sl seminar 11 july 20021 machine protection and interlock systems for the lhc sl-seminar rüdiger...

SL Seminar 11 July 2002 1

Machine Protection and Machine Protection and Interlock Systems for the LHCInterlock Systems for the LHC

SL-Seminar

Rüdiger Schmidt

on behalf of the MPWG

The LHC challenges

Powering Operation and Protection

Beam Operation and Protection

SL Seminar 11 July 2002

OutlineOutline

LHC parameters and layout LHC stored energy and associated risks LHC protection systems

Protection and interlocks for powering

Protection and interlocks for beam operation Beam Dump Beam Cleaning Beam Loss Monitors Beam Interlock System

Conclusions

LHC parameters and layout LHC stored energy and associated risks LHC protection systems



Conclusions

4

Momentum at collision 7 TeV/cMomentum at injection 450 GeV/cDipole field at 7 TeV 8.33 TeslaCircumference 26658 mNumber of electrical circuits ~1700

Luminosity 1034 cm-2s-1 Number of bunches 2808 Particles per bunch 1.1 1011 DC beam current 0.56 AStored energy per beam 350 MJ

Normalised emittance 3.75 µmBeam size at IP / 7 TeV 15.9 µmBeam size in arcs (rms) 300 µm

High beam energy in LHC tunnelSuperconducting NbTi magnets at 1.9 KStored energy in magnets very large

High luminosity at 7 TeV very high energy stored in the beam

beam power concentrated in small area

LHC Parameters and Challenges for LHC Parameters and Challenges for ProtectionProtection

5

Energy in the magnet system: 11 GJ

In case of failure, extract energy with a time constant of up to about 100 s

Energy in two LHC Beams: 700 MJ

Dump the beams in case of failure within 89 s after dump kicker fires

Drop 35 tons from 28 km

Energy in Magnets and Beams Energy in Magnets and Beams

Drop it from 2 km

One beam, nominal intensitycorresponds to an energy that melts 500 kg of copper

6

Challenges: Challenges: Energy stored in the magnetsEnergy stored in the magnets

Energy stored in the LHC magnets, powered in ~1700 electrical circuits - all need protection

HERA: all dipole magnets store about 700 MJ

LHC: to limit energy - powering in eight sectors

Energy in dipole magnets (one sector): 1.3 GJ eight systems in the LHC - 8 dipole circuits

Energy in main quadrupole magnets (one sector): 40 MJ sixteen systems in the LHC for main quadrupoles

Energy in special quadrupole magnets (6 kA): about 100 circuits

Energy in 600 A circuits (i.e. chromaticity correction): 10 - some 100 kJ several 100 systems

7

Challenges:Challenges: Energy stored in the beam Energy stored in the beam

courtesy R.Assmann Momentum [GeV/c]

Ene

rgy

stor

ed in

the

bea

m [

MJ]

Energy density: even larger factor between LHC and other machines

x 200

x 10000

The risksThe risks

Damaging equipment in case of uncontrolled release of energy stored in the magnets Dipole magnet replacement would take about 30 days

Damaging equipment in case of uncontrolled beam losses No realistic estimation of possible damage

Magnets could quench due to beam losses, or due to other failures Quench recovery at 7 TeV could take several hours

Beam losses due to a large variety of failures (sc magnets, resistive magnets, …) Recovery from 7 TeV could take hours

9

Failures of machine equipment must be Failures of machine equipment must be anticipatedanticipated

Risk comes from large stored energy plus possible failures

7000 magnets (most of them superconducting), powered in ~1700 electrical circuits …. ~1700 power converters

Superconducting magnets operate at 1.9 K with a small margin in temperature, at the edge of their performance

The protection of the sc elements (magnets, busbars and current leads) requires several 1000 detectors

The protection from beam losses includes more than 1000 channels (beam loss monitors and other equipment)

Realistic failure scenarios => Protection systems

A quench in a superconducting magnet could lead to beam losses A failure of a power converter could lead to beam losses Failures in many other systems could lead to beam losses

10

LHC Machine Protection is to…..LHC Machine Protection is to…..

