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Social AnthropologyandTwo ContrastingUsesof Tribalism n AfricaPETER P. EKEHState University of New Yorkat Buffalo

A remarkable eatureof African studies has been the sharpdiscontinuities nthe characterization f transitions n Africanhistoryandsociety from one erato another. Thus, for an importantexample, colonialism has rarely beenrelated to the previousera of the slave trade in the analysisof any dominantsocioeconomic themes in Africa. Such discontinuityis significant in oneimportant trandof modem African studies:The transition romthe lore andscholarshipof colonial social anthropology o postcolonialforms of Africanstudies has been stalled into a brittle breakbecause its central focus on thetribe has been under attack. Social anthropologygained strengththroughits analysisof the tribeand its associatedconceptsof kin groupsandkinshipbehaviors in colonial Africa. However, following criticisms of the missionand manners of social anthropologyby postindependenceAfrican scholarsandpoliticians,and a bravereexamination f theconceptualproblemsof theirdiscipline, social anthropologistsmore or less agreedto abandon he use ofthe tribe and of its more obvious derivative tribalismwith respectto Africa.Withthe abandonment f the use of tribe andtribalismhasemergedconsid-erableconfusionin variousdisciplinesconcernedwiththe intellectualdiscern-ment of Africansocial realitiesin connection with theircapacityto probewithpersistence ssues troublingAfrica for decades andtheirabilityto analyzenewconceptionsof the notionof tribalism. We list some aspectsof this problem.First, in discardingthe terms tribe and tribalism, social anthropologyhascreateda gap in African studiesby renderingyearsof scholarshipconcerned

This paperwas preparedwhile I was a fellow at the WoodrowWilson InternationalCenterforScholars, Washington,D.C., and on leave from the Universityof Ibadan,Nigeria. I thank theSenateof the Universityof Ibadan or grantingme leave and the WoodrowWilsonCenterfor itsgenerousresearch acilities. My researchassistantat the Wilson Centerfor the summerof 1989,Miss MaryShawGalvin, now a graduate tudentat YaleUniversity,madeimportant nd sensitivesuggestions which led me to make some changes in the paper.I am particularlyndebtedto thetwo anonymousreadersfor this journal, ComparativeStudies in Society and History, whoseextensive queriesenabled me to reworkpartsof the original manuscript.0010-4175/90/4240-3162 $5.00 ? 1990 Society for ComparativeStudyof Society andHistory660


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SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND TRIBALISM IN AFRICA 66I

with the analysis of kinship as virtuallyirrelevant.Clearly,such organizedfocus on kinship behaviors as social anthropologymanaged for up to fivedecades ought to be of continuingbenefit and currentrelevance for under-standingmoder social behaviors n Africa. Second, while it now appears hatthe term ethnic group has replacedthe disparagedconcept of tribe inAfricanscholarship, here is no clear statementabouttherelationshipbetweenthe two-whether, especially, there has been transition rom one to the otherandwhetherthereis persistentrelevance in the previousanalysisof tribes forourunderstandingof ethnic groupsin moder Africa. Third,while tribalismseems now abandoned in academic scholarshipin African studies-withsome proposing and indeed using ethnicity as its replacement-paradox-ically, the use of the term tribalism s enjoying unprecedented oom not onlyin everydayinteractionsamong ordinaryAfricans butmoreespecially amonghigh-rankingAfricans in governmentand universityinstitutions.Thereappears o be clearneed andjustificationfor a review of the intellec-tualcomponentof this problemof the tribe and for some analysisof the newphenomenonof tribalism n Africa. Thispapercarriesoutthe followingformsof analysis againstthis backgroundandunderstanding.First, I shall evaluatethe anthropologicaltheory of the tribe along with its demise, stressing itsahistoricity.Second, I shall go behind the colonial era explored by socialanthropologyo carryout a probabilityanalysisof the socialoriginsof kinshipbehaviors n Africa, with the hypothesisthattheyowe theirscope andsignifi-cance in both the privateandpublicrealmsin Africa to the weaknesses of theAfrican state, which was unable to provide protectionfor the individualagainsttheravagesof the slavetrade.Inotherwords,I shallargue hatkinshipassumed the role of state surrogateduringthe centuries of the slave trade.Along withthisposition, I arguethatethnicgroupsarose undercolonialismassubstantialand notionalexpansionsof kinship systems and kinship ideologyentrenchedn the slave tradeerabeforecolonialrule.Third,I shalldistinguishbetween the meaning of tribalism n anthropologyas a valued and desirableattributeof tribes and tribesmen,and its uses in modernAfrica, which haveinvertedthe anthropologicalmeaning of this term. In this latterusage trib-alism emerges as a counterideology nventedto fight againstrampantkinshipideology in multiethniccommunities in modernAfricannations. That is, Ishall demonstrate that beyond the positive meaning of tribalism in socialanthropologyas the sum of the ways of life of tribesmen, here is a new usageof the term tribalism thatconveys undesirablemodes of behavior in modernAfrica-a subjectclearly requiring ome attention.Underlying his attemptatanalysingtribalism,and its historical and conceptualantecedents,is the as-sumption hat, in this area at least, there arecontinuities n Africanhistoryandsociety, and that the sociological and historicalmeaningsof modernAfricanphenomena will emerge most fully if they are traced to their roots in thecenturiesof the slave trade and colonialism.


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662 PETER P. EKEH

EVALUATION OF THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY OF THE TRIBEAND KINSHIP BEHAVIORS IN AFRICAStretching back to the beginnings of their discipline in Radcliffe-Brown'searly sketches (for example, 1924), social anthropologists reduced Africansocieties they studied to what they termed tribes. The notion of the tribewas apparently adopted as a heuristic category for the convenience of analy-sis, with only intuitive meanings attached to it. Indeed, well up to the 1950sthere was no known major effort to define the tribe. The itchings and irrita-tions of African nationalist reactions compelled clearer attention to the defini-tion of the tribe in the late 1950s and 1960s, even as social anthropology wasin danger of losing its territory of captive natives, with the twilight ofBritish and French colonization in sight. When finally anthropologists turnedtheir attention to the challenge of clarifying the meaning of the tribe, theoutcome was not enlightening.The net result of various initial stocktaking exercises (for example, Fried1967:154-74; essays in Helm 1968; and Lewis 1968a) was that anthropolo-gists agreed the term tribe was not amenable to a clear definition and shouldbe modified. The nearest that could be accommodated within the disciplinewas tribal society. Given the vastness and frequency of the use of tribe inthe literature of social anthropology, this must be seen as a far-reachingconclusion and is as astounding as if sociologists or political scientists were toabandon the use of the term social class or the state because it wasadjudged to be unamenable to clear definitions (as indeed Easton (1953:107-8) once contended in vain with respect to the state ).Nemesis pursued the discipline of social anthropology with controversydespite the refined appearance of tribal society. As the contributors to themost imaginative debate on the notion of the tribe agree, tribes and tribalsociety are controversial terms (Gutkind 1970). Southall's commandingpiece in The Passing of Tribal Man in Africa (1970:28-50) begins thus:Controversial houghthe matter s, the most generallyacceptablecharacteristics f atribal society are perhaps that it is a whole society, with a high degree of self-sufficiencyat a nearsubsistence evel, based on a relatively simple technologywithoutwritingor literature,cultureand sense of identity,tribalreligion being also conter-minous with tribalsociety. (1970:28)In elaborating further on these characteristics, Southall (1970:46) does addspecifically the importance of the domain of kinship and [its] multiplexrelationships with all the institutional implications of these characteristics.Would such a definition of tribal society then hold for African societiesstudied by social anthropologists?

Actually, the composition of these characteristics into tribal society wouldonly beget a straw man. Following elaborate analysis and illustrations, South-


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SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND TRIBALISM IN AFRICA 663all (1970:45) gives threecogent reasonswhy the tribalconcept shouldbeabandoned:These areproblems f definitionambiguous,mprecise, rconflicting efinitions ndalso thefailure o stick to themconsistently); roblems f illusion falseapplicationf theconcepto artificialndmisconstruedntities) ndproblemsf transitionnd ransfor-mation use of the conceptof the tribeunjustifiably ithreference o phenomenawhichare a directproduct f modem nfluences) italicsadded).'It was entirely possible thatanthropologistsmight have been able to reevalu-ate and salvage the concept of the tribe or its new version, tribalsociety, inspite of these difficulties. However,Southallsuggests important easons out-side the logic of science why it was prudentfor social anthropology n thepostcolonialera to abandonthese emotive terms. With anthropologyalreadynaturally mbarrassedby the colonialisttaintwhichbesmirches t in so muchof the [thirdworld], Southall(1970:47) calls on social anthropologistsand,presumably,otherAfricanists to stopcallingprimitiveand tribal he contem-porarycommunities from which may come modem Africananthropologistsandscholars as theirnew colleagues. He pleads, Thismaybe a case in whichhumanfeelings haveto prevailover strict ogic. Continuing n the same veinof prudence, Southall asks thatfor the strategicmoment ... the wordprimitiveshould be dropped romthe vocabu-laryof social anthropology . .that the term tribe shouldusuallybe appliedonly tothe small-scaleocietiesof thepastwhichretainedheirautonomyhardlyo befoundin the Africaof thecolonialera studiedby socialanthropologists]ndthat henewassociationserived rom hem n thecontemporaryontext houldbe referredo asethnicgroups 1970:48).Southall'sviews deserve this extendedrestatementbecause they stand out inthe debate aboutthe tribe in not only attending o the theory andpracticeofsocial anthropologybutin also offeringa clearprescription.With two decadesalreadypast, we may inquire,how well haveanthropologistsesponded o thisclarion call to redressthe subjectmatterof social anthropology?Furthermore,whatimpacthas social anthropologymadeon the new breed of social scienceand social history in Africa?There seems to be little doubt thatby avoidingthe use of the termtribe,thelanguageof social anthropologyhas become morepolite and less offensive inthe view of African scholars. Within African studiesthe more current erm isethnicgroup, which is presumed o have the samemeaningas tribe. On theother hand, outside of African studies the term tribe continues to be usedwithouthindranceby anthropologists.Recently,Southall 1988:55)once again

1 J. Clyde Mitchell's related views (1970:101) were presented n the same volume in whichSouthall was writing: Tribalman as a member of a geographicallydefined small-scale society,who is immersed in sets of social relationsunaffectedby events and circumstancesoutside hiscommunity,almost by definition has ceased to be.


