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CORNELLUNIVERSITYLIBRARY


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Date Due


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Cornell UniversityLibrary

The original of tliis book is intine Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright restrictions inthe United States on the use of the text.


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THE PHYSICAL SYSTEMOF ST. T HOMAS.


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BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

Principles of Political Economy. By Matteo Libeeatoke,S.J. Translated by Edward Heneage Dering, author ofFreville Chase, etc. 8vo, cloth, bevelled, 7s. 6d.

On Universals. An Exposition of Thomistic Doctrine. ByMatteo Libebatore, S.J. Translated by E. H. Debing.In wrapper, 7s. 6d. Bound in vellum, 10s. 6d.

The Atherstone Novels, by E. H. Dering.The Lady of Raven's Combe. 2 vols. , 7s. 6d. ; in one vol. , 5s.Freville Chase. New Edition. 2 vols., 7s. 6d. : in one vol., 5s.The Ban of Maplethorpe. In the Press.Sherborne ; or, The House at the Four Ways. New

Edition. To follow.


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BEFORE the last chapter of this treatisewas in print, its lamented author had

passed out of this world, in which he had doneinvaluable service to the Church of God.

While the present translation was passingthrough the press, the translator also, EdwardHeneage Dering, was suddenly called to hisreward. The last composition that he printed(in the Tablet, Nov. 19, 1892), was the followingshort memoir of his friend and master inScholastic science, Father Matteo Liberatore :

** 3n flDemoriam. Sixty-seven years ago a boy of fifteen,

whose book-learning had till then been inabeyance, by reason of his having wonderfullybeen the mainstay of his widowed mother'shouse from the age of ten, entered a Jesuitschool in Naples, and, rapidly passing all hiscompetitors, was in the following year a novicein the Society of Jesus. He was Professor ofPhilosophy from 1837only twelve years aftergoing to schooltill the Revolution of 1848


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VI

forced him into exile, from which he returnedat the imminent risk of his life, and was madeProfessor of Theology at Naples. The riskwas evident, because his name was on the listof the proscribed, as intended for the patriot'sdagger. In 1850 he co-operated in foundingthe Civiltdb Cattolica, to defend the Church,the Holy See, and notably the teaching ofSt. Thomas. Without him that invaluableperiodical would have died still-born, insteadof doing the great work that it has done andcontinues to do. But this necessitates a briefretrospect. When he began teaching philo-sophy as a professor, thirteen years before, hefound it infected with dangerous errors. Wecannot speak of them here for want of space,but certain it is that the Angelic Doctor wasgenerally forgotten, discredited, misrepresented,and that false philosophy was taught evenwithin the Church. He was the first in thefield against that, published his InsiitutionesPhilosophicoe in 1840, and continued to fightthe good fight as long as Almighty God willedthat his life should last. That man wasFather Matteo Liberatore, who died in Eomeon the 18th of last October, eight months afterthe death of his great co-operator and confrere,Father Giovaxni Maria Cornoldi. When twosuch men are taken away from the Churchmilitant, one can only turn to Almighty God


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Vll

and say, Fiat voluntas Tua. To myself theloss of Father Liberatore is a personal griefand an irreparable loss. Dominus dedit. . .Dominus ahstulit. . . sit nomen Dominibenedictum.Baddesley Clinton,l^o\. 19, 1892.

Mr. Daring's life and literary labours hadbeen devoted to the enlightenment and conver-sion of his countrymen. He died, as he haddesired to do, in harness; and, lamenting thegreatness of his loss, the many who loved him,can only echo his last printed words : Dominusdedit. . . . Dominus ahstulit. . . . sit nomenDomini henedictum.


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PREFACE.WHY THIS TREATISE WAS WRITTEN.

TT A V I N G for many years openly defendedthe Philosophy of St. Thomas, even in

what concerns the fundamental doctrines oforganic and inorganic nature, we think it timeto treat that subject, not merely touching onone or another point, but dealing with thosedoctrines philosophically.

[n Italy, where Masonic influence is nowfelt in every department of Government, no-thing has been omitted by which the mindsand hearts of our young men could be turnedaway, not only from the religious teaching ofthe Catholic Church, but also from all philoso-phical doctrines that are not against Keligion.The teaching of Metaphysics was made overyears ago to professors who only corruptedtheir pupils by the German transcendentalismof Kant, Hegel, Schelling and others : but,


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X PREFACE.inasmuch as that philosophy was abstruse, ill-suited to the wicked purpose intended andvery apt to produce weariness, Metaphysics,properly so-called, were afterwards proscribedin the schools, to make way for Positivismand Materialism.

If in our Catholic schools Physical Scienceswere rightly and fully taught, the evil wouldbe less. But what we call Government schoolsare, for the most part, obligatory ; and, byreason of the method prescribed, even forprivate schools it is impossible to elucidatethose doctrines without which the pupils areneither instructed sufl&ciently nor prepared forresisting the temptations of the Universities.By this treatise we cannot hope to be of

use directly and immediately in the publicschools of the Government : but we can hopeto do something indirectly and mediately.

In the second place, many who have agreat reverence for the wisdom of the AngelicDoctor, and, in obedience to the Vicar ofJesus Christ, declare their adhesion to his


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PEEFACE. XIdoctriney, know too little of the fundamentalquestions that belong to Physics. Many haveconfused ideas about them, and therefore areliable to be taken in by the sophisms and theauthority of men who pass as wise and learnedin such things. Hence they either give in orvacillate, accepting as probable what is notonly improbable, but also absurd and bad.

These and other reasons have induced us toput before our readers, especially those whoare given to the stud)'' of philosophy andnatural sciences, that system which we callthe Physical System, whose principles werecertainly professed by the Angelic Doctor,St. Thomas. It is, or should be, unnecessaryto say that we are not going to rake up ex-ploded doctrines of the old physicists. Thehabit of confusing such opinions with thephilosophical principles of rational Physics,ascribing to the latter what belongs to pureexperiment, has led many to attack truthwith the hatred due to error and to put thewisest in the category of quacks.


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CONTENTS.

Chap. I. the essence and nature ofCORPOREAL substances 1

II. MATERIA PRIMA 4III. SUBSTANTIAL FORM 12IV. NATURE - 21V. CREATION 28VI. ATOMS 37VII. SEMINAL CAUSES 46

VIII. QUALITIES 56IX. ATTRACTION 69X. PHYSICAL LAWS 81XL WHY THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM IS

SO CALLED 90XII. THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM WITH

RESPECT TO PHYSICS INGENERAL. ' THE NATURE OFTHIS SCIENCE 95

XIII. MECHANICAL INERTIA ANDPHYSICAL ACTIVITY OFBODIES 100

XIV. OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE DOC-TRINE PROPOSED 108


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XIV CONTENTS.XV. ACTION AT AN ABSOLUTE DIS-

TANCE 117XVI. MOTION 125

XVII. THE PRINCIPLE, quod MOVETURAB ALIO MOVETUE, ET PRI-MUM ilOVENS EST IMMOBILE 138

XVIII. THE MUTABILITY OF EXTENSION 150XIX. WHY THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM IS

SUPPOSED TO BE IN OPPOSI-TION TO PHYSICS 160

XX. ON THE DIVISIBILITY OF THECONTINUOUS EXTENDED 163

XXI. ETHER 170XXII. CHEMISTRY- 177XXIII. ELEMENTARY ATOMS 180XXIV. THE MATTER AND FORM OF

ELEMENTARY SUBSTANCESARE REALLY DISTINCT 184

XXV. AN ELEMENTARY SUBSTANCE ISCHEMICALLY SIMPLE- 188XXVI. THE MIXTUM, OR THE CHEMI-

CAL COMPOUND. AFFINITYBETWEEN THE ELEMENTS 193

XXVII. THE MIXTUM, OR CHEMICALCOMPOUND, HAS A NATURESPECIFICALLY DIFFERENTFROM THAT OF ITS COM-PONENTS 198

XXVIII. WHAT IS MEANT BY SUBSTAN-TIAL TRANSFORMATION 201


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CONTENTS. XVXXIX. THK COMMON SENSE OF MAN-

KIND IS IN FAVOUR OF ABELIEF IN THE TRUE SUB-STANTIAL TRANSFORMATIONOP THE ELEMENTS 204XXX. THE SUBSTANTIAL TRANSFORMA-TION OF THE ELEMENTS ISPROVED BY FACTS 207

XXXI. OPPOSITION TO THE DOCTRINEOF SUBSTANTIAL TRANSFOR-MATION 211


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THE PHYSICAL SYSTEMOF ST. THOMAS.

I

THE ESSENCE AND NATURE OF COEPOEEALSUBSTANCES.

THERE is nothing perhaps harder to defendand easier to attack than a system notclearly defined, at least in its principal parts.Its defenders waste their time in showing whatis either beside the question or only touchesthe surface, and its adversaries, when theyhave pointed out the weak points in thatwhich, true or false, has nothing to do withthe truth of the system, settle the controversyin their own favour.

