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AlaFile E-Notice To: HALL JOHN BRYANT [email protected] 01-CV-2014-901437.00 Judge: DONALD E. BLANKENSHIP NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALABAMA The following matter was FILED on 10/30/2015 3:21:15 PM HARRINDA SMITH ET AL V. THE BIRMINGHAM CITY SCHOOL BOARD ET AL 01-CV-2014-901437.00 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 56 Notice Date: 10/30/2015 3:21:15 PM [Filer: GEAR GAYLE HAYWOOD] ANNE-MARIE ADAMS CIRCUIT COURT CLERK JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALABAMA 716 N. RICHARD ARRINGTON BLVD. BIRMINGHAM, AL 35203 205-325-5355 [email protected] JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALABAMA C001 SMITH HARRINDA C002 STREET MARION

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The Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting brief for Count II.

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Page 1: SMith and Street Count II Stamped MSJ

AlaFile E-Notice

To: HALL JOHN BRYANT

[email protected]

01-CV-2014-901437.00

Judge: DONALD E. BLANKENSHIP

NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALABAMA

The following matter was FILED on 10/30/2015 3:21:15 PM

HARRINDA SMITH ET AL V. THE BIRMINGHAM CITY SCHOOL BOARD ET AL

01-CV-2014-901437.00

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 56

Notice Date: 10/30/2015 3:21:15 PM

[Filer: GEAR GAYLE HAYWOOD]

ANNE-MARIE ADAMS

CIRCUIT COURT CLERK

JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALABAMA

716 N. RICHARD ARRINGTON BLVD.

BIRMINGHAM, AL 35203

205-325-5355

[email protected]

JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALABAMA

C001 SMITH HARRINDA

C002 STREET MARION

Page 2: SMith and Street Count II Stamped MSJ

/s/ GAYLE HAYWOOD GEAR

Signature of Attorney or Party:Date:Check here if you have filed or are filingcontemoraneously with this motion an Affidavit ofSubstantial Hardship or if you are filing on behalf of anagency or department of the State, county, or municipalgovernment. (Pursuant to §6-5-1 Code of Alabama(1975), governmental entities are exempt fromprepayment of filing fees)

Case No.STATE OF ALABAMAUnified Judicial System

01-JEFFERSON District Court Circuit Court

Revised 3/5/08

HARRINDA SMITH ET AL V. THE BIRMINGHAMCITY SCHOOL BOARD ET AL

CIVIL MOTION COVER SHEETName of Filing Party:

Name, Address, and Telephone No. of Attorney or Party. If Not Represented.

Attorney Bar No.:

GAYLE HAYWOOD GEAR

2229 MORRIS AVENUE

BIRMINGHAM, AL 35203

GEA002

TYPE OF MOTION

Motions Requiring Fee Motions Not Requiring Fee

Default Judgment ($50.00)

Joinder in Other Party's Dispositive Motion (i.e.Summary Judgment, Judgment on the Pleadings, orother Dispositive Motion not pursuant to Rule 12(b))($50.00)

Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56($50.00)

Renewed Dispositive Motion(Summary Judgment,Judgment on the Pleadings, or other DispositiveMotion not pursuant to Rule 12(b)) ($50.00)

Judgment on the Pleadings ($50.00)

Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative SummaryJudgment($50.00)

Other

Add Party

Amend

Change of Venue/Transfer

Compel

Consolidation

Continue

Deposition

Designate a Mediator

Judgment as a Matter of Law (during Trial)

Disburse Funds

Extension of Time

In Limine

Joinder

More Definite Statement

Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)

New Trial

Objection of Exemptions Claimed

Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss

Preliminary Injunction

Protective Order

Quash

Release from Stay of Execution

Sanctions

Sever

Special Practice in Alabama

Stay

Strike

Supplement to Pending Motion

Vacate or Modify

Withdraw

Otherpursuant to Rule (Subject to Filing Fee)

pursuant to Rule ($50.00)

*This Cover Sheet must be completed and submitted to the Clerk of Court upon the filing of any motion. Each motion should contain a separate Cover Sheet.