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SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND TRIBALISM IN AFRICA 665

timeanthropologys takingo become irmly ootedn the academictructureithinAfrica-though someprogresss nowbeingmade Southall 983:65).In universities acrossBlack Africa, there are scarcely any separatedepart-ments of anthropologyto be found anywhere. Originallytucked behind so-ciology, as the Departmentof Sociology andAnthropology,anthropologyhasbeen conveniently forgottenby universityadministrations.Modem Africangovernmentshave befriendedbothforeignandindigenouspoliticalscientists,sociologists, and historians, but they are uneasy about anthropologyandanthropologists.In many instances Africananthropologistshavehad to adaptto new academic fields; moreover, there are not adequategraduatepro-

grammes in anthropologyon the continent to sustain the discipline into thefuture.Obviously,the taint of colonialismon anthropologyhas not been easyto wipe clean. This is not to say that social anthropologyand its works andproductsare dead in Africa. On the contrary,much of the organized socialknowledge produced by Africans tends to be reaction formations againstpursuitsof social anthropologyduringthe colonizationof Africa.Withrespectto thenarrower ubjectmatterof thisessayon tribalism,socialanthropology'serstwhilepreoccupationwith the tribehas left behind a bit-tersweetlegacy in Africa. Whereasleadersof governmentsand intellectualsreject the label and blame anthropologists or creatingit (see Chitepo 1970;Okot p' Bitek 1970:13-14; Mafeje 1971; Mamdani1976:3;Nnoli 1978:1-20), theynonethelessshow concern abouttribalism,whichmany regardas thenew evil plaguingmodernAfrica. The use of tribalismas a concept is new inmoder Africa, although its adoptionseems to have been imposed by thesheerpredominanceof the anthropologicaluses of the termtribe.3Because ofits importance, I shall attemptto analyze the meaning of tribalism in thisessay. However, in order to fully understand ts historical and sociologicalorigins, we must first gain a sense of colonial social anthropology'smissionand the reactions to it from African intellectuals.The Characterof British Social Anthropology n AfricaThe characterof Britishsocial anthropologyn Africa4calls for someexplora-tion not only because it deserves it on its own weight, with regardto its

3 Mafeje(1971:254) notes that unlikesuch other terms as clan, nation, or lineage, theterm tribe is only used by Africans when they speak foreign languages and that it has noequivalent translation in indigenous African languages. He argues, In many instances thecolonial authoritieshelpedto create[sic] the thingscalled tribes,in the sense of politicalcommu-nities; this process coincided with and was helped along by the anthropologists'preoccupationwith 'tribes.' This providedthe material as well as the ideological base of what is now called'tribalism.'Is it surprising hat the modem African, who is a productof colonialism, speaksthesame language[as the anthropologists]? f that is a greatpuzzle to the modem social scientist, itwas not to Marx [i.e., Marx andEngels, 1845:64], who in 1845 wrote: 'The ideas of the rulingclass are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e. the class which is the ruling material force ofsociety, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force.'4 AlthoughotherEuropean olonialpowerswere also involved in themakingof colonial social


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666 PETER P. EKEHachievementsin its studies of kinshipbehaviors n Africa, but more signifi-cantlybecause suchexplorationwill help us to underlinehow the intellectualreactionsto its presentationof African social realities have shapedthe con-tents and conduct of modem African studies in the humanities and socialsciences. Perhaps he most important tatementaboutit is that the disciplineof social anthropologyn Africa was an integralpartof colonialism. If such astatement s received today with resentmentand even hostility,it is becausecolonialism has, in its aftermath,come to be seen as less graciousthan itsdominantcontemporaneous mage led its practitionerso perceive it. Socialanthropologistsimagined that their discipline was a gentler aspect of thecolonizationandconquestof Africa, but it was undeniablya centralpiece ofthe craft of colonization.While colonialism lasted, social anthropologywas the dominant socialscience disciplinein the studyof Africa. Its Durkheimianmageryof society,expertlyreducedto its empiricistdimensionsby Radcliffe-Brown or Britishpractice(see Ekeh 1974:6-9), enabled t to become apracticalscience of menand society in Africa. The inner characterof British social anthropology sbest revealedin its mission of assistingcolonialadministrationn understand-ing colonial peoples. With infrequentexceptions, social anthropologywas infact an applied science, with its theories invented to addresspressing prob-lems of governance n the alien circumstancesof colonialrule. In thisregard,one of the cleareststatementsof the mission of social anthropologys to befound in S. F. Nadel, the Austrianscholar who became a governmentan-thropologist of the Anglo-EgyptianSudan:It has been saidthatmodemanthropologys destined o be of greatassistanceocolonialgovernmentsn providingheknowledge f the socialstructure f nativegroupsuponwhicha soundandharmonious ativeAdministration,s envisagednIndirect ule,shouldbe built.Letmesaythat foronefirmlybelieve n thepossibilityof suchcooperationetweenanthropologistndadministratorNadel1942:vi).

Thedoctrineof indirectrule, whichenjoinedcolonial administratorso rulenative populationsat minimum cost to the imperialgovernment by usingpermissible indigenousinstitutionalarrangements see Fields 1985:33), wasthe cord tying social anthropologistsand administratorsn colonized Africa.Indeed, when necessary,colonial administratorswere required o collect an-thropologicaldata to assist their work of administration.The architectandtheoreticianof the doctrineof indirectrule, FrederickLugard,endorsedthisarrangement. In his prestigious forward to Nadel's A Black Byzantium,anthropology,no other collection of anthropologistscommanded the height and consensusachieved by Britishsocial anthropologistsn Africa. Thus, while Frenchanthropologistshad asignificant presence in African studies, particularly n the developmentof Marxist social an-thropology,they were much less partof colonization thanin the Britishexperience.


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SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND TRIBALISM IN AFRICA 667Lugard stated this policy, and praised its author's achievement within itscontext:Since it is the declaredpolicy of the BritishGovernment o help the differentunits ofnativesociety to governthemselves . . . it goes withoutthe sayinghow valuablesuchanobjective study[as Nadel's]would be to the Administration.Wefindthat, in fact, ithas been utilized in conjunction with the researches of District Officers (Lugard1942:iv).

Helen Lackner (1973) has traced the origins of the full official union be-tween colonial administration and social anthropology to the so-called Wom-en's War of 1929, the name given to the massive uprising of Ibo women (inEastern Nigeria) against the colonial state and its policy of indirect rule. It wasoccasioned by rumours that the warrant chiefs, whose offices had beencreated and imposed on Ibo communities in order to implement the mandateof indirect rule, were about to collect taxes from women, as had been the casewith men's poll tax in the previous year. Fearing that indirect rule required farmore knowledge of indigenous institutions than was then available, there wasnow sharper inclination toward the work of professional anthropologists. Asseveral contributors to the symposium Social Anthropology and the ColonialEncounter (Asad 1973) have emphasized, there was a continuing debate inthe British colonial administration as to whether the necessary research shouldbe carried out by colonial administrators, a view supported by Lugard, or byprofessional social anthropologists, as advocated by Lord Hailey (for exam-ple, 1938:40-67). In spite of a most ambiguous attitude towards[professional] anthropologists on the part of the Colonial Office in London(Lackner 1973:132-3), social anthropologists came to develop close ties withcolonial administrations in Africa. As Langham (1981:xv) has remarked, adistinguishingfeatureof British Social Anthropologywas its close ties with Britishimperialism.Almost all the influential fieldwork done by British Social Anthropolo-gists was performed in what were or had been colonies of Mother En-gland. . . . Leading anthropologistsike Malinowskimade blatant(and, one gathers,successful) attempts to raise money for anthropologicalresearchby pushing an-thropologyas useful in colonial administration.

With so much attention paid to pressing problems of governance, socialanthropology had little interest in such leisurely concerns as the reconstructionof the African past. The immediate present was clearly its parish of concern.In caring so little about the African past, colonial social anthropologists couldrely on the authoritative justification on the subject provided by Radcliffe-Brown (1950:2):ForEuropean ountrieswe can tracethedevelopmentof social institutionsoverseveralcenturies.Formost Africansocieties the records from which we can obtainauthentichistory are extremely scanty or in some instancesentirely lacking except for a veryshortperiodof the immediatepast. We cannothave a historyof Africaninstitutions.


