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SINGAPORE*MODEL!UNITED'NATIONS!2015!

ASEAN +3

study%guide!

Table of Contents Dais Introduction 2

Committee Introduction 2

Topic A: ASEAN Economic Integration 3

Background of ASEAN Economic Integration 3

Major Blocs and Their Positions 7

Questions to Consider 8

Concluding Remarks 9

Recommended Further Reading 9

Topic B: Food Security in Southeast Asia 10

Background 10

Recent Regional Developments 13

Major Blocs and Their Positions 14

Relevant International Treaties and Resolutions 15

Questions to Consider 15

Concluding Remarks 16

Recommended Further Reading 16

Position Paper guidelines 17

Closing remarks 18

Bibliography 19

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Dais Introduction Chairperson: Russell Marino Soh Russell’s MUN experience began in 2011, with the Sustainable Development Youth Convention (SDYC) organized by NUS High School. He served as the fourth SDYC’s Co-Chairperson in 2013, and has also seen success as a delegate, winning awards at the 2012 World Expo MUN (WEMUN) held in China, 2013 Berkeley MUN in the United States, and 2013 SMUN. He also co-edited MUNABRIDGED, an anthology of MUN experiences. After graduating from NUS High School, Russell had a hand in organizing the first three rounds of Fundamental MUN in 2014. He hopes to remain active in the local MUN circuit while serving his National Service, which is set to conclude in April 2016. Besides MUNs, Russell also enjoys poetry and volunteering in his community.

Co-Chairperson: Wang Shi Yun, Winnie Winnie first encountered MUN in 2011 at the SDYC. In the following two years, she was a member of the SDYC’s Academic Team. Since enrolling in the NUS School of Business, she has enriched herself with delegating experience at Fundamental MUN, YNC-AP MUN, NTUMUN and WorldMUN in Seoul. As a freshman, she hopes to keep her MUN streak going throughout her college years. In her free time, Winnie is either fixated on her laptop or chewing on a page of a good ol’ book.

Co-Chairperson: A Kanageswari Kanageswari is a first year undergraduate reading Political Science at NUS. She first ventured into MUNs as part of her college orientation camp in 2014. Since then, coupled with her interest in the ASEAN region, she has discovered her passion for MUNs and is looking forward to her first full-fledged MUN at SMUN 2015. She has facilitated dialogue sessions with former Nominated Members of Parliament to encourage youth participation in community service. She is also an active member of the Girl Guides of Singapore and often plans camps and activities for her fellow volunteers.

Co-Chairperson: Mayang Krisnawardhani Mayang is a second year student at the University of Indonesia, majoring in Social Welfare. She started her MUN career in high school, competing in and winning awards at conferences such as Jakarta MUN and Padjadjaran MUN. She has also served as Chair in councils at Indonesia MUN and Scholastic MUN. She recently represented the University of Indonesia as Head Delegate at the Harvard World Model United Nations in Seoul.

Committee Introduction Overview The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok with the signing of the ASEAN Declaration. The bloc’s founding members: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, created ASEAN to promote political and economic cooperation as well as stability within the region. Over the following years, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam joined, forming today’s ten-member ASEAN.

To strengthen partnerships with the growing East Asian economy, ASEAN+3 was institutionalized, comprising the ten ASEAN member states, along with China, Japan and South Korea. Since the release of the Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation in 1999, leaders of the thirteen states have met annually at the ASEAN+3 Summit with the aim of spearheading and strengthening joint ventures in the region, to develop in both economic and social fields.

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This council will, in particular, focus on economic integration and food security in Southeast Asia; specifically, in the ASEAN+3 region. With a combined population of more than two billion, these are key topics which must be considered to ensure the bloc’s security moving forward. This study guide will cover the background of each topic in context, introduce the basic concepts involved and point out the key issues which need to be addressed in this council. Delegates are encouraged to seek further reading to furnish their understanding of the information provided in this guide.

Rules of Procedure This council shall follow the standard protocol as listed in the SMUN Rules of Procedure guidebook, with the exception of Draft Resolutions and Resolutions. This council will not be passing a Resolution; it will instead be creating Draft Chairman’s Statements and, accordingly, passing Chairman’s Statements. A Chairman’s Statement is distinct from a United Nations Resolution – it is not a single sentence comprising preambulatory and operative clauses. However, clauses as recommended in the SMUN Rules of Procedure guidebook are applicable.

Draft Chairman’s Statements must be unanimously voted upon to pass; that is to say, a single vote against would equate to its failure. However, abstentions are allowed, and will not factor in the vote on Draft Chairman’s Statements.

Topic A: ASEAN Economic Integration Background of ASEAN Economic Integration Economic integration in ASEAN started with the 1977 Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements, which set broad guidelines for cooperation in trade amongst member states. However, with already-established economic regions furthering cooperation through free trade agreements (FTAs), such as the European Union Single Market and North American Free Trade Area, ASEAN began looking towards this avenue to continue establishing itself as a stable economic region.

Today, economic integration within ASEAN comes chiefly through free trade, implemented through FTAs. FTAs are, essentially, agreements to remove tariffs on imports and exports between two states to reduce costs, encourage trade and promote mutual economic growth. FTAs also encourage foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. FDIs are investments made in the industries of another state and can generate economic growth through the sharing of corporate practices across borders and infrastructural improvements, among others.

FTAs work mainly on the basis of comparative advantage – every state is relatively better than other states in producing certain goods. For example, both Singapore and Malaysia are able to produce computer chips; however, due to Singapore’s strong technology industry, it is able to produce and export computer chips at a lower cost than Malaysia. On the other hand, Malaysia’s relatively stronger agricultural sector is able to produce fresh produce more efficiently than Singapore. While both states have the ability to produce both goods, it makes economic sense for both to specialize in producing the goods for which they have a comparative advantage.

