http://www.archive.org/stream/cu31924085504169/cu31924085504169_djvu.txt

A practical and concise manual of the law re-lating to private trusts and trustees"

-----------------------------------------------------

http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84027008/1866-01-04/ed-1/seq-1/;words=que+cestui?date1=1860&sort=date&date2=1922&searchType=basic&state=&rows=20&proxtext=Cestui+Que+&y=0&x=0&dateFilterType=yearRange&index=0

Click on text to copy text

The daily phoenix., January 04, 1866, Image 1

About The daily phoenix. (Columbia, S.C.) 1865-1878

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Cha2/18-19/11

http://www.courtfunds.gov.uk/forms/forms_cfo.htm

http://forum.davidicke.com/showthread.php?p=1059341683

Cestui Qui Trust = The Strawman Rule of Grammar for the use of CAPITAL LETTERS used in a NAME: when CAPITAL letters are used anywhere in a NAME this always refers to a LEGAL ENTITY/FICTION, COMPANY or CORPORATION no exceptions.e.g. John DOE or Doe: JANE (PASSPORT, DRIVER LICENSE, MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE and BIRTH CERTIFICATE)C’EST TUI QUE TRUST: (pronounced set–a–kay) common term in NEW ZEALAND and AUSTRALIA or STRAWMAN common term in USA or CANADA is a LEGAL ENTITY/FICTION created and owned by the GOVERNMENT whom created it.“Legally, we are considered to be a FICTION, a concept or idea expressed as a NAME, a symbol. That LEGAL PERSON has no consciousness; it is a juristic PERSON, EN LEGIS, a NAME/word written on a piece of paper” – Jason Whitney, Presenter & Researcher: The Occult World of Commerce.When you are born, (your Mothers’ WATER broke) your Parents Name you, for example John or Jane DOE. The Nurse or Doctor along with your Parents sign your Record of Live Birth (Title

of Deed to Real Property) so your BIRTH CERTIFICATE could be created (a “certificate is a negotiable instrument; see Certi & fi-duc(e) iary & fi-cat(e) iary) for the purpose of “creating the LEGAL ENTITY/FICTION (this LEGAL ENTITY/FICTION is regulated and works in commerce as GOVERNMENT can only regulate that which it creates and it didn’t create the living breathing Man or Woman – God did). The LEGAL ENTITY/FICTION is registered by the Department of Commerce, under the ADMIRALTY MARITIME LAW/JURISDICTION (LAW of the WATER) – JURISDICTION of Commerce and War.You (the baby) are what is called a “C’est tui Que (pronounced “Set–a–kay”) Trust, the STRAWMAN, or rather the COLLATERAL or the CORPUS (body) of the Trust. Your LABOUR is the energy you generate as a Living Being. However, as a baby, you are deemed “Invalid (in–valid/dis–abled) and Incompetent, and even though your Mother Birthed you, she agrees to be the TRUSTEE of the Trust (by her SIGNATURE) which was SETTLED (created–Settlor) by the Federal Government, so you (your body) are ENTRUSTED to her for safe keeping until the age of eighteen.Under Biblical Law: WOMEN are incapable of entering into binding agreements/contracts, their Husband or Father must be present when making agreements or the contract is void. In most cases both parties are present during birth or manifestation of a MARITIME product. Unless prior written consent and approval by the male representative exists, the Mother who would not DREAM of “giving” her newborn baby to the Government, does so unknowingly, by the undisclosed conditions of the signed Contract”  Submission of an Application for Registration for a BIRTH CERTIFICATE e.g.You’re Parents “agree/consent” to be the Trustee and sign your BIRTH CERTIFICATE. (BIRTH CERTIFICATES were only for “slaves” prior to women becoming “equal” to men). Usually the Mother is the ONLY one required to sign, because she is deemed to be the direct blood more so than the Father. She has the higher “claim” to the living baby.Once the negotiable instrument (BIRTH CERTIFICATE) is transferred to the Dept of Commerce, they “pledge” your “Labour for your Lifetime” as its “secured” asset, and proceeds to “assure” (different from insure) YOUR Labour against it’s (the government’s) DEBT, and it subsequently gets an “underwriter” to insure your Labour.The underwriter determines a lowball figure from your Labour to be valued at $1 Million dollars, and it takes out a “Bond” which is held at the Bank, the numbers on your BIRTH CERTIFICATE are the tracking numbers for your LEGAL ENTITY/FICTIONS Bond. $1 million FEDERAL RESERVE notes are then issued with that same number and put into circulation.On the LEGAL ENTITY/FICTIONS BIRTH CERTIFICATE, the one with your name in ALL CAPS (which represents an ENTITY/FICTION, CORPORATION) there is a “Bond” tracking number. That number has 7–9 digits with a “letter” in front of it. Get a 1 dollar bill and compare that “serial” number with the number on it. You will see the similarity. On the face of the dollar bill, is a letter inside a symbol with the words “FEDERAL RESERVE Bank of (State Name)” That is the letter designation of the State Bank which holds that Bond. example “E” is the Bank of Virginia. The letter of the number on the BIRTH CERTIFICATE is the Bank that is holding a Bond which represents your “labour” for your lifetime. Your “labour” has been “insured” and “assured”, and money has been borrowed against it. This is HOW people have been turned into collateral for the FEDERAL RESERVE Bank(s).Legal Definitions

Person: A human being is not a person because he is a human being, but because rights and duties have been ascribed to him

The ‘person’ is the legal subject or substance of which rights and duties are attributes Black’s Law Dictionary Not a human being, but the human being invisible coat

Application: Means to ‘beg, plead, petition, implore, entreat or request Must: Legally can be synonymous with ‘may’. Has two senses; Imperative or a

directive. One creates obligations, the other defines conditions. Always a ‘directive’ when used with ‘apply’

Submit: To agree to another’s will or to leave to another’s discretion. Form of surrender. Always voluntary. Implies lawful right to fight.