No uncontrolled release of stored energy

Priority I: prevent damage of equipment

Priority II: prevent unnecessary down-time - for example: DUMP the beam in case of beam losses that could lead to a magnet quench

The Machine Protection Systems include

A) Systems to protect the LHC superconducting elements in case of a quench, or others failures in the powering system

B) Systems to protect the LHC equipment in case beam losses become unacceptable

…together with tools for consistent error and fault diagnostics ……. POST MORTEM

11

Beam InterlockSystem

Powering InterlockSystem

Beam lossMonitorSystem

Beam CleaningSystem

Beam Dump

SystemQuench

ProtectionSystem

Warm Magnet

Protection

LHC protection systems and main LHC protection systems and main interfacesinterfaces

Accessystem

CryogenicsSystem

Power converterSystem

Emergency Stop (AUG)

MagnetSystem

warm+coldVacuumSystem

InjectionSystem

Experiments

RFSystem

BIAll systems interface to All systems interface to control systemcontrol system

12

LHC Machine Protection = Integration of systemsLHC Machine Protection = Integration of systems

This presentation focuses with the integration of systems into the LHC MACHINE PROTECTION SYSTEM,… with the interlocks as glue linking systems

Input from

Superconducting Magnet tests, String 2 Accelerator Physics - Collimation - input for BEAM LOSS

SCENARIOS

And experience from other accelerators

SPS, LEP, HERA, RHIC and FERMILAB

13

Some Systems for Machine Protection were already in the baseline: Quench Protection (LHC-ICP), Beam Dump (SL-BT), Beam Losses (SL-BI), Beam Cleaning (J.B.Jeanneret, SL-BI) …

Machine Protection WG started in March 2001, R.Schmidt and J.Wenninger (chairman, scientific secretary) - reports to LCC

Interlock System: Architecture of Interlock Systems, LHC Project Report 521, (F.Bordry et al.), System done in SL-CO, B.Puccio

Autumn 2001 Beam Cleaning Study Group (BCSG, chairman R.Assmann): “Study beam dynamics and operational issues for the LHC collimation system. Identify open questions, assign priorities, and show the overall feasibility of the LHC cleaning system.“ Reports to LCC and works in close collaboration with MPWG

This presentation is on behalf of the MPWG - and many other colleagues that contributed to the work (in particular in the Beam Cleaning Study Group)

How did it start….How did it start….

14

…….. where should it go - .. where should it go - be ready in timebe ready in time

Fabrication of equipment

Installation of completed components

Very thorough commissioning of the hardware systems starting in 2005, sector by sector, as key for successful fast start up with beam, throughout 2005 and 2006

From

now

to

2006

In 2006 - one beam injected and transported across two sectors (hopefully - requires operation of SPS )

Start-up with two beams in spring 2007

15

Layout of the LHC ring: 8 arcs, and 8 long Layout of the LHC ring: 8 arcs, and 8 long straight sections straight sections

Betatron Cleaning

WARM

Momentum Cleaning

WARM

Beam dump system

RF + Beam instrumentation

One sector

= 1/8

LHC parameters and layout LHC stored energy and associated risks



Conclusions

17

Sector

Continuous Cryostat / Cryoline Superconducting bus-bars runthrough cryostat connecting magnets.

Current feeds at extreme ends.

Other central insertion elementseg. Low Betas, separator dipoles, matching

COLD (<2K) 2.9km

WARM500m

1

5

DC Power feed

3

Oct

ant

DC Power

Main Arc FODO cells

main dipoles, quadrupoles, chromaticity sextupoles, octupoles tuning and orbit correctors, skew quadrupoles, spool pieces

End of Continuous Cryostatdispersion suppressors,

Some of the matching section, and the electrical feedbox.

2

4 6

8

7LHC27 km Circumference

LHC Powering in 8 Sectors

Slide from P.Proudlock

Powering Sector

18

Separation of Protection systemsSeparation of Protection systems

With respect to operation with BEAM:

Energy stored in beams

Two systems - one BEAM DUMP SYSTEM for each beam

With respect to operation of the POWERING system:

Energy stored in magnets of one cryostat

Electrical circuits in one continuous cryostat independent from circuits in other cryostats

POWERING ABORT POWERING ABORT BEAM ABORT BEAM ABORT

Dump Trigger

Back to EDF

POWERING Detect quenches or other failures Energy stored in magnets to be

safely deposited with POWER DUMP SYSTEM (Energy extraction)

ExtractionResistors 2min

MagnetsCryogenics 500ms

MagnetEnergy

EDF

Beam Dump 89s

Collimation system 0.1-10h

Magnets / Cryogenics 10h

LHC Experiments 10hSPS + RF

BeamEnergy

BEAM OPERATION Detect dangerous failures or

beam losses Energy stored in beams to be

safely deposited with BEAM DUMP SYSTEM

20

Example: Protection main dipolesExample: Protection main dipoles

When conditions are OK - green light for powering

In case of a failure (quench), uncontrolled release of energy is prevented:

