sélection industries de defense...rapprochement nexter systems - kmw la promesse d·une aube ? (in...

GULLIVERN

Gullivern’s Think Tank Review

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A’S THINK TANK REVIEW

Sélection

INDUSTRIES DE DEFENSE 2016-3 (3/3) 2016

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Gullivern, The Think Tank Review

is a trademark of

Cover image

by Cea +

Licensed under Creative Commons

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FOREWORD

Every day, several thousands of think tanks

around the planet produce reports, analyses,

research papers about contemporary world

issues.

These documents bring precious data,

knowledge and operational ideas to decision-

makers in businesses and governments, as well

as to researchers and information

professionals.

Our ambition is to help you access easily this

valuable material, whatever field you are

interested in.

GULLIVERN’s think tank review is a collection

of bimonthly or quarterly thematic digests

gathering a selection of think tank publications

on specific subjects. Our database references

several hundreds of think tanks, which

guarantees that you will never miss a

document relevant for your activity domain.

Currently GULLIVERN’s think tank review

covers the following subjects :

Water, agriculture and food issues

Defense and security

Innovation and digital world

International trade

Low-carbon transition

Urbanization and smart cities

Visit our web site for more details:

http://www.gullivern.org

Christine Euvrard and Olivier Guy

Co-founders of gullivern.org

AVANT-PROPOS

Chaque jour, des milliers think tanks autour de

la planète produisent des rapports, des

analyses, des études sur les problèmes du

monde contemporain.

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ainsi que pour les chercheurs et les

professionnels de l'information.

Notre ambition est de vous permettre

d’accéder facilement à cette matière, quel que

soit votre domaine d’intérêt.

GULLIVERN’s think tank review est une

collection de recueils thématiques bimestriels

ou trimestriels regroupant une sélection de

publications de think tanks sur des sujets

spécifiques. Notre base recense plus de 1000

think tanks, ce qui garantit que vous ne

manquerez jamais un document pertinent pour

votre activité.

GULLIVERN’s think tank review est aujourd’hui

publiée pour les thématiques suivantes :

Eau, agriculture et alimentation

Défense et sécurité

Innovation et monde numérique

Commerce international

Transition bas-carbone

Urbanisation et villes intelligentes

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http://www.gullivern.org

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Overview 6

Document list 7

Document details Western Europe 12

Central and Eastern Europe 48

North America 52

East Asia 68

Central and South Asia 70

Appendices List of tables, figures and boxes 74

Keyword index 81

Useful tips

Click on a page number to go to this page inside the digest

Click on a document’s title to open it on the original website

Click on the up arrow at the bottom of each page to scroll back to the table of contents.

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DOCUMENT LIST

Western Europe

Think tank Think tank country Document title Page

Armament Industry European Research

Group - ARES European Union

A "game changer" ? The EU's preparatory action on defence

research 12



A European drone by 2025? The View from Italy on

EUROMALE 13



A European drone by 2025? The View from Spain on

EUROMALE 14

Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique -

FRS France A Perspective on Russia - Proliferated Drones.pdf 15



APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF EUROPEAN STRATEGIC

AUTONOMY 16

Groupe de Recherche et d'Information sur

la Paix et la Sécurité - GRIP ( Group for

Research and Information on Peace and

security)

Belgium Au cœur du système Lockheed Martin Contribution au

débat sur le remplacement du F-16 en Belgique 18




security)

Belgium Banques et exportations d’armes 19




security)

Belgium Contrôle des exportations d’armes : Zoom sur les Balkans

(Serbie, Bosnie et Monténégro) 20


FRS France

Cybersécurité : ambitions israéliennes et positionnement des

acteurs défense (in Défense & Industries n°6) 21

Institut de relations internationales et

stratégiques - IRIS (French Institute for

International and Strategic Affairs)

France Defence Budgets and Cooperation in Europe: Trends and

Investments 22

Istituto Affari Internazionali - IAI Italy DEFENCE BUDGETS AND INDUSTRY: TABLES AND GRAPHS 24



DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN BELGIUM AND THE

NETHERLANDS 25




security)

Belgium DÉMANTÈLEMENT DES ARMES ET BÂTIMENTS NUCLÉAIRES

- Terrifiant héritage pour les générations futures 26




security)

Belgium Dépenses militaires et importations d’armes dans cinq États

ouest-africains 27

British American Security Information

Council - BASIC United Kingdom

Feeding the ‘monster’ Escalating Capital Costs for the

Trident Successor Programme 28



FOUR PROPOSALS FOR A DEFENCE PROCUREMENT PLAN

FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION 29


FRS France

Inde : une Defence Procurement Policy 2016 dictée par le «

Make in India » ? (Défense & Industries n°6) 30


FRS France

Industrie de l’armement terrestre : quelques fondamentaux

(in Defense&Industries, n°7, Juin 2016) 31



KRAUSS‐MAFFEI WEGMANN ‐ NEXTER : A Rapid Integration

as the Key for a Real Marriage 32


FRS France La Corée du Nord spatiale 33

http://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ARES-Group-Policy-Paper-Fiott-and-Bellais-04-16-OK.pdf


http://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/COMMENT-Ares_Euromale_Italy_26.4.16.pdf


http://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/COMMENT-Ares_Euromale_Spain_26.4.16.pdf


https://www.frstrategie.org/competences/russie-eurasie/doc/2016-05-12-facon-drones.pdf

http://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ARES-Group-Report-Strategic-autonomy-November-2016.pdf


https://www.grip.org/sites/grip.org/files/NOTES_ANALYSE/2016/NA_2016-12-02_FR_C-WASINSKI.pdf


http://www.grip.org/sites/grip.org/files/NOTES_ANALYSE/2016/NA_2016-03-24_FR_JA-DE-SAINT-RAP.pdf

http://www.grip.org/sites/grip.org/files/NOTES_ANALYSE/2016/NA_2016-03-10_FR_L-GEHIN.pdf


https://www.frstrategie.org/publications/defense-et-industries/web/documents/2016/6.pdf


http://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/pma_2.pdf


http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/tabelle-grafici-en.pdf

http://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Policy-Paper-Defence-Policy-Belgium-NL-October-2016.pdf


http://www.grip.org/sites/grip.org/files/NOTES_ANALYSE/2016/NA_2016-06-20_FR_L-MAMPAEY.pdf


http://www.grip.org/sites/grip.org/files/NOTES_ANALYSE/2016/NA_2016-06-15_FR_G-BERGHEZAN.pdf


http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/Feeding-monster-April2016.pdf


http://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Comment-Four-Proposals-june-2016.pdf




https://www.frstrategie.org/publications/defense-et-industries/web/documents/2016/7-1.pdf


http://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Comment-KMW-Nexter-June-2016.pdf


http://www.frstrategie.org/publications/recherches-documents/web/documents/2016/201601.pdf

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FRS France

La politique de défense du Japon : nouveaux moyens,

nouvelles ambitions (in Défense & Industries n°6) 34




security)

Belgium Le Japon : nouvel exportateur d'armements - Attentes,

réalités et enjeux stratégiques 35




security)

Belgium Libye : armes, embargo et diplomatie à l’ombre de la

menace islamiste 36

Centre d’Etudes Stratégiques de la Marine -

CESM France MARINES D’AILLEURS 37

International Institute for Strategic Studies

- IISS United Kingdom

MILITARY CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT: NEW

TECHNOLOGIES, LIMITED BUDGETS AND HARD CHOICES

(15TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT/THE IISS SHANGRI-LA

DIALOGUE)

39


FRS France

Rapprochement Nexter Systems - KMW : la promesse d’une

aube ? (in Défenses&Industries, n°6, février 2016) 40

Transnational Institute - TNI The Netherlands Tax evasion and weapon production - Mailbox arms

companies in the Netherlands 41

Institut Français des Relations

Internationales - IFRI (French Institute of

International Relations)

France The challenges of maintaining nuclear cultures - US and UK

perspectives 42

Oxford Research Group United Kingdom The UK’s Nuclear Future (Labour’s Defence Policy Review) 43

Stockholm International Peace Research

Institute - SIPRI Sweden TRENDS IN WORLD NUCLEAR FORCES, 2016 44




security)

Belgium Ventes d’armes françaises à l’Égypte :les risques d’une

coopération opportuniste 45

Central and Eastern Europe


Russian International Affairs Council - RIAC Russia 100 POSTULATES ON RUSSIA–INDIA RELATIONS 48

North America


Rand Corporation United States A Review of Selected International Aircraft Spares Pooling

Programs. Lessons Learned for F-35 Spares Pooling 52

Center for Strategic and Budgetary

Assessments - CSBA United States

ADVANCING BEYOND THE BEACH - AMPHIBIOUS

OPERATIONS IN AN ERA OF PRECISION WEAPONS 53



Advancing Beyond the Beach: Amphibious Operations in an

Era of Precision Weapons (Presentation) 54



ANALYSIS OF THE FY 2017 DEFENSE BUDGET AND TRENDS

IN DEFENSE SPENDING 55

Rand Corporation United States

Managing U.S. Air Force Aircraft Operating and Support

Costs: Insights from Recent RAND Analysis and

Opportunities for the Future

56

Center for a New American Security - CNAS United States RED ALERT: The Growing Threat to U.S. Aircraft Carriers 57

Center for a New American Security - CNAS United States THE $100 BILLION QUESTION: The Cost Case for Naval

Uninhabited Combat Aircraft 58

Stimson Center United States The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs - From the First to the Second

Nuclear Age 59

East-West Center United States The Morning After: Australia, Japan, and the Submarine Deal

that Wasn’t 60



http://www.grip.org/sites/grip.org/files/NOTES_ANALYSE/2016/NA_2016-03-25_FR_B-HELLENDORFF.pdf


http://www.grip.org/sites/grip.org/files/NOTES_ANALYSE/2016/NA_2016-02-10_FR_F-SANTOPINTO.pdf


http://cesm.marine.defense.gouv.fr/images/EM/EM10_Marines-ailleurs.pdf

https://www.iiss.org/-/media/documents/events/shangri-la%20dialogue/sld16/speeches%202016/special%20sessions/sld16%20special%20session%202%20final.pdf






https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/issue-brief-arms-trade-web.pdf


http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp55brooks-mckane.pdf


http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/ORG%20Submission%20Part%20II%20-%20Labour%20Defence%20Policy%20Review%202016.pdf

https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/FS%201606%20WNF_Embargo_Final%20A.pdf

http://www.grip.org/sites/grip.org/files/NOTES_ANALYSE/2016/NA_2016-02-25_FR_F-GUILLON.pdf


http://russiancouncil.ru/common/upload/WP-India-Russia-29-Eng.pdf

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR900/RR999/RAND_RR999.pdf


http://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA6216-AmphibiousWarfare_FINAL_LoRes.pdf


http://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Amphibious_Warfare_Report-slides.pdf


http://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA6196-2017-Budget-Analysis_PRINT.pdf





http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNASReport-CarrierThreat-160217.pdf

http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/CNAS%20Report_UAV%20Lifecycle%20Costs_FINAL_080715.pdf


https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Lure_and_Pitfalls_of_MIRVs.pdf


http://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/apb346.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=35662


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Center for a New American Security - CNAS United States The Promise of Unmanned Systems in the Asia-Pacific 61



Winning the Salvo Competition - Rebalancing America's Air

and Missile Defenses (slide presentation) 62



Winning the Salvo Competition: Rebalancing America's Air

and Missile Defenses (full report) 63

Center for Complex Operations - CCO United States Women Warriors - Why the Robotics Revolution Changes

the Combat Equation 65

East Asia


National Institute for Defense Studies -

NIDS Japan NIDS China Security Report 2016 68

Central and South Asia


Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses -

IDSA India Indian Defence Industry: An Agenda for Making in India 70

http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_Sayler-promise-of-unmanned-systems.pdf

http://csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Winning-Salvo-Competition.pptx


http://csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/CSBA6173-PGM2-Report-WEB_2.pdf


http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_6-1/Women%20Warriors.pdf


http://www.nids.go.jp/publication/chinareport/pdf/china_report_EN_web_2016_A01.pdf

http://www.idsa.in/system/files/book/book_indian-defence-industry_0.pdf

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List of think tanks mentioned in this document

Armament Industry European Research Group - ARES

British American Security Information Council - BASIC

Center for a New American Security - CNAS

Center for Complex Operations - CCO

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments - CSBA

Centre d’Etudes Stratégiques de la Marine - CESM

East-West Center

Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique - FRS

Groupe de Recherche et d'Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité - GRIP ( Group for Research and Information on Peace and

security)

Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques - IRIS (French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs)

Institut Français des Relations Internationales - IFRI (French Institute of International Relations)

Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses - IDSA

International Institute for Strategic Studies - IISS

Istituto Affari Internazionali - IAI

National Institute for Defense Studies - NIDS

Oxford Research Group

Rand Corporation

Russian International Affairs Council - RIAC

Stimson Center

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute - SIPRI

Transnational Institute - TNI

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WESTERN EUROPE

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European Union Armament Industry European Research Group - ARES

Cover page

A "game changer" ? The EU's preparatory action

on defence research

Fiott, Daniel; Bellais, Renaud

2016/04

Abstract

This policy paper does not look specifically at the conclusions of the GoP

report and nor does it outline potential technology areas that the

Preparatory Action could invest in. Rather, it looks at the potential

development of the Preparatory Action as it relates to EU‐level

governance of defence research. The paper therefore looks at the likely

relationships or approaches that may emerge and it draws out some of

the challenges that could emerge when rolling out of the Preparatory

Action. Accordingly, this policy paper is structured in relation to four

major questions: 1) is the Preparatory Action ambitious enough when

compared to Europe’s historical trends in defence R&T and R&D and the

changing nature of defence innovation?; 2) how should Europeans think

about defence innovation under the Preparatory Action?; 3) how will

national defence research efforts relate to the Preparatory Action?; and

4) what are the likely political and strategic consequences of a move

towards a Europeanisation of defence research?

Keywords

defence systems Military of the European Union

Companies and organizations mentioned in document

European Defence Agency European Union European Space Agency

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Countries and locations mentioned in document

China France Germany Italy Spain Sweden United Kingdom

Policy brief

14 pages

English

Table of contents

THE PREPARATORY ACTION: TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE? | COMPREHENSIVE MANAGEMENT OF DEFENCE INNOVATION |

THE NEED TO AVOID CONFLICTING TECHNOLOGY ROADMAPS | THE IMPLICATIONS OF EU DEFENCE RESEARCH |

CONCLUSION



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Cover page

A European drone by 2025? The View from Italy

on EUROMALE

Marrone, Alessandro

2016/05

Abstract

In May 2015, Italy agreed with France and Germany the launch of a

definition study for a weaponized MALE RPAS which would able to carry

out both ISR missions, target acquisition and engagement. Spain joined

the group in December 2015. This cooperative effort is in principle open

to other participants, following agreement of common operational

requirements, and Poland could be an interesting new partner

considering its planned investments on RPAS. The Italian Ministry of

Defence will bear 23 per cent of the EUROMALE costs, namely 13.8

million euro, similar to French and Spanish MoDs, and supported the

decision to task OCCAR to manage a 2year long contract for the

EUROMALE definition study. The contract is supposed to be assigned to

a consortium of European industries including Airbus, Dassault and

Finmeccanica. However the industrial agreement is not yet entirely

defined. Such an approach to EUROMALE reflects the main features of

the “Italian way” of participating in European cooperative programmes.

(...)

Keywords

Eurofighter dual-use technologies drones EUROMALE NH90

Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS)


Airbus Finmeccanica Thales Italian Air Force Fincantieri


France Germany Italy Poland Spain United Kingdom United States

Commentary/Opinion

5 pages

English

Table of contents

THE “ITALIAN WAY” | AND A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE



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Cover page

A European drone by 2025? The View from Spain

on EUROMALE

Arteaga, Felix

2016/05

Abstract

In February 2015, after several years of overlapping initiatives and

projects, the Spanish Ministry of Defence approved the RPAS Master

Plan1. It identifies the required capabilities in the field of Remotely

Piloted Aircraft Systems for the period 2015‐2026. The Master Plan was

designed to assess the RPAS state‐of‐the‐art and identify the needs of

the Armed Forces at short (2016), medium (2020) and long (2026) term.

According to the assessment, Spain had no RPAS system in the category

of over 600 kg (Class III). The Master Plan therefore advised immediate

procurement of RPAS as a temporary bridging solution. It also

recommended entry into a European research and development

program that could deliver an advanced RPAS around 2017‐2020.

Accordingly, Spain evaluated and acquired the on‐the‐shelf American

MQ‐9 Reaper as an interim solution to cover the lack of RPAS Class III

systems and began to consider pros and cons of entering into a

European co‐operative program.(...)

Keywords

Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) MQ-9 Reaper EUROMALE


European Defence Agency European Union


France Germany Italy Spain

Commentary/Opinion

5 pages

English

Table of contents

THE MASTER PLAN | GREAT EXPECTATIONS



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France Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique - FRS

Cover page

A Perspective on Russia - Proliferated Drones.pdf

Facon, Isabelle; Kotani, Tetsuo

2016/05

Abstract

In recent years, Russia has grown increasingly aware of the importance of

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in modern warfare as well as

increasingly interested in expanding its own use of drones. In addition to

military missions (surveillance, reconnaissance, communications,

intelligence, electronic warfare, strike, etc.), drones will be used for

domestic security purposes (e.g., border patrol, coastal surveillance) and

for civilian purposes (e.g., search and rescue, prevention of major forest

fires, Arctic exploration). Russia seriously lags behind the West in drone 1

technologies. In theory, given its proven ability to develop complex air

and space systems, Russia should be able to master the competencies

required to design and produce UAVs. However, shortcomings in key

technologies associated with drone development (optics, electronic

systems for light aircraft, composite materials, etc.) will need to be

overcome. As an additional hurdle, the Russian armed forces have

experienced difficulties in formulating requirements and specifications

for Russian drone manufacturers.(...)