To avoid this, we shall explain withoutdelay the system of which we are going totreat ; and, first of all, we must remark that itdiffers from the Mechanic and Dynamic systemsas to the very essence of corporeal substances.According to the Mechanic system, corporealsubstance means inert and resisting atomsaggregated in varying order. The Dynamic


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I THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM OF ST. THOMAS.system recognizes subsisting forces only, as inmathematical points of space. The Physicalsystem supposes that every individual corporealsubstance is essentially composed of two prin-ciples really distinct. One is the source ofextension, and is called ^materia prima. Theother is the source of activity, and is calledthe substantial form. On the variety of thelatter the diversities of nature in every substancedepend. The materia prima and the sub-stantial form, being incomplete substances,cannot be apart. God did not create matterquite without form, but endowed it with diverseforms actuated with virtues that may be calledseminal, radically containing the whole orderand beauty of the sensible universe, which bydegrees developed and in the course of timeis continually developing. During this continualdevelopment we perceive changes in substances,in their qualities and in their accidents, andin their mutual approach and departure. Inthe former case there is a true change of sub-stantial forms, the matter of one body beingtransmuted into that of another. In thesecond there is a change of accidental formsonly. In the third, unless there is somemechanical impulse, one body is brought to-wards another by true attraction. From suchforms and such properties, impressed on creation,a determinate development of the corporeal


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MATERIA PRIMA. 3

universe necessarily follows ; and in these formsand in these properties we must recognize theexistence of physical laws, considered, not as inthe Mind or Will of the Creator, but as an effectin the created things themselves.

But this is too rapid a sketch. We mustconsider each part of the system in detail.


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II.

MATERIA PEIMA.

TH E very ancient philosophers, the beginnersin philosophy, held that corporeal substancesare nothing more than aggregations of atoms,either inert, or, at the most, endowed with attrac-tive and repulsive force, like some sort of sympa-thy and antipathy. Afterwards Plato taught thedoctrine of Matter and Form, infected howeverwith grave errors, which Aristotle partly cor-rected, and which the Catholic Doctors, the onlyphilosophers who had a clear and firm conceptionof God the Creator, afterwards rooted out. The ancient philosophers, says St. Thomas, came to the knowledge of truth slowly andby degrees. For at first, as being less cultivated,they recognized no other beings than sensiblebodies ; and those among them who acknow-ledged movement in such, admitted that sortof movement only which takes place in someaccidents, as in rarity and density, by aggre-gation and disgregation. Afterwards, supposingcorporeal substance to be uncreated, they assignedsome causes for their accidental changes, as, for


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MATERIA PEIMA. 5instance, friendship, strife and such like.Thence they went on to distinguish substantialform and matter, which they supposed to beuncreated, and they perceived that substantialtransmutations happen in bodies. *We shall proceed to enquire how they came tothis knowledge.

Plato in his Timceus remarks that in thesensible universe every being is subject tosubstantial changes without a continual annihila-tion of previous things and continual creationof succeeding ones. Hence he inferred thatin this changing of substance there alwaysremains a substratum, or subject,a matterwhich is adapted and transformed successivelyinto various natures. Thus fluids become plants,and plants become the flesh of brutes and evenof man. And, since by such transforming ofmatter the eternal forms or ideas are determined,there must be in the universe a matter thatis itself deprived of all determinate nature andis disposed for receiving those species whichit derives from the communication or impres-sion of the archetypal ideas. Three things,he says, have here to be distinguished : thatwhich is generated (the new nature) ; that inwhich it is generated (the matter) ; that fromwhich the generated thing gets its proper like-ness (the idea or form). Now, if these things

* Sttmma, P. i. Q. xliv. a. 2.


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b THE PHYSIOAL SYSTEM OF ST. THOMAS.be compared, the nature generated resemblesan offspring ; the thing in which it is generatedresembles a mother ; and that from whichit gets its likeness resembles a father. Thisdoctrine must be understood to mean that,as the forms of things are distinguishedby every sort of variety, this womb [i.e.matter, thereto compared J could neverbe well disposed for the formations to beproduced in it, unless it were formless, quitevoid of all forms whatsoever; because, if italready had in itself any of those natures forwhich it is in a state of potentiality, it wouldnot be capable of receiving a contrary form.Thus, if it were essentially water, how could itbe changed into wood ? It would inconceivablybe at once water and wood. But, as it is po-tentially all these things, it cannot have theform of any, just as modelling clay has none.As the matter of scented unguents is purposel}^without scent, and modelling clay has no shapetill the artist has modelled it, so the thingthat is to be modelled according to theeternal ideas must have no form natural toitself. Therefore the mother, or receptacle ofthe corporeal universe, is neither earth, norair, nor fire, nor water, nor that which con-stitutes their nature, nor something else com-posed of them, but rather it is a certain invisiblesomething, a formless womb, potentially every-


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MATERIA PEIMA. 7thing, incompreiiensibly participating in theDivine nature through the impression that itreceives from the archetypal ideas. Such awomb cannot be known as it is, but only as wehave explained it. In these words Platogives us a doctrine almost perfect as to theessence of bodies ; but he spoilt it byhis theory of ideas subsisting outside theDivine Mind, and by his belief that the matterwhich receives the impression of them iseternal.

St. Augustine, who was a great admirer ofPlato, vainly sought from learned men thatknowledge of matter which he afterwards gainedwhen he had considered the passing of thingsfrom one substantial form to another, andseen that all through the change between twoterms there must remain in both somethingidentical and itself indifferent to both. my God, he said, if I were to speak or writewhat Thou hast taught me about this WhenI heard of it from those who understood itnot, I heard the name without knowing whatit meant, and, thinking of it under innumer-able forms, precisely for that reason thoughtnot of it as it is. Ugly and horrible formspassed in disorder through my mind ; butforms they were all the while. I called themformless, not as being without form, butbecause they were such that the sight of


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8 THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM OF ST. THOMAS.them was too strange and hideous for humaninfirmity to bear. That of which I thought wasnot formless by privation of all form, butonly in comparison with more beautiful forms

;

and right reason showed me that, if I wantedto think of the formless, I must take quiteaway aU remains whatsoever of form. But/this I was unable to do ; -for I could thinkmore easily that what has no form is nothing,than think of something between a thing formedof nothing, not formed and not nothing, form-less and therefore near to nothing. Then,instead of continuing to imagine various changesof bodies already formed, I fixed my attentionon the bodies themselves, examining moredeeply their mutability, how they cease to bewhat they were, and begin to be what theywere not ; and I suspected that such passingon from form to form must be through asomething without form, yet not pure nothing.But I wanted to know, not to conjecture.If I could unfold all that in this questionThou hast made clear, who among my readerswould be able to understand it ? But my heartwill never cease to give thanks and praisefor what it cannot express. *

That St. Thomas foi'med his conception ofmateria prima in the same way is evidentin many passages. Here is one of them : He

* Con/ess., 1. xii. c. 6.


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MATERIA PKIMA. 9[Aristotle] declares the aforesaid principles,and affirms that the nature firstly subject tochange, i.e. materia prima, cannot itself beknown, inasmuch as things are known throughtheir form, while materia 'prima is thesubject of every form. The thing is knownby analogy, i.e. according to proportion. Thuswe know that wood is something really distinctfrom the form of a bench or of a bed, becausethe wood is sometimes under the one form andsometimes under the other. When thereforewe see that what was air becomes water, 'wemust say that there is something existingbeneath the forms of natural substances, (forinstance, under the form of water and the formof air,) just as in artificial ones, wood is some-thing besides the form of a bench or the form of abed, or copper is something besides the form ofa statue. Therefore that which is to naturalsubstances as copper is to a statue and wood is tobed, and every material and formless thing is toits form, that thing we call materia prima. *

Materia prima is then the subject of allTHE SUBSTANTIAL TKANSFORMATIONS OF THECORPOREAL UNIVERSE, which from the beginningof the world, while the various natures of thingshave perished and are perishing to make wayfor new ones, has remained and remains alwaysthe same. Yet some people believe that St.

* In I. Phys., lect. xiii.


