social dilemmas dawes.1980

7/27/2019 Social Dilemmas Dawes.1980

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/social-dilemmas-dawes1980 1/25

A' Rev Pycho /80. ;/-Coprght © b Annua ws In A rh rrd

SOCIAL DLEMMAS .324

Robyn M Dawes!

Deparment of Psychology, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon 9743

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION TO THE LOGIC OF SOCIAL DIEMMAS 10PROPOSLS OR ELICITING COOPERTVE BEHOR................ 4

Changing the Payf............................ 7From Payf to Utilties 75

Altrum ...... 176Concence an no

THE MTHEMATICAL STRUCTURE OF DILEMMA AMES 78T "Tak Sm Gam 179The "Give Some Game . 179

REEW OF THE LTERATURE ABOUT EXPERIMENTAL N-PERSONDILEMMA AMES 82Finding 183

Inment ............. 8mmunin.................... 18Gp se 186Pbl dclsu f he veus ym 18Exptatos about othe' bhavor 8Moling . 188

A FINA HYPOTHESIS ABOUT EICIIN COOPERATIE BEHAIOR... 188

Interest in social dilemmas-partcuay those esulting from overpopUaton, resource depleton and pollutonhas grown damatcaly n the past10 yeas among humansts scentsts and phlosophers Such dlemmas aredened by to smple propetes: (0) each ndivdual eceves a hgherpayo fo a socialy defecting choce eg having additional chldren usingall the enegy avalable poluting his or her neighbors) than for a socallycooperative choce no matter what the other ndviduals in socety do but() all dvduals ae bette o if al cooeate than f all defect. Whle

Thi paper wa written whe I was a James McKeen attel Sabbatica Fellow at the

Rech Cente fo Gou Dyamc at the Isttute o Soca Reech at the Uvetyof Mchga ad at the ychology deatmet thee I thank thee ttuto fo the ce d eecally all my fend thee who heled.

169

66-08/80/00069$0

A n n u . R e v . P s y c h o l . 1 9 8 0 . 3 1 : 1 6 9 - 1 9 3

. D o w n l o a d e d f r o m a r j o u r n a l s . a n n

u a l r e v i e w s . o r g

b y I o w a S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y

o n 0 1 / 2 3 / 1 0 . F o r p e r s o n a l u s e o n l

y .



170 DAWS

mn thinker hve impl pointed out tht our mot prein ocietlproblem reut rom uch dilemm, mot hve ddreed themelve to the quetion o ho� to et people to cooperte. Anwer hve rned rom

impoition o dicttorhip evthn to "mutul coercion mutullreed upon, to ppel to conciencehi pper review the tucture nd ubiquit o ocil dilemm prob

lem, outline propoed "olution, nd then uve the contbution opcholoit who hve tudied dlemm behvior in the contet oNperon me N > 2. he hpothei tht ollow rom thi uve ndreview i tht tere re two crucil ctor tht led people to cooperte in oci demm itution. Firt, peope mut "think bout nd come toundertnd the nture o the diemm o tht morl, normtive, nd ltru-itic conce well extel po cn inuence bevior. Secondpeople mut hve ome reon or beievin tht other wil not deect or while the dierence in po m w vor deection no mtter wht other do, the bolute po i hiher i other cooperte thn i the dont.he ecc o both ctornd indeed the poibiit o coopertive bevior t in diemm itutioni bed upon rejectin the prnciple o "nontiet o economic reed n xiom o ctu humn beviorAnd it i rejected

INTRODUCTION TO THE LOGIC OF SOCIALDIEMMAS

ocil dilemm re chrcterzed b two propetie a the ocial po to ech individul or deectin behvior i hiher thn the po or coopertive bevior, rerdle o wt the other ociet member do, et (b individul in te ociet receive ower po i deect tn ll coopete

Emple bound. eople ed to eep tei theott low o coneve ener ae bein ked to uer rom the cold without ppreciblconevin the uel uppl b their individul crce; et i ll keep teir thermott hih, ll m un out of uel nd reee. Durin pollution lertin Euene, Oreon, reident re ked to ride biccle or wlk rther thnto drve teir cr. But ec peron i better o drivin, becue hi or her cr contribution to the polution probem i neliible, while choice tobiccle or wl ield te po of te drver exhut. Yet te rei-dent re wore o drivin their cr nd mintinin the pollution thnthe would be i l bicced or wlked. oldier who ht in lre bttle cn reaonbl conclude tht no mtter wht their comrde do the peronll re better o tkin no chnce et i no one tae chance, the reult will be rout nd luhter wore or ll the oldier thn i tin

A n n u . R

e v . P s y c h o l . 1 9 8 0 . 3 1 : 1 6 9 - 1 9 3 . D

o w n l o a d e d f r o m a r j o u r n a l s . a n n u

a l r e v i e w s . o r g

b y I o w a S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y o n

0 1 / 2 3 / 1 0 . F o r p e r s o n a l u s e o n l y .



SCAL DLEMMAS 17 1

chances Or consider the position of a wae eaer who is asked to use restraint in his or her salar demands. Don so will hurt him or her andhave a minute eect on the overall rate of ination; et if all fail to exercise

restraint the result is unawa ination from which all will suer. Womenin India wil almost certainly otlie their husbands and or the ast maorit who can't work their onl source of support in their old ae istheir male sons Thus each individual woman achieves the hihest socialpao b havin as many children as possible Yet the resultin overpopulation makes a social securt or oldae benet sstem impossible so that allthe women are worse o than the would have been if they had all practicedrestraint in hain children Untenured assistant professors are best o

pblishin eery article possible no matter how mediocre or in how obscre a oual. (The deans' committees never actually read articles.) Yet the reslt is an eplosion of dbios infoation and an epectation that any-o wowl wl av bse 10 or 15 al w 5 years of obtainin a hD a result from which we all suer (except those of us whoown paper pulp mills)

Some of these examples come from the three crucial problems of the mode wold: resource depletion polltion and oepopulation In most societies it is to each individuals adantae to use as much ener to

pollute as much and to have as many children as possible. (This statement should not be interpreted as meanin that these three phenomena are independentfa from it.) Yet the result is to eceed the carrin capacit(Hardin 1976) of "spceship earth an excess from which all people sueror will suer eventuall. These problems hae asen of corse becase the checks on enery use pollution and poplation that eisted until a hundredyears or so ao have been all but destroyed by mode technolomainly industrial and medical. And use of new ener sources or new ariculturaltechniques for increasin havests often exacerbate the problems (see Wade 194ab). While many societies throot histoy have faced their mem-bers with social ilemmas it is these dilemmas that are particlarl lobaland pressin that hae attracted the most attention amon social thinkers(from an etraordinaly wide vaiety of elds).

Perhaps the most inuential article published recentl was arrett Har-dins "Traedy of the Commons which appeared in Scence in 1968 Init Hardin are that moe hmanity as the reslt of the ability tooeoplate and ovese resorces faces a problem analoos o that faced

b herdsmen usin a common pasture (1968 p 1244)People n auent o n Communst socetes do not contute to wold ovepopulaton ut

n most sets n the wold the payo emans geatest o havng many chlden

possle

A n n u . R e v . P s y c h o l . 1 9 8 0 . 3 1 : 1 6 9 - 1 9 3 . D o

w n l o a d e d f r o m a r j o u r n a l s . a n n u a

l r e v i e w s . o r g

b y I o w a S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y o n 0 1 / 2 3 / 1 0 . F o r p e r s o n a l u s e o n l y .



