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So competent, so unethical? The influence of self-perceived competence on

ethical decision making

Rosine Rutten I6021493

July 2015

MSc Human Decision Science

School of Business and Economics, Maastricht University

1st supervisor: Dr. Suzanne van Gils

2nd supervisor: Dr. Hannes Guenter

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Abstract

The popularity of ethical decision making research has increased immensely. The

current paper proposes a new model that expects self-perceived competence to

influence ethical decision making, mediated by risk perception, and moderated by

trait competitiveness. Two studies examined these relationships. Study 1 employed an

experimental design in an online questionnaire. Study 2 was designed to empirically

examine risk perception as a mediator. Both studies found no, or a slightly reversed,

effect of self-perceived competence on unethical decision making, and no mediation

by risk perception. Support for a moderation effect of trait competitiveness was found

in both studies, meaning that those high on trait competitiveness and low self-

perceived competence (study 1), and high self-perceived competence (study 2) made

more unethical decisions. Strengths, limitations, and implications are discussed.

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Introduction

The amount of research on ethical decision making in organizations has

increased enormously in popularity since, among other corporate scandals, the Enron

scandal in 2001 that led to the bankruptcy of Enron Corporation. Executive leaders

were able to hide billions of dollars of debt by using poor financial reporting and

other cover-up tactics such as destroying evidence (McLean & Elkind, 2004).

Understanding ethical decision making in organizations is important for the

advancement of organizational science. Whenever multiple stakeholders, values, and

interests are involved under uncertain conditions, ethical issues are present. The

decisions managers have to make impact the lives and well being of their

subordinates, making these decisions of an ethical nature. Numerous theoretical

models have been proposed over the years, attempting to explain and predict

organizational ethical decision making, including the situational-individual interaction

model of Trevino (1986), the contingency framework of Ferrell and Gresham (1985),

and the moral intensity model of Jones (1991). Although the social scientific study of

ethics in organizations has grown, there are still many opportunities for future

research (Brown & Mitchell, 2010).

The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new model that predicts a way in

which general unethical decision making occurs. The model proposes that unethical

decision making increases when individuals’ self-perceived competence increases.

Various mechanisms and moderators that come into play will also be explained.

Ethical decision making

A moral issue is present when a person’s freely performed actions may harm

or benefit others (Velasquez & Rostankowski, 1985). In other words, the decision or

action must involve choice on the part of the decision maker, and the decision or

action must have consequences for others in order for it to be a moral issue. The

decision maker can also be seen as the moral agent, the one making the moral

decision. The moral agent does not necessarily have to be aware the issue he or she is

deciding upon is of a moral nature (moral and ethical are considered equivalent for

the remainder of this paper). An ethical decision is defined as “a decision that is both

legal and morally acceptable to the larger community” (Jones, 1991, p. 367).

As stated before, many theoretical models concerning ethical decision making

have been proposed over the years. Most of these are based on the four-component

model for individual ethical decision making and behavior proposed by Rest (1986).

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The model states that a moral agent must a) recognize the moral issue, b) make a

moral judgment, c) resolve to place moral concerns ahead of other concerns, and d)

act on these moral concerns. These components are conceptually distinct and success

or failure in one stage does not imply the same in any other stage. Theoretical models

such as those by Trevino (1986) or Ferrell and Gresham (1985) mostly incorporate

more than one of Rest’s four components. Furthermore, these models build upon two

major factors that influence ethical decision-making: individual and organizational or

situational factors. Individual factors include ego strength, field dependence, locus of

control, knowledge, values, attitudes, intentions, personality and so forth. Situational

(or organizational) factors include elements of job context, characteristics of work,

organizational culture, leadership style, significant others etc. These models are

typical rationalist models of morality, which assume that moral judgment is reached

through a rational, a priori process (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969; Turiel, 1983).

However, other models such as Haidt’s social intuitionist model (2001) are based on

emotions and intuitions. Ethical decision making herein depends on so-called moral

intuitions, which come first and cause moral judgments (Shweder & Haidt, 1993).

Evidently, opinions on the matter are divided, and many possible theories and

explanations have been put forward. The current paper assumes a (partially)

subconscious change in moral judgment to influence ethical decision making through

various individual and situational factors. In short, heightened self-perceived

competence is expected to lower morality and thus increase unethical decision making

through a lowered risk perception. The following sections will go deeper into the

underlying theory, after which the proposed model will be specified further.

Theoretical background

Competence and morality

Deci and colleagues (1991) describe competence as “understanding how to

attain various external and internal outcomes and being efficacious in performing the

requisite actions” (p. 327). It involves the ability of an individual to do a job properly.

It can be seen as a combination of theoretical and practical knowledge, cognitive

skills, values, and behavior used to improve performance. Competence is a so-called

self-profitable trait in the distinction between other- and self-profitable traits in person

evaluations (Peeters, 1992). When people make evaluative impressions of others, this

happens mostly routinely without effort or a specific purpose (Dijksterhuis & Bargh,

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2001; Zajonc, 2000). One of the most basic criteria in forming these evaluations is the

one of self-interest, broadly defined as preserving the perceiver’s well being.