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10 THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM OF ST. THOMAS.Thomas understood materia prima to meanj)ure nothing or the possibility of forms ; andthis in defiance of such passages, for instance,as the following in the Summa Theologica,P. i. Q. xiv. a. xi. ad 3, where we read :Materia, licet recedat a Dei similitudine secun-dum suatn potentialitatem, tamen, in quantumvel sic esse hahet, similitudinem quamdam retinetdivini esse. And in the Qiicestiones Disputatce,De Verit. Q. iii. a. v. ad 1, he says: Quamvismateria prima sit informis, tamen inest in eaimitatio primce formce. Quantumcumque dehileesse habeat, illud tamen est imitatio primi entis ;et secundum hoc piotest habere similitudinem inDeo.The followers of the Mechanic and Dynamic

systems have quite a different conception ofmateria prima. The former suppose it to beinert atoms, while the latter consider it as asubsisting form in the manner of mathematicalpoints. According to these two theories theatoms and the forces would not be the subjectof substance, but true substances. An atom ofoxygen, for instance, which with hydrogenforms water, is not merely an atom, but hasthe nature of oxygen, not that of hydrogenwhereas, according to the doctrine of Plato,Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and somany other men of noble genius who followedthem, the potential entity which was there


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MATERIA PRIMA. 11constituted in the nature of oxygen, and whichafterwards, by union with hydrogen, becamewater, is materia prima. It is called primato mark it as the first requisite for bodies,in order to constitute their substantial being,which substantial being is first ; and alsoto distinguish it from that which is calledviateria secunda (secondary matter), whichbecomes the subject of various accidental modi-fications. We must now speak of the formwhence that primary constitution proceeds.


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12

III.

SUBSTANTIAL FORM.

IN Latin the word forma was used to signifyidea, and was applied to the exemplar

of a work, whether it be in the mind of theartist or expressed materially.

Nee vero, says Cicero, ille artifex, cumfaceret Jovis formam aut Minervce, contem-plabatur aliquem a quo similitudinem duceret,sed ipsius in mente insidebat species, qiiamcontuens in eaque dejixus, ad illius similitudinemartem et manum dirigehat Has rerum formasappellahat ideas ille, non intelligendi solum,sed etiam dicendi, gravissimus auctor et magisterPlato, easque gigni negat, et ait semper esse, aratione et intelligentia contineri ; cetera nasci, oc-cidere, fiuere, lahi, nee diutius esse uno et eodemstatu.

The substantial form of anything is, philo-sophically speaking, the likeness of a DivineIDEA, WHICH BEING EXPRESSED IN MATTER CON-STITUTES IT IN A DETERMINATE SUBSTANCE ; aS,for example, the entity whence the matterof gold is constituted in its proper substantialbeing.


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SUBSTANTIAL FORM. 13From the variety of these forms results the

distinction of Genera and Species. These, adorn-ing the sensible universe, present beautiful imagesof those exemplars which are in the DivineMind. Hence Plato and Aristotle with theirfollowers gave to those forms names that in-dicate order and beauty, even calling thema divine thing, a participation of God, the onefrom which every substance receives unity.And Albert the Great approves of these, addingmore of his own, especially where he takesinto consideration the names adapted to signifyform in its twofold relations, viz. as the termof the artist's action expressed in matter,and as that which constitutes the matter ina determinate being. The names of form,he says, are various, inasmuch as it is theend of motion, an4 constitutes in being thething formed. In the former sense it is saidto be something divine, something most ex-cellent, something desirable. ... In the lattersense it is called form, as giving form andas distinguishing formless matter ; and species,as constituting the thing in its being, thusrendering it knowable ; reason, as having in itthe definition of the thing ; idea, paradigma^image, as proceeding from its exemplar,which is in the First Cause, because everyform impressed in matter was at first in theFirst Mover, called by Plato the archetypal


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14 THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM OF ST. THOMAS.world, accordins; to the well known words ofBoetius : Pidchrum pulcherrimus ipse mun-dum mente gerens, similique ah imagineformans.Form then, as being in the First Exemplar,is called idea ; as expressed in matter it iscalled paradigma ; and that impression, asimitating the idea, is called an image. *From this one sees clearly that the degrees

are in the perfection of the forms, accordingto the various expressions of the Divine Beingcommunicated by these forms to corporealsubstances.

St. Thomas thus distinguishes them in thesecond article of his Opusculum De Formis, twhere the whole doctrine, contained in variousparts of his writings, is put together.

By means of the form, he says, thingscome to participate of the Divine Being, andtherefore the form also must be a certainparticipation and likeness of the First Act orDivine Being. ... So that the nearerthis form is in its likeness to the First Act,or the more it participates of His perfections,the more perfect it will be. Therefore theforms that participate of the perfections ofthe Actus Primus merely as to their being areof the lowest degree. Those that are like-

* In 11. Phys., 17.t This Opusculum De Formis was formerly printed as an

appendix to St. Thomas's Commentary In Libras Physicorum.


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SUBSTANTIAL FORM. 15nesses of the Actus Primus not only by being,but also by living and being able to give life,have the second rank, under the name ofanimce vegetativce. The third are those thatare likenesses of the Actus Primus not onlyin having being and life, but also in knowing,though imperfectly ; and these are namedanimcB sensitivce. These are the first thathave any participation of knowledge. Lastly,those that are likenesses of the Actus Primusnot only in being and living and having asort of knowledge, but moreover in knowingwith intellective cognition, constitute in naturethe highest and noblest grade, though indifferent ways ; and all of these are called in-tellectual substances.One can easily conceive how a greater per-

fection takes into itself inferior perfections, orhow an act perfect in itself contains the lessperfect acts. Therefore Almighty God, Whois the most perfect Act, has in Himself theperfection of all things created and possible.The more perfect substantial form containsvirtually the less perfect, till we come down-wards to a form that in its perfection maybe called elementary or lowest. So from unitythere begins a series, each term of which is >endowed with the perfection of the precedingone and something more ; so that it tendstowards the infinite, which it never can reach.


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16 THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM OF ST. THOMAS.Thus from the triangle begins a spries ofpolygons, inclining more and more to a polygonwith infinite sides, that gives us the concep-tion of the circle, wherein we may find imagedthe various perfections of the forms whence thebeings in this visible created world, fromelements up to man, have their properperfection.

Since then, according to the principles ofthis system, every individual being is onesubstance, so the substantial form that makesit one substance must be one. And whereit is more perfect, as in man, it must containin itself all the perfections which, apart fromman, are communicated by diverse other formsto beings less perfect.

Thus in this system the human soul, throughbeing a form superior to all others in thevisible creation, contains in itself virtuallytheir perfection, which it therefore cancommunicate to matter, while, through beingspiritual, it is like the separated substances (theangels), but inferior tq all of them, and is as alink that binds the corporeal substances with theincorporeal, the visible with the invisible, alink that joins beings without sense and beingswith sense to the order of purely intellectualbeings. Therefore it is the most perfect ex-pression made in matter by the First Act,Who is God. It is a divine inspiration, a


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SUBSTANTIAL FORM. 17principle which, though intellectual, can never-theless transmute the slime of the earth intovegetative and sentient substance. The soul,says St. Thomas, is on the confines of theseparated substances which are incorporeal,and of the material forms which are corporeal

;

for it is the lowest of incorruptible forms, . . .and therefore is partly separated from matterand partly in matter. *Hence the essential difference between

materia prima and the material form andthe subsisting form. Materia prima is thedeterminable principle of corporeal substances.The substantial form is the determining princi-ple, the act that constitutes matter in adeterminate nature. A substantial form iseither inseparable from matter, and is calledm^aterial, or separable from matter, and iscalled immaterial. This quality of beingseparable from matter is called subsistence,and the forms endowed with it are calledsuhsistent.

The forms of which we have hitherto spokenare called substantial, in contradistinction tothose which are called accidental forms ; for,as the former constitute substances in theirfirst being as such, so do the latter bring tothem, without changing their nature, a secondand accidental being.

* Opuso. 45, De Pluralitate, Formar., P. i.


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18 THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM OF ST. THOMAS. Some things that are, not, may be, says

St. Thomas, and some ' already are. Thatwhich may be, but is not, is said to be inpotentia. That which already is, is said to bein actu. The being of a thing is two-fold,essential or substantial, such as being a man,which is called Being simpliciter, and acciden-tal being, such as a man being white, whichis called Being secundum quid. . . . Thatwhich makes the substantial being in actu iscalled the substantial form, and that whichmakes accidental being i7i actu is called anaccidental form. And, since generation ismotion towards a certain form, as there is atwofold form so is there a twofold generation.Generation absolutely [simpliciter'] answers toa substantial form. Generation secundum quidanswers to an accidental form. So that thesubstantial form of a thing is said to make itbe simpliciter, as a man comes to be, or isgenerated ; but the accidental form makes itcome to be, not simpliciter, but in this orthat way, as a man who is fair is said tohave been born fair, in contradistinction tohaving been born simpliciter. This twofoldgeneration implies a twofold corruption, viz.corruption simpliciter and corruption secundumquid. Simple generation and corruption gonot beyond the genus of substance ; butgeneration and corruption secundum quid


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SUBSTANTIAL FORM. 19are in all the other genera of accidentals. *

Clearly, then, on the death of a man or abrute or a plant, the substance of the manor of the brute or of the plant ceases to bethe substance that it was, as water does whendecomposed into its elements. These are exam-ples of absolute corruption ; whereas, when aman loses his colour, the brute its healthiness,the plant its vigour, or the hot water its heat,the substances remain while the accidentschange, and the corruption therefore is not acorruption of the substance, but of somethingthat is in the substance.Hence it follows that matter can pass fromone form into another, by reason of not havingthe form into which it will pass. If thematter, for instance, which now is wheat hadalready the substantial form of flesh, how couldits transformation into flesh be intelligible ?When we think of a substance in its actualbeing, we have only to look at the two princi-ples of matter and form ; but if we think ofit in its production, we must also consider theprivation of that form, by which privation thematter is, so to speak, affected. St. Thomassays : In order that generation may takeplace, three things are required, viz. a potentialbeing, which is matter (materia prima) ; thewant of actual being, which is privation ;

* Opusc. De Principiis Naturce.


