Intellectual Property

A SURVEY OF THE LAW

2017 CASE UPDATE SUPPLEMENT

Ned Snow

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A Case Update for Chapter 10, Part C – Useful Articles

Recently in Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., the Supreme Court has attempted to clarify the conceptual separability analysis. The Court explained that an aesthetic feature of a useful article is eligible for copyright protection only if the feature:

(1) can be perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful article; and

(2) would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work—either on its own or fixed in some other tangible medium of expression—if it were imagined separately from the useful article into which it is incorporated.

In setting forth this test for conceptual separability, the Court rejected reasoning that lower courts had employed in the past. Specifically, the Court rejected the argument that a creator’s design methods and purposes could suggest conceptual separability. The Court taught that rather than inquiring into the design process of the article, courts should instead examine how the article and feature are perceived. At the same time, the Court rejected the argument that the market’s reaction to a work may suggest conceptual separability.

StarAthletica,L.L.C.v.VarsityBrands,Inc.137S.Ct.1002(2017)

THOMAS,J.

Congresshasprovidedcopyrightprotectionfororiginalworksofart,butnotforindustrialdesigns.Thelinebetweenartandindustrialdesign,however,isoftendifficulttodraw.Thisisparticularlytruewhenan industrialdesign incorporatesartisticelements.Congresshasafforded limitedprotection for these

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artisticelementsbyprovidingthat“pictorial,graphic,orsculpturalfeatures”ofthe“designofausefularticle” are eligible for copyright protection as artistic works if those features “can be identifiedseparatelyfrom,andarecapableofexistingindependentlyof,theutilitarianaspectsofthearticle.”1

We granted certiorari to resolve widespread disagreement over the proper test for implementing §101’s separate-identification and independent-existence requirements. We hold that a featureincorporatedintothedesignofausefularticleiseligibleforcopyrightprotectiononlyifthefeature(1)canbeperceived as a two- or three-dimensionalworkof art separate from theuseful article and (2)wouldqualifyasaprotectablepictorial,graphic,orsculpturalwork—eitheronitsownorfixedinsomeothertangiblemediumofexpression—ifitwereimaginedseparatelyfromtheusefularticleintowhichitisincorporated.Becausethattestissatisfiedinthiscase,weaffirm.

I

RespondentsVarsityBrands,Inc.,VarsitySpiritCorporation,andVarsitySpiritFashions&Supplies,Inc.,design,make,andsell cheerleadinguniforms.Respondentshaveobtainedoracquiredmore than200U.S.copyrightregistrationsfortwo-dimensionaldesignsappearingonthesurfaceoftheiruniformsandother garments. These designs are primarily “combinations, positionings, and arrangements ofelements” that include “chevrons ..., lines, curves, stripes, angles, diagonals, inverted [chevrons],coloring,andshapes.”

Petitioner Star Athletica, L.L.C., also markets and sells cheerleading uniforms. Respondents suedpetitioner for infringing their copyrights in the five designs. The District Court entered summaryjudgmentforpetitioneronrespondents’copyrightclaimsonthegroundthatthedesignsdidnotqualifyasprotectablepictorial,graphic,orsculpturalworks.Itreasonedthatthedesignsservedtheuseful,or“utilitarian,”functionofidentifyingthegarmentsas“cheerleadinguniforms”andthereforecouldnotbe“physicallyorconceptually”separatedunder§101“fromtheutilitarianfunction”oftheuniform.2

TheCourtofAppealsfortheSixthCircuitreversed.3...

II

. . . TheCopyrightActalsoestablishesa special rule forcopyrightingapictorial,graphic,or sculpturalwork incorporated into a “useful article,”which is definedas “anarticlehaving an intrinsic utilitarianfunction that is notmerely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.” Thestatutedoesnotprotectusefularticlesassuch.Rather,“thedesignofausefularticle”is“consideredapictorial, graphical, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporatespictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable ofexistingindependentlyof,theutilitarianaspectsofthearticle.”

Courts, theCopyrightOffice,andcommentatorshavedescribedtheanalysisundertakentodeterminewhether a feature can be separately identified from, and exist independently of, a useful article as“separability.” Inthiscase,ourtask is todeterminewhetherthearrangementsof lines,chevrons,and

117U.S.C.§101.22014WL819422,*8–*9(W.D.Tenn.,Mar.1,2014).3799F.3d468,471(2015).

