MAJOR MARK S. LESLIE

TSM STRYKER/BRADLEYCORNER

“Where precision fire is concerned, the sniper exists as thepremiere and undisputed answer to the use of deadly force withthe least chance of collateral damage and use of excessive force.”

— U.S. Army Sniper School

In an operating environment like Iraq, with an insurgencyaimed at disrupting stability and reconstruction operations, the ability to place precision fires on the targeted enemy

and only the targeted enemy is paramount to a successfulcounterinsurgency fight. The sniper and his abilities are essentialand critical tools that every commander must address during theplanning process. The Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) isan organization that has a larger and more flexible sniper taskorganization than its counterparts in light or mechanized infantryunits.

Appendix C of FM 3-21.2, Stryker Brigade Combat TeamInfantry Battalion, puts the role of snipers in the SBCT intoperspective:

“Snipers play an important role in the SBCT infantry battalion.They give the commander accurate, discriminatory, long-rangesmall-arms fire. The best use of sniper fire is against key targetsthat other available weapon systems may be unable to destroydue to their range, size, or location; visibility; security and stealthrequirements; avoidance of collateral damage; intensity ofconflict; or rules of engagement. The techniques snipers use enablethem to gather detailed, critical information about the enemy asa secondary role. The effectiveness of a sniper is not measuredsimply by the number of casualties or destroyed targets; snipereffectiveness also includes the effect the presence of snipers hason enemy activities, morale, and decisions. The presence of snipershinders the enemy’s movement, creates confusion and personalfear, disrupts enemy operations and preparations, and compelsthe enemy to divert forces to deal with the snipers.”

Compared to the other infantry formations in our Army today,the SBCT snipers are uniquely suited for the mission we face

in our current global war on terrorism due to thesignificant, substantial increase in sheer numbers, and

task organization within the SBCT. This is not meantto imply that theindividual snipersthemselves are any

better than theircounterparts in other

battalions, only to suggest that the taskorganization of the SBCT supports the role of

the sniper element better than previousformations.

Task OrganizationThe doctrinal sniper task organization in the SBCT

is a sniper squad at the battalion level and three snipers inevery infantry company. That would bring the total to 48 snipers

per SBCT. This is a substantial increase from other organizations.Snipers are capable of inflicting the right amount of force at theexact time and location the commander wants with minimalresources and with minimal collateral damage and negative impactupon the community we are there to protect. The battalion sniper

Snipers in the SBCT

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Photo by Mike Buytas

squad is at the disposal of the battalioncommander to use with as METT-TC(mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time,civilians) requires. It can and often isconsidered a separate maneuver element.This sniper squad gives the battalioncommander the capability to place precisionfires on a target with minimal collateraland/or negative effects, at multiplelocations throughout his battlespace. Thebattalion sniper squad is composed of twothree-man sniper teams with a sniper squadleader. Each team is armed with an M107sniper rifle, an M24 sniper rifle, and anM16/M203 per team. The company sniperteam gives a company commander thesame capability to place precision fires ona target with minimal collateral and/ornegative effects as the battalion commanderat a reduced scale. Company sniper teamsare composed of three Soldiers: a teamleader and two snipers. They are armedwith an M24 sniper rifle, an M107, andM16/M203 per team. This allows thecompany commander the ability to taskorganize his sniper team appropriatelybased off of the mission at hand withoutseeking additional assets from the battalionlevel for precision fires.