72 DAWS

As a rational bing, ach herdsman sks to maximiz his gain Explicitly or mplicitymore or ls consciousy he asks "Wat is the utility to e of addng one more animalto y herd? This tiity h one negative and one positive coponent

The positive component is a funcion of the increment of one nimal Since theherdsmn receivs the procds fro the sale of the additional imal the positietility is nery +

2 The negative component is a nction of the additional overgrazing created by onemore anmal Since howeer the es of oergrang are shred by all the herdsen the negative tility for y prticlr cision-ang herdsan is only a fractionof 1

Addng together the comonent prial utilities the rational herdsm conclds thatthe only sensible core for to pre is to add another il to his herd ndnother; nd another Bt this is the coclusion rched by every rationl herdsmansharng the commons Therein is the trgedy Each man is lked into a system that

copels hi to incree his herd wthot tin a world that is limit is thedtnation toward which lmen rsh, ech pursuing his own bt intert in a societythat beevs in the frdom of the commons3•4

Th aitosl hamspaout situatio os i sult i a socialilmma althouh ot all social immas ha that pcis om (Daws75

oas as aayss s s wa w -stucio with m mths (776 76 aalysis of th iiiual wok-s uit bcc i a aiszai capitalistic socity

It is not fro the bneolence of the btcher the brewer or the baker that we exptour dinner bt from ther regard to their own interestWe addrss oselves not to their humanity but to their selloe nd nee ak to them of our own nssiti but of ther adang (Book p 8)

As eey ndivdul therefore endeors much s he ca both to employ his cpilin the sppor of domtic industry and so to dirt that indsty that it prodce ay

b of the gratest alue eer inddual necssrly abors t o render the nnl reenueof the society s grt s he y preferrng the suppo of domtic to that of foreig indsty he itens his own surty; d by directing that dsty such a

mner s its prodce may be for the tt alue he intends only s own gain dhe in ts s in mny other c l by an sible hnd to promote n end whichw no pat of his ntention (Book p 77)

'Actualy he negatie payo must be more negative than for a te dilemma to exsHrdn clarly mpli a gater alue when he discuss the dtction of the commons for example, the comos mainti 0pounds of cattle when 0 lO pound bllre gr on it bt oy 99 pods when bll are gz the the herds whointroduc additionl bll hs two 9-pond bllsa gain of 8 pouds oer onel.pound onwhie the tot welth of the commons hs dresed by 1 pouns

4d s the te "tiity to refer to social eonoic payo s wil be ephied

i the next stion of this rticle, there may be other tiities that deterine behaior so itdo not folow from his ysis that "fro a commons brgs in to all (1968 p2)

A n n u . R

e v . P s y c h o l . 1 9 8 0 . 3 1 : 1 6 9 - 1 9 3 . D

o w n l o a d e d f r o m a r j o u r n a l s . a n n u a l r e v i e w s . o r g





SOCIAL DILEMMAS 13

Hri Smih re o oil heori with imetrill ooeview ou he eet of elfiteree ehvior Rher he re iu-ig ieret itutio Hri' i ilemm ituio i whih the eter-

l oequee of eh herm trig to mimie hi rot re egtive, the egtive oequee outweigh the oitive oe to him[Hri eill eorie Smith iviible h i reolvig oultio roblem ( 1)] Smih iuio i oilemm oe i whihmximiig iiviul ro oe o hu other more h it ee he iiviul i f, i hel hem Thi eree i ture i te eoomi oet of exteralty (uh 1971, 7): "we ee etelit beig reet wheever the behvior of ero et the itutio of other ero without the eliit greemet of tht ero or eroI Hri ommo he exeliie re egive greter h he iiviul' o i Smih' Sol he re oitive

To ee oil ilemm i tem of mitue of etelitie woul,however, volve iterperol omro of o I mot e uh omrio i imle, but ot i ll For emle, it i iult to omre the river' oitive o for rivig urig ollutio lert to the bike ier egtive o for brethig ollue ir I otrt the eiio of oil lemm rooe he egiig of thi er ivolve o

omrio ol tn

iiviul (who reeive higher o for efetig t whoe o for uiverl efetio i lower t tht for uiverl ooertio It i eough to ote tht mot eoomi writig out egtive etelitie tht h ome to m ttetio h i ft ee out ilemm iutio

ill, l (19) oe of ca tap i loel rele o he oe of ilemm He ee oil tr ourrig whe ehvior ht reult i immeite rewr le to logterm uihme or em-le, m oberver hve ote tht m moe tehologil ve

m be tr eg the goo eet of DDT uge were immeitel evietwhile the itrou ee took er o eri Moreover eve whe he logterm ill eet re kow t the egiig, he m e "time ioute ("If we're till rou, we'll jum o tht rige whe we ome to i) O iiviul level, igrette mokig overetig eeive lohol igetio re tr O the oil level, mot oil ilemm re oil tr ut gi ot llfor ilemm eit i whih eve efetig behvior i uihe (beue eough oher eole re ou toefet)lhough o bl ooerive behvior woul be uher,

ot ll oil ilemm ivolve time lgWe retu the to the origil eitio of oil ilemm Ehiiviul reeives higher o for oill efetig hoie th for







174 DAWES

a soal ooperae one, e a ndduals hae a hher pao f allooperae han i al defe. ll he examples dsussed earlier mee hese wo ondions

Gien he ubqui of soal diemmasand he lobal mporane of some of hemhe queson arses of how indiduals and soeies an dealwih hem ne answer is ha he an' he roe of he soal heors iso pon ou where dilemmas exs and hen o wah eerone defeerifn he hpohess ha a soal dlemma ndeed s here. far more ommon nswer has been o propose mehanisms b whh ooperaonma be enendered n people fain soal dlemmas

PROPOSLS FOR ELICIING COOPERTIVEBEHVIOR

Changing the PayofSoal dlemmas are dened n erms of he soal pao srure he smples proposal for eln ooperae behao s o hane ha sue ha s when analss eeas ha a soia dilema exss an eo an be made o oberae b appopae hoes of rewards and punish-mens for ooperae and defen behaior respeie Then i is noloner a soal dlemma

The spli of hs appoah s appean unl we as who wl hane he paos and how he almos unersal answer o he rs queson isoeme n, andsomewha surprsin en he ulural baround of he wriershe mos ommon answer o he seond queson s hrouhoeron Thus for exampe adn 1968 p 17 adoaes "muualoeron uual aeed upon and phuls 1977 and eilbrone 1974adoae oeron from an auhoriaan oemen in orde o aoid he mos pessn soal dlemas. hese soluons ae essenall he same asobbess 151 Leahan onsed o aoid he soial dema of he warre of all aans all Bu here s epii eidene ha hose soeieswhee people are bes ouren a an raeare hose whose oemens orespond leas o obbess auhorarian Leahan (rbell Ruheford 197. The ounerarumen (Robeson 1974 s ha hese soees are hose ha hae been forunae enouh o hae ample nauralresoures o o hae eoled fom a more auhoriaran sae oiinain a a me when pressin soia dlemmas dd in fa exis. nd if new dlemmasn he form of oerpopulaon polluon and ener depleon

ome as expeed Leahan ll aan be neessar Mos ofus ould prefer reward o oeion, ahouh here are hose whoare wiln o pa ompex and expensie oemenal bureauraies omae sure ha onl he "desern ahiee oeena rewards raher

