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CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 4 5/12/2023 10:41 PM

Chapter 4

Who are the critical citizens?

Concern about trust and confidence in governing institutions has risen and fallen over time in

periodic cyclical waves, with theories in social sciences reflecting contemporary events. After

summarizing the main conclusions derived from the previous body of research we compare societies

cross-nationally in 1995-2005. To focus upon the phenomenon of critical citizens, democratic aspirations

are compared with public evaluations of democratic practices. We can also examine trends from the

early-1980s until the 2005 in the sub-set of eleven societies contained in all waves of the WVS to see if

support has eroded significantly and consistently across these countries. We can also explore the

meaning of democracy and whether people in many countries are merely expressing lip-service to

democratic notions, representing relatively superficial and uninformed expressions of opinion, or

whether attitudes are more deeply grounded in a cognitive understanding which reflects the standard

principles and values outlined in democratic theory.

Concern about citizen’s orientations towards government

During the late-1950s and early-1960s, the theoretical impetus for Almond and Verba’s Civic

Culture reflected contemporary concern to understand the underlying causes of regime instability. This

interest was generated by real-world events associated with what Huntington identified as the second

great reverse wave of democracy.1 This included the historic rise of Nazi Germany and Italian fascism

and the global disruption of the Second World War, as well as the collapse of fledgling parliamentary

democracies in many newly independent African states emerging from colonial rule, and the checkered

political experience of Latin America in the 1960s, due to military coups, populist dictators, and

Communist revolution.2 The central message emerging from The Civic Culture emphasized that political

stability required congruence between culture and structure. It was believed that the democratic public

needed to be finely balanced in equilibrium between the dangers of either an excessively deferential,

apathetic and disengaged citizenry, on the one hand, or an overly-agitated, disenchanted, and heated

engagement, on the other. There was thus assumed to be an optimal level of political trust in stable

democratic states, where active and watchful citizens checked the powerful, without succumbing to the

destabilizing forces of either excessive loyalty and deference, at one pole, or else excessive disaffection

and alienation, at the other extreme.

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The idea that societies differed in their political culture was hardly novel; indeed it had been the

subject of philosophical speculation for centuries, in classic works from Montesquieu to de Tocqueville.

But one of the more radical aspects of the civic culture study was the way that support for the theory

was derived from a path-breaking cross-national opinion survey, demonstrating that citizen’s

orientations could be examined empirically. The study analyzed the mass publics in Mexico, the United

States, Italy, Britain, and Germany during the late-1950s. Almond and Verba concluded that the United

States (and to a lesser extent, Britain) exemplified the civic culture: “Respondents in the United States,

compared with those in the other four nations, are very frequently exposed to politics. They report

political discussion and involvement in political affairs, a sense of obligation to take an active part in the

community, and a sense of competence to influence the government. They are frequently active

members of voluntary associations. Furthermore, they tend to be affectively involved in the political

system: they report emotional involvement during election campaigns, and they have a high degree of

pride in the political system. And their attachment to the political system includes both generalized

system affect as well as satisfaction with specific government performance.” 3 By contrast, Italy (and to a

lesser extent, Mexico) exemplified an alienated political culture: “The picture of Italian political culture

that has emerged from our data is one of relatively unrelieved political alienation and distrust. The

Italians are particularly low in national pride, in moderate and open partisanship, in the

acknowledgment of the obligation to take an active part in local community affairs, in the sense of

competence to join with others in situations of political stress, in their choice of social forms of leisure

activity, and in their confidence in the social environment.”4 The question arising from contemporary

developments is whether many political cultures have gradually edged closer to the Italian model during

the half century since the original study was conducted, or whether civic orientations remain alive and

well in many parts of the world.

During the 1960s and early-1970s, many other American and European commentators also

raised questions about the capacity of democratic institutions to serve as an outlet to contain public

dissent. Indicators in the American National Election Study (NES) (see Figure 4.2) suggested that U.S.

trust in the federal government in Washington DC plummeted steadily every election year from the late-

1950s to the late-1970s.5 These findings seemed to reflect a broader civic malaise in the tumultuous

protest politics the United States, with urban riots symbolizing a breakdown of social control, and

deepening radical sentiments over issues such as Viet Nam, welfare, race, and gender, triggering new

interest in the causes of protest activism.6 Nevertheless interpretations of the meaning of the standard

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ANES political trust indicators differed, sparking a long-standing debate. As discussed in chapter 2, the

standard American National Election Study questions about political trust emphasize the ethical

standards, efficiency, and integrity of elected officials, for example by asking whether the ‘government

in Washington’, or ‘people running the government’ can be trusted to do what is right, whether they

waste taxes, whether government is run for a few big interests, or whether public officials are crooked.