Evaluations as such help an individual determine whether to approach or avoid

another individual (Caccioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997). Other-profitable traits

are traits that have a direct effect on the well being of people surrounding the target

person, such as sincere, kind, or aggressive. In contrast, self-profitable traits have a

direct effect on the well being of the target person, such as intelligence or

impracticality.

Wojciszke (2005) states that the theoretical distinction between these two

dimensions of trait favorability, that is, self- and other-profitable traits, overlaps

substantially with the concepts morality and competence. Moral traits can be seen as

other-profitable, since they capture whether another individual’s goals are harmful or

beneficial to others. For clarity, in this study morality is defined as “the interpersonal

content of goals of an acting person – whether the goals are beneficial to other people

and maintain moral norms” (Wojciszke, 2005, p.165). Competence traits are self-

profitable since they are directly rewarding (or immediately harmful in case of e.g.

stupidity) for the trait possessor rather than for others. Together, these two dimensions

determine global favorability of traits, explaining nearly all variance in favorability

ratings (Wojciszke, Dowhyluk, & Jaworski, 1998b).

People thus perceive themselves and others on two major dimensions: one

concerning the other person’s competence, and one concerning the other’s moral

character (Wojciszke, 1994). These perceptive dimensions can also be conceptualized

as frames. A frame is a fundamentally interpretive process, a personal perspective of a

situation (Benford & Snow, 2000). Based on the overlap with self- and other-

profitable traits, it is not hard to see that morality and competence traits serve

different goals. Wojciszke (2005) therefore states that to observers, morality of others

is more important than their competence. After all, moral traits are primarily good for

the observer. At the same time, own competence is more salient than morality to

actors, since it primarily serves the actor’s well being. Various studies have supported

these propositions. For example, Wojciszke et al. (1998a) found that perception of

others is dominated by concern with morality-related information. Participants rated

moral traits as more favorable in rating others than competence traits. However, it

should be noted that this is only a general trend. Cognitive processes of evaluating

others are highly dependent on an observer’s goals (Martin, Strack, & Stapel, 2001).

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If, for example, a manager is looking for a competent employee, competence traits

will most likely be more salient. The manager will predominantly be evaluating

through a competence frame. Furthermore, Wentura, Rothermund, and Bak (2000)

showed that the tendency of observers to give priority to morality information over

competence information even appears to be automatic. They did so by using the

Stroop paradigm, in which participants showed longer reaction times (greater

interference) when words denoted other-relevant traits, compared to self-relevant

words. The proposition that competence is dominant in self-perception has also

received support. Wojciszke (1997) found that individuals interpret ambiguous

behavior in terms of competence rather than morality after being primed with a

perspective of self rather than a perspective of others. In addition, competence self-

ascriptions were found to be a much better predictor of self-esteem, an affective

response toward the self, than moral trait ascriptions, which did not even seem to

contribute to self-esteem at all (Wojciszke, 2005). Lastly, emotional arousal (e.g.

shame and guilt) after an individual commits an immoral act is less pronounced than

the emotional arousal felt after an action that led to a performance failure (Wojciszke

& Dowhyluk, 2003).

These data support the notion that morality and competence as evaluative

dimensions serve different goals; competence is most important in self-perception,

whereas morality is most important in other-perception. This serves as one of the

basic assumptions of the current paper.

In addition, a similar distinction can be found in Paulhus and John’s Alpha

and Gamma theory (1998), which explains both egoistic and moral biases in self-

perception. They propose that Alpha and Gamma are two distinct ‘packages’ of

values, motives and biases that influence self-perception. The two fundamental

human values, agency and communion (Wiggins, 1991), lead to two motives: need for

power and need for approval, respectively. Similar to competence and morality

theory, individuals can perceive and evaluate themselves and others through a

dominant Alpha frame, or through a dominant Gamma frame. The Alpha frame is

associated with a heightened self-worth with regard to intellectual and social

competence. This, together with the need for power motive, leads to an egoistic bias

in self-perception. Gamma on the other hand, is associated with high moralistic

values. Individuals high on Gamma try to avoid disapproval of others by conforming

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to social norms (motive need for approval). This often leads to a moralistic bias in

self-perception (Paulhus & John, 1998).

So how does all of this relate to unethical decision making? The current study

proposes that the process of ethical decision making as traditionally proposed by Rest

(1986) is threatened by the phenomenon that competence is more important to self-

perception than morality. In terms of framing, the competence frame rather than the

morality frame dominates self-perceptions (Drucker, 2005). If people define

themselves primarily in terms of competence, internal conflicts might arise if

situational demands do not correspond. This can create a so-called ethics blind spot;

individuals may be so predisposed with their competent self, they overlook the

salience and expression of their moral values (Moberg, 2006). Moreover, if people

perceive themselves as competent, their self-focused frame is likely to become more

salient, meaning their need for approval diminishes and their need for power and

status increases. The model proposes that this may increase the probability of the

emergence of ethics blind spots (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011), eventually possibly

leading to an increase in unethical decisions and their far stretching consequences.

This leads to the formation hypothesis 1, concerning the direct effect in the proposed

model; the described trade-off between competence and morality.