Fire quench heaters (quenched magnets)

Current by-passes magnet via power diode

Extract energy by switching a resistor into circuit - eight tons of steel heated to 300 °C

Switch off dipole power converter, and possibly others

Release helium by safety relief valve

13 kA switches from Protvino Russia

K.Dahlerup-Petersen (LHC-ICP)

21

Example for architecture in one LHC sector - Example for architecture in one LHC sector - powering subsectorspowering subsectors

Scheme of POWERING SUBSECTORSexample for sector between IP8 and IP1

arccontinuous cryostat 1L

continuous ARC cryostatInner Triplet

IP 1ATLAS

Matching sectionQ5+Q4D2

Inner Triplet

IP 8LHCb

arccontinuous cryostat 8R

Matchingsection cryostats 8R

Innertriplet cryostat

PIC

Matchingsection cryostat 1L

PC and QuenchProtection

Innertriplet cryostat

Matching sectionQ6Q5Q4D2






PIC PIC PIC PIC PIC

22

Results from the StringResults from the String

String 2: commissioning of Powering, Magnet Protection and Powering Interlocks successfully in 2001 and 2002

String 2 gave us confidence as we observed a smooth commissioning of the powering protection systems

Complexity of powering systems for String 2 are similar to one of the LHC Powering Subsectors

=> scaling to the LHC is reasonable

R.Saban and the String TeamR.Saban and the String Team




Conclusions

Machine protection when operating with beamMachine protection when operating with beam

Early commissioning: First injection of beam into the LHC

Regular injection into the LHC

At 450 GeV During the energy ramp

At 7 TeV - before squeezing At 7 TeV - after squeezing

Operation with beam is discussed in the LHC Commissioning Committee (LCC) - chaired by S.Myers, scientific secretary O.Brüning

Beam intensitiesBeam intensities

Energy of LEP beam

Number of bunches

Bunch Intensity

Number of protons Comment

1 5.00E+09 5.00E+09 pilot bunch

1 1.10E+11 1.10E+11 nominal bunch

216 1.10E+11 2.38E+13nominal batch from

SPS

2808 1.10E+11 3.09E+14 nominal LHC beam

Intensity range~ 1:60000 !!

26

Machine protection: Machine protection: Beam energyBeam energy

For 7 TeV: fast beam losses between 106 and 107 protons could quench a

dipole magnet fast beam losses with less intensity than one “nominal bunch”

could already damage superconducting coils slow regular losses could quench the magnets

Quench limits: J.B.Jeanneret, D.Leroy, L.Oberli and T.Trenkler, LHC Project Quench limits: J.B.Jeanneret, D.Leroy, L.Oberli and T.Trenkler, LHC Project Report 44, 1996Report 44, 1996

Requirements and Design Criteria for the LHC Collimation System, Requirements and Design Criteria for the LHC Collimation System, R.W.Assmann et al., EPAC 2002 and Project Note 277R.W.Assmann et al., EPAC 2002 and Project Note 277

27

Machine Protection Systems must be operationalMachine Protection Systems must be operational

Beam Dump System The beam dump block is the only element that can stand the full 7 TeV beam without

damage

Beam cleaning system (collimators) Capture particles with collimators in the warm insertions, with an efficiency of > 99.9%, to minimise

losses in superconducting magnets For equipment failure, collimators are the first to capture beam losses Collimator position adjustment is critical

Beam Loss Monitor System Measures beam losses and, possibly triggers a beam dump

Beam Interlock System “Green Light” for beam operation, if changes to red => BEAM DUMP

Post Mortem recording must be operational Working Group on Post Mortem, chaired by J.Wenninger

Beam “lifetime” for optimum operationBeam “lifetime” for optimum operation

During “healthy” operation with nominal luminosity the lifetime is determined by the collision of two protons (beam lifetime in the order of 20 hours)

A large fraction of the protons is “lost” in the high luminosity collision points - and into ATLAS and CMS (corresponds to 10 kW per experiment)

At the end of the fill or in case of failure - the residual beam will be dumped, and its energy will end in the beam dump blocks

29

Lifetime of the beam with nominal Lifetime of the beam with nominal intensity at 7 TeVintensity at 7 TeV

Beam lifetime

Beam power into equipment (1 beam)

Comments

100 h 1 kW Healthy operation

10 h 10 kW Operation acceptable, collimation must absorb large fraction of beam energy