Registration: To sign over all chattel content for safe keeping. always voluntary. Abandons complete ownership for partial.

Capitis Diminutio (meaning the diminishing of status through the use of capitalization) – In Roman law. A diminishing or abridgment of personality; a loss or curtailment of a man’s status or aggregate of legal attributes and qualifications.Capitis Diminutio Minima (meaning a minimum loss of status through the use of capitalization, e.g. John Doe) - The lowest or least comprehensive degree of loss of status. This occurred where a man’s family relations alone were changed. It happened upon the arrogation [pride] of a person who had been his own master, (sui juris,) [of his own right, not under any legal disability] or upon the emancipation of one who had been under the patria potestas. [Parental authority] It left the rights of liberty and citizenship unaltered. See Inst. 1, 16, pr.; 1, 2, 3; Dig. 4, 5, 11; Mackeld. Rom.Law, 144.Capitis Diminutio Media (meaning a medium loss of status through the use of capitalization, e.g. John DOE) – A lessor or medium loss of status. This occurred where a man loses his rights of citizenship, but without losing his liberty. It carried away also the family rights.Capitis Diminutio Maxima (meaning a maximum loss of status through the use of capitalization, e.g. JOHN DOE or DOE JOHN) – The highest or most comprehensive loss of status. This occurred when a man’s condition was changed from one of freedom to one of bondage, when he became a slave. It swept away with it all rights of citizenship and all family rights.

The sun., June 27, 1899, Page 8, Image 8About The sun. (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916

http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83030272/1899-06-27/ed-1/seq-8/;words=que+ces-tui?date1=1860&sort=relevance&rows=20&searchType=basic&state=&date2=1922&prox-text=cestui+que&y=17&x=13&dateFilterType=yearRange&page=6&index=0

"Ileferrlng to mv reent communication to

you In regard to the failure of the MunicipalAssembly to vote on certain bond isHUes. andespecially thn Ismo of foOO.OOO for the sanitary protection of tho Croton watershed. Irake the llbeity or calling your attention to theprovisions of section Ml of thn charter, whluhprovides not onlv that the several members ofthe Municipal asemhly shall be consideredw hh trustees of the property, funds and ef-fects ofald city respectively, so far as such pioperty.funds or efTocts arc or maj be committed toIhclr nianagoment or control, but also makes1-tl oftlcers of the city co-trustees with themlor that purpose, and provides expressly thatimv co-trueteo shall bo entitled as against saidtrustees and In'regnrd to said property, fundsand effects to all the rights and privileges provided by law for anr co-trustee or cestui quetrust to prosecute and maintain any action to

prevent waste and Injury to any property,funds and estate held in trust--

The law of trusts and trustees: under the Trustee act 1888, the Trust ... By Great Britain, Arthur Reginald Rudall, James William Greighttp://books.google.com/books?id=-Y00AAAAIAAJ&dq=Judicial%20Trustees%20Act%2C%201896&pg=PA262#v=onepage&q&f=false

CESTUI QUE TRUST:

Abroad, persons resident abroad may be appointed trustees, 96. Acquiescence by, in breach of trust, effect of, 6. Appointment of, as trustee not favoured by Court, 96. Charge secured by a trust, rights of, 6. Extinguishment of trust by, 63.

Laches of, in bringing action for breach of trust, 6.

Remedy of, where trustees for sale sell under depreciatory conditions, 68.

Rights of, against purchaser for valuable consideration, 14.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/50692092/Cestui-Qui-Trust

Copernic Agent Search ResultsSearch:CESTUI QUI TRUST(All the words)Found:96 result(s) on _Full.SearchDate:3/14/2011 1:17:12 AM1.May 19, 2005... paid for out of the common fund, i.e. company's money or trust fund, was thecommon property of the shareholders, or cestui qui trust. ...http://www.courtsni.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/F7F94E17-503A-4E2B-914C-16D70AFBD563/0/j_j_WEIF5289.htm88%2.of solicitor and client, trustee and cestui qui trust or the other relationships treated in equity as of afiduciary character. ...http://www.nhsjusticegroup.co.uk/pdf/fiduciary_disclosure_of_medical_mistakes.pdf 87%3.