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20 THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM OF ST. THOMAS.and that which makes a thing actually tobe, which is the form. Thus, for instance,when an image is made of copper, the copperwhich is in potentia to the form of the imageis the matter. The want of figure is pri-vation. The figure that makes it an imageis the form. Not, however, a substantialform ; for the copper had an actual beingpreviously as copper, a being not depen-dent on having this or that figure. Itis an accidental form ; and so are all artificialforms, because art works at those things onlythat have their own natural being. Thereare three principles of nature therefore, viz.matter, form and privation ; the form being thatfor which generation takes place. The othertwo belong to the term from which generationis. Hence matter and privation are the samething in their subject, but differ in our minds ;for the same thing that is copper is unfiguredbefore it receives the form of an image, butin one respect is called copper, and in anotherrespect is called unfigured. Wherefore priva-tion is said to be a principle, not per se hntperaccidens, because it coincides with the matter. *

Having now considered separately the twoprinciples of every corporeal substance, weshall pass on to consider the same together,as constituting the nature of such.

* Ibid.


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21

IV.NATUKE.

TH E definition of the word nature, asused by the Scholastic doctors, is takenfrom the second book of Aristotle's Physics. Nature, he says, is the first principle ofMOTION AND OF REST, peQ^ SB, not per accidens.To understand this definition, we must re-member that a substance may be moved byan intrinsic or an extrinsic principle. If it ismoved by an extrinsic principle, the motion isforced. If it is moved by an intrinsic principle,the motion is natural. When one billiard ballis sent at another, the impulse is extrinsicand the motion forced ; but when two dropsof mercury, placed near each other, approachand meet, their motion is from an intrinsicprinciple, and is natural.

This principle is called nature. But, besidesbeing a principle of motion, it must also bea principle of rest ; for nature inclines thingsto move, not for the sake of moving, but becauseit tends to a scope, an end, a honum, whichbeing attained, rest supervenes. Without someobstacle or attraction the motion given to the


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22 THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM OF ST. THOMAS. 'billiard ball would be perpetual, because itwas not directed to a term fixed ; whereas thedrop of mercury will rest as soon as it hastouched the other drop of mercury, to whichit is brought by the principle that causes itsmotion. In this definition of nature, as theprinciple of motion and of rest, the wordsprima and per se, contradistinctive to pei'accidens, are put to distinguish the principlewhence the motion proceeds (which is nature)from any modification or accidental affectionof it, without which it would either not beset in motion towards the object, or inclinedwith a different intensity a very valuabledistinction in Catholic theology for distinguish-ing nature from grace and the natural fromthe supernatural. And this much will sufficeabout the physical meaning of the word nature.

Let us now see what constitutes it in acorporeal substance. In this there is matterand form. Matter alone would not be sufficient,because matter (materia prima) remains thesame under all substantial forms, and there-fore, were it per se a principle of operation,it would always operate in one way. Butthat does not happen. Oxygen, for instance, andwater are different in their operation, thoughall the matter (materia jyrima) that is in oneis likewise in the other. Does the substantialform, then, constitute the nature of corporeal


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NATURE. 23substance ? If we consider the matter as per seinert, and the form as the only other thing incorporeal substances, we must say that the formis the principle of operation or of motion.But would it be so, if it were separated from thematter ? No, for it could not exist at all.And therefore, to be the principle of operationand of motion, it must be united with matter.The word nature does indeed principally applyto it, but not with propriety as prescindingfrom the matter which it informs. Eightlvtherefore did Aristotle say in the second bookof Physics, that as copper, if we prescindfrom its figure, cannot be called art, neithercan matter (materia prima), when consideredapart from the substantial form which deter-mines it to a certain species, be called thenature of a thing ; but that name should ratherbe given to the form.* As that may becalled art, says St. Thomas, which belongs toanything that is according to art and artificial,so may that be called nature which belongsto anything that is according to nature andnatural. But that which is only in potentiato be made by man's art cannot be said to haveanything of art in it, because it has not as yetthe nature of (for instance) a bed. Therefore innatural things that which is flesh and bone inpotentia has not the nature of flesh and bone

* Phys., Lib. ii. Cap. i.


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24 THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM OF ST. THOMAS.till it has received the form, according to whichis the definite nature of the thing, and throughwhich we know what flesh is and what boneis. There is no nature in it till it hasits form ; and therefore the form is in a waythe nature of natural things that have inthem the principle of motion. tFrom this we can easily understand why

the Scholastics called matter and form incom-plete substances, and the compositum a completesubstance. For that being which naturally isof itself is a substance ; and matter cannot beof itself without the form, nor can a materialform (for of that we are here speaking) bewithout matter. True it is that neither theone nor the other can be called an accident,because each has its own entity ; butwhen disjoined they are wanting in what isrequired for the definition of substance, andtherefore are incomplete. This they acquirewhen conjoined ; and then they are a completesubstance. We call a substance physicallyincomplete, says Suarez in his Metaphysics,that by its entity has not in itself what isrequired for the nature of substance takengenerically ; and that which has it we call acomplete substance. This we express by meansof negation, saying that a substance is physi-cally complete which is not ordained per se

t In II. Phys., lect. 2.


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NATURE. 25to perfect or to constitute with another sub-stance another being. *And Cicero speaks likewise in these words :De natura autem ita dicehant (Aristotle and

his followers) ut earn dividerent in res duas,tit altera esset efficiens, altera, quasi huic seprcebens, ea quce efficeretur aliquid. In eoquod efficeret, vim esse censebant : in eoautem quod efficeretur materiam quamdam :in utroque tamen utrumque. Neque enimmateriam ipsam cohcerere potuisse, si nullaVI contineretur, neque vim sine aliqua materia.Nihil est enim quod non alicubi esse cogatur.Sed quod ex utroque, id jam corpus nomina-hant. t

Here it is evident that, since what he callsvim cannot be without matter, nor matterwithout form, each is an incomplete substance,and the body alone, composed of the two, isa complete substance.

Moreover, if the substantial form principallyconstitutes the nature, clear it is that pluralityof such forms brings plurality of natures.Hence a body can never be considered as onenature, if it be nothing more than an aggregateof atoms, each furnished with its own sub-stantial form. Even a man could not be saidto have one complete nature, if there were inhim more than one substantial form ; for with

* Disp., 3.3, Sect. 1. n. 3. t Acad., i. 6.


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26 THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM OF ST. THOMAS.each form he would have a complete nature.And therefore St. Thomas argues thus : Onething results from many things, firstly accord-ing to order alone, as a city is made of manyhouses, or an army is made of many soldiers ;and secondly by order and composition, as ahouse is made by contact and junction of parts.But these two ways do not suffice to constituteout of many things one nature ; and thereforethose things that have a common form in orderor in composition are not natural things, whoseunity can be called the unity of nature. *And therefore, if we suppose a body as formedby mere aggregation of atoms or molecules, wecannot call it one in nature, though all itsparts concur in one operation as to the term.One nature implies not only one term, butalso one principle of operation, which cannotbe where many operating things have a dividedbeing. It is impossible, says St. Thomas, that there can be one operation in thingswhich differ in their being, I say one, not onthe part of that in which the action terminates,but as it comes from the agent ; for manymen dragging a boat do one work as to thething done, which is one, but on the part ofthe men who drag it the actions are many,because the impulses that move the boat aremany. t

Contra Gent., iv. 35. + Contra Gent, ii. 57.


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IsATURE. 27Nor can it be said that we may suppose

each atom to be an incomplete nature which iscompleted by the aggregation ofmany atoms ; forfrom what we have shown about the two natures(the complete and the incomplete), it is evidentthat each atom would really be a completesubstance and nature, and therefore that thewhole would only have a collective unity.We say this because it is important to makethe meaning of the word nature quite clear,seeing that it is not always in these times asclear as in the days of old. Any one may seehow necessary it is to be clear about this.If there were no other reason, the Catholicdefinitions concerning man, and above all, con-cerning the Divine Word Incarnate, ought to besufficient.


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28

CEEATION.