For Citrin, these signs indicated an expression of public dissatisfaction with the performance of

particular incumbent political leaders, representing part of the regular cycle of normal electoral politics. 7

In this view, views about the ethics, honesty and integrity of specific office-holders, including members

of congress and specific presidents, can be expected to ebb and flow over time. For Miller, however, the

roots of public dissatisfaction extended more deeply to indicate a crisis of legitimacy in American

democracy, representing a loss of faith that U.S. political institutions were the most appropriate ones for

American society.8 The gloomier sentiments received their strongest expression in a major influential

report written during the mid-1970s for the Trilateral Commission by Crosier, Huntington and Watakuki,

which diagnosed a ‘crisis’ of democratic authority afflicting not just America but also many similar post-

industrial societies.9

This wave of concern ebbed somewhat during the 1980s, reflecting the more quiescent

Thatcher-Reagan era. A sharp revival of American trust in the federal government registered in the

standard National Election Study series in the early-1980s, despite the deep economic recession during

these years. The gloomier prognostication about the health and vitality of democracy in the United

States and Western Europe was increasingly regarded as overly-alarmist during this era. This

interpretation was typified by Lipset and Schneider, who conducted a detailed study of a wide range of

American public opinion polls towards government, business, and labor. 10 The study noted that mass

support for many types of political institutions in the United States had indeed eroded over time, but the

authors concluded that most criticisms were leveled at the behavior and performance of specific power-

holders, not doubts about the underlying structure and function of American institutions. This positive

perspective was strongly reinforced by a multivolume comparison examining broader trends in Western

Europe from the early-1970s until the mid or late-1990s, the Beliefs in Government project. This

thorough and detailed collaborative study dismissed talk of a ‘crisis of democracy’ as exaggerated, and

arrived at relatively sanguine conclusions. In particular, chapters in these volumes examining

institutional confidence and trust in politicians concluded that there was little evidence of a steady

secular erosion of systems support in Europe during these three decades. Instead the authors

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emphasized the existence of persistent cross-national differences in systems support across different

European member states, and a pattern of trendless fluctuations over the years.11

The 1990s saw a renewed wave of interest in the causes of civic disengagement, exemplified in

the United States by a catalogue of concern about low or falling voting turnout (Teixiera), declining

support for political parties (Aldrich), eroding social capital (Putnam), lack of trust in government (Nye,

Zelikow and King), and plummeting popular support for Congress (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse). 12 The

original Critical Citizens volume, published in 1999, extended the time-series analysis by another decade

and widened the cross-national coverage by considering a global perspective, including developments in

many third wave democracies. The general diagnosis emerging from the team of contributors in this

volume confirmed that a serious and significant long-term erosion of public support for some of the core

institutions of state had indeed occurred during the late-twentieth century, as popular commentators

often suggested. In particular, a global comparison by Klingemann, based on analyzing data from the

second and third waves of the World Values Survey conducted in the early to mid-1990s, demonstrated

substantial cross-national variations and relatively low evaluations of the performance of representative

institutions in many third-wave democracies, especially in post-Communist Europe and in Latin

America.13

In comparisons across established democracies and post-industrial societies, Russell Dalton

demonstrated that citizens had become more distant from political parties, more critical of political

elites and institutions, and less positive towards government during the period from the 1960s until the

early-1990s, weakening the links connecting citizens and the state.14 Subsequent research by Dalton

confirmed the persistence of these trends in these established democracies, and yet he found no

evidence of any erosion of support for democratic principles and values, or any weakening of

identification with the nation-state. 15 Analysis of the fifth wave of the World Values Study, conducted in

2005, allows this book to update the analysis and also to broaden the comparisons to compare public

opinion in emerging economies and developing societies in many parts of the world. We can examine

whether the trends documented earlier in Critical Citizens have continued to persist and even deepen

over time, or alternatively whether criticism of democratic institutions and processes has gradually

eroded general faith in democratic ideals.

Other recent studies have commonly echoed these conclusions, whether focused on trends

within specific established democracies, or based on a broader comparison across global regions. 16

Hence Catterberg and Moreno compared institutional confidence in 37 nations where comparisons were

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available over at least two points of time from 1981 to 2001, using the World Values Survey. They

focused on analyzing trends in confidence towards parliaments and the civil service. The study

concluded that confidence in these institutions declined in most of the established and third wave

democracies under comparison, with some of the sharpest falls registered in Latin America and post-

Communist Europe.17 Nevertheless although there is commonly an erosion of confidence, the exact

timing of these shifts is often country-specific. There is also considerable volatility over time in many

survey measures, like a jagged fall, rather than steady secular erosion. For example the trends in trust in

federal government in the American National Election surveys in Figure 4.2 show an overall decline from

the high point registered at the start of the series in 1958 until the end point fifty years later. But there

are periods where trust in the federal government has fluctuated, reviving in the early-1980s, for

example, as well as sharply during the mid-to-late 1990s, before peaking around the dramatic events of

9/11.