Keywords

RQ-170 Sentinel robotics Embedded systems Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

(UAV) Bird-Eye 400 I-View Mk 150 Searcher Mk II Takhion Eleron


Israel Aerospace Industries Oboronprom Gorizont United Instrument

Manufacturing Corporation Vega Radio Engineering Corporation Adcom

Systems Russian MoD State Unmanned Aviation Center (GTsBA)

Lavochkin Tupolev


Georgia Iran Israel Japan Russia Soviet Union Syria Ukraine

United Arab Emirates United States Latakia

Issue brief

13 pages

English

Table of contents

Technology | Strategic Implications | Constraints | Conclusion | Response: Japan Perspective


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Cover page


AUTONOMY

Arteaga, Felix; Jermalavicius, Tomas; Marrone, Alessandro;

Maulny, Jean-Pierre; Terlikowski, Marcin

2016/11

Abstract

(...) The European Union’s action in terms of regulation and support of

the EDTIB depends on the role that States want to entrust the European

Union with, in order to develop the European Defence Technological and

Industrial Base Strategy (EDTIB). Defence companies are economic

players. But their sphere of activity relates to a mission: ensuring the

security that is exercised by sovereign nations and by the European

Union. Beyond the texts, the principle of subsidiarity and its application

to the defence industry depends on the States’ answer to these two

questions: (1) What will the European Union’s role be in the defence of

citizens and its ambition on the international scene? (2) What is the

content of the 'strategic autonomy' notion and what could the

consequences of this notion be on the EDTIB? To answer these

questions, we first sought to compare how States perceive the notion of

strategic autonomy. We did so through a common template with three

issues: What is the meaning of strategic autonomy in each State? What

are the consequences of that approach on the armaments acquisition

policy, as well as the R&D policy? Lastly, how does each State envision

what could be an “appropriate level of strategic autonomy” at European

level?(...)

Keywords

Future Combat Aircraft Systems (FCAS) EUROMALE European Defence

Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) France's White Paper on

Defence and National Security research and development military

strategy White Paper 2016 on German security policy and the future of the

Bundeswehr defense industries defense spendings UK Strategic

Defence and Security Review (SDSR) British army


Fincantieri Finmeccanica Leonardo Polish Armament Group (PGZ)

MBDA European Union European Defence Agency (EDA) Organisation

Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'Armement (OCCAR) German army

French army Italian Army Swedish army Polish army Spanish army

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Thales


China Estonia Finland France Germany Iraq Italy Japan Latvia

Lithuania Poland Russia Scotland Spain Sweden Ukraine United

Kingdom United States Baltic States

Report/Study

43 pages

English

Table of contents

1. CASE STUDIES | 1.1 The Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania | Political vision for the national level autonomy |



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Consequences on Defence procurement policy and defence R&T/R&D | Vision for appropriate level of European

strategic autonomy | 1.2 France | Political vision for the national level autonomy | Consequences on defence

procurement policy and defence R&T / R&D policy | Vision for the appropriate level of European strategic autonomy |

1. 3. Germany | Political vision for the national level autonomy | Consequences on defence procurement, R&T and

R&D policy | Vision for the appropriate level of European strategic autonomy | 1.4 Italy | Political vision for the

national level autonomy | Consequences on defence procurement, R&T and R&D policy | 1.5 Poland | Political vision

for the national level autonomy | Vision for the appropriate level of European strategic autonomy | 1.6 Spain |

Political vision for the national level autonomy | Consequences on defence procurement policy and defence R&T/R&D

poli cy | Vision on the appropriate level of european strategic autonomy | 1.7 SWEDEN | Political vision for the

national level autonomy | Consequences for defence procurement policy and defence R&T / R&D policy | Vision on

the appropriate level of european strategic autonomy | 1.8 UK | Political vision for the national level of autonomy |

Consequences on defence procurement, R&T and R&D policy | Vision on the appropriate level of european strategic

autonomy | 2. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STRATEGIC AUTONOMY NOTION IN EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER

STATES | 2.1 Few countries have an industrial defence strategy | 2.2 The term “strategic autonomy” is not commonly

used, but many countries use similar terminologies | 2.3 The notion of strategic autonomy (or similar) does not have

the same content/substance from one country to another | 2.4 The notion of strategic autonomy does not have the

same scope from one country to another | 2.5 The notion of strategic autonomy is linked to maintaining the

competitiveness of national DTIB | 2.6 Just a few member states develop a vision for European strategic autonomy |

3. WHICH APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF STRATEGIC AUTONOMY FOR THE EU?

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Belgium Groupe de Recherche et d'Information sur la Paix et la

Sécurité - GRIP ( Group for Research and Information on Peace and security)

Cover page

Au cœur du système Lockheed Martin

Contribution au débat sur le remplacement du F-

16 en Belgique

Wasinski, Christophe

2016/12

Abstract

De quel système politique, économique et militaire émane le F-35 Joint

Strike Fighter de Lockheed Martin ? Les forces armées belges ont lancé

en juin 2014 une procédure destinée à remplacer les F-16. Le F-35 est

l’un des cinq appareils qui fait l’objet d’une évaluation de la part de la

composante aérienne à cette fin. Nombreux sont par ailleurs ceux qui

pensent que l’avion a les faveurs des pilotes belges. Dans cette note,

nous cherchons à contextualiser le débat belge qui entoure ce

remplacement en explorant d’une manière critique les rouages sociaux

sous-jacents à ce projet technique.

Keywords

F-35 F-16 aviation militaire C-5A Cheyenne Norman Augustine F-

104 lobbying pork barrel politics


Lockheed Martin Armée belge armée américaine


États-Unis Allemagne Arabie saoudite Australie Belgique Canada

Chili Corée du Nord Danemark France Grande-Bretagne Hongrie

Inde Italie Japon Jordanie Maroc Norvège Pakistan Pays-Bas

Pologne Roumanie Russie Turquie

Analysis

16 pages

French

Table of contents

Les lobbies de la puissance aérienne | La rupture des années 1970 : l’impossible maîtrise des coûts et l’inquiétante

interdépendance | La résilience du mésosytème dans l’après-Guerre froide | Pork barrel à l’international | Conclusion




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Cover page

Banques et exportations d’armes

Saint-Rapt (de), Jean-Annet

2016/03

Abstract

Actives dans le financement des exportations d’armes, les banques

européennes ont connu des évolutions réglementaires importantes. Cela

les a conduites à réaliser désormais des contrôles plus approfondis,

notamment en ce qui concerne les opérations liées à l’armement. Ces

contrôles pourraient d’ailleurs se révéler utiles pour compléter le travail

d’information des autorités publiques dans les procédures d’octroi de

licences d’exportations.

Keywords

commerce des armes banques industries de l'armement Patriot Act

blanchiment terrorism Know Your Customer (KYC)


Barclays HSBC Amnesty International European Network Against Arms

Trade Union Européenne Organisation de Coopération et de

Développement Économiques (OCDE) BNPP Fortis Crédit Agricole Dexia

Deutsche Bank Société Générale ING


Égypte États-Unis Belgique Brésil Corée du Sud France Inde

Indonésie Luxembourg Mozambique Qatar

Analysis

20 pages

French

Graphics samples from document

Table of contents

Introduction | 1. La banque européenne aujourd’hui : rentabilité, contrôle et réputation | 1.1. Une organisation

tournée vers la rentabilité | Une organisation matricielle | Rentabilité des clients | 1.2. Les banques sous contrôle ? |

Deux ruptures réglementaires importantes | Les départements de risques, pivots de la conformité | Politiques

sectorielles « défense » | 1.3. Avoir confiance dans son banquier | Maintenir sa réputation | La pression sociétale | 2.

La banque et les exportations d’armes | 2.1. Le paiement | Description du circuit de paiement international | Le

contrôle des flux monétaires en dollars américains (USD) | 2.2. Le financement bancaire | Processus classique d’octroi

d’un crédit | Particularité du financement d’exportations d’armes | 3. Réalité des contrôles bancaires pouvant

améliorer l’analyse des exportations d’armes | Procédures KYC | Connaître le bénéficiaire économique | Une source

pour les analyses d’exportations ? | 3.1. Échanges d’informations | De l’évasion fiscale à l’échange d’informations |

Perspectives pour les analyses d’exportations | 3.2. Listes d’exclusion | Dissuasion et protection | Un label pour les

analyses d’exportations ? | Conclusion

List of tables and figures in the appendix section


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Cover page

Contrôle des exportations d’armes : Zoom sur les

Balkans (Serbie, Bosnie et Monténégro)

Géhin, Léo

2016/03

Abstract

Les projets d’intégration de l’Union européenne ont conduit plusieurs

pays de l’Europe du Sud-Est à entreprendre une révision de leur

législation sur les transferts d’armes afin de se conformer à la Position

commune sur les exportations d’armes de l’UE. Détenteurs d’une

industrie de la défense centrée sur la production d’ALPC et de leurs

munitions, la Serbie, le Monténégro et la Bosnie forment un groupe

important de pays exportateurs d’armes qui ont su pénétrer des marchés

délaissés par les producteurs européens plus importants. Si leurs

législations sont en phase d’harmonisation avec la Position commune,

une fraction non négligeable de leurs exportations d’armes continue de

se diriger vers des pays sous embargos de l’UE.

Keywords

Slobodan Tesic industrie de la défense commerce des armes


A.D. Consultants Aerocom Yugoimport Atlantic Technology ATD

Beltechexport Charso Ltd CPR Impex Interjug Libyan Islamic Fighting

Group Montenegro Defence Industry Prvi Partizan Taos Industries

TEMEX European Union Interpol OTAN


Europe Égypte États-Unis Afghanistan Algérie Arabie saoudite

Arménie Belgique Biélorussie Birmanie Bosnie - Herzégovine

Burkina Faso Chypre Croatie Iraq Jordanie Libye Macédoine

République de Bosnie-Herzégovine Rwanda Sierra Leone Tchad

Ukraine Yougoslavie

Analysis

16 pages

French

Table of contents

Introduction | 1. Analyse des systèmes nationaux de contrôle des exportations | 1.1 Les catégories d'armes couvertes

| 1.2 Les mécanismes opérationnels de contrôle des exportations | a) Les institutions en charge de l'octroi des licences

| b) Les licences des transferts d'armements




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Cover page

Cybersécurité : ambitions israéliennes et

positionnement des acteurs défense (in Défense

& Industries n°6)

Martin, Kevin

2016/02

Abstract

Depuis 2013, les autorités israéliennes publient (...) des données relatives

au marché de la cybersécurité. Cette communication fait ainsi partie

intégrante de la stratégie plus globale visant à renforcer l’image du pays

sur la scène internationale en tant que nation leader dans le domaine.

Ainsi, à l’occasion de la conférence d’Herzliya en 2014, l’Israel National

Cyber Bureau (INCB) précisait, selon ses estimations, que l’État hébreu se

positionnait au deuxième rang mondial des exportateurs de solutions de

cybersécurité, derrière les États-Unis.

Keywords

Israel Electric Corporation cyberwarfare Filière israelienne de

cybersécurité cybersécurité


Airbus Defence & Space BAE Systems BreakingPoint Systems Cisco

Elbit Systems Finmeccanica IAI IBM Intel Ixia KUD NICE Systems

Northrop Grumman Rafael Raytheon Safran ST Engineering Thales

TSG Ness Technologies UKTI


Article

4 pages

French

Table of contents

Renforcement des compétences nationales et création d’un cluster de cybersécurité | Acteurs défense et cybersécurité

: quelles stratégies de pénétration ? | Rafael et IAI : l’option du « partenariat » | Elbit Systems : l’option de la | « filiale

dédiée »




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France Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques -

IRIS (French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs)

Cover page

Defence Budgets and Cooperation in Europe:

Trends and Investments

Bergstrand, Bengt-Göran; Chagnaud, Marie-Louise; France

(de), Olivier; Dokos, Thanos; Fattibene, Daniele; Granholm,

Niklas

2016/07

Abstract

(...) The aim of this second DBC study is two-fold. Firstly, it looks more

closely at European defence spending, with a view to ascertaining how

much is devoted to investment and procurement across 31 European

countries (hereinafter DBC31) in 2016. To do so, it seeks to identify

national specificities. Secondly, it analyses relevant developments in

defence cooperation across Europe at bilateral, regional and mini-lateral

levels, occurred between October 2015 and March 2016. In doing so, it

refers to the analytical framework developed by the first DBC study

published in January 2016. In conclusion, this study draws on data

collected by the Consortium to outline current trends in European

defence spending and cooperation, with a view to underlining

opportunities for defence collaboration in Europe.

Keywords

F-35 aerospace industries defense industries EUROMALE Solar Wind

Magnetosphere Ionosphere Link Explorer (SMILE) Enhanced RPAS

Automation (ERA) Eurofighter MiG-29 UH-60 defense spendings in

Europe Bulgaria-Poland relations Tandem-X satellites missiles


Airbus Eurosam Finmeccanica Rheinmetall PGZ (Polska Grupa

Zbrojeniowa / Polish Armament Group) Sikorsky Thales Saab Airbus

Defence and Space ONERA ESG Elektroniksystem North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) WZL (Wojskowe Zaklady Lotnicze / Polish Military

Aviation Work) European Defence Agency (EDA) MBDA PDL Space


Algeria Austria Belgium Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic

Denmark Egypt Estonia Finland France Germany Greece

Hungary Ireland Italia Italy Kuwait Latvia Libya Lithuania

Luxembourg Malta Mauritania Morocco Netherlands Norway

Poland Portugal Romania Russia Saudi Arabia Schweiz Serbia

Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Tunisia Turkey

United Kingdom United States Central and Eastern Europe

Report/Study

38 pages

English

Table of contents

1. Defence Budgets, edited by Olivier de France | 1.1 How to measure investments in defence equipment | 1.2 Central

and Eastern Europe | 1.3 Nordic Region | 1.4 South-Eastern Europe | 1.5 Western Europe | 2. Defence Cooperation,

edited by Alessandro Marrone and Daniele Fattibene | 2.1 Defence cooperation at bilateral level | 2.1.1 Working with

neighbours | 2.1.2 Bilateral cooperation with non-neighbouring countries | 2.2 Mini-lateral cooperation slightly

increases | 2.3 Multilateral cooperation: growing but still lagging behind | 2.4 Germany: decreased but still significant



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TEST DGA 2016-1 23

role in terms of defence cooperation | 2.5 United States: still significant role in terms of defence cooperation | 2.6

Reducing dependency on Russian equipment


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Italy Istituto Affari Internazionali - IAI

Cover page

DEFENCE BUDGETS AND INDUSTRY: TABLES

AND GRAPHS

Badde, Francesco Jonas; Bitondo, Francesca; Sartori, Paola

2016/07

Abstract

-

Keywords

research and development defense spendings aerospace industries

defense industries


Finmeccanica AgustaWestland Selex ES Fincantieri Avio Aero

Elettronica Iveco Defence Vehicles OTO Melara Thales Alenia Space

Italia Telespazio WASS Alenia Aermacchi Rheinmetall Italia Secondo

Mona Aerea Vitrociset Simmel Difesa Thalès Boeing Airbus

Lockheed Martin General Dynamics BAE Systems United Technologies

Corporation (UTC) Northrop Raytheon MBDA Eurofighter


Afghanistan Cyprus Djibouti Germany Israel Lebanon Libya Mali

Malta Niger Palestinian Territories Qatar Spain Sudan United

Kingdom United States

Presentation

22 pages

English


Table of contents

1. GENERAL OVERVIEW | 2. AEROSPACE, SECURITY AND DEFENCE INDUSTRY | 3. ITALIAN OVERVIEW



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TEST DGA 2016-1 25


Cover page

DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN BELGIUM AND

THE NETHERLANDS

France (de), Olivier; Mampaey, Luc; Zandee, Dick

2016/10

Abstract

The following piece endeavours to uncover the drivers of defence and

industrial policy in Belgium and the Netherlands. It brings out

convergences, divergences, as well as the main features of the defence

industry across the two countries. In doing so it brings to bear upon both

countries a similar set of parameters, which will be used to compare

defence industrial policy across other key European countries.

Keywords

defense industries defense spendings economy of Belgium economy of

The Netherlands arms trade Triple Helix research and development


AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) MECAR

HERSTAL GROUP SONACA GIAT INDUSTRIES Agoria Belgian Security &

Defence Industry Group (BSDI) Flemish Aerospace Group (FLAG)

Entreprises Wallonnes de l’Aéronautique (EWA) Brussels Aeronautical

Group (BAG) Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding (DSNS) Fokker

Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO)

Netherland's National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR) Maritime Research

Institute of the Netherlands (MARIN) Stork Thales


Belgium France Germany Israel Libya Netherlands Saudi Arabia

United Kingdom United States

Report/Study

15 pages

English

Table of contents

I. MAPPING DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS | 1.1. Belgium: Looking for a defence

industrial policy | 1.1.1. The consequences of regionalisation | 1.1.2. A regional policy driven by exports | 1.1.3.