**Motions titled 'Motion to Dismiss' that are not pursuant to Rule 12(b) and are in fact Motions for Summary Judgments are subject to filing fee.

*Motion fees are enumerated in §12-19-71(a). Feespursuant to Local Act are not included. Please contact theClerk of the Court regarding applicable local fees.

Local Court Costs $

C001 - SMITH HARRINDAC002 - STREET MARION

0.00

10/30/2015 3:04:16 PM

CV201490143700

Pendente Lite

Oral Arguments Requested

Motion to Intervene ($297.00)

ELECTRONICALLY FILED10/30/2015 3:21 PM

01-CV-2014-901437.00CIRCUIT COURT OF

JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALABAMAANNE-MARIE ADAMS, CLERK

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALABAMA HARRINDA SMITH, ) MARION STREET, )

Plaintiff/Petitioner, ) )

vs. ) )

THE BIRMINGHAM CITY SCHOOL BOARD; ) CASE NO.: 01-CV- 2014-901437 DR. CRAIG WITHERSPOON, ) in his individual capacity as ) Superintendent of the Birmingham City Schools; ) ARTHUR WATTS ) in his individual capacity as Chief Financial ) Officer of the Birmingham City Schools; ) et.al. )

) Respondents. )

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO COUNT II

OF PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

COMES NOW, Plaintiffs/Petitioners Harrinda Smith and Marion Street, (hereafter

“Plaintiffs”) and, pursuant to Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 56, move this Honorable Court

for an ORDER granting summary judgment and related relief with respect to Count II of the

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint in this matter for the reasons stated herein, as well as the

Plaintiffs’ Evidentiary submission and the Deposition Testimony of Superintendent of Schools

Craig Witherspoon, Chief Financial Officer Arthur Watts (“CFO”), Human Resources Director

Jeffery McDaniels, and former Birmingham Board member Virginia Volker. All deponents listed

have personal knowledge of the enactment and implementation of the 2014 Classified Salary

Schedule. CFO Watts and Superintendent Witherspoon (who have both recently resigned) are

ELECTRONICALLY FILED10/30/2015 3:21 PM

01-CV-2014-901437.00CIRCUIT COURT OF

JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALABAMAANNE-MARIE ADAMS, CLERK

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sued in their individual capacities. All other defendants (current Birmingham Board members,

School Superintendent1, Chief Financial Officer2) and are sued in their official capacities.

I. Introduction

Count II of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint seeks relief under 42 USC §1983.

Defendants Witherspoon and Watts intentionally denied Plaintiffs their rights to the property

interest Plaintiffs hold in their employment and related salary. Witherspoon and Watts admit in

deposition testimony that, they held a legal duty to adhere to the 2014 Classified Salary Schedule

enacted by the Birmingham Board. They also admitted that they certified to the Birmingham

Board that sufficient funds were budgeted to fully fund all employee salaries. The 2014 Certified

Salary Schedule expressly provided that placement on the Salary Schedule STEP is categorized

by “years of experience.” Defendants Witherspoon and Watts further admitted that Plaintiffs

were not given credit for years of experience when determining their STEP placement on the

Classified Salary Schedule. Instead, Defendants Witherspoon and Watts placed Plaintiffs on

Salary Schedule STEPS that represented a slight increase in their previous salary specifically for

the purpose of foreclosing Plaintiffs’ access to the due process mechanisms available through

established Board procedure. At the same time, Defendants Witherspoon and Watts gave full

credit for “years of experience” to other similarly situated classified personnel.

Defendants fraudulently and in bad faith attempted to conceal their actions by giving no

written notice of what they later refer to as a well known “procedure” to move existing personnel

to a STEP that affords a slight increase of salary regardless of their years of experience.

Defendants Witherspoon and Watts admitted that this “procedure” was never memorialized in

writing nor was it published to the Birmingham Board or to the Alabama State Department of

1 Kelley Castlin-Gacutan was recently appointed to the Superintendent position. 2 At this time, Defendant Watts’ successor has not been named.

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Education. It is undisputed that the Birmingham Board had not enacted any policy that allowed a

departure from the officially enacted 2014 Classified Salary Schedule. Both Watts and

Witherspoon try to claim that violating the duly approved Salary Schedule policy is a generally

accepted practice.