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668 PETER P. EKEH

Social anthropology's emphasis on the immediate colonial situation, ofcourse, coincided with administrativeproblemsof governance. A greatdealof the problemsof colonial rule emerged in communitieswith scantyhistor-ical records,such as theIbo, whereassocieties withwell-knownhistories(forexample, Benin, Kano, Ashanti)were morepacific once the initialproblemsof conquest were resolved. A corollaryof this predisposition o antihistori-cism in the disciplinewas thus the choiceof a distincttypeof communities orinvestigation:Those areas posing difficulties in governancewere generallypreferredto more orderly and pacific communities. To cite West Africanexamples, social anthropologywas moreinterested n riot-proneTiv (Bohan-nan and Bohannan 1953) than in well-ordered and history-soakedSokotoCaliphate;and in the examination of the mysteriousand turbulentTallensipolitical system (see Fortes1945) thanin the historyof centuries-oldAshantikingdom.5Such lack of interestin the past by colonial social anthropologyn Africawas also extendedto its disdain for the sociologicalinvestigationsof thepast.In a provocativestatement n their introduction o the famousAfricanPoliticalSystems, Fortesand Evans-Pritchard1940:5) aver:We do notconsider hat heoriginsof primitivenstitutionsanbe discovered nd,therefore,we do not thinkthat it is worthwhileeekingfor them.Wespeakforanthropologistshenwe say thata scientific tudyof politicalnstitutionsmustbeinductive ndaimsolelyatestablishingndexplainingheuniformitiesoundamongthemandtheir nterdependenciesithother eatures f socialorganization.This functionalist injunction against the sociological reconstructionof thebasis of institutions n society, saidto betokenrejectionof nineteenth-centuryevolutionism,was religiouslyobservedby colonialsocialanthropologists;nd

5 See Forde and Kaberry 1967:xi): New concepts andfield researchmethodsdevelopedinsocial anthropologyduringthe thirtieshad little immediateinfluence on the studyof the largerWestAfrican[sic] chiefdoms. They had been developedmainlywithreferenceto the interpreta-tion of custom and understandingof social processes in small communities. . . . Interest inuncentralized egmentarysocieties was fosteredby theoretical nterest n the processeswherebysocial structureswere maintained n the absence of any institutionalizedhierarchyof authorityand by the practical problemsposed for colonial governments n attempting o integratesuchsocieties in their administration. Also see Michael Crowder(1968:13): The European ter-eotype of Africa was based on the acephalous society . . because of the romanticEuropeanmind these peoples were more fascinatingthanthose who hadattaineda morecomplex formofpolitical administration. And because even scholarly studies of African societies by an-thropologistswere predominantly oncerned n the colonial periodwith such societies, the latterbegan to appearto be the rule rather than the exception that they were in West Africa. Thepreoccupationof anthropologistswith segmentaryor 'primitive' societies in Africa . . . doesmuch to explain the unpopularityof that discipline among Africans today. Anthropologistsbecame, in the eyes of the nationalist eaders,agentsof those who held the view that the Africanwas incapableof self-government.The mood of the discipline in acceptingwhat was importantmay be seen in the outstandingcareerof Meyer Fortes.Althoughhe probablyspentas muchtime in studyingthe Ashantias hedid the Tallensi, Fortes' fame was established with the benefit of his work on the acephalousTallensi rather han among the politically sophisticatedAshanti.


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SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND TRIBALISM IN AFRICA 669it clearly narrowedthe scope and depthof theirenquiries.According to itstenets, any existing institutionsin society were accepted as given. In thisfashion,therampantkinshipsystemsocial anthropologistsncountered very-where in Africa was not probed with respect to how long it had been inexistence, why it was so dominant n Africa, or whether t was relatedto theslave trade that ravaged Africa before Europeancolonization. Ultimately,colonial social anthropologyhad this latent but fundamentalassumption:Kinship is constantover time in any given society in Africa.Withinthe ambianceof such an assumption,there was considerablevaria-tion as to which end of the kinship pendulumof blood and soil (Kuper1982:71-74) leading anthropologistsand their disciples swung (see Kuper1973:107-22; also Guyer 1981). What seems undeniable s that, relative toworld ethnography,Africa was outstanding n havinga greaterproportionofunilineal corporate descent groups than systems of bilateralkindred (seeFreedman1961:214).Whywas thisthe case?The limitationof colonial socialanthropologywas thatit neverattempted o transcend ts data andfindingsbyframing larger theoretical issues that would involve an explorationof theAfrican historicalpast in search of answers to such questions.Until the AfricanIndependence benchmarkyearof 1960 (see CarterandO'Meara1985), the authorityandthe views of Radcliffe-Brownand the othercoeditorsof AfricanPolitical Systems(FortesandEvans-Pritchard 940) andAfrican Systems of Kinship and Marriage (Radcliffe-Brown and Forde 1950)provided the general guidelines for the conduct of social anthropology ncolonizedAfrica. Thereafterhedisciplinewas besiegedwithproblems: Thepresent crisis in social anthropology . . . has become worse at a time whencolonies have become 'independent'and there is no more need for colonialadministration, ndirectRule andthe anthropology hatthey broughtabout(Lackner1973:149).AlthoughBritish social anthropologyhas adjustedratherwell to this postcolonialcrisis-largely by developingotherfields of interestoutside of Africa (such as urbananthropology)and also by blendinginto thehuge American universitymilieu-it cannot be said that it has retained itsformer outstandingidentity and vigour cultivated in the midst of Britishimperialism n Africa. A greatdeal of the questioning hatled to the difficul-ties the disciplinefaced came in the form of African scholars'rejectionsandcriticisms of colonial social anthropology'saims and claims, a subject towhich we now turn.African Reactions: Social History Versus Social AnthropologyThe most importantand sustained ntellectualreactions o the damaged mageAfricasuffered from social anthropologicalpublicationshavecome from Af-rican historians originally trained in western historiographyand historicalmethodology.These historiansworkedto uproot hreeassumptionsand trendsprevalentin Europe about African societies. First, there was the common


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SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND TRIBALISM IN AFRICA 671such majorlandmarks n Africanhistoryas Dike's (1956) Trade and Politicsin the Niger Delta and Biobaku's (1957) The Egba and their Neighbours.Well aware that the net outcome of the anthropologists'work was thatAfrica was now seen outside Africa, and indeed inside it, as the continentoftribesmen,the new Africansocial historians'confessed mission was to exor-cise African studies of the ugly images thus foisted on it. Ajayi and Alagoa(1974), both leaders of the Ibadan School of History, have given a clearaccount of the route the new dominant African social history traveled toaccomplish its mission: Duringcolonial rule, which embodied an attempttocutthe African driftromhis historicalxperiencend n effect oundermineis basichumanity,there merged]he effort o rehabilitate frican istory ndre-establishherelevance f theAfrican istoricalxperience. ssentially, fricansi.e. African isto-rians]andEuropeansnteredntoan intellectualtruggleorthecontrol f theAfricanmind(1974:127).Indeed, social history became an active arm of decolonization, and socialhistorians the counterpoise of the anthropologists championing . . . the stat-ic, functionalistview of Africansociety. Inthis struggleAfrica'snew univer-sities began to involve professionalhistorians n the politics of decoloniza-tion (1974:129), just as colonial administrations adhired andrecruited heservices of anthropologistsn the colonization of Africa. Last, with indepen-dence and the attainmentof self-government,Ajayi and Alagoa (1974:131)urge thatIf Africanhistorys to providehe Africanwith[worthyelf-perception],nd hus oplayan effective olein independentfrica, t hasto correct hedistortionndbridgethe gap createdby the colonialexperiencen the Africanhistorical raditionand]evolve its ownidentity ndependentf westernhistoriographyalsosee Ajayi1961).

In the view of many Africans, social historians-unlike African socialscientists-have succeeded in redressing he subjectmatterof theirdisciplineand have carried he main burdenof the campaignagainstthe injuriousconse-quencesof social anthropology,which hadconveyedthe image of Africa as aland of tribesandtribesmen.7The emphasisof the new social historyclearlybears the marks of reaction to colonial social anthropology.In their search,principallythroughmuchof West and EastAfrica, the social historianschosecommunities andpoliticalentities whose demonstrablehistoriesprecededtheIbadan School were prominentEuropeanswho adoptedthe style and methodologyof the newAfrican history. These included R. Smith (e.g., 1969), Ryder (e.g., 1969), and Omer-Cooper(e.g., 1966).7 It is an indicationof the success of the implantation f thenew historicism n African studiesand the changed circumstances of social anthropologyin the postcolonial era that social an-thropologistsbegan to incorporatehistorical methods and substantialhistory in what must beregarded as a revisionist, if upgraded, version of social anthropology.Thus, apartfrom theexceptional earlier work on the political historyof Zariaby M. G. Smith (1950), by his back-groundhardlya colonial social anthropologist,mainstreamBritish social anthropologistsbeganto include history in their work in the postindependenceperiod:see Lloyd (1971), Forde andKaberry(1967), Jones (1963), and Lewis (1968b).


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672 PETER P. EKEHarrivalof Europeanconquestandrule, thatis, the very areas in which socialanthropologistswere least interested.Moreover,whereasthe principalactorsin the accountsof social anthropologywere faceless andnamelesstribesmen,the new social historycelebrated hedeeds andlineagesof kings andwarriors,particularly hose challengingthe European nvadersand conquerors.In going back in time to a deeperAfricanpast before the anthropologistsand colonization, African historiansnecessarilylandedin the era of the evildays of the slave trade.In studyingit, they were not principally nterested nits socioeconomic consequences for Africa;8rather, heir aim was to demon-stratethat even here there were African actors who stood on the strengthoftheir will in their interactionswith alien traders.They therefore showed nohesitationin dubbingslave tradechieftains as heroes, provided hey were notpassive and supine in dealing with European raders.Thus, Nana Olomu ofthe Niger Delta (Ikime 1968), andKing Agajaof Dahomey (Akinjobin1967)were portrayedas heroic figures, even thoughtheir hands were sullied in thebloodshedof the slave trade.9

Although colonial social anthropologyand African social history sharebetween them the distribution f strength n Africanstudies,in termsof sheervolume of publicationsand depthof scholarship, heirseparatecontributionshave not jointly upgradedourintellectualmasteryof social reality in Africa.This is largely because these two dominantdisciplineshave tendedto avoidthe explanationand analysis of common issues and themes in Africa. Ineffect, social anthropologyand its intellectual rival social history have notcontributed o continuitiesin Africanstudies, not even by way of dialecticalconfrontations,because they avoidedeach other's territoryand field of in-terest. This leads to a lack of consistentpursuitof themesraisedin the socialanalysis of Africa. Thus, remarkably,variousaspectsof kinship(which an-thropologists ound to be rampantn Africansocieties)deserve moreattentionfrom social scientistsandhistorians hanhasbeenpaidto it in Africanstudies.In the rest of this paper,I shall attemptto develop the naturalhistoryofkinship in Africa. It is my view thatthe scope and persistenceof kinshipinAfrica have their beginnings in the exigencies and imperativesof the slavetrade.Undercolonialismkinshipregistered ts revisedpresence n the formofkinship systems studied by social anthropologists.In colonial and post-colonialAfrica, kinshiphas been transformed nto ethnicgroupswhose mem-

8 In fact, Dike and Ajayi (1968:398) have typically shown hostility to any emphasison theslave trade, dismissing it as anothermyth [which] regardsthe influenceof the Atlanticslavetradeas so all-pervasive hatit canexplainall major rends n Africanhistorysince the nineteenthcentury.9 It is remarkable hat the contentsof the resplendentAfricansocial historyreveals so littlemoralismconcerningthe slave trade, thuscontrastingquite sharplywith the moral sensitivitiesdisplayedby Africansin diaspora say, EricWilliams1944;WalterRodney1972) in weighingtheroles played by variousparticipantsn the slave trade.


