pigtrap P+ID no.: 11-PE-1001-001
Equipment under control Pig receiver Safe state of the process prevent opening of shut-off valves at the pig receiver when personnel are working at open door Protected system personnel working on Pig receiver Description of the SIS function inhibit to open / prevent opening of shut-off valves at the pig receiver when personnel are working at
open door and prevent gas flow to atm. Description of mode of operation of the plant for which the SIS is required
all cases defined in E066-AB-P-LE-0001 "Operational Design Scenarios of Snøhvit Feed for Hammerfest LNG Plant", as well as start-up, shutdown, off-spec. case.
Setpoint Description of SIS Output Action (including force manual close signal to ensure safe state of process unit)
Response time of final element
H HH L LL open door inhibit to open Shut-off -Valves
SIL allocation (Reason for Selection of Each Risk Parameter) based on "Risk Matrix for HSE and Assets" E066-AB-S-SG-0002 Consequence to (without SIF)
Description / Reason
Personnel 4 Large gas release to atm. when opening of shut-off valves at the pig receiver. Personnel are working at open door. Risk of fire and explosion. One to three fatalities possible.
Exposure Time Risk
1 operator is present when opening the valves
Environment 3 large gas release Assets: Equipment / Production Downtime
1 no impact, as gas jet will not be directed to the plant equipment
Averting of hazard
yes 11PDSHH1014 prevents also that the shut-off valves are open when the pig receiver door is open. ( 1 IPL) no impact, as gas jet will not be directed to the plant equipment highly established operating procedure is available / supervised action (1 IPL)
Frequency/ Demand Rate
2 operator mistake during a highly supervised action, removing a pig is only once per year.
Remarks:
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 1 Asset Integrity Level (AIL) - Special requirement for the SIS, if not covered by the General part of the Safety Requirements Specification: Requirement for proof test interval if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Manual shutdown possibility if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Energise or deenergise to trip if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part Special requirement for reset of SIS if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part specific requirements for starting or restarting the SIS
if not otherwise stated, refer to Safety Requirements Specification General Part
Bypass requirements Mean Time to Repair MTTR Additional safety instrumented functions to support special operational cases (e.g. start-up, stand-by, shutdown etc.).
Revealed failure : on impact on production thus low availability Review date : 15.10.03