A n n u . R

e v . P s y c h o l . 1 9 8 0 . 3 1 : 1 6 9 - 1 9 3 . D






SOCIAL DILEMMAS 175

ha o allow givaways. Th problm wih boh rwar a oriohowvr is ha hy ar vry osly Th soiy fa wih h poialila us pl is sous ih o wa hos p o f

or o sablish a poliig auhoy ha is suily iv ha hos mp wil o ar o so. This plio is pai by som or all soiy brs. I h ilmma has b u io a w siuaio whr vryo mus oopra bu whr h payos o vryo ar lss hahy woul b if vyo wr o oopra frly i h origial siuaioSois i fa i is o v possibl o avoi a ila by war o orio baus h oss of waig popl fo oopag or ivly orig hm o o so x h gai h soiy rivs from havig vryo oopra rahr ha f

Morovr soial hag i h payos by irouig rwars a puishms a b rrbly ii. Cosir for xampl h workr o a oliv a whos pouiviy is us i pa o pay o a poli ag whos job is o ak sur ha ha wok os o sl h fampou paly o oly os ha su i was pouiviy of h workr bu his poli ag himslf ou isa b oig somhig prouiv for h soiysuh as workig o h farm Fialy oriv sysmsa so govmal rwar sysmsapparly ra or a

las xarba a moivaio o g arou h ruls.From Payof to UtiltiesMay of us woul o rob a bak v if w kw ha w ou g away wih i a v if w ou b assur ha o of our fris or ighborswou kow May of us giv moy o pubi lvisio or o h Ui Fu v hough w kow ha our pal oibuio will ak oir i s of h srvis rr Mos of us ak roubl ovo v hough w kow ha h probabiliy ha a lio will b

i by a sig ballo is ivly ro som oups siig a larg faily o i fa limi is si o ou of sir bu ou of a blif ha i is o moral o hav oo may hilr.

Al hs bhaviors ivolv rig a payo ha is lag fo o ha is sall h poial bak obbs oul b walhy h oibuosou sav hi moy h vors oul sav hmsvs iovia h oupls who wa hilr ol hav hm Th poi is ha h popl makig hs isios hav utities ha rmi hir bhavioruiliis assoia wih asps of hir bhavior ohr ha h xal

payos hy woul riv Th usio of whhr al bhavior is "uliay slsh baus i s ome uiliis is bsi h poi jus ash qusio of whhr suh slshss is a pa hua oivaor isirrva o h qusio of whhr soiy mmbrs faig a ilma ar







176 WES

doomd o df T poi i if po oo io A ov io h A m by diio) ha a iliy; if imlaoly aio oid a ih oial ayo i m of oomi b o y (aai by diio) oh ilii m b idi h idiidal'hoi T problm i o a wa ilii a d o dy i ol i o oopiv avio.

Th i i poibl o ha a oial dilmma pd by a payo ad y a pol ooa. Th ao wold b ha h idiidal ilii do o m wih a dilmma. Th ilii mo imoa i lii oopaio a ho aoiad wih alim followi oil orm d obyi di of oi T will b oidrd i .

TRUM I i a dmoabl fa ha ol a ao of ohpayo a wll a of i ow i ahi diio. Good Smria xi.(Whh hi bhaio i limaly lh i lih of om ho of a i aai ila.) Fw o wold ap $0 wi oi fo o fd i li of $48 fo ah of T imoa of payo o oa dmod xprimally by i ad Clio i & Clio 968 i 199 Clio al 197)albi iom omii xpimal ox w b apaly wih omimiz h ayo o oh o a la o maximiz h diay bw ow ad oh ayo i & Thoa 17).

T qio i w lrim ld o oopaiv baio i fa of oial dilmma. If o fo o pyo i mly tacticaoidaio fo obi f wad fom a o iliy fo bhai aliially ao b od o a a fao ha old owi xl oial pyo. I mo oial dilmm idividl m bha aly ad h oblm o ba h oial oom lfom h aa oial baio ao a la m of opl wo dont i. T fw popl wold b moivad o oopa by ilalim.

Do alim xi oh ha a a ai? Tha qio i dil oaw xpimlly o o bai of aalii obrvaio b i hab addd ly by oiobioloi ad o d i mlaio of olioay hoy fo mod hma bhaio Thy doo a abo alim o had om i a oi i f of l i lio owd p lh oio lom podi of ali hoh alii bhaio i wold b dlio i a ox oid h oiyTh ambll 175 fo xaml bliv i a oial olio owadalii d ooai om d moal o ha m b aflly

A n n u . R

e v . P s y c h o l . 1 9 8 0 . 3 1 : 1 6 9 - 1 9 3 . D







SOCIAL DILEMMAS 77

gua agan ampan nvualm an h cnqun gnc uccf h m lh lany (1976) n ha f whav an (h ln f h hapng a cy' lf?) wmn n all c pf

mn wh a aluc an av h wh a lfcn an cwaly. S ally an xual pfnc may nvlv a cal ng f aluc a agan h ha mgh n fa wll n a wa f allagan all. Fnally v (971) pp a alum a accaavanag u cally mp nm cpcy.

In cna, clg yphz mchanm by whch al-um n an f lf may ul n gnc ppagan, vn f n hughc ppagan. h ppng ha uch uvval wk hughgup lcn ulmaly nng h nvual cunly (1980) hav fw ahn. Many h (.g. Alxan 1980) hav pp knalum a a plaul gnc lnk all alum Ppl ha gn wh l la, an g yn n lba l f p an man aunlp la uv y nanc pably ha h wn gn a ppaga. vnc f uch knalum m aly fun n a mh acc f h chln. nc h g whch aluc cnc fcu pmaly n cl kn(npc) an paally gncally a, wul xpc nca hugh gnc lcn Whh uch kn alum wul la a gnal aluc cnc f uunng ppl f a whl cy a m qun.

lau n p a cla ncan f whh alum puly accaln any h lau my knlg. vhl, may n b lm accal cnc, n whch ca cul anmpan fac n lang ppl cpa n a cal lmma uan. h n mpan pv: ppl hav kn au h pay h f aluc ul a cv h pv n val.