Cestui Qui Trust = The StrawmanCestui Qui Trust = The Strawman. 1 / 3. Cestui Qui Trust = The Strawman. Rule of Grammar forthe use of CAPITAL LETTERS used in a NAME: when CAPITAL letters ...http://www.freedom-school.outofstate.us/aware/cestui-qui-trust-the-strawman.pdf 87%4.@sfiorare can you understand Cestui Qui Trust wookie? WHORL GRROWL AWOOORK! chewysproud of ya sfiorare, chewys proud! ;) ... bankruptcy-software.com ...http://www.123people.co.uk/s/dom+jolly86%5.Topic One: Equity, a RepriseÆ Object: The beneficiary, cestui qui trust, or purpose of the trust. Æ Trusts may be created bywill (testamentary) or deed (inter vivos). ...http://lsa.mcgill.ca/pubdocs/files/equityandtrusts/236-klinck_equityandtrusts_Fall2000.doc86%6.Cestui Que Trust - David Icke's Official ForumsCestui Que Trust Freeman-On-The-Land. ... The Cestui Qui Vie Act of 1666 gives a person 7 yearsto prove they are alive, therefore meaning ...http://www.davidicke.com/forum/showthread.php?p=105933963784%7.Pacific GuardianCestui Qui Trust = The Strawman. Rule of Grammar for the use of CAPITAL LETTERS used in aNAME: when CAPITAL letters are used anywhere in a NAME this always ...http://www.pacificguardian.info/strawman.html84%8.Cqv Cestui Que Vie Trust - Appointing The Judge Trustee In New ...Feb 3, 2011 ... The state took custody of everybody and their property into a trust, the Cestui Quitrust, the state became the trustee/husband holding all ...http://wn.com/CQV_Cestui_Que_Vie_Trust_-_Appointing_the_Judge_Trustee_in_New_Hampshire 83%9.DISTRICT COURT for _____ CountyThat being completed the next point would be in that the maximum life of a Cestui Qui Trust islimited to 25 years and with no contract renewal and is now ...http://www.freedom-school.com/bonds/court-order-to-close-trust.doc83%10.Kids.Net.Au - Encyclopedia > Law Frenchcestui qui trust[?], the creator of a trust. cy-pres doctrine[?], the power of a court to transfer theproperty of one charitable trust to another charitable trust when ...http://encyclopedia.kids.net.au/page/la/Law_French83%11.$21Silver.com « Carlton A. Weiss « Trustees in Commerce: A ...I can create a thousand trusts, naming all of them based on the cestui qui trust, and thebeneficiaries don’t even have to be told they are beneficiaries for the trusts ...http://www.21silver.com/?show=weiss&read=trustees_in_commerce82%12.Documents - ScribdCestui Qui Trust = The Strawman Rule of Grammar for the use of CAPITAL LETTERS used in aNAME: when CAPITAL letters are used anywhere in a NAME this always ...http://www.scribd.com/unityofbeing/documents82%13.Injunctions against trustees in comparison to action under Special ...As the cestui que trust may compel the trustee to the observance of the duty, so , on the otherhand, if the cestui qui trust has reason to suppose and can ...http://legalsutra.org/1284/injunctions-against-trustees-in-comparison-to-action-under-special-relief-act/82%14.N.A.B Kotoye V Mrs F.M. Saraki & Anr(i) taking away the beneficial interest of a cestui qui trust, or a Bank. (ii) merely protecting thelegal title of a registered holder of ...http://www.nigeria-law.org/N.A.B%20Kotoye%20V%20Mrs%20F.M.%20Saraki%20&%20Anr.htm82%15.

Glossary & Terms » Estate Preservation Group, LLCOne who receives an advantage, recipient, donee, inheritor, legatee, receiver, cestui qui trust, heir,grantee, winner, and pensioner. COMMUNITY PROPERTY: ...http://www.estate-preservation-group.com/index.php?p=1_17_Glossary-Terms81%16.Trust and Teleology: Locke's Politics and his Doctrine of Creation*and the cestui qui trust for whom the trust was created. ... we shall find it easy enough to identifytrustee and cestui qui trust, but who is the trustor? ...http://www.jstor.org/stable/4023044181%17.recourse against the trust estate. As regards the beneficiary under the trust (cestui qui trust) his right has always been regarded as a jus crediti. ...http://www.jstor.org/stable/75424380%18.30 U.S. 151The plaintiffs' counsel seem to consider this as a case where the first ejectment was brought by atrustee, and the second by a cestui qui trust. ...http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/US/30/30.US.151.html80%19.Download Johnny Liberty - Reclaiming Your Sovereign ...Cestui Qui Trust - the strawman.docx: 16.42 KB : GlobalSovereignsHandbook-lulu-v4.pdf: 3.72 MB: Individual Sovereignty Process.pdf: 19.29 MB : Johnny Liberty - Reclaiming Your ...http://www.kickasstorrents.com/johnny-liberty-reclaiming-your-sovereign-citizenship-1995-t1143440.html80%20.IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE DEWITT KENNARD ...Feb 12, 2008 ... trustees, and conclusively presumes that acts done by them in regard to the trustproperty are done for the benefit of the cestui qui trust. ...http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/opinions/tca/PDF/081/kennarddOPN.pdf 80%21.No. ED 86875. - BERNDSEN v. FLAGSTAR BANK FSB - MO Court of ...To qualify under this section, the mortgagor shall provide the request in the form of a demandletter to the mortgagee, cestui qui trust, or assignee by certified mail ...http://caselaw.findlaw.com/mo-court-of-appeals/1415785.html80%22.Cestui Que Trust [Archive] - David Icke's Official Forums[Archive] Cestui Que Trust Freeman-On-The-Land. ... The Cestui Qui Vie Act ...http://www.davidicke.com/forum/archive/index.php/t-108087.html79%23.Dec. - This Week in Georgia Civil War HistoryWith Unabated Trust: Major Henry McDaniel's Love Letters from Confederate ... heirs, legatees orcestui qui trust; and all in his order direct in what ...http://georgiainfo.galileo.usg.edu/CivilWar/dec263.htm79%24.G.R. No. L-19872... trust for the recovery of the property held in trust where (a) the trustee has performedunequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui qui trust ...http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1974/dec1974/gr_l_19872_1974.html79%25.House of Commons Standing Committee (pt 3)"The office of cestui qui trust Is reserved for the learned and just, Any villain you choose Can becestui qui use, But a lawyer for cestui quitrust."www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmstand/...http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmstand/second/st990317/90317s03.htm79%Cestui Qui Trust

http://www.scribd.com/doc/50692092/Cestui-Qui-Trust

The law of trusts and trustees: under the Trustee act 1888, the Trust ... By Great Britain, Arthur Reginald Rudall, James William Greig