Without tariffs on importing and exporting such goods between two states, prices are determined by supply and demand. Each state thus gains from lowered costs and expanded industries, creating more jobs and boosting their individual economies. There exist numerous individual bilateral FTAs amongst member states of ASEAN.

The key FTA tying the whole of ASEAN together is the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). AFTA’s goals of generating economic growth and trade accessibility in ASEAN are primarily achieved though the Common Effective

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Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme – an agreement to implement tariff reductions over time throughout the region. In 2009, the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) was signed, streamlining the provisions of the CEPT scheme upon its implementation in 2010.

There also exist bilateral FTAs between ASEAN and the other members of ASEAN+3 – the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP), and ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Area (AKFTA).

After the implementation of AFTA, economic integration in ASEAN was further set in motion with the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) initiative, adopted in 2003, and its corresponding AEC Blueprint, conceptualized and drafted at the 2006 ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting. The AEC is based on four main goals, to be achieved by the end of 2015:

1.   To create a single market and production base; 2.   To allow ASEAN to become a competitive economic region; 3.   To create fair, equitable economic development; and 4.   To allow ASEAN to integrate into the global economy.

The AEC Blueprint reflects those goals, with specific targets to be met and actions to be taken by 2015. Naturally, the AEC is closely linked to AFTA, which plays a large role by reducing trade tariffs and encouraging industrial specialization, thus creating the aforementioned “single market and production base”. In this paradigm, each ASEAN member state becomes a champion in producing specific goods; these goods are seamlessly transferred amongst member states, and exported to the global market for further economic growth. The AEC Blueprint also sets out goals for technology transfer, free flow of labor and capital, to further cement ASEAN as a single unit, capable of unified, yet individually specialized, growth.

Unequal spread of benefits As of 2014, the AEC has supposedly achieved 82.1% of its stipulated targets. Intra-ASEAN trade, FDIs and GDPs have all risen. However, it should be of note that most of these benefits have not been spread evenly amongst all ten member states. Das (2015) states that “while FDI inflows have gone up from US$21.8 billion in 2000 to US$110.3 billion in 2012 for the ASEAN region as a whole, they have mostly gone to Singapore.”

This is likely to be caused by the “hub and spoke” problem of FTAs between ASEAN and non-member states. In these situations, grouping the whole of ASEAN as a single entity causes disparities and inequity to arise. Weaker economies of ASEAN can often become mere spokes to a central hub (the external non-member state, a stronger economy), whilst the more advanced member states, such as Singapore, are able to achieve more equitable negotiations, and hold their own against non-member states in these negotiations.

That being said, this points to a clear issue in the way in which FTAs between ASEAN and non-member states are being conducted – the needs of the weaker ASEAN economies are insufficiently considered. It is important to realize that ASEAN is diverse not only socially, but also economically – member states range from the economically thriving to those barely established. Delegates should thus consider how FTAs involving ASEAN may be improved or changed, to better accommodate the circumstances of each member state.

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Table 1: Economic Disparities Amongst ASEAN Member States (1995)

Member State GDP (USD billion)

GDP per capita (USD)

FDI inflows (USD billion)

FDI inflows (% of GDP)

FDI inflows (% of ASEAN)

Brunei 4.734 16,047 N.A. N.A. N.A.

Cambodia 3.441 320 0.151 4.4 0.58

Indonesia 201.1 1,041 4.346 2.2 16.8

Laos 1.764 362 0.095 5.4 0.37

Malaysia 88.83 4286 4.178 4.7 16.1

Myanmar N.A. N.A. 0.280 N.A. 1.08

Philippines 74.12 1065 1.478 2.0 5.70

Singapore 87.89 24,937 11.54 13.1 44.5

Thailand 168.0 2,849 2.068 1.2 7.98

Vietnam 20.74 288 1.780 8.6 6.87

Source: World Bank; “N.A.” indicates data not available.

Table 2: Economic Disparities Amongst ASEAN Member States (2013)

Member State GDP (USD billion)

GDP per capita (USD)

FDI inflows (USD billion)

FDI inflows (% of GDP)

FDI inflows (% of ASEAN)

Brunei 16.11 24,185 0.895 5.6 0.70

Cambodia 15.24 709 1.345 8.8 10.4

Indonesia 868.3 1,810 23.29 2.7 18.1

Laos 11.24 751 0.427 3.8 0.33

Malaysia 313.2 6,990 11.58 3.7 8.99

Myanmar 53.14 824 2.254 4.2 1.75

Philippines 272.1 1,581 3.664 1.3 2.85

Singapore 297.9 36,898 63.77 21.4 49.5

Thailand 387.3 3,438 12.65 3.3 9.82

Vietnam 171.4 1,029 8.900 5.2 6.91

Source: World Bank

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Table 1 and 2 above show the economic disparities amongst ASEAN member states – clearly, there is a definite rift between two groups in the bloc. The terms CLMV – an acronym for Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam – and ASEAN-6, referring to the other members, have been in use since the CLMV states first joined ASEAN. ASEAN-6 comprises the more developed and/or stable, large economies; while the CLMV states are relatively unestablished with infant industries. But, despite the AEC Blueprint’s provisions for the CLMV states to catch up, they still lay on the lower end of the Human Development Index; to date, the gap between them and ASEAN-6 remains just as large.

