Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 182957 June 13, 2013ST. JOSEPH ACADEMY OF VALENZUELA FACULTY ASSOCIATION (SJA VFA)-FUR CHAPTER-TUCP,Petitioner,vs.ST. JOSEPH ACADEMY OF VALENZUELA and DAMASO D. LOPEZ,Respondents.R E S O L U T I O NREYES,J.:St. Joseph Academy of Valenzuela Faculty Association-FUR Chapter TUCP (petitioner), in behalf of thirteen ( 13) of its members, filed the present petition1seeking review of the Decision2dated January 11, 2008 and Resolution3dated May 20, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 8164 7, which deleted the reinstatement and award of back wages portions in the Secretary of Labor and Employment's (SOLE) Decision4dated September 9, 2003.The dispute arose from a notice of strike filed by the petitioner against respondent St. Joseph Academy of Valenzuela (SJAV) for illegal termination and union busting. The SOLE assumed jurisdiction after the parties agreed to submit the case for voluntary arbitration.5Originally affected were nineteen (19) union members employed by SJAV as teachers. Four (4) of the members have already passed the teachers board examinations, namely: (1) Reshiel R. Isagan; (2) Mary Grace C. Dimaunahan; (3) Novelyn I. Puyot; and (4) Elizabeth O. Nicol.6The SOLE ordered their reinstatement with full backwages up to the date of their actual reinstatement.7The other 15 members are non-licensees. They are: (1) Lucita A. Marzan; (2) Ma. Erlinda H. Sarmiento; (3) Ma. Lourdes B. Alonzo; (4) Toni Socorro B. Eliseef (Eliseef); (5) Maureen F. Aliwalas; (6) Yvor Stanley A. Aquino; (7) Teresita M. Musa (Musa); (8) Luzviminda L. Cruz; (9) Glenda D. Pedrosa; (10) Ma. Theresa E. Oliveros; (11) Anna Lea C. Junsay; (12) Rebesita F. Ferry; (13) Bernadeth M. Salvador; (14) Maribeth S. Bandola; and (15) Jeneth W. Eugenio.8With regard to them, the SOLE ordered the reinstatement of those with a valid temporary or special permit with full backwages up to the date of their actual reinstatement. The SOLE, however, also ordered that they shall only serve for the remaining period corresponding to the period of validity of their permit.9The pertinent dispositive portion of the SOLE Decision provides:WHEREFORE, foregoing premises being duly considered, x x x.With respect to the fifteen (15) non-licensee teachers, only those who have submitted a valid temporary or special permit shall be reinstated to their former positions with full backwages computed from the time their compensation were withheld up to the date of their actual reinstatement. But they shall only serve for the remaining period corresponding to the period of validity of their permit.x x x xSO ORDERED.10In ordering their reinstatement and the award of backwages, the SOLE ruled that even as probationary employees, the non-licensees still enjoy security of tenure and SJAV should have given them the opportunity to comply with the license requirement mandated by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7836.11Hence, the SOLE concluded that SJAV "should retain their services and backwages x x x from April 1, 2003 up to the date they are reinstated to their former positions."12The CA, however, ruled that reinstatement is no longer possible inasmuch as it is the Department of Education, Culture and Sports that can assign the para-teachers13to schools as it may determine. Moreover, SJAV cannot be deprived of its right to choose its teachers and the positions have already been actually filled up.14The CA also deleted the award of backwages since, as found by the SOLE, there was no illegal dismissal committed by SJAV, the non-licensees not being its regular employees.15The petitioner now beseeches the Court to restore the SOLEs award of backwages and for the award of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, anchored on grounds of "equity and compassionate justice."16The petitioner admits that the non-licensees temporary or special permits have already expired, thus making reinstatement impossible; it, however, asks for the award of separation pay and backwages given the non-licensees years of service with SJAV, that they "somehow contributed" to the schools progress and they have been efficient teachers.17The petitioner also stated that two (2) of the non-licensees, Eliseef and Musa, opted to pursue before the National Labor Relations Commission their claim for separation pay, which was decided by the Labor Arbiter in 2005 with the recommendation that "the federation dwell on the matter of complainants benefits in a supplemental pleading if only to call the attention of the division justices to whom the case is assigned for decision."18Expectedly, SJAV calls for the dismissal of the petition on the argument that since the non-licensees could not have become regular employees, then there can be no grant of backwages and reinstatement as it presupposes illegal termination of employees.19Review of labor cases under Rule45 of the Rules of CourtIn Phimco Industries, Inc. v. Phimco Industries Labor Association,20the Court reiterated the basic approach in the review of CA decisions in labor cases, viz:In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA decision, in contrast with the review for jurisdictional error that we undertake under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it. This is the approach that should be basic in a Rule 45 review of a CA ruling in a labor case. In question form, the question to ask is: Did the CA correctly determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the case?21Applying the foregoing rule, the question now is whether the CA committed an error in deleting the award of backwages and reinstatement originally granted by the SOLE.Reinstatement or payment ofseparation pay, and award ofbackwages proper only in cases ofillegal dismissalGenerally, the