Hypothesis 1: individuals with relatively high self-perceived competence will

be more likely to engage in unethical decision making compared to individuals

with relatively low self-perceived competence.

Cognitive mechanism: Risk perception

I propose that heightened self-perceived competence may lead to increased

unethical decision making through the cognitive process of diminished risk

perception. This mechanism involves perceiving situational demands as either threats

or opportunities. A possibility to engage in immoral behavior is always accompanied

by some form of risk. Immoral conduct might be reprimanded with punishment by

one’s social group, organization, or more severely by law, possibly resulting in loss of

status, job, material goods, or even freedom (e.g. Grasmick & Green, 1980). On the

other hand, the advantage of taking risks can be the evenly great gains that can be

acquired. How are decisions involving risk made, and what determines risk taking or

risk avoidance?

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Decision scientists still have difficulty explaining or predicting decisions

under high uncertainty. In the traditional economic view, utility theory predicts that

people will always choose the option that will maximize their utility after rationally

deliberating all choices (Fishburn, 1968). However, many empirical results have

shown diverging outcomes. Therefore, Kahneman & Tversky’s (1979) prospect

theory incorporates found anomalies, theorizing that risk aversion and risk seeking

occur differently based on the choice and situation at hand. Moreover, individuals

differ in their tendency to be risk seeking or risk averse. Individual differences in

personality or preferences are reflected in utility curves, which can greatly vary

depending on what antecedents are examined (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). In

addition, Soane and Chmiel (2005) showed that some individuals are consistent in

their risk perception, while others are more inconsistent or domain-specific, primarily

dependent on their personality characteristics.

This thesis focuses on risk perception as a cognitive mechanism through

which heightened self-perceived competence leads to increased unethical decision

making. Risk perception is defined as “an individual’s assessment of how risky a

situation is in terms of probabilistic estimates of the degree of situational uncertainty,

how controllable that uncertainty is, and confidence in those estimates” (Sitkin &

Weingart, 1995). Decision makers differ in the extent to which they take risks because

they interpret the same cues about a situation or decision differently. This subjective

cue interpretation makes that one person may view a risky situation as a potential

opportunity, while another may view it as a potential threat (Dutton, 1993). When risk

perception is low, individuals perceive the costs (threats) of an immoral act to be less

than the gains (opportunities). There is evidence that strongly suggests that greater

self-perceived competence leads to a diminished risk perception. For example, Heath

and Tversky (1991) found that risk taking appeared to be greater in situations in

which people felt they had more personal competence. Furthermore, Cooper,

Dunkelberg, and Woo (1988) showed that entrepreneurial managers who rate

themselves as having above-average perceived competence consistently tend to see

more opportunities in risky situations. The managers in this study tended to believe

they could overcome risk through skill. Krueger and Dickson (1994) also found a

strong positive correlation between perceptions of opportunity and self-efficacy,

which was interchangeably used with self-perceived competence.

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Logically following from above reasoning, individuals faced with an immoral

(thus inherently risky) decision perceive it as an opportunity or threat. Individuals that

perceive themselves as highly competent will be more likely to perceive immoral

(risky) behavior as an opportunity. This will emphasize advantages of conducting the

behavior in question and de-emphasize possible negative consequences, heightening

the probability of unethical decision making.

Furthermore, I expect lower general risk perceptions to lead to an increase in

unethical decision making. For example, Cherry and Fraedrich (2002) found that

lower perceptions of risk lead to significantly more favorable ethical judgments of

bribery, and greater indicated inclinations to follow up on these judgments by actually

conducting the unethical behavior. Apparently, as so-called comfort increases, that is,

the balance of outcomes becomes more favorable, the salience of outcomes overrides

intrinsic moral values of the right- or wrongness of a decision or action. Einarsen and

Skogstad (1996) have also found that diminished risk perception can increase

immoral behaviors at work. Their results showed that bullying was much more

frequent in large and bureaucratic organizations, where the length and formality of

decision-making procedures make the bully less visible, and consequently reducing

the risks of being caught or punished.

Summarizing, the current study predicts that heightened self-perceived

competence will result in increased unethical decision making through a lowered risk

perception, leading to hypothesis 2.

Hypothesis 2: those with relatively high self-perceived competence will have a

lower general risk perception, which will consequently result in more

unethical decision making. Thus, risk perception will mediate the relationship

between self-perceived competence and unethical decision making.

Trait competitiveness

An additional purpose of the current research is to examine boundary

conditions for the proposed direct effect between self-perceived competence and

unethical decision making. Therefore, this thesis examines the possibly moderating

role of trait competitiveness. There are reasons to expect that a heightened self-

perceived competence does not lead to more unethical decision making for all

individuals. For example, although Utz et al. (2004) found a direct effect of priming

competence on cooperative behavior, they also found a moderating effect of social

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value orientation. Their research showed that a competence prime only has a direct

effect when one has a competitive value orientation, as opposed to a prosocial value

orientation.