Infrastructural and Logistical Deficiencies The disparity in developmental levels within ASEAN creates further impairment to free trade – infrastructural deficiencies. A lack of infrastructure to distribute goods to the people naturally impairs a state’s ability to import goods from other states, since these goods cannot even reach the people. Even the ASEAN-6 states are not exempt from this lack of infrastructure – Indonesia and the Philippines, too, do not have sufficient infrastructure for imports and distribution.

Table 3: Logistics Performance Index (LPI) Ranking of ASEAN Member States (2014)

Member State Rank (out of 155) Score

Brunei N.A. N.A.

Cambodia 83 2.74

Indonesia 53 3.08

Laos 131 2.39

Malaysia 25 3.59

Myanmar 145 2.25

Philippines 57 3.00

Singapore 5 4.00

Thailand 35 3.43

Vietnam 48 3.15

Source: World Bank, “N.A.” indicates data not available.

Table 3 above highlights the logistical performance of each ASEAN member state – Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar rank the lowest amongst the bloc – Das (2012) argues that their lack of infrastructure and logistics performance negates the benefits of the free flow of goods, even with increased trade facilitation. Indeed, without efficient infrastructure, additional costs are generated in distribution, which results in increased costs on the consumer.

Non-Tariff Barriers Another issue arises from non-tariff barriers (NTBs), also known as non-tariff measures (NTMs); these are trade restrictions which do not impose fees on trade itself, but through other means. This council will focus on one main group of NTBs – preventive barriers to imports. Das notes that “Myanmar, Indonesia and the Philippines are

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seen as the most NTM-restrictive countries, while Cambodia and Thailand are the least restrictive.” Delegates must note that while NTBs are protectionist and a barrier to trade, they also serve as a means for ASEAN states to nurture their domestic industries.

Take, for example, Myanmar. Its location between two of the largest producers in the world, China and India, along with the implementation of AFTA and the AEC Blueprint, has left it struggling. It has to support its domestic industries, and protect itself from becoming an import-reliant state at the cost of its economy. Without tariffs, the only options Myanmar has are to introduce NTBs which will serve its domestic industries and allow them to stay afloat amidst a tidal wave of cheap imports.

Preventive barriers to imports can come in two forms – subsidies and import quotas. Subsidies are a form of financial assistance provided by state governments to local businesses. Subsidies aim to boost the competitiveness of domestic industries and counteract the effects of more developed foreign industries. In theory, with the additional influx of money, businesses can thrive and boost their productivity through research and development, decreasing the need for imports from other states.

Import quotas function similarly to subsidies – as their name suggests, import quotas are a cap on the quantity of a good which can be imported from another state. By restricting how much of a good can be imported, domestic industries are placed front and center, and become the main producer of that good. Once again, this allows domestic industries to be favored over foreign importers, creating domestic growth and boosted employment rates.

In this way, domestic industries should benefit most from these NTBs; however, they directly contradict free trade because they oppose the concept of comparative advantage. While comparative advantage allows individual economies to grow based on who produces which goods best, subsidies distort regional economies by giving assistance to domestic industries which do not naturally have an advantage over their counterparts in other states. Similarly, import quotas restrict the preferable, most cost-efficient flow of goods while generating a cost on the people. Given this, delegates in this council need to consider how to achieve a balance between liberalizing trade and allowing individual member states’ domestic industries to flourish and grow.

Restrictions on flow of skilled labor The free flow of skilled labor has been another challenge for ASEAN in achieving the goals of the AEC. As part of the AEC, Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) have been signed into action for seven service sectors; specifically, accountancy, architecture, dental, education, engineering, medical and nursing. These MRAs grant ASEAN-wide recognition for relevant certification and experience granted or gained in another state. MRAs facilitate mutual development through allowing skilled workers to work in areas where their skill is lacking.

However, these agreements have had little impact on ASEAN; this is likely due to the fact that the sectors signed under the MRAs account for a minute share of total employment in the region. Furthermore, MRAs have had a low take-up rate due to inertia in domestic legislation. Dasgupta and Das (2014) cite the examples of Thailand and Malaysia, both of which have legislation that prevents non-citizens from freely entering as skilled engineers. With such rules in place, the effects of MRAs are likewise negated and cannot translate into tangible benefits for ASEAN.

Major Blocs and Their Positions From the above, it is clear that a large part of the contentions with the ASEAN economic integration stem from developmental gaps amongst member states. The divide between the public and private sectors will also be a significant dynamic which will surface in this council. Delegates are advised to read on their economic position and

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policies, in addition to how they have contributed and been affected by AFTA and the AEC. This section will not be an entirely comprehensive guide to individual states’ positions; the groups discussed below should not be seen so much as separate blocs within this council, but rather groups which have separate concerns.

ASEAN-6 Comprising Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, these are the relatively developed economies of ASEAN. With thriving specialized industries, ASEAN-6 is more poised for complete economic integration and free trade than the CLMV states. In particular, one state which has benefited the most from recent economic integration is Singapore, receiving nearly half of all FDI inflows to ASEAN. While these states may have established industries, the level of development amongst them still varies largely – this is especially prominent in their infrastructural and logistical capabilities. ASEAN-6’s concerns should be on improving infrastructure in the region, as well as maximizing the reduction of tariffs and NTBs.

CLMV states These are the four least developed member states of ASEAN – Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, according to the Human Development Index 2014. In contrast to ASEAN-6, the CLMV states do not possess established industries. What the CLMV states should be concerned with is how they will benefit from economic integration. As discussed above, less-developed nations tend to reap fewer benefits and may be taken advantage of when it comes to free trade. By and large, the CLMV states will fight for their individual interests, mainly addressing local poverty and defending their infant industries in the face of regional competition.