Compared with a light/airborne/airassault infantry battalion, the additionalcapabilities and tools at the hands of theSBCT battalion and company commandersare striking. A light/airborne/air assaultinfantry battalion has six two-man sniperteams organic to the scout platoon that areused by the battalion commander as METT-TC dictates. These six two-man teams arearmed with three M24 sniper rifles andthree M107 sniper rifles. This is a healthyasset that has and will continue to be usedeffectively in our operating environments.But, this task organization is restrictivecompared to the SBCT. The companieshave no organic precision-fire capability,other than designated marksmen, at theirdisposal. The quality of designatedmarksmen in all units is often tempered bythe equipment available, training, andcommander’s focus on precision-firetraining. A mechanized infantry battalion’sprecision capability is even more restricted.By task organization, the mechanizedinfantry battalion has two snipers per riflecompany, each armed with an M107 sniperrifle and an M24 sniper rifle. The battalions

also utilize squad designated marksmen.Recognizing the need for precision fires inour current operating environment in Iraq,some mechanized infantry battalions haveconsolidated their snipers at the battalionlevel, somewhat mirroring the SBCTdoctrinal task organization. But this comesat the expense of the company commandersin terms of boots on the ground. It is aninvestment that is usually profitable,increasing the flexibility and capability of thebattalion commanders. Compare this to theSBCT, which has the precision-fire capabilityorganic to the battalion and company levelswith the flexibility to “surge” precision-firecapabilities at the company or even platoonlevel when the need is identified for specificoperations. Of course, the ability to surgeassets to one company is not unique to theSBCT, and the need to do so may be less oftenexercised due to the multitude of precision-fire capabilities organic at the battalion andcompany levels in the SBCT. In turn, it alsodoes not deny the other units within thebattalion the precision-fire capability that isoften the best answer in a counterinsurgencyfight.

Even though sniper teams avoid contactuntil they have identified their targets andinvolvement in sustained close combat isnot the optimal employment of sniperteams, the enemy and circumstances incombat often change that equation, and thesniper teams themselves have little say soin the matter. One of the unique elementsof the SBCT sniper capability is that in lieuof the traditional two-man teams, anadditional Soldier has been added as asecurity man. This is an improvement overpast sniper team organizations in that itgives the sniper team additional organicsecurity without having to rely onadditional assets from the parent

organization. The additional security manis a part of the sniper team and is not onlyable to provide security but transition to therole of sniper if the need arises.Additionally, he can assist in thetransportation of what is often a heavyamount of equipment that the modernsniper needs to stay alive on the modernbattlefield. The battalion sniper squad is abattalion asset to be used at the battalioncommander’s discretion. The emphasisplaced on snipers at every level within theSBCT lends credence to the Army’sevolving picture on warfare in this century.In a counterinsurgency, the need forprecision fires is often greater than in thetraditional fight. The need to destroy onlythe designated target with minimalcollateral damage in a counterinsurgencyfight often makes our Army’s technologicaland heavy weapons a disadvantage.

TrainingCurrently, the U.S. Army Sniper School

has no training specific to the SBCT or anyother type of unit, and rightly so. Themission of the Sniper School focuses ondeveloping and sharpening the skills of theindividual sniper. According to Sniper

September-October 2006 INFANTRY 7

Figure 1 — Battalion Sniper Squad

Figure 2 — Company Sniper Team

TSM STRYKER/BRADLEY CORNER

School officials, SBCTs are proportionally represented in sniperclasses and have in the past performed above standard duringpre-train ups prior to mobile training teams (MTTs) conductedon-site by Sniper School cadre, resulting in a large number oftrained Snipers within the SBCTs.

While preparing this article, I conducted interviews with twoSniper School instructors from the 2nd Battalion, 29th InfantryRegiment at Fort Benning, Ga., who have served in an SBCT assnipers in Iraq. Staff Sergeants Shannon Kay and Joseph Brownboth served in Stryker units during their tours of Iraq. They bothhad very positive experiences as snipers in a SBCT and have aplethora of knowledge on how snipers in the SBCT operate andtrain. Both had very positive things to say in regards to theirtraining at Sniper School and said the training had prepared themfor what was expected from snipers in combat. Neither Soldierrecommended that any “unit-specific” (such as the SBCT) trainingbe implemented in Sniper School as it would detract from theprimary mission of training snipers on the individual skillsrequired of them. Both agreed that this would be a task better leftto the unit and felt that the unit was better suited to conduct thistraining before and after a sniper’s graduation from the school.This is based on the premise that the unit prepares the Soldier toattend Sniper School by focusing on the basics of being a sniperand what is required to complete the training. Sniper School thengives the sniper the foundation. After graduating from SniperSchool, the unit then capitalizes on the basic groundworkingrained and focuses its training depending on the type oforganization. From their combat experience, both SSGs Kay andBrown agreed that other than marksmanship skills, target detectionis probably the single most important skill learned in SniperSchool. Often, a sniper’s job is 90-percent observation andreporting and at best, 10-percent actual engagement. Otherinstruction that the two NCOs found extremely useful included:pistol training, urban operations training, and unorthodox and/oroffhand shooting exercises.