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SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND TRIBALISM IN AFRICA 673bers are boundtogether by new moral definitions. In this postcolonial repre-sentation,kinshipbehaviorshavegiven rise to the conceptcalled tribalism.Inorderto capture his intricateexistence in Africa we begin with a probabilityanalysis and reconstructionof the circumstancesof the individualduringtheera of the slave tradein Africa.THE SLAVE TRADE AND THE SOCIAL ORIGINSOF KINSHIP IN AFRICA

Such is the segmentation n African studies that it is likely to appearunusualto link up kinship, the exclusive centerpiececonstructof colonial social an-thropology, with the slave trade, aboutwhich social history (but not socialanthropology)has developed some interest. Social anthropologyapparentlyassumed kinship to be so naturalto Africa that it saw no need to trace itssociological origins in other institutionsor in previoushistoricalepochs, norto accountfor its persistencein the Africanhistorical andscape.Thus, socialanthropologists tudyingAfricankinship systems (as the principalaspectsofAfricansocial structures) mmediatelyat the close of the slave tradedid notrelate them to the dynamicsof that trade.There is a vast literatureon the slave trade, the phenomenon dominatingseveral centuriesof Africa's chequeredcentury.First, there is considerableattentionto the techniquesof the trade and its cold-blooded economics withrespectto the transportationf its victims. This literaturencludesthe livelydebateson the numberof Africans lost to the trade,especially following thepublicationof Philip Curtin's(1969) The Atlantic Slave Trade:A Census.Second, therehave also been some good accountsas to rolesplayedby Britishand WesternEuropeancircumstancesand personagesin promotingthe tradeand in later ensuringits abolition. The third area is the impactof the slavetradeon the New Worldof the United States, LatinAmerica, and the WestIndies. All threestrandsof literatureon the slave tradeare of old vintageandof continuinginterest and importin Westernhistoryand scholarship.In sharp contrast to such established traditions in the study of the slavetrade,thereis muchthinner ocus on its impacton Black Africa itself. Giventhe durationandscope of the slave trade n Africa, this neglect is not liable tobe helpful in any attemptsto understandAfrica fully. The Arab side of thetrade, involving trans-Saharan ndtrans-IndianOcean routes, spannedsomenine centuries (A.D. 950-1850) and almost certainly their much longerdurationconjointlyproduceda totalexportof slaves of the same orderas thatof the Atlantic trade (Hair 1978:26). The Europeantrans-Atlantictradestretchedacrosssome four centuries(1450-1850) andinvolvedthe successfulexport of not less than 12 millions and not more than 20 millions (Hair1978:26) of Africans to the New World. Indeed, the Nigerian economichistorianJosephInikori(1982:25) has calculated hataboutthirtymillionmen


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674 PETER P. EKEHand women in their prime were drained from Africa to Arab lands and theNew World n these centuries.Surelymillionsof people, perhapsmanymore,perished in the civil strife, pestilence, and famine induced by the double-barrelledtradefrom Africa.What impactdid such prolongeddisruptionshave on the developmentofstate and society in Africaand the relationshipof the individual o both stateand society? Neithercolonial social anthropologynor its rivalAfricansocialhistory was predisposedto pay attention to such a query.The study of theslave tradeand considerationsof its consequencesfor African developmenthave not been on the mainstreamagendaof these two domains of Africanstudies.As MarvinHarris 1968:536)haspointedout in chidingBritishsocialanthropologyfor its ahistoricism:It is difficult o imaginea less propitiousombinationf placeandsubject orsyn-chronic nalysisthannAfrica] ... Forassurely s theslave-runlantationystemof the NewWorld oundedhedeathknellof Americanboriginalocieties, t alsomarked hebeginning f vastupheavalsf human opulationsn Africa.Blame for such neglect of the analysis of the African slave trade'sconse-quences shouldin fact be extended to African social historians,and indeed tothe new crop of African social scientists, who are wont to be uneasy aboutraisingany issue of such moral ambivalenceas the slave trade.Serious considerationof the impactof the slave tradeon Africa began aslate as the 1960s withclaimsby the Caribbean cholarWalterRodney(1966,1972) of its pervasivenegativeconsequences.In sharprebuttalsof Rodney'sviews, Fage (1969a, 1969b, and 1974) and otherBritishhistorians-includ-ing notably Hopkins (1973:117-23), Johnson(1976) and Hair(1978)-haveengaged in the ratherawkwardsubjectof the economics of the slave trade.Most of these works emphasize the economic and commercial effects of theslave trade and tend on the whole to agree with Fage (1969a:55) that the

broadeffect of the slave tradeseems to havebeen to createconditions for acommercialrevolution in Africa.10The Slave Trade and State Formation in AfricaFagedid venturebeyond profit-and-losscalculationson theAfrican side of hisassessmentof the slave trade. WalterRodney (1966) had arguedthat in theUpper Guinea internalslaveryand other forms of inequalitieshad been cre-ated in society by the intensity of the externalslave trade. In reply, Fage(1969b, 1974) arguedthat internalslavery and otherforms of subjectstatuswere not only alreadyin existence in Africa before the advent of the slave

10 There is at least one compelling rejectionof this viewpoint. Manning(1982), althoughengaging in the same economist reckoningof the slave trade as Fage and other writersof thisview, did reach importantconclusions that show that on balanceDahomey'seconomic growthsuffereddisastrouslyas a resultof the slave trade.


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SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND TRIBALISM IN AFRICA 675trade but in fact betokenedpolitical developmentand state formation n Af-rica. As Wrigley (1971:116) so wryly put it, Fageis unmistakably ongrat-ulating West Africa in having achieved the institution of slavery withoutEuropeanhelp. Dr. Rodney, who proudly demonstrated hat the people ofUpperGuineawere innocent of slaveryuntil the eighteenthcentury,was stoodupon his head. In Fage's views, slaveryand inequalitywere the noble em-blems of statematurity.Fage(1969b:402) was even moredaring n suggestingthe following hypothesis:On the wholeit is probablyrue o saythat heoperationf theslave rademayhavetendedointegrate, trengthennddevelopunitary,erritorialolitical uthority,and]to weaken rdestroymore egmentaryocieties.Whetherhiswasgoodorevilmaybea nice point;historicallyt maybe seen as purposive ndperhaps s moreor lessinevitable.

Wrigley(1971) has correctlyblamed the insensitivityand the amoralismofFage's positionon the historicistpreoccupationwith the state as the litmus testof political development n Africanhistoriography.However,the issues raisedby Fage are well beyond the methodology and metatheoryof African histo-riography:They touchon the raresubjectof the relationshipbetweenkinshipand state formationin the context of the slave trade.Fage is arguingthat theslave trade tended to destroy kinship organizationwhile usefully promotingstate formation.This was why Fage (1969b:403) ruedthe interventions hatterminated the slave trade. Fage necessarily states his case in probabilityterms, and it can be furtherextended within its own logic. Toputhis case incounterfactualerms, Fagewould most likely reasonthat if the slavetradehadnot takenplace, state formationwould have been less noticeable andkinshipnetworksmore extensive in Africa.Ironically, the opposite conclusion would seem to emerge from a finerprobabilityanalysis that takes into account the probableindividual and his

reactions n the conditionsof the slave trade.Typically,Fage(especially 1974)sees ordinaryAfricans in their traditional societies as subjects, not as cit-izens-as personswhose politicalchoices weremade for themby theirrulers,notby themselves. Inaddition,Fage's imageryof theAfricanrulerwas one ofan unfettered PresterJohn whose untrammelledpowers could not be chal-lenged from below by his subjects.The facts of Africa'shistoryandpoliticsare quite different. The individual was more skillful than to leave himselfexposed as a subjectCalibannakedly seeking the protectionof his Prospero.In practicehis membership n a morallydefinedkinship system protected heaverageindividualfrom the wantonness of despoticrulers. Not to belong toa king or one of his feudatories, writes Fage (1974:14), was to be dan-gerously exposed in the circumstancesof the African slave trade. In fact,however, kinshipsystems and groupsensuredthatthe individualescaped thefate of subjectsand brokenmen who hadto belongto a king for their ownsake and protection.