China, Japan and Korea All three states each have bilateral FTAs with ASEAN; naturally, their interest lies in getting efficient trade out of the ASEAN states. ACFTA, between ASEAN and China, is one of the largest FTAs globally, covering a third of the world’s population. The full effects of ACFTA’s tariff cuts will be realized later in 2015, when the CLMV states fully implement them. Japan’s AJCEP has cut import tariffs on fish and fish products, bananas, processed foods, chemical products and wood produced by ASEAN, tariffs worth a total of US$53 billion. Likewise, AKFTA is expected to reap significant economic benefits for both ASEAN and Korea. The three states all have a vested interest in ensuring the development and growth of ASEAN, given their individual FTAs with the bloc.

Questions to Consider In the previous sections, some issues with current ASEAN economic integration were surfaced. With these key points of discussion in mind, delegates are encouraged to consider the following questions as well, and consider relevant solutions which may be applied and presented in this council.

1.   Given that ASEAN is already such a diverse community in terms of individual member states’ economies, how can free trade be achieved within ASEAN without engendering further developmental and economic divide within the bloc? Are ASEAN states ready to commit to tariff-free trade by 2015, as stated in the AEC Blueprint?

2.   It has been discussed that protectionist policies, such as subsidies and import quotas, stem from individual states’ desires to preserve their own economies, but do the benefits outweigh the costs? After all, in the end, consumers and taxpayers bear the brunt of these policies, with increased goods prices and taxes.

3.   Stemming from the above, how can the CLMV states protect their infant industries while contributing to regional free trade?

4.   A lack of infrastructure is another problem discussed in this study guide. Without ample infrastructure, how can ASEAN member states move forward and get the most out of trade liberalization and economic integration? Can provisions be made for infrastructural development in the region?

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5.   What role can the three East Asian states in this council play in furthering economic integration within and beyond ASEAN? Consider that each of the three has separate FTAs with ASEAN. Is there a need, and is it feasible to expand or merge the three agreements?

Concluding Remarks ASEAN has set ambitious goals for itself with the AEC; however, the bloc has a long way to go before being able to achieve the ideals it has set for itself. Without a proper focus and medium for economic and developmental gaps to be bridged, ASEAN has thus far failed to prepare itself amply for full economic integration. The bloc must find the political will to progress further and charge on with the terms of the AEC, and embark on further trade liberalization as well as economic integration, in order to successfully meet the economic trials of the 21st century.

Recommended Further Reading While delegates are encouraged to explore the countless resources available online, below are two key readings which the Dais believes will serve delegates best in providing basic information on this topic as an extension of this study guide. These sources will also provide arguments and proposed solutions to the issues brought up in this study guide. Delegates may wish to consider these ideas when preparing for this council:

1.   Das, Sanchita Basu, Jayant Menon, Rodolfo C. Severino, and Omkar Lai Shreshta. The ASEAN Economic Community: A Work In Progress. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Asian Development Bank, 2013.

This collection of essays by ISEAS researchers on the feasibility of ASEAN achieving the goals of the AEC by 2015 is a good starting point for delegates in the early stages of research. In particular, Sanchita Basu Das has written numerous articles on this particular topic. Her essays provide a good perspective and analysis on the issues discussed within this study guide. Delegates are strongly encouraged to read up on this book and other ISEAS publications, which are readily available on their website, for a comprehensive introduction to ASEAN’s economies.

2.   Findlay, Christopher, et al. ASEAN+1 FTAs and Global Value Chains in East Asia. Jakarta: ERIA, 2011.

This research report lays out how ASEAN has changed and developed in terms of its economic integration policies and strategies. The authors present a detailed analysis of the impacts of past ASEAN actions and how the bloc has adapted to new means of economic integration, with a focus on looking outward – moving beyond just ASEAN, into ASEAN+1 and ASEAN++ FTAs. Delegates can pick up on ASEAN’s development in the past two to three decades, as well as gain insight into the bloc’s ever-changing stance and position on the global economy, given its constant state of flux.

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Topic B: Food Security in Southeast Asia Background Food security is an undeniable fundamental building block of sustainable development. Defined as a condition in which “all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” under the ASEAN Integrated Food Security Framework (AIFS), the elements of food security by extension include availability, accessibility, utilization, and stability of food supply. However, this basic tenet of human survival has always been a challenging agenda for ASEAN, a region deeply vulnerable to vagaries of natural disasters and climate change. At the 2012 ASEAN Summit, ASEAN leaders declared that “food security remains a major challenge for ASEAN and the world as a whole, at a time of high commodity prices and economic uncertainty”.

Throughout the colonial era, ASEAN’s agricultural sector was more focused on producing cash crops for the lucrative spice trade, rather than on daily commodities. Furthermore, efforts to improve irrigation, power, communications and agricultural infrastructure and research were minimal. Naturally, the agricultural systems in these states in post-colonial independence were outdated, inefficient, and had been overexploited for cash crops. Subsequently, land reforms such as loosening institutional structures and providing security to tenants met with mixed success.

As such, throughout the post-colonial 1960s to early 1970s, many ASEAN member states suffered from food shortages – shortages which were covered through massive amounts of donations from regional and international aid programmes. During that tumultuous period, known as the “Green Revolution”, the United States invested large amounts of capital and technical support towards agricultural development in developing states, with a focus on Southeast Asia. High-yielding crop strains, fertilizers, pesticides, agricultural techniques and infrastructure were introduced, along with local initiatives to improve the socioeconomic environment. This resulted in a remarkable spike in crop yields, food production and agricultural incomes – an optimistic trend which continued well into the 1990s.