Home station training focused largely around marksmanshipskills, demolition classes and breach exercises, infiltration andexfiltration exercises as well as developing rapport with the restof the company at the company level and with the line companiesfor the battalion sniper squad. In hindsight, both agreed that roomclearing was a skill that the sniper teams needed to hone andbecome proficient at prior to deployment. As experienced NCOs,both were proficient and comfortable with room clearing drillswith a squad, but clearing a room with a sniper team, with reducedcombat power and direct fire assets, was something new. No teamwas ever committed to any openly hostile building where theyhad received direct fire and were required to clear the enemy andestablish a hide, but as all good Soldiers know, prior toestablishment of a position, in this case a hide site, the area mustbe cleared. While overtly clearing a building with a four-manstack from a platoon is one thing, clearing a building covertly,with a three-man sniper team with pistols and bolt action rifles,is quite another.

One area of particular concern in the sphere of training andtask organization is the snipers at the company level. While thecommand relationship and employment of the snipers at the

battalion and company levels was a positive atmosphere, the levelsof training varied. This is probably due to the fact that there areonly three snipers at the company level, and although they aredesperately needed and a valued asset, the commander’s focusand priority for training is to the bulk of his company. While havinga sniper team organic at the company level in combat and traininggives the company commander a degree of flexibility and optionsthat are needed in the counterinsurgency fight, the method oftraining them at home station prior to deployment becomesdifficult. It may be better to have all snipers in the battalion at thebattalion level, effectively having two sniper squads. This wouldallow the battalion commander to ensure quality control and acommon baseline for training for all sniper teams throughout thebattalion. The sniper teams in the second squad could be habituallyassigned to the same company on training exercises to developthe rapport necessary for proper support and employment. Once adeployment order is received, the operational control of the sniperscould then be given to their respective companies. This wouldallow the company commander to inherit a trained sniper teamthat he and his subordinates have developed a relationship andrapport with, without losing any capabilities organic to the SBCT,and allow him to focus on the majority of his combat power. Thiswould also allow the battalion commander to ensure that all of hissniper teams are trained to a common standard, have comparableskills, and would ease training as far as ranges, etc.

Sniper Employment OfficerThe issue of “who is the Sniper Employment Officer or SEO”

at both the battalion and company levels is often overlooked andsometimes not even addressed. This is a critical issue to ensurethat the commander gets the most out of all his assets. During themilitary decision-making process (MDMP), both at the battalionand company levels, all units are represented with what they canbring to the fight. To ensure that the snipers at all levels areemployed in accordance with the commander’s intent and properlywithin their capabilities, it is paramount that they are representedin the MDMP process. The sniper squad leader usually was presentat the battalion level and served as the S-3’s “go to” guy for allsniper-related issues as far as employment, capabilities, etc. Hewas also the person that did not let the S-3 forget about the sniperassets available to the battalion when the S-3 was focusing on thebigger moving pieces and mechanics involved in a battalion fight.

At the company level, it usually fell upon the executive officer(XO) to act as the company SEO. This was not by design, butworked out extremely well when looking at the SBCT companytask organization. No vehicle is specifically designated as the“mover” of the sniper team. A Stryker Mortar Carrier Vehicle

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It may be better to have all snipers in thebattalion at the battalion level, effectively

having two sniper squads. This would allow thebattalion commander to ensure quality control

and a common baseline for training for allsniper teams throughout the battalion.