Offsets as the only “national” defence industrial policy | 1.2. The Netherlands | 1.2.1. Dutch Defence Industrial

Strategy | 1.2.2. Implementing of the Dutch Defence Industrial Strategy | 1.2.3. Industrial participation as part of the

strategy | II. DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL STAKEHOLDERS | 2.1. Belgium: stakeholders with diverging interests | 2.1.1.

Ownership | 2.1.2. The regional public companies: A Belgian exception | 2.1.3. Weak sectoral organization, strong

trade-unions | 2.2. The Netherlands: Stakeholders working closely together 2.2.1. Government: Two Ministries | 2.2.2.

Industry: A focus on dual-use | 2.2.3. Industrial associations: Lobbying for all and per sector | 2.2.4. Knowledge

institutes: Crucial for technological innovation | 2.2.5. The Triple Helix and the influence of stakeholders



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Cover page

DÉMANTÈLEMENT DES ARMES ET BÂTIMENTS

NUCLÉAIRES - Terrifiant héritage pour les

générations futures

Mampaey, Luc

2016/06

Abstract

Dans le cadre des accords de désarmement, ou en raison de leur

obsolescence, un grand nombre d’armes et de bâtiments nucléaires – en

particulier des sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire – doivent être

démantelés. Tous les pays font face au même défi : les contraintes

sécuritaires et environnementales de l’entreposage pour une très longue

période de matières fissiles et de matériaux radioactifs en grandes

quantités. La filière économique nouvelle que pourraient générer ces

activités, à Brest par exemple, ne peut faire oublier la charge terrifiante

que quelques décennies de « croyance » dans la dissuasion nucléaire

font peser sur les générations futures.

Keywords

armes nucléaires Trident non-prolifération plutonium déchets

radioactifs Sous-marins nucléaires lanceurs d’engins (SNLE)

démantèlement des armes nucléaires uranium hautement enrichi Y-12

National Security Complex Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE)



États-Unis Allemagne Belgique France Norvège Royaume-Uni

Russie Mer de Kara

Analysis

12 pages

French

Table of contents

Introduction | La destruction des ogives | Des enjeux de stockage, non-prolifération et vérification | Un coût

dérisoire au regard | de celui de la modernisation des arsenaux | Le démantèlement des bâtiments à propulsion

nucléaire | Écocide soviétique en mer de Kara | Le rattrapage russe | Aucun pays n’a « la » solution | Retour à Brest

| Un lourd héritage, pour Brest et pour l’humanité




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Cover page

Dépenses militaires et importations d’armes

dans cinq États ouest-africains

Berghezan, Georges

2016/06

Abstract

La présente note est consacrée à l’évolution des dépenses militaires et

aux achats d’armes de la dernière décennie de cinq pays francophones

d’Afrique de l’Ouest : le Burkina Faso, la Côte d’Ivoire, le Mali, le Niger et

le Sénégal. Aucun de ces pays ne peut être considéré comme une grande

puissance, mais la plupart d’entre eux ont récemment choisi la voie d’un

net renforcement de leur potentiel militaire, apparemment en riposte aux

menaces terroristes et sécessionnistes qui secouent la sous-région. Sans

trancher sur le bien-fondé d’une réponse militaire à ce type de menaces,

la note tente de fournir un éclairage sur la quantité de ressources

affectées à la défense et la sécurité, en les comparant dans la durée et au

regard des dépenses affectées aux besoins sociaux des populations de

ces pays.

Keywords

commerce des armes corruption indice du développement humain (IDH)

trafic d'armes dépenses militaires en Afrique de l'Ouest



États-Unis Afrique du Sud Angola Arabie saoudite Belgique Brésil

Bulgarie Burkina Faso Chine Espagne France Ghana Indonésie

Iran Italie Libye Mali Maroc Niger Nigeria Pologne Roumanie

Russie Sénégal Sierra Leone Turquie Ukraine Afrique de l'Ouest

Analysis

16 pages

French


Table of contents

Introduction | Une décennie de dépenses militaires | a) Des chiffres à examiner avec précaution | a) Le Burkina Faso

| b) La Côte d’Ivoire | c) Le Mali | d) Le Niger | e) Le Sénégal | Dépenses militaires versus budgets sociaux | Des

importations d’armes modestes | a) Le Burkina Faso | b) La Côte d’Ivoire | c) Le Mali | d) Le Niger | e) Le Sénégal |

f) Les principaux fournisseurs | Conclusion




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United Kingdom British American Security Information Council - BASIC

Cover page

Feeding the ‘monster’ Escalating Capital Costs

for the Trident Successor Programme

Ritchie, Nick

2016/04

Abstract

In October 2015 Jon Thomson, Permanent Under Secretary at the

Ministry of Defence, described the Trident Successor programme as a

“monster” that kept him up at night, “the biggest project the Ministry of

Defence will ever take on” and “an incredibly complicated area in which

to try to estimate future costs.”(...) The Successor submarine project has

been plagued by delay and confusing, out-dated or overoptimistic cost

assessments, made worse by conflicting bases of reporting. This briefing

from Nick Ritchie pulls into one place the evolution of the main official

statements in relation to costs associated with the UK Trident renewal

project from 2006 to the present.

Keywords

PWR2 nuclear reactor PWR3 nuclear reactor UK Trident programme

Ballistic missile submarines British Armed Forces Vanguard-class

submarine deterrence theory


Babcock BAE Systems Rolls Royce Power Engineering Royal Navy

HMNB Clyde


United Kingdom United States

Report/Study

14 pages

English


Table of contents

History | Additional costs | Conventional protection forces | PWR3 nuclear reactor development | Vanguard

submarine life extension | Operating costs | Full programme cost | Cost inflation: Astute and Project D154



GULLIVERN


TEST DGA 2016-1 29


Cover page

FOUR PROPOSALS FOR A DEFENCE

PROCUREMENT PLAN FOR THE EUROPEAN

UNION

Maulny, Jean-Pierre

2016/06

Abstract

European defence and armament as it exists nowadays, was built under

the impetus of France and Germany. It was however only made possible

with the consent of the British, symbolised by the St Malo French‐British

summit in 1998. Since January 1, 2003, European defence can lead

military operations; it defines the resources necessary to these

operations – namely, the Headline Goals – and it has at its disposal a

body, the European Defence Agency, tasked with addressing capability

gaps that have been identified with the ultimate goal to launch European

cooperative armament programmes. Nevertheless, the latter function has

remained only theoretical for lack of agreement between the States to

initiate the cooperation programmes. It must be said that European

defence came into being in times of peace. The last sentence of the 2003

European Security Strategy stated, “Europe has never been so

prosperous, so secure nor so free”. Today, the situation is different...

Keywords

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)


European Union European Defence Agency (EDA)


France Germany Russia United States

Policy brief

6 pages

English




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TEST DGA 2016-1 30


Cover page

Inde : une Defence Procurement Policy 2016

dictée par le « Make in India » ? (Défense &

Industries n°6)

van den Ende, Patrick

2016/02

Abstract

En décembre 2015, Manohar Parrikar, ministre indien de la Défense, a

annoncé la publication, au cours du premier semestre 2016, d’une

nouvelle Defence Procurement Policy (DPP). Réforme attendue depuis la

prise de fonction du Premier ministre Narendra Modi, cette révision de la

DPP marquera le deuxième temps fort de son ambitieux programme «

Make in India » dans le domaine de la défense.(...)

Keywords

industrie de la défense Defence Procurement Policy Buy and Make

Make in India


AgustaWestland BAE Systems Bharat Dynamics Ltd Bharat Electronics

Ltd Finmeccanica Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers Ltd Goa

Shipyards Ltd Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd Hindustan Shipyards Ltd

Larsen & Toubro Mahindra & Mahindra Mishra Dhatu Nigam Ltd Naval

Magazon Dock Ltd Reliance Rheinmetall Tata Bharat Earth Movers

Ltd Defence Research and Development Organization


États-Unis France Inde Israel Pologne Singapour

Article

4 pages

French

Table of contents

DPP 2013 ou la volonté de promouvoir l’industrie nationale | DPP2016 : vers un renforcement du poids de l’industrie

privée ? | Une remise en question du monopole des groupes publics de défense qui s’annonce lente




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Cover page

Industrie de l’armement terrestre : quelques

fondamentaux (in Defense&Industries, n°7, Juin

2016)

Masson, Hélène

2016/06

Abstract

L’intensité opérationnelle caractérise le niveau d’engagement très élevé

des forces terrestres françaises sur les théâtres d’opérations extérieures

depuis 2011 (Harmattan, Serval, Barkhane, Sangaris, Chammal) et sur le

territoire national depuis 2015 (opération Sentinelle). Comme le met en

exergue le rapport d’information sur « les conséquences du rythme des

opérations extérieures sur le MCO des matériels »1, trois phénomènes

opérationnels se conjuguent avec pour conséquence l’usure prématurée

des équipements déployés ou leur destruction : la surintensité (liée aux

conditions climatiques et de terrain), la suractivité (utilisation des

matériels audelà de leur potentiel « normal ») et les dommages de

guerre (de plus en plus fréquents et graves). Dans un tel contexte, la

problématique du renouvellement du parc de véhicules militaires se pose

avec une nouvelle acuité.

Keywords

industries de défense véhicules blindés


BAE Systems General Dynamics Junghans Microtec CTA International

MAN SE Patria RUAG SantaBarbara Sistemas Steyr-Daimler -Puch

Thales Volvo Group Leonardo (ex Finmeccanica) Qinetiq General

Dynamics European Land Systems (GEDLS) Moog CNH Industrial

Rheinmetall Defence Nammo Nexter Systems Krauss-Ma?ei Wegmann

(KMW)


Allemagne Autriche Danemark Espagne Finlande France Italie

Norvège Royaume-Uni Russie Suède Suisse Ukraine

Article

3 pages

French

Table of contents

Intensité opérationnelle | Dynamique de la demande, dispersion de l’offre | Ouverture des marchés à la |

concurrence : le cas britannique | General Dynamics, désormais incontournable sur le marché européen | Marchés

export : prérequis | Mutations à venir




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Cover page

KRAUSS‐MAFFEI WEGMANN ‐ NEXTER : A Rapid

Integration as the Key for a Real Marriage

Linnenkamp, Hilmar; Maulny, Jean-Pierre

2016/06

Abstract

The merger between Nexter and Krauss‐Maffei‐Wegmann, announced in

2014 and finalized in 2015, is of particular importance, which the French

and the German, and generally all European countries, must be aware

of...

Keywords

defense industries


BAE Systems Leonardo Krauss-Maffei-Wegmann (KMW) Nexter Airbus


Commentary/Opinion

5 pages

English



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TEST DGA 2016-1 33


Cover page

La Corée du Nord spatiale

Gaillard-Sborowsky, Florence

2016/02

Abstract

Que peut-on dire des motivations qui animent Pyongyang en matière

spatiale afin de tenter de décrypter d'une part ses intentions et d'autre

part d'évaluer la réalité de son programme en regard de la filière

balistique ?(...)

Keywords

Kim Il Sung Kim Jong Il Kwangmyongsong-4 missiles balistiques

satellites armes nucléaires industrie spatiale


Bureau d'État du Développement Spatial


Égypte États-Unis Chine Corée du Nord Corée du Sud Cuba Inde

Iran Japon Libye Russie Soudan Ukraine Vietnam

Report/Study

32 pages

French


Table of contents

1 INTRODUCTION | 2 AUX ORIGINES, UN SCHÉMA CLASSIQUE DE CONVERSION MISSILE - LANCEUR | Des

programmes pour asseoir la politique/idéologie du « Juche » | Premiers développements 1960-1979 | 1979-1998 : la

montée en puissance des capacités nucléaires et balistiques | 3 LE TEMPS DU SPATIAL : RÉALITÉ OU DESSEIN

MANIPULATOIRE ? | Le spatial, objet de fierté nationale et base du développement scientifique et technologique |

Essai de missile ou lanceur spatial ? | A.- Chronologie des événements | B.- Analyse des tirs | Les sites de lancement

nord-coréen



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Cover page

La politique de défense du Japon : nouveaux

moyens, nouvelles ambitions (in Défense &

Industries n°6)

Niquet, Valérie

2016/02

Abstract

Derrière le concept de « pacifisme proactif » énoncé dans la Stratégie de

sécurité nationale, la première dans l’histoire du Japon d’après-guerre, il

s’agit pour Tokyo de répondre à deux défis majeurs qui sont la montée

en puissance militaire d’une Chine qui multiplie les provocations dans

l’environnement immédiat de l’archipel, et la nécessité d’assurer à long

terme l’engagement de l’allié américain aux côtés du Japon. Au-delà, les

textes fondamentaux de la défense japonaise soulignent la montée des

tensions dans l’ensemble de l’Asie, notamment sur mer, et le risque posé

par une Corée du Nord qui poursuit le développement de ses capacités

balistiques et nucléaires.(...)

Keywords

Shinzo Abe National Defense Program Guidelines JSDF capacity

building aid buki yushutsu sangen soku F35 Mutual defense

assistance act Soryu SNA Barracuda industrie de la défense


METI TKMS DCNS Mitsubishi Heavy Industry Kawasaki Shipbuilding

Corp


États-Unis Afghanistan Allemagne Australie Cambodge Chine

Corée du Nord Espagne France Grande-Bretagne Guinée Inde

Indonésie Iraq Italie Japon Malaisie Mongolie Thaïlande Viêtnam

Article

4 pages

French

Table of contents

Une extension du domaine d’action des forces d’autodéfense (JSDF) | Le socle d’une coopération accrue avec les

partenaires de Tokyo | Le « renforcement des capacités » (capacity building), un vecteur important de coopération |

Les nouvelles règles d’exportation de matériels et de technologies militaires | Un nouvel acteur sur le marché des

transferts d’armement ?




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Cover page

Le Japon : nouvel exportateur d'armements -

Attentes, réalités et enjeux stratégiques

Hellendorff, Bruno

2016/03

Abstract

Sous Shinzo Abe, le Japon se cherche une nouvelle « normalité » qui,

depuis 2014, implique la possibilité pour ses entreprises d’exporter des

armes. Le Japon se remilitarise-t-il ? Quels sont les enjeux de cette

évolution, alors que l’Asie du Nord-Est est en plein chamboulement

géopolitique ? Cette Note s’attache à détailler le contexte, les attentes et

les réalités de cette conjugaison entre exportations d’armes et

contributions à la paix que défend Tokyo aujourd’hui, pour illuminer

enfin les enjeux stratégiques qui en découlent.

Keywords

Shinzo Abe Tony Abbott les « trois principes » doctrine Yoshida guerre

froide F-35 politique étrangère Japon relations Etats-Unis Japon

industries de l'armement


BAE Systems Kawasaki Heavy Industries Lockheed Martin Mitsubishi

Heavy Industries Raytheon Northrop Grumman Mitsubishi Electric

Corporation (MELCO) Boeing NEC IHI Conseil de sécurité nationale

japonais


États-Unis Afghanistan Australie Belgique Brésil Cambodge Chine

Corée du Nord France Haïti Inde Indonésie Iraq Japon Malaisie

Mozambique Qatar Royaume-Uni Rwanda Soudan Thaïlande

Togo Viêtnam Yougoslavie

Analysis

24 pages

French

Table of contents

Introduction | 1. Stratégie et identité : un débat récurrent | 1.1 Guerre froide et « doctrine Yoshida » | 1.2 Les « Trois

Principes » | 2. L’ère des réformes | 2.1. Exceptions et « arrangements entre amis » | 2.2. Bases et moteurs des

nouvelles réformes | 3. Le « coup de tonnerre » de Shinzo Abe | 3.1. Un contexte toujours plus pressant | 3.2. Une «

contribution proactive à la paix » | 3.3. Les « trois principes », nouvelle mouture | 4. Le bénéficiaire : l’industrie de

défense japonaise | 4.1. Les acteurs de la BITD japonaise | 4.2. Contrats à attendre | Conclusion




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Cover page

Libye : armes, embargo et diplomatie à l’ombre

de la menace islamiste

Santopinto, Federico

2016/02

Abstract

Faut-il armer la Libye afin de faire face à la montée en puissance de

Daech, si ce pays parvenait à former un gouvernement d’unité nationale

? Cette question en soulève immanquablement une série d’autres.

Légales avant tout : quid des embargos onusien et européen auxquels la

Libye est soumise ? Politiques ensuite : qui devrait être armé, et sous

quelles conditions ? Militaires enfin : pourquoi encore des armes, alors

qu’elles sont déjà tellement répandues dans le pays ? Autant de

questions auxquelles cette Note tentera de répondre.