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colorful shapes appearing on the surface of respondents' cheerleading uniforms are eligible forcopyrightprotectionasseparablefeaturesofthedesignofthosecheerleadinguniforms.

A

Asaninitialmatter,wemustaddresswhetherseparabilityanalysisisnecessaryinthiscase.

Respondentsarguethatseparabilityisonlyimplicatedwhenapictorial,graphic,orsculpturalworkisthe“designofausefularticle.”Theycontendthatthesurfacedecorationsinthiscasearetwo-dimensionalgraphic designs that appear on useful articles, but are not themselves designs of useful articles.Consequently, the surface decorations are protected two-dimensional works of graphic art withoutregardtoanyseparabilityanalysisunder§101.4Underthistheory,two-dimensionalartisticfeaturesonthesurfaceofusefularticlesare“inherentlyseparable.”

Thisargument is inconsistentwith the textof§101.Thestatute requiresseparabilityanalysis forany“pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features” incorporated into the “design of a useful article.” “Design”refers here to “the combination” of “details” or “features” that “go tomake up” the useful article.5Furthermore,thewords“pictorial”and“graphic”include,inthiscontext,two-dimensionalfeaturessuchas pictures, paintings, or drawings.6 And the statute expressly defines “[p]ictorial, graphical, andsculpturalworks” to include“two-dimensional ...worksof ... art.”7Thestatute thusprovides that the“design of a useful article” can include two-dimensional “pictorial” and “graphic” features, andseparabilityanalysisappliestothosefeaturesjustasitdoestothree-dimensional“sculptural”features.

...

Wemust now decidewhen a feature incorporated into a useful article “can be identified separatelyfrom” and is “capable of existing independently of” “the utilitarian aspects” of the article. . . . Thestatute provides that a “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural featur[e]” incorporated into the “design of ausefularticle” iseligibleforcopyrightprotectionif it(1)“canbeidentifiedseparatelyfrom,”and(2) is“capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”8 The first requirement—separate identification—is not onerous. The decisionmaker need only be able to look at the usefularticle and spot some two- or three-dimensional element that appears to have pictorial, graphic, orsculpturalqualities.

The independent-existence requirement isordinarilymoredifficult tosatisfy.Thedecisionmakermustdetermine that the separately identified feature has the capacity to exist apart from the utilitarianaspectsofthearticle.Inotherwords,thefeaturemustbeabletoexistasitsownpictorial,graphic,orsculpturalworkasdefinedin§101onceitisimaginedapartfromtheusefularticle.Ifthefeatureisnotcapableofexistingasapictorial,graphic,orsculpturalworkonceseparatedfromtheusefularticle,then4 See 2W. PATRY, COPYRIGHT § 3:151, p. 3–485 (2016) (Patry) (“Courts looking at two-dimensional design claimsshouldnotapplytheseparabilityanalysisregardlessofthethree-dimensionalformthatdesignisembodiedin”).53OXFORDENGLISHDICTIONARY244(def.7,firstlisting)(1933)(OED).6See4id.,at359(defining“[g]raphic”tomean“[o]forpertainingtodrawingorpainting”);7id.,at830(defining“[p]ictorial”tomean“oforpertainingtopaintingordrawing”).7§101.8Id.

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it was not a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural feature of that article, but rather one of its utilitarianaspects.

Ofcourse,toqualifyasapictorial,graphic,orsculpturalworkonitsown,thefeaturecannotitselfbeausefularticleor“[a]narticlethatisnormallyapartofausefularticle”(whichisitselfconsideredausefularticle).9Nor could someone claim a copyright in a useful articlemerely by creating a replica of thatarticle in some othermedium—for example, a cardboardmodel of a car. Although the replica coulditselfbecopyrightable,itwouldnotgiverisetoanyrightsintheusefularticlethatinspiredit....

C

Insum,afeatureofthedesignofausefularticleiseligibleforcopyrightif,whenidentifiedandimaginedapartfromtheusefularticle,itwouldqualifyasapictorial,graphic,orsculpturalworkeitheronitsownorwhenfixedinsomeothertangiblemedium.