TO show the unity, beauty and majesty ofthe Physical System, we must considerit, as far as the nature of this treatise willallow, in its principal relations ; and creationis certainly one of them. For this purposewe shall here quote the words of a mostsublime genius, where he interprets the firstchapter of Genesis. What is that void andformless earth, and the darkness, and theabysses, and the waters, and the Spirit ofGod moving over it, of which we readin that divine book ? The Spirit of God,says St. Augustine, moved over the water.It was not yet said that God made the water;nor can we believe that the water was notmade by God, nor that it was before He hadformed anything. For by Him, through Himand in Him are all things, as the Apostle says.Therefore God did make the water, and wecannot say otherwise without being greatlyin error. Why then is it not said that Godmade the water ? Did He give the name of waterto that same matter which He called heaven


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CREATION. 29and earth, earth invisible and uncomposed, andan abyss ? Why should it not be called water,if it could be called earth, when neither earthnor water nor anything was distinct ? Butperhaps, and not incongruously, it was firstcalled heaven and earth, then uncomposedearth, and an abyss without light, and lastlywater. Firstly, to indicate, under the nameof heaven and earth, the matter of the universe,to form which it was all taken out of nothing.Secondly, to show, under the names of uncom-posed earth, and of an abyss, the nudity offorms [informitas], because the earth is themost unformed and least splendid of thosethings. Thirdly, to signify under the name ofwater that matter is obedient to the artificer

;

for water is more pliant than earth, andtherefore matter, by reason of being pliant, wasbetter expressed by the word ' water ' than bythe word ' earth.' . . . This way of signifyingmatter shows firstly the end, or why it wasmade, secondly the formlessness, thirdly thedependence on and subjection to the artificer.To the first, then, belong ' heaven and earth,'for which precisely matter was made. To thesecond belong the words, ' invisible and un-composed earth,' and ' darkness over the abyss,'or formlessness without light, wherefore it wascalled invisible earth. To the third belongs' the water subject to the Spirit,' and receiving


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30 THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM OF ST. THOMAS.therefrom order and forms. Thus the Spiritof God moved over the waters ; whereby wemay understand that the Spirit operated, andthat water was the matter of His operation. *We can therefore conceive, in accordance withthe saint, an immense ocean, as it were, ofwe know not what entity, as yet withoutany definite nature, so that it could be trulycalled neither water, nor air, nor ether, noranything that is considered in physics. Itwas not divided into atoms nor determinedin certain figures any more than the darknessthat represents it was divided into colours.It only gives us that primitive matter whichGod created as the indeterminate subject,capable of receiving in itself the images ofthe divine archetypal ideas, which, as we showedin the third chapter, the substantial forms are.

This is how the Spirit of God (which meansGod Himself) applies Himself, as we may say,to this formless water, or rather primitivematter, and infuses into it His own virtue,so that in it and with it in ways innumerableHe expresses Himself in more or less perfectdegrees, just as a sculptor (to use a weaksimilitude) might express in modelling clayhis own image, not by an instrument, butby the application of himself, that leavesa greater or less impress here and there.

* De Gen., ad litt. i. c. 2.


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CREATION. 31God, being infinite, cannot express Himselfadequately otherwise than in His Word, WhomHe generates, and Who has the same nature.In matter, whether the whole or a part, Hecannot be expressed. Hence, though thegrades of creatures in the corporeal universeare almost innumerable, according to the variousperfections imparted to them by their forms,these creatures reflect only a very feeble rayfrom that Actus Ptjrissimus which God is

;

and so does every other created being, howeversublime and perfect. This is expressed byDante, in the Paradiso :

Colui che volse il sestoAlio stremo del mondo, e dentvo ad essoDistinse tauto occulto e manifesto,Non potfeo suo valor si fare impressoIn tutto rUniverso, che il suo VerboNon rimanesse in infinite eccesso.

* * *E quinci appar ch' ogni minor naturaE corto recettacolo a quel beneChe non ha fine e sfe con sfe misura. *

And in Canto xxix. he says :Vedi 1' ecoelso omai e la larghezzaDeir eterno Valor, poseia che tantiSpeculi fatti s'ha, in che si spezza,Uno manendo in sfe come davanti.

St, Augustine goes on to explain the self-application of God in forming matter to Hisown image. And the Spirit of God, he

* II Paradiso, canto xix.


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32 THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM OF ST. THOMAS.says, bore Himself over the water, not asoil floats on water .... but with a certaineffective and making virtue [ vi quadavieffectoria et fabricatoria\ by which that overwhich Hfe bears Himself is made and constructed,as the will of an artificer acts on the wood orother material on which he works, or on thelimbs of his own body when he moves them tothe work. But this, though the best of cor-poreal similitudes, is poor and almost nothingas intended to make us understand how theSpirit of God bore Himself above the mundanematter subject to His operation. Yet, amongthose things that may somehow be understoodby men, we cannot find a similitude that couldbe more clearly understood, or more nearlyresemble that of which we have spoken. *

It will be objected that, if materia primais at first formless and then formed, we mustadmit an entity which has neither the natureof earth nor of water nor of anything else

;

an entity which has no nature at all, or, asthey say in the Schools, is not quid ; an entitywhich has no determinate figure, and therefore isnot quantum , sua. entity which has no attributes,no accidents, no quality of any sort, and there-fore is not quale. This, it will be said, isinconceivable. Now, if the doctrine were thatGod created materia prima first in order of

* De Gen., ad litt. ibid. 16.


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CREATION. 33time, and afterwards determined it in variousnatures by impression of forms, assuredly sucha Tiec quid, nee quantum, nee quale, standingby itself, would be inconceivable and extremelyunnatural, if not absurd. But, when we aretold that in creation materia prima precededthe forms in order of nature only, and notin order of time, the difficulty vanishes, asSt. Augustine explains with his usual profound-ness. Hast Thou not taught me, Lord,he says, that before this formless matterwas formed and distinguished by Thee, therewas nothing at allno colour, no figure, nobody, no spirit ? Not however quite nothing,but a certain informity without a species ofany sort. . . Nor will this appear inconsis-tent to any one who can distinguish betweenthe precedence of eternity, of time, of electionand of originbetween eternal precedence, asGod precedes all things ; precedence in time,as the flower precedes its fruit ; precedenceby election, as the fruit is preferred to theflower ; and precedence by origin, as the soundprecedes the singing. Of these examples thefirst and last are very difficult to understand

;

but the others are very easy. For indeedit is an arduous work, and very rarely done,to raise one's eyes to Thine Eternity,Lord, which, being incommutable, makes themutable things, and therefore precedes them.


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34 THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM OF ST. THOMAS.

And then, who is sufficiently acute to discernwithout much labour how the sound is beforethe singing, seeing that the singing is the soundformed (distinct in certain forms), and that,although there can be a thing unformed, whatis not cannot receive a form ? Thus matteris before that which is made of it, but notfirst, as the efficient cause ; for it does notmake, but rather is made. Nor is it first byan interval of time ; for even in singing wedo not first emit unformed sounds, and thengive them the order and form of singing, as whtena man makes a casket out of wood or a vaseout of silver. The wood and the silver precedein time the form of a casket and of a vase :but in singing it is not so. What we hearis not firstly an unformed sound, that passesaway when formed, and leaves nothing behindfor art to recover. It is the very sound ofthe singing itself ; and therefore the singing de-velopes in the sound, which is its own sound,its own matter formed into song. Hence, asI said, the matter of the sound is prior to theform of the song : not prior by efficiency, forthe sound does not make the song ; but by beingsubject to the soul that produces the song.Neither is it prior in time ; for it comes forthtogether with the song. Nor is it prior bychoice ; for sound is not preferable to song,which is a sound and also a beautiful sound.


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CREATION. 35

It is prior by priority of origin ; for the formis not given to make the song a sound, butto make the sound a song. Let this exampleserve to show, before those who can under-stand, how the matter of things wasmade first, and called heaven and earth,because heaven and earth were made of it, butnot made first in time, because the forms givethe order of time, and the matter wasunformed. *

The holy doctor then exclaims : May Thyworks praise Thee, that we may loveThee ; and may we love Thee, that so Thyworks may praise Theethose works which havein time their beginning and end, their risingand setting, their perfection and defect, formand privation. They had therefore successivelymorning and evening, partly hidden and partlymanifest ; for by Thee they were made fromnothing, not of Thee, nor of anything not Thine,nor of anything anterior in time, but of matterconcreated, by Thee created together with them ;because Thou, without interval of time, didstgive form to the formlessness of this matter,the matter of heaven and earth being otherthan the form of heaven and earth, Thou took-est the matter absolutely from nothing, andfrom formless matter the form of the world.Yet both didst Thou make together, so that

* Confess, xii. 3, 40.


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without the interposition of a moment the formfollowed the matter. *But we have said enough about the out-

coming of primitive matter by the power ofGod, and about its distinction in those primitivesubstantial forms from which the developmentof the universe came successively. We havenow to see what happens in the actuationof this matter in the diverse forms that dis-tinguish it.

* Ibid. xili. 48


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37

VI.