At the same time, however, building on Easton’s original insights, Critical Citizens emphasized

that the concept of systems support was not all of one piece, so that considerable care is needed in

disentangling the most appropriate components and measures.18 In contrast to the survey data showing

rising skepticism about democratic institutions, little systematic evidence suggested a long-term ‘crisis’

in support for democratic principles over these decades, indeed rather the reverse; at the end of the

twentieth century, these values commanded almost universal acceptance as an ideal; as Klingemann

concluded, “I can find no evidence of growing dissatisfaction with democracy as a form of

government.”19 Nor was this pattern confined to Western societies; according to the burgeoning range

of cross-national surveys, widespread public support for democratic ideals was apparent in many parts

of the world, even in many states governed by autocratic regimes.20 Surveys, including the series of

global-barometers covering major world regions, suggest that many citizens around the globe have

come to adhere to democratic principles and aspirations as the best system of government.21

Evidence for mass support for democratic principles has now accumulated in a broad swath of

countries, as well as among different types of cultural areas, notably from the regional Barometers

conducted in post-Communist Europe, Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Arab states. The

consensus which has emerged in the previous research literature, on the basis of survey evidence until

the late-1990s, suggests that support for democratic ideals, at least in the abstract, has become

pervasive among the majorities of publics around the world. Support for democracy is far from simply a

Western cultural artifact, as the ‘Asian values’ debate once claimed.22 Even in the Middle East, which

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lags behind the globe in democratic reforms, 2006 Arab Barometer surveys in Jordan, Algeria, Morocco

and Kuwait report that eight or nine out of ten respondents believe that ‘democracy is the best form of

government’ and that ‘having a democratic system of government would be good for our country’. 23 As

Diamond summarizes a recent review of the survey evidence: “Strikingly, the belief that democracy is (in

principle at least) the best system is overwhelming and universal. While there is a slightly higher

preference for the Western industrialized countries, in every region – even the former Soviet Union and

the Muslim Middle East – an average of at least 80 percent of people polled say that democracy is

best.”24

Evidence for worldwide democratic aspirations

In the light of the debates in the literature, we need to reexamine the cross-national evidence

for democratic aspirations, understood throughout this study as expressions of support for the

principles, normative ideals, and values underpinning democratic regimes. This concept can be

measured through surveys by gauging agreement with the idea of democracy, including citizen’s

approval of democracy as the 'best form of government' and as 'a good way of governing' for their own

country, as well as by monitoring the value and importance of democracy, and also comparing

preferences for democratic governance over types of regimes. Cross-national surveys have accumulated

considerable evidence concerning mass support for democratic principles in a wide range of nations, as

well as among the mass public living under different types of regimes in Africa, Asia and Latin America. 25

The previous literature which has examined public opinion concludes that, at least by the mid-1990s or

early 2000, support for democratic ideals had become widespread around the world. Even in countries

with little or no experience of this form of government, such as Azerbaijan, Iran and Vietnam, the

majority of the public say that they support democracy as the best form of government. 26

To examine the survey data, the proportion of ordinary people who express support for

democracy as the best of government for their own country can be compared in 95 societies contained

in the World Values Survey from 1995 to 2005. The survey asked the following “ I'm going to describe

various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country.

For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this

country? Having a democratic political system.” Figure 4.1 shows the proportion who responded in each

society with the strongest approval (‘very good’). The graph illustrates the wide range of replies, with

the strongest support expressed in Ghana, Greece and Morocco, where eight out of ten people thought

that a democratic system was a very good form of government. Far from being a Western phenomenon,

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a glance down the ranking suggests no particular obvious pattern; approval was widespread among the

majorities of the populations in more than fifty societies. Approval was expressed in a wide range of

democratic and autocratic states, and among all cultural regions, as well as among developing countries,

emerging economies, and post-industrial economies from around the world. Popular support was

weaker in the remaining 48 societies, with the lowest levels of popular support expressed in Ukraine,

Latvia, Russia and Hong Kong, but again there is no obvious single factor which these countries share.

[Figure 4.1 about here]

This pattern confirms previous studies based on the World Values Survey and the regional

Barometer surveys which also found that by the end of the twentieth century, support for democracy as

a form of government had become widespread among the publics in many societies worldwide. The

analysis needs updating, however, to see whether democratic aspirations have further strengthened

during the last decade, or whether public opinion has become increasingly skeptical, reflecting the

general slowdown in further democratization which has occurred around the world. 27 The association

of democracy promotion under the Bush administration with unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan

may also have depressed support for this type of regime, especially in the Middle East and in Muslim-

majority states. Table 4.1 shows approval of democracy in the twenty-one countries which carried this

item in both the 1995 and 2005 World Values Surveys.