Keywords

Al-Qaeda Ansar al-Charia embargo sur les armes commerce des armes

transferts d’armement S-300


European Union United Nations Conseil de sécurité


Égypte Belgique Biélorussie France Jordanie Libye Qatar Russie

Soudan Turquie Ukraine

Analysis

12 pages

French

Table of contents

1. Les contraintes légales | 1.1 Un régime de dérogations évoluant avec la crise | 1.2 Un flux continu malgré

l’embargo | 2. Quelles armes pour un pays déjà surarmé ? | Conclusion




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France Centre d’Etudes Stratégiques de la Marine - CESM

Cover page

MARINES D’AILLEURS

Royer, Pierre; Pflimlin, Edouard; Facon, Isabelle; Saint-

Mézard, Isabelle; Pajon, Céline; Kourliandsky, Jean-Jacques et

alii

2016/06

Abstract

Il y a quelques mois, je vous invitais à saisir l’ampleur, le rôle et

l’importance du domaine maritime de la France, à partir de ses outre-

mer. Je vous propose de prolonger cette réflexion avec cet aperçu des «

marines d’ailleurs », celles justement que nous côtoyons dans ces eaux

proches ou lointaines.(...) En France, plus aucun acteur public ou privé ne

nie l’importance de la mer pour l’avenir de notre pays. « Maritimisation »

est devenu un mot d’usage courant, mais hélas trop souvent incompris,

mal compris ou mal défini. Et les scies des « ressources depuis la mer »,

de « l’émergence des puissances navales » en sont presque à provoquer

un rejet automatique tant elles ont été employées – à bon mais aussi à

mauvais escient. Il est alors utile de regarder « ailleurs » pour percevoir

une profonde évolution des puissances navales mondiales, tant dans leur

ordre de bataille que dans la construction d’une politique maritime

cohérente, se déclinant en stratégie, action diplomatique et militaire,

mise en œuvre de moyens dans le temps et la continuité. Qu’y-a-t-il

derrière cette notion de stratégie dans le domaine maritime ? (...)

Keywords

Relations Etats Unis-Japon forces navales sous-marins porte-avions

missiles systèmes de défense anti-missiles Sous-marins nucléaires

lanceurs d’engins (SNLE) Sous-marins nucléaires d’attaque (SNA)

destroyers piraterie hélicoptères corvettes zones économiques exclusives (ZEE)


Armée Chinoise Armée Américaine Armée Russe Forces d'Autodéfense

Japonaises Armée Australienne Armée Indienne BAE Systems Aegis

DCNS Armée Brésilienne Armée Turque Armée Iranienne Armée

Italienne Armée Espagnole


Égypte États-Unis Afghanistan Afrique du Sud Algérie Allemagne

Angola Arabie saoudite Argentine Australie Bénin Belgique

Birmanie Brésil Brunei Bulgarie Cameroun Cap - Vert Chili Chine

Chypre Colombie Congo Corée du Nord Corée du Sud Croatie

Cuba Danemark Djibouti Espagne Fidji Finlande France Ghana

Grèce Guinée Guinée équatoriale Haïti Inde Indonésie Iran Iraq

Irlande Israel Italie Japon Kenya Koweït Liban Libye Lituanie

Malaisie Maldives Malte Maroc Maurice Mexique Mozambique

Namibie Norvège Oman Pérou Pakistan Paraguay Pays-Bas

Philippines Pologne Portugal Qatar Roumanie Royaume-Uni

Russie Sénégal Salvador Sao Tomé et Principe Seychelles

Singapour Somalie Soudan Sri Lanka Suède Syrie Tunisie

Turquie Ukraine Venezuela Viêtnam Yémen Yougoslavie Iles

Report/Study

112 pages

French



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Paracels Iles Senkaku/Diaoyu Iles Spratleys golfe de Guinée Détroit

de Malacca Détroit de Bab-el-Mandeb Canal de Panama Canal de Suez

Détroit d'Ormuz Mer de Chine Méridionale Mer de Chine Orientale

frégates multimissions (FREMM) Méditerranée Panama

Table of contents

L’IMPERATOR | Les États-Unis : les premiers, pour quoi faire ? | DES ASPIRATiONS MONDIALES | Chine : vers une

ambition mondiale ? | Les ambitions navales de Vladimir Poutine | S’AFFIRMER RÉGIONALEMENT | La politique

maritime indienne : de nouvelles impulsions mais pour quels objectifs ? | La stratégie maritime du Japon à l’épreuve de

l’expansion chinoise | Brésil : une ambition maritime émergente | MARINES ÉMERGENTES | Naître ou renaître |

UNION EUROPÉENNE : SURSAUT OU DÉCLIN ? | L’Europe peine à maintenir sa puissance navale


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United Kingdom International Institute for Strategic Studies - IISS

Cover page


TECHNOLOGIES, LIMITED BUDGETS AND HARD

CHOICES (15TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT/THE

IISS SHANGRI-LA DIALOGUE)

Giegerich, Bastian; Lim, Perry; Gong, Xianfu; Errera, Philippe;

Hewson, Marillyn

2016/06

Abstract

5TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT / THE IISS SHANGRI-LA DIALOGUE

SPECIAL SESSION 2

MILITARY CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT: NEW TECHNOLOGIES, LIMITED

BUDGETS AND HARD CHOICES

SATURDAY 4 JUNE 2016

CHAIR: DR BASTIAN GIEGERICH, DIRECTOR OF DEFENCE AND MILITARY

ANALYSIS, IISS / MAJOR GENERAL PERRY LIM, CHIEF OF DEFENCE

FORCE, SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES, SINGAPORE / MAJOR GENERAL

(RETD) GONG XIANFU, VICE CHAIRMAN, CHINA INSTITUTE FOR

INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, CHINA / PHILIPPE ERRERA,

DIRECTOR-GENERAL, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND STRATEGY,

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, FRANCE / MARILLYN HEWSON, CHAIRMAN,

PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, LOCKHEED MARTIN

CORPORATION; MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL, IISS

Keywords

defense spendings defense industries weapons systems submarines

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) intelligence surveillance and

reconnaissance (ISR)


Lockheed Martin French Army MBDA DCNS Tata Advanced Systems

Chinese Army (People's Liberation Army - PLA) Singapore Army


Australia Belgium China Cyprus Djibouti France Germany India

Iraq Japan Libya Malaysia Mali Norway Poland Russia

Singapore South Korea Syria Ukraine United Kingdom United States

Vietnam northern Mali

Event report/transcript

pages

English





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Cover page

Rapprochement Nexter Systems - KMW : la

promesse d’une aube ? (in Défenses&Industries,

n°6, février 2016)

Winter, Gaëlle

2016/02

Abstract

Ce 15 décembre 2015, le rapprochement de deux acteurs majeurs du

secteur européen de l’armement terrestre a pris corps sous la forme

d’une société holding, provisoirement baptisée « Honosthor », et dont le

siège est implanté à Amsterdam.(...) Ce contexte nouveau amène à

s’interroger sur ce que l’opéra on de rapprochement KMW - Nexter

Systems apporte à la rela on franco-allemande, mais aussi sur les défis

qui attendent l’entreprise nouvellement créée pour inverser durablement

le schéma de rivalité et lui donner un vrai avantage compétitif.

Keywords

EUROMALE industries de défense Close-In Fire Support (CIFS) Main

Ground Combat System (MGCS) Bundesamt für Ausrüstung


Nexter Systems GIAT Industries Honosthor Institut franco-allemand de

recherches de Saint-Louis (ISL) IABG Rheinmetall Centre d’analyse

technicoopéra onnel de défense (CATOD) Krauss-Ma?ei Wegmann (KMW)


Allemagne France

Article

3 pages

French

Table of contents

Premiers enseignements pour le franco-allemand | Un sursaut franco-allemand | Le pari gagnant des méthodes de

dialogue « baroques » | Le pied de nez à l’argument de l’incompatibilité des approches industrielles française et

allemande | Inverser durablement le schéma de rivalité | Affirmer une nouvelle géographie symbolique | Gérer le

bicéphalisme | Développer un nouveau gisement d’innovation et de production | Renforcer les liens politiques




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The Netherlands Transnational Institute - TNI

Cover page

Tax evasion and weapon production - Mailbox

arms companies in the Netherlands

Broek, Martin

2016/05

Abstract

Who are these tax evading arms companies and what are their

strategies? In this report, Stop Wapenhandel and Transnational Institute

publish their findings resulting from a search through the Dutch

Chamber of Commerce. We found a large number of arms-producing

companies with shell companies established in the Netherlands. Most of

the production of these companies takes place in the major western

arms-producing countries; the United States, United Kingdom, France

and Germany. The arms companies turned out to have zero or minimal

personnel presence in the Netherlands. Their almost empty offices and

sometimes only having a mailbox allows them to legally pay as little tax

as possible...

Keywords

Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) F-35 arms trade defense

industries defense spendings


Lockheed Martin Boeing BAE Systems SGG Management Raytheon

Northrop Grumman Airbus United Technologies (UTC) Finmeccanica

L-3 Communications Loral Thales Pratt & Whitney Otis Sikorsky

Astrium General Dynamics


China Germany France India Israel Netherlands Pakistan Russia

South Korea United Kingdom United States Japan Sudan Egypt

Issue brief

45 pages

English

Table of contents

Introduction | Chapter 1: Short history of Dutch tax law | Chapter 2: Tax evasion in the Netherlands | Chapter 3: Top

10 defence industries and Dutch holdings | Chapter 4: Tax evasion by company | Chapter 5: Corruption and

misbehaviour | Chapter 6: The Dutch connection in the Malaysian airline disaster | Chapter 7: Panama Papers and the

arms trade | Conclusion | Annex – The use of Trusts



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France Institut Français des Relations Internationales - IFRI

(French Institute of International Relations)

Cover page

The challenges of maintaining nuclear cultures -

US and UK perspectives

Brooks, Linton; McKane, Tom

2016/01

Abstract

After the world entered the nuclear age, civilian and military

organizations have witnessed the slow emergence of nuclear cultures,

defined as the set of values and knowledge, shared among the national

security community, about the relative importance of nuclear weapons in

the country's defense posture, the distinctive features of nuclear

weapons in terms of security, safety and operational requirements, and

the workings of deterrence. Nuclear cultures have helped to ensure

some level of coherence in policymaking and, most importantly, to

maintain safe and effective determents. At a national level, however, each

nuclear culture is confronted with significant challenges, such as

generational change, decreasing levels of understand or attention

among the political and military leadership, insufficient funding or a

growing inability to meet manpower requirements in both the nuclear

weapoons complexes and the armed forces. This paper looks at the

United States and the United Kingdom's recent efforts to maintain their

nuclear culture, and at the key challenges these two countries face while

pursuing this aim.

Keywords

weapons systems nuclear energy Nuclear weapons UK Polaris

programme UK Trident programme


Rolls Royce Obama administration Russian Government UK

government


Afghanistan China Czech Republic France Kingdom of Great Britain

Northern Ireland Russia Scotland Ukraine United Kingdom United

States South China Sea

Report/Study

45 pages

English

Table of contents

Introduction | 1 U.S. Nuclear Culture in the 21st Century | 2 Nuclear Culture in the United Kingdom | 3 Information

for readers



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United Kingdom Oxford Research Group

Cover page

The UK’s Nuclear Future (Labour’s Defence

Policy Review)

Street, Tim

2016/04

Abstract

Oxford Research Group (ORG) submits the following additional evidence

to Labour’s Defence Policy Review in regard to the costs, risks and

options surrounding the renewal of the UK’s nuclear weapons

programme. Its first section aims to set out the available evidence on the

real costs of the Successor programme and associated capabilities. The

second section aims to set out how current and alternative proposals to

renew or reorient British nuclear capability square with the UK’s legal

obligations to disarmament, non-proliferation and creation of a nuclear

weapons free world (NWFW).

Keywords

Trident Successor Nuclear weapons British Armed Forces B-61 F-35


Rolls Royce BAE Systems


China France India Iran Iraq Libya North Korea Russia Scotland

Soviet Union United Kingdom

Policy brief

22 pages

English

Table of contents

Introduction | 1. What are the real costs of the UK being a nuclear weapon state? | 1.1 Future cost drivers for

Successor | i)Delays, complications or budget problems with the US nuclear modernisation programme | ii) Increased

design complexity owing to strategic and/or technological developments | iii) Competition for nuclear skills | iv)

Government management of Successor / relations with monopoly suppliers / shortages of other skilled personnel |

v)Scottish independence and relocating Trident | 1.2 The costs of the UK being a NWS with Trident | 1.2.1

Conventional forces and the ‘deterrence spectrum’ | 2. Options: Keep, Scrap or Downgrade Trident? | 2.1 The UK’s

dual international disarmament obligations | 2.2 Assessing alternatives: reducing the salience of nuclear weapons | A

‘Trident lite’ programme that adheres to current understandings of ‘minimum deterrence’. | A ‘reduced readiness’

downsized Trident replacement programme that scales back ‘minimum deterrence’ requirements. | A flexible, dual-use

‘hybrid’ submarine programme for conventional and nuclear missions that also ends CASD and scales down ‘minimum

deterrence’ requirements. | A nuclear-armed cruise missile capability aboard current or new attack submarines i.e.

Astute-class SSNs with less missiles and warheads. | F-35 Joint Strike Fighters armed with B-61-12 bombs | A non-

deployed strategic force | Sharing nuclear weapons with France | 2.3 How can the UK help create a NWFW? |

Conclusion



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Sweden Stockholm International Peace Research Institute - SIPRI

Cover page

TRENDS IN WORLD NUCLEAR FORCES, 2016

Kile, Shannon N.; Kristensen, Hans M.

2016/06

Abstract

As of January 2016, nine states—the United States, Russia, the United

Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and the Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea)—possessed

approximately 4120 operationally deployed nuclear weapons (see table

1). If all nuclear weapons are counted, these states together possessed a

total of approximately 15 395 nuclear weapons (see fi gure 1), compared

to approximately 15 850 in 2015. While the overall number of nuclear

weapons in the world continues to decline, none of the nuclear weapon-

possessing states are prepared to give up their nuclear arsenals for the

foreseeable future...

Keywords

Nuclear weapons nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN)

intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) sea-launched ballistic missiles

(SLBM) cruise missiles highly enriched uranium (HEU) deterrence



China Denmark France India Israel North Korea Pakistan Russia

South Korea United Kingdom United States

Bulletin/Note

8 pages

English


Table of contents

OVERVIEW | US NUCLEAR FORCES | RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FORCES | BRITISH NUCLEAR FORCES | FRENCH NUCLEAR

FORCES | CHINESE NUCLEAR FORCES | INDIAN NUCLEAR FORCES | PAKISTANI NUCLEAR FORCES | ISRAELI

NUCLEAR FORCES | NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR FORCES



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Cover page

Ventes d’armes françaises à l’Égypte :les risques

d’une coopération opportuniste

Guillon, Arthur

2016/02

Abstract

At two different periods in History, France has been acting with

opportunism and pragmatism on the Egyptian armament market. Since

2010, the situation seems to be favorable again as the amounts of the

orders and of the delivered equipment are steadily rising. However, these

arms transfers have occurred in a very turbulent period linked with a

growing political instability and insecurity since Mohamed Morsi’s

removal in the summer 2013. Therefore, the risks related to these arms

exports are many.

Keywords

Abdel Fattah Al-Sissi Anouar el-Sadate Gamal Abdel Nasser Henry

Kissinger Jimmy Carter commerce des armes industrie de la défense

Gowind Rafale FREMM Mica Scalp 2ASM Mistral Mirage


Renault Truck Sagem Thales DCNS Human Rights Watch Union

Européenne


Égypte États-Unis Arabie saoudite Belgique France Grande-Bretagne

Israel Libye Oman Qatar Royaume-Uni Russie Turquie Ukraine

Analysis

16 pages

French



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CENTRAL AND

EASTERN EUROPE

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Russia Russian International Affairs Council - RIAC

Cover page

100 POSTULATES ON RUSSIA–INDIA RELATIONS

Denisov, I. E.; Popadyuk, O. A.

2016/10

Abstract

By 2016, Russia found itself in a completely new foreign policy reality.

Both external and internal factors have brought the country into a

difficult economic situation, and negative trends in Russia’s relations with

the West have defined the task of qualitatively diversifying external ties.

The main focus of this re-orientation is on Russia’s strategic partners in

Asia, above all China. As Russia’s new Asian policy takes on greater

conceptual depth, new outlines of Russia’s interaction with Japan and the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries also take

shape. And it is only with regard to India that comparable foreign policy

steps have not been taken.(...) The Working Paper presents the results of

Russian and international discussions as assessments, suggestions, and

recommendations. We believe that these ideas may prompt experts and

decision-makers in Russia and India to open up a new discussion on the

prospects of relations between the two countries and the steps necessary

for their development.

Keywords

India-Russia relations foreign relations of India Narendra Modi Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Make in India Economy of India

pharmaceutical industry nuclear energy hydroelectricity oil and gas

defense industries defense spendings military aircraft missiles

helicopters submarines aerospace industries medias education

Fifth Generation Fighters Aircraft (FGFA) Multi-Role Transport Aircraft (MTA)

BrahMos missiles


Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) BRICS Gazprom RusHydro

Rosneft Power Machines Rosatom PhosAgro Acron Oil and Natural

Gas Corporation (ONGC) Alrosa Air India Atomstroyexport

Rosoboronexport Sukhoi MiG Promsvyazbank Gazprombank

Vnesheconombank Vibrant Gujarat Forum Rostourism India-Russia

Trade and Investment Forum Aurobindo Pharma Astra


Afghanistan Australia Bhutan Brazil Chile China France Germany

India Indonesia Iran Japan Kazakhstan Myanmar Nepal

Pakistan Russia Singapore South Africa South Korea Syria

Turkmenistan Ukraine United Arab Emirates United States Vietnam

Working Paper

41 pages

English

Table of contents

1.Russia and India on the International Arena | 1.1. Key Foreign Policy Results of the Narendra Modi Administration |

1.2. Russian and Indian Positions on Shaping a New Architecture of International Relations | 1.3. Interaction on

Regional Problems | 1.4. Searching for Common Approaches to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation | 2. Russia and India:

Toward a New Agenda in Economic and Trade Relations 2.1. The Economic Programme of the Modi Government | 2.2.