Plaintiffs hereby seek an Order declaring that Plaintiffs have been denied equal protection

under the law and due process of the law under the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, Art. I, §§ 1,

6, 13, and 22, and the Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV. Further, Plaintiffs

seek to be awarded general compensatory damages, to include all back pay, where appropriate,

and to restore any and all benefits, as required; and such other and further relief as necessary to

make Plaintiffs fully whole and that this Court order Defendants to pay all costs incurred,

including reasonable attorneys’ fees. Additionally, Plaintiffs seek to be awarded such other and

further relief, at law or in equity, to which they might otherwise be reasonably entitled.

II. Undisputed Material Facts

The following incorporates facts from Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Motion for

Summary Judgment as to Count I of the Second Amended Complaint.

1. Defendants Superintendent Witherspoon, Chief Financial Officer Watts and Human

Resource Director Jeffery McDaniels were legally obligated by Birmingham Board policy

and by Alabama State law to implement the duly enacted 2014 Classified Salary Schedule.

(McDaniels Depo. at 87; Witherspoon Depo. at 16-17, 28-29, 117 and Depo. Exh. 5-6;

Watts Depo. at 14-15, 21-22, 36 & 54 and referenced Exhs. 4 & 6; Volker Depo. at 17 and

referenced Exhs. 2-3).

2. The 2014 Classified Salary Schedule specifically provided that STEP placement is

determined (“categorized”) by “years of experience.” STEP placement on the previous

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salary schedule (The 2013 Classified Salary Schedule) also stated that STEP placement was

categorized by “years of experience”. (McDaniels Depo. at 17-21, 26-27, 29, 30-31, 35 &

Depo. Exhibit 2 & 3 at pg. 3).

3. Defendants Witherspoon and CFO Watts possessed no discretion as to STEP placement

because the duly enacted 2014 Classified Salary schedule expressly stated that STEPS are

“categorized” as “years of experience.” (Watts Depo. at 21-23, 36, 38-39 and referenced

Exhibit 12 at pgs. 3, 14-15).

4. CFO Watts certified to the Birmingham Board of Education that sufficient funds were in the

2014 Budget to pay classified personnel in accordance with the 2014 Classified Salary

Schedule. (Witherspoon Depo. at 56-57; Watts Depo. at 18, 22-23, 36, 45 & 54 and

referenced Exhibit 7).

5. CFO Watts did not communicate in writing to the Birmingham Board members, to the State

Department of Education, or affected classified personnel that (with the implementation of

the 2014 Classified Salary Schedule) “years of experience” would not determine STEP

placement for currently employed classified personnel. (Witherspoon Depo. at 119-120;

Watts Depo. at 32, 40, 62-63; Volker Depo. at 28-30, 31-34, 38-39).

6. Instead, STEP assignments for classified personnel (including Plaintiffs Harrinda Smith and

Marion Street) STEPs were arbitrarily lowered to the salary STEP that closely

approximated their previous 2013 salary rather than to the STEP that represented their “years

of experience.” (McDaniels Depo. at 56-57, 83-84, 95; Witherspoon Depo. 40-44, 115; Watts

Depo. at 19-20).

7. Jeffrey McDaniels, the Director of Human Resources, admitted that some classified

personnel were not placed on the STEP they were due because it would diminish the

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“reserve fund” that the State Department of Education required during the period the

Birmingham Board was under State supervision. (McDaniels Depo. at 140).

8. Both Superintendent Witherspoon and CFO Watts admitted that at the time the 2014

Classified Salary Schedule was recommended for passage, they did not intend to adhere to

the provision that STEP placement is categorized as “years of experience.” (Witherspoon

Depo. at 43-45; Watts Depo. at 31).

9. With the implementation of the 2014 Classified Salary Schedule Plaintiff Smith’s STEP

placement was lowered from STEP 11 (reflecting actual years of experience) to STEP 1,

which corresponds to no experience. The salary difference between STEP 11 and STEP 1

is $5,477.00. (McDaniels Depo. Exh. 10, BOE stamped pg. 291; see generally Smith

Affidavit).