CONSCENE AND NORMS vn hugh cncnc may fn b nly h nn vc whch wa u ha mn may lkng (Mnckn,qu n Ck 1955) a n a pwful fc uh hy nmvang human hav Ppl f . yan u manhav f ppl ha h ppl blv uncncnabl Dpa appal a ma mm uccfullyy pna vcm f aggn

Han (1968, pp. 124647) pccally m appal cncnc

a a man f lcng cpav ba n cal lmma hypz a uh an appal a ubl bn, bau pnmakng appal may ga pn way a a mpln. ncaly . F f pn makng appal al a a ga f

A n n u . R e

v . P s y c h o l . 1 9 8 0 . 3 1 : 1 6 9 - 1 9 3 . D o w n l o a d e d f r o m a r j o u r n a l s . a n n u a






178 A

on "clr conscinc (prps s is "onl sr rrd tn isall on. A scond rmnt of Harins confss morlit it nrotic ilt nd conclds tt ppls to conscinc r "pscoloicll

patonic (an m, lik in ls, b miss b nscrplosiniilsBt Hardin's is t main discssion of ppls to conscinc in t

litrtrr t lst in t litrtr ic s com to m ttntionscoloists, conomists, political scintists, n sociobioloists o not tnd to s "conscinc s n xplantor constrct, prps bcas it isoftn consir scona to otr factors Bt scona or not it osappar to a an impornt plc in tminin ra bior ns on ppr to rid in t for sction of tis rticl ssts it m b ccios in licitin coopation.

orms r somr tn conscinc nd corcion. Most normstat xist ma licit pnismnt if iolatd Bt norms a t ilit tomotit popl in t snc of n trt of cnsr If t rl cas ar in Casars Lions it is tr tt ma cimat if do not Bt it is not t fr of cimtion tt lds most of s to t rl W t cs of t r Similrl, popl m cooprt in socil dilmms cs of t t r t r not t kind of popl o prot at otrs xpns or o contrit to a olocast

TH MATHMATIA STUTU OF DMMA GAMS

A m is simpl sstm of pos dpndin on t combintion of coics md t plrs (An aitioal "coic m ma a ranom lmnt tat rci no pao n ilmm ams ac plr s on of to coics D (for fctin or C (for cooprtin T pao to c plar pns oll on is or r coic of D or C ndon t nmr of otr plrs o coos C or D

Lt D( b t po to t dfctors in n N prson m r plrs cooprt nd lt C( t po to t cooprtor n plars (inclin tmsls cooprat A socil ilmma am is caractriz b to simpl inlitis.

1. D(m) > C( + 1)

Tt is, t po n otr popl cooprt is las ir for an iniial o rmins a fctor an for on o bcoms t plsrst cooprtor ( o from 0 to N 1

2 D( < C(N

A n n u . R

e v . P s y c h o l . 1 9 8 0 . 3 1 : 1 6 9 - 1 9 3 . D






AL LA 79

Tha is iesal cpeai amg he N playes leads a geae pay ha des iesal defeci

The saeme f cdii . i game hery lagage is ha defec-

i s domtg strte. B if eeye chses ha dmiaig saegy, he cme ha esls is e ha is less pefeed by all playes a leas e he (eg ha eslig fm iesal cpeai) Sice accrdig game hey all playes shld chse a dmiaig saegyhe esl is emed a equbrum ( playe ld a sich hisr her chice) Becase he cme daed by he dmiaig sraegy isless pefeed by all playes he cme f aims cpeai hiscme is emed defet. Hece demm gme s oe whh pyers hve domtg strteges tht resut defet equbrum Tgames deelped f experimeal eseach ae illsaieThe "Take Some GameEach f hee playes simlaesly hlds p a ed ble pe hipEach playe h hlds p a ed chip eceies $300 i pay b each f he hee players udg tht per is ed $00 f ha chice Thisis he egaie exealiy ach playe h hlds p ble chip receies$. ih esla e Thee ble chips beig held p pides a $.pay ll players (ad a scial prdc $30 hile hree ed chipsbeig held p pides a ze pay f all (ad a ze scial pdc) A he same ime hee each playe eass ha he she is bes hldig p a ed chip becase ha iceases he es he she ms ay by ly $10 hile icreasig he immeiae am receied by $0 $30

) I eec he layer ges . frm he her players .es I his game e ca tke some fm hers ch a chice isaalgs ha iled i he decisi plle (Daes Delay &Chapli 974).

The Give Sme Gameach f e playes may keep $8 fm he experimee f himself r herself r e $ frm he expermeer each f he he playersAgai i is a dilemma becase if all gve, all ge $200 (4 X $) hile if all keep all ge $8.; ye i is clealy i each players idiidal iees keep I fac each playe is geig $800 me by eepig ha by gighis game i based he eseach acich (97). he gv some game peses he sbecs ih a chice aalgs ha f decidg hehe

cibe a pblic gd (Olse 96) (Each f s ca eap he bee f hes cibis hile ihhldig s.)he "ake sme ad "gie sme games ca be peseed i maix frm

displayig he pays defecs ad cpeas as a fci f he mbe f cpeas (Table ).

A n n u . R e







180 A

Payoffs for the two games

T "Tak Sm Gam

Numbe o Poffs o Poffs

oope eeo ope

3 $.002 $2.00 01 $100 -$1000 0

Giv e Gam

ue of Pyoff o Paoff o

pe eec o cope

$004 $0.00 $ 9003 $700 $ 6.00 $00 $ 300 $100 00 $ 800

In addton to properties 1 and 2 (above), the take soe" and the gvesoe" ges have hree rther properies

A. D m + 1 - D m) = > 0

B. C m + 1) C () = > 0

C D m) C ( + ) = > 0

In the te soe ge, $ $, n c $ egive soe" game, = $3, = $3, and = $8

I we were to plot the payos o defeton and ooperaton as a fntonof the nber o cooperators, propertes A and B state that both nctonsre strght lnes with postive sopes (see Shelling 1973, Habrge1973) Property states that these slopes are eql Condon No 1 (thatan addtional ooperator akes less thn had he or she reaned a efetorollows directly ro property C and condtion No 2 states that the rghthand extreme of the ooperatng fncton s above the left hand extree of th defectng nction raphically a social dlemma exists when the Dpayo fncton s above the C ntion for ts entire length and the right

extreity of the nton s hgher thn the let extrety o the Dnton It s apparent tha a very we range o ongratons wl eetths spation Shellng (1973) hs ssse any sh ongrationsand has given a host of magnative examples

Hambrger (1973) has shown that dlema gaes havng properties Athogh C are evalent to games in which each patcipant simltaneosly

Popet A and B do not mply poty C unls 2, ause t s possle thatpays opeaton and deeton ae nea ut d not have eu sopes. On the othehand popet A and C nt ony mpy popety B, ut that s equal to Cz welPot B and yeld te same mplaon Popety y tse as no mpaton othetan ondton No, ause t do not spy that the payo ntons nd stahtln

A n n u . R e v . P s y c h o l . 1 9 8 0 . 3 1 : 1 6 9 - 1 9 3 . D



b y I o w a S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y o n 0 1 / 2 3 / 1 0 . F o r p e r s o n a l u s e o n l y

.



AL LA 181

plays identical twopeson pisones diea gaes having popety C (tered separale" in the literatre) against each o the reaining N 1participants Dawes (175) has shown hat the are also eqivalent to the

algeraic expression o the coons dilea" descred Hardin(168). Fige 1 plots the payos o the take soe gae and the givesoe" gae espectively

n the iteate to e descied hee ost o the dilea gaes haveproperies AC We shal ter these urm games, ollowing Kahan(13) and Goehring & Kahan (176). One gop o experenters woking prarl at rzona State Universiy in the 170s ses ch dierentgaesthose in which sjects ay daw points o a pool that canrepenish itsel" (e e increased y the experenter) at varyng intervalsin aonts depending pon the sjects ehavio (eg. estaint o selsacrice) This paradig, which dees a siple atheatica desciption, mla o a ad gam dvd Rub h dooal dao

c Renstein et al 175. Sch gaes will e reerred to as ariabe

$2 .

oopt yof

A 3um g

.