ATOMS.

rpHE word atom, used by Democritus and-L Epicurus, Descartes and Gassendi, to signifythe smallest possible substance, means ratherthat which is undivided, and cannot whilepreserving its nature be divided. This defini-tion implies the notion of individuality, asCicero says ; and, since it prescinds per sefrom size, a large body might sometimes becalled an atom, while a smaller one could not.This being premised, let us consider what anatom is in the system that we are explaining.As a seal can multiply its own image byimpressing any sealing-wax whatsoever, so can

the divine archetypal idea multiply the divineimage in matter according to the number ofimpressions that God makes on it. From thisit clearly appears that universality belongs tothe idea, and that singularity and individualitycome from the matter on which it is impressed,as St. Thomas lays down in these often re-peated words : Individuatio formcB est ex ma-teria, per quam forma contrahitur ad hocdeterminatum. * Now this impression on

* Quodlib. vii. 3.


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38 THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM OF ST. THOMAS.matter is in the manner of a virtue derivedfrom God ; and the substantial form determinesan individual being in its nature. Hence itevidently is not and cannot be made individed and separated matter, because inthat case the form would not be one, but asmany as the parts of the disjointed matter.Therefore an individual corporeal substance iscontinuous^is an atom. The size of it willdepend on the form, which may require moreor less extension in the matter, or be itselfindifferent as to that. Thus an individualman is a substance in his continuous extension,not an aggregate of minute bodies divided andseparated. For otherwise the human soul, whichis the substantial form of human beings, wouldbe in itself divided and separated ; and insteadof one soul there would in fact be as manysouls as there would be little bodies of whichwe should suppose ourselves to be constituted.The same may be said of an individual brute,and of an individual plant, and of any inani-mate substance that is individual. So that,if the word cdom is to mean an individualcorporeal substance, we may call by that namenot only a little inanimate substance, but evena plant, a brute or a man. Whence it followsthat in the one and the same substancethe so-called physical pores, i.e. intersticesplaced all round each atom, or, as they call


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ATOMS. 39it, each corporeal substance of the smallestdimensions, cannot be admitted in the physicalsystem, because they would take away theunity of the individual. But the pores thatwe do find in corporeal substances do nottake away the unity of the subject ; and theymust be acknowledged, because experience provesthat they are.An atom, understood in the strict sense ofthe word, requires also indivisibility, not abso-lute but relative, owing to which the substancecalled atom cannot be divided without ceas-ing to be what it is. This does not prejudice theindefinite divisibility of matter ; for that re-gards extension as considered by reason of thequantity, not by reason of the nature in whichit inheres. The relative indivisibility of matteris especially observable in living things, thatwill not bear division while retaining the natureof their being, because they have a form thatrequires a certain organism not to be had inevery small quantity of matter. Generally allcorporeal substances have a minimum, thatcannot be less without ceasing to exist, andtherefore may deservedly be called an atomaccording to the strictest meaning of the word.

But will two individual substances, or atoms,that occupy an equal space, have in themselvesan equal quantity of matter? And, withoutincrease of the matter, can the same substance


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40 THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM OF ST. THOMAS.occupy more space than before, or occupy lesswithout diminishing it ? This question belongsto the doctrine about the mass and volumeof the atom ; the volume meaning the placeoccupied by the atom, or its extension with re-spect to space, and the said volume being eitherreal or apparent. The place, for instance, whicha plant seems to occupy is the apparent, notthe real volume ; for, although the plant hasin all its living substance a true continuation,it yet contains innumerable interstices or pores,in which the substance is not. If it werethere, the volume would be not merely ap-parent, but real. The matter intrinsic to theplant constitutes its mass.

This being laid down, the followers of thephysical system said that two substances occu-pying an equal space can have different masses,or a different mass in equal real volumes, andthat the same substance may have, withoutincrease of mass, a real volume sometimesmore and sometimes less. We remember show-ing in the year 1878 in the Civilta Cattolica(Serie x. vol. vi. p. 73) that an argument ofGalileo's, to prove the variability of real volumes,had no force : but disapproving of the argumentin favour of a thing is very different from dis-approving of the opinion itself. Epicurus andDescartes did disapprove of it, for they acknow-ledged no other density and rarity than what


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ATOMS. 41arises from more or less distance between theatoms, and affirmed their extension to beimmutable. Cardinal Toledo explains theteaching of Aristotle and of St. Thomas aboutit in these words : That which contains littlematter in much quantity is called i^re. . .That which contains much matter in littlequantity is dense. . . We have to remem-ber that there is a twofold rarefaction andcondensation, proper and improper. Improperrarefaction or condensation is what happensby mere approximation or segregation ofparts, without any change or , alteration ofthem, . . .and this [improper rarefactionor condensation] does not take place unless anexternal body is expelled or introduced. Manj^among the ancients acknowledged no otherthan this ; but they supposed quite vacantpores in bodies, while we affirm them to befull of a most subtle corporeal substance.Proper rarefaction and condensation is not pro-duced by expelling or introducing an extraneousbody, but by an internal change of the sub-ject. * Here we have a change of extension.The matter remains the same.

This suggests a natural explanation of thegreater or less gravity that substances acquireby change of position. In fact, if part of asolid body be divided and subdivided ever

* In IV. Phys., C. 9, Q. 11.


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42 THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM OF ST. THOMAS.SO much by purely mechanical means, it willnot be lighter than before ; but it really wouldbe so, if properly rarified, so that in risingit made room for the other part of the samebody, which was not rarified, and which hasmore matter under an equal real volume.We say of the same body, because we mustadmit that a corporeal substance in a liquidstate may be more dense and contain morematter than another corporeal substance in asolid state. This variation of gravity is ex-plained by St. Thomas, according to the doctrineof Aristotle, as follows : The size of a bodyis extended or simplified in rarefaction, not bythe matter receiving into itself any other thing,but because the matter which first was inpotentia to be greater or less becomes actuallyso ; and therefore the substance is not maderare or dense by addition or substraction ofextraneous particles, but by the matter itselfbecoming rare or dense, . . . He [Aristotle]proves his assertion by the effects of the rareand the dense ; for the difierence between theheavy and the light, the hard and the soft,follows the difference between rarity anddensity. . . He says therefore that the light-ness of bodies is in consequence of their rarity,the heaviness in consequence of their density.And he is right ; for the rarity of a substancecomes from the matter receiving greater


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ATOMS. 43dimensions, and its density is because the matterhas less dimensions. Hence, if, of two bodiesequal in extension, the one is rare and theother dense, the dense body has the mostmatter. * These considerations deserve to beweighed and examined, not despised.

According to this doctrine it follows thatcorporeal substances, unless impeded by anextrinsic motive power or other obstacle, willbe so disposed around centres of gravity thatthe more dilated bodies will go further andfurther from them. Therefore, if all roundthe earth, for instance, various spaces be sup-posed in the manner of concentric sphericalstrata, each corporeal substance would haveits own, in proportion to its density, fromthe densest even to the most subtle ether,whose density is so slight that we can hardlyform a conception of it.And consequently we have to admit that

an ethereal and most subtle bodily substanceis everywhere diffused in the interplanetaryspaces, as the vehicle and subject of the re-ciprocal operation of the stars and the planets,though these are placed at such enormous dis-tances from each other. Thus without con-tradicting the indisputable axiom, Non daturactio in distans, we can explain the diffusionof light and heat in agreement with experience.

* III IV. Phys., lect. 14.


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44 THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM OP ST. THOMAS.On tlie contrary, they who, following Epicurusand Descartes, affirm the existence of equallyimpenetrable atoms unalterable in their exten-sion, are compelled thereby to admit innature much more of absolute void than ofspace occupied by corporeal substances. Theyhave to suppose ethereal atoms at a great dis-tance from each other, and thus make in-explicable (according to the true system ofirradiation) not alone the extreme rapidityof the propagation of light, but even the factof its propagation. God, however. Who willedorder and unity in the corporeal universe,and made substances to act on other substancesin the most various and admirable ways, soordained that there are substances whose natureit is to dilate and rarify in the highest degreeand fill the vast spaces of the heavens, passingbetween the interstices of bodies almost incredi-bly small. This is what is meant by the veryold adage, Natura abhorret a vacuo. Weshould be indulgent to the old physicists whoexplained by this adage such phenomena asthe rising of water in curved tubes, and soon ; but the modern physicists have no rightto maintain that the Torricellian vacuum re-futes the adage. The old adage refers to anabsolute vacuum, while the vacuum obtainedby art is imperfect and relative.We have now to pass on from the


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ATOMS. 45

consideration of corporeal substances, in theirindividual and absolute being, to consider themin those mutual relations that have their founda-tion and origin in the seminal causes.


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46

VII.

SEMINAL CAUSES.