(approx. = cryogenic cooling power at

1.9 K)

1 h 100 kW Operation only possibly for short time, collimators must be very efficient

1 min 6 MW Equipment or operation failure - operation not possible - beam must be dumped

Acceptable lifetimes worked out by Beam Cleaning Study Group - see reports

30

Lifetime of the beam at 7 TeVLifetime of the beam at 7 TeV

Beam lifetime

Comments

1 s Failure of equipment - beam must be dumped fast

15 turns Failure of D1 normal conducting dipole magnet - monitor beam losses, beam to be dumped as fast as possible

1 turn Failure at injection, failure of beam dump kicker, or injection kicker misfiring with stored beam, potential damage of equipment, protection relies on collimators

Comments:The parameters at injection energy of 450 GeV are much more relaxed

Specification for the BLMs, J.B.Jeanneret+H.Burkhardt in the BI-Specification Committee

Very fast losses due to failures of the dump systems, LHC Project Note 293, R.Assmann, B.Goddard, E.Vossenberg, E.Weisse - not discussed here

31

Though the LHC cycle: Though the LHC cycle:

First injection into the LHCFirst injection into the LHC Early commissioning: first injection into the LHC with low intensity beam

would neither quench magnets nor damage equipment (pilot bunch with about 5 · 109 protons)

Establish circulating beam Commission beam monitoring and other systems Commissioning of beam dump system Possibly first energy ramp with pilot bunch

Protection against beam losses is not required

…but it needs to be certain that beam intensity is low, at top energy collimators should be in “coarse” position

32

Regular injection - consider the first turnRegular injection - consider the first turn

There are about 7000 magnets powered in ~1700 electrical circuits, >100 collimator jaws, more than 100 vacuum valves, roman pots….

Low beam intensity (pilot bunch, 109 - several 1010) - no problem Beam intensity is above about 1010 - quenches of sc magnets Beam intensity is much higher, up to 2·1013 - equipment could be damaged

see J.B.Jeanneret et al.

Experience from SPS - injected beam hits UA2, could happen for LHC (studies by W.Herr): NOT TOLERABLE FOR LHC

Example: magnet has wrong setting (Power Converter fault, or Power Converter has wrong input)

• The beam is deflected during the first turn • The beam touches / traverses the vacuum chamber • The beam hits equipment (magnet, collimator, experiment, ...)

33

If beam is already circulating, injected beam will survive

LHC ring with several 1000 objectsthat could prevent the beam from circulating (magnets, mechanical objects, …)

In principle, one proton for checking would be sufficient - in practice 1010 -

1011 are more practical

Any relevant failure would prevent the beam from circulating

34

How to avoid damage at injectionHow to avoid damage at injection

No beam is circulating In case of equipment failure condition - no injection Injection of intense beam NOT ALLOWED (interlock)

Step 1: Injection of weak beam <1011 protons - ALLOWED

Step 2A: If beam circulates - request injection of intense beam

Step 2B: JUST BEFORE INJECTION check if circulating beam is OK

Step 3: Injection of beam with higher intensity, ONLY, if beam is still present

If there is no circulating beam => no injection => go back to step 1

If there is circulating beam - inject beam => go to step 2

If there is a bunch present at the longitudinal position of the fresh beam to come

in, it will be deflected into the TDI - go to step 2

35

MKI - injection kicker

TDI - injection dump

Beam from SPS

Circulating beam

Pilot beamkicked out

Replacing pilot beam by batch from SPSReplacing pilot beam by batch from SPS

Injection failures have been worked out by the Injection WG and the BT-Group - led to proposal for TDI

36

Beam Dump SystemBeam Dump System

The beam dump system has many active components - kicker magnets, septum magnets, dilutor - all need to ramp with beam energy

The beam dump is an active system - it requires a trigger to dump the beam Quality and reliability of the beam dump system can not be better than the

quality and reliability of the trigger

The beam is dumped, either due to an operator request, or by the

beam interlock system after a failure has been detected

From SL-BT, E.Carlier

37

Beam dump must be synchronised with particle free gap

Strength of kicker and septum

magnets must match energy of the beam

« Particle free gap » must be free of

particles

Requirement for clean beam dumpRequirement for clean beam dump

particle free abort gapof 3 s

Kicker magnets constant angle

Beam dump block

Time

Kicker strength

Illustration of kicker risetime

38

Beam dump must be synchronised with particle free gap

Strength of kicker and septum

magnets must match energy of the beam

« Particle free gap » must be free of

particles

Requirement for clean beam dumpRequirement for clean beam dump

The entire beam would be deflected with an angle that does not correspond to the nominal angle