B

m oog

ir aphs pas h tw gams







82 AE

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ABOUTEXPERIMENTAL N-PERSON DILEMMA AMES

h rsoer emm is twopero dile ge h e drvsfro n necdot conceing two prsoners who hve joitly coitted felony d who hve been ppreheded by District ttoey who cnnotprove their gilt The District ttoey holds the incoicdo ndoers ech the chnce to cofess If one confesss nd the othr doest, thone who confsss will go fr whil the other will receive xistc f both cofess thy will both rceive odrt stc, whilif neither confesses both will receive ini sentence In this sittionconfessio is doinn srtegy (If the other confesses, confession ledsto oderte sentence rther thn to xi one; if the other doesnt,it leds to fredo rther thn to ini stnc) Bt confssionlds to decit qilibi bse dl confssio reslts i odrtestces, whrs in stc cold b chivd by ithr cofessing Hence the dile.

n th exerietl gig lirtre rsoners diles re oftenplyed repetedly Tht leds to n dditionl constrint on th pyos sotht the plyers cnot tke ts plying th defecting strtegy. (The sof th pyos for oe defctig d o cooprtig choic st b lss ththe s for two cooprtig choics Uifor dile gs stisfy thiscostrint, bt so do y others

h ovrwhling jority of exprietl investigtions of behvior insocil dile ges hve stdied sbjects' responses in twoperson prisoners dils tht r plyd rptdly by the s sbjcts (or bysbjcts who bliv tht thy r lyig gist th se othr sbjctwho y be copter progr). yos for thse twoprso gs hvslly b in sll ots of oy (g ils) in virtlly ll xperi-

ents, sbjects hv been told tht their prpose shold be to xiizetheir own gilthogh we sspect tht y other otives sch sxiizig reltiv gi (Messick & hogt 967) or iniizig bore-do y hve be ivolved There y wll be ovr 000 exprietsreported in the psychologicl litertre docenting how college stdetsbhv i sch itrtd prsoer's dils

The twoperson iterted prisoner's dile hs three chrcterstics,however, tht ke it id hence nrepresettive of the socidiles discssed in this rticle

1 n the twoperso prisoner dile (iterted or not) ll hr fordfctio is visitd copltly on th other plyr hr is focsd rthrth sprd ot ost socil dls i cotrst, hr for dfectigbehvior is dised over cosiderble nber of plyers

A n n u . R

e v . P s y c h o l . 1 9 8 0 . 3 1 : 1 6 9 - 1 9 3 . D






A EA 18

2 In ost social dilas dfcting bhavior ay b anonyos it isnot ncssarily so bt th possibility is thr. In th twoprson itratdga in contrast ach playr knows with crtainty how th othr has

bhavd s ncssary knowdg s nq to th twoprson sitation

3 ach playr has total rinforct cotrol ovr th othr i thitratd twoprson dila That is, ach playr can pnish th othrfor dfction or coopration (bhavior that is socially optial if individallysboptial) by choosing dfction on th sbsqnt choic and can r-ward" th prvios choc of th othr by choosing coopratio hs, achplayr can attpt to shap th othrs bhavior by choic of dfction andcoopration whil partially dtrining his or hr own otco by thatsa choic h sitation is vry coplicatd ach ga" is analogosto a play in chss which has aning only within th taga of th ntirmatch. fact, o Rapoport (1967) has shown that if subjects reay

can innc ach othrs sbsqnt choics thn th itratd prisonrsdila isnt a dila at all! So if sbcts bliv that thy hav schinnc it is not a dila to th This charactristic is iq to thtwoprson itratd dila whn th ar or popl invovd it is notpossibl to attpt to shap a paticlar othr prsons bhavior by di

cios (or blivd to b dicios) choc of ons own bhavior (hr ayb so lnt of sch attptd shaping whn th nbr of poplinvolvd approachs twi thr or orbt th potntial ctivnssof doing so is clarly diltd)

D to th spcicity of ham th lac of possil anonymity and thpotntial s of ons own bhavior as a stratgy to shap th othr twoprson itratd prisonrs dilas canot b cosidrd to b rprsntativ social dlas in genera Th rviw of th litratr and its ndingsthat follow will b liitd to invstigations of dilas involvig thr or

or popl

Findings

NVOVEMENT Whil any corrlation btwn th cologial validity"of an xprint and th dgr of sbct involvnt is far fro prfctth assssnt of sch involvnt crtainly an iportant factor invalating a doain of stdis. Whn social dila gas ar playd forsbstantial aonts of ony sbcts ar xty involvd. In 172,

Boacich ra two condtios of 5prso giv so" gas in both conditons $ a low temptaton" condton ranged rom $0

to $20 across v trials, whil in a high tptation condition it ran fro$01 to $75 with a spcial trial at th nd whr sbcts cold win p to







1 84 A

16 by betraying their grops. In both conditions conication wasallowed and the sbjects ade aple se o evalative ters (cheat"scre" greed" nk" being the or ost coon) In a later stdy

(176) Bonacich sed larger aonts o oney which reslted in evenore striking nvolveent. l· sbjects in 5person grops played twogaes; in the rst = = = .0 while in the second which was nota nior gae any deection rested in no payo to coopertors nd apyo as high s 00 to single deector

Bonacich writes (176 p 20):

Duing the coding of the tap we noticed occasional joking threats about what the gopwould do to a noncoopeato; he would no leave the place alive they would push himown the stas he le they woul beat him up they would wite a lette to the studentnewspape exposng s py o they woul take hm to small clams cou. Thesethts coul b ntmatng n coul suggest how angy the goup woul be towdthe noncoopato

awes McTavish & Shaklee (177) condcted an experient invovingeven larger aonts o oney sbects played st once. Total cooperationsulted in $250 o mmb o t 8-so ous totl dtoreslted in no payent to anyone I = = 150 and = 8. asbstantial onetary incentive to deect Soe grops cold conicate

whie others cod not awes McTavish&

Shaklee (p. 7) write:One of the most siant ats of ths tudy howeve did not show up in the dataanayss It s the exteme seousnss wth whch the subets take the poblems Comments such as "I you eect on the st o us you'e gong to have to lve wth t thet o you le wee not at luncommon No ws t unusu o people to wsh tolav by the back oo to clam that the i not wsh to see the sons o btcheswho double-cosed them to beme etemely agy at othe subt o to becometeaul

The aet level was so high that we ae nwillig to n intact groups because of theet the game might have on the mem' flings about each other Te at level

also mtgate aganst examining choice vsibility [NB n expements involving ighstak] n pettng we n one gop n which choies wee made pUbic The threedeeto were the target o a geat dea of hostity ("You have no idea how much youlenate m one cooato shout oe stomng out o the oom) they emanae the expment unt ll the coopatos wee pumably long gone

xperienters whose payos consist o points to be converted to trivialaonts o cash or corse credits do not report the aect level o theirsbjects t ay aso be high bt I sspect that i it were it wold beentioned.