finding of illegal dismissal entitles an employee to the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of backwages.22Article 279 of the Labor Code states, in part, that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. These twin remedies reinstatement and payment of backwages make the dismissed employee whole who can then look forward to continued employment.23The law intends the award of backwages and similar benefits to accumulate past the date of the Labor Arbiters decision until the dismissed employee is actually reinstated. But if, as in this case, reinstatement is no longer possible, this Court has consistently ruled that backwages shall be computed from the time of illegal dismissal until the date the decision becomes final. (Emphasis supplied)x x x xThe basis for the payment of backwages is different from that for the award of separation pay. Separation pay is granted where reinstatement is no longer advisable because of strained relations between the employee and the employer. Backwages represent compensation that should have been earned but were not collected because of the unjust dismissal. The basis for computing backwages is usually the length of the employees service while that for separation pay is the actual period when the employee was unlawfully prevented from working.24In this case, the SOLE and the CA were one in ruling that there was no illegal dismissal committed by SJAV against the non-licensees. As both stressed by the SOLE and the CA, R.A. No. 7836 provides that no person shall engage in teaching and/or act as professional teacher unless he is a duly registered professional teacher, and a holder of a valid certificate of registration and a valid professional license or a holder of a valid special/temporary permit.25Obviously, aside from the finding that there was no illegal dismissal, the non-licensees cannot be reinstated since they do not possess the necessary qualification for them to be engaged in teaching and/or act as professional teachers. This conclusion binds the Court, especially in the absence of any circumstance that militates against such conclusion. The rule is that the findings of fact of the SOLE and the CA and the conclusions derived therefrom are generally binding on the Court if amply supported by evidence on record.26Consequently, the Court finds that the CA did not commit an error in ruling that reinstatement is not possible. In the same light, the Court finds that the CA, likewise, did not commit an error in deleting the award of backwages.1wphi1As previously stressed, payment of backwages and other benefits is justified only if the employee was illegally dismissed.27Award of financial assistance as ameasure of social justice and equityNevertheless, the Court, in exceptional cases, has granted financial assistance to legally dismissed employees as an act of "social justice" or based on "equity" so long as the dismissal was not for serious misconduct, does not reflect on the employees moral character, or would involve moral turpitude.28In Nissan Motor Philippines, Inc. v. Angelo,29the Court ruled that, inspired by compassionate and social justice, it has in the past awarded financial assistance to dismissed employees when circumstances warranted such an award. Meanwhile, in Pharmacia and Upjohn, Inc. v. Albayda, Jr.,30the Court held that an award to the employee of separation pay by way of financial assistance, equivalent to one-half (1/2) months pay for every year of service, is equitable. The Court, in Pharmacia, noted, among others, that although the employees actions constituted a valid ground to terminate his services, the same is not so reprehensible as to warrant complete disregard of his long years of service.Similarly in this case, the dismissal of the 13 non-licensees31was due to their failure to possess teaching licenses. It was not due to any serious misconduct or infraction reflecting their moral character. Records also bear that they have been in the employ of SJAV from five (5) to nine (9) years,32and as observed by the SOLE, SJAV has not shown any dissatisfaction with their teaching services, "otherwise, x x x, it would not have kept them under its employ for such quite a period of time."33This being the case, the Court, in keeping with equity and social justice, grants the award of financial assistance to the 13 non-licensees equivalent to one-half (1/2) months pay for every year of service rendered with SJAV.WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated January 11, 2008 and Resolution dated May 20, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81647 are MODIFIED and respondent St. Joseph Academy of Valenzuela is hereby ORDERED to pay the thirteen ( 13) non-licensees financial assistance equivalent to one-half (1/2) month's pay for every year of service.The case is remanded to the Department of Labor and Employment for proper computation of the award in accordance with this Decision.SO ORDERED.BIENVENIDO L. REYESAssociate JusticeWE CONCUR:MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENOChief JusticeChairpersonTERESITA .J. LEONARDO-DE CASTROAssociate JusticeLUCAS P. BERSAMINAssociate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.Associate JusticeC E R T I F I C A T I O NPursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENOChief Justice