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676 PETER P. EKEHThepoliticalsociology of slave-tradeAfricawas farfrombeinguniform,ofcourse. Withrespectto politicalinstitutions,threecategoriesof statesmay beidentified in this period, each with distinct interrelationshipswith kinshipformations.First,some ancient statesin existence at the adventof the Atlanticslave tradecontinuedin their wonted ways of governanceand were thus notinvolved in the trade. Foremost in this category is the remarkablecase ofEthiopia, which is usually left out in any considerationsof the slave trade,presumablybecause it did not participate see Levine 1974:26). On the con-trary,this fact is an importantelement in any fair assessment of the factorspredisposingother African states to take part. Ethiopiais noteworthyfor its

age-old strongstate institutionsand feudal traditions with theiremphasisonpersonaland contractualrelations between lords and peasantswhose safetywas thus securedfrom foreignexploitation).It is the absence of these institu-tions andtraditions I lsewherein Black Africathat enabled the exploitationof the slave tradeby outsidersto takeplace. It is also noteworthy hat in all ofBlack Africa,Ethiopia raditionallyhaskinshipstructureswiththe leastpoliti-cal salience.Along with Ethiopia,we may include Benin in this firstcategoryof states.Long before the slave tradeBenin haddevelopeda strongsense of statehood,with deep experiencesin warfare or the sakeof protecting hepublic interest(see Egherevba 1934; Ekeh 1976). Although Benin had empires at various1 Outside of Ethiopia, no full-fledged feudal institutions and traditions were sustained inBlack Africa. The varied claims for their existence by both liberal and Marxist scholars (forexample, Mamdani1976;Prah1977; Potekhin1960;Olderogge1957;Loeb 1962) appear o meexaggerated. Ronald Cohen's discussion (1966) of Bomo helps to illustratethe difficulty ofmakinga case for feudalismin slave-tradeAfrica. Cohen(1966:92-5) compares he generalizedviolence in medievalEurope which, as Marc Bloch argues,was a factorthat ed to the institutionof feudalbonds for the protectionof the individual n the absence of an effective state)with thewild violence in Borno, whose victims were sold into the slave trade. He argues that suchconditionsof violence createdpossibilitiesfor therise of feudalism,as it was the case in Europe.But there is this importantdifferencebetweenthe two: In westernEurope,thestate failed to stemthe tide of the violence of the invasions from the outside and its institutionsconsequentlysuffered,paving the way for the emergenceof feudalism. In Borno, the violence thatengulfedsociety was sponsoredby the stateand its functionarieswho were strengthened ndemboldenedby the profitsand armaments f the slave trade romdistant ands. In effect, the statewas wagingwar on society, particularlyas the state-sponsored aids into other territories such as Adamawa)spilledover to domesticviolence. In these circumstances, hose in positionof authorityhad littleincentive for feudal contracts. If in Europethe response to the failureof the state to providesecurityfor the individualwas the institutionof feudalism,in Africa the responseto the violationof the citizenryby the state in its sponsorshipof the slave tradewas the entrenchment f kinshipcorporations.Because of its links with externalmercantilecapitalism,the slave tradewas inher-ently inhospitable o the emergenceof feudal institutions.Thatfeudal institutionsand traditionswould haveeventuallyemergedin several culturalenclaves withouttheprolongedslave tradeandthe succeeding European imperialism in Africa may be imagined from the advanced pa-trimonialism n Benin at the time of its conquest by the British (Bradbury1973:76-128) andstrong ndicationsof protofeudalpossibilitieselsewhere(forexample, Bryant1929).See Goody'sdifferentargument(1969) on the groundsof economy and technology for rejectingclaims forfeudalism in Africa.


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SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND TRIBALISM IN AFRICA 677points in its history,the core of its politicalorganizationwas BeninCity.Likemost city-states n history,its citizens were sensitive abouttheirfreedom,andthe powerof the King of Benin was tied to his abilities to provideandprotectsuch freedom. It was not thereforesurprising hat, in spite of pressures romits slave-tradingneighborsand European lave traders,Benin did not exploitits opportunitiesin this respect. As Ryder (1969:198), who reviewed thismattercarefully,concluded:There s no evidencehatBenin verorganized great lave rading etworkimilarothatwhichsuppliedheportsof the eastern elta[inmoder-dayeasternNigeria], rthat t everundertookystematiclaveraiding . . Benin ither ouldnotorwouldnotbecomea slave-tradingtateon a grand cale(alsosee Davidson 971:65).Again as in the case of Ethiopia, kinshipinstitutionshavebeenweakin Benin,in sharpcontrast o other communities n southernNigeria.The ordinaryBinirelied more on state institutions to protecthim from harm than he did onkinship systems (see Bradbury1973:10-16).12From the prevalenceof the slave tradein Africa, Ethiopiaand Benin mustbe regardedas theexceptionamongtheAfricanstatesin existence attheonsetof the slave trade.Unlike them, most otherancientAfricanstates, corruptedinto the service of the slave trade, constitute the second category of ourclassification. Examplesof these states includeDahomey, Oyo, the Hausa-Fulanistates, and Borno. It should be assumed that involvement n the slavetrade would compromise the characterof these states and make them lessdependenton internalsourcesof power.We should also expectthat n the longrun the individualcitizen wouldrely less on the stateforhis own protection nthese changedcircumstances,bothbecause each state's interestandabilitytoprotectthe individualdiminishedsignificantlyand also becausemanyof themturnedon theirown citizens, providing hem as victimsfor the slave trade seeWilson 1856:189-93).

An outstandingexample of this second categoryof states is Oyo, the mostprominentof the Yoruba tatesin West Africa. Its fortuneswereruined,from12 Thereis considerableconfusionin the literature n the slave trade n thevariedreferences oBenin City (as a state presidedover by the King of Benin); Benin River (a waterloggedareaarounda river named after Benin City in its fame, but quite some distancefrom the city anddominatedby the riverineIjo andItsekiri);and the Bight of Benin (a hugebay alongthe AtlanticCoast in WestAfrica, which runsfromGhanato Lagos in Nigeriaandhas no geographical inkswith either Benin City or Benin River). This confusion has become compoundedby the recentchange in the nameof the countryof Dahomeyto Benin and the adoptionof Benin as the officialtitle for such institutionsas the NationalUniversityof Togo-apparently all in tribute o the oldenfame of Benin City. Because of the frequentmentionof Benin in the historicalrecordsof theslave trade with referenceto these other areas with Benin appellation, here s a false tendencyto attributea greatdeal of volumein the slavetrade o BeninCity.It shouldbe noted,on the otherhand, thatBenin was not innocentof internalslavery,which its aristocracypractised or at leasttwo centuries prior to the Atlantic slave trade. The fact of internalslavery in Benin and thereluctanceor refusal of the Benin city-stateto engage in the slave tradeshould undermine hepopularargument hat the existence of slavery in Africa inducedthe international lave trade.


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the outsideand the inside, as it turned tself intoa predatorylave-tradingtateand fritteredaway its humancapitalin the fiasco of the trade.Eventually, twas itself consumed in wars whose captives fed the slave markets of WestAfricaandslave-holdingestatesof Brazil in the lastphaseof the slave trade nthe nineteenthcentury.By contrastwithEthiopiaandBenin, whatappeared oremarkableaboutOyo was the deep involvementof its kinshipstructures npolitics and the governance of the state. Historian Robin Law (1977:63)notes that The political system of [slave-tradeera] Oyo was thus foundedupon the lineage .... The city of Oyo can, indeed, be regarded as essen-tially a federationof lineages (also see Lloyd 1955; 1962:31-37). Becausethere are no recordsof Oyo's political system in the preslavetradeperiod,Law (1977:62) has suggested that we have to proceedby assumingthat thebetter-documentedonditionsof the nineteenthcenturycanbe projectedback-wards into earlier times and thus concludethatthe ancientOyo state was ascontrolledby the forces of kinshipas in the laterslave-trade ra. But thispieceof retrospectivedeterminism must be questioned. Indeed, Law and otherhistoriansof Oyo providegood reasonswhy it is saferto assume thatkinshipwas less pervasive in the preslavetradeera. Thus, the King of Oyo was lessdependent on lineage politics in the earlier period; and succession to thethronewas by the protofeudalrule of primogeniture Law 1977:67;Johnson1921:41). By the later slave-tradingperiod, there had been a decay in thesuccessionrule to competitionamongunits and sub-unitsof the royal lineagefor the throne, with the kin-composedchiefly council, Oyo Mesi, playing amajorrole in such struggle.Wesuggestthat in ancientAfrican statescorrupt-ed into the slave trade,therewas greatlikelihood that there would be regres-sion from protofeudalpossibilities to the growth, by way of reaction, ofkinshipinstitutions,as seemed to have beenthecase withOyo. Even whenthemachineryof the stateappearedmoredecisive, as in Dahomey, herewouldbesubstantialundergrowth f kinshipnetworksnot under he controlof the state.By way of comparison,it is noteworthythat in Benin, with its strongstateinstitutional ies with society, kinshipwas notonly weak, but the protofeudalrule of successionby primogeniturewas strengthenedn time (see Egherevba1934:39, 43-44; Bradbury1973:16, 97; Ekeh 1976:70).The thirdcategoryof statesin Africain the slave tradeera consistsof thosearisingfrom the imperativesof the tradeandthereforeab initiodependentonit. A large numberof these statesdid arise with the apparentimitedaim ofsecuring captives to feed into the slave trade.Examplesof these statescomemost readilyfrom the most exploitedarea of the West African Atlantic coastand the Niger Delta. These states-studied by, interalia, Dike (1956), Jones(1963), andIkime (1968)-were the direct formationsof the slave trade andembodiedthepovertyof the statein Africa:Theyhad littleor no link withanysociety over which they presided.In spite of the heroicregard n which theirmerchantprinces are held by African social historians,theydid notrely on