Applyingthistesttothesurfacedecorationsonthecheerleadinguniformsisstraightforward.First,onecan identifythedecorationsas featureshavingpictorial,graphic,orsculpturalqualities.Second, if thearrangementofcolors,shapes,stripes,andchevronsonthesurfaceofthecheerleadinguniformswereseparatedfromtheuniformandappliedinanothermedium—forexample,onapainter'scanvas—theywould qualify as “two-dimensional ... works of ... art.” And imaginatively removing the surfacedecorationsfromtheuniformsandapplyingtheminanothermediumwouldnotreplicatetheuniformitself.Indeed,respondentshaveappliedthedesignsinthiscasetoothermediaofexpression—differenttypesof clothing—without replicating theuniform. Thedecorations are therefore separable from theuniformsandeligibleforcopyrightprotection.

Thedissentargues that thedesignsarenot separablebecause imaginatively removing themfromtheuniformsandplacingtheminsomeothermediumofexpression—acanvas,forexample—wouldcreate“pictures of cheerleader uniforms.” Petitioner similarly argues that the decorations cannot becopyrighted because, even when extracted from the useful article, they retain the outline of acheerleadinguniform.

Thisisnotabartocopyright.Justastwo-dimensionalfineartcorrespondstotheshapeofthecanvasonwhich it ispainted,two-dimensionalappliedartcorrelatestothecontoursofthearticleonwhich it isapplied. A fresco painted on a wall, ceiling panel, or dome would not lose copyright protection, forexample,simplybecauseitwasdesignedtotrackthedimensionsofthesurfaceonwhichitwaspainted.Orconsider,forexample,adesignetchedorpaintedonthesurfaceofaguitar. Ifthatentiredesignisimaginativelyremovedfromtheguitar'ssurfaceandplacedonanalbumcover, itwouldstillresemblethe shape of a guitar. But the image on the cover does not “replicate” the guitar as a useful article.Rather,thedesignisatwo-dimensionalworkofartthatcorrespondstotheshapeoftheusefularticletowhichitwasapplied.Thestatuteprotectsthatworkofartwhetheritisfirstdrawnonthealbumcoverand then applied to the guitar's surface, or vice versa. Failing to protect that art would create ananomaly:Itwouldextendprotectiontotwo-dimensionaldesignsthatcoverapartofausefularticlebutwouldnot protect the samedesign if it covered the entire article. The statute does not support thatdistinction, nor can it be reconciledwith the dissent's recognition that “artwork printed on a t-shirt”couldbeprotected.

9Id.

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Tobeclear,theonlyfeatureofthecheerleadinguniformeligibleforacopyrightinthiscaseisthetwo-dimensional work of art fixed in the tangible medium of the uniform fabric. Even if respondentsultimatelysucceedinestablishingavalidcopyrightinthesurfacedecorationsatissuehere,respondentshavenorighttoprohibitanypersonfrommanufacturingacheerleadinguniformofidenticalshape,cut,anddimensionstotheonesonwhichthedecorations in thiscaseappear.Theymayprohibitonly thereproductionofthesurfacedesignsinanytangiblemediumofexpression—auniformorotherwise.10

D

Petitionerand theGovernment raise severalobjections to theapproachweannounce today.None ismeritorious.

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Petitioner firstargues thatour readingof the statute ismissingan important step. It contends thatafeaturemay exist independently only if it can stand alone as a copyrightable work and if the usefularticlefromwhichitwasextractedwouldremainequallyuseful.Inotherwords,copyrightextendsonlyto “solely artistic” features of useful articles. According to petitioner, if a feature of a useful articleadvances theutilityof thearticle, then it is categoricallybeyond the scopeof copyright. Thedesignshere are not protected, it argues, because they are necessary to two of the uniforms’ “inherent,essential, or natural functions”—identifying thewearer as a cheerleader and enhancing thewearer'sphysicalappearance.Becausetheuniformswouldnotbeequallyusefulwithoutthedesigns,petitionercontendsthatthedesignsareinseparablefromthe“utilitarianaspects”oftheuniform....

Thedebateovertherelativeutilityofaplainwhitecheerleadinguniformisunnecessary.Thefocusofthe separability inquiry is on the extracted feature and not on any aspects of the useful article thatremainaftertheimaginaryextraction.Thestatutedoesnotrequirethedecisionmakertoimagineafullyfunctioning useful article without the artistic feature. Instead, it requires that the separated featurequalifyasanonusefulpictorial,graphic,orsculpturalworkonitsown.