Footnotes1Rollo, pp. 3-27.2Penned by Associate Justice Arcangclita M. Romilla-Lontok, with Associate .Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a member of this Court) and Romeo F. Barza, concurring; id. at 50-58.3Id. at 60-61.4Rendered by Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas; id. at 30-48.5Id. at 30.6Id. at 32.7Id. at 48.8Id. at 32.9Id. at 48.10Id.11AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN THE REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF THE PRACTICE OF TEACHING IN THE PHILIPPINES AND PRESCRIBING A LICENSURE EXAMINATION FOR TEACHERS AND OTHER PURPOSES.12Rollo, p. 45.13Under Section 26 of R.A. No. 7836, teachers who failed the licensure examination for professional teachers shall be eligible as para-teachers and be issued special or temporary permits by the Board for Professional Teachers and assigned by the DECS to schools it may determine under the circumstances.14Rollo, p. 55.15Id. at 56-58.16Id. at 22.17Id.18Id. at 17.19Id. at 106.20G.R. No. 170830, August 11, 2010, 628 SCRA 119.21Id. at 132, citing Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation, G.R. No. 183329, August 27, 2009, 597 SCRA 334, 342-343.22Exodus International Construction Corporation v. Biscocho, G.R. No. 166109, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 76, 92; St. Lukes Medical Center, Inc. v. Notario, G.R. No. 152166, October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA 67, 80; Velasco v. NLRC, 525 Phil. 749, 761-762 (2006).23Velasco v. NLRC, 525 Phil. 749, 761-762 (2006), citing Santos v. NLRC, 238 Phil. 161, 167 (1987).24Aliling v. Feliciano, G.R. No. 185829, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 186, 213, citing Golden Ace Builders v. Talde, G.R. No. 187200, May 5, 2010, 620 SCRA 283, 288.25Section 26.26De La Salle University v. De La Salle University Employees Association (DLSUEA-NAFTEU), G.R. No. 169254, August 23, 2012, 679 SCRA 33, 53.27Lansangan v. Amkor Technology Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 177026, January 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 493, 500.28Villaruel v. Yeo Han Guan, G.R. No. 169191, June 1, 2011, 650 SCRA 64, 72-73; Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 123294, October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA 18, 46-47.29G.R. No. 164181, September 14, 2011, 657 SCRA 520.30G.R. No. 172724, August 23, 2010, 628 SCRA 544.31Excluded are Eliseef and Musa.32Rollo, p. 43.33Id. at 45.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 188747 January 29, 2014MANILA WATER COMPANY,Petitioner,vs.CARLITO DEL ROSARIO,Respondent.D E C I S I O NPEREZ,J.:This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the 31 March 2009 Decision2rendered by the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 925 83. In its assailed decision, the appellate court: ( 1) reversed as grave abuse of discretion the Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which dismissed the petition of Manila Water Company (Manila Water) on technical grounds; and (2) proceeded to affirm with modification the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. Manila Water was ordered to pay respondent Carlito Del Rosario (Del Rosario) separation pay to be computed from 1 August 1997 up to June 2000.In a Resolution3dated 7 July 2009, the appellate court refused to reconsider its earlier decision.The FactsOn 22 October 1979, Del Rosario was employed as Instrument Technician by Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS). Sometime in 1996, MWSS was reorganized pursuant to Republic Act No. 8041 or the National Water Crisis Act of 1995, and its implementing guidelines Executive Order No. 286. Because of the reorganization, Manila Water absorbed some employees of MWSS including Del Rosario. On 1 August 1997, Del Rosario officially became an employee of Manila Water.Sometime in May 2000, Manila Water discovered that 24 water meters were missing in its stockroom. Upon initial investigation, it appeared that Del Rosario and his co-employee, a certain Danilo Manguera, were involved in the pilferage and the sale of water meters to the companys contractor. Consequently, Manila Water issued a Memorandum dated 23 June 2000, directing Del Rosario to explain in writing within 72 hours why he should not be dealt with administratively for the loss of the said water meters.4In his letter-explanation,5Del Rosario confessed his involvement in the act charged and pleaded for forgiveness, promising not to commit similar acts in the future.On 29 June 2000, Manila Water conducted a hearing to afford Del Rosario the opportunity to personally defend himself and to explain and clarify his defenses to the charge against him. During the formal investigation Del Rosario was found responsible for the loss of the water meters and therefore liable for violating Section 11.1 of the Companys Code of Conduct.6Manila Water proceeded to dismiss Del Rosario from employment on 3 July 2000.7This prompted Del Rosario to file an action for illegal dismissal claiming that his severance from employment is without just cause. In his Position Paper submitted before the labor officer, Del Rosario averred that his admission to the misconduct charged was not voluntary but was coerced by the company. Such admission therefore, made without the assistance of a counsel, could not be made basis in terminating his employment.Refuting the allegations of Del Rosario, Manila Water pointed out that he was indeed involved in the taking of the water meters from the companys stock room and of selling these to a private contractor for personal gain. Invoking Section 11.1 of the Companys Code of Conduct, Manila Water averred that such act of stealing the companys property is punishable by dismissal. The company invited the attention of this Court to the fact that Del Rosario himself confessed his involvement to the loss of the water meters not only in his letter-explanation, but also during the formal investigation, and in both instances, pleaded for his employers forgiveness.8After weighing the positions taken by the opposing parties, including the evidence adduced in support of their respective cases, the Labor Arbiter issued a Decision9dated 30 May 2002 dismissing for lack of merit the complaint filed by Del Rosario who was, however, awarded separation pay. According to the Labor Arbiter, Del Rosarios length of service for 21 years, without previous derogatory record, warrants the award of separation pay. The decretal portion of the decision reads:WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for illegal dismissal for lack of merit.