ksSection 8.—This Section effected a most important and much-needed alteration in the law. The effect is that, except in the three cases of fraud by a trustee, retention of trust property by him, or receipt by him and conversion of it to his own use, a trustee who has committed a breach of trust is entitled to the protection of the several Statutes of Limitations as if actions or proceed-ings for breaches of trust were enumerated in them (How v. Earl Winterton [1896], 2 Ch. 626). Even if the breach of trust is not barred by lapse of time under this Section, yet if the trustee has acted "honestly and reasonably, and ought fairly to be excused for the breach of trust, and for omitting to obtain the directions of the Court in the matter in which he committed such breach," the Court may now, under Section 3 of The Judicial Trustees Act, 1896 (59 & 60 Vict. c. 35), relieve him, either wholly or partly, from personal liability (see notes to Section 3, in-fra). Previous to the passing of The Trustee Act, 1888 (apart from The Bankruptcy Act, 1883, referred to hereafter) the state of the law as to how far the Statutes of Limitations applied to ac-tions for breaches of trust seems to have been as follows:—

1. As to Express Trusts.—It is clear that they were not within the Statutes of Limitations. In Petre v. Petre (1 Drew. 393) the Vice-Chancellor of England said: "A person who is, under

some instrument, an express trustee, or who derives title under such trustee, is precluded, how long soever he may have been in enjoyment of the property, from setting up the Statute." In

Obee r. Bishop (1 De G. F. & J. 137) Turner, L. J., said: "I am of opinion that it would be most dangerous to hold that a demand against the assets of a deceased trustee or personal representa-tive, in respect of a breach of trust or misappropriation committed by him, is barred at the expi-ration of six years from his death." This has been followed in many subsequent cases, and the Statutes have been held not to apply, even after very long periods of time have elapsed (see

Woodhouse v. Woodhouse, L. B., 8 Eq. 514; Butler v. Carter, L. R., 5 Eq. 276; and Edwards v. Warden, 1 App. Cas. 281). Any doubt on this point would be set at rest by Section 25, Sub-sec-tion 2, of The Judicature Act, 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66), which enacts that "no claim of a ces-tui que trust against his trustee for any property held on an express trust, or in respect of any

breach of such trust, shall be held to be barred by any Statute of Limitations."

This may at first sight appear to be inconsistent with Section 10 of The Beal Property Limi-tation Act, 1874 (37 & 38 Vict. c. 57), which enacts that "after the commencement of this Act no action, suit, or other proceeding shall be brought to recover any sum of money or legacy

charged upon or payable out of any land or rent, at law or in equity, and secured by an express trust, or to recover any arrears of rent or of interest in respect of any sum of money or legacy

so charged or payable and so secured, or any damages in respect of such arrears, except within the time within which the same would be recoverable if there were not any such trust." But this is explained by the fact that the latter Section quoted applies as between land charged and the persons entitled to a charge, while the former applies to claims as between a cestui que trust

and trustee (see Fearnside v. Flint, 22 Ch. D. 579; Hughes v. Coles, 27 Ch. D. 231).

But even in cases of express trust, where there has been gross laches in bringing the action, and there is evidence of acquiescence on the part of the plaintiff, the Court will not, after the lapse of a long period (in the case in question about twenty years), interfere on the plaintiff's

behalf (Bright v. Legerton, 2 De G. F. & 3. 606).

2. As to Implied or Constructive Trusts.—It seems that in cases where there has been laches on the part of the plaintiff in bringing the action, or acquiescence, the Court would not readily

interfere, though no strict rule has been laid down as to the exact length of time required to jus-tify the Court in refusing its assistance (see Kirkman v. Booth, 11 Beav. 273; Sleeman v. Wil-son, L. R., 13 Eq. 36: in each of which cases a period of about forty years had elapsed before

the action was brought).

In Townshend v. Townshend (1 Bro. C. C. 550) Lord Commissioner Ashurst says: "Then as to trusts being an exception to the Statute of Limitations, the rule holds only as between

trustees and cestui que trusts. It is true that a trustee cannot set it up against his cestui que trust, but this is merely the case (referring to the case he was hearing) of a trustee by implication, and as such affected by an equity; but that equity must be pursued within some reasonable

time. Both Courts of Law and Equity preserve an analogy to the Statute of Limitations." Again, in Beckford and Others v. Wade (17 Ves. 87) the M. R. said: "It is certainly true that no time

bars a direct trust as between a cestui que trust and trustee; but if it is meant to be asserted that a Court of Equity allows a man to make out a case of \constructive trust at any distance of time after the facts and circumstances happened out of which it arises, I am not aware that there is any ground for a doctrine so fatal to the security of property as that would be; so far from it, that not only in circumstances where the length of time would render it extremely difficult to

ascertain the. true state of the fact, but where the true state of the fact is easily ascertained, and where it is perfectly clear that relief would originally have been given upon the ground of con-structive trust, it is refused to the party who after long acquiescence comes into a Court of Eq-

uity to seek that relief."

The Statute would (by analogy) begin to run in these cases of constructive trust from the date of the discovery of the circumstances which constitute the right to relief.

Reference has been made above to The Bankruptcy Act, 1883, which, by permitting (Section 37, Sub-sections 1 and 3) liabilities for breaches of trust to be provable in bankruptcy, and by enacting (Section 30, Sub-section 2) that an order of discharge shall release the bankrupt from debts provable in bankruptcy other than (inter alia) debts or liabilities incurred by means of a fraudulent breach of trust, opened a method of escape, though not an inviting one, to trustees

seeking to be relieved from long-standing liabilities arising from ordinary breaches of trust un-tainted by fraud.