Understanding the meaning of democracy

Therefore democratic aspirations appear to be widespread, according to this evidence, even in

unlikely cases. It remains unclear, however, what ordinary people understand by the idea of democracy.

The skeptical view suggests that attitudes towards democracy are relatively shallow, superficial and

malleable. Democracy is a complex idea open to alternative meanings, including variants such as

‘liberal’, ‘participatory’, and ‘deliberative’, debated in political philosophy.28 Not surprisingly, there is

considerable lassitude for different understandings of the term in ordinary language. Moreover cross-

national surveys may capture responses towards democracy which are culturally-specific in their

meanings. Schaffer conducted in-depth interviews in Senegal, for example, a mostly Islamic and agrarian

country with a long history of electoral politics. He discovered that ideas of “demokaraasi” held by

Wolof-speakers often reflect concerns about collective security, rather than the standard liberal

concepts of free and fair elections, accountable executives, and respect for human rights. 29

7


In a broader comparison, Welzel and Inglehart found that most people around the world pay lip

service to the idea of democracy, but they argue that this does not necessarily indicate strong

motivations or deep-rooted coherent orientations.30 They reason that a marked disjuncture is evident in

many societies between overt public support for democracy and the actual type of regime in power. By

contrast, they argue, the presence of more deeply-rooted ‘emancipative’ values in society, exemplified

by feelings of social trust, tolerance, and participation, proves a more accurate predictor of ‘effective’

democratic regimes. Yet debate continues and other scholars have challenged the evidence for the

Welzel and Inglehart argument, and dismissed the more general claim that democratic development is

affected either by emancipative values or by overt expressions of approval for democratic values.31 It

may be naïve to assume, however, that democratic aspirations, by themselves, have the power to

overthrow repressive regimes and long-established autocracies, where states are willing to use

techniques of imprisoning opponents and suppressing opposition reform movements. Even in more

liberal regimes, institutional structures and levels of socioeconomic development may prove more

powerful drivers of democratization than cultural values alone.32 In this context, the expression of

cultural values in each society, while genuine, would probably prove a poor predictor of contemporary

patterns of democratic governance.

Democracy is a complex idea open to multiple interpretations – along with the related concepts

of self-government, human rights, freedom, equality, participation, rule of law, accountability, and

representation. The cultural meaning of support for democracy deserves closer scrutiny, in particular,

among publics in long-standing autocracies, such as in China, Vietnam and Saudi Arabia, where the free

flow of political information is restricted and ordinary people have never had any direct experience of

living under this form of governance. We need to establish whether ordinary people are merely

expressing lip-service to the abstract notion of democracy, representing relatively superficial and

uninformed expressions of opinion, or whether attitudes are more deeply grounded in a coherent

cognitive understanding which reflects the standard principles, structures and values embedded in

democratic theory.

The heart of this debate concerns the need to interpret what ordinary people understand when

they express support for democratic values. Poor people living in Accra, Cairo and Sichuan may regard

the image of democracy favorably today, as the political system associated historically with rich and

powerful nations and with modern post-industrial societies. But positive approval does not imply that

they know much in any detail about the complex principles, practices, and abstract ideas underlying this

8


form of governance. Alternatively, when they express approval of democracy, Nigerians, Egyptians and

the Chinese may be expressing more deep-seated aspirations for self-governance, and they may share

an understanding of basic democratic values, structures, and processes which is similar to citizens living

in long-established democracies. After the fall of the Berlin wall, Hofferbert and Klingemann found that

Western and Eastern Germans shared common notions of what defines democracy in terms of values

and processes, such as the association of this form of governance with freedom of speech and

competitive elections, although citizens differed in their understanding of the social and economic

features of democracy.33 Similarly Dalton, Shin and Jou analyzed open ended responses when ordinary

people were asked about the meaning of democracy in surveys conducted in roughly fifty countries. 34

They found that in most places, democracy is broadly identified with freedom and civil liberties. This

response was far more common that understanding the meaning of democracy in terms of institutions

and procedures, such as elections or rule of law, or in terms of social benefits, such as peace and

equality. At the same time, roughly one fifth of the public could not offer any substantive definition,

even in long established democracies.