Beam Energy Tracking using special hardwareBEAM ENERGY METER

I) Cleaning of particle free gap (active and passive)II) Monitoring of beam intensity - if too large- dump beams

About 100 bunches would be deflected with an angle between 0 and the nominal kick

I) Rigorous synchronsationII) Additional collimators 1)

Depending on the beam intensity in the gap, particles would be sprayed

1) TCDQ - suggested by SL-BT, and LHC Project Note 297

39

Energy tracking required locally in insertion 6 for the beam dump system: Extraction kicker Septum magnets Dilution kickers

The field of the septa magnets needs to track the beam energy within about +-0.5 %

The dump kickers need to track the beam energy It is required to apply trims to the extraction trajectory

M.Gyr, J.B.Jeanneret

Distribution of energy information to Beam Loss Monitors around the ring (how…?)

Beam Energy MeterBeam Energy Meter and beam dump system and beam dump system

40

Current for the magnet with standard power converter / standard control electronics with a current versus time function loaded into the controller

During the energy ramp the deflection angle is constant. The non-linearity between current of the power converter and magnetic field is taken into account in the definition of the ramp function (as for all other magnets)

This is not sufficient for such critical system, therefore… Reliable monitoring for safe operation is required

Safe tracking that allows trimming of the Safe tracking that allows trimming of the functions in the beam dump system in a functions in the beam dump system in a limited rangelimited range

41

Beam Energy Meter

DCCT

Beam Energy Meter

DCCT

DCCT DCCT

Dump beam

Other

users

Make energy

Beam Energy Meter

Beam Energy Meter

Septum magnet

beam 1

Septum magnet

beam 2

Dipole magnets

Sector 5-6

Energy not consistent

Energy consistent

Prototyping components for Energy Meter has been made by J.Pett et al.

Dipole magnets

Sector 6-7

42

Beam Cleaning SystemBeam Cleaning System

Collimators close to the beam are required during all phases of operation

• Sophisticated beam cleaning system with many collimators has been designed (J.B.Jeanneret, and EPAC 2002 presentation by BCSG - R.Assmann) - limit aperture to about 6-10

• Together with the Beam Loss Monitors produce a fast and reliable signal to dump the beam if beam losses become unacceptable

43

+- 3 1.3 mm

Beam +/- 3 sigma

56.0 mm

Beam in vacuum chamber at 7 TeVBeam in vacuum chamber at 7 TeV

Example for failure Example for failure

at 450 GeVat 450 GeV

Assume that the current inone orbit correctormagnet is off by 10% of maximum current (Imax = 60 A)

12.0 mm

16.0 mm

Beam +/- 3 sigma

Beam +/- 3 sigmaand orbit corrector10 % / 100 % of Imax

56.0 mm

Ralphs EURO

Beam +/- 3 sigma

56.0 mm

1 mm

+/- 8 sigma = 4.0 mm

Example: Setting of collimators at 7 TeV - with luminosity opticsExample: Setting of collimators at 7 TeV - with luminosity optics Beam must always touch collimators first !Beam must always touch collimators first !Collimators might remain at injection position during the energy rampCollimators might remain at injection position during the energy ramp

Ralphs EURO

Collimators at Collimators at 7 TeV, squeezed7 TeV, squeezed

46

Particles that touch collimator after failure of normal conducting D1 magnets

After about 13 turns 3·109 protons touch collimator, about 6 turns later 1011 protons touch collimator

V.Kain

“Dump beam” level

1011 protons at collimator

47

Beam Loss MonitorsBeam Loss Monitors

Primary strategy for protection: Beam loss monitors at collimators continuously measure beam losses

Beam loss monitors indicate increased losses => MUST BE FAST

After a failure: Beam loss monitors break Beam Permit Loop Beam dump sees “No Beam Permit” => dump beams

In case of equipment failure, enough time is available to dump the beam before damage of equipment - including all magnets and power converters - but issues such a General Power Cut etc. are still being addressed

Failure scenarios with circulating beam studied by O.Brüning, and V.Kain

Beam Loss Monitor System: Specifications by BI-Spec-Committee (JBJ+HB), and realisation of the system by B.Dehning et al. in SL-BI

48

Redundant strategy for protection in case of Redundant strategy for protection in case of equipment failure equipment failure

Beam loss monitors around the LHC machine (a subset of all BLMs is critical for protection - to be defined)

Detection of fault states from equipment (e.g. power converter)