This fits into the proposed model, which further predicts that trait

competitiveness will determine whether individuals with high self-perceived

competence will make more unethical choices. Kohn (1992) describes the concept of

trait competitiveness as an aspect of personality that involves the enjoyment of

interpersonal competition and the goal to be better than others and to win. He

furthermore argues that competitiveness can lead to uncooperative and anti-social

behavior. Highly competitive individuals are more likely to see others as threats, and

are thus less likely to cooperate with such people (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970). For

example, Jelinek and Ahearne (2010) found that employees high on trait

competitiveness were more likely to show interpersonal deviance.

The proposed model thus predicts that when an individual perceives oneself as

highly competent, and is highly competitive, one will make more unethical decisions.

The current study examines trait competitiveness as a boundary condition for the

direct effect. It is therefore theorized that the interplay between high self-perceived

competence and high trait-competitiveness will lead to more unethical decision

making.

Hypothesis 3: Trait competitiveness will moderate the relationship between

self-perceived competence and unethical decision making, through risk

perception, such that individuals with relatively high self-perceived

competence will be more likely to make unethical decisions when their trait

competitiveness is high, compared to individuals with low trait

competitiveness.

The model

Figure 1 displays the entire research model. The proposed model incorporates

two cognitive mechanisms through which ethical decision making is affected. The

current research focuses on mechanism 2, risk perception, while Rutten (2015b)

primarily focuses on mechanism 1, need to belong.

It should be noted that the key component in this model is self-perceived

competence, in which self-perception is an important word. It is not about how

competent one actually is, but about how competent one perceives him or herself to

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be. Many theories describe other-perception; how perceivers view targets, how groups

view members, how members view groups etcetera. The way we perceive and

categorize others influences many aspects of our behavior and choices. Logically, the

same could be said about self-perception. However, research in this area is not

abundant. What, for example, will happen when somebody feels he or her outgrows

his or her social group? What if one feels more competent than their fellow group

members? Will this impact the way in which one makes decisions of a moral nature?

Trying to answer these questions might bring us closer to being able to explain and

predict unethical decision making and its possible consequences. Therefore, the

current research examines the proposed model in two separate studies, as described in

more detail below.

Study 1

The first study was designed to establish causality between competence and

unethical decision making (hypothesis 1). Furthermore, it measured the possible

moderating effect of trait competitiveness (hypothesis 3). An experimental design was

employed in the form of an online questionnaire.

Method

Participants and design

Figure 1. The proposed theoretical model

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The sample consisted of 163 participants (96 women and 67 men, Mage =

25.63 years, SD = 7.77) gathered through social media activity. Participants were

recruited by posting an online message on various social media websites asking them

to participate in an online study about the relationship between verbal skills and

decision making of about 10 minutes. Most participants were students (73%). No

compensation was available for participating individuals. Participants were randomly

assigned to one of two conditions: competence prime and neutral prime.

Procedure

Once participants were interested in participating in the study, the link to the

online questionnaire showed an online consent form, which informed participants

about their rights. After signing this form by continuing with the experiment, the

participants were first asked to answer some demographic questions. Second, they

were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions (competence vs. neutral). The

randomization procedure was automatized within the online questionnaire program.

Participants were then presented with the Scrambled Sentence Test, either priming

them with competence or not priming them at all, as is further explained below.

Following this, participants were asked to rate to what extent they feel they possess

different personality characteristics such as ‘intelligent’, ‘social’, ‘competent’,

‘efficient’, etc. on a slider scale ranging from 0 to 100 in order to establish whether

the prime was successful. Participants were then asked to rate the scenarios measuring

the dependent variable: ethical decision making. The dependent variable is explained

in more detail below, and items are available in the appendix. Finally, participants

were asked to answer 4 items developed by Helmreich and Spence (1978) in order to

measure trait competitiveness. After completion of the online questionnaire,

participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation.

Priming

The Scrambled Sentence Test (Srull & Wyer, 1979) was used as a

supraliminal prime. The task was introduced as a language skill task. Participants

were asked to unscramble 16 sentences; each consisting of five words with which four

of them a correct sentence could be formed. Ten of these 16 sentences were primes in

the competence prime condition. Participants in this competence prime condition

were asked to unscramble sentences with words related to competence, such as

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talented, gifted, intelligent etc. The neutral primes were neither related to competence

or morality.

Dependent variable

The second task in the online questionnaire measured the dependent variable:

ethical decision making. Participants were presented with 13 scenarios (of which 8

were considered unethical by various experts) describing behavior, developed by

Detert et al. (2008). They were asked to rate the likelihood of them engaging in the

behavior described by the scenarios on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at

all likely) to 7 (highly likely).

Results

Descriptives

Summary statistics (means, standard deviations, correlations, and Cronbach’s

a values) for the study variables are presented in Table 1. Gender (58.9% female) and

age are included as demographic control variables in the analysis, because these are

known to influence ethical decision making (e.g. Barnett & Karson, 1989; Betz,

O’Connell, & Shepherd, 1989; Ruegger & King, 1992).