Problems and Prospects of Bilateral Trade and Economic Relations | 3. Russia–India Relations: Toward a New Agenda

in Military-Technical Cooperation | 3.1. Key Features of India’s Arms and Military Equipment Market | 3.2. State,


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Problems and Prospects of Russia–India Military-Technical Cooperation | 4. Problems of Russia-India Educational,

Scientific and Cultural Cooperation 4.1. Improving Russia’s Image in India: Opportunities and Problems | 4.2. Russian

and Indian Media: Toward a New Quality of Cooperation | 4.3. Education, Academic and Cultural Exchanges

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NORTH AMERICA

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United States Rand Corporation

Cover page

A Review of Selected International Aircraft

Spares Pooling Programs. Lessons Learned for F-

35 Spares Pooling

Lorell, Mark A.; Pita, James

2016/04

Abstract

Development of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter was shared by nine

countries, who agreed that F-35 sustainment assets would be managed

as a global pool. This report reviews other military aircraft spares pooling

programs to identify lessons learned.

Keywords

A400M C-130 C-17 Eurofighter Typhoon F-104 F-16 F-35 F-4K

F-4F Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) NH90 Rolls-Royce RB199 Rafale


Boeing C-17 Global Integrated Sustainment Partnership (GISP) North

Atlantic Treaty Organization USAF Air Mobility Command AgustaWestland

EADS Fokker Lockheed Martin Rolls-Royce Cassidian


Australia Belgium Canada Denmark East Germany Finland France

Germany Greece India Italy Libya Luxembourg Netherlands

New Zealand Norway Oman Portugal Qatar Saudi Arabia Spain

Sweden Turkey United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States West Germany

Report/Study

54 pages

English

Table of contents

1. Introduction and Overview | 2. NATO and European Experience with International Spares Pooling | Introduction

and Overview | Historical Barriers to European Combat Aircraft Spares Pooling | Ensuring Security of Supply |

Managing Configuration Control and Encouraging Innovators | Managing Partners Who Fail to Meet Their Financial

Obligations | Early NATO and Other European Support Cooperation and Spares Pooling Initiatives Up to 2000 | The

NATO European F-104G Collaborative Fighter Program | The Multinational F-16 Fighter Collaborative Acquisition

Program | The Tri-Nation Panavia Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) Tornado Fighter-Attack Program | A Special

Case: The NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Program | More Recent European Initiatives | Recent NATO and

European Union Broad Initiatives | The Eurofighter Typhoon | The NH90 Medium Helicopter | 3.The C-17 Global

Integrated Sustainment Partnership | Overview of the C-17 GISP | Configuration Management and Promoting

Innovation | Security of Supply: Prioritization and Allocation of Scarce Resources | Financial Shirking | 4. Conclusions




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United States Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments - CSBA

Cover page


OPERATIONS IN AN ERA OF PRECISION

WEAPONS

Clark, Bryan; Sloman, Jesse

2016/11

Abstract

(...) Amphibious assaults have always been a competition between

attackers at sea and defenders ashore. This competition passes through

phases as each new generation of weapons is countered by new

methods to get troops ashore. The amphibious warfare competition is

now entering a new phase because surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and

anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) have achieved ranges and lethality that

enable them to threaten ships and supporting aircraft 200 nm or more

away. This could allow a defender to use a relatively small number of

defenses to protect long areas of coastline and significantly constrain the

attacker’s options for an amphibious assault.(...)

Keywords

aircraft carriers amphibious combat vehicle (ACV) Amphibious Readiness

Group (ARG) anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) anti-ship cruise missile

(ASCM) electronic warfare Indirect Fires Protection Capability (IFPC)

helicopters F-35 MV-22 Osprey unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)

deterrence Expeditionary Advanced Bases (EAB)


United States Navy Chinese Army (People's Liberation Army - PLA) Iranian

Army


Afghanistan China Iran Iraq Israel Japan Lebanon Oman

Philippines Russia Soviet Union Taiwan United Arab Emirates United

States Yemen

Report/Study

70 pages

English


Table of contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | A New Strategic Approach | New Operational Concepts for Amphibious Forces |

Implications for Capabilities and Processes | INTRODUCTION | The Next Phase of Amphibious Warfare | A NEW

STRATEGIC APPROACH | Increasing Challenges to Access | Shifting to a Denial and Punishment Approach to

Deterrence | Implications of the Environment for Amphibious Forces | NEW AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE CONCEPTS |

Expeditionary Advanced Bases | Raids to Assure Access | Cross-Domain Fires | Surface Warfare (SUW) and Strike |

Blockade | IMPLICATIONS FOR POSTURE, FORCE STRUCTURE, AND CAPABILITIES | Imperatives for Amphibious

Forces | Capability Implications | CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS





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Cover page

Advancing Beyond the Beach: Amphibious

Operations in an Era of Precision Weapons

(Presentation)

Clark, Bryan; Sloman, Jesse

2016/11

Abstract

-

Keywords

F-35 aircraft carriers amphibious combat vehicle (ACV) anti-ship cruise

missile (ASCM) Indirect Fires Protection Capability (IFPC) helicopters

deterrence MV-22 Osprey Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC)

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) counter-ISR systems hypervelocity

projectiles (HVP) Expeditionary Advanced Bases (EAB)



Presentation

33 pages

English


Table of contents

Study methodology | Contested areas make “rollback” challenging | New deterrence approaches needed | Iranian

ASCMs can threaten entire Gulf | Islands threaten air & surface across SCS | New platforms designed to increase

reach | Surface connectors vulnerable or slow | Fires need same reach as troops | EABs can support a range of

applications | Defend EABs by increasing req’d salvo size | New air defenses increase defensive capacity | Counter-

ISR systems grow number of targets | EABs supported organically or by host nation | Cross-domain fires create

barrier to enemy | Blockade key to protracted conflict | Amphibious raids to defeat threats to access | Amphibious

forces can support SUW | New amphibious posture to deny and punish | Lighter vehicles can increase range &

firepower | Connectors optimized for ocean travel | Missiles increase MAGTF’s long-range fires | Missiles can

support distributed ops | Increase amphibious ship armament | Rebalance amphibious loadouts to aviation | Four-

ship ARG increases capacity | Four-ship ARG increases fires | STOVL fighter mission inventory will increase | New

readiness cycle will enable more presence | Amphibious fleet should expand




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Cover page

ANALYSIS OF THE FY 2017 DEFENSE BUDGET

AND TRENDS IN DEFENSE SPENDING

Blakeley, Katherine

2016/10

Abstract

This report discusses the FY 2017 DoD budget request, beginning with

an overview of the topline budget request, the Budget Control Act caps,

and the OCO budget. It then goes into more detail within the

procurement; research, development, test and evaluation; operation and

maintenance; military personnel; military construction and family

housing; and revolving and management fund appropriations titles.

Finally, it covers defense-related funding outside of the DoD budget, as

well as historically informed analytic perspectives on the defense budget.

Unless otherwise noted, all dollars cited are FY 2017 constant dollars,

deflated using the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Chained

GDP deflation factors.

Keywords



Report/Study

96 pages

English


Table of contents

THE FY 2017 DEFENSE BUDGET | The Base Budget and the BCA Caps | Overseas Contingency Operations Funding |

Procurement | RDT&E | Operation and Maintenance | Personnel | Military Construction and Family Housing |

Revolving and Management Funds | Defense-Related Funding outside of the DoD Budget | HISTORICAL

PERSPECTIVES | CONCLUSIONS




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United States Rand Corporation

Cover page

Managing U.S. Air Force Aircraft Operating and

Support Costs: Insights from Recent RAND

Analysis and Opportunities for the Future

Boito, Michael; Light, Thomas; Mills, Patrick; Baldwin, Laura

H.

2016/04

Abstract

Air Force aircraft operating and support (O&S) costs A grew at an

average rate of 6.5 percent per year between fiscal years (FYs) 1996 and

2011 despite a reduction of over 1,000 aircraft in the Air Force fleet and

minimal increases in total flying activity.(...) Analysis conducted by RAND

Project AIR FORCE (PAF) during FY 2012 found that, based on the size,

fleet mix, and activity level of the Air Force and economy-wide inflation,

only a 0.8 percent rate of growth would have been expected. Thus, costs

grew 5.7 percent per year faster than can be accounted for by these

underlying factors.(...) To better understand the drivers of this cost

growth above inflation, we conducted detailed case study analyses of the

KC-135R/T and C-130H fleets, platforms selected by our research

sponsors to inform Air Force leaders about the root causes of the cost

growth experienced for these large and costly fleets, with a particular

focus on weapon system sustainment (WSS) costs

Keywords

C-130 F-16 F-35 KC-135 T-56 operating and support (O&S) costs

weapon systems


U.S. Air Force Boeing Lockheed Martin Air Force Life Cycle Management

Center


United States

Analysis

12 pages

English


Table of contents

KC-135R/T AND C-130H O&S COST GROWTH FINDINGS | Fuel | Unit Personnel | Weapon System Sustainment

Costs | Aircraft Depot Maintenance | Engine Depot Maintenance | Depot-Level Reparables | Modifications | Other

Operating and Support Costs | OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE | OPERATING AND SUPPORT COSTS | Reducing Fuel

Costs | Reducing Unit Personnel Costs | Reducing Weapon System Sustainment Costs | Increased Senior Leader

Attention to Understanding and Managing Costs | Development of an Air Force Enterprise Sustainment Strategy |

Sustainment Business Case Analyses for Legacy Fleets | ONGOING AIR FORCE INITIATIVES TO UNDERSTAND AND

CONTROL | OPERATING AND SUPPORT COSTS | SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS





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United States Center for a New American Security - CNAS

Cover page

RED ALERT: The Growing Threat to U.S. Aircraft

Carriers

Sayler, Kelley

2016/02

Abstract

While the U.S. Navy has long enjoyed freedom of action throughout the

world’s oceans, the days of its unchallenged primacy may be coming to a

close. In recent years, a number of countries, including China, Russia, and

Iran, have accelerated investments in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)

capabilities such as advanced air defense systems, anti-ship cruise and

ballistic missiles, submarines, and aircraft carriers. These capabilities are

likely to proliferate in the coming years, placing greater constraints on

U.S. carrier operations than ever before.(...)

Keywords

air defense systems Anti-ship ballistic missile Cruise missile Aircraft

carrier


A2/AD systems Aegis United States Navy


China Guam Iran Japan Philippines Russia Taiwan United States

Arabian Sea Bay of Bengal South China sea Spratley Islands

Report/Study

16 pages

English


Table of contents

Introduction | Short-Range Threats | Medium-Range Threats | Long-Range Threats | U.S. Countermeasures




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Cover page

THE $100 BILLION QUESTION: The Cost Case for

Naval Uninhabited Combat Aircraft

Burg, Daniel; Scharre, Paul

2016/08

Abstract

The Navy is already beginning to examine options to replace the F/A-

18E/F Super Hornet, which will retire in the mid-2030s. The replacement

of the F/A-18E/F with a future naval aircraft (FNA) represents a major

opportunity to shape the Navy’s future carrier air wing to respond to

emerging challenges but must take into account budget constraints. This

analysis examines the potential cost differences between a notional

human-inhabited FNA and an uninhabited FNA.

Keywords

F-35 F/A-18 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) aircraft carriers

research and development military aircraft


Unites States Army


Case study

36 pages

English


Table of contents

INTRODUCTION | WHAT’S DIFFERENT FOR UNINHABITED AIRCRAFT? | AIRCRAFT LIFE-CYCLE COSTS | HUMAN-

INHABITED FNA | UNINHABITED FNA – CONSERVATIVE CASE | UNINHABITED FNA – MODERATE CASE |

UNINHABITED FNA – AGGRESSIVE CASE | TOTAL ESTIMATED SAVINGS | CONCLUSIONS



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United States Stimson Center

Cover page

The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs - From the First to

the Second Nuclear Age

Krepon, Michael; Wheeler, Travis; Rittenhouse Green,

Brendan; Arbatov, Alexey; Lewis, Jeffrey G.; Basrur, Rajesh

2016/05

Abstract

This monograph begins with expert analyses of the internal and external

factors that led the United States and the Soviet Union to affix multiple

warheads atop their longest-range missiles. Then three essays assess

whether and how China, India, and Pakistan might embrace multiple

independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). As with previous

Stimson publications, we expect that The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs will

be read carefully by government officials, serving and retired military

officers, senior and rising strategic analysts, and students interested in

how the second nuclear age will play out in India, Pakistan, and China.

Keywords

Anti-ballistic missile Ballistic missiles Nuclear weapons missile defense

systems directed energy weapons deterrence theory multiple

independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) hard-target kill (HTK)

Nuclear proliferation Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (START) Shaheen-II

Shaheen-I R-36 (SS-9) K-15 B-1 B-2 B-52 F-15 F-16 K-4 SU-

30 Tu-160 Tu-22M3 Tu-95 Jimmy Carter James Schlesinger Henry

Kissinger Deng Xiaoping weapons systems intercontinental ballistic

missiles (ICBM)



Afghanistan Bangladesh China France Germany India Iran Japan

North Korea Pakistan Russia Saudi Arabia Singapore Soviet Union

Sri Lanka Taiwan United Kingdom United States Vietnam West

Germany Yugoslavia

Report/Study

204 pages

English

Table of contents

Introduction | The Geopolitical Origins of US Hard-Target-Kill Counterforce Capabilities and MIRVs | The Impact of

MIRVs and Counterforce Targeting on the US-Soviet Strategic Relationship | China’s Belated Embrace of MIRVs |

India’s Slow and Unstoppable Move to MIRV | Pakistan, MIRVs, and Counterforce Targeting | Summing Up and

Looking Ahead



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United States East-West Center

Cover page

The Morning After: Australia, Japan, and the

Submarine Deal that Wasn’t

Bisley, Nick; Envall, H. P. D.

2016/06

Abstract

Barely had the visitng Japanese submarine, JS Hakuryu, departed Sydney

Harbour on 26 April than Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull

announced to the media that Australia’s future submarines would be

built by the French contractor, DCNS Group. A week prior to Turnbull’s

announcement, the news that Japan had finished last in the tender

process began to leak from the Cabinet’s National Security Commi ee.

Japan’s Defense Minister Gen Nakatani expressed “immense

disappointment” at the decision and said that he would be seeking an

explanation...

Keywords

Submarines Tony Abbott


DCNS Australian Submarine Corporation (ASC)


Australia China Japan United States

Bulletin/Note

2 pages

English



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Cover page

The Promise of Unmanned Systems in the Asia-

Pacific

Sayler, Kelley

2016/05

Abstract

Unmanned systems are rapidly proliferating throughout the world with

significant implications for international security and strategic stability.

Today, more than 90 countries and non-state actors operate unmanned

aerial vehicles (UAVs) – a rapidly rising number. In Asia, the proliferation

of these systems is particularly advanced, with approximately 15

countries operating UAVs. Some, including South Korea, China, and

India, additionally employ other types of unmanned systems, such as

sentry robots or unmanned ground vehicles.

(...) This regional proliferation occurs against the backdrop of China’s

aggressive program of military modernization as well as its acquisition of

increasingly sophisticated anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities

(e.g., advanced air defense systems, antiship cruise and ballistic missiles,

and submarines) designed to force China’s competitors to operate at

greater ranges, further from its ever-expanding shores.

Keywords

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) intelligence surveillance and

reconnaissance (ISR) Global Hawk Triton anti-access/area denial

(A2/AD) weapon systems ballistic missiles aircraft carriers


United States Army


Australia China Guam India Indonesia Japan Korea Malaysia

New Zealand North Korea Pakistan Philippines Singapore South

Korea Sri Lanka Taiwan Thailand United States Vietnam Asia-

Pacific region

Analysis

6 pages

English



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Cover page

Winning the Salvo Competition - Rebalancing

America's Air and Missile Defenses (slide

presentation)

Gunziger, Mark; Clark, Bryan

2016/05

Abstract

• Emerging salvo competition – First report: Precision strike – This report:

Air and missile defense

• Operational concepts to counter PGM salvos

• Enabling capabilities and technologies

• Barriers to change

• Summary of recommendations

Keywords

anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons high energy lasers Theater High-Altitude

Area Defense (THAAD) kinetic defenses radars missile defense systems

cruise missiles ballistic missiles hypervelocity projectiles Unmanned

Aerial Vehicles (UAV) Control Communications Computers Intelligence

Surveillance Reconnaissance (C4ISR) microwave weapons military

strategy Tomahawk Patriot


Aegis


China Germany Guam Iraq Singapore United States Vietnam

Presentation

47 pages

English





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Cover page

Winning the Salvo Competition: Rebalancing

America's Air and Missile Defenses (full report)

Gunziger, Mark; Clark, Bryan

2016/06

Abstract

This report proposes operational concepts and capabilities that could

improve our nation’s ability to counter guided weapon salvos that

threaten its future ability to project power. As with a previous CSBA

assessment on DoD’s portfolio of PGMs, the report uses a “salvo

competition” framework to assess promising operational concepts and

capabilities for air and missile defense. This term refers to the dynamic

between militaries that have PGMs and capabilities to counter one

another’s precision strikes. In a salvo competition, both combatants seek

to gain advantages by improving their capabilities to attack with

precision and defend against its opponent’s strikes.