[Manila Water] is hereby ordered to pay complainant separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) months salary for every year of service based on his basic salary (Php 11,244.00) at the time of his dismissal. This shall be computed from [1 August 1997] up to June 2000, the total amount of which is ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND SIXTY-TWO (Php 118,062.00) PESOS.10In a Resolution11dated 30 September 2003, the NLRC dismissed the appeal interposed by Manila Water for its failure to append a certification against forum shopping in its Memorandum of Appeal.Similarly ill-fated was Manila Waters Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution12dated 28 April 2005.On Certiorari, the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 31 March 2009, reversed the NLRC Resolution and held that it committed a grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Manila Waters appeal on mere technicality. The appellate court, however, proceeded to affirm the decision of the Labor Arbiter awarding separation pay to Del Rosario. Considering that Del Rosario rendered 21 years of service to the company without previous derogatory record, the appellate court considered the granting of separation pay by the labor officer justified. The fallo of the assailed Court of Appeals Decision reads:WHEREFORE, the petition is partly granted. The assailed Resolutions dated September 30, 2003 and [April 28, 2005] of public respondent NLRC are set aside. The Decision dated May 30, 2002 of the [L]abor [A]rbiter is reinstated, subject to the modification that the computation of the award of separation pay [to] private respondent shall be counted from August 1, 1997 x x x up to June 2000.13In a Resolution14dated 7 July 2009, the Court of Appeals refused to reconsider its earlier decision.Unrelenting, Manila Water filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the foregoing Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution on the sole ground that:THE [COURT OF APPEALS] SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED DECISION AND RESOLUTION WHICH DIRECTLY CONTRAVENE BOOK VI, RULE 1, AND SECTION 7 OF THE OMNIBUS RULES IMPLEMENTING THE LABOR CODE AND PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE WHICH CATEGORICALLY PROVIDE THAT AN EMPLOYEE SEPARATED FROM SERIOUS MISCONDUCT IS NOT ENTITLED TO TERMINATION (SEPARATION) PAY.15The Courts RulingIn the instant petition, Manila Water essentially questions the award of separation pay to respondent who was dismissed for stealing the companys property which amounted to gross misconduct. It argues that separation pay or financial assistance is not awarded to employees guilty of gross misconduct or for cause reflecting on his moral character.16Del Rosario for his part maintains that there is no legal ground to justify his termination from employment. He insists that his admission pertaining to his involvement in the loss of the water meters was merely coerced by the company. Since his dismissal was without valid or just cause, Del Rosario avers that Manila Water is guilty of illegal dismissal rendering it liable for the payment of backwages and separation pay.17It must be stressed at the outset that the correctness of the Labor Arbiters pronouncement on the legality of Del Rosarios dismissal is no longer an issue and is beyond modification. While Manila Water timely appealed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter awarding separation pay to Del Rosario, the latter did not question the dismissal of his illegal termination case.18It is settled in our jurisprudence that a party who has not appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the appealed decision.19Due process prevents the grant of additional awards to parties who did not appeal.20Having said that, this Court will no longer dwell on the issue of whether or not Del Rosario was illegally dismissed from employment. Included in the closed aspect of the case is respondents argument that the absence of his counsel when he admitted the charge against him diminished the evidentiary value of such admission. Nonetheless, it may be mentioned that the constitutional right to counsel is available only during custodial investigation. If the investigation is merely administrative conducted by the employer and not a criminal investigation, the admission made during such investigation may be used as evidence to justify dismissal.21Our focus will be on the propriety of the award for separation pay.As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 28222of the Labor Code is not entitled to a separation pay.23Section 7, Rule I, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor Code provides:Sec. 7. Termination of employment by employer. The just causes for terminating the services of an employee shall be those provided in Article 282 of the Code. The separation from work of an employee for a just cause does not entitle him to the termination pay provided in the Code, without prejudice, however, to whatever rights, benefits and privileges he may have under the applicable individual or collective agreement with the employer or voluntary employer policy or practice.In exceptional cases, however, the Court has granted separation pay to a legally dismissed employee as an act of "social justice" or on "equitable grounds."24In both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) did not reflect on