In 1979, ASEAN member states signed the Agreement on the ASEAN Food Security Reserve (AFSR), which established the ASEAN Emergency Rice Reserve (AERR). The reserve comprises national food security stocks voluntarily pledged to address food emergencies. In times of crisis, these stocks would be disbursed through bilateral negotiations between the state in emergency and the state offering its stocks.

Contemporary Challenges Issues arose around the turn of the 21st century, when population growth in ASEAN surpassed agricultural activity. Numerous reasons were cited for the stagnation of crop yields, including a technological ceiling, ban in pesticides, reduction in land available for new crops, decline in soil fertility, higher pest infestation rates and agricultural ventures being less profitable as they economy modernized. In the wake of these new problems, the AERR suffered from insufficient reserves – in conjunction with the ineffectiveness of government negotiation procedures and insufficient funding for its operations, the AERR never made a single release of its reserves. As a result, early cooperation arrangements of the AFSR failed.

While the prevalence and severity of undernourishment in ASEAN member states have decreased dramatically since the 1990s, many member states have only attained marginal self-sufficiency in food supply and progress at improving food security began to plateau. Although food prices hit a historic low by the end of the 1990s, they

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started to increase again at the turn of the 21st century. In 2008, the price of many major commodities, particularly rice, escalated throughout the world, raising concerns over a global food crisis.

The impacts of the food crisis were compounded by the global financial crisis happening at the same time. Widespread malnutrition afflicted the poor as they ate less and turned to lower quality cereals. Food riots and social unrest occurred in many regions such as Indonesia and Malaysia. The National Bureau of Investigation in the Philippines had to conduct raids to prevent traders from stockpiling and hoarding grains. Double-digit increases in inflation in states such as China, Indonesia and Vietnam also hindered economic growth and prompted governments to impose export restrictions, which discouraged agricultural trade. While some farmers and traders benefitted from the price increase, most of the population was forced to tighten their belts in order to tide over the crisis.

Several factors affect the state of food security in the region. On the demand side, increasing dependence on food imports has resulted in vulnerability to structural changes in the global market, such as the competing demand between agricultural goods for consumption and biofuel industry. On the supply side, agricultural production costs have increased due to higher fuel prices, lower yield from irregular climate patterns and higher inventory costs for perishable commodities. The situation escalated to such worrying levels that UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon acknowledged that it may “pose real threats to economic growth, social progress, and even political security”.

ASEAN member states have tried to cushion small farmers and small-scale producers – their most vulnerable groups of people - with protectionist policies such as export restrictions, price controls, and subsidies and import facilitation, many of which have undermined trade and hampered regional solidarity in the area of food security by contributing to volatility of the regional market. To produce a collective long-term regional solution to these problems, the ASEAN Integrated Food Security (AIFS) Framework was established to support the ASEAN+3 Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR) and East Asia Emergency Rice Reserve (EAERR).

Demographic Challenges According to estimates from the United Nations Population Division, ASEAN’s urban population is expected to increase by about 27% by 2050 to 750 million. Meanwhile, the Asian urban population is expected to increase by about 89%, with China and India accounting for about two-thirds of the increase. Lastly, Asia’s share of the global GDP is expected to increase from 27% (2010) to 52% by 2050. Overall, this points at increasing affluence in Asia as a whole.

These changing demographics have had and will continue to have a massive impact on the region’s consumption patterns; this naturally influences food security policies as well. As regional population and affluence grow, consumption demand is likely to shift from starchy roots and tubers to superior cereals such as rice and wheat; and vegetables to meats. While direct demand for less superior cereals for human consumption may only show gentle increases, the derived demand for cereals in animal feed is expected to accelerate, especially in developing middle income member states. Corn, soybean and wheat imports have seen an increase in mainly Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. In many member states such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, increased demand for imported goods has been met by increased imports instead of the diminishing local agricultural production sector. This would lead to an increase in regional dependency on imports; thus increasing member states’ susceptibility to fluctuating food prices and availability.

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While increases in food intake and quality should ideally be sustained with a healthy agricultural sector and improved domestic production, the agricultural sector in Asia is also undergoing a transformation. According to the World Bank, between 1961 and 2009, agriculture’s share of GDP has fallen from 43% to 18% in South Asia. There are also fewer people working in the agricultural sector, with numbers declining from 66% in 1980 to 50% in 2010. This trend is projected to continue as the region develops further.

Farms are also becoming smaller and older, due to population growth and inheritance-based fragmentation, while the age of agricultural workers has increased steadily. According to the Japanese Agricultural Ministry, 70% of Japanese farmers are 60 years old or older. The younger generation is reluctant to join the farming sector and migratory trends show them moving to cities in search of other career options and further education.

Regardless, based on 2005 estimates, in member states such as Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, a sizable 60-80% of their population still engages in the agricultural sector to earn a humble living. In such states, a healthy and robust agricultural sector drives growth in other non-agricultural sectors and increases self-sufficiency in food supply. Hence, it is of crucial social and economic importance for such member states to exploit further agricultural opportunities in order to provide productive employment for the workforce of a sunset industry.

Environmental Challenges The degradation of natural resources such as land and water contributes to the distress straddling the agricultural sector as well. More than one-fourth of Asia’s total land area, a whopping 4.3 billion hectares, is regularly affected by desertification and drought. Water erosion in degraded soil and water scarcity are also serious issues facing large parts of China, Indonesia and the Philippines. The monsoon season also causes instability in crop yields, especially in unirrigated areas; this in turn results in fluctuating food availability. Floodwaters that inundate large areas of fields also devastate food production, cause losses up to millions of dollars and worsen malnutrition in the poorer regions.