Whether or not high stakes and aect are necessary to reach valid conc-sions abot behavior in socia dileas is a qestion that cannot be an-swered a priori bt depends in prt pon a gener nding o congrent or

A n n u . R

e v . P s y c h o l . 1 9 8 0 . 3 1 : 1 6 9 - 1 9 3 . D






SOCIAL DILEMMAS 18

dsparat rsls aross hgh nvolvnt and low nvolvn sds syt thr ar not nogh nvstgations n th ld to know

rtly ost o th dl sttos whch w r trstd

nvolv hgh at.g hat xprincd y th athor dring th 173gsol crss s rd d ghor r rd d ghor kd otto co rglar cstor" o so srvc sto

OMMUNAON Th saltary ts o onaton on ooprton ar qtos In th rst xprnt y Bonach rportd aov,oato was allowd ll grops, ad 3% o th chocs wroopratv n th sond xprnt thr was a 4% coopraton rat

Bonacch dd ot rn a noconaton control grop (cas h wasnot stdyng th cts o concaton pr s), t Daws McTavsh,d Shkl dd Thy od 72% coopro thr coctgro w o o wo y o o opposd to 1 % n thr noocato grops (whh also cosstdo two typs)

Usng ponts as payos Rapopor t l (62) and Bxnst al (166)ond that concatng grops cooprtd or Usng varal gaswth pots tkn ro rplsh pool, Brchr (17), dy &

Harpr (8, 17), and Harpr (177) all ond that grops al tococ cooprtd or w h rsl tht or pots wr rvstd" ro th pool

Usng a hypothtcal nor snss ga (n whh anactrrsold ooprat aganst onsrs), rd & Rosn (14) ond thatconcaton hanc coopraton t n a nor ga n whhscs shold c s ch pot wr worh $1," ldwll (17) ddot Cldwll d , howvr, tha cocato codon n wcsts old sancton dctors rsltd n grtr cooprton Morovr,

h ond tht concaton pr s dd yld hghr ooprao lthoghnot sgncantly so, and as h wrot (p 2), rhaps wth ral onyscts wold lss cld to trt th xprt s copttvga"

What s t aot oncaton that lads to or coopraton? Whlost o th td tod ov sply pt cocto gst

he results require qualication The communication that was eective in the Rapopot et al study was unintended; it cued during a break betwn two 3 hour sessons and because te exrimentes' (. ) "main interst was n te distribution of choices the

bsn o communication the reults after the reak were gnored ecet for noing the high degree of cooration. The game in the Bixenstine et al study wa not strictly a dilemma,because there were some points at which detion did not domnate cooeration







18 AE

no communicaion, Dawes, McTavish, and Shakee aemped o sudy heeecs of various aspecs of communicaion They argued ha here is ahierarchy of a leas hree aspecs involved in any faceoface communica

ion abou diemma probems Firs subjecs ge o know each oher ashuman beings humanizaion) second hey ge o discuss he diemma wihwhich hey are faced discussion) hird, hey have he opporuniy o makecommimens abou heir own behavior and o aemp o eici such com-mimens from ohers commimen) Commimen enais discussion, anddiscussion in u enails humanzaion Wha Dawes, McTavish, andShakee did was o run ou ypes o groups hose ha coudn' communicae a all hose ha communicaed or 10 minues abou an irreevanopic hey were asked o esimae he proporion of peope a various

income levels in ugene, Oregon), hose ha coud discuss he problem bucouldn ask or public commimens and hose ha were reuired o oaround he abe" and make pubic commimens aer discussion The swo ypes yielded cooperaion raes of 0% and 2% respecivey, while helas wo had raes o 72% and 7 1% Thus, humanizaion made no dierencea leas no ersonal acuainance based on a 1 minue discussion heaverae amoun of ime ha he disssion and commien roups spenon he probem) Surrisingy, commimen made no dierence, bu i musbe remembered ha his commimen was one forced by he experimenersraher han one arising sponaneously from he group process Moreovereve subec roised o cooerae, which is he ony reasonabe saemeno make no maer wha ones inenions.)

ROUP ZE expermeners who have made expici or impici compasons o diemma games wih varying number o payers have concudedha subecs cooperae ess in arer roups han in smaer ones Rapopore a ) an Bixensine e a ) simpy noed he ow egree o cooperaion in heir hree and sixperson games and saed ha i is lesshan in comparabe woperson prsoners diemmas Bu hey had no sccrieron o comparabiliy Marell & Schmid (1 972) sudied wo andhreeperson uniform games wih 3 eual in each and ound ess cooper-aion in he hreeperson game. Unorunaely Cl and C2 were no euaedbein wice as are in he woperson as in he hreeperson ame whichresued in he expeced values" o cooeraion and defecion being idenica he oher payers were o respond in a random manner). Harpere al unpublished) compared one, hree, and sixperson roups in he

variable dilemma invovin pool replacemen; hey found cooeraion de-creased wih group size, bu i is no clear wha he resus were for aoneperson group" esoher han he inellecua abiiy of a single

A n n u . R

e v . P s y c h o l . 1 9 8 0 . 3 1 : 1 6 9 - 1 9 3 . D






SCAL LMMAS 187

v to sov t rpsmt probm n optm mnr vt xprmtrs rpnsmnt ru

T prom s o cours ow to qut nd prson dmm

ms or vn wtr s qut s dsr rom t stdponto oo vdty") Co t not r or xmp tt tmotv to dct ) sod tury ncrs wt mor pyrsus t rm rom dcto tv xttysod dusd mon mor pop

T most r jo o qutn w v oud s n o m rom rr sty by Bo t (197). Ts vsttors st h q n tr sx n prson ms n ty dscovrd ttooprto rsd wt rs sz otrry to tr tort

xpttons w ws tt ts prmtrs on woud trm rto dcton

U DOURE O HOE VERU AOYMY Tr stusv comprd prvt wt puc coc Bxnstn t 19 Jrd &os 1974, ox&Gyr 1978) o r rts o cooprton wo ws pb W t r btw oymty d pubdsosur n ts sts s not strkn ty us mnm pyos

v t nvovmt otd wt sct muts o moy wsuspt tt t r wo b mu rtr wr t pyos morsnnt

EXEAO AOU OHER' EHAVOR T r tr stustt coctd sujcts xpcttons out wtr otrs pyn tms woud ooprt or dct Tyszk& Grzk 197, Dws McTv-s & Skl 1977 Mrw&ms 1979). Tr r two poss prd-tos To t dr to w sb vs otrs wn't dt ors my t s poss to otn pyo wtot rt otrs toom Ts dsr to r r" [or r" s Coombs (197) trmst] o rsut tv orrto tw t propsty o ooprtd s t os wl To t dr to w sbt bvs ttotrs wlt or s my tt t s ncssry to vod ossy dtn ms or rs T sr to vo skr" [orr" s Coombs (197) trms t] o rst postv orrto

'Inteestingl thee is an optimal solution o havesting animals in thei natual envion

ment. Detemie the maximal popuation size whee thee is no haesting an then keep thepulation at pisely ha that size. S Daw, Deay & haplin (1974) and Andeson 7.

A n n u . R e







188 AE

bwn h propnsiy o oopra and blifs ha ohrs will. n fa, allhr sudis rpor srong psiti orrlaions. This dig is ompaiblwih hos riwd by Prui & Kil 1977) i h ara of irad

gams.Thr is o ohr inrsing dig in h Daw al ad h Tyska

ad Grlak sudis. Dfors ar mor aura a prdiig oopraionras han ar oopraors Bu Daws MTaish, and Shakl found hahy wr nt mor aura a prdiing spially who would oopraad who would o This appar disrpay bw bas ra aurayad spi auray a b bs udrsood by onsidrig h prdiionsof h ouom of oi osss prso who prdis hads 0% of h imwill b or oly 0% of h im dspi a pr bas ra auay

a prson who prdis hads 10% of h i will also b orr 0% of h im dspi making h wors possibl bas ra prdiion. n fa, inh Daws, MTaish, ad Shakl sudy subs wr e poor a prdi-ing who would and who would no oopra.