Ofcourse,becausetheremovedfeaturemaynotbeausefularticle—asitwouldthennotqualifyasapictorial, graphic, or sculpturalwork—there necessarilywould be some aspects of the original usefularticle “left behind” if the featurewere conceptually removed. But the statute does not require theimaginedremaindertobeafullyfunctioningusefularticleatall,muchlessanequallyusefulone....

Petitioner's argument follows from its flawed view that the statute protects only “solely artistic”featuresthathavenoeffectwhatsoeveronausefularticle'sutilitarianfunction.Thisviewisinconsistentwith the statutory text. The statute expressly protects two- and three-dimensional “applied art.”“Appliedart”isart“employedinthedecoration,design,orexecutionofusefulobjects,”11or“thosearts

10Thedissentsuggests thatour testwould leadtothecopyrightingofshovels.Butashovel, likeacheerleadinguniform,evenifdisplayedinanartgallery,is“anarticlehavinganintrinsicutilitarianfunctionthatisnotmerelytoportray the appearance of the article or to convey information.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. It therefore cannot becopyrighted. A drawing of a shovel could, of course, be copyrighted. And, if the shovel included any artisticfeatures that couldbeperceivedasartapart from the shovel, andwhichwouldqualifyasprotectablepictorial,graphic,orsculpturalworksontheirownorinanothermedium,theytoocouldbecopyrighted.Butashovelasashovelcannot.11WEBSTER'STHIRDNEWINTERNATIONALDICTIONARY105(1976).

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orcraftsthathaveaprimarilyutilitarianfunction,or...thedesignsanddecorationsusedinthesearts.”12Anartisticfeaturethatwouldbeeligibleforcopyrightprotectiononitsowncannotlosethatprotectionsimplybecause itwas first createdasa featureof thedesignofausefularticle,even if itmakes thatarticlemoreuseful....Werewetoacceptpetitioner'sargumentthattheonlyprotectablefeaturesarethose that play absolutely no role in an article's function, we would effectively abrogate the rule ofMazerandread“appliedart”outofthestatute.

Because we reject the view that a useful article must remain after the artistic feature has beenimaginativelyseparatedfromthearticle,wenecessarilyabandonthedistinctionbetween“physical”and“conceptual”separability,whichsomecourtsandcommentatorshaveadoptedbasedontheCopyrightAct’s legislativehistory.13 Accordingtothisview,afeature isphysicallyseparablefromtheunderlyinguseful article if it can be physically separated from the article by ordinary means while leaving theutilitarian aspects of the article completely intact. Conceptual separability applies if the featurephysicallycouldnotberemovedfromtheusefularticlebyordinarymeans.14

Thestatutorytextindicatesthatseparabilityisaconceptualundertaking.Becauseseparabilitydoesnotrequiretheunderlyingusefularticletoremain,thephysical-conceptualdistinctionisunnecessary.

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Petitionernextarguesthatweshouldincorporatetwo“objective”componentsintoourtesttoprovideguidance to the lower courts: (1) whether the design elements can be identified as reflecting thedesigner'sartisticjudgmentexercisedindependentlyoffunctionalinfluence,and(2)whetherthereisasubstantiallikelihoodthatthepictorial,graphic,orsculpturalfeaturewouldstillbemarketabletosomesignificantsegmentofthecommunitywithoutitsutilitarianfunction.

Werejectthisargumentbecauseneitherconsiderationisgroundedinthetextofthestatute.Thefirstwouldrequirethedecisionmakertoconsiderevidenceofthecreator'sdesignmethods,purposes,andreasons. The statute’s text makes clear, however, that our inquiry is limited to how the article andfeatureareperceived,nothoworwhytheyweredesigned.

The same is true of marketability. Nothing in the statute suggests that copyrightability depends onmarketsurveys.Moreover,askingwhethersomesegmentofthemarketwouldbeinterestedinagivenworkthreatenstoprizepopularartoverotherforms,ortosubstitutejudicialaestheticpreferencesforthepolicychoicesembodiedintheCopyrightAct.15...