Keywords

Patriot anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) land-attack cruise missiles

(LACM) high energy lasers missile defense systems weapon systems

submarines sensors Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program

(SEWIP) Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) microwave weapons

military strategy vertical launching system (VLS) hypervelocity projectiles

electromagnetic railguns (EMRG) precision-guided munitions (PGM)

Ballistic missiles Cruise missiles intelligence surveillance and

reconnaissance (ISR)


Aegis United States Army Chinese Army (People's Liberation Army)

Iranian Army


China Germany Guam India Iran Japan North Korea Philippines

Poland Romania Russia Singapore Spain Taiwan Turkey United

States

Report/Study

102 pages

English


Table of contents

INTRODUCTION | Emerging Precision Strike Complexes | Summary | OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS FOR COUNTERING

ENEMY SALVOS | Reducing the Density and Effectiveness of Enemy Salvos | Increasing the Capacity of U.SAir and

Missile Defenses | ENABLING CAPABILITIES AND TECHNOLOGIES | Kinetic Defenses | Mature and Maturing

Technologies for Non-Kinetic Salvo Defenses | Battle Management: A Critical Enabler | CASE STUDIES | Case Study 1:

Alternative Defensive AAW Capabilities Mix | Case Study 2: Increasing the Density of Base Defenses | Summary |

BARRIERS TO CHANGE | Old Assumptions for Defending Theater Bases | A Bias for Long-Range Missile Interceptors |



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A Strategic Bias Toward Ballistic Missile Defense | Unclear Responsibilities for Salvo Defense | Insufficient Resources |

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS | APPENDIX 1 CHINA’S CRUISE MISSILES | APPENDIX 2 CHINA’S BALLISTIC

MISSILES | APPENDIX 3 IRAN’S CRUISE MISSILES | APPENDIX 4 IRAN’S BALLISTIC MISSILES | APPENDIX 5 GROSS

WEAPON SYSTEM UNIT COSTS FOR INTERCEPTORS IN PRODUCTION FOR THE U .S MILITARY


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United States Center for Complex Operations - CCO

Cover page

Women Warriors - Why the Robotics Revolution

Changes the Combat Equation

Letendre, Linell A.

2016/03

Abstract

To understand how robotics will change the equation of women in

combat, this article first examines the current law and policy regarding

women in combat positions, taking a close look at how the services are

approaching the current Department of Defense (DOD) guidance to

establish gender-neutral standards for all occupational specialties. While

present policy and direction favors opening all combat career fields

across genders, full integration is still more notional ideas than reality. To

understand why, this article examines the arguments surrounding

women in combat, both for and against. Next, the article highlights how

robotics technology in development today will change the future

battlefield by augmenting the physical capabilities of soldiers and

lightening the loads carried by combat troops. Finally, this article

assesses how robotic advancements will not only counter the naysayers

of women in combat, but should also compel senior leaders to integrate

women into combat roles faster than currently planned. In sum, diverse

combat teams will improve U.S. future combat effectiveness in a robotic

and autonomous systems fight.

Keywords

autonomous systems Unmanned Ground Vehicle Military robot robotics

technology Women in the military exoskeleton Human Load Carrier

Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit Marine Austere Patrolling System

Legged Squad Support System Squad X


Lockheed Martin United States Army Department of Defense MIT

Israeli Defense Forces Center for Military Readiness Defense Advanced

Research Projects Agency


Israel United States Vietnam

Analysis

14 pages

English

Table of contents

Women in Combat: Current Status of Law and Policy | Women in Combat: Arguments For and Against | Revolution in

Robotics: A Changing Battlefield | Impact of Robotics Revolution on Women in Combat Debate | A Question of

When…Not If



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EAST ASIA

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Japan National Institute for Defense Studies - NIDS

Cover page

NIDS China Security Report 2016

2016/03

Abstract

The NIDS China Security Report is widely distributed in Japan and abroad

to provide analysis conducted by NIDS researchers on China's military

affairs and security from a mid- to long-term perspective.

Keywords

United States Navy Nuclear weapons Military of China stealth

technology Intercontinental ballistic missile C-130 CH-4 J-10 J-15

J-20 PLAAF aircraft carrier


Chinese Communist Party


South China Sea Strait of Malacca Taiwan Strait Okinawa island Sea

of Japan Indian Ocean Bashi Channel East China Sea Gulf of Aden

Hainan Island Java Sea Johnson South Reef Afghanistan Australia

China Guam India Iraq Israel Japan Libya Macau Malaysia

Paracel Islands Philippines Russia Somalia Soviet Union Spratly

Islands Sri Lanka Taiwan Ukraine United States Vietnam Yemen

Report/Study

89 pages

English


Table of contents

Chapter 1: Strengthening Operational Capabilities in Open Seas - The PLAN | 1 China's Changing Naval Strategy | 2.

Increasingly Active Naval Operations over a Wider Area | 3 Future Development of the PLAN | Chapter 2: Revising Its

Strategic Posture and Expanding Capability - The PLAAF | 1. PLAAF Strategy: From Territorial Air Defense to Integrated

Aerospace | Capabilities and Simultaneous Offense and Defense | 2 Modernization of Air Force Equipment | 3

Looking to the Chinese Force of the Future | The Gaoxin project | Chapter 3: Expanding and Strengthening Its Missile

Force - The PLASAF | 1. Nuclear Force Aiming at Assured Second-Strike Capacity | 2 Development of Conventional

Missiles | 3 The Future of the PLASAF | Development of Hypersonic Glide Vehicules | Chapter 4: Enhancement of the

PLA’s Joint Operational Capabilities | 1. Aiming to win Informational Local Wars | 2. Enhancing Capabilities for

System-versus-System Operations | 3. The Direction of Reforms of Command and Force Structures | Conclusions



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CENTRAL AND

SOUTH ASIA

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India Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses - IDSA

Cover page

Indian Defence Industry: An Agenda for Making

in India

Kumar Behera, Laxman

2016/06

Abstract

The key question (...) is whether Make in India will enable India to attain

its long cherished goal of 70 per cent self-reliance in defence

procurement. This book examines this question. In doing so, it examines

not only Make in India as it evolves, but also the key constituents of

defence industry and the policies surrounding Indian defence

production, relying extensively on hard evidence.

Keywords

Indian Army missile defense systems defense industries Make in India

weapon systems research and development


Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL) Bharat Electronics (BEL) Bharat Dynamics

(BDL) Mishra Dhatu Nigam (MIDHANI) Goa Shipyard (GSL) Garden

Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE) Mazagon Dock (MDL)

Hindustan Shipyard (HSL) BEML (formerly Bharat Earth Movers Ltd) Tata

Motors NOVA Integrated System Anjani Technoplast Kirloskar

Pneumatic Micron Instruments Dassault Aviation Israel Aerospace

Industries (IAI) BAE Systems Raytheon Lockheed Martin


Canada China Ecuador France Germany India Israel Italy Japan

Malaysia Mauritius Netherlands Pakistan Poland Russia

Slovakia South Africa South Korea Soviet Union Sweden Switzerland

Thailand Turkey United Kingdom United States

Report/Study

222 pages

English


Table of contents

1. Indian Defence Industry: The Journey to Make in India | Defence Industrialisation Phases | Can the Indian Defence

Industry Make in India? | 2. Ordnance Factories | Origin and Growth | Management | Employees, Production, Sales

and Accounting | R&D and Technology Absorption | Execution of Orders | Pricing of OFB Products | Quality of

Products | Exports | Capacity Utilisation and Impact of Modernisation | Poor Inventory Management | Outsourcing

and Vendor Development | Corporatisation | Challenges from the Private Sector | Conclusion | 3. Defence Public

Sector Undertakings An Overview | From Nomination to Competition Defence Procurement: Share of DPSUs Indirect



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APPENDICES

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TABLES, FIGURES AND BOXES

ADVANCING BEYOND THE BEACH - AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN AN ERA OF PRECISION WEAPONS 53

FIGURE 1: STUDY METHODOLOGY

FIGURE 2: POTENTIAL THREAT ENVIRONMENT AROUND QESHM ISLAND

FIGURE 3: POTENTIAL THREAT ENVIRONMENT AROUND FIERY CROSS

FIGURE 4: F-35B LIGHTNING II

FIGURE 5: MV-22B OSPREY

FIGURE 6: LANDING CRAFT (UTILITY)

FIGURE 7: LANDING CRAFT (AIR CUSHIONED)

FIGURE 8: AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIP (LHA/D)

FIGURE 9: AMPHIBIOUS LANDING DOCK (LPD)

FIGURE 10: ILLUSTRATIVE EAB CONCEPT

FIGURE 11: VISUAL AND EO/IR DECOY

FIGURE 12: ULTRA-LIGHT CAMOUFLAGE SYSTEM

FIGURE 13: ARMY IFPC INCREMENT 2-I

FIGURE 14: M777 155MM HOWITZER

FIGURE 15: ILLUSTRATIVE EAB DEFENSIVE CAPACITY

FIGURE 16: DAILY SUSTAINMENT NEEDED FOR AN EAB, COMPARED TO AN ILLUSTRATIVE HOST NATION

FIGURE 17: AMPHIBIOUS RAID IN SUPPORT OF SEA CONTROL

FIGURE 18: HIMARS LAUNCHER

FIGURE 19: EABS SUPPORTING ANTI-SHIP AND ANTI-AIR OPERATIONS

FIGURE 20: AMPHIBIOUS FORCES CONDUCTING SURFACE WARFARE

FIGURE 21: AMPHIBIOUS FORCES SUPPORTING A BLOCKADE

FIGURE 22: PROPOSED AMPHIBIOUS FORCE POSTURE

FIGURE 23: RANGE OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCE CONNECTORS AND WEAPONS

FIGURE 24: AIR COMBAT ELEMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH NEW ARG CONFIGURATIONS

FIGURE 25: STORAGE AVAILABLE IN DIFFERENT ARG CONFIGURATIONS

FIGURE 26: AMPHIBIOUS FORCE READINESS CYCLES

FIGURE 27: SMALL-DECK AMPHIBIOUS SHIP CONSTRUCTION PLAN

ANALYSIS OF THE FY 2017 DEFENSE BUDGET AND TRENDS IN DEFENSE SPENDING 55

Figure 1: FY 2017 DoD Budget Request by Service

Figure 2: FY 2017 DoD Total Budget Request by Appropriations Title

Figure 3: FYDP Discretionary Base Budget Plans by Administration (FY 1978–FY 2017)

Figure 4: BCA Caps and Base Budget Defense Spending Plans (FY 2012–FY 2017)

Figure 5: Amended BCA Caps and FY 2017 FYDP

Figure 6: FY 2017 OCO Request by Operation and Service

Figure 7: OCO Budget Authority by Appropriations Title (FY 2001–FY 2017)

Figure 8: Percentage of OCO Budget Authority by Appropriations Title (FY 2001–FY 2017)

Figure 9: Base and OCO Enacted and Projected Funding (FY 2000–FY 2021)

Figure 10: DoD Base Discretionary Budget by Appropriation Type (FY 2001–FY 2017)

Figure 11: Projected Procurement Spending by Budget Activity (FY 2017–FY 2021)

Figure 12: FY 2012 Planned Procurement Spending vs. Enacted Spending

Figure 13: FY 2017 Aviation Plan Aircraft Inventory (FY 2017–FY 2026)

Figure 14: Potential Air Force Fighter Aircraft Inventory Under One Retirement and Procurement Scenario

Figure 15: F-35 Funding and Procurement (FY 2012–FY 2021)

Figure 16: Apache and Blackhawk Helicopter Funding and Procurement (FY 2012–FY 2021)

Figure 17: FY 2017 Navy Shipbuilding Plan Fleet Inventory (FY 2017–FY 2046)

Figure 18: DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class Destroyer Funding and Procurement (FY 2012–FY 2021)

Figure 19: Virginia-class Attack Submarine Funding and Procurement (FY 2012–FY 2021)

Figure 20: Total Procurement BA by Service (FY 2011–FY 2017)

Figure 21: Discretionary Defense Budget Authority for Procurement by Service (FY 1948–FY 2017)

Figure 22: Percentage Discretionary Defense Budget Authority for Procurement by Service Total (FY 1948–FY 2017)

Figure 23: Service Procurement Spending in OCO and Base Budget (FY 2001–FY 2017)

Figure 24: Percentage of Service Procurement Spending as OCO and Base Budget (FY 2001–FY 2017)

Figure 25: Requested RDT&E Funding by Budget Activity (FY 2017)

Figure 26: Projected RDT&E Funding for System Development and Demonstration (BA 5) (FY 2017–FY 2021)

Figure 27: Projected RDT&E Funding by Service (BA2, 3, and 4) (FY 2017–FY 2021)

Figure 28: Total RDT&E Budget Authority by Service (FY 2001–FY 2017)



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Figure 29: Discretionary Defense Budget Authority for RDT&E by Service (FY 1948–FY 2017)

Figure 30: Percentage Discretionary Defense Budget Authority for RDT&E by Service (FY 1948–FY 2017)

Figure 31: Service RDT&E Funding in OCO and Base Budget (FY 2001–FY 2017)

Figure 32: FY 2012 Planned RDT&E Funding vs. Enacted Funding

Figure 33: Requested O&M Funding by Budget Activity and Service (FY 2017)

Figure 34: Requested O&M Funding by Appropriation Title for (FY 2017)

Figure 35: FY 2012 Planned O&M Funding vs. Enacted Funding

Figure 36: Total O&M Budget Authority by Service (FY 2001–FY 2017)

Figure 37: Discretionary Defense Budget Authority for O&M by Service (FY 1948–FY 2017)

Figure 38: Percentage Discretionary Defense Budget Authority for O&M by Service (FY 1948–FY 2017)

Figure 39: Service O&M Funding in OCO and Base Budget (FY 2001–FY 2017)

Figure 40: Percentage of Service O&M Funding as OCO and Base Budget (FY 2001–FY 2017)

Figure 41: Base Budget and Total O&M Funding per Active-Duty Servicemember by Service (FY 2001–FY 2017)

Figure 42: DoD O&M Funding per Servicemember Less Defense Health and Civilian Pay (FY 2001–FY 2017)

Figure 43: Total Mandatory and Discretionary Military Personnel Funding and Total Active-Duty End Strength (FY 2001–FY

2017)

Figure 44: Active-Duty End Strength and Military Personnel Costs (FY 2001–FY 2017)

Figure 45: Requested Military Personnel Funding by Appropriation Title and Service (FY 2017)

Figure 46: FY 2012 Planned Military Personnel Funding vs. Enacted Funding)

Figure 47: Total Military Personnel Budget Authority by Service (FY 2001–FY 2017)

Figure 48: Military Personnel Funding and Active-duty End Strength (FY 2001–FY 2017)

Figure 49: Discretionary Defense Budget Authority for Military Personnel by Service (FY 1948–FY 2017)

Figure 50: Percentage Discretionary Defense Budget Authority for Military Personnel by Service (FY 1948–FY 2017)

Figure 51: Military Personnel Funding per Servicemember (FY 2001–FY 2017)

Figure 52: MILCON and Family Housing Budget Authority by Service (FY 1948–FY 2017)

Figure 53: Budget Authority for Revolving and Management Funds (FY 1948–FY 2017)

Figure 54: DoD Base Budget Authority and War Funding (FY 1978–FY 2021) . 65

igure 55: Cycles in Defense Budget Authority (FY 1948–FY 2017)

Figure 56: Cycles in Defense and Procurement (FY 1948–FY 2017)

Figure 57: Defense Active-Duty End Strength and Budget Authority by Title (FY 1948–FY 2021)

Figure 58: Defense Budget Authority by Appropriations Title as a Share of the Total Budget (FY 1948–FY 2021)

Figure 59: Army, Navy, Air Force, and DoD-Wide Budget Authority (FY 1948–FY 2021)

Figure 60: Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP, Federal Spending, and Overall (FY 1940–FY 2017)

Table 1: Current Budget Control Act Caps for DoD and the FY 2017 PB

Table 2: Original and Amended BCA Caps for DoD

Table 3: Selected House Defense Authorization Bill Additional OCO-to-Base Funds for Procurement . 7

Table 4: OCO Funding by Region (FY 2014–FY 2017)

Table 5: FY 2017 Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund Focus Areas

Table 6: European Reassurance Initiative Funding (FY 2015–FY 2017)

Table 7: OCO Funding by Mission (FY 2014–FY 2017)

Table 8: Projected Procurement Budget Authority by Service (FY 2017–FY 2021)

Table 9: Projected RDT&E Discretionary Budget Authority by Service (FY 2017–FY 2021)

Table 10: Projected O&M Discretionary Budget Authority by Service (FY 2017–FY 2021)

Table 11: Projected MILPERS Discretionary Budget Authority by Service (FY 2017–FY 2021)

Table 12: Compound Annual Growth Rate of Defense Budget Authority During Defense Budget Buildup and Drawdown

Cycles

Banques et exportations d’armes 19

Schéma simplifié d’octroi d’un crédit

Tableau comparatif des politiques sectorielles de défense de sept établissements bancaires européens

Contrôle des exportations d’armes : Zoom sur les Balkans (Serbie, Bosnie et Monténégro) 20

c) La procédure d'évaluation d'une demande

d'octroi de licence d'exportation d'armements

1.3 Exemptions au régime de contrôle

1.4 Établissement de rapports

2. La structure des exportations d'armes (2009-2013)

2.1 Les industries de la défense : aperçu d'un secteur dynamique

2.2 Type de matériel et destinataires

3. Alignement relatif de la Serbie vis-à-vis des embargos européens

Conclusion

L'implication des acteurs étrangers dans les exportations d'armes en Bosnie-Herzégovine