10. With the implementation of the 2014 Classified Salary Schedule, Plaintiff Street’s STEP

placement was lowered from STEP 14 (reflecting actual years of experience) to STEP 2,

which corresponds to two years of experience. The salary difference between STEP 14 and

STEP 2 is $5,643.00. (McDaniels Depo. at 120-121; see generally Affidavit of Street).

11. In contrast, newly hired (or rehired) classified personnel were assigned to the STEP that

corresponded to their respective “years of experience”. (McDaniels Depo. at 37-43, 44-45,

60-62, and referenced depo. exhibits. 4-9).

12. Also in contrast, STEP placement for classified personnel assigned to the Central Office

retained their former (2013) STEP placement, that is according to their respective “years of

experience”. (McDaniels Depo. at 98-104 and referenced depo. exhibit 11).

13. Classified personnel were assigned to the STEP that closely corresponded (yet afforded an

increase) to their 2013 salary so that they would not be able to pursue an appeal of their

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STEP placement on the 2014 Classified Salary Schedule. (McDaniels Depo. at 83-85;

Witherspoon Depo. at 115).

14. Plaintiffs Smith and Street promptly registered their concerns about improper placement on

the 2014 Classified Salary Schedule to Superintendent Watts and HR Director McDaniels.

(Watts Depo. at 46; McDaniels Depo. at 123; see generally Affidavits of Smith and Street.)

III. Arguments

In light of the foregoing undisputed facts, it is clear that Defendants’ conduct has denied

Plaintiffs equal protection and due process of law under the Constitution of Alabama of 1901,

Article I, §§1, 6, 13, and 22, and the United States Constitution, Amendment XIV. Plaintiffs

have a property interest in the salary they derive from their positions with the Birmingham Board

under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution as well as the Constitution of

Alabama of 1901, Article I, §§1, 6, 13, and 22. Defendants’ deprivation of Plaintiffs’ rights

without due process of law as well as Defendants’ refusal to afford equal protection to Plaintiffs

under the law has caused damage to Plaintiffs’ professional life and career opportunities,

emotional distress, inconvenience, humiliation, shame, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life,

and pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. (see generally Affidavits of Smith and Street).

A. Summary Judgment Standard

The standard of review on a motion for summary judgment is well settled under Alabama

law. Pursuant to Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(3), summary judgment is proper “if the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Once the movant meets this burden, “the

burden then shifts to the non-movant to rebut the movant's prima facie showing by “substantial

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evidence.’” Lee v. City of Gadsden, 592 So.2d 1036, 1038 (Ala. 1992). “(S)ubstantial evidence is

evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial

judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.” West v. Founders

Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989).

B. Defendants Witherspoon and Watts are State Employees Whose Actions Were Taken Under Color of Law

A prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. §1983 consists of two elements: 1) the action

occurred under color of law and 2) the action is a deprivation of a constitutional right or a federal

statutory right. 42 USCS §1983.

The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power 'possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.' …

It is firmly established that a defendant in a § 1983 suit acts under color of state law when he abuses the position given to him by the State.

Duran v. Buckner, 157 So. 3d 956, 969 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014).

Both Defendants Witherspoon and Watts are policy makers for the Birmingham City

Schools, a division of the State of Alabama. Witherspoon had been Superintendent of

Birmingham City Schools since March of 2010.3 Watts served as CFO of the Birmingham City

Schools for 13 years.4 As policy makers, both Witherspoon and Watts have statutory duties that

they must fulfill with regard to the placement of employees upon the salary schedule. (see ¶ 1, 3,

& 4 supra)5. Both Witherspoon and Watts report directly to the Birmingham Board of Education.

(Witherspoon Depo. at pg. 19-20, 25-26).

3 http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2014/10/craig_witherspoon_out_as_birmi.html 4 http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2015/04/birmingham_school_system_cfo_a.html 5 All references to specific numbered paragraphs refer to Undisputed Material Facts above.

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C. Defendants Witherspoon and Watts have violated Plaintiffs’ Rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution as well as the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, Article I, §§1, 6, 13, and 22.