12RANDOMHOUSEDICTIONARY73(1966)(emphasisadded);seealso1OED576(2ded.1989)(defining“applied”as“[p]uttopracticaluse”).13SeeH.R.Rep.No.94–1476,p.55(1976).14SeeCompendium§924.2(B);butsee1P.GOLDSTEIN,COPYRIGHT§2.5.3,p.2:77(3ded.2016)(explainingthatthelower courts have been unable to agree on a single conceptual separability test); 2 PATRY §§ 3:140–3:144.40(surveyingthevariousapproachesinthelowercourts).15SeeBleisteinv.DonaldsonLithographingCo.,188U.S.239,251(1903)(“Itwouldbeadangerousundertakingforpersonstrainedonlytothelawtoconstitutethemselvesfinaljudgesoftheworthofpictorialillustrations,outsideofthenarrowestandmostobviouslimits”).

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III

Weholdthatanartisticfeatureofthedesignofausefularticleiseligibleforcopyrightprotectionifthefeature(1)canbeperceivedasatwo-orthree-dimensionalworkofartseparatefromtheusefularticleand(2)wouldqualifyasaprotectablepictorial,graphic,orsculpturalworkeitheronitsownorinsomeother medium if imagined separately from the useful article. Because the designs on the surface ofrespondents'cheerleadinguniformsinthiscasesatisfytheserequirements,thejudgmentoftheCourtofAppealsisaffirmed.

Itissoordered.

BREYER,J.,dissenting

Iagreewithmuch intheCourt'sopinion.But IdonotagreethatthedesignsthatVarsityBrands, Inc.,submittedtotheCopyrightOfficeareeligibleforcopyrightprotection.Evenapplyingthemajority’stest,the designs cannot be perceived as two- or three-dimensionalworks of art separate from the usefularticle.

Look at the designs that Varsity submitted to the Copyright Office. You will see only pictures ofcheerleader uniforms. And cheerleader uniforms are useful articles. A picture of the relevant designfeatures,whether separately “perceived”onpaperor in the imagination, is apictureof, and thereby“replicate[s],” the underlying useful article of which they are a part. Hence the design features thatVarsity seeks to protect are not “capable of existing independently o[f] the utilitarian aspects of thearticle.”16

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Therelevantstatutoryprovisionsaysthatthe“designofausefularticle” iscopyrightable“only if,andonly to theextent that, suchdesign incorporatespictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that canbeidentified separately from,andare capableofexisting independentlyof, theutilitarianaspectsof thearticle.” But what, we must ask, do the words “identified separately” mean? Just when is a designseparatefromthe“utilitarianaspectofthe[useful]article?”...Consider,forexample,theexplanationthattheHouseReportfortheCopyrightActof1976provides.Itsays:

Unlesstheshapeofanautomobile,airplane,ladies'dress,foodprocessor,televisionset,oranyotherindustrialproductcontainssomeelementthat,physicallyorconceptually,can be identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the designwouldnotbecopyrighted....17

Thesewordssuggesttwoexercises,onephysical,onemental.Canthedesignfeatures(thepicture,thegraphic,thesculpture)bephysicallyremovedfromthearticle(andconsideredseparately),allthewhileleaving the fully functioning utilitarian object in place? If not, can one nonetheless conceive of thedesignfeaturesseparatelywithoutreplicatingapictureoftheutilitarianobject?Iftheanswertoeither

1617U.S.C.§101.17H.R.Rep.,at55(emphasisadded).

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ofthesequestionsis“yes,”thenthedesigniseligibleforcopyrightprotection.Otherwise,itisnot.Theabstractnatureof thesequestionsmakesthemsounddifficult toapply.ButwiththeCourt'swords inmind,thedifficultytendstodisappear.

Anexamplewillhelp.Imaginealampwithacircularmarblebase,avertical10–inchtallbrassrod(containingwires) insertedoffcenteronthebase,alightbulbfixtureemergingfromthetopofthebrassrod,andalampshadesittingontop.InfrontofthebrassrodaporcelainSiamesecatsitsonthebasefacingoutward.Obviously,theSiamesecatisphysicallyseparatefromthe lamp, as it could be easily removedwhile leaving both cat and lampintact.And,assumingitotherwisequalifies,thedesignedcat iseligibleforcopyrightprotection.