To consider the meaning of democracy, the WVS asked

Comparing evaluations of state institutions

If there is any ‘crisis’ of democracy, many commentators argue that the heart of the problem

lies in an erosion of trust and confidence in the core institutions of state, including the legislature,

executive and judicial branches of government, as well as other public sector agencies, such as the

police, military and civil service. Nevertheless previous research examining institutional confidence in

America and Western Europe has emphasized the need to distinguish among both public and private

sector agencies, as well as among different branches of government. 35

The distribution of critical citizens

To build upon the conceptual foundation, the heart of this study seeks to focus upon the

contrast and tensions between positive approval of democratic values, on the one hand, and negative

evaluations of the performance of democratic institutions, on the other. The aim is not to look at all

types of support for the nation state but rather to understand the syndrome of ‘critical citizens’ in more

depth. 36 The matrix in Figure 4.X illustrates the framework and how this is measured. Any selection of

suitable variables for indicators needs to balance the desirability of using composite measures derived

9


from the factor analysis, with the potential advantage of the greater reliability derived from multi-item

scales, against the problems arising from missing data and more limited cross-national and time-series

coverage which arise from this process.

The horizontal dimension concerns democratic values. This reflects the aspirations which

citizens express towards the ideal type of principles for governing their state, irrespective of the type of

democratic or autocratic regime actually in power. Democratic values involve the normative

underpinnings which are involved in approval or disapproval of this type of state. This concept is gauged

using a single item from the pooled World Values Survey 1995-2005 in terms of strong agreement ( ‘very

good’) with the statement ‘I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you

think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly

good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system?’ It

should be noted that this item does not seek to define any particular type of democracy in terms of

principles or structural institutions, so it open to multiple meanings within each culture.

The vertical dimension concerns citizen’s confidence in state agencies in their own country,

understood to reflect approval of their performance in practice. This is also measured using four items

selected from the pooled WVS from 1981-2005 by the question: “I am going to name a number of

organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal

of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? Parliament, the civil

service, the police, and the armed forces.” Each of these are an integral part of any effective nation-

state, whether democratic or not, and as the factor analysis demonstrated, attitudes towards these

agencies are also strongly correlated with confidence in the national government, the courts, and

political parties, where the pooled WVS contained a more abbreviated time series (1990-2005). The

confidence in state institutions scale is constructed by summing the four components as a standardized

100 point scale and then the scale is dichotomized around the mean into high and low categories.

[Figure 4.X about here]

Combining these components in the matrix generates four ideal types. The critical democrats,

representing those located in the lower right quadrant, referring to citizens who simultaneously aspire

to democracy as the ideal form of government yet who remain skeptical about the way that state

institutions work in practice. The top right quadrant contains the satisfied democrats, where there is

congruence between support for democratic values and confidence in state agencies. Alternatively, the

matrix also identifies the critical non-democrats, a group which does not adhere to democratic values 10


and which is also skeptical about state institutions. Lastly, the satisfied non-democrats do not subscribe

to democratic values and they are satisfied with institutional performance. When operationalized using

the measures in the pooled World Values Survey 1995-2005 the distribution in Figure 4.X shows that

critical democrats proved to be the largest category, with 43% of respondents. The next largest category

contained the satisfied democrats, representing roughly one third (35.1%) of all respondents. Critical

non-democrats represented 13.6% of respondents, while the satisfied non-democrats were the smallest

group (8.4%).

Therefore the growing tensions between support for democratic values and practices have been

observed in many previous studies in the literature, but nevertheless these components are most

commonly analyzed separately, rather than being integrated.37 Systematic research has not clearly

established the social background and political characteristics of critical citizens, and the distribution of

these groups across different types of societies, cultural regions, and regimes. We also need to describe

trends over time within the same set of countries to establish whether and where there has been any

significant growth in the proportion of critical democrats. Lastly, we also need to examine the behavioral

consequences of these particular attitudinal profiles for civic engagement, governance, and regime

stability. Subsequent chapters explore all these issues in greater depth to understand how we can best

explain the phenomenon of critical citizens in any society, and also why this matters.

11


Figure 4.1: Trends in nationalism

Note: The nationalism scale is constructed from two items: (V75) Willingness to fight for one’s country in a war and (V209) Feelings of national pride. These items are summed and standardized to a 100-point scale.