the moral character of the employee.25In the leading case of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. NLRC,26we laid down the rule that separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in the instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct reflecting his moral character. We clarified that:We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice.A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect, of rewarding rather than punishing the erring employee for his offense. And we do not agree that the punishment is his dismissal only and that the separation pay has nothing to do with the wrong he has committed. Of course it has. Indeed, if the employee who steals from the company is granted separation pay even as he is validly dismissed, it is not unlikely that he will commit a similar offense in his next employment because he thinks he can expect a like leniency if he is again found out. This kind of misplaced compassion is not going to do labor in general any good as it will encourage the infiltration of its ranks by those who do not deserve the protection and concern of the Constitution.The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged. At best[,] it may mitigate the penalty but it certainly will not condone the offense. Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Social justice cannot be permitted to be refuge of scoundrels any more than can equity be an impediment to the punishment of the guilty. Those who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not simply because they happen to be poor. This great policy of our Constitution is not meant for the protection of those who have proved they are not worthy of it, like the workers who have tainted the cause of labor with the blemishes of their own character.27In the subsequent case of Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. National Labor Relations Commission,28we expanded the exclusions and elucidated that separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct, willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of trust, commission of a crime against the employer or his family, or those reflecting on his moral character. In the same case, we instructed the labor officials that they must be most judicious and circumspect in awarding separation pay or financial assistance as the constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be an instrument to oppress the employers.29The commitment of the court to the cause of the labor should not embarrass us from sustaining the employers when they are right, as here. In fine, we should be more cautious in awarding financial assistance to the undeserving and those who are unworthy of liberality of the law.30Guided by the foregoing rules, we have carefully treaded the path of compassionate justice in the subsequent cases so as not to slip and favor labor at the expense of management.In Tirazona v. Phillippine EDS Techno-Service, Inc. (PET, Inc.),31we denied the award of separation pay to an employee who was dismissed from employment due to loss of trust and confidence.While [this] Court commiserates with the plight of Tirazona, who has recently manifested that she has since been suffering from her poor health condition, the Court cannot grant her plea for the award of financial benefits based solely on this unfortunate circumstance. For all its conceded merit, equity is available only in the absence of law and not as its replacement. Equity as an exceptional extenuating circumstance does not favor, nor may it be used to reward, the indolent or the wrongdoer for that matter. This Court will not allow a party, in guise of equity, to benefit from its own fault.32(Emphasis supplied).The attendant circumstances in the present case considered, we are constrained to deny Del Rosario separation pay since the admitted cause of his dismissal amounts to serious misconduct. He is not only responsible for the loss of the water meters in flagrant violation of the companys policy but his act is in utter disregard of his partnership with his employer in the pursuit of mutual benefits.In the recent case of Daabay v. Coca-Cola Bottlers,33this Court reiterated our ruling in Toyota and disallowed the payment of separation pay to an employee who was found guilty of stealing the companys property. We repeated that an award of separation pay in such an instance is misplaced compassion for the undeserving who may find their way back and weaken the fiber of labor.That Del Rosario rendered 21 years of service to the company will not save the day for him.1wphi1To this case, Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission is on all fours, thus:Although long years of service might generally be considered for the award of separation benefits or some form of financial assistance to mitigate the effects of termination, this case is not the appropriate instance for generosity under the Labor Code nor under our prior decisions. The fact that private respondent served petitioner for more than twenty years with no negative record prior to his dismissal, in our view of this case, does not call for such award of benefits, since his violation reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty and worse, betrayal of the company. If an employee's length of service is to be regarded as a justification for moderating the penalty of dismissal, such gesture will actually become a prize for disloyalty, distorting the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of undesirables.34(Emphasis supplied).Indubitably, the appellate court erred in awarding separation pay to Del Rosario without taking into consideration that the transgression he committed constitutes a serious offense. The grant of separation pay to a dismissed employee is determined by the cause of the dismissal. The years of service may determine how much separation pay may be awarded. It is, however, not the reason why such pay should be granted at all.In sum, we hold that the award of separation pay or any other kind of financial assistance to Del Rosario, under the nomenclature of compassionate justice, is not warranted in the instant case. A contrary rule would have the effect of rewarding rather than punishing an erring employee, disturbing the noble concept of social justice.