Political Challenges The issue of food security also is muddled with conflicting interests of different groups of people. Supermarkets have replaced traditional supply chains, cutting profit margins and market anticipation of small farmers and small- to medium-sized suppliers. Conversely, local consumers benefit from improved economic and physical access to commodities. Dependence on foreign imports also places strain on foreign exchange reserves of a state that stabilise foreign exchange rates and cushion the country against currency fluctuations.

Combined with the decline in productivity of agriculture, all signs point at problems in the long-term sustainability of the Asian agricultural sector. The repercussions of a lack of food security are numerous. Social instability, as poorer households have limited access to coping mechanisms such as relocating to a more resource-rich area or amassing enough financial resources to pay for the inflated prices of food. More vulnerable families will require more social assistance, before widespread malnutrition and hunger occur, which can lead to social unrest and further social inequality. With the growing complexity in food security ecosystems, modern food security also stretches beyond simply the physical availability of food for the entire population. The multi-dimensional nature of food security also includes improving an individual’s, including the poor and vulnerable, ability to access and secure good quality and nutritious food throughout the year.

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Recent Regional Developments ASEAN Integrated Food Security (AIFS) Framework In response to the sharp spike in food prices during the 2007/8 financial crisis, the AIFS framework was developed to address long-term food security and provide pragmatic approaches for cooperation within ASEAN. The framework consists of four components: strengthening food security arrangements, promoting sustainable food trade, strengthening integrated food security information systems and promoting agricultural innovation.

Strategic Plan of Action on Food Security (SPA-FS) Adopted together with the AIFS framework at the 14th ASEAN summit in March 2009, the SPA-FS aims to attain sustainable food security and improve the livelihood of farmers in the region. Similar to the AIFS, SPA-FS was designed to improve food production, promote effective agricultural practices, encourage favorable markets and trading systems for food commodities, as well as operationalize existing food emergency relief arrangements. However, during the global food crisis, policy responses made limited space for regional initiatives. Effectiveness was limited due to the different food needs and situations of ASEAN member states that cannot be fulfilled with a similar policy approach.

ASEAN + 3 Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR) This reserve builds upon the East Asia Emergency Rice Reserve (EAERR). It was endorsed by ASEAN after the global food crisis to establish emergency food reserves, particularly rice – an Asian diet staple. There are various issues the APTERR has to adequately address in order to ensure effective regional cooperation in managing food security, such as climate change and detailed commitments required of each member state. The reserve’s effectiveness remains to be seen, but it is believed to be only able to alleviate emergencies in the short run, unless prudent and effective management builds its credibility over time and expands its influence through higher state commitment and cooperation with other countries or regions.

L’Aquila Joint Statement on Global Food Security In 2009, the G8 leaders and some developing countries, including China, Indonesia and India agreed on a more comprehensive and coordinated approach to food security strategies. The agreement was reinforced through the L’Aquila Joint Statement on Global Food Security and a commitment to raise $22 billion over three years for agricultural investment. The general approach is centered on five principles:

1.   Investment in country-led plans; 2.   Comprehensive approach to food security including humanitarian support and sustainable agricultural development;

3.   Strategic coordination of assistance; 4.   Strong role for multilateral institutions; and 5.   Sustained commitment of financial resources.

Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme (GAFSP) In April 2010, the GAFSP was established with a view towards sustainable development. GAFSP works to finance medium- and long-term efforts to improve agricultural productivity, increase incomes, and ensure food and nutrition security in low-income countries by responding to specific needs of countries. Currently, the programme is funded by both the public and private sector in a total of 31 states and has received funding amounting to US$1.3 billion. The impacts of ongoing GAFSP projects have been substantial. In Rwanda, the GAFSP partnered with the government to introduce land and irrigation projects that have increased the productivity and commercialisation of small farmers. In Bangladesh, the GAFSP financed the Agricultural Productivity Project that introduced better training, techniques and infrastructure, hence improving the livelihoods of smallholder farmers. In many of its

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projects, the GAFSP has also managed to co-operate with relevant government agencies and serve as leverage for additional funding, owing to its credibility amongst donors.

Major Blocs and Their Positions Cambodia and Myanmar Cambodia has maintained a national surplus in its production of rice since 1995. Ironically, despite its theoretical self-sufficiency in production, Cambodia actually imports rice from external markets due to problems in the local distribution of rice. In 2008, the government banned the export of rice; however, the state’s small inventory capacity and skyrocketing global prices caused this ban to be lifted just months later.

Myanmar faces a similar problem – as the largest ASEAN member state by land size, it is rich in natural resources and is one of the largest producers of rice in the world. However, malnutrition is rampant in Myanmar as households lack access to food. One in three Burmese children under the age of five is underweight. Cambodia and Myanmar are the epitome of infrastructural deficiencies in ASEAN member states – their needs will center mainly on securing proper channels of distributing food locally, given that local production is already sufficient for their own needs.

China China is currently one of the top exporters of food globally. In 2005, it became ASEAN’s third largest agricultural export market in fruits, vegetables, processed foods and fish. On the other hand, China also imports a large amount of agricultural commodities such as vegetable oil and rubber from ASEAN. While China’s role as a great exporter has grown, its local food security is not certain. Instability of food prices and supply, as well as an increasing income gap have reduced accessibility to food and created large rifts between the rich and poor in China. China’s main interests will likely lie in tapping on ASEAN’s growing production base as a springboard for the former’s own food needs.

Laos Around 25% of the Lao population lives in poverty. Locally, Laos imports a large amount of its rice demand. However, local prices remain high; in response to this, the Lao government introduced restrictions on the exportation of rice, and providing low-interest loans to local farmers to encourage productivity. Oddly enough, the global food crisis hit Laos less dramatically than other ASEAN member states – this is likely because its main staple, sticky rice is produced locally and not imported. As such, it was able to exercise self-sufficiency and resilience in that period. Laos’ concerns lie in how food can be traded more cheaply (and potentially preferentially within Southeast Asia) such that it can secure food for its people.

Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines These states are highly dependent on imports of rice to support local demand. Their main concerns are local production feasibility, regional food prices and resilience in times of crisis.

Like many Asian states, rice is a primary staple for Indonesia. However, only 10 of its 33 provinces produce rice, an insufficient amount for the local population. Currently, Indonesia imports rice from regional partners such as India, Myanmar, Pakistan, Thailand and Vietnam; annual imports have increased by 10% year on year. However, 8.6% of Indonesians remain undernourished – food security is as such a persistent challenge for the local government. In 2009, Indonesia was listed as one of ASEAN’s low-income food-deficit states.

Despite having 17.5% of its land area designated to agriculture, Malaysia remains highly dependent on imports of food for local consumption and processing. To fully meet local demand for its population of 30 million, Malaysia

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imports about 30 to 40% of its rice. In light of the global food crisis, the Malaysian government increased national rice stocks and encouraged local farmers to increase productivity. However, Malaysia's resilience in times of crisis remains to be seen, given its high reliance on imports.

The problems with Philippines’ high dependence on food imports was most clearly highlighted in the global food crisis – they paid increasingly high premiums for already-restricted rice from Vietnam, which led to dramatically escalated local food prices. The state’s lack of buffer space in times of crisis has trickled down to suffering for their people.

Thailand As the globally-proclaimed “rice basket” of the world, Thailand produces a great amount of the global demand for rice. Producing 35 million tons of the staple grain in 2010, Thailand is the top producer and exporter of rice on the global market, with an annual export of about 8.5 million tons. Undernourishment in the state has fallen significantly to 16% in 2011 from 26% in 1990. As a global provider of rice, Thailand is in a prime position to contribute to initiatives such as APTERR, but it must also consider its local needs as a newly-developed nation.

Relevant International Treaties and Resolutions Food Assistance Convention (FAC) Adopted on 25 April 2012, the FAC is the only legally binding international treaty on food aid which requires signatories to provide a minimum amount of wheat or financial commitment. It covers a broader range of food items (defined as “nutritious food”) and explicitly calls on signatories to carry out evaluations on food aid programmes, as compared to its predecessor, the Food Aid Convention. While the new convention appears promising in terms of delivering a greater quantity of food aid and improving food aid effectiveness, concerns have been raised over the predictability of future donor contributions. The impacts of the Food Assistance Convention remain to be seen.

Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Established in 1945, the FAO is an agency of the United Nations that aims to eliminate hunger and improve nutrition and standards of living through enhancing agricultural productivity. As a neutral forum, the FAO serves both developing and developed nations by facilitating negotiations on agreements and policy debates. It has since created various conventions and launched many successful campaigns such as the EndingHunger online campaign they organized in partnership with other UN agencies and NGOs in 2011. By rallying efforts of the international community to promote effective strategies in agricultural development, the FAO has successfully promoted knowledge-sharing among member nations. Today, it is in the process of reforming itself for a more transparent and result-oriented organization.

Questions to Consider Food supply instability and insecurity are complex problems resulting from the interplay of a wide range of factors operating at different levels. Delegates are expected to address these issues as adequately as possible, taking into account their country’s stance and policies.

1.   In light of individual member states’ challenges, such as emerging demographic changes, is it possible for member states to create blanket solutions to food security issues? How can each member state’s requirements be addressed to ensure sustainable food security policies in the long run?

2.   How might biotechnological applications in agriculture, such as high-yield crops introduced during the Green Revolution, be better distributed to all who need them?

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3.   Given the limitations of physical food reserves, what other types of measures may be taken to ensure multidimensional food security throughout the population? Additionally, how can each member state’s limitations be factored in to the solutions crafted by this committee?

4.   Given the conflicting nature of the interests of different groups, how can member states strike a balance between domestic food security and economic openness?

Concluding Remarks Food security is very much still a pressing matter which this committee needs to address with urgency. Individual states remain uncertain on the sustainability of their food production bases and policies, while the region as a whole is almost wholly unprepared for any potential food crises. Delegates thus need to carefully consider their role in the larger scale of regional food security, while at the same time ensuring that their domestic interests are taken care of.

Recommended Further Reading While delegates are encouraged to explore the countless resources available online, below are two key readings which the Dais believes will serve delegates best in providing basic information on this topic as an extension of this study guide. These sources will also provide arguments and proposed solutions to the issues brought up in this study guide. Delegates may wish to consider these ideas when preparing for this council:

1.   Pearson, Craig, et al. The Challenge of Food Security: International Policy and Regulatory Frameworks. Edited by Rosemary Rayfuse and Nicole Weisfelt. London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012.

This is a collection of essays by researchers, professors and lawmakers which examines food security related issues from both academic and policymaking perspectives that sheds light on the complex nature of the debate. The writers have provided a good analysis the roots causes of food insecurity and addressed past initiatives as well as regulatory challenges in ensuring a sustainable, adequate and equitable access to food. Delegates may wish to craft recommendations from the lessons learnt from previous policy implementations across the region as explored in this book.

2.   Redfern, Suzanne K., Nadine Azzu, and Jesie S. Binamira. "Rice in Southeast Asia: Facing Risks and Vulnerabilities to Respond to Climate Change." Building resilience for adaptation to climate change in the agriculture sector. Proceedings of a Joint FAO/OECD Workshop, Rome, Italy, 23-24 April 2012. Rome: FAO, 2012. 295-314.