Table 1. Summary Statistics for study 1

Note. N = 163. Alpha coefficients are displayed on the diagonal. * Correlations significant at p < .05, ** p < .01

Manipulation check

An independent samples t-test revealed no significant effect of the

supraliminal prime on feelings of competence, F(2,161) = .544, p > .05. This shows

that participants in the competence prime condition did not feel more competent after

Variable M SD 1 2 3

1. Self-perceived Competence 72.74 15.46 -

2. Trait Competitiveness 4.19 .91 -.01 (.82)

3. Unethical Decision Making 4.47 1.37 -.17* .19* (.64)

Gender 1.59 .49 -.03 -.14 -.24**

Age 25.63 7.77 .13 -.27** -.17*

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completing the supraliminal competence prime task (M = 71.54, SD = 16.01) than

those in the neutral prime condition after completing the neutral prime task (M =

73.93, SD = 14.90). Despite the non-significant effects of the manipulation check, the

main effect of the manipulation was included in the initial regression analyses to

check for further results. However, these analyses yielded no significant effects (F =

.299). Therefore, in further analyses we replaced the condition variable with

participants’ score on self-perceived competence.

Unethical Decision Making

As can be seen in table 1, Cronbach’s alpha of the dependent variable is quite

low (α = .64). However, Detert’s (2008) ethical decision making scale is formative,

meaning it is inherently multidimensional (Wilcox et al., 2008). Although regression

was also conducted for each item independently, further analyses were executed using

the mean score of the entire scale per participant.

Hypotheses were tested using hierarchical regression analyses (enter method).

At step 1, demographic control variables were entered. At step 2, the expected main

effects of self-perceived competence and trait competitiveness were entered. Finally,

at step 3, a possible moderating effect of trait competitiveness and self-perceived

competence (trait competitiveness x self-perceived competence) was included to test

the prediction that the expected effect of heightened self-perceived competence on

unethical decision making is most pronounced in individuals high on trait

competitiveness. Table 2 shows the regression results.

Table 2. Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Unethical Decision Making

Unethical Decision Making Dependent variable Step 1 Step 2 Step 3

Gender -.44** -.42** -.41** Age -.02* -.01 -.02 S-P Competence (SPC) -.01* .02 Trait Competitiveness (TC) .09 .66* SPC x TC -.01* R2adj .08 .11 .12 R2change .04 .02 Overall F 7.58** 5.74** 5.60** df 2,160 4,158 5,157

Note. * Correlations significant at p < .05, ** p < .01

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At step 1 in the analysis, age (β = -.02, t = -2.23, p = .027) and gender (β = -

.44, t = -3.20, p = .002) were significantly related to unethical decision making. This

indicates that men are more likely to make unethical decisions than women, and that

relatively younger people make more unethical decisions.

At step 2 in the analysis, self-perceived competence (β = -.01, t = -2.20, p =

.029) was significantly related to unethical decision making, however not in the

expected direction. In the current design, relatively high self-perceived competence

was negatively related to unethical decision making, meaning that individuals with

high self-perceived competence made less unethical decisions. Unethical decision

making was not significantly related to trait competitiveness (β = .09, t = 1.61, p =

.109). The significance of the previously entered variables was unaltered, apart from

the effect of age, which was rendered nonsignificant at this step.

Importantly, at step 3, the interaction between self-perceived competence and

trait competitiveness had a significant effect on unethical decision making (β = -.01, t

= -2.12, p = .035). Furthermore, trait competitiveness was a significant predictor at

step 3 (β = .66, t = 2.40, p = .018), while the significance of the other previously

entered variables did not change.

Simple slope analyses were conducted to illustrate the nature of the

interaction. More specifically, the simple slope of the relationship between

competence and unethical decision making was examined at low and high levels of

trait competitiveness. When trait competitiveness was high (one SD above the mean),

self-perceived competence was significantly negatively related to unethical decision

making (β = -.325, p = .003). However, when trait competitiveness was low (one SD

below the mean), the effect of self-perceived competence on unethical decision

making was not significant (β = -.012, p = .896), meaning that the observed overall

interaction effect is due to high trait competitiveness. Specifically, this means that, as

expected, trait competitiveness enlarges the effect of self-perceived competence on

unethical decision making. However, since the main effect found contradicts the

prediction, the expected moderation also applies to low instead of the hypothesized

high self-perceived competence.

Discussion study 1

These results do not support hypothesis 1 as proposed by the current model:

No positive direct effect of self-perceived competence on unethical decision making

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was found. However, a small negative effect occurred, indicating that relatively low

self-perceived competence may lead to an increase in unethical decision making,

contrary to expectations. Furthermore, hypothesis 3 was partially confirmed. Trait

competitiveness did strengthen the direct effect of self-perceived competence on

unethical decision making. Those relatively low on self-perceived competence and at

the same time high on trait competitiveness were more unethical in their decision

making than those relatively high on self-perceived competence.

Study 2

The second study was designed to replicate findings of study 1 with a different

sample, and to empirically determine the mediating effect of risk perception on the

relationship between self-perceived competence and unethical decision making

(hypothesis 1, 2a-c), and the moderating effect of trait competitiveness (hypothesis 3)

through an online questionnaire.

Method

Participants

The sample consisted of 46 individuals employed at different companies. A

precondition of participation was that all participants should have a direct supervisor

and worked either part time or full time (not under 20 hours a week). 29 males and 17

females participated, the average age was 41.85 years (SD = 12.13).