12


Figure 4.2: Approval of democracy as best form of government for own country (% ‘Very good’) 2005

Hong KongLatvia

PolandKyrgyzstanEl SalvadorPhilippines

MexicoEstoniaTaiwan

MoldovaArmenia

ChileBulgaria

AzerbaijanGeorgia

Czech RepublicPortugal

East GermanyNetherlands

AndalusiaPeru

AndorraSouth Africa

UruguayIndia

IrelandNorth Ireland

IranGreat Britain

ZimbabweRomania

IndonesiaPakistan

VenezuelaNew Zealand

MaliWest Germany

Trinidad and TobagoAustriaCroatia

EgyptNorwaySweden

Dominican RepublicCyprus

DenmarkEthiopia

MoroccoGhana

.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0% 80.0% 90.0%

13


Figure 4.2: Institutional confidence

Note: Institutional confidence scale (8) 1981-2005

Source: Pooled WVS 1981-2005

14


Figure 4.3: Confidence in parliament

Note: Confidence in parliament, 1981-2005

15


Figure 4.4: American trust in federal government, 1958-2008

1958

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

7376

6561

53 53

3633

2925

33

44

3840

28 29

21

33

4044

56

47

35.6

R² = 0.287994123440628

% Trusting most of the time/just about always

Note: The standard ANES question is: “How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right -- just about always, most of the time or only some of the time?”

Source: The American National Election Surveys, 1958-2008

16


Figure 4.5: The dimensions and distribution of critical citizens

Non-democratic values Pro-democratic values

High confidence in state

agencies

Satisfied non-democrats

(8.4%)

Satisfied democrats

(35.1%)

Low confidence in state

agencies

Critical non-democrats

(13.6%)

Critical democrats

(42.9%)

Notes:

Democratic values are measured in the WVS from 1995-2005 by the question (V151) “‘I'm going to

describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this

country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of

governing this country? Having a democratic political system?’” Pro-democratic values are classified

from those who responded ‘very good’ or fairly good’, with the remainder classified as holding non-

democratic values.

Confidence in state agencies is measured in the WVS from 1981-2005 by the question: “I am going to

name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in

them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?

Parliament, the civil service, the courts, the police, and the armed forces .” The scale is constructed by

summing these five components as a standardized 100 point scale and then the scale is dichotomized

around the mean into high and low categories.

Source: World Values Survey 1995-2005

17


Figure 4.6

18


19


20


Figure 4.X Perceived characteristics o democracy by years experience of living in a democratic state

Table 4.1: Approval of democracy as the best form of government for own country (% very good)

Nation 1995 2005 Change 1995-2005Russian Federation 6 24 18Ukraine 20 36 16Moldova, 26 41 15Sweden 63 76 13Chile 30 42 12Uruguay 45 55 10Finland 31 39 8Taiwan 25 33 8Australia 52 59 7

21


Germany 58 65 7Slovenia 41 47 5Brazil 27 30 3India 49 52 3Argentina 51 52 2Mexico 28 28 -1United States 55 52 -3Bulgaria 37 33 -5Colombia 35 27 -8Japan 43 35 -8Romania 66 54 -13Serbia 50 35 -15Republic of Korea (South) 45 24 -21Total 40 43 2

Note: Question “I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system.” Percentage ‘very good’.

Source: World Values Survey 1995-2005

22


Table 4:2 Perceived characteristics of democracy.

Survey items Political rights Strong

government

V157. Civil rights protect people’s liberty against oppression. .706

V154. People choose their leaders in free elections. .699

V161. Women have the same rights as men. .682

V160. People can change the laws in referendums. .660

V158. The economy is prospering. .630

V159. Criminals are severely punished. .541

V155. People receive state aid for unemployment. .519

V153. Religious authorities interpret the laws. .787

V156. The army takes over when government is

incompetent.

.723

V152. Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor. .491

% of variance 29.8 16.9

Note: Q “Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy.

Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of

democracy. Use this scale where 1 means “not at all an essential characteristic of democracy” and 10

means it definitely is “an essential characteristic of democracy”” The table presents the results of

Principle Components factor analysis using Varimax rotation and Kaiser normalization.

Source: World Values Survey 2005

23


Table 4.2: Perceived essential characteristics of democracy

Region Women

equal

Free

elections

Civil

liberties

Referend

a

Economy

prospers

Punish

crime

State aid for

unemploymen

t

Tax rich Army

takes

over in

need

Religious

leaders

define

law

Africa 8.22 8.36 7.34 8.03 7.71 7.81 6.86 6.03 4.87 4.84

Asia-Pacific 8.49 8.51 8.11 7.72 8.24 8.13 7.00 7.40 4.62 4.59

Central & Eastern

Europe

8.92 8.67 8.39 8.14 8.53 8.07 7.84 6.53 4.43 3.86

North America 8.68 8.41 7.69 6.91 6.92 6.51 6.53 5.59 4.28 3.49

South America 8.76 8.63 7.77 7.98 7.49 6.82 7.19 5.69 4.03 4.03

Scandinavia 9.50 9.20 8.72 7.94 6.17 6.15 7.35 6.71 2.81 2.16

Western Europe 8.98 8.62 8.25 7.90 7.46 7.58 7.43 6.43 3.00 2.82

Total 8.69 8.56 8.00 7.82 7.80 7.60 7.19 6.46 4.21 3.95

Note: For the exact questions, see Table 3.X


24


Table 4.3

Region Importance of living in

a democracy

Evaluation of

democracy in own

country

Respect for human

rights in own country

Scandinavia 9.13 7.45 1.83

Western Europe 8.86 6.28 2.20

North America 8.81 6.62 2.17

Africa 8.64 6.45 2.37

Asia-Pacific 8.46 6.89 2.09

South America 8.35 6.57 2.60

Central &Eastern Europe 8.05 5.13 2.82

Total 8.51 6.34 2.46

Notes:

V162.”How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale

where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you

choose?”