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SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND TRIBALISM IN AFRICA 679societal legitimacyfor their survival.Theirpowerderivedfromtheirpartnersacross the AtlanticOcean, who would eventually, n anotherguise of imperi-alism, depose and humiliate them. Such states grew along with kinship sys-tems: The slave trade led to the invigoration,not the attenuation,of kinshipsystems offeringthe individualmeaningfulprotectionagainstsuchbrash newstate institutionsas sproutedupto servicethe avariceof slave-trade hieftainsexternally supportedby the invisible hand of internationalmercantilecap-italism from across the Atlantic.Some comparisonsmay be usefully made amongthese differentcategoriesof states in slave-tradeAfrica. From the point of view of political sociology,the greatestdamageinflicted on thepoliticalcultureof Africawas the divisioncreated between state andsociety by the slave trade.In thepredatory tates ofthe second andthirdcategories,the stategrew apart romsociety in proportionas its dependencyon externalalien sourcesdeepened.On its part,the forces ofsociety became moreindependentof the state, withkinshipflourishingas themost significantrepresentation f society. In thisreckoning,Europeanmperi-alism must be seen as a historicalsuccessor to the slave trade. Once the rulesof association were redefinedin Europe,the predatory tatesnecessarilyfellvictim of theirdependencyon Europeanmercantilecapitalismwhich, as EricWilliams (1944) has argued, had to be replacedin Englandand Europe byindustrialcapitalism, demandingmore settled conditions of colonial rule inAfrica. In spite of accounts of heroic African resistanceto imperialconquestpopularized n African social history,the onset of colonization was more orless an affair between the African states and their formeralien supporters,with little involvement from society. Whereas historiansmay creditablycitethe durabilityof Samory's Seven YearsWar with the Frenchas an instanceof what African resistance to European conquest could demonstrate(seeCrowder1968:86-89), it should be clearon the otherhandthat,especially inmost West African nations riddled with the slave trade, internalproblemsarisingfrom the separationof the state fromsociety weakenedthecapabilitiesof African states to maintain their political independencefrom foreign con-quest. The example of Sir Gilbert Carter'sspectacular progress throughYorubaland n 1893 (Ryder 1969:278) or the lightning speed with whichFrederickLugardsubdued he mightySokotoCaliphate 1900-04) was hardlya measureof resistance thatcould be posed from a society mobilized againstforeigners.It is againnot surprisinghat Beninprovedto be the mostdifficultareato be conquered n southernNigeria.As Ryder(1969:287)putit, It nowstood isolated as the last importanttraditional state surviving in southernNigeria. When Benin's conquestcame, it was in the real fashion of war inwhich all society was involved (see Bradbury1973:91). Nor should it beforgottenthatEthiopiawas not colonized because of some act of mercyfromEurope; the organizationof Ethiopia's state and society would hardly bereceptiveto European mperialismandpenetrationn the fashion in which the


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680 PETER P. EKEH

rest of Africa was subdued. Its convincing defeat of the Italian invasion(1895-96), at the final battleof Adwain January1896, was a feat that couldonly have been achieved by a mobilized society (see Boahen 1987:54-56;Rubenson 1964).Involvement in the slave trade clearly shortened the life span of manyindigenousAfrican statesof theperiod.As Daaku(1965:137)hasputit, Therelativelyshort lives of manyof these states was due [ironically]to the slavetrade because [their]energieswere sapped by the frequentneed to fight ifnot for survivalthen for political aggrandizement n the quicksandof theugly geopoliticsof the slave trade. Colonial rulewas, of course, the ultimatecollective terminationof their independenceand sovereignauthority.Anothertype of comparison s instructive. Africanstatesin the pre-slave-tradeera decidedly attainedgreaterculturalheightsthanthe statesoperatingunder the aegis of the violence of the slave trade. In this respect, Wrigley's(1971:123) sensitive observationsdeserve to be echoed:A conditionof culturalcreativity. . . is most unlikelyto belong to the kind of statethatowes itsexistence r itsgreatnesso slavery rthe slave rade. Itis remarkable]that heacknowledged asterpiecesf theBeninandIfe artistswereproducedeforetheend of the seventeenthentury nd hataesthetic ecadenceet inpreciselywhenthe slavetradewasbecominghe dominantmodeof economic ndsocial ife.Wrigley'sviews herecan be extendedto the threebest knownancientstatesofGhana,Mali, andSonghai,which thrived n succession in the westernpartofAfrica from about the sixth to the sixteenth centuries. Various accounts,including those by Arab traders and visiting scholars, presenta picture ofstates showing far more responsibilitythan the later ones of the slave-tradeera. Fage(1964:20)himself said that there seems to be noquestion that theempiresof Ghana,Mali, andSonghai rankamongthe highestachievementsof Negro Africans n history. Forexample,it is remarkable hatthepeace andsecurityof these earlier times allowed learnedpursuits n the culturalsphere:There was an academiccommunityof scholars and students n Timbucktu nSonghai thathas been referred o as Black Africa's first university(Cissoko1984:208-10). This is a far cry from the purely mundane interestsof theslave-tradingstates in the following centuries.Of course, vast areasof slave-tradeAfricalay outsideregionsof organizedstates. Historically,however, they were not isolated from the slave trade,cutoff in any tribalenclosures.On the contrary,a good numberof the victims ofthe slave trade were captives from those areas social anthropologists atercharacterizedas stateless societies-the classic examplesof the Tiv (Bohan-nan and Bohannan 1953); Ibo (Green 1947); Tallensi (Fortes 1945); Nuer(Evans-Pritchard940). These statelesssocieties wereusuallyborderedby,oratany rate wereclose to, one or moreslave-tradingtates and networks.Fromthe point of view of history,the diacriticalmarkof these societies is thattheywere areasinto which predatory tatessentorganizedraids for captivesto be


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SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND TRIBALISM IN AFRICA 68I

sold into the slave trade. Fromthe point of view of colonial social anthro-pology, these societies were remarkable or exhibiting pristineforms of uni-lineal descent systems of kinship that have markedAfrica as a region inwhich, unlikeotherethnographic egions, cognatic systems [of kinship]arerare (Freedman1961:214).Therelevantquestionflowing forth aboutthemisthis: Is thereany relationshipbetween the anthropological nd historicalcon-figurationsof these societies?The correspondencebetween the vast historyof these raids for captivestobe sold into the slave trade and the ecology of this pristineform of kinshipformation of corporate unilineal descent groups (with prominentpoliticalfunctions)in the same societies seems to be too close to be dismissed as merecoincidence. It appearsto denote a notable case of reactionformation. Ofcourse, the apparentlyfragmentedforces of kinship could not adequatelymatch the power of importedgunfire (see Inikori 1977) in the handsof thepredatorystates. However, in the absence of any shieldingstate institutions,the little corporationsof unilineal descent groupswere liable to be strength-ened. The individual could at least rely on the supportand loyalty of hispatrilineage,as much as he was prepared o lend support or its survivalbyprotecting its constituent members. The success of kin descent groups inprotecting the individual may now be difficult to measure, but their ca-pabilities in forming networks and alliances for protectingtheir membersshould not be minimized.Because the problemwas notposed in this modein thepast, andin view ofthe proverbialcomplaintabout lack of authentic historicalrecords n thesesocieties, we may never have conventional answers to the question as towhetherthe pristineform of unilinealkinshipwas a social formationof theslavetrade,or at least whetherkinshipwasreinforcedandstrengthenednthesezones of brigandageand vandalism nthe centuriesof the slavetrade.However,we can piece together indirect evidence from the Ibo experience withkinlessnessbefore and duringthe slave-tradeperiod. In a close-knit and kin-bonded society, to be kinless is a burden of great nastiness to the affectedindividuals.Kinlessnessgains its significancefromthe intensityof kinshipinsociety: the greaterthe necessity for upholdingkinshipbonds in privateandpublicbehaviors,the greater heugliness and burdenof kinlessness. Wecite afamous European example: In the medieval history of Ireland, the kinlessbrokenmen, or Fuidhirs, had to seek safety and securityby attachingthemselvestoclan andtribalchiefsinasocietyinwhich it wasdangerouso liveoutsidethe realmof one'skinfolk(Maine 1888:173-84). InIboland,thefate ofthe kinless, called osu, was similarto that of the IrishFuidhirs.In the earlier,pre-slave-tradeperiod, kinless men and women sought safety and securitythroughbondageto publicgods whose priestswere therebyobliged to protectthem as slaves of the gods from the dangerswhich kinless people wouldotherwise face (Basden 1938:247). The crisis of the slave trade led to the


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worseningof the conditionsof thedaily livingof the osu. Isichei(1976:47-48)paintsthepictureof theirplightin the followingmanner: Another nstitutionthat underwentdistortionandcorruptionduring hegeneralcrisisof the slavetrade in Iboland] was that of osu, cult slavery ... the evidence suggeststhat . . . [in] the nineteenth century, their numbers expanded and their statusdeteriorateddramatically,so that they became outcasts, [sic] feared, anddespised. Surely, if there is such dramaticchange in the status of Ibokinlessness as a result of the slave trade, should we not assume that theconvulsionscreatedby the slave trade also deepenedkinshipin Iboland?It seems fair to assumethatin the extendedcenturiesof the slave tradeinAfrica, kinship systems were strengthenedand elaborated as a means ofprovidingprotectionagainstthe dangersof the violence createdby the slavetrade. It is my view that the most enduringsocial structurewithin whichAfricanscould be assuredsome measure of protectionwas provided by thekinshipsystem, not the capriciousstate institutions hatrose and diedwith theturbulenceof the slave trade.In proposingthat the slave trade should lead tothe attenuationof kinshiporganizations,Fage (1969b) was obviously apply-ing a favoriteWesternhistorical model of development.Maine(1888) showsfrom his Irish data how independentkin-based statesevolve into complex,centralizedpolities. The lattereventuallydestroy the kin bodies which givethem origin, and thus ultimatelysubstantiate he discontinuitybetween kininstitutionsand state institutions (Fox 1971:138). Fage to the contrary, heabnormality f the slave trade s that t disenabled his formof developmentbyensuringthatthe two grow together,with the kinshipinstitutionsserving ascountervailingforces to the barbarismof predatorystate institutions. As amatterof fact, it could be arguedfrom the Africanexperiencethatin severalinstanceskinship institutionseventuallyoutlived state institutions.The slave trade ed to another ormof abnormaldevelopment n Africa. Byencouraging the growth of kinship institutions, the slave trade led to thefragmentationof moral perspectives, with the segmented and nucleatedkinshipentitiesservingas sanctuaries or moralpractices.Rather handevelopan inclusive world view defining common moralityunder the aegis of aninclusive deity, African states of the slave-tradeera presidedover societieswith differentiatedmoraldefinitions n manyinstancescelebratedn the sacra-ment of ancestorworship.Outsideof Ethiopia,the emergenceof a commonworldview, derivedfroma worldreligion,was notachievedin any regionsofBlack Africa.