(MCV) orFire SupportVehicle (FSV) wereusually designated to carry thesniper team on administrative moves.Often attached to platoons for operations,the snipers would do as snipers in allorganizations have done in the past andmake themselves part of the platoon for theinsertion in their vehicles. Whenconducting infiltrations separate orindependent from a platoon or the rest ofthe company, the XOs used either the MCVor the FSV to insert the teams. This workedout well, gave the sniper team independentsupport without hindering or reducing thecombat power of the platoons, and allowedthe commander visibility of the sniper teamat all times through the XO.

Intelligence and EquipmentSupport

The available intelligence assets organicto the SBCT battalion are fairly robustcompared to that of their counterparts inthe heavy and light battalions. This allowsthe intelligence officer the ability to developvery good target folders and “real time”imagery and video to assist the snipers inmission planning and hide site selection.Both SSGs Kay and Brown reportedregularly receiving target folders andproducts from the S-2 that enhanced theircapabilities to plan and determine thefeasibility of a mission. Of course, extensiveplanning on a battlefield such as Iraq wasnot always a luxury snipers had, and theyoften had to operate off of verbal orders viaFM radio. They were, however, still ableto get “real-time” intelligence updates fromthe S-2 from the assets available, whichwere fed to them as situations developed.

While the snipers in an SBCT are notequipped with any more or less specialequipment than snipers in any other unit,their observations on some of the equipmentdeserve noting.

1. The Stryker vehicle itself is anexcellent insertion/extraction vehicle dueto its high speed, low or subdued noisesignature, and agility. Deception operationsare a viable insertion technique, and theStryker’s reduced noise signature can easily

Major Mark S. Leslie is currently serving asthe deputy chief of Training and Organization forthe Stryker Transformation Team at Fort Benning,Ga. He is a 1997 OCS graduate and has almost20 years of service in the Infantry. He has servedas a Long Range Surveillance Team Leader,Ranger Instructor, and commanded A Companyand HHC of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1stCavalry Division. MAJ Leslie is a veteran ofOperations Just Cause, Desert Shield/DesertStorm and Iraqi Freedom.

September-October 2006 INFANTRY 9

capitalize on the observation mission of thesnipers. This allows a unit to investigatewhat the sniper observes when deadly forceis not desired or when they do not want tocompromise their position, without theobserved target receiving early warning(due to noise) of their approach.

2. The PVS 10 scope is a good piece ofequipment but rather fragile, and repairsin country were difficult.

3. The AN/PRC 148 radio is an excellentpiece of equipment that needs to be standardequipment for all sniper teams.

4. Suppressors for sniper weapons are amust. They reduce a sniper’s signature andreduce the chances of compromise once anengagement is initiated, therefore increasingsurvivability and reducing the possibility ofhaving to conduct a displacement once anengagement is initiated.

5. In an SBCT, the M107 rifle’s role islimited in its employment due to thephenomenal ability of the Remote WeaponSystem (RWS) in the Stryker. This lendsvalidity to the “arms room” concept of thesniper in the SBCT. The trained sniperknows best the weapon of choice for themission at hand.

The SBCT is a unique organization inour Army today. It has organic assetsspecially suited for the counterinsurgencyfight. The number of precision-fire assetsavailable to the maneuver commander isunprecedented. The flexibility of havingnumerous precision fire teams afford theSBCT commander the ability and flexibilityto not only kill the enemy, but ensure thatonly the enemy is killed, preserving theprecious, carefully cultivated relationshipsdeveloped with our Iraqi partners.

“Untutored courage is useless in theface of educated bullets.”

— General George Patton

Photo by Staff Sergeant Kevin L. Moses

A Soldier with the 2nd Battalion,22nd Infantry Regiment providessecurity during a mission in Iraq.