Nowsupposethereisnolongbrassrod;insteadthecatsitsinthemiddleofthebaseandthewiresrunupthroughthecattothebulbs.Thecat isnot physically separate from the lamp, as the reality of the lamp’sconstructionissuchthatanefforttophysicallyseparatethecatandlampwill destroy both cat and lamp. The two are integrated into a singlefunctional object, like the similar configuration of the ballet dancerstatuettesthatformedthelampbasesatissueinMazerv.Stein,347U.S.201(1954).Butwecaneasilyimaginethecatonitsown,asdidCongresswhen conceptualizing the ballet dancer. In doing so,we do not create amentalpictureofalamp(or,intheCourt'swords,a“replica”ofthelamp),whichisausefularticle.Wesimplyperceivethecatseparately,asasmallcatfigurinethatcouldbeacopyrightabledesignworkstandingalonethatdoesnotreplicatethelamp.Hencethecatisconceptuallyseparatefromtheutilitarianarticlethatisthelamp....

Bywayofcontrast,VanGogh'spaintingofapairofoldshoes, though beautifully executed and copyrightableas a painting, would not qualify for a shoe designcopyright. Courts have similarly denied copyrightprotection to objects that begin as three-dimensionaldesigns, such asmeasuring spoons shaped like heart-tippedarrows,candleholdersshapedlikesailboats,andwirespokesonawheelcover. Noneofthesedesignscould qualify for copyright protection that wouldprevent others from selling spoons, candleholders, orwheelcoverswiththesamedesign.Whynot?Becausein each case the design is not separable from theutilitarianaspectsoftheobjecttowhichitrelates.The

designs cannot be physically separated because they themselves make up the shape of the spoon,

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candleholders,orwheelcoversofwhichtheyareapart.Andspoons,candleholders,andwheelcoversareusefulobjects,asaretheoldshoesdepictedinVanGogh'spainting.Moreimportantly,onecannoteasily imagineorotherwiseconceptualize thedesignof thespoonsor thecandleholdersor theshoeswithoutthatpicture,orimage,orreplicabeingapictureofspoons,orcandleholders,orwheelcovers,orshoes.Thedesignsnecessarilybringalongtheunderlyingutilitarianobject.Henceeachdesignisnotconceptuallyseparablefromthephysicalusefulobject.

Theupshotisthatonecouldcopyrightthefloraldesignonasoupspoonbutonecouldnotcopyrighttheshapeofthespoonitself,nomatterhowbeautiful,artistic,orestheticallypleasingthatshapemightbe:Apictureoftheshapeofthespoonisalsoapictureofaspoon;thepictureofafloraldesignisnot.

Torepeat:Aseparabledesignfeaturemustbe“capableofexistingindependently”oftheusefularticleasaseparateartisticworkthatisnotitselftheusefularticle.Iftheclaimedfeaturecouldbeextractedwithoutreplicatingtheusefularticleofwhichitisapart,andtheresultwouldbeacopyrightableartisticwork standing alone, then there is a separable design. But if extracting the claimed features wouldnecessarilybringalongtheunderlyingusefularticle,thedesignisnotseparablefromtheusefularticle.Inmanyormostcases,todecidewhetheradesignorartisticfeatureofausefularticleisconceptuallyseparatefromthearticleitself,itisenoughtoimaginethefeatureonitsownandask,“HaveIcreatedapictureofa(usefulpartofa)usefularticle?”Ifso,thedesignisnotseparablefromtheusefularticle.Ifnot,itis....

II

To ask this kind of simple question—does the design picture the useful article?—will not provide ananswerineverycase,fortherewillbecaseswhereitisdifficulttosaywhetherapictureofthedesignis,orisnot,alsoapictureoftheusefularticle.ButthequestionwillavoidcourtsfocusingprimarilyuponwhatIbelieveisanunhelpfulfeatureoftheinquiry,namely,whetherthedesigncanbeimaginedasa“two-orthree-dimensionalworkofart.”Thatisbecausevirtuallyanyindustrialdesigncanbethoughtofseparately as a “work of art”: Just imagine a frame surrounding the design, or its being placed in agallery. Consider Marcel Duchamp's “readymades” series, thefunctional mass-produced objects he designated as art. What isthereintheworldthat,viewedthroughanestheticlens,cannotbeseen as a good, bad, or indifferent work of art? What designfeatures could not be imaginatively reproduced on a painter'scanvas?Indeed,greatindustrialdesignmaywellincludedesignthatisinseparablefromtheusefularticle—where,asFrankLloydWrightput it, “form and function are one.”18 Where they are one, thedesigner may be able to obtain 15 years of protection through adesign patent. But, if they are one, Congress did not intend acenturyormoreofcopyrightprotection....