Part de différentes catégories d'armements en pourcentage du montant total des licences d'exportation octroyées (2009-



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2013)

Le rachat de Montenegro Defence Industry

Valeur des licences d'exportations octroyées entre 2009 et 2013, en pourcentage du total par région

Principaux destinataires des licences d'exportation octroyées entre 2009 et 2013 (en valeur financière des licences

d'exportations)57

L’Irak et les armes de Bosnie

Defence Budgets and Cooperation in Europe: Trends and Investments 22

Table 1 Overview of defence cooperation developments occurred in Europe

Dépenses militaires et importations d’armes dans cinq États ouest-africains 27

Dépenses militaires 2006-2015 de cinq pays ouest-africains

Dépenses militaires par habitant des cinq pays étudiés et des deux principales puissances africaines

Comparaison des dépenses publiques, en % du PIB

Principaux fournisseurs d’armement des cinq pays étudiés (en % du point de vue des importateurs)

Indian Defence Industry: An Agenda for Making in India 70

Table 1.1: Industrial Production and Population in UK and India, 1945

Figure 1.1: Share of Defence Expenditure in GDP, 1950-2016

Figure 1.2: Share of R&D in Defence Expenditure (%)

Table 1.3: AoNs Approved, 2010-15

Table 1.4: Top 5 Arms Suppliers to India

Table 1.5: FMS Agreements with India

Table 1.6: Year-wise ILs Pending for Approval

Table 1.7: Select High-value Projects for Indian Defence Industry

Table 2.1: Product Range of Ordnance Factories

Table 2.2: Employee Strength of OFs

Table 2.3: Values of Production and Sales of OFs

Table 2.4: Indenter-wise Supplies of OFB, 2013-14 (Provisional)

Table 2.5: Status of Indigenisation of Items under Technology Transfer

Table 2.6: OFB’s Vendor Base

Table 2.7: OFB’s Import Dependency

Table 2.8: OFB’s R&D Expenditure

Table 2.9: OFB’s Futuristic R&D Projects

Table 2.10: Products Developed though OFB’s In-house R&D

Table 2.11: Delay in Execution of Orders by OFB

Table 2.12: Overheads as Percentage of Cost of Production

Table 2.13: Overhead Cost as Percentage of Cost of Production of Select OFs

Table 2.14: Export Performance of OFs

Table 2.15: OFB’s Capacity Utilisation, Standard Man and Machine Hours

Table 2.16: Outsourcing by OFB

Table 3.1: DPSUs at a Glance, 2014-15

Table 3.2: Tenders Lost by BEL to Competition, 2009-2013

Table 3.3: Defence Procurement: Share of DPSUs

Figure 3.1: Import Share of Parts, Components and Raw Materials Consumed in HAL and MDL

Table 3.4: Foreign Exchange Utilisation by DPSUs

Table 3.5: Outsourcing of DPSUs

Table 3.6: Number of Patents/Copyright held by DPSUs/OFs (as in March 2012)

Table 3.7: Patent Scorecard of Major Global Defence Companies

Table 3.8: R&D Expenditure by DPSUs, 2014-15

Figure 3.2: Value Addition by DPSUs

Table 3.9: Employees in DPSUs

Table 3.10: Break-up of Total Employees in DPSUs (As on 31 March 2008)

Table 3.11: Break-up of Total Employees in DPSUs (as on 31 March 2015)

Table 3.12: Per Employee Sales of Select Global Defence Companies, 2013

Figure 3.3: Per Employee Sales of DPSUs, 2014-15

Table 3.13: Capacity Utilisation in HAL

Table 3.14: HAL’s Labour Hours for ALH

Table 3.15: Profit Analysis of DPSUs, 2014-15

Table 3.16: DPSUs’ Exports on FoB Basis

Table 3.17: Share of Offsets in BEL’s Order Book

Table 3.18: Foreign Exchange Earning by DPSUs,

Table 3.19: Share of Exports in Turnover of Select Global Defence Companies




GULLIVERN


TEST DGA 2016-1 77

Table 4.1: System/Sub-system/Component-wise List of Licences Issued to Indian Industry (As on 31 October 2015)

Table 4.2: Heavy Mobility Vehicles (HMV) Contracts Won by the Indian Private Sector under Capital Acquisition

Table 4.3: Export of Defence Items Based on no Objection Certificate Issued by the Government

Figure 4.1: Defence Capital Expenditure: Projections up to 2025-26

Table 4.4: Army’s Capital Acquisition: Share of Indian and Foreign Vendors

Table 4.5: Air Force’s Capital Acquisition: Share of Indian and Foreign Vendors

Table 4.6: Select Cases of Delay in Approval of Industrial Licence (As in February 2013)

Table 4.7: Industry Sector-wide Tax and other Incentives

Table 4.8: Private Sector’s Expenditure on Defence R&D

Table 4.9: Delay in Acquisition pre-CNC Stage

Table 4.10: Delay in Acquisition post-CNC Stage

Table 4.11: FDI Proposals in the Defence Sector 2014-15 (As in November 2015)

Table 5.1: DRDO’s Human Resources Strength

Table 5.2: Value of DRDO-developed Systems Inducted or Underinduction

Table 5.3: Import Content in the major Systems Developed/Being Developed by DRDO

Table 5.4: List of 26 Critical Defence Technologies for Acquisition by DRDO through Offset Route

Table 5.5: Select Cases of Time and Cost Overruns in DRDO Projects

Table 5.6: Comparison of Benchmarks for Evaluation of MBT Arjun vis-à-vis T-90 Tank

Table 5.7: Number of Auxiliary and Administrative Staff per R&D Staff/Scientist in DRDO (As in April 2010)

Table 5.8: DRDO’s Project Portfolio (As in 2011)

Table 5.9: DRDO’s Share in India’s GDP and Total R&D Expenditure

Table 5.10: Comparison of Underfunding between the Armed Forces and DRDO

Table 5.11: DRDO’s Grants-in-Aid

Table 5.12: Number of Patents Granted: China and India

Table 5.13: Innovation Indicator: Ranking of Select Countries

Table 5.14: Top-10 R&D Spenders in the World, 2014

Figure 5.1: R&D Expenditure by Leading Indian Industry Groups, 2009-10

Table 6.1: Select Sector-wise FDI Equity Inflows into India (April 2000-August 2014)

Table 6.2: Approved JVs post-increase of FDI Cap (August 2014-March 2015)

Table 6.3: ITC (HS) Codes for Category of Defence Items Requiring Industrial Licence

Table 6.4: ITC (HS) Code-wise Exports

Table 6.5: Select Country-wise Exports under ITC (HS) Codes 8802 and 8803, 2014-15

Table 6.6: Exports under ITC HS Code 8803 to Countries with Offset Liabilities

Table 6.7: Key Performance Parameters of DPSUs and OFs

Table 6.8: Exports as Percentage of Turnover of HAL and BEL

Table 6.9: Letters of Intent/Industrial Licences Issued to the Indian Private Sector

Table 6.10: Defence Exports by the Indian Private Sector

Table 6.11: Offset: Threshold, Percentage and Multiplier

Table 6.12: Offset Banking and Trading

Table 6.13: Burden on Indian Companies under Buy (Global) Contract

Table 6.14: South Korean Offset Category and Weighted Value

Table 7.1: Select Committees on National Security post-1999

Figure 7.1: Organisational Structure for Defence Capital Acquisition

Table 7.2: Category-wise Acceptance of Necessity (AoN)

Table 1: Proposed Group/Segments for Selection of SPs

La Corée du Nord spatiale 33

Tableau n° 1 : ARSENAL DE LA CORÉE DU NORD À LA FIN DES ANNÉES 1990

Tableau n° 2 : PRINCIPAUX CLIENTS DE LA CORÉE DU NORD PENDANT LES ANNÉES 1990

Tableau n° 3 : TABLEAU RÉCAPITULATIF DES ESSAIS NUCLÉAIRES ET LANCEURS

Figure n° 1 :CONFIGURATION D'UNHA-2

Figure n° 2 : MARKUS SCHILLER AND ROBERT SCHUMECKER'S ASSESSING THE SUCCESSFUL NORTH KOREAN SATELLITE

LAUNCH39

Figure n° 3 :TRAJECTOIRES UNHA-2/UNHA-3

Figure n° 4 : LES TRAJECTOIRES ESPÉRÉE ET RÉELLE DE L'UNHA-3, AVRIL 2012

Figure n° 5 :COMPARAISON DES TRAJECTOIRES UNHA-3/UNHA-2

Figure n° 6 : NOUVEAU PAS DE TIR

Figure n° 7 : CENTRE DE LANCEMENT DE SOHAE (TONGCHANG-RI)

Figure n° 9 : CENTRE DE LANCEMENT DE MUSUDAN-RI

Figure n° 10 : TIR DU 29 AOÛT 20124

Figure n° 11 : LES ZONES D'INSTALLATIONS MISSILES

Figure n° 12 : SITES DE LANCEMENT ET COMPLEXE NUCLÉAIRE48


GULLIVERN


TEST DGA 2016-1 78

Le Japon : nouvel exportateur d'armements - Attentes, réalités et enjeux stratégiques 35

Principales entreprises de défense par total des ventes mondiales (2014)

Libye : armes, embargo et diplomatie à l’ombre de la menace islamiste 36

Les dérogations possibles à l’embargo d’armes sur la Libye (UE et ONU)

L’embargo pendant la première guerre civile libyenne (2011)

L’embargo, lors de la chute de Kadhafi

L’embargo face à l’éclatement de la Libye en 2014 (deuxième guerre civile)

L’embargo face à la montée en puissance de Daech

L’embargo et le nouveau gouvernement d’unité nationale

Managing U.S. Air Force Aircraft Operating and Support Costs: Insights from Recent RAND Analysis and Opportunities for the Future

56

KC-135R/T and C-130H O&S Cost Growth Areas (FY 1996–2012)

MARINES D’AILLEURS 37

Outils de puissance navale dans le monde (échéance 2025)

Flottes et bases militaires navales américaines dans le monde

Ambitions maritimes chinoises : de la ligne en neuf traits au collier de perles

Inde : des ambitions maritimes régionales

Brésil : un Amazone bleu

Les puissances navales européennes en 2016 (principaux bâtiments)

Quand l’Afrique du Sud prend la mer

Chili, la marine du bout du monde

Turquie, une marine discrète mais qui compte

Iran, le trublion

Corée du Sud, la possibilité d’une île

Quand les kangourous reprennent la mer…

NIDS China Security Report 2016 68

Figure 0-1: Examples of PLA’s Expanding Operations

Table 1-1: Changes in PLAN Strategy

Fig. 1-1: Trend in Numbers of New-type Destroyers and Frigates

Fig. 1-2: Trend in Numbers of New-type Submarines

Figure 2-1: Trend in PLAAF force structure balan

Table 2-1: Major fighters

Table 2-2: Gaoxin Project

Table 3-1: Holdings of Nuclear Warheads

Table 3-2: Deployment of Nuclear-Mounted Ballistic Missiles

Table 3-3: China’s Major Long-Range Ba

Table 3-4: Changes in the Number of Conventional Ballistic Missile Launchers Deployed

Table 3-5: Major Conventional Ballistic Missiles and Cruise Missiles

Figure 3-1: Range of Major Missile

Figure 4-1: Image Chart of Informationized Local Wars at

Figure 4-2: Organizational Structure of the PLA (Before the end of 20

RED ALERT: The Growing Threat to U.S. Aircraft Carriers 57

THREAT DISTANCE FROM MAINLAND CHINA

THREAT DISTANCE FROM WOODY ISLAND AND FIERY CROSS REEF

RANGE OF SELECT CHINESE A2/AD CAPABILITIES

TRENDS IN WORLD NUCLEAR FORCES, 2016 44

World nuclear forces, share of world total by country, 2016

World nuclear forces, January 2016

Total warhead holdings of all nuclear-weapon possessing states (the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France,

China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea), 2007–16

Total warhead holdings of all nuclear-weapon possessing states (the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France,

China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea), 2016

Winning the Salvo Competition: Rebalancing America's Air and Missile Defenses (full report) 63










GULLIVERN


TEST DGA 2016-1 79

FIGURE 1: ILLUSTRATIVE PRECISION STRIKE “SALVO COMPETITION”

FIGURE 2: PLAAF H-6K BOMBER WITH EXTERNAL WEAPON PYLONS AND A DF-21 ON A MOBILE LAUNCHER

FIGURE 3: HYPOTHETICAL HGV ATTACK

FIGURE 4: IRANIAN “SEJIL” MOBILE MRBM AND “GHADAR” CRUISE MISSILE

FIGURE 5: NAVY AAW INTERCEPTOR PROCUREMENT FUNDING SINCE 1999

FIGURE 6: DOD CUMULATIVE LAND-BASED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE INTERCEPTOR PROCUREMENT FUNDING SINCE

1999

FIGURE 7: OPERATING FROM LOWER THREAT AREAS

FIGURE 8: DISPERSING INSIDE A2/AD AREAS

FIGURE 9: OVERLAPPING SALVO DEFENSES IN A NOTIONAL BASE CLUSTER

FIGURE 10: COMPLICATING AN ENEMY’S PRECISION TARGETING

FIGURE 11: INTERCEPTING THE ARCHERS

FIGURE 12: NOTIONAL INTEGRATED FIRE CONTROL-COUNTER AIR NETWORK

FIGURE 13: ILLUSTRATIVE SHORT- AND MEDIUM-RANGE DEFENSIVE AAW CAPABILITIES

FIGURE 14: HYPERVELOCITY PROJECTILES FOR EMRG, 5-INCH GUN, AND 155MM ARTILLERY; NAVY LASER WEAPON

SYSTEM ON USS PONCE

FIGURE 15: ILLUSTRATIVE SHORT- AND MEDIUM-RANGE BASE DEFENSES

FIGURE 16: LAUNCH OF A DAVID’S SLING

FIGURE 17: CONCEPT FOR AN INTEGRATED MEDIUM-RANGE BASE DEFENSE

FIGURE 18: RIM-162 ESSM AND RIM-116 ROLLING AIRFRAME MISSILE

FIGURE 19: LAND-BASED MULTI-MISSION MEDIUM RANGE RAILGUN WEAPON SYSTEM CONCEPT

FIGURE 20: LOWER-AD INTERCEPTOR AND AI3 INTERCEPTOR

FIGURE 21: ARTIST’S CONCEPT OF MAD-FIRES THREAT ENGAGEMENTS

FIGURE 22: 155MM HOWITZER

FIGURE 23: PROTOTYPE EMRG AND ARTIST’S CONCEPT OF AN EMRG ON THE USNS TRENTON

FIGURE 24: BEAM DIRECTORS FOR THE MIRACL LASER AND LAWS DEPLOYED ON THE USS PONCE

FIGURE 25: ILLUSTRATIVE LASER POWER LEVELS FOR VARIOUS TARGETS

FIGURE 26: HELLADS MOCKUP AND THE MARITIME LASER DEMONSTRATOR

FIGURE 27: AAW CAPACITY COMPARISON FOR A CRUISER OR DESTROYER

FIGURE 28: AAW CAPACITY COMPARISON FOR A CARRIER STRIKE GROUP

FIGURE 29: COMPARING COSTS TO DEFEAT EACH ASCM IN A SALVO

FIGURE 30: COMPARING COSTS TO DEFEAT EACH ASBM IN A SALVO

FIGURE 31: CHINA’S DF-26 IRBM AND NORTH KOREA’S KN-08 ICBM

FIGURE 32: GUAM AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE ENGAGEMENT COMPARISON

FIGURE 33: COMPARING COSTS TO DEFEAT EACH LACM IN A SALVO

FIGURE 34: COMPARING COSTS TO DEFEAT EACH BALLISTIC MISSILE IN A SALVO

FIGURE 35: BREAKOUT OF 1999–2017 TOTAL INTERCEPTOR PROCUREMENT FUNDING BY ORGANIZATION

FIGURE 36: ANNUAL INTERCEPTOR PROCUREMENT FUNDING SINCE 1999

FIGURE 37: COMPARISON OF FY 2015 PROCUREMENT FUNDING FOR KINETIC INTERCEPTORS AND S&T FOR ELECTRIC

WEAPON TECHNOLOGIES DEVELOPMENT

TABLE 1: CURRENT SHORT-RANGE TO MEDIUM-RANGE KINETIC DEFENSES

TABLE 2: FUTURE KINETIC DEFENSES

GULLIVERN


TEST DGA 2016-1 80

GULLIVERN


TEST DGA 2016-1 81

KEYWORD INDEX

Key concept Documents Page

Know Your Customer (KYC) Banques et exportations d’armes 19

S-300 Libye : armes, embargo et diplomatie à l’ombre de la

menace islamiste

36

2ASM Ventes d’armes françaises à l’Égypte :les risques d’une

coopération opportuniste

45

air defense systems RED ALERT: The Growing Threat to U.S. Aircraft Carriers 57

aircraft carriers RED ALERT: The Growing Threat to U.S. Aircraft Carriers 57


THE $100 BILLION QUESTION: The Cost Case for Naval

Uninhabited Combat Aircraft

58

The Promise of Unmanned Systems in the Asia-Pacific 61


OPERATIONS IN AN ERA OF PRECISION WEAPONS

53

Advancing Beyond the Beach: Amphibious Operations in

an Era of Precision Weapons (Presentation)