Procedure

Participants were recruited through personal networks, via e-mail, and via

linked-in. Potential participants were asked to fill out the online survey. The link to

the online questionnaire was provided in the e-mail, or on linked-in. Furthermore,

anonymity was assured and a small description of the alleged purpose of the study

was provided: exploring general work attitudes and perceived leadership. There was

no compensation for participation. After following the link to the online

questionnaire, participants were asked to choose in what language to continue. The

questionnaire was available in both Dutch and English. Participants were then

provided with more extensive information about the study, and with an online consent

form. After choosing to partake in the study, participants were automatically directed

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to the first question. After completion of all questions, participants were debriefed and

thanked at the end of the survey.

Measures

Firstly, participants were asked to answer some demographic questions, such

as age, gender, tenure, and number of subordinates.

Self-perceived competence was measured through the Work-related Basic

Need Satisfaction scale developed by Van den Broeck et al. (2010), which contains a

competence subscale. The measure consists of three subscales (competence,

autonomy, relatedness), each containing six items. Items included questions such as “I

am good at the things I do in my job”, and “I doubt whether I am able to execute my

job properly” and were rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree to 7 =

Strongly agree).

Risk perception was established through 6 items measuring general ethical

risk perception. The items are part of a subscale derived from the Domain-Specific

Risk-Taking Scale (Blais & Weber, 2006), which consists of several domains (total

30 items). An example of an item is “Taking some questionable deductions on your

income tax return”. Participants were asked to what extent they perceived the

described actions as risky, with answers measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging

from 1 = Not at all risky to 7 = Extremely risky.

Trait competitiveness was measured with a 4-item subscale of the Work and

Family Orientation Questionnaire developed by Helmreich and Spence (1978). Items

contain questions such as “I enjoy working in situations involving competition with

others”, which participants again have to rate on a 7-point Likert scale.

Finally, unethical decision making was rated through six dilemma’s made

and previously used by Zhong, Ku, Lount, and Murnighan (2010). The dilemma’s can

be found under the appendix and consist of a short description of a situation and four

possible answers each corresponding to an ‘ethical dilemma score’. The total

unethical decision making score is then defined by the total of the answers to the

dilemmas. A high total score depicts relatively ethical decision making, while a low

total score depicts relatively unethical decision making. The dilemma’s used in study

1 were not employed as a measure of unethical decision making in study 2, because

those used in study 1 were specifically suitable for a student sample. The current

sample solely consists of employees working part- or fulltime (no students).

18

Results

Descriptives

Table 3 presents correlations between the scales, means, standard deviations,

and Cronbach’s alpha coefficients. Age and gender were added as control variables

since previous research shows they can influence ethical decision making (e.g. Loe,

Ferrell, & Mansfield, 2000). Due to the small sample size (N = 46), alpha coefficients

are quite low. As can be seen in table 3, internal consistency of the unethical decision

making measure is unacceptably low. This is why further analyses consider each

dilemma individually.

Table 3. Summary Statistics for study 2

Note. N = 46. Alpha coefficients are displayed on the diagonal. Gender was coded as 1 = male, 2 = female.

* Correlations significant at p < .05, ** p < .01

Analysis strategy. Since this research is focused on a moderated mediation model

(Fig. 1), the hypotheses were analyzed according to Hayes’ (2013) approach. For

testing hypothesis 1 through 3, model 8 of PROCESS, an add-on for SPSS (Hayes,

2012), was employed. The analysis executed included 1,000 bootstrap samples. For

each dilemma, a regression analysis was performed with competence as independent

variable, risk perception as mediator, trait competitiveness as moderator, and

unethical decision making as the dependent variable.

Initial inspection of the ethical dilemmas showed that only scores for

dilemmas 1, 2, and Total yielded any significant results (see Table 4 for an overview).

As these are the only dependent variables that yielded any significant results, further

analyses will be focused on direct and indirect effects of the independent variables on

Variable M SD 1 2 3 4

1. Self-perceived Competence 5.92 .65 (.72)

2. Risk Perception 4.76 .89 .04 (.69)

3. Trait Competitiveness 4.28 1.18 .12 -.16 (.73)

4. Unethical Decision Making 29.54 3.97 .13 .36* -.16 (.17)

Gender 1.37 .49 .33* .23 -.13 .16

Age 41.85 12.13 .11 .14 -.27 .33*

19

dilemmas 1, 2, and total. A more detailed description of the results found for these

dependent variables follows.

Table 4. Model summaries for independent dilemmas and total score

Dilemma 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total

R2 .27 .38 .12 .04 .15 .15 .28

F 2.44 3.90 .91 .28 1.13 1.15 2.51

p .04* .004** .50 .95 .36 .35 .04* Note. Dependent variable: unethical decision making, N = 46, df = 6,39

Dilemma 1. In order to test for main effects, firstly a regression analysis

including self-perceived competence, risk perception, trait competitiveness, and

unethical decision making in dilemma 1 was performed. The results of this analysis

showed that risk perception was a significant predictor of unethical decision making

in dilemma 1 (β = .64, t(45) = 2.5, p = .014). Contrary to expectations, there was no

direct effect of self-perceived competence on unethical decision making in dilemma 1

(β = .15, t(45) = .59, p = .559). Therefore, hypothesis 1 was not confirmed in this

dilemma.