MORLZING Noing ha h subjs in h Daws, MTaish, andShakl sudy ofn raisd moral issus in h disussion and ommimngroups Daws al unpublishd) ran wo xprims in whih h xpri-nrs hsls oralid a h subs Ths wo sudis on on

dud a Saa Barbara, alifoia, ad on odud a ug, Orgo,orasd a oomuiaio odiio wih a oouiaio odiio i whih h xprimr dird a word srmo abou groupb, xploiaion, whals, his, and so on. boh loaions, h srmn workdyilding ras of oopraion omparabl o hos found inh disussion and oin groups of h arlir xprins Of ours, hs srmons ofoudd logi, soial prssur, xprimal d-mad, moioal appal, ad so o

A FINA HYOTHESIS ABOUT EICITINGCOOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR

Th xprims riwd in his aril ar lousy simuatins of h soialdilmmas wih whih os of us ar ond. n our urrn or-populad world, h dilmmas of gras impor iol housads omillios of popl, lagsal ommuiaion or publi dislosur is impos-sibl, and mos of h popl hoosing do no shar h ulural bakgroundof mrian high shool or ollg sudns. indings abou how smallgoups of suh sudns bha i onid siuaions ao b gralid o samns abou how o sa h world n hough par of our

A n n u . R

e v . P s y c h o l . 1 9 8 0 . 3 1 : 1 6 9 - 1 9 3 . D






AL LEA 19

own rrchndn d , w on prnd h hy cn,hrby dn rnn nc o xpc uch n)

Wh u b ud h h pychologcl nd ocl cor h

d o dcon or coopron n c d r rouhy h ho h nunc bhvor r d O cour dl y b udd n hr own rh, n whch c no uchupon ncy) Th upon cnno b bd puy on hor hcl) dny o ll nd r dl Rhr,uch n upon u b bd on brodr horcl d bouhun bhvord h py wh h d pop o coopr ordc n nrl nd whch y hn b d n h ll dl

uon. Mo o h ud rvwd n h c r bd on uchd. Tho, or xpl, h rly xn h c o chnnhcl prr n h xprnl uon hv bn od.)

h dncon bwn xpn uon n hypohn dvc no ju on o rrd. For xpl, ouon ud vry prr o h d l ollown hprcdn o nur rd ponr dl ud) uch udr bd on h upon h h prr hcllydnd dr o conc") hv counrpr n h r word,"

houh dcu no pob o dny h wh ny prconn conr, ho ud h nv vrbl oud h rucur oh councon pubc dcour orlnvry huch ud r bd on h upon h h xprnl d u) nohr r o h ubjc, nd h hr bhvor wb cd by h vbl n h wy or or ) would bcd n ohr d uon nd h xpcon h h vbl wll c bhvor u wy b bd on o horc orn-on or bl

Th nly nd lrur rpord hu r uppor vry p ho-rc propoon on drvd ro xnv rur docunn hpopl hv vry d bl o proc noron on concouv, prcury ocl noron h by d rlv owh w nvly bv h , udy r udy h hown upnnbly o proc noron corrcy on wh ppr o b h plk, provd hy r no ovr or uoc h rur up-pon h procn phnonon oo v o b rrncd hr

whou doubln h bblorphy, bu Dw 968 an ha i is awas possibe o aemp consc a eaame incopoain c

vaiab ahouh ei eac oe and aameeizaion is ereme dic o deeine







0 A

Suh ogntv lmtaton may otn rsult n an nablty to undrstando ully gasp th utlts a soal dlmma stuaton oth than thos thata most obvous .. thos o wth th payos But t s psly

th payo utts that ad th plays to dt whl th oth utlts.g thos onntd wth altrusms norms and onsnlad thplayrs to ooprat t ollows that manpulatons that nhan th salnand undrstandng o ths utlts should nras oopraton Commun-ato wth o wthout ommtmt) publ dslosu ad moalzng aprsly suh manpulatons

Moovr th ar two addtonal studsn mntond by andon nvolvng an tratd gamtha support ths hypothss that gratrnowldg ylds gatr oopaton Marwll & ms 17) otatdhgh shool studnts both by tlphon and mal and asd thm to nvsta numb o tos suppld by th xpmnt n th a pvat opubl sto Th tons nvst n th prvat sto rsultd n a xdmontay yld p ton Thos vstd th publ sto sultd n apayo to a mmbrs oth subjts group o or 0 mmbrs whom thsubt ddt ow) ths pao was an alatng unton o th umbro popl who nvstd thr tons n ths publ

sto Th dlmma

oud baus subjts v mony om th publ vstmtwhthr or not thy prsonally otrbutd tos to t. t was not how-v sttly a dmma stuato baus nough oth goup mmbsnvstd n th publ sto a provson pont was rahd byond whhth publ sto was also prsoally mor rwardng than was th vatsto.)

Mawll ad ms obtand a muh hgh at o oopato publnvstmnt) than would b pdtd rom onom thory thr subjtswr as muh ond wth ass as wth montary rtu. Why?Th hypothss proposd hr suggsts that th on wth th ntal

utlty o ass ould hav bn brought about by th ength 0/tie thsubjts had to onsd thr ho Thy had a mmum o days Thtm n th typal oommunaton xprmt s 0 muts.) t ollowsthat thy had tm to th about atos oth tha th xtal payos.g to th about ass Not that ths study was don undr aondton o total anoymty a ato most ommo n lagsal soaldlmmas.

Th othr study supportng th gal hypothss prsntd hr s thato Klly & Grzla 12) Whn ntvwng subjts who had playd

an tratd soal dlmma gam n goups o subjts ths nvstgatosound that subts who had mad a latvly) hgh poporton o oopratv sponss w btt abl to dnty th spons bst o th goupthan wr thos who mad a low proporton o oopratv rsponss Whl

A n n u . R

e v . P s y c h o l . 1 9 8 0 . 3 1 : 1 6 9 - 1 9 3 . D






SO DEMMS 191

th hypothss statd hr s th convrs of that ndng, dircton notmagntud) of statstca asocation s symmtc

s knowdg a that s ncssay? o, fo wh utts assocatd wth

atusm norms, and conscnc may b mad sant by nowdg, thydo not ncssay ovrwhm thos asocatd with th payos Rpugnantas t may b fom a nomatv pont of vw moa and montay orsurvva) utits combn n a compnsatory fashon fo most pop

H ady woud you sp wth m fo 1,pounds?Sh Why, ys Of cousH Woud you sp wth m for 1 shingsSh: angriy) What do you thnk am a posttut?