Section 25, Sub-section 2, of The Judicature Act, 1873, cited above, is in effect repealed by the Section of this Act now under discussion (Section 8), so far as regards innocent breaches of trust untainted by fraud; but not in cases where the claim is to recover trust property still re-

tained or previously received by the trustee and converted to his use.

As pointed out above in the note to Section 1 (ante, p. 2) the distinction drawn in equity be-tween express and constructive trusts is no longer of importance in applying the Statutes of Limitations (see Soar v. Ashwell [1893], 2 Q. B. 393; and Warren v. Murray and Another

[1894], 2 Q. B. 648).

Sub-section 1.—"Action" has probably a wider meaning than the technical one given it in The Judicature Act, 1873, Section 100, where it is denned as "a civil procseding commenced

by writ, or in such other manner as may be prescribed by rules of Court, and shall not include a criminal proceeding by the Crown." Whatever it may mean is considerably widened by the ad-dition in Section 8, Sub-section 1, of this Act of the "or other proceeding," which would cover

all civil and criminal proceedings.

The benefit of the Act is not personal to the trustee; it extends also to "any person claiming through him."

The Section is intended to give trustees the benefit of the Statutes of Limitations, and it is clear from the decisions that the particular Statute of Limitations the protection of which will

be chiefly invoked is 21 Jac. I. c. 16, which limits the period for bringing actions of debt to six years from the cause of action (see How v. Earl Winterton [1896], 2 Ch. 626).

The Act has in no way altered the principles which determine the time at which a cause of action for breach of trust or concealed fraud accrues (Thorne v. Heard [1894], 1 Ch. 599). Time

begins to run from the date of the breach of trust, as by making a wrong investment, not the date of the loss accruing from it (re Bowden, Andrew v. Cooper, 45 Ch. D. 444; and re Somer-

set, Somerset v. Earl Poulett [1894], 1 Ch. 231).

This is consonant with the principles applied under 21 Jac. I. c. 16 to actions for negligence, in which cases, the Statute being pleaded, it has been held that it runs from the time when the

breach of duty is committed, and not from the time when the negligence was discovered or the consequential damage accrued (Howell v. Young, 5 B. & C. 259; Smith v. Fox, 6 Hare 386).

In Sovereign Assurance Society v. Eardley Wilmot (37 Sol. J. 581) it was held that a wind-ing up of a company does not revive or create any new liability as between the directors for

acts done in the past and the liquidator, but thut they are trustees qua the company, and that the Statute will run as between them and the company as their cestui que trust from the period

when the' act complained of was done.

As Section 8, Sub-section 1 (6), of this Act says that time is to be a bar, "in the like manner and to the like extent as if the claim had been against him in an action of debt for money had

and received," it is obvious that the Statute will have the same effect in a case of trust as iu the case of an action for debt; hence, as it is clear that in the latter case the Statute does not extin-guish the debt, but merely bars the remedy by action (Cnrwen v. Milburn, 42 Ch. D. 424), the rule will be the same in a case of breach of trust. It would seem, however, that the practical ef-

fect of this is not of any importance, except so far as there may be acknowledgment.

Certain cases are expressly excepted from the operation of the Section (see Section 8, Sub-sec-

tion 1) :—

1. Where the claim is founded on any fraud.

2. Where the claim is founded on fraudulent breach of trust to which

the trustee was party or privy.

8. Where the claim is to recover trust property, or the proceeds thereof, still retained by the trustee.

4. Where the claim is to recover trust property, or the proceeds thereof,

previously received by the trustee and converted to his Use.

To these may be added the modification created by the last clause of Sub-section 1 (6): namely—

5. The Statute shall not begin to run against any beneficiary unless and until

the interest of such beneficiary shall be an interest in possession.

Exception 1.—Where the Claim is Founded on any Fraud.—The Court, for obvious reasons, has always carefully refrained from defining fraud. Fraud on the part of a trustee of an express trust is a misdemeanour, and punishable under the Criminal Law (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, Section

80; and see also Section 1 of that Act for the definition of "trustee").

Exception 2— Party or Privy—In Thorne v. Heard ([1894] 1 Ch. 599), Lindley, J., remarks that a person " who knows nothing of the fraudulent act of another, and in no way ratifies or benefits by it, and has no moral complicity with it," cannot be said to be party or privy to it.

Exception 3.—This exception would prevent the Statute of Limitations applying even now to such a case as Soar v. Ashwell ([1893] 2 Q. B. 393), which would be decided under the law as

it now stands as it was decided in 1893. As to the meaning of the words "still retained" see Thorne v. Heard ([1894] 1 Ch. 599). This exception applies and is confined to cases in which at the date of the writ the trustee still retains—that is, has actually in his hands or under his

control—the trust property, or the proceeds thereof, sought to be recovered (Wassell v. Leggatt [1896], 1 Ch. 554).

Exception 4.—See in re Gurney, Mason v. Mercer ([1893] 1 Ch. 590). The case of Wassell v. Leggatt ([1896] 1 Ch. 554) is a good example of the scope of this exception. There a woman,

married in 1854, received in 1876 a legacy of £300 given her for her separate use, but was forcibly deprived of the money by her husband, who knew it was a legacy. During the hus-

band's lifetime the wife frequently asked him for the money; but no proceedings to recover it were taken until after his death, which occurred in 1894. Romer, J., held the husband was af-fected with notice of the separate use, and was a trustee for the wife, and that the Statute of

Limitations did not apply.

Exception 5.—If there be a gift to A. for life, remainder to B. for life, remainder to children of A., and in default to A. in fee, it would seem that if the Statute were a bar to an action by A.

while his life estate only was in possession, it would not necessarily bar an action after the fee in remainder had come into possession (see re Somerset, Somerset v. Earl Poulett [1894], 1 Ch.