In order to test hypothesis 2 and 3, moderated mediation analysis was

conducted according to the recommendations by Hayes (2013) described above. The

results from this analysis show no main effects or interaction effect of self-perceived

competence and trait competitiveness on the mediator, risk perception. Results of the

full moderated mediation model show that risk perception was significantly related to

the answers participants gave to dilemma 1 (β = .70, t(40) = 2.56, p = .014), as can be

read in Table 5. This means that individuals with a relatively high risk perception

answered this dilemma significantly more ethically, which is in line with hypothesis

2b. Furthermore, trait competitiveness did not moderate this relationship (hypothesis

3).

Dilemma 2. In order to test for main effects on dilemma 2, a regression

including self-perceived competence, risk perception, trait competitiveness, and

unethical decision making in dilemma 2 was performed. For dilemma 2, results show

that trait competitiveness has a significantly negative effect on unethical decision

making (β = -.33, t(40) = -2.35, p = .024), meaning that participants high (one

standard deviation above mean) on trait competitiveness gave more unethical answers

20

to dilemma 2. As was the case for unethical decision making in dilemma 1, self-

perceived competence was not significantly related to unethical decision making in

dilemma 2 (β = .18, t(45) = 1.27, p = .213), which does not support hypothesis 1.

Table 5. Regression results moderated mediation for risk perception (mediator) and

various unethical dilemma outcomes

* Correlations significant at p < .05, ** p < .01

To test hypothesis 2 and 3 for dilemma 2, moderated mediation regression

analysis was performed again using Hayes’ (2012) PROCESS SPSS add-on. The

results in table 5 show that there is a significant direct effect of self-perceived

competence on unethical decision making in dilemma 2 (β = 2.46, t = 3.40, p = .002)

when all other variables are controlled for. However, the coefficient is positive,

meaning that individuals relatively high on self-perceived competence score relatively

high on ethical dilemma 2, in turn meaning they are relatively more ethical. This

contradicts hypothesis 1. Furthermore, a significant interaction effect of competence

and trait competitiveness was found on unethical decision making in dilemma 2 (β = -

.53, t(40) = -3.13, p = .003). Figure 2 shows the interaction. Individuals high on self-

perceived competence answered dilemma 2 more ethical when their trait

competitiveness was low, whereas those high on self-perceived competence answered

dilemma 2 less ethical when their trait competitiveness was low. This means that

hypothesis 3 was confirmed by these results, contrary to results of study 1 (in which

those low on self-perceived competence and high on trait competitiveness answered

ethical dilemmas more unethical).

Dependent Variable

Risk Perception

(Mediator) Dilemma 1 Dilemma 2

Total unethical

DM score

Self-perceived Competence (C) .14 2.35 2.46** 6.14

Trait Competitiveness (TC) .20 2.94 2.95** .09

Interaction C x TC -.05 -.52 -.53** -1.39

Risk Perception - .70* .20 1.27

Gender .41 -.67 -.30 .45

Age .01 .03 0.01 .11*

21

Figure 2. The relationship between self-perceived competence and unethical decision

making as moderated by trait competitiveness (study 2, dilemma 2).

Total unethical DM score. Although Cronbach’s alpha of the total unethical

decision making measure was very low, due to the significance of the overall model, I

did conduct analyses for the total score of all unethical dilemmas. Regression analysis

for the complete model showed an only just significant effect of risk perception on

total unethical decision making (β = 1.17, t(40) = 2.02, p = 0.05). Further moderated

mediation analyses (Table 5) showed that only age was significantly related to

participants’ total unethical decision making score (β = .11, t(40) = 2.20, p = .034).

However, no real conclusions can be based upon this measure of unethical decision

making.

Discussion study 2

Similar to the findings in study 1, findings of study 2 concerning hypothesis 1

were somewhat contradictory, as self-perceived competence had a direct effect in

some ethical dilemmas, but not in others. Furthermore, when there was an effect, it

was reversed, meaning that high self-perceived competence was related to ethical

decision making, whereas low self-perceived competence was related to unethical

decision making. This contradicts hypothesis 1. In addition, hypothesis 2 suggested

that risk perception would serve as a mediator between self-perceived competence

and unethical decision making. However, results could not confirm this. Finally,

hypothesis 3 was confirmed by the results of study 2 with ethical dilemma 2 as

1 1,5

2 2,5

3 3,5

4 4,5

5

Low C High C

Une

thic

al D

M D

2

Low TC High TC

22

dependent variable. High trait competitiveness enlarged unethical decision making on

dilemma 2 of those with relatively high self-perceived competence.

General discussion

In two studies, I explored the relationship between self-perceived competence,

risk perception, trait competitiveness, and unethical decision making. The proposed

model expected heightened self-perceived competence to lead to lowered risk

perception, which in turn was expected to lead to increased unethical decision

making. Trait competitiveness was expected to moderate the direct effect of self-

perceived competence on unethical decision making. The results yielded mixed

conclusions. Whereas results concerning hypothesis 1 were somewhat contradictory,

hypothesis 3 was partially confirmed in study 1 and confirmed in study 2. No

significant results were found to support or discard the mediation by risk perception

as proposed in hypothesis 2.