W hav aady stabshd that fact, madam What w a hag-ging about s th prc

Evryon may not hav h or hr pc, but t do not rqur a ytm-

atc survy to stabsh that most pop n th word w compoms hsor h atruistc or thica vaus for mony or survva Thus th ngativpayos fo oopatv bhavo must not b too sv f pop a tocoopat t may b fo pcsy this rason that th xptaton thatothrs w coopat s so hghy coratd wth coopaton tsf f othrs

cooprat thn th pctd payo for coopraton s not too ow vnthoughn a unfom gam, fo xampth eree btwn thpayo fo coopaton and that fo dfcton s st ut ag Pop mayb grdy may pfr mo to ss but th grd s not insatab" wnoth utits a invovd

Thus, th important ndnts or nhancing coopation n socadmma situatons may b: knowdg moraity and tust Ths ancntvrtus w not dscovrd by th autho by th Unitd Stats Gov-mnt, whch nvstd mons of doas n sach gants ov th ya

to hav subjcts pay xprmnta gas ut th abov anayss ndcatsthat thy may b th partcuar virtus rvant to th noncocv andhnc cint) rsoution of th socia dimmas w fac







2 A

Literatur Cited

Alexander, R D 1980 Dainism and Human Aair Seattle: niv Washington

PrssAdeson J M. 1974 A model for the"tragedy of the commons. IEEETra Sys Man ybe pp. 103-5

Benstine, V E, Levitt, C. A, Wlson, K. R1966 Coartion amon si peronsin a prisoner's dilemma game Conict Resout 10:488-96

Bany, P 196 Genetic basis of behaviorspially of altusm Am Psychol31358

Bonacich, P. 1972. Noms and cohion asadaptive ponses to poltical conct

an expermental study. Sociomet 35357-75Bonacich P 1976 Sry and solidrty.

Sociomet 39:2-8Bonacic P, Sure, G H, Kaan, P

Mker, R. J. 196. Coopration and group se the Nperson prsoner'sdlemma onict Rsout 20;687-705

rner, K C 1977 epmealysis o cial traps. Exp Soc. Psychol 13552

Buchanan, . M. 1971. The Besfor oective Action. New York Gen Ps

Cadwell, M D 1976 Communication and sex eects in a vepeon prsoner'sdilemma. Soc yho 332738

Campbel, D. T 1975 On the conct betwn ioloical d socil evolutionad between psychology and te moratradition A. Psychol 301103-26

Cooe, A 1955. Th Vintage Mncken, p3 New York: Vantae

Coombs, C A 1973 A reparameteration ofthe psoner's dilemma game Beha

Sc 18448 Daw, R M 1975 oal models ofdiem

mas n socia disionmn In uman Judgmnt and Decson oc M F Kapan, S. Scwatz, pp. 88-107. New York; Academic

Daw, R M. 1976 Shaow psychooy InCognitions and Socia Behaior Caol, Payne, pp 3-12 HllsdaleN: Erlbaum

Daws, R. M, Delay, J., Chaplin, W. 1974.The dision to pollute Envionmntand Panning pp 2-10

Daw, R M, Mcavs, ., ShaklH 1977 Beavior, communication and assumptions aut other oples behavor in a mmons demma situation Pr Soc. Psycho 351-11

Dawes, R M, Shakl, Talarowsk, FOn getting people to cooperate when

facng a social dilemma moralizinghelps Upublishe manucrptEdney, J., Harer, C. S. 1978 Te eects

of infomaton a resource management problem A social trap alog.um Eco 6387-95

Edney, J ., Haper, C. S 199. Heroism ina resource cisis a simulation study.Envinmenta Management. In press

Fo, J Guyer, M 1978 "Public choice and cooperation in npeson pisonersdiemma. onictResout. 468 8 1

Goehring, D J, Kahan, J P. 196. The uniform npeson prsoners diemmagame onict Rsout 0; 1 1 18

Hambuger, 1973 Npeson pisonersdilemmas Mat Sociol 3278

Hardin, R 1968. he tray of the ommn cinc 1621243-8

ardin G. R 196. Carring capacity as aethica concept. Soundings Interdci 9:113

ae� C . 1 977 Cometition and copr-aton I a resource management task; asocial trap analogue n iorities forEninmnta Dign Rsah ed S.Weidman, J R. Anderson, pp 30512

Washington DC Envron R AssocHarper, C S, Greoy, W L., Edey, ,Lindner, D. rou sze ets in a simulated commons demma. Unpbshmanuscrpt

eilbroner, R 1974 An Inqui into the Human osct. New York: Noton

obb, T 1651, 197 Leiathan ondonDen

Jerdee T H, Rosen B 194. Ets of opotunity to communicate and visibilityof individua decisions on behavior inthe common interest Appl Psychol

5971216Kaan, P 1973 Noninteraction aanonymous treepeson risoner'semma ame. Bhav Sc 8:124-27

Keley H H relak J 1972 Conct twen individual and common terstin an nerson reationship Per SocPsycho 21 190-97

Maell, G., Ames, R. E. 1979. Epeimentson the provision of public goods I resoucs, intest, goup size, and tefee der problem. Am Socio 84133-60

Marwell, G Schmidt, D R. 1972 Cpration i a trperson prsonersdilemma. Per Soc. Psychol 3 1 3683

McClintk, C G, Messick, D M, Kuhleman, D. M, Campos, F. T. 193. Moti

A n n u . R

e v . P s y c h o l . 1 9 8 0 . 3 1 : 1 6 9 - 1 9 3 . D






vaional bass of choic in hr-choicdeomposed gam . So. ho 9:5290

Mssick, D M 1969190 Sm tu�ts

e ature f um cmptit.Hyohs sh Psyho Ovon 14:3852

Mssick, D , McCnck, C G 1968Motivtial ss f cice i expeimenal gams So Psyho.4125

Msic, D , Tat! W .B. 196 Retv mxImIt m xpemtl game So yho 3;85101

Olsen, 195 Th oi of CoiAon. Camidg Mass Harvrd

PrsOpuls, W 1977 oo an h Pois oSariy. Sn Frcisc Frma

Orl, J M, Ruhrord, B. 19 CnLviahan mae he lfe of mn ls sli, pr ty, i, t? B Poi Si. 3383407

Plat, G 93 Soci trps Am. sho.2864151

Pi, D G, Kimm, J 1977. Twenyyear of permenal gamin: criqu,snhesis nd suggesons for e fuur Ann Rv. Psyho 28:36392

Rappt, Am 196 Optima plicis

SCAL DLEMMAS 193

for he prsonr's dilmma PyhoRv. 74138

ppt, At, Ca, A, Dwr, J.,Gyr, J 962 Trps zsum nngoibl ams Bhav S73058

Rbson, D 194 Wll, dos Lviahan ?Br. Po S 424550

Ruinstin, F D, Wke, G, Dctr, RH Dna J. 975 Te c f twoinciv schms upon h csevtin f sd rsurc y vprsups Oan. Bhav. Hm. Pom.33338

Schellng, T C 193 Hocke elmes, ocaled wpons, and dalig sving: astud f iy cics wit itis Coni Rso. 1 312

Smih, A 1776, 196 h Wah oNaionChica Univ Cco Prss

Tivrs, R L 191 T vouion ofrciprl aluism Q. Rv. Bio. 463557

yszk, , rzek, J L 96 te chic in nconsan rosum gam Coni Rso/. 2056

de, N 1974 Saelian drugh N vicy fr aid Sin 1852337

Wade, N 194b Green revolion (1): juscog, on unus in us Sn1 6 09496





social dilemmas dawes.1980

Documents