1. Defendants Witherspoon and Watts Denied Plaintiffs Due Process

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States says in part “No state

shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the

United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law…” The Constitution of Alabama protects the inalienable rights of the individual

(§§ 1), affords relief from the deprivation of “life, liberty, or property, except by due process of

law” (§§ 6), protects the individual’s right to “due process of law” (§§ 13), and restricts state

actors from impairing the obligations of contracts (§§ 22).

The undisputed record evidence shows that Defendants Witherspoon and Watts had a

clear legal duty to pay in accordance with the Birmingham Board’s 2014 Classified Salary

Schedule. (see ¶1, 2, & 3 supra). Witherspoon and Watts conceded that despite the enactment of

the Classified Salary Schedule they didn’t intend to follow it for all personnel. (see ¶8 supra).

While some Classified personnel were assigned to a salary schedule STEP based on their

“years of experience,” other Classified personnel were moved to a STEP that corresponded with

their 2013 salary. Plaintiffs were moved to a STEP that would represent a technical increase of

their salary but less than they were due under the 2014 Classified Salary Schedule. The HR

Director explained that because Plaintiffs received a slight increase in salary they would not have

access to the appeal mechanism available to employees who receive a loss in salary. (see ¶13

supra). After Plaintiffs became aware that they were being denied credit for years of experience,

they immediately requested assistance to remedy the issue. They were again denied the benefit of

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due process in that neither Defendant Witherspoon nor Defendant Watts remedied the incorrect

placement when requested to do so. (see ¶14 supra).

Defendants Witherspoon and Watts have abused the power and responsibility with which

they were entrusted by the State of Alabama. Defendants had a legal duty to give Plaintiffs credit

for their years of experience and they have admitted that they cannot produce any written policy

which would allow for the arbitrary assignment of employees to lower salary STEPS. Under

color of law, Defendants Witherspoon and Watts intentionally denied Plaintiffs credit for their

years of experience depriving Plaintiffs of the valuable property interest they each possess in

their employment by virtue of having a decade or more of experience. (see ¶9, 10 supra).

Though they requested it, Plaintiffs were given no process in which to correct or even dispute the

deprivation of their rights. In fact, Defendants took intentional steps to deny Plaintiffs access to

the established due process mechanism within the Birmingham City School system. (see ¶7

supra and Affidavits of Smith and Street generally).

This is clearly an unconstitutional taking, done to these Plaintiffs arbitrarily, under color

of law, and without any other avenue of recourse than the above-styled action. The Defendants’

actions are in clear violation of the Due Process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment and

the Constitution of Alabama. In that all material facts are undisputed, summary judgment is

proper and due to be granted as to Plaintiffs’ due process claims.

2. Defendants’ Denied Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Under the Law

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States says in part “No state

shall…deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Alabama

Courts have recognized successful Equal Protection claims where the Plaintiff alleges that they

have been intentionally treated differently than others who are similarly situated and there is no

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rational basis for the difference in treatment. McCord-Baugh v. Birmingham City Bd. of Educ.,

894 So. 2d 692, 693 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004). In McCord-Baugh, the Plaintiff was performing the

duties of a community-school coordinator but received less pay than others who held the title of

community-school coordinator. Plaintiff brought suit to be paid as a community-school

coordinator. The Alabama Supreme Court found that the Plaintiff could bring a 42 USC §1983

action against the Board of Education because she had been treated differently than other

similarly situated community-school coordinators and there was no rational basis for the Plaintiff

to be salaried differently than similarly situated community-school coordinators.

The Code of Alabama requires policies that guide the conduct and management of

schools be in writing, be vetted by the local employee’s professional organization, be

communicated to professional assistants, principals, employees and other interested citizens.

They must be provided to all persons affected by the policy and any changes must be

promulgated in a similar manner. Code of Ala. § 16-1-30 (b). In this case, Defendants

Witherspoon and Watts admitted they cannot produce a written policy establishing any authority

to arbitrarily reduce the years of experience attributed to Plaintiffs for pay purposes. The most

they can say about a policy is that they think one exists and that some unknown person told them

that they think it exists. Witherspoon and Watts cannot rely upon this so-called “procedure”

because the Birmingham Board has not enacted such a policy. Defendants Witherspoon and

Watts’ actions were intentional, done without legal authority, arbitrary and capricious and in

clear violation of the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. (cf Coosa County

Bd. of Educ. v. Hamilton, 778 So. 2d 831 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000)).