54

amphibious combat vehicle (ACV) ADVANCING BEYOND THE BEACH - AMPHIBIOUS


53



54

Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) ADVANCING BEYOND THE BEACH - AMPHIBIOUS


53

anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) The Promise of Unmanned Systems in the Asia-Pacific 61

anti-ballistic missile The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs - From the First to the

Second Nuclear Age

59

anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons Winning the Salvo Competition - Rebalancing America's

Air and Missile Defenses (slide presentation)

62

Winning the Salvo Competition: Rebalancing America's

Air and Missile Defenses (full report)

63

anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) RED ALERT: The Growing Threat to U.S. Aircraft Carriers 57



53

anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) ADVANCING BEYOND THE BEACH - AMPHIBIOUS


53



54



63

Arabian Sea RED ALERT: The Growing Threat to U.S. Aircraft Carriers 57

armes nucléaires La Corée du Nord spatiale 33

DÉMANTÈLEMENT DES ARMES ET BÂTIMENTS

NUCLÉAIRES - Terrifiant héritage pour les générations

futures

26











































GULLIVERN


TEST DGA 2016-1 82

autonomous systems Women Warriors - Why the Robotics Revolution


65

aviation militaire Au cœur du système Lockheed Martin Contribution au

débat sur le remplacement du F-16 en Belgique

18

ballistic missile submarines Feeding the ‘monster’ Escalating Capital Costs for the

Trident Successor Programme

28

ballistic missiles The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs - From the First to the

Second Nuclear Age

59



63


Winning the Salvo Competition - Rebalancing America's


62

banques Banques et exportations d’armes 19

Bashi Channel NIDS China Security Report 2016 68

Bay of Bengal RED ALERT: The Growing Threat to U.S. Aircraft Carriers 57

blanchiment Banques et exportations d’armes 19

British Armed Forces Feeding the ‘monster’ Escalating Capital Costs for the


28

The UK’s Nuclear Future (Labour’s Defence Policy

Review)

43

British army APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF EUROPEAN STRATEGIC

AUTONOMY

16

buki yushutsu sangen soku La politique de défense du Japon : nouveaux moyens,

nouvelles ambitions (in Défense & Industries n°6)

34

Bulgaria-Poland relations Defence Budgets and Cooperation in Europe: Trends and

Investments

22

Buy and Make Inde : une Defence Procurement Policy 2016 dictée par le

« Make in India » ? (Défense & Industries n°6)

30

Canal de Panama MARINES D’AILLEURS 37

Canal de Suez MARINES D’AILLEURS 37

capacity building aid La politique de défense du Japon : nouveaux moyens,


34

commerce des armes Libye : armes, embargo et diplomatie à l’ombre de la

menace islamiste

36

Contrôle des exportations d’armes : Zoom sur les Balkans

(Serbie, Bosnie et Monténégro)

20

Ventes d’armes françaises à l’Égypte :les risques d’une


45

Banques et exportations d’armes 19

Dépenses militaires et importations d’armes dans cinq

États ouest-africains

27

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) FOUR PROPOSALS FOR A DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

PLAN FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION

29

Control Communications Computers Intelligence

Surveillance Reconnaissance (C4ISR)



62













































http://csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Winning-Salvo-Competition.pptxv


GULLIVERN


TEST DGA 2016-1 83



63

counter-ISR systems Advancing Beyond the Beach: Amphibious Operations in


54

cruise missiles RED ALERT: The Growing Threat to U.S. Aircraft Carriers 57



62




63

cybersécurité Cybersécurité : ambitions israéliennes et positionnement

des acteurs défense (in Défense & Industries n°6)

21

cyberwarfare Cybersécurité : ambitions israéliennes et positionnement


21

déchets radioactifs DÉMANTÈLEMENT DES ARMES ET BÂTIMENTS


futures

26

Defence Procurement Policy Inde : une Defence Procurement Policy 2016 dictée par le


30

defence systems A "game changer" ? The EU's preparatory action on

defence research

12

defense industries Indian Defence Industry: An Agenda for Making in India 70

DEFENCE BUDGETS AND INDUSTRY: TABLES AND

GRAPHS

24

KRAUSS‐MAFFEI WEGMANN ‐ NEXTER : A Rapid

Integration as the Key for a Real Marriage

32

Tax evasion and weapon production - Mailbox arms

companies in the Netherlands

41



CHOICES (15TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT/THE IISS

SHANGRI-LA DIALOGUE)

39

Defence Budgets and Cooperation in Europe: Trends and

Investments

22


AUTONOMY

16

100 POSTULATES ON RUSSIA–INDIA RELATIONS 48


NETHERLANDS

25

defense spendings DEFENCE BUDGETS AND INDUSTRY: TABLES AND

GRAPHS

24

Tax evasion and weapon production - Mailbox arms

companies in the Netherlands

41





39


AUTONOMY

16



NETHERLANDS

25





















































GULLIVERN


TEST DGA 2016-1 84

defense spendings in Europe Defence Budgets and Cooperation in Europe: Trends and

Investments

22

démantèlement des armes nucléaires DÉMANTÈLEMENT DES ARMES ET BÂTIMENTS


futures

26

deterrence TRENDS IN WORLD NUCLEAR FORCES, 2016 44



53



54

The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs - From the First to the

Second Nuclear Age

59



28

Détroit de Bab-el-Mandeb MARINES D’AILLEURS 37

Détroit de Malacca MARINES D’AILLEURS 37

Détroit d'Ormuz MARINES D’AILLEURS 37

directed energy weapons The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs - From the First to the

Second Nuclear Age

59

doctrine Yoshida Le Japon : nouvel exportateur d'armements - Attentes,

réalités et enjeux stratégiques

35

drones A European drone by 2025? The View from Italy on

EUROMALE

13

dual-use technologies A European drone by 2025? The View from Italy on

EUROMALE

13

East China Sea NIDS China Security Report 2016 68

economy of Belgium DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN BELGIUM AND THE

NETHERLANDS

25

economy of India 100 POSTULATES ON RUSSIA–INDIA RELATIONS 48

economy of The Netherlands DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN BELGIUM AND THE

NETHERLANDS

25

education 100 POSTULATES ON RUSSIA–INDIA RELATIONS 48

electronic warfare ADVANCING BEYOND THE BEACH - AMPHIBIOUS


53

embargo sur les armes Libye : armes, embargo et diplomatie à l’ombre de la

menace islamiste

36

embedded systems A Perspective on Russia - Proliferated Drones.pdf 15

EUROMALE A European drone by 2025? The View from Italy on

EUROMALE

13


EUROMALE

14

Rapprochement Nexter Systems - KMW : la promesse

d’une aube ? (in Défenses&Industries, n°6, février 2016)

40


Investments

22














































GULLIVERN


TEST DGA 2016-1 85


AUTONOMY

16

European Defence Technological and Industrial Base

(EDTIB)


AUTONOMY

16

exoskeleton Women Warriors - Why the Robotics Revolution


65

Expeditionary Advanced Bases (EAB) ADVANCING BEYOND THE BEACH - AMPHIBIOUS


53



54

F-35 La politique de défense du Japon : nouveaux moyens,


34

Filière israelienne de cybersécurité Cybersécurité : ambitions israéliennes et positionnement


21

foreign relations of India 100 POSTULATES ON RUSSIA–INDIA RELATIONS 48

France's White Paper on Defence and National Security APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF EUROPEAN STRATEGIC

AUTONOMY

16

FREMM Ventes d’armes françaises à l’Égypte :les risques d’une


45

Future Combat Aircraft Systems (FCAS) APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF EUROPEAN STRATEGIC

AUTONOMY

16

Golfe de Guinée MARINES D’AILLEURS 37

Gowind Ventes d’armes françaises à l’Égypte :les risques d’une


45

guerre froide Le Japon : nouvel exportateur d'armements - Attentes,


35

Gulf of Aden NIDS China Security Report 2016 68

Hainan Island NIDS China Security Report 2016 68

hard-target kill (HTK) The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs - From the First to the

Second Nuclear Age

59

helicopters 100 POSTULATES ON RUSSIA–INDIA RELATIONS 48



53



54

high energy lasers Winning the Salvo Competition - Rebalancing America's


62



63

highly enriched uranium (HEU) TRENDS IN WORLD NUCLEAR FORCES, 2016 44

Human Load Carrier Women Warriors - Why the Robotics Revolution


65

hydroelectricity 100 POSTULATES ON RUSSIA–INDIA RELATIONS 48












































GULLIVERN


TEST DGA 2016-1 86

hypervelocity projectiles (HVP) Winning the Salvo Competition - Rebalancing America's


62



63



54

Iles Paracels MARINES D’AILLEURS 37

Iles Senkaku/Diaoyu MARINES D’AILLEURS 37

Iles Spratleys MARINES D’AILLEURS 37

Indian Army Indian Defence Industry: An Agenda for Making in India 70

Indian Ocean NIDS China Security Report 2016 68

India-Russia relations 100 POSTULATES ON RUSSIA–INDIA RELATIONS 48

Indirect Fires Protection Capability (IFPC) ADVANCING BEYOND THE BEACH - AMPHIBIOUS


53



54

industries de défense La politique de défense du Japon : nouveaux moyens,


34

Contrôle des exportations d’armes : Zoom sur les Balkans

(Serbie, Bosnie et Monténégro)

20

Ventes d’armes françaises à l’Égypte :les risques d’une


45

Inde : une Defence Procurement Policy 2016 dictée par le


30

industrie spatiale La Corée du Nord spatiale 33

industries de l'armement Banques et exportations d’armes 19

Le Japon : nouvel exportateur d'armements - Attentes,


35

intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) The Promise of Unmanned Systems in the Asia-Pacific 61



63





39

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) NIDS China Security Report 2016 68



Second Nuclear Age

59

Java Sea NIDS China Security Report 2016 68

Johnson South Reef NIDS China Security Report 2016 68

JSDF La politique de défense du Japon : nouveaux moyens,


34

kinetic defenses Winning the Salvo Competition - Rebalancing America's


62



63
















































GULLIVERN


TEST DGA 2016-1 87

Kwangmyongsong-4 La Corée du Nord spatiale 33

land-attack cruise missiles (LACM) Winning the Salvo Competition: Rebalancing America's


63

Legged Squad Support System Women Warriors - Why the Robotics Revolution


65

les « trois principes » Le Japon : nouvel exportateur d'armements - Attentes,


35

lobbying Au cœur du système Lockheed Martin Contribution au


18

Make in India Inde : une Defence Procurement Policy 2016 dictée par le


30



Marine Austere Patrolling System Women Warriors - Why the Robotics Revolution


65

medias 100 POSTULATES ON RUSSIA–INDIA RELATIONS 48

Méditerranée MARINES D’AILLEURS 37

Mer de Chine Méridionale MARINES D’AILLEURS 37

Mer de Chine Orientale MARINES D’AILLEURS 37

Mer de Kara DÉMANTÈLEMENT DES ARMES ET BÂTIMENTS


futures

26

Mica Ventes d’armes françaises à l’Égypte :les risques d’une


45

microwave weapons Winning the Salvo Competition - Rebalancing America's


62



63

military aircraft THE $100 BILLION QUESTION: The Cost Case for Naval


58


Military of China NIDS China Security Report 2016 68

Military of the European Union A "game changer" ? The EU's preparatory action on

defence research

12

military robot Women Warriors - Why the Robotics Revolution


65

military strategy Winning the Salvo Competition - Rebalancing America's


62



63


AUTONOMY

16

Mirage Ventes d’armes françaises à l’Égypte :les risques d’une


45













































GULLIVERN


TEST DGA 2016-1 88

missile defense systems The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs - From the First to the

Second Nuclear Age

59



62



63


missiles balistiques La Corée du Nord spatiale 33

Mistral Ventes d’armes françaises à l’Égypte :les risques d’une


45

multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles

(MIRV)


Second Nuclear Age

59

Mutual defense assistance act La politique de défense du Japon : nouveaux moyens,


34

National Defense Program Guidelines La politique de défense du Japon : nouveaux moyens,


34

nuclear energy The challenges of maintaining nuclear cultures - US and

UK perspectives

42


Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 100 POSTULATES ON RUSSIA–INDIA RELATIONS 48

Nuclear proliferation The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs - From the First to the

Second Nuclear Age

59

Nuclear weapons The challenges of maintaining nuclear cultures - US and

UK perspectives

42



Second Nuclear Age

59

The UK’s Nuclear Future (Labour’s Defence Policy

Review)

43


nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) TRENDS IN WORLD NUCLEAR FORCES, 2016 44

oil and gas 100 POSTULATES ON RUSSIA–INDIA RELATIONS 48

Okinawa island NIDS China Security Report 2016 68

operating and support (O&S) costs Managing U.S. Air Force Aircraft Operating and Support



56

Patriot Act Banques et exportations d’armes 19

pharmaceutical industry 100 POSTULATES ON RUSSIA–INDIA RELATIONS 48

plutonium DÉMANTÈLEMENT DES ARMES ET BÂTIMENTS


futures

26

politique étrangère Japon Le Japon : nouvel exportateur d'armements - Attentes,


35

pork barrel politics Au cœur du système Lockheed Martin Contribution au


18














































GULLIVERN


TEST DGA 2016-1 89

precision-guided munitions (PGM) Winning the Salvo Competition: Rebalancing America's


63

R-36 (SS-9) The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs - From the First to the

Second Nuclear Age

59

radars Winning the Salvo Competition - Rebalancing America's


62

Rafale Ventes d’armes françaises à l’Égypte :les risques d’une


45

A Review of Selected International Aircraft Spares

Pooling Programs. Lessons Learned for F-35 Spares

Pooling

52

relations Etats-Unis Japon Le Japon : nouvel exportateur d'armements - Attentes,


35

Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) A European drone by 2025? The View from Italy on

EUROMALE

13


EUROMALE

14

research and development THE $100 BILLION QUESTION: The Cost Case for Naval


58


DEFENCE BUDGETS AND INDUSTRY: TABLES AND

GRAPHS

24


AUTONOMY

16


NETHERLANDS

25

Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) Advancing Beyond the Beach: Amphibious Operations in


54

robotics A Perspective on Russia - Proliferated Drones.pdf 15

robotics technology Women Warriors - Why the Robotics Revolution


65

satellites La Corée du Nord spatiale 33


Investments

22

Scalp Ventes d’armes françaises à l’Égypte :les risques d’une


45

Sea of Japan NIDS China Security Report 2016 68

sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) TRENDS IN WORLD NUCLEAR FORCES, 2016 44

sensors Winning the Salvo Competition: Rebalancing America's


63

Shaheen-I The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs - From the First to the

Second Nuclear Age

59

Shaheen-II The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs - From the First to the

Second Nuclear Age

59

SNA Barracuda La politique de défense du Japon : nouveaux moyens,


34















































GULLIVERN


TEST DGA 2016-1 90

Soryu La politique de défense du Japon : nouveaux moyens,


34

Sous-marins nucléaires lanceurs d’engins (SNLE) DÉMANTÈLEMENT DES ARMES ET BÂTIMENTS


futures

26

MARINES D’AILLEURS 37

South China Sea The challenges of maintaining nuclear cultures - US and

UK perspectives

42


South China sea RED ALERT: The Growing Threat to U.S. Aircraft Carriers 57

Spratley Islands RED ALERT: The Growing Threat to U.S. Aircraft Carriers 57

Squad X Women Warriors - Why the Robotics Revolution


65

stealth technology NIDS China Security Report 2016 68

Strait of Malacca NIDS China Security Report 2016 68

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (START) The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs - From the First to the

Second Nuclear Age

59

submarines The Morning After: Australia, Japan, and the Submarine

Deal that Wasn’t

60



63





39


Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program

(SEWIP)



63

Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit Women Warriors - Why the Robotics Revolution


65

Taiwan Strait NIDS China Security Report 2016 68

terrorism Banques et exportations d’armes 19

Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Winning the Salvo Competition - Rebalancing America's


62

transferts d’armement Libye : armes, embargo et diplomatie à l’ombre de la

menace islamiste

36

Triple Helix DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN BELGIUM AND THE

NETHERLANDS

25

UK Polaris programme The challenges of maintaining nuclear cultures - US and

UK perspectives

42

UK Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF EUROPEAN STRATEGIC

AUTONOMY

16

UK Trident programme The challenges of maintaining nuclear cultures - US and

UK perspectives

42













































GULLIVERN


TEST DGA 2016-1 91



28

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) A Perspective on Russia - Proliferated Drones.pdf 15

THE $100 BILLION QUESTION: The Cost Case for Naval


58



62






39



53



54

Unmanned Ground Vehicle Women Warriors - Why the Robotics Revolution


65

uranium hautement enrichi DÉMANTÈLEMENT DES ARMES ET BÂTIMENTS


futures

26

Vanguard-class submarine Feeding the ‘monster’ Escalating Capital Costs for the


28

vertical launching system (VLS) Winning the Salvo Competition: Rebalancing America's


63

weapon systems Managing U.S. Air Force Aircraft Operating and Support



56




63


The challenges of maintaining nuclear cultures - US and

UK perspectives

42


Second Nuclear Age

59





39

White Paper 2016 on German security policy and the

future of the Bundeswehr


AUTONOMY

16

Women in the military Women Warriors - Why the Robotics Revolution


65











