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.SO ORDERED.JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZAssociate JusticeWE CONCUR:ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate JusticeChairpersonARTURO D. BRIONAssociate JusticeMARIANO C. DEL CASTILLOAssociate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABEAssociate JusticeA T T E S T A T I O NI attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate JusticeChairperson, Second DivisionC E R T I F I C A T I O NPursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENOChief Justice

Footnotes1Rollo, pp. 3-19.2Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta with Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Apolinario D. Brusuelas, Jr., concurring. Id. at 25-36.3Id. at 38.4Id. at 39.5Id. at 40.6Id. at 42.7Id. at 43.8Id. at 44-48.9Id. at 77-81.10Id. at 81.11Id. at 108-109.12Id. at 115-121.13Id. at 35-36.14Id. at 38.15Id. at 11.16Id. at 3-19.17Id. at 177-179.18Id. at 108-109.19Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Rivera, G.R. No. 201701, 3 June 3013.As an exception, he may assign an error where the purpose is to maintain the judgment on other grounds, but he cannot seek modification or reversal of the judgment or affirmative relief unless he has also appealed or filed a separate action. See Aklan College, Inc. v. Enero, G.R. No. 178309, 27 January 2009, 577 SCRA 64, 80.20Daabay v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 199890, 19 August 2013.21Manuel v. N.C. Construction Supply, 346 Phil. 1014, 1024 (1997).22ART. 282. Termination by employer. - An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:a. Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;b. Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;c. Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;d. Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; ande. Other causes analogous to the foregoing.23Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 555 Phil. 134, 138-139 (2007).24Unilever Philippines v. Rivera, supra note 19.25Id.26247 Phil. 641 (1988).27Id. at 649-650.28562 Phil. 759 (2007).29Id. at 810-811.30Id.31G.R. No. 169712, 20 January 2009, 576 SCRA 625.32Id. at 633.33Supra note 20.34Supra note 23 at 139-140.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 199890 August 19, 2013JEROME M. DAABAY,PETITIONER,vs.COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC.,RESPONDENT.D E C I S I O NREYES,J.:This resolves petitioner Jerome M. Daabays (Daabay) Verified Petition for Review1, which assails the Decision2dated June 24, 2011 and Resolution3dated December 9, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03369-MIN.The case stems from a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, unfair labor practice and monetary claims filed by Daabay against respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. (Coca-Cola) and three officers of the company.4The records indicate that the employment of Daabay with Coca-Cola as Sales Logistics Checker was terminated by the company in June 2005,5following receipt of information from one Cesar Sorin (Sorin) that Daabay was part of a conspiracy that allowed the pilferage of company property.6The allegations of Sorin were embodied in an affidavit which he executed on April 16, 2005.7The losses to the company were also confirmed by an inventory and audit conducted by Coca-Colas Territory Finance Head, Silvia Ang. Such losses comprised of cases of assorted softdrinks, empty bottles, missing shells and missing pallets valued atP20,860,913.00.8Coca-Cola then served upon Daabay a Notice to Explain with Preventive Suspension, which required him to explain in writing his participation in the scheme that was reported to involve logistics checkers and gate guards. In compliance therewith, Daabay submitted an Explanation dated April 19, 2005 wherein he denied any participation in the reported pilferage.9A formal investigation on the matter ensued. Eventually, Coca-Cola served upon Daabay a Notice of Termination that cited pilferage, serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence as grounds. At the time of his dismissal, Daabay had been a regular employee of Coca-Cola for eight years, and was receiving a monthly pay ofP20,861.00, exclusive of other benefits.10Daabay then filed the subject labor complaint against Coca-Cola and Roberto Huang (Huang), Raymund Salvador (Salvador) and Alvin Garcia (Garcia), who were the President and Plant Logistics Managers, respectively, of Coca-Cola at the time of the dispute.11On April 18, 2008, Executive Labor Arbiter Noel Augusto S. Magbanua (ELA Magbanua) rendered his Decision12in favor of Daabay. He ruled that Daabay was illegally dismissed because his participation in the alleged conspiracy was not proved by substantial evidence. In lieu of reinstatement and considering the already strained relations between the parties, ELA Magbanua ordered the payment to Daabay of backwages and separation pay or retirement benefits, as may be applicable. The dispositive portion of ELA Magbanuas Decision reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the dismissal of complainant Jerome Daabay as illegal, and ordering respondents to pay complainant his backwages in the amount of [P]750,996.00.Additionally, respondents are hereby