IN creating actuated matter by substantialforms God produced also what may be calledthe seminal causes of things, which enable sub-stances to produce others like or unlike them-selves. Strictly speaking, however, this termexpresses the virtue communicated by God toa living substance, and through it to its seed,by which it generates another substance ofthe same species. Furthermore it expressesthe virtue by which even things without lifeare the causes of substantial change. Fromthat which is more perfect, says St. Thomas, the denominations of things are taken. Nowthe most perfect of all corporeal substancesare living substances . . But evidently theseeds from which they are generated are theiractive and passive principle ; and thereforeall the active and passive virtues thattire principles of generation and of naturalchanges are suitably called by St. Augustine(3 De Trinitate) seminales rationes. Theactive and passive virtues may be consideredin a manifold order. Firstly, as St. Augustine


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SEMINAL CAUSES. 47says, * they are principally and originally intlie very Word of God, as ideal essences.Secondly, they are in the elements of theworld, where from the beginning they wereproduced at once, as universal causes. In athird way they are found in those things thatout of universal causes are in course of timeproduced, for instance, in this plant or thatanimal, as in particular causes. In a fourthway they are in the seeds produced by animalsand plants, t . . . Without these seminalvirtues, given by God, the living things firstcreated would have disappeared from the earth,and that continual transformation of substances,which is so necessary for the maintenance ofsuch, would ' have ceased.

This most wise providence of the Creatoris thus described by St. Thomas : The comingforth of creatures from God is like the comingforth of artistic works from an artist ; andtherefore, as artificial forms in matter proceedfrom the artificer, so do natural forms andvirtues descend from the ideas in the DivineMind. . . . But the works of God differin two respects from those of the artificer.Firstly, on the part of the matter ; for theartificer does not produce that, but works onit, and never could give to it the power of

* 6 De Gen., ad litt. t Sttmma, P. i. Q. ex v. a. 2.


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48 THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM OF ST. THOMAS.receiving those forms which he communicatesthereto ; but God, Who is the cause of allbeing, not only gave to things their formsand natural being, but also communicated tomatter (materia prima) the power of receivingwhatever He may please to operate in it.Secondly, on the part of the forms ; for theforms introduced by the artificer are not ableto produce a being like themselves. A woodenbed cannot bring forth another wooden bed,though, if reduced to ashes, it may help to forma plant ; but the natural forms can producethe same things, and therefore have the propertyof seed, in virtue of which they may be calledseminal. *Having thus given a general sketch of the

Physical System as to the generation of things,we must now descend to the particular, andapply it to the various kinds of corporealsubstances. Some living things have onlyvegetative life, and others have sensitivelife also. The former are called plants, thelatter animals. G-od gave to the primitiveanimals the above mentioned seminal virtue, butso that in the one sex it should be an activeprinciple, in the other passive, and that theseminal substance communicated by the ge-nitors should have life, not actually, butvirtually, as having the power to produce,

* III II. Sent., Dist. xviii. 1, 2.


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SEMINAL CAUSES. 49under requisite circumstances, a living thing.In such generation therefore there is nocreation, properly so called ; for the animasensitiva is caused by the originating seminalvirtue, which, though simple in itself, is yetmaterial, as being so tied to matter that itcan neither operate nor exist separate there-from. Of course we are prescinding from man,because the human soul is immaterial, and there-fore, even when separated, can exist and operate. God has not given to corporeal substances,says St. Thomas, by means of the seminalvirtues, the means of producing a human soul

;

but He has given to brutes the power of soproducing the anima sensitiva. And this, headds, the Sacred Scripture seems to indicatein the book of Genesis. There, speaking ofthe origin of other animals, it ascribes theirsouls to other causes, saying Producant aqucBreptile animce viventis, &c. * But, whenspeaking of man, it shows that his soul wasimmediately created by God ; for it saysthat God formed man of the slime of theearth, and breathed into his face the breathof life. t And here we must remark thatthe conjunction of the two seminal principlesin every living thing is called conception,and is prior in time to the production andexistence of the vital principle or soul, which

* Gen., i. 20. t Met, vii.


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50 THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM OF ST. THOMAS.is called animation. It is absurd and againstfacts to suppose that the conception and theanimation are simultaneous.The same thing is to be said of plants

;

for God conferred on them similar virtues,and they confer those virtues on the seminalsubstances, so that the one gives the active, andthe other the passive seminal principle, which,being conjoined, give the completed seed, notliving actually, but having efficient power oflife. When there is no distinction of sexone part of the same plant gives the activeprinciple, and the other the passive. Those[animals], St. Thomas says, that have perfectlife have also a perfect generation, and there-fore are distinguished as active and passive.But it is not so in the imperfect life thatplants have ; for in the same plant thereis the twofold virtue, active and passive, thoughsometimes the active is found in one, and thepassive in another, so that the one plant issaid to be masculine and the other feminine.

Clearly then the distinction of sex in plantsis not a recent discovery of modern science,as some people would have it to be. Herewe must remark, by the way, that, if anyhuman being could by chemical art determinewith certainty the elements of which the seminalsubstance of living beings is composed, and

* Comm. in III. Sent., Dist.iii. Q. ii. a. 1.


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SEMINAL CAUSES. 51

combine them so as to make of it a substancequite similar materially to the completed seed,the substance would nevertheless have no semi-nal virtue, because it would not proceed fromliving parents. And therefore if, per impossihile,it were possible for any man to produce byart the organism of a plant or of a brute, hecould never produce a live brute or a liveplant.

The two principles of seminal virtue for thegeneration of animals and plants may, by ana-logy, be said to be required for the productionof a new substance in beings without life.Oxygen and hydrogen will not produce water,although put together ia the right proportions,unless there is some extrinsic cause to modifytheir virtue, so that their mutual action mayproduce a change of one relative principle intoanother, thereby constituting the nature ofwater. Evidently these elementary substancesare different from non-elementary or mixedsubstances. The elementary substances do notresult from the union of two other substances

;

but by physically uniting they produce a newsubstance in a different nature, yiz. mixedsubstances. But why do we call these mixed,when in natural sciences now they are calledcomposite, and the word mixed is used to signifya mixture 1 The reason is, that since everycorporeal substance is composed of matter and


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52. THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM OF ST, THOMAS.form, tlie name of composite belongs as muchto the elementary as to the non-elementary

;

so that a mixed substance cannot properly becalled a mixture, but only two or more sub-stances locally mingled by aggregation, eachkeeping its primary nature. The word onixedbelongs of right to that only which is producedby physical union, so that from two or moresubstances there results one substance only.

And, since anything may be resolved intothe elements of which it is constituted, anymixed substance (say water) may be resolvedinto its component parts. Aristotle, explainingas a philosopher the inmost nature of elements,tells us* that an element of bodies is thatsubstance which is obtained by resolution ofothers, and which cannot be resolved intoanother of a diflferent species. St. Thomas,commenting on him, says : An element ofother bodies is that into which those otherbodies are decomposed or resolved ; for notevery cause may be called an element, butonly that which enters into the compositionof a thing. t Again he says: In naturalcorporeal substances, those into which all mixedbodies resolve themselves are called elementsof bodies ; and consequently they are thosefrom which the mixed bodies result. Andthe bodies called elements are not divided into

* iii. De Coelo et MuMo. + Lect. viii.


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SEMINAL CAUSES. 53

others differing from each other in species,but into similar parts. * Hence he callselementary bodies simple. Elementary-bodies, he says are simple, and there is nocomposition in them except that of matterand form. t Following this doctrine, Toledosays : In two ways we may conclude thatelementary substances are. Firstly, from thedissolution of bodies ; it being a fact that somedecompose into bodies of a different nature,and others into bodies of the same nature.The resolved parts are evidently composed ofthose into which they do resolve ; and aninfinite process of resolving is repugnant toreason. Therefore, there must be bodies thatare not resolved into others, or, in other words,elementary bodies. Secondly, we may concludethis likewise from composition. For we knowthat many bodies are made by mixture (nowcalled chemical combination) ; but elementarybodies cannot be so made. Therefore thosereally are simple bodies, which do not resultfrom composition of others. J

Such is the doctrine professed in the systembefore us ; but it does not claim to determinehow many and which the elementary bodiesare. These have been supposed to be four,and thought to be twenty or fifty, and now

* In V. Ma., 3. f Contra Gent., iii. 23.t Lib. ii. De Generat. et corrupt. , Q. 4.


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the amount is over eighty ; nor can any one sayhow many they may be found to be. Bymeans of reasoning we can only affirm withToledo that the elements are more than one. *That much we can affirm ; for otherwise theproduction of new natures would be impossible,because the union of two equal things cannotconstitute something of a different species.The atomic theory, therefore, cannot be true

;

because, according to that doctrine, thq atomsare all of the same nature. Experiment, hotreason, determines which and how many ele-mentary substances cooperate in forming thisor that mixed body ; and even experimentdoes not, after so many centuries, give withcertainty a final settlement of that question.