Strengths and limitations

Various strengths and limitations of both studies should be mentioned. The

current paper possesses a number of strengths, including the innovative nature of the

proposed model, which contrasts with research in the domain of competence that

focuses on other-evaluations. This is one of the first studies to address competence

and morality focused on self-evaluations, which also means that no research

paradigms have been previously validated to help design a solid study. Another

strength is that two different research methods were used, an experiment and a survey,

which compensate each other’s weaknesses. On the other hand, the innovative nature

also causes some limitations. Since no paradigms were validated in past research,

methods of both studies were based on those of studies in related, but not completely

similar fields. Measuring unethical decision making, especially using a questionnaire,

is hard, since morality is such a subjective topic in general (Aquino & Reed, 2002).

Some might see a slightly immoral decision as slightly moral, whereas others may

not, making it hard to reach high alpha coefficients for ethical decision making scales.

For example, Moral Foundations Theory focuses on the plurality of the moral domain:

many moral foundations exist, which are based on many social challenges. These

differ across culture, country, region, and even family (Graham et al., 2012).

Another issue that could explain the lack of the expected direct effect is the

conceptualization of self-perceived competence. Study 1 aspired to prime competence

23

through a previously validated method (Srull & Wyer, 1979). After confirming that

the manipulation did not have the intended effect, the manipulation check was used as

the independent measure of self-perceived competence. However, people may differ

in their personal conceptualization of the word competence. It is very broad, and some

may feel very competent in one area and not competent at all at another. General self-

perceived competence may be hard to grasp for participants themselves, making it

hard to measure. Study 2 faced a similar problem. In absence of a scale that measured

the construct of competence exactly as conceptualized in my research model, I

included a scale that was originally designed to measure work related competence.

This scale was designed to measure basic work need satisfaction of employees, which

might not specifically measure the type of general self-perceived competence aimed

at by the theory. Therefore, further research may benefit from developing and

incorporating more detailed investigations of self-perceived competence in order to

specifically measure the construct as conceptualized in the proposed model, e.g.

including constructs such as self-confidence, self-efficacy, mild forms of narcissism,

or domain-specific competence.

Another limitation for both studies, but especially for study 2, is the sample

size. A small sample size lowers statistical power, which in turn has a reduced chance

of detecting a true effect. The results that were found in study 2 should therefore be

interpreted with caution, since the likelihood that the effect is true is also reduced due

to the lowered power. Generalizability and reproducibility of results can be

considered quite low (Button et al., 2013). Future research should focus on reducing

these statistical limitations when examining the current model.

Lastly, the limited amount of control and boundary variables may influence

the results in both studies. Factors such as personality characteristics (e.g.

Machiavellianism), industry climate, ethical orientation and identity, cultural

environment, and cognition have been previously found to influence unethical

decision making (Loe, Ferrell, & Mansfield, 2000), and there is a strong possibility

these could serve as boundary conditions of the currently proposed theory. It is simply

not possible to incorporate all possible variables in a study with this scope, and the

trade-off between data gathering efficiency (length of survey) and completeness was

an issue.

24

Implications and further research

Although the results of both studies did yield limited insights with regard to

the proposed model, they can still make a contribution. The results of these studies

showed there might be an effect of lowered self-perceived competence on unethical

decision making. These findings could be related to those of Ferris et al. (2009), who

found that low self-esteem leads to more deviant behavior. Since self-esteem and

competence are related concepts, this is worth further examination.

In addition, due to the partially supported third hypothesis regarding the

moderation effect of trait competitiveness, results of both studies suggest that

boundary conditions influence the proposed direct effect. As mentioned before, it is

hard to incorporate all variables that might influence this relationship. However,

further research could focus on discovering and examining more boundary conditions,

such as personality characteristics such as Machiavellianism, situational

characteristics such as leadership style, and organizational factors such as underlying

organizational culture.

Even though the proposed model was not supported by the current studies,

organizations might benefit from keeping in mind the theory behind the hypotheses.

Higher managers might lose track of their moral standards once they get predisposed

with building their competence. Further research focusing on antecedents or boundary

conditions of the emergence of ethical blind spots in managers might make it easier

for organizations to select certain individuals for certain positions, consequently

lowering the chance of ethical misconduct. In this light, it might also be interesting to

examine whether it is self-perceived competence, or the presence of a competence

frame (previously discussed Alpha-Gamma theory) at work that might be a cause of

these ethical blind spots.

Conclusion

Based on the results of the current studies, self-perceived competence did not

influence unethical decision making. Furthermore, no mediating effect of risk

perception was found. However, trait competitiveness did strengthen the effect of

self-perceived competence on unethical decision making. The underlying theory is

quite new and innovative, making the research design and methods new and relatively

unrefined. Further research is greatly needed to explore other options of how to

examine the proposed model and to incorporate more control and boundary variables.

25

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