IV

Ifweaskthe“separateness”questioncorrectly,theanswerhereisnotdifficulttofind.Themajority'sopinion, in itsappendix,depicts

18F.WRIGHT,ANAUTOBIOGRAPHY146(1943)(reprint2005).

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thecheerleaderdressdesignsthatVarsitysubmittedtotheCopyrightOffice.CanthedesignfeaturesinVarsity'spicturesexistseparatelyfromtheutilitarianaspectsofadress?Canweextractthosefeaturesascopyrightabledesignworksstandingalone,withoutbringingalong,viapictureordesign,thedressesofwhichtheyconstituteapart?...LookingatallfiveofVarsity’spictures,Idonotseehowonecouldconceptualizethedesignfeaturesinawaythatdoesnotpicture,notjustartisticdesigns,butdressesaswell.

WereItoacceptthemajority'sinvitationto“imaginativelyremov[e]”thechevronsandstripesastheyare arranged on the neckline, waistline, sleeves, and skirt of each uniform, and apply them on a“painter's canvas,” that painting would be of a cheerleader's dress. The esthetic elements on whichVarsityseeksprotectionexistonlyaspartoftheuniformdesign—there isnothingtoseparateoutbutfor dress-shaped lines that replicate the cut and style of the uniforms. Hence, each design is notphysically separate, nor is it conceptually separate, from the useful article it depicts, namely, acheerleader’sdress.Theycannotbecopyrighted.

. . . As Varsitywould have it, itwould prevent its competitors frommaking useful three-dimensionalcheerleader uniforms by submitting plainly unoriginal chevrons and stripes as cut and arranged on auseful article. But with that cut and arrangement, the resulting pictures on which Varsity seeksprotectiondonotsimplydepictdesigns.Theydepictclothing.Theydepict theusefularticlesofwhichthedesignsareinextricableparts.AndVarsitycannotobtaincopyrightprotectionthatwouldgivethemthepowertopreventothersfrommakingthoseusefuluniforms,anymorethanVanGoghcancopyrightcomfortableoldshoesbypaintingtheirlikeness.

Ifearthat,inlookingpastthethree-dimensionaldesigninherentinVarsity'sclaimbytreatingitasifitwerenomorethanadesignforaboltofcloth,themajorityhaslostsightofitsownimportantlimitingprinciple.Onemaynot“claimacopyrightinausefularticlemerelybycreatingareplicaofthatarticleinsomeothermedium,”suchasinapicture.Thatistosay,onecannotobtainacopyrightthatwouldgiveitsholder“anyrightsintheusefularticlethatinspiredit.”

Withrespect,Idissent.

CASE COMPREHENSION 1. The majority attempts to clarify the test for conceptual separability by providing a two-pronged

test. What is that test? How well does it provide clarity in determining the copyrightability of useful-article designs?

2. What is the distinction between physical and conceptual separability and why does the majority abandon this distinction?

3. Why does the majority find it necessary to employ the separability analysis given that the decorations of the uniforms merely appear on useful articles, and therefore do not seem to constitute the designs of the useful articles themselves?

4. Recall that the majority cites the design of an automobile as an example that could not receive copyright protection under the useful article doctrine. Yet consider a lavish-looking sports car.

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Couldn’t such a car be perceived as a three-dimensional work of art, separate from the functionality of the car? And if we imagined the design of the lavish-looking sports car as a clay sculpture, wouldn’t that qualify as a sculptural work? Under the test that the majority has laid out, would the useful article doctrine necessary preclude copyright protection? Why or why not?

5. Why does the majority reject the argument that a copyrightable feature must be able to stand along as a copyrightable work and that the useful article must remain equally useful after conceptually extracting the aesthetic feature?

6. What problem does the dissent see with the majority’s reasoning? What test would the dissent adopt?