Europeancolonial rule was imposed on this substratumof fragmentedmoralperspectivesin the dying decades of the nineteenthcenturyand in thefirst half of the twentiethcentury.Its platformof the plexus of kinshipwaswell capturedby colonial social anthropologistswho, however,failed to traceits social origins back to the unsettlingcircumstances of the slave trade.Kinship providedthe individualroom for defininghis citizenship(thatis, his


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SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND TRIBALISM IN AFRICA 683rights and duties) and meaningfulprotection against the vicissitudes of theslave tradeand its predatorystate institutions.The relevantquestionthat this analysisleadsto is: Whatwas the impactofcolonialism on such rampantkinship in Africa? To thatquerywe now turn.COLONIALISM AND KINSHIP IDEOLOGY IN AFRICA

Kinship, writesRichardFox (1971:129), criticallyparaphrasingntrenchedwisdom in political anthropology, withersawayas societypasses fromprim-itive to the complex. Familial etiquette gives way to class relationship.MortonFried(1967:229) defines the stateas the conquestof kinship: A stateis betterviewed as the complexof institutionsby meansof whichthepowerofthe society is organizedon a basis superiorto kinship.The drama and dilemma of politicaldevelopment n Africastem from thisfact, that such respected views on political development to the contrary,colonialism heightenedand enhancedthe political salience of kinshipin thestate and for the individual.Plotnicov'scomparison 1970:66-7) pointsto theheart of the matter:Within the process of modernization n the West, the features of intensiveurbaniza-tion, extensive migration,and geographicaland social mobilityhavebeen associatedwith a concomitantdecline in the importanceof wide kinshipties. ... By contrast, nAfrica strong and extensive kinship ties . . . have alteredlittle. Ethnic associationshave not only persisted, in many cases they have increased in importance n the newtowns and cities.Indeed, under colonialism the notion of kinshipwas considerably expandedinto the constructionof ethnic groupsand kinship ideology, which thus be-came centralelements of any meaningfuldefinitionof the publicrealm. Thispersistence of kinship in Africa must be seen as a productof the craft ofcolonial rule, which by and large built its methods of governance on thedominance of kinship in precolonialAfrica.The resultingcolonial stateemergedfrom two processes.First,the authori-ty of existingAfrican states and othernonstatepolitical systemswas dissolvedand subjectedto alien Europeancontrol.Second, some elements of the Euro-peanmodel of the statewere composedin the colonial settingandimposedonAfrica societies as the colonial state. The partsof the model of the Europeanstate imported nto Africa were mainlycoercive aspects needed in the courseof its conquestand colonization. Thus the military,police force, andbureau-cracy were prominent.However, the constructionof the new colonial stateavoided as much as possible controlsimposed by societalconstraints, nclud-ing legislative processes. Consequently,the colonial state in Africa was ingeneral separated rom the values andmoralityof both the European ocietiesfrom which these elements of the state were imported, and the African so-cieties on which they were imposed.


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Contraryto the relationshipbetween the Europeanstate and society, inwhich, as Engels (1884:155) said, the state is by no means a powerimposedfrom without . . . rather, it is a product of society, the colonial state inAfricawas a powerimposedfromoutside Africa andclearlyset apart romthesocieties over which it presided. Several consequencesdevelopedfrom thisseparationof state and society. First, althoughthe Europeancolonization ofAfrica resultedin single national states spreadacross the territoriesof con-quest, there were no national societies commensurateand coextensive withthe nationalstates of conquest. In territories ike Nigeria, the nationalstatethereforecoexisted and functionedalongsideseveraldisparatesocieties withtheirown distinctmoralitycomplexes and normativegivens.Second, state and society in Africa were now operatedon differentprin-ciples of morality.Whereas the state and its extended colonial apparatuseswere run on the principle of institutionalizedamorality,action within re-stricted spheres of society (say, in an ethnic group) was governed by theprincipleof morality.Interactionamongpersonsfrom differentsocietalrepre-sentations,such as differentethnicgroups, would thus notbe subjectto moralprinciples,but rather o the principleof amorality.The dilemmapromotedbythe involvement of the same persons in morally defined activities in thesocietal sphere of kinship nexus and amoral activities in the civic public ofstate institutionsposes one set of intractableproblems in the analysis ofAfricanpolitics (see Ekeh 1975).Beneath the colonial state level, in the underbrushof society, the newcolonial environment appedthe resources of precolonial society by feedingon kinshipcodes of moralbehavior, eadingto theirexpansion nto emergentethnic groupsin the colonial setting. In the precolonialperiod,there were noopportunitiesfor such ethnic groups: They were social formations in thecircumstancescreatedby colonialismin whichpersonsfromdifferentkinshipentities interacted n urbanand polyglot communities,but the ethnic groupsthat thus emerged were not integrated nto a composite society. Furnivall'scolonial Burma-basedcaricature(1948) of a market-oriented nd morallyimpoverished pluralsociety was not distantfrom the patternof colonialinteractions n Africa. Interactionswere rich and plentiful,but relationshipsbetween persons from differentethnic groupswere essentiallyamoral.Colonialismled to the crystallizationof ethnicityfrom anotherdirection.Colonial rule involved minimumgovernmentand minimumstate functions,especially outside the maintenanceof law and order. In much of colonialAfrica, social welfare for individualswas not part of state responsibility.Consequently,social welfare functionsfell into the sphereof the only otherentity organized to undertake t: the upgradedkinship system, which fullyabsorbedthis responsibilityfor the social welfare of the individual,alive ordead. The items involvedin the ethnicsocial welfarecatalogueundercoloni-alism extendedfrom such endeavorsas the provisionof educationandhealth


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SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND TRIBALISM IN AFRICA 685(and educational and health institutions)to safeguard against harassment(even by the colonial law enforcementagencies) and assurance hat the indi-vidual would be given properburial and his family taken care of after hisdeath. These functionsof the kinshipsystem and ethnicgroupswereparticu-larlyundertakenn the cities by town and clan associationsformed fromfragmentsof the kinshipsystemthatmigrated o polyglotcities. Inthe coloni-al setting the individualcould only rely on state services at his own peril.Third,colonialismindirectlycontributed o the growthof ethnicityby encour-aging voluntary Christianmissions thatsoughtandmaintainedgood rela-tionshipswithkinshipentities.Thus, forinstance,by translatingheBible andChristiancatechism texts into Africanlanguages, the missionarieshelpedtocrystallize the boundaries of the emergent ethnic groups (see Abernethy1969). Finally, colonial rule did contribute o the expansionof ethnicity byorganizing colonial administrationalong kinship lines. For ease of gover-nance, colonial rulers, especially in British colonies, appointed chiefswhere they already existed definitively; otherwise the rulers imposed newwarrant hiefs on existingkinshipentities(see Afigbo 1972; Suret-Canale1964:71-91).The impact of these developments on the ordinaryindividual in Africacounts a greatdeal towardsa clearunderstanding f thecolonialAfricanstate.Above all else, a majorresult of the way thecolonialstatedevelopedwas thatthe individual could only be indirectlyrelated to the state. Membershipof akinship group-either in a substantialcontextof immediateclan networks nruralareasor in more rarifiedappearance f ethnicity n polyglotcommunitiesin the cities-became an integralmeaningof citizenshipfor the individual nthe colonial state. In this sense, then, the colonial state was an overgrowthspreadacross, and with ties to, a mosaic of kinshipgroups. The individualsaw his duties to the colonial state as only partof his responsibilitiesto hiskinship group.Thus, taxation was for the most part evied andcollected on akinshipbasis. In otherwords,the worthof the individualwas calculated n theidiom of kinship membership.The meaningof citizenshipin the colonial stateas the rightsand dutiesofthe individualcollectively managed hroughkinshipnetworksdominatedpol-itics at the stage of decolonizationand was deepenedby thetactics of colonialgovernors, who exploited this ideology of kinshipby encouragingdivisionsalong ethnic lines in the dying days of colonial rule. Postcolonialstates thusinheriteda definitionof politicsimpregnatedwith a potentkinship deology aspartof the definitionof statehoodin independentAfrica.TRIBALISM AND KINSHIP IDEOLOGY IN POSTCOLONIAL AFRICAThe political turbulence n much of postcolonialBlack Africa owes a greatdeal of its virulence to the confrontationbetween entrenched and rampantkinshipideology inherited rom colonialism and theeffortsof a fractionof the