231).

Sub-section 1 (a).—In re Bowden, Andrew r. Cooper (45 Ch. D. 444), which was an action against the executor of a deceased trustee in respect of investments negligently made, it was es-tablished that in cases of mere negligence Section 8 applied—Sub-section 1 (6) being the par-

ticular part which operated —and that none of the exceptions excluded the case from that oper-ation.

Shortly, the case was as follows:— A newly appointed trustee of a Will brought an action against an old trustee and the representatives of two deceased trustees to compel them to make good losses arising from investments negligently made on insufficient security more than six

years before the action. It was held that Section 8, Sub-section 1 (6), applied. In this case a cu-rious point was raised with reference to Section 8, Sub-section 1 (a), of the Act. It was said that

that Sub-section could not apply, for the action was one which could not be brought against anyone not a trustee; and Fry, J., in reference to this argument, said: "That was the Sub-section relied on by the defendant; but I do not think that it can apply in this case. In the first place, it is obvious that if a person had not been a trustee he could not be sued for a breach of trust, and further, that there is no right or privilege, that I am aware of, conferred by any Statute of Limi-tations in respect of a breach of trust." If this view is correct, Sub-section 1 (a) might as well

have been left out of the Act.

Probably it was put in ex nuijore cautelu, but it was certainly not intended to be merely nuga-tory. This comment of Fry, J., is, it is submitted, a refinement in construing the Statute which

might tend to destroy a useful legislative enactment. The Sub-section in question evidently means that, assuming an action is brought against a trustee in that capacity, then he is to have the same protection from the Statute of Limitations (except in the cases excluded) as if he had not been a trustee. Thus, in an action for breach of trust by negligent investment (or, to put it shortly, an action for negligence) he can plead the Statute relating to limitation of actions for negligence, as any other subject of the Queen might who is not a trustee, and this view has

been adopted in the case, cited above, of How v. Earl Winterton ([1896] 2 Ch. 626).

If, however, the view of Fry, J., is correct, it seems clear that this particular Sub-section does not apply to an action against a trustee for breach of trust.

In re Page, Jones v. Morgan ([1893] 1 Ch. 304), a trustee was sued for breach of trust by having expended the whole of a sum payable to the plaintiff on attaining majority in educating

and maintaining him during minority. Twelve years after coming of age the action was brought. The plaintiff did

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- cestui que trust

The law of trusts and trustees: un-der the Trustee act 1888, the Trust ... By Great Britain, Arthur Reginald Rudall, James William Greighttp://books.google.com/books?id=-Y00AAAAIAAJ&dq=Judicial%20Trustees%20Act%2C%201896&pg=PA262#v=onepage&q&f=false

Section 8.—This Section effected a most important and much-needed alteration in the law. The effect is that, except in the three cases of fraud by a trustee, retention of trust property by him, or receipt by him and conversion of it to his own use, a trustee who has committed a breach of trust is entitled to the protection of the several Statutes of

Limitations as if actions or proceedings for breaches of trust were enumerated in them (How v. Earl Winterton [1896], 2 Ch. 626). Even if the breach of trust is not barred by lapse of time under this Section, yet if the trustee has acted "honestly and reasonably, and ought fairly to be excused for the breach of trust, and for omitting to obtain the di-rections of the Court in the matter in which he committed such breach," the Court may now, under Section 3 of The Judicial Trustees Act, 1896 (59 & 60 Vict. c. 35), relieve him, either wholly or partly, from personal liability (see notes to Section 3, infra). Pre-vious to the passing of The Trustee Act, 1888 (apart from The Bankruptcy Act, 1883, referred to hereafter) the state of the law as to how far the Statutes of Limitations ap-

plied to actions for breaches of trust seems to have been as follows:—

1. As to Express Trusts.—It is clear that they were not within the Statutes of Limitations. In Petre v. Petre (1 Drew. 393) the Vice-Chancellor of England said: "A person who is, under some instrument, an express trustee, or who derives title under such trustee, is precluded, how long so-

ever he may have been in enjoyment of the property, from setting up the Statute." In Obee r. Bishop (1 De G. F. & J. 137) Turner, L. J., said: "I am of opinion that it would be most danger-ous to hold that a demand against the assets of a deceased trustee or personal representative, in respect of a breach of trust or misappropriation committed by him, is barred at the expiration of

six years from his death." This has been followed in many subsequent cases, and the Statutes have been held not to apply, even after very long periods of time have elapsed (see Woodhouse v. Woodhouse, L. B., 8 Eq. 514; Butler v. Carter, L. R., 5 Eq. 276; and Edwards v. Warden, 1

App. Cas. 281). Any doubt on this point would be set at rest by Section 25, Sub-section 2, of The Judicature Act, 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66), which enacts that "no claim of a cestui que trust

against his trustee for any property held on an express trust, or in respect of any breach of such trust, shall be held to be barred by any Statute of Limitations."

This may at first sight appear to be inconsistent with Section 10 of The Beal Property Limita-tion Act, 1874 (37 & 38 Vict. c. 57), which enacts that "after the commencement of this Act no

action, suit, or other proceeding shall be brought to recover any sum of money or legacy charged upon or payable out of any land or rent, at law or in equity, and secured by an express trust, or to recover any arrears of rent or of interest in respect of any sum of money or legacy so charged or payable and so secured, or any damages in respect of such arrears, except within the time within which the same would be recoverable if there were not any such trust." But this is explained by

the fact that the latter Section quoted applies as between land charged and the persons entitled to a charge, while the former applies to claims as between a cestui que trust and trustee (see Fearn-

side v. Flint, 22 Ch. D. 579; Hughes v. Coles, 27 Ch. D. 231).