Example: Power converter failure of D1 separation dipole induces orbit distortion

Signal from Powering Interlock System to Beam Interlock System to DUMP BEAM

OR

Signal from Beam Loss Monitors to Beam Interlock System to DUMP BEAM

What to include to generate Beam Abort - to be worked out later (some flexibility required, the system must be tuned to optimise operational efficiency)

Architecture of the BEAM INTERLOCK SYSTEM Architecture of the BEAM INTERLOCK SYSTEM

Pt.1

Pt.2

Pt.3

Pt.4

Pt.5

Pt.6

Pt.7

Pt.8ATLAS

CMS

LHC-BALICE

Momentumcleaning

RF Beam Dump

Betatroncleaning

BEAM 1clockwise

BEAM 2counter-clockwise

InjectionBEAM II from SPS

InjectionBEAM I from SPS

BEAM DUMPCONTROLLERS

BPC

BIC

BPCBPC

BPCBPCBPC

BIC

BIC

BIC

BIC BIC

BIC

BIC

BIC

BIC

BIC

BIC

BICBIC

BIC

BIC

Beam Interlock Loopssignal transmitted viaoptical fibre at 10 MHz

p. 50

Time Stamping

power in from UPS

BEAM INTERLOCKCONTROLLER

BEAM PERMIT from PICESSENTIAL CIRCUITS OK

Link to Control system

BEAM PERMIT LOOPS

Signals fromPOWERING INTERLOCK CONTROLLERS

Signals fromsubsystems to give BEAM PERMIT,and ABORT ifPERMIT is absent

Machine / Beam Status

Other systemsBeam LossAccessExperimentsVacuumRFBEAM DUMPInjectionWarm magnetsCollimators

BEAM PERMITfrom equipment

BEAM PERMITto equipment

BEAM PERMIT from PICAUXILIARY CIRCUITS OK

POWERING INTERLOCKSYSTEM (several PICs)

BEAM INTERLOCK BEAM INTERLOCK CONTROLLERCONTROLLER

51

General Layout of the 2 Machine General Layout of the 2 Machine Interlock SystemsInterlock Systems

Control Room

B.Puccio

52

Quantifying reliability for the LHCQuantifying reliability for the LHC

Reliability can be quantified - with accepted mathematical tools. Such tools are challenging since mathematics involved can be rather advanced

Reliability of different systems can be compared To estimate the reliability of the entire accelerator, the reliability of all

subsystems need to be estimated Strictly required for systems related to safety of personnel (INB, legal

obligation)

Should be extended to equipment protection systems

… and for other systems in order to optimise the efficiency of LHC operation

Examples of past studies: quench protection system, interconnects between magnets, SPS access system, …




Conclusions

ConclusionsConclusions

The LHC is a global project with the world-wide high-energy physics community devoted to its progress and results

As a project, it is much more complex and diversified than the SPS or LEP or any other large accelerator project constructed to date

I consider the complexity of the LHC with its magnets systems at 1.9 K and the machine protection issues to be the main challenges for the LHC

From the summary of the LHC Machine Advisory Committee in March 2002, chaired by Prof. M. Tigner

55

ConclusionsConclusions If the protection systems will not be fully operational for Hardware

commissioning in 2005 and Beam commissioning in 2007 - there is no way to startup the machine

Very good progress for the protection against uncontrolled release of magnet energy, due to the excellent collaboration of people and the experiments at the String - a sound baseline has been established

For the protection against beam losses still substantial work ahead of us - in particular for fast losses - to avoid any damage of collimators or other machine equipment (work ongoing in BCSG and MPWG, LCC is the coordinating body)

For several important sub-systems principles and the architecture has been established - but the technical work is hampered by lack of personal and responsibilities need to be defined

Renovation of SPS interlocks - possibly with the same brainware and hardware (J.Wenninger & R.Giachino + B.Puccio & myself)

56

AcknowledgementAcknowledgement

This presentation is based of the work of many people

Particular thanks to my colleagues in the MPWG, and its scientific secretary J.Wenninger

Particular thanks also to my colleagues in the Beam Cleaning Studies team, to its chairman R.Assmann, and to the “father of LHC collimation” J.B.Jeanneret

References under:

http://www.cern.ch/lhc-collimation/

http://www.cern.ch/lhc-mpwg/

Future related presentation could be on Beam Cleaning, Beam Loss Monitoring, Beam Dump System, Quench Protection System and Post Mortem System

sl seminar 11 july 20021 machine protection and interlock systems for the lhc sl-seminar rüdiger...

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