ordered to pay complainant his separation pay at one (1) month for every year of service, or his retirement benefits based on the latest Collective Bargaining Agreement prior to his suspension/termination.Other claims are hereby ordered dismissed for failure to substantiate.SO ORDERED.13Dissatisfied, Coca-Cola, Huang, Salvador and Garcia, appealed from ELA Magbanuas Decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Daabay filed a separate appeal to ask for his reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, the payment of backwages instead of separation pay or retirement benefits, and an award of litigation expenses, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.The NLRC reversed the finding of illegal dismissal. In a Resolution14dated August 27, 2009, the NLRC held that there was "reasonable and well-founded basis to dismiss [Daabay], not only for serious misconduct, but also for breach of trust or loss of confidence arising from such company losses."15Daabays participation in the conspiracy was sufficiently established. Several documents such as checkers receipts and sales invoices that made the fraudulent scheme possible were signed by Daabay.16The NLRC also found fault in Daabay for his failure to detect the pilferage, considering that the "timely recording and monitoring as security control for the outgoing [sic] of company products are necessarily connected with the functions, duties and responsibilities reposed in him as Sales Logistics Checker."17Notwithstanding its ruling on the legality of the dismissal, the NLRC awarded retirement benefits in favor of Daabay. The dispositive portion of its Resolution reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal of complainant is DENIED for lack of merit, while that of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. is GRANTED.Accordingly, the assailed 18 April 2008 Decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment is entered DISMISSING the present complaint for want of evidence.Let, however, this case be REMANDED to the Executive Labor Arbiter or the Regional Arbitration Branch of origin for the computation of complainants retirement benefits in accordance with the latest Collective Bargaining Agreement prior to his termination.SO ORDERED.18Coca-Colas partial motion for reconsideration to assail the award of retirement benefits was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution19dated October 30, 2009. The NLRC explained that there was a need "to humanize the severe effects of dismissal"20and "tilt the scales of justice in favor of labor as a measure of equity and compassionate social justice."21Daabay also moved to reconsider, but his motion remained unresolved by the NLRC.22Undaunted, Coca-Cola appealed to the CA.The CA agreed with Coca-Cola that the award of retirement benefits lacked basis considering that Daabay was dismissed for just cause. It explained:We are not oblivious of the instances where the Court awarded financial assistance to dismissed employees, even though they were terminated for just causes. Equity and social justice was the vague justification. Quickly realizing the unjustness of these [s]o-called equitable awards, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to curb and rationalize the grant of financial assistance to legally dismissed employees. Thus, in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Supreme Court recognized the harsh realities faced by employees that forced them, despite their good intentions, to violate company policies, for which the employer can rightfully terminate their employment. For these instances, the award of financial assistance was allowed. But, in clear and unmistakable language, the Supreme Court also held that the award of financial assistance should not be given to validly terminated employees, whose offenses are iniquitous or reflective of some depravity in their moral character. x x x.23(Citation omitted)Thus, the dispositive portion of its Decision dated June 24, 2011 reads:FOR THESE REASONS, the writ of certiorari is GRANTED; the portion of the Resolution promulgated on 27 August 2009 remanding of the case to the Executive Labor Arbiter or the Regional Arbitration Branch of origin for computation of retirement benefits is DELETED.SO ORDERED.24Daabays motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution25dated December 9, 2011; hence, this petition.It bears stressing that although the assailed CA decision and resolution are confined to the issue of Daabays entitlement to retirement benefits, Daabay attempts to revive through the present petition the issue of whether or not his dismissal had factual and legal bases. Thus, instead of confining itself to the issue of whether or not Daabay should be entitled to the retirement benefits that were awarded by the NLRC, the petition includes a plea upon the Court to affirm ELA Magbanuas Decision, with the modification to include: (a) his allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent in the computation of his backwages; (b) his actual reinstatement; and (c) damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses.We deny the petition.We emphasize that the appeal to the CA was brought not by Daabay but by Coca-Cola, and was limited to the issue of whether or not the award of retirement benefits in favor of Daabay was proper. Insofar as CA-G.R. SP No. 03369-MIN was concerned, the correctness of the NLRCs pronouncement on the legality of Daabays dismissal was no longer an issue, even beyond the appellate courts authority to modify. In Andaya v. NLRC,26the Court emphasized that a party who has not appealed from a decision may not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate court other than what he had obtained from the lower court, if any, whose decision is