There is no legitimate reason for Defendants Witherspoon and Watts to deny Plaintiffs

Smith and Street equal protection of the law by arbitrarily placing them on a salary schedule

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STEP that does not reflect Plaintiffs’ years of experience. Other similarly situated secretaries are

being given full credit for their years of experience. (see ¶12 supra). Newly hired secretaries and

secretaries who were rehired by the Board are also being given full credit for their years of

experience. (see ¶11 supra). Defendant Watts certified that there was enough money in the

budget to cover the salaries as required in the 2014 Certified Salary Schedule. (see ¶4 supra).

However, Defendants Witherspoon and Watts admit that they had no intention of adhering to the

provision that STEP placement was to be categorized as “years of experience.” (see ¶8 supra). In

fact, Defendant Jeffery McDaniels admitted that some, but not all, classified employees were

denied placement on the STEP they were due because it would diminish the reserve fund. (see ¶7

supra).

Defendants Witherspoon and Watts arbitrarily, fraudulently, and in bad faith targeted the

Plaintiffs for a reduction in salary. With the implementation of the 2014 Classified Salary

Schedule, similarly situated secretarial staff continued to receive credit for their years of

experience. Plaintiffs, having drawn the short straw to preserve the reserve fund, shouldered this

responsibility only because Defendants Witherspoon and Watts intentionally and clandestinely

planned to deny arbitrarily selected employees of their constitutionally protected right to equal

protection of the law. This selection of the Plaintiffs to be denied credit for their years of

experience is arbitrary, capricious, and irrational. Defendants Witherspoon and Watts have

offered no legitimate reason nor can they provide a legitimate reason to deny Plaintiffs their

years of experience while allowing others who are similarly situated to receive the benefit. This

is a clear violation of the Plaintiffs’ constitutionally protected right to equal protection. In that all

material facts are undisputed, summary judgment is proper and due to be granted as to Plaintiffs’

equal protection claims.

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IV. Conclusion

Defendants Witherspoon and Watts colluded with HR Director McDaniel to deny

Plaintiffs credit for their years of experience. They did not inform the Plaintiffs it was going to

happen, nor did they inform the Birmingham Board or the Alabama State Department of

Education. Together they formulated and implemented a procedure whereby certain classified

employees would be denied credit for years of experience (and equal protection of the law) while

others similarly situated would receive full credit for their experience. They intentionally gave

the affected employees a small increase in pay specifically for the purpose of denying them

access to the Board-established due process mechanism. They did all this under color of law,

abusing the trust and power of the State of Alabama. For these reasons, Plaintiffs are due an

Order from this Court that Defendants Witherspoon and Watts, as well as the Birmingham

Board, have denied them due process and equal protection under the law, and that Defendants

are liable to Plaintiffs under 42 USC §1983 for general compensatory damages, to include all

back pay, where appropriate, and to restore any and all benefits, as required; and such other and

further relief as necessary to make Plaintiffs fully whole and that this Court Order Defendants to

pay all costs incurred, including reasonable attorneys’ fees. Additionally, Plaintiffs seek to be

awarded such other and further relief, at law or in equity, to which they might otherwise be

reasonably entitled.

Respectfully submitted, s/ Gayle H. Gear Gayle H. Gear, Esq. s/ J. Bryant Hall J. Bryant Hall

The Law Offices of Gayle H. Gear 2229 Morris Avenue Birmingham, AL 35203

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on October 30, 2015, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the AlaFile system, or by United States Postal Service to the following: Afrika Parchman General Counsel, Birmingham Board of Education 2015 Park Place Birmingham, AL 35203 Claire Puckett Carl Johnson Bishop, Colvin, Johnson, & Kent, LLC 1910 1st Avenue North Birmingham, AL 35203

s/Gayle H. Gear Gayle H Gear, Esq. s/J. Bryant Hall J. Bryant Hall, Esq.

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