This paper examines the climate and socioeconomic threats facing the production of Southeast Asia’s most important grain – rice. While a significant portion of this topic is rooted in creating food accessibility for people, delegates must also consider this topic from a technical viewpoint and consider feasibility in any proposed solutions. Delegates are thus encouraged to enrich their knowledge on current agricultural technologies used in the region and the technicalities of possible agricultural improvements through the resilience-building recommendations in this paper.

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Position Paper guidelines All delegates are required to submit position papers detailing their country’s stance on the respective topics and proposing solutions they would support. Position papers introduce the Dais to your stance, and help you orient your position and prepare for the conference. Though position papers are not intended to be all-encompassing, they are a good springboard for your interactions in the committee and will help you identify fellow delegates with similar ideas. You do not have to feel like you are bound to every word on your position paper; your opinion may change over the course of the conference, and that is alright.

Generally, each position paper per topic could include: a brief statement of the problem and/or its history, with emphasis on its relationship with your country; past actions taken by your represented country; and the answers to the questions a resolution must answer, including collaborative and comprehensive solutions.

Please keep your position papers to a maximum of one page per topic, single spaced with Times New Roman 12 font and justified alignment. Please include your committee, country and topic at the heading. You are encouraged to use headings, subheadings, bold and italics as per necessary. However, the Secretariat strongly discourages the use of national symbols or flags, so as to allow delegates more space to express their stance within the page limit per topic, and for easy viewing.

Please note that late submissions of position papers without valid reasons or prior approval for an extension by the Chairpersons could be counted against them in decisions for all awards. The submission deadline for position papers is on Wednesday, 03 June 2015, at 11.59 pm Singapore time (GMT+8). Please submit your position papers to <smun15.asean3@gmail.com>

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Closing remarks The dais of ASEAN+3 looks forward to meeting you this June! In preparation for the conference, we have the following tips for the conference:

Research - This study guide should not be the only document for delegates to prepare their conference for. As an additional tip, if you are using Google to search for sources online, you could type “pdf” followed by a space and the topic you want to look for (e.g. “pdf ASEAN food security” or “pdf ASEAN Economic integration”). It would reveal academic articles and reports that would make things easier for your research.

Preparation for the conference - We urge all delegates not to “spot” or predict topics will be discussed in the conference, because both topics will be discussed. That being said, agenda setting is still important, because you would want to create a stronger impression in your stronger topic that you want the council to debate on.

Decorum – Delegates are reminded that this conference is a simulation of multilateral diplomatic negotiations. As delegates will be representing member states of the international community, they are reminded to observe decorum in their conduct and speeches. This includes ensuring that delegates clean up after themselves and ensuring that conference rooms are kept clean at the end of each committee session.

Most importantly, make friends at the conference and have fun! You will never know how paths will cross again many years down the road, where you may be delegates this conference, but maybe buddies during National Service (for the boys from Singapore) or classmates in University. Should you have any queries, please email the Dais at <smun15.asean3@gmail.com>

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Das, Sanchita Basu. "Can the ASEAN Economic Community be Achieved by 2015?" Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Perspective, no. 7 (2012).

Das, Sanchita Basu. "The ASEAN Economic Community: An Economic and Strategic Project." Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Perspective, no. 4 (2015): 3.

Das, Sanchita Basu, Jayant Menon, Rodolfo C. Severino, and Omkar Lai Shreshta. The ASEAN Economic Community: A Work In Progress. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Asian Development Bank, 2013.

Dasgupta, Sukti, and Sanchita Basu Das. "The Limited Impact of the ASEAN Economic Community on Skilled Labour Migration." Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Perspective, no. 48 (2014): 1-8.

Deardorff, Alan V. "Benefits and Costs of Following Comparative Advantage." Research Seminar in International Economics. no. 423. Michigan, January 12, 1998.

Fan, Liang-Shing, and Chuen-Mei Fan. "On the Welfare Effect of an Equivalent Tariff and Quota." Economic Issues 10 (2005).

Findlay, Christopher, et al. ASEAN+1 FTAs and Global Value Chains in East Asia. Jakarta: ERIA, 2011.

Geib, Peter, and Lucie Pfaff. "China: Trade Agreements and Relationships with Southeast Asian Nations." Journal of Management Policy and Practice 13, no. 2 (2012): 56-65.

Herrmann, Ulrike. Free Trade: Project of the Powerful. Brussels: HDMH, 2014.

Loungani, Prakash, and Assaf Razin. "How Beneficial is Foreign Direct Investment for Developing Countries?" Finance & Development 38, no. 2 (2001).

Park, Donghyun, Innwon Park, and Gemma Esther B. Estrada. "Is the ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Area (AKFTA) an Optimal Free Trade Area?" Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration, no. 21 (2008).

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Severino, Rodolfo. "The ASEAN Developmental Divide and the Initiative for ASEAN Integration." ASEAN Economic Bulletin, no. 24.1 (2007): 35-44.

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Galero, Sealtiel, Steven So, and Marites Tiongco. "Food Security versus Rice Self-Sufficiency: Policy Lessons from the Philippines." DLSU Research Congress. Manila: De La Salle University, 2014.

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Mathur, Arpita. "Rising Food Prices and Food Security: Impact of the 2008 Food Crisis on Asia." Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies Insight, August 2010: 1-8.

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Md Razak, Mohamad Idham, Afzan Sahilla Mohd Amir Hamzah, Norazira Abas, Rafidah Idris, and Zakimi Ibrahim. "Sustaining Food Production for Food Security in Malaysia." Journal of Economics and Development Studies 1, no. 2 (2013): 19-25.

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