V163: “And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10,

where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what

position would you choose?”

V164” “How much respect is there for individual human rights nowadays in this coun try? Do you feel

there is 1 A great deal of respect for individual human right, 2 ‘Some respect”, 3 Not much respect, 4 No

respect at all.”


25


26

1 Samuel P. Huntington. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman:

The University of Oklahoma Press.

2 For the intellectual history of the origins of the civic culture study, see Gabriel Almond’s (1996) ‘The civic

culture: Prehistory, retrospect, and prospect’ (http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/96-01) and Gerardo L.

Munck and Richard Snyder. 2007. Passion, Craft, and Method in Comparative Politics.

3 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p. 314.

4 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p.308.

5 See the ANES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior.

http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/graphs/g5a_1_2.htm

6 Samuel Barnes and Max Kaase. 1979. Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies.

Beverley Hills, CA: Sage.

7 Jack Citrin. 1974. ‘Comment: The political relevance of trust in government.’ American Political Science

Review 68:973-88; Jack Citrin and Donald Philip Green. 1986. ‘Presidential leadership and the resurgence of

trust in government.’ British Journal of Political Science 16: 431-53.

8 Arthur H. Miller. 1974. ‘Political issues and trust in government, 1964-1970.’ American Political Science

Review 68: 951-72; Arthur H. Miller. 1974. ‘Rejoinder to 'Comment' by Jack Citrin: Political discontent or

ritualism?’ American Political Science Review 68:989-1001; Arthur H. Miller and Stephen A. Borrelli. 1991.

‘Confidence in government during the 1980s.’ American Politics Quarterly 19: 147-73.

9 Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki. 1975. The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the

Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission. New York: New York University Press. See also

Samuel P. Huntington. 1981. American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony. Cambridge: Harvard University

Press.

10 Seymour Martin Lipset and William C. Schneider. 1983. The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and

Government in the Public Mind. New York: Free Press. P.6. See also Joseph S. Nye, Philip D. Zelikow, and

David C. King. Eds. 1997. Why People Don't Trust Government. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

11 See, in particular, Ola Listhaug and Matti Wiberg. 1995. ‘Confidence in political and private institutions.’

In Citizens and the State, eds. Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs. Oxford: Oxford University Press;

Ola Listhaug. 1995. ‘The dynamics of trust in politicians.’ In Citizens and the State, eds. Hans-Dieter

Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

12 This concern generated an extensive American literature during the early to mid-1990s. See, for example,

Ruy A. Teixeira. 1992. The Disappearing American Voter. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution; John R.

Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 1995. Congress as Public Enemy. New York: Cambridge University

http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/graphs/g5a_1_2.htm

Press; John H. Aldrich. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Susan J. Tolchin. 1996. The Angry American: How Voter Rage Is

Changing the Nation. Boulder, CO: Westview Press; Joseph S. Nye, Philip D. Zelikow, and David C. King. Eds.

1997. Why People Don't Trust Government. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Robert D. Putnam.

2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. NY: Simon and Schuster; John R.

Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 2001. What Is It About Government That Americans Dislike?

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

13 Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 1999. ‘Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis.’ In Critical

Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance. Ed. Pippa Norris. New York: Oxford University Press.

14 Russell J. Dalton. 1999. ‘Political support in advanced industrialized democracies.’ In Critical


15 Russell J. Dalton. 2004. Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political

Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies. New York: Oxford University Press.

16 See, for example, Neil Nevitte and M. Kanji. 2002. ‘Authority orientations and citizen support: A cross-

national analysis of satisfaction with governments and democracy.’ Comparative Sociology 3-4: 387-412;

Mattei Dogan. Ed. 2005. Political Mistrust and the Discrediting of Politicians. The Netherlands: Brill; Colin

Hay. 2007. Why We Hate Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press.

17 Gabriela Catterberg and Alejandro Moreno. 2006. ‘The individual bases of political trust: Trends in new

and established democracies.’ International Journal of Public Opinion Research 18(1): 31-48.

18 David Easton. 1965. A framework for political analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall; David Easton.