In defending the old teachers from unjustattacks, men of high ability and great learn-ing, such as the distinguished philosopher,Cardinal Battaglini, and the famous ProfessorLorenzelli, have in their philosophical coursesgiven another meaning to the word elements ;but we prefer to avoid troublesome and un-necessary disputation. We simply say thatsince the old teachers, when teaching asphilosophers, tell us that elements or elemen-tary bodies are those bodies of which mixedbodies are composed, and which result fromthe decomposition of the latter, we have a

* Ibid., iii.


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SEMINAL CAUSES. 55right to use the same correct definition in ex-perimental physics, for the purpose of seeingwhat bodies are suchwhether solid, liquid,fluid, or aerial. Modern chemists cannot denythat ; for with them the element is the firstin chemical synthesis and the last in chemicalanalysis.


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56

VIII.

QUALITIES.

OF these very little is said in modern schoolsof physics or of philosophy ; and yet thedoctrine about it is so important, that withoutit the physical system would be untenable, andall nature would appear to the mind to be full,not only of inexplicable puzzles, but also ofevident contradictions. Let us begin by askingthis question : Suppose that we acknowledge thecomplete and highest Being of God, yet deny Hisoperation. What could we then say about Hisknowing, loving, creating ? What sort of con-ception could we form of that most perfectNature ? Either none at all, or the conceptionof an absurdity.

' As God is the complete and most perfectBeing (esse), so in Him there is not any realdifference between being and the power to doand the action itself. He is the One most pure,most simple, most complete, most perfect Act.But it is not so with created substances, especial-ly corporeal ones, with which we are now moreparticularly concerned. They have indeed alikeness to God, inasmuch as they have being,and have power to act, and do act ; but, by


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QUALITIES. 57reason of their imperfection, there necessarily isa real distinction between their being, theirpower to act and their action. Moreover, sinceGod is most perfect and the source of all being.He never can receive from His creatures any-thing intrinsic to Himself, nor can they takefrom Him anything of His own. In otherwords, He cannot receive that inner mutationwhich is philosophically called passio, andwhich in its general meaning denotes a changemade in a substance by the action of somebeing.

This being premised as the basis of the fol-lowing dissertation, let us consider any finitesubstance : and since it is easier to descendfrom the more perfect to the less, when themore perfect is known to us, we shall beginwith man. Now by mentally abstractingfrom man all action, all passion, every faculty,what remains of him ? The bare essence ofthe human individual, as constituted by thesoul substantially informing the corporeal mat-ter. Whatever therefore we may conceive ashappening to him when thus constituted anddetermined, will not be a substantial form thatdetermines his nature, but an accidental form,which adds nothing more than quality. There-fore, remembering that besides human naturewith its natural faculties, man has dispositionsthat adorn it and make it fitter for action.


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58 THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM OF ST. THOMAS.we must acknowledge that these are truequalities.When a man acts either with his intellect

or with his will, or with any other power thathe has, there certainly happens to him a modi-fication that before was not ; and this is aquality. And, when at the sight of an object,pleasing or otherwise, he receives in his sensesand in his soul an impression that was notthere before, this, too, is a quality. Lastly,the human soul, as the substantial form, isthe determining principle of the substancesthat nourish man to become part of his nature

;

and thus it gives in various ways to the bodya certain extension, quantity and figure. Hereagain there is quality. We can therefore

' distinguish four species of quality, of whichthe first belongs to Being ; the second to action ;the third to passion ; the fourth to quantity. Properly speaking, says St. Thomas, qualitymeans a certain mode of substance. . . .Now the mode, or the determination of thesubject, according to accidental Being, may beunderstood either according to the nature ofthe subject, or in reference to action, or to passion,(these proceed from the principles of nature whicharc matter and form,) or according to quantity.If we take the mode or determination of thesubject according to quantity, we have thefourth species of quality. . . . The mode


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QUALITIES. 5.9

or determination of the subject accordingto action and passion gives the second andthird species of quality. . . . But themode or determination of the subject accordingto the nature of the thing belongs to the firstspecies of quality. * . . . This does notcontradict what he lays down in his commen-tary on the Sentences, where he says that thecompositum does not operate in virtue ofthe matter, but of the form, which is its actusand principle of action. The quantity, hesays, belongs to matter, the quality toForm. t For it is not afiirmed that the saidspecies of quality is quantity itself. It isthe determination that is in the composite beingunder this or that quantity ; and though thequantity belongs to matter, the determinationis by virtue of the form.Of the species inferior to man, whether they

have life or have not, we must consider firstlytheir substantial being : secondly, what is acci-dental in them, constituted by the four differentspecies of quality before mentioned. If anatom of oxygen, for instance, receives intoitself a disposition which it previously hadnot, it will have a quality of the first species :and being in fact able to operate on anotherby attracting or altering, it will have amodification that contains the quality of the

* Summa, la. 2ee. Q. xlix. 2. t Bk. xii. iv. Q. 1.


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60 THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM OF ST. THOMAS.second species. If instead of that, it receivesinto itself the operation of another, it will ac-quire through the change undergone a qualityof the third species. Lastly, if by virtue ofan extrinsic cause, its proper quantity comesto be so determined that it acquires a differentconformation of parts, that quality will belongto the fourth species.We must observe that all the corporeal sub-stances of equal matter have substantial forms,which, though differing from each other in per-fection, have something in common, as we haveseen by the comparison that Aristotle and St.Thomas took from geometricalj figures and num-bers. As in every polygon there is the triangle,and in every number there is unity, so in everysubstantial form there is an inferior or ele-mentary form, not formally but virtually. Thisapplies to qualities also, which, as we havesaid, are in being by reason of form. Hencethe lowest qualities of the lowest elementarysubstance are common to all the superior sub-stances. Thus, for instance, we find thatattraction and gravitation, subjection to heat,expansion and the rest, are common to allcorporeal substances. Since then a more per-fect being has a substantial form that containsthe perfections of the inferior forms, it mustalso possess their qualities. But as in a onebeing all must be in harmony and order, so


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QUALITIES. 61

even in the qualities, there is a certain lawby which, where the inferior qualities wouldclash with the superior, the inferior are therein a remitted degree, or, in modern language,diminished or neutralized. We must holdwith the philosopher (Aristotle), says St.Thomas, that the forms of the elements re-main in the mixture, not actually, but virtually.The qualities of the elements properly remain,though remitted ; and in them appears thevirtue of the elementary forms. *And now, to make the whole theory of the

system clear as to the gradation in themodes operating and the qualities of all beings,we cannot do better than quote another grandpassage from the Angelic Doctor, where hereduces it to order and unity, giving us a surefoundation of rational physics. There is nothing, he says, that more im-mediately and intimately belongs to thingsthan Being ; and therefore, since matter isactuated by form, the form that gives beingto the matter must be conceived as coming toit first of all things, and most intimatelyNow it is a property of the substantial formthat it gives being absolutely to matter ; forTHE SUBSTANTIAL FORM IS THAT BY WHICH ATHING IS WHAT IT IS. The accidental formsdo not give being absolutely, but in one

Summa, P. i. Q. Ixxvi. a. 4 ad 4.


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62 THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM OF ST. THOMAS,

respect, such as being great, or coloured, etc.Hence, if there is a form that does not givebeing to matter absolutely, but comes to matteralready actuated by some form, it will not besubstantial. Hence it is evident that betweensubstantial form and matter there cannot beany intermediate substantial form (as some willhave it) supposing that, according to the orderof genera, of which one is under the other,there is an order of diverse forms in matter

:

as, for instance, that matter has the beingof actual substance from one form, the beingof corporeal substance from another, the beingof an animated body from another, and so on.But according to that position the first formonly, by which the actual being of substancewas given, would be substantial. All theothers would be accidental ; for the substantialform, as we have already said, is that whichconstitutes the determinate being, (quce facithoc aliquid.) ' We must therefore say that oneand the same form is that by which a thing isa determinate substance and by which it isdetermined in its ultimate species (specialissima),and in all the intermediate genera, (by which,for example, a man is a man and an animal anda living creature and a corporeal substance). Consequently, since the forms of natural thingsare like numbers, in which the addition and sub-traction of a unit makes a difi'erent species.


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QUALITIES. 63

we must understand that the diversity ofnatural forms, according to which the matteris constituted in different species, is becauseone form adds a greater perfection. For in-stance, one form constitutes a substance incorporeal being only. . . . Another andmore perfect form constitutes matter invital as well as in corporeal being. And thenanother form gives to it not only corporealand vital being, but also sensitive being, andso forth. We must see therefore that themore perfect form, inasmuch as simultaneouslywith the matter it constitutes the compositumin the perfection of an inferior grade, mustbe understood as material with respect to anulterior perfection, and so on. Thus materiaprima, as constituted in corporeal being, ismatter with respect to the ulterior perfectionof that which has life. Hence (logically) thebody is the genus of the living body, and itsbeing animated or living is the differentia.For the genus is as the matter, the differentiais as the form ; and thus in a manner oneand

sistema físico de santo tomás

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