But even in cases of express trust, where there has been gross laches in bringing the action, and there is evidence of acquiescence on the part of the plaintiff, the Court will not, after the

lapse of a long period (in the case in question about twenty years), interfere on the plaintiff's be-half (Bright v. Legerton, 2 De G. F. & 3. 606).

2. As to Implied or Constructive Trusts.—It seems that in cases where there has been laches on the part of the plaintiff in bringing the action, or acquiescence, the Court would not readily inter-fere, though no strict rule has been laid down as to the exact length of time required to justify the Court in refusing its assistance (see Kirkman v. Booth, 11 Beav. 273; Sleeman v. Wilson, L. R., 13 Eq. 36: in each of which cases a period of about forty years had elapsed before the action was

brought).

In Townshend v. Townshend (1 Bro. C. C. 550) Lord Commissioner Ashurst says: "Then as to trusts being an exception to the Statute of Limitations, the rule holds only as between trustees

and cestui que trusts. It is true that a trustee cannot set it up against his cestui que trust, but this is merely the case (referring to the case he was hearing) of a trustee by implication, and as such af-fected by an equity; but that equity must be pursued within some reasonable time. Both Courts of Law and Equity preserve an analogy to the Statute of Limitations." Again, in Beckford and Oth-ers v. Wade (17 Ves. 87) the M. R. said: "It is certainly true that no time bars a direct trust as be-tween a cestui que trust and trustee; but if it is meant to be asserted that a Court of Equity allows a man to make out a case of \constructive trust at any distance of time after the facts and circum-stances happened out of which it arises, I am not aware that there is any ground for a doctrine so

fatal to the security of property as that would be; so far from it, that not only in circumstances where the length of time would render it extremely difficult to ascertain the. true state of the fact, but where the true state of the fact is easily ascertained, and where it is perfectly clear that relief would originally have been given upon the ground of constructive trust, it is refused to the party

who after long acquiescence comes into a Court of Equity to seek that relief."

The Statute would (by analogy) begin to run in these cases of constructive trust from the date of the discovery of the circumstances which constitute the right to relief.

Reference has been made above to The Bankruptcy Act, 1883, which, by permitting (Section 37, Sub-sections 1 and 3) liabilities for breaches of trust to be provable in bankruptcy, and by enact-ing (Section 30, Sub-section 2) that an order of discharge shall release the bankrupt from debts provable in bankruptcy other than (inter alia) debts or liabilities incurred by means of a fraudu-

lent breach of trust, opened a method of escape, though not an inviting one, to trustees seeking to be relieved from long-standing liabilities arising from ordinary breaches of trust untainted by

fraud.

Section 25, Sub-section 2, of The Judicature Act, 1873, cited above, is in effect repealed by the Section of this Act now under discussion (Section 8), so far as regards innocent breaches of trust untainted by fraud; but not in cases where the claim is to recover trust property still retained or

previously received by the trustee and converted to his use.

As pointed out above in the note to Section 1 (ante, p. 2) the distinction drawn in equity be-tween express and constructive trusts is no longer of importance in applying the Statutes of Limi-tations (see Soar v. Ashwell [1893], 2 Q. B. 393; and Warren v. Murray and Another [1894], 2 Q.

B. 648).

Sub-section 1.—"Action" has probably a wider meaning than the technical one given it in The Judicature Act, 1873, Section 100, where it is denned as "a civil procseding commenced by writ, or in such other manner as may be prescribed by rules of Court, and shall not include a criminal proceeding by the Crown." Whatever it may mean is considerably widened by the addition in Section 8, Sub-section 1, of this Act of the "or other proceeding," which would cover all civil

and criminal proceedings.

The benefit of the Act is not personal to the trustee; it extends also to "any person claiming through him."

The Section is intended to give trustees the benefit of the Statutes of Limitations, and it is clear from the decisions that the particular Statute of Limitations the protection of which will be

chiefly invoked is 21 Jac. I. c. 16, which limits the period for bringing actions of debt to six years from the cause of action (see How v. Earl Winterton [1896], 2 Ch. 626).

The Act has in no way altered the principles which determine the time at which a cause of ac-tion for breach of trust or concealed fraud accrues (Thorne v. Heard [1894], 1 Ch. 599). Time be-gins to run from the date of the breach of trust, as by making a wrong investment, not the date of the loss accruing from it (re Bowden, Andrew v. Cooper, 45 Ch. D. 444; and re Somerset, Som-

erset v. Earl Poulett [1894], 1 Ch. 231).

This is consonant with the principles applied under 21 Jac. I. c. 16 to actions for negligence, in which cases, the Statute being pleaded, it has been held that it runs from the time when the

breach of duty is committed, and not from the time when the negligence was discovered or the consequential damage accrued (Howell v. Young, 5 B. & C. 259; Smith v. Fox, 6 Hare 386).

In Sovereign Assurance Society v. Eardley Wilmot (37 Sol. J. 581) it was held that a winding up of a company does not revive or create any new liability as between the directors for acts done in the past and the liquidator, but thut they are trustees qua the company, and that the

Statute will run as between them and the company as their cestui que trust from the period when the' act complained of was done.

As Section 8, Sub-section 1 (6), of this Act says that time is to be a bar, "in the like manner and to the like extent as if the claim had been against him in an action of debt for money had and received," it is obvious that the Statute will have the same effect in a case of trust as iu the case

of an action for debt; hence, as it is clear that in the latter case the Statute does not extinguish the debt, but merely bars the remedy by action (Cnrwen v. Milburn, 42 Ch. D. 424), the rule will be the same in a case of breach of trust. It would seem, however, that the practical effect of this is

not of any importance, except so far as there may be acknowledgment.