1975. ‘Reassessment of the concept of political support.’ British Journal of Political Science 5(OCT): 435-457.

19 Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 1999. ‘Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis.’ In Critical


20

21 Larry Diamond. 2008. ‘Introduction’. In How People View Democracy. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner

(eds). Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. P.xi.

22 Russell Dalton and Doh Chull Shin, eds. 2006. Citizens, Democracy and Markets around the

Pacific Rim Oxford: Oxford University Press.

23 Amaney Jamal and Mark Tessler. 2008. ‘The Arab Aspiration for Democracy.’ Table 1. In Larry

Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds). How People View Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University

Press.

24 Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds). 2008. ‘Introduction’. In How People View Democracy.

Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

25 Michael Bratton, Michael, Robert Mattes, and E. Gyimah-Boadi. 2004. Public Opinion, Democracy, and

Market Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Roderic Camp. ed. 2001. Citizen Views of Democracy in

Latin America Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press; Russell J. Dalton and Doh Chull Shin, eds., 2006.

Citizens, Democracy and Markets around the Pacific Rim Oxford: Oxford University Press.

26 Ronald Inglehart. 2003. ‘How solid is mass support for democracy: and how do we measure it?’ PS:

Political Science and Politics 36:51-57; Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel. 2003. ‘Political culture and

democracy: Analyzing cross-level linkages’. Comparative Politics. 36(1): p. 61-+; Larry Diamond and Marc F.

Plattner (eds). 2008. ‘Introduction’. In How People View Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins

University Press.

27 Larry Diamond. 2008. The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World.

New York: Times Books; Arch Puddington. 2009. ‘Freedom in the world 2009: setbacks and resilience. ’

Freedom in the World, 2009. Washington, DC: Freedom House.

http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw09/FIW09_OverviewEssay_Final.pdf

28 David Held. 2006. Models of Democracy. 3rd ed. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

29 Frederic G. Schaffer. 1998. Democracy in Translation: understanding Politics in an Unfamiliar Culture.

Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press

30 Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel. 2003. ‘Political culture and democracy: Analyzing cross-level

linkages’. Comparative Politics. 36(1): p. 61-+; Christian Welzel. 2007. ‘Are levels of democracy affected by

mass attitudes? Testing attainment and sustainment effects on democracy.’ International Political Science

Review 28(4): 397-424; Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart. 2008. ‘The role of ordinary people in

democratization.’ In Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds). In How People View Democracy. Baltimore:

The Johns Hopkins University Press.

31 See Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell. 2005. ‘Cultural and economic prerequisites of democracy: Reassessing

recent evidence.’ Studies In Comparative International Development 39 (4): 87-106; Christian Welzel and

Ronald Inglehart. 2006. ‘Emancipative values and democracy: Response to Hadenius and Teorell.’ Studies In

Comparative International Development 41 ( 3): 74-94; Jan Teorell and Axel Hadenius. 2006. ‘Democracy

without democratic values: A rejoinder to Welzel and Inglehart.’ Studies In Comparative International

Development 41(3): 95-111.

32 Pippa Norris. 2008. Driving Democracy: Do Power-sharing Institutions Work? Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw09/FIW09_OverviewEssay_Final.pdf

33 Richard I. Hofferbert and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 2001. ‘Democracy and Its Discontents in Post-Wall

Germany.’ International Political Science Review 22(4): 363-378. See also Dieter Fuchs. 1999. ‘The

Democratic Culture of Unified Germany.’ In Pippa Norris. Ed. Critical Citizens: Global Support for

Democratic Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

34 Russell J. Dalton, Doh C. Shin and Willy Jou. 2008. ‘How people understand democracy.’ In Larry Diamond

and Marc F. Plattner (eds). 2008. How People View Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University

Press.

35 See Seymour Martin Lipset, and William C. Schneider. 1983. The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and

Government in the Public Mind. New York: Free Press; Ola Listhaug and Matti Wiberg. 1995. ‘Confidence in

political and private institutions.’ In Citizens and the State, eds. Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs.

Oxford: Oxford University Press

36 For alternative conceptualizations and studies about this phenomenon, see also Susan Pharr and Robert

Putnam. (Eds.) 2000. Disaffected Democracies: what's troubling the trilateral countries? Princeton:

Princeton University Press; Mariano Torcal and José R. Montero . 2006. Political Disaffection in

Contemporary Democracies: Social Capital, Institutions, and Politics. London: Routledge; Richard I.

Hofferbert and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 2001. ‘Democracy and Its Discontents in Post-Wall Germany.’

International Political Science Review 22(4): 363-378.

37 The main exception is the study presented by Richard I. Hofferbert and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 2001.

‘Democracy and Its Discontents in Post-Wall Germany.’ International Political Science Review 22(4): 363-

378.

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