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new rulers to destroywhatthey saw as a divisive instinctstanding n the wayof the evolutionof a unitedandcomposite politicalorganizationn the fashionof the Europeanstate. In this respect, we must acknowledgethe hopes andvision of a few pioneeringAfricanstatesmenwho thought t was possible todislodge such robustkinship ideologies in their attemptsat building virilekinship-freeAfricanstates. KwameNkrumah, n Ghana,andSekouToure, nGuinea, in theirvariousways underestimated he strengthof ethnic loyaltiesand blundered nto antipluralist olicies. Sekou Tourewas firm in his denun-ciation of the forces of ethnicity. Accordingto AristideZolberg (1966:45):SekouToure tressed hatthe most importantaskof the state was the definitereinforcementf the nationbymeansof theeliminationf thesequelsof theregionalspirit ... Howcan theunityof the nationbeforgedf there emainsnthepoliticalandelectoral omainrrationallementso beexploited rwhichcan nfluence partof society?But, as Sekou Tourepainfully discovered, the regional spirit of bondedkinshipwas not easy to dislodge. The Africanstatecontinued,even in Ghanaand Guinea, to be plaguedby the divisivenessof kinshiployalties implantedduringthe slave-tradeera and emboldenedduringcolonialism.Unlike GhanaandGuinea, otherpostcolonialstatesvery early settled to adifferentpatternof responseto the problemof kinshiployalties. In Nigeria,for a primeexample, the salience andpotencyof ethnicity,and its associatedkinship ideology, were fully recognizedin the early 1960s as problemsthathadto be acceptedinto the definitionof the Nigerianstate.In Nigeria, Zaire,Cameroun,Kenya, and a host of otherpostcolonialstatesin Africa, no effortswere made-unlike the attempts n Ghanaand Guinea-to destroytheprinci-ple of exercisingone's ultimateloyalties to constituentethnic groups;how-ever, important ttemptsandcompromisesweremade to containtheirdestruc-tive effects and domesticate their political ambitions. Perhaps the mostarticulateof such effortsis theconstructionof the doctrineof federalcharacterin the 1979Nigerianconstitution,whichdesignedan elaborate ormula ortheconsociational apportionment f offices and other state resourceson thebasis of the ethniccompositionof Nigeria(see EkehandOsaghae1989). TheNigerian doctrineof federal character s an affirmationand recognitionofethnicity as an organizingprinciple, but it is also an attemptto blunt thedivisiveness induced by the kinship ideology informing public affairs inNigeria's postcolonialhistory,whichled to a fierce civil warin the late 1960s.The principleof federalcharacter s consciously intended,in Nigeria,to limitthe dangers inherentin the struggleto enhance sectionaland ethnic oppor-tunitiesthroughthe controlof state apparatuses.13

13 The framersof the 1979 NigerianConstitutiongavefederal charactera final cause defini-tion as follows: 'Federalcharacter'of Nigeriarefers to the distinctivedesire of the peoples ofNigeriato promotenationalunity,foster national oyaltyandgive everycitizenof Nigeriaa sense


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SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND TRIBALISM IN AFRICA 687Apartfrom such directedefforts atdomesticating he problemsarisingfromkinshipideology andkinshiployalties in Black Africa as through he deliber-ated constitutionaldevice in the Nigerianexperiment,an attempthas emergedto limit the dangers of this kinship ideology throughsocietal control of thebehaviors of those who act in modem multiethniccommunities. It is man-ifested in the widespreaduse of two terms in modem Africa: tribalismandtribalists. Because tribalismis a sociological constructionattackingkinshipideology, I shall term it a counterideology.Althoughthis counterideologyoftribalism is one of the most importantsociological thoughtsto emerge inpostcolonial Africa, there is no statement of its meaning in the literature.

Indeed, there is a sizeable confusion between this sociological notion oftribalism as a counterideologyand as rejectionof the tenets of ethnicityandkinship ideology, and the anthropologicalmeaning of tribalismas a strongsense of identifyingwith one's ethnic and kinship groups in rural enclaves.This confusion is quite significantbecause outside Africa tribalismcontinuesto be used in its anthropologicalsense, whereas inside Africa tribalismiswidely used in its other meaning in both everyday interactionsand in suchserious circles as universities, parliament,official governmentdocuments,and in newspapers. It appearsproperthat the distinctionbetween these twouses of tribalism should be outlined.Two Contrasting Uses of Tribalism in AfricaThe anthropologicalmeaning of tribalism is best capturedfrom the vastliterature nd theearlydirectionof theRhodes-LivingstoneInstituteof BritishCentralAfrica, in which tribalismwas understoodas theattribute f tribes andof tribesmenwho demonstrate oyalty and adherence o tribalways of doingthings. As enunciatedby its second director(Gluckman1945:1),the Instituteaim[ed] to analyze the organizationof modem CentralAfrica and to showhow selected urbanand tribalcommunities ive within it. The Institute'scoreattention urnedon ruralmen andtribal olkways,andhowtheirbehaviorsweretransposed o new colonialurbanconcentrations.As Gluckman 1961:67)wasto summarize t muchlater, Perhapsout of the traditionof anthropology,we[in the Institute]have been interested argelyin the problemof why tribalismof belonging to the nation notwithstanding he diversitiesof ethnic origin, culture, languageorreligion which may exist and which it is their desire to nourishandharnessto the enrichmentofthe FederalRepublicof Nigeria (Williams 1976:x). This condensed definitionof federal char-acter was distilled from three separatepoints of view as proper ways of achievingthe supremeconstitutionalgoal of the promotionof national oyalty in a multi-ethnicsociety, whichurged:fair andequitabletreatment or all thecomponentstates and ethnicgroups n thecountry ; fairand just treatmentfor all ethnic groups within the area of authorityof [any] government inNigeria; and the avoidance of the predominancein the FederalGovernmentor any of itsagencies of personsfrom some states, ethnicor othersectionalgroupsto the exclusionof personsfromotherstates, ethnic or other sectionalgroups,or the monopolyof the office of the Presidentby persons from any state or ethnic groups (Williams 1976:viii-ix).


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persists, both in tribalareasandin towns, in spite of the industrial evolutionwhich has producedsuch great social changes. Accordingly, detribaliza-tion, or thedegreeto which a townsmandeparts rom his tribalways, becamea central constructof the anthropologists f the Rhodes-LivingstoneInstitute(see Wilson 1941-2).14Severalstudiesof tribalism n southernAfrica werepremisedon the mean-ing of loyalty and adherenceto traditionalvalues and norms as a sourceofindividualstrength,with ambivalenceon the possibilityof detribalizationor departure rom tribalism. J. C. Mitchell's acclaimed The Kalela Dance(1956) andEpstein'sPolitics in an UrbanAfricanCommunity1958) revolvedaround this meaning of tribalism. Many distinguishedpapers on southernAfrica which carry tribalism n their titles imply approbationor the tribalfolkwayscarried nto new urbanareas: hus,Gluckman 1960), Mayer(1961),Mitchell (1960), and Lee (1971).Suchananthropologicalmeaningof tribalism s dramaticallydifferent romits moder sociological uses in postcolonial Africa. In this latter context,tribalismrefersto obnoxious modes of behavior n multiethniccircumstancesthat threatenandendangernormal coexistence among personsfrom differentethnicgroups.As used by Africans, tribalism n postcolonialAfricarefers tothe abhorrence or the abuseof commonopportunitiesandpublicgoods (thatis, those owned in commonby various ethnic groups)throughmanifestationof unduepreferencesforpersonsof one's own ethnicgrouping.Tribalismhasalso been used as a term of opprobrium o denoteobjectionableactivities ofindividuals who threatenthe integrityof the nation and yet favor its spe-cialized ethnic fragments.Thus, the governmentof the Republicof Somaliafelt compelled to explain the basis of this meaningof tribalism n its book,War Against the Evils of Tribalismin Our Country (Somalia DemocraticRepublic 1983); and the governmentof Kenya thoughtit wise to sponsorapublic opinion poll on tribalism in Kenya (MarketResearch Company1961). Even an employeeof the socialistgovernmentof Ghana'sInformationServiceDepartmentattempted o offer a Marxistexplanation or the existenceof tribalismamongeducatedGhanaiansn termsof false consciousness andamisinformed class struggle (Asamoa 1982). In this meaning, tribalismand14 Richard Brown (1973, 1979) has given symphateticaccountsof the Rhodes-LivingstoneInstitute and its first two directors, Godfrey Wilson and Max Gluckman. His defense of theInstituteandits two pioneerdirectorswas writtenagainst hebackground f what he saw as unfair

attackson colonial social anthropology(1973:173-74). In contrastto such criticisms, Brown(1973:174-75) believes that the case of GodfreyWilson andthe Rhodes-LivingstoneInstitute san interestingone since it illustratesthe fundamentalambiguitywhich lay at the heart of therelationshipbetween anthropologyand colonial rule. Furthermore,he RLI was the first instituteof its kind in the dependentempireand it served as a model in manyrespectsfor those thatwerelater established after the second world war in east and west Africa and in the West Indies.Predictably, he name of the Institute was rapidlychanged(to the Institutefor AfricanStudies,Universityof Zambia) in the postcolonialera.


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SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND TRIBALISM IN AFRICA 689tribalistsare seen as evil forces in Africa, which governments,tradeunions,studentorganizations,and newspapersfeel compelledto fight.This intellectuallyinsurgentnotion of tribalism in Africa does not neces-sarily reject traditionalways of doing things. Virtuallyeveryone who pro-motes this counterideology respects tradition,but attacksthe abuse of in-terethnicpublicgoods by thoseprivilegedto use suchgoods, especiallyif theyare also in a position to dispensethem. Furthermore,his notion of tribalismrejectsthe principleof exclusivity inherent n kinshipideology as implantedinto colonial statecraft.We can characterize he counterideologyof tribalismin this sense as an emergentsociological form of decolonizationdeservinganalysis.The Sociological Contentsof the Counterideologyof TribalismThe terms ideology and counterideology, as used in this paper,refer tosociological constructions hat haveemergedin Africanhistoryandsociety inresponse to the major consequences of slave tradeand colonialism. What Ihave characterizedas kinshipideology constitutesa body of ideas and prac-tices that have enthronedkinship as a governing principle of private andpublic behaviors of individuals whose identity thus rests on their kinshipassociations. Because such kinship ideology defined the individual's rela-tionshipsto the colonial state, the usual atrophyof kinshipin the face of theinc

social anthropology and two contrasting uses

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