Certain cases are expressly excepted from the operation of the Section (see Section 8, Sub-sec-tion 1) :—

1. Where the claim is founded on any fraud.

2. Where the claim is founded on fraudulent breach of trust to which

the trustee was party or privy.

8. Where the claim is to recover trust property, or the proceeds thereof, still retained by the trustee.

4. Where the claim is to recover trust property, or the proceeds thereof,

previously received by the trustee and converted to his Use.

To these may be added the modification created by the last clause of Sub-section 1 (6): namely—

5. The Statute shall not begin to run against any beneficiary unless and until

the interest of such beneficiary shall be an interest in possession.

Exception 1.—Where the Claim is Founded on any Fraud.—The Court, for obvious reasons, has always carefully refrained from defining fraud. Fraud on the part of a trustee of an express trust

is a misdemeanour, and punishable under the Criminal Law (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, Section 80; and see also Section 1 of that Act for the definition of "trustee").

Exception 2— Party or Privy—In Thorne v. Heard ([1894] 1 Ch. 599), Lindley, J., remarks that a person " who knows nothing of the fraudulent act of another, and in no way ratifies or benefits

by it, and has no moral complicity with it," cannot be said to be party or privy to it.

Exception 3.—This exception would prevent the Statute of Limitations applying even now to such a case as Soar v. Ashwell ([1893] 2 Q. B. 393), which would be decided under the law as it now stands as it was decided in 1893. As to the meaning of the words "still retained" see Thorne v. Heard ([1894] 1 Ch. 599). This exception applies and is confined to cases in which at the date

of the writ the trustee still retains—that is, has actually in his hands or under his control—the trust property, or the proceeds thereof, sought to be recovered (Wassell v. Leggatt [1896], 1 Ch.

554).

Exception 4.—See in re Gurney, Mason v. Mercer ([1893] 1 Ch. 590). The case of Wassell v. Leggatt ([1896] 1 Ch. 554) is a good example of the scope of this exception. There a woman,

married in 1854, received in 1876 a legacy of £300 given her for her separate use, but was forcibly deprived of the money by her husband, who knew it was a legacy. During the husband's lifetime the wife frequently asked him for the money; but no proceedings to recover it were taken until after his death, which occurred in 1894. Romer, J., held the husband was affected with no-tice of the separate use, and was a trustee for the wife, and that the Statute of Limitations did not

apply.

Exception 5.—If there be a gift to A. for life, remainder to B. for life, remainder to children of A., and in default to A. in fee, it would seem that if the Statute were a bar to an action by A.

while his life estate only was in possession, it would not necessarily bar an action after the fee in remainder had come into possession (see re Somerset, Somerset v. Earl Poulett [1894], 1 Ch.

231).

Sub-section 1 (a).—In re Bowden, Andrew r. Cooper (45 Ch. D. 444), which was an action against the executor of a deceased trustee in respect of investments negligently made, it was es-tablished that in cases of mere negligence Section 8 applied—Sub-section 1 (6) being the partic-ular part which operated —and that none of the exceptions excluded the case from that operation.

Shortly, the case was as follows:— A newly appointed trustee of a Will brought an action against an old trustee and the representatives of two deceased trustees to compel them to make good

losses arising from investments negligently made on insufficient security more than six years be-fore the action. It was held that Section 8, Sub-section 1 (6), applied. In this case a curious point was raised with reference to Section 8, Sub-section 1 (a), of the Act. It was said that that Sub-

section could not apply, for the action was one which could not be brought against anyone not a trustee; and Fry, J., in reference to this argument, said: "That was the Sub-section relied on by

the defendant; but I do not think that it can apply in this case. In the first place, it is obvious that if a person had not been a trustee he could not be sued for a breach of trust, and further, that there is no right or privilege, that I am aware of, conferred by any Statute of Limitations in respect of a breach of trust." If this view is correct, Sub-section 1 (a) might as well have been left out of the

Act.

Probably it was put in ex nuijore cautelu, but it was certainly not intended to be merely nugatory. This comment of Fry, J., is, it is submitted, a refinement in construing the Statute which might

tend to destroy a useful legislative enactment. The Sub-section in question evidently means that, assuming an action is brought against a trustee in that capacity, then he is to have the same pro-

tection from the Statute of Limitations (except in the cases excluded) as if he had not been a trustee. Thus, in an action for breach of trust by negligent investment (or, to put it shortly, an ac-

tion for negligence) he can plead the Statute relating to limitation of actions for negligence, as any other subject of the Queen might who is not a trustee, and this view has been adopted in the

case, cited above, of How v. Earl Winterton ([1896] 2 Ch. 626).

If, however, the view of Fry, J., is correct, it seems clear that this particular Sub-section does not apply to an action against a trustee for breach of trust.

In re Page, Jones v. Morgan ([1893] 1 Ch. 304), a trustee was sued for breach of trust by having expended the whole of a sum payable to the plaintiff on attaining majority in educating and maintaining him during minority. Twelve years after coming of age the action was brought. The plaintiff did ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------http://www.archive.org/stream/cu31924085504169/cu31924085504169_djvu.txt

A practical and concise manual of the law relating to private trusts and trustees"

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Cha2/18-19/11

http://www.courtfunds.gov.uk/forms/forms_cfo.htm

http://forum.davidicke.com/showthread.php?p=1059341683

The daily phoenix. (Columbia, S.C.) 1865-1878, January 04, 1866, Image 1Image provided by University of South Carolina; Columbia, SC

Persistent link: http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84027008/1866-01-04/ed-1/seq-1/

Print this image | Download this image