brought up on appeal.27Further, we explained in Yano v. Sanchez,28that the entrenched procedural rule in this jurisdiction is that a party who did not appeal cannot assign such errors as are designed to have the judgment modified. All that he can do is to make a counter-assignment of errors or to argue on issues raised below only for the purpose of sustaining the judgment in his favor.29Due process prevents the grant of additional awards to parties who did not appeal.30Considering that Daabay had not yet appealed from the NLRCs Resolution to the CA, his plea for the modification of the NLRCs findings was then misplaced. For the Court to review all matters that are raised in the petition would be tolerant of what Daabay was barred to do before the appellate court.Before the CA and this Court, Daabay attempts to justify his plea for relief by stressing that he had filed his own motion for reconsideration of the NLRCs Resolution dated August 27, 2009 but the same remained unacted upon by the NLRC. Such bare allegation, however, is insufficient to allow the issue to be disturbed through this petition. We take note of Daabays failure to attach to his petition a copy of the motion which he allegedly filed with the NLRC. It is also quite baffling why Daabay does not appear to have undertaken steps to seek the NLRCs resolution on the motion, even after it remained unresolved for more than two years from its supposed filing.Granting that such motion to reconsider was filed with the NLRC, the labor tribunal shall first be given the opportunity to review its findings and rulings on the issue of the legality of Daabays dismissal, and then correct them should it find that it erred in its disposition. The Court cannot, by this petition, pre-empt the action which the NLRC, and the CA in case of an appeal, may take on the matter.Even as we limit our present review to the lone issue that was involved in the assailed CA decision and resolution, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the CA.Daabay was declared by the NLRC to have been lawfully dismissed by Coca-Cola on the grounds of serious misconduct, breach of trust and loss of confidence. Our pronouncement in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC31on the issue of whether an employee who is dismissed for just cause may still claim retirement benefits equally applies to this case. We held:At the risk of stating the obvious, private respondent was not separated from petitioners employ due to mandatory or optional retirement but, rather, by termination of employment for a just cause. Thus, any retirement pay provided by PALs "Special Retirement & Separation Program" dated February 15, 1988 or, in the absence or legal inadequacy thereof, by Article 287 of the Labor Code does not operate nor can be made to operate for the benefit of private respondent. Even private respondents assertion that, at the time of her lawful dismissal, she was already qualified for retirement does not aid her case because the fact remains that private respondent was already terminated for cause thereby rendering nugatory any entitlement to mandatory or optional retirement pay that she might have previously possessed.32(Citation omitted and emphasis ours)In ruling against the grant of the retirement benefits, we also take note of the NLRCs lone justification for the award, to wit:Where from the facts obtaining, as in this case, there is a need to humanize the severe effects of dismissal and where complainants entitlement to retirement benefits are even admitted in [Coca-Colas] motion to reduce bond, [w]e can do no less but tilt the scales of justice in favor of labor as a measure of equity and compassionate social justice, taking into consideration the circumstances obtaining in this case.33(Emphasis ours)Being intended as a mere measure of equity and social justice, the NLRCs award was then akin to a financial assistance or separation pay that is granted to a dismissed employee notwithstanding the legality of his dismissal. Jurisprudence on such financial assistance and separation pay then equally apply to this case. The Court has ruled, time and again, that financial assistance, or whatever name it is called, as a measure of social justice is allowed only in instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character.34We explained in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. NLRC35:[S]eparation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice.A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect, of rewarding rather than punishing the erring employee for his offense. And we do not agree that the punishment is his dismissal only and that the separation pay has nothing to do with the wrong he has committed. Of course it has. Indeed, if the employee who steals from the company is granted separation pay even as he is validly dismissed, it is not unlikely that he will commit a similar offense in his next employment because he thinks he can expect a like leniency if he is again found out. This kind of misplaced compassion is not going to do labor in general any good as it will encourage the infiltration of its ranks by those who do not deserve the protection and concern of the Constitution.36(Emphasis ours)Clearly, considering that Daabay was dismissed on the grounds of serious misconduct, breach of trust and loss of confidence, the award based on equity was unwarranted.1wphi1Even the NLRCs reliance on the alleged admission by Coca-Cola in its motion to reduce bond that Daabay is entitled to retirement benefits is misplaced. Apparently, the supposed admission by Coca-Cola was based on the following:In support of its motion to reduce bond, Coca-cola seeks leniency for its failure to include in the posting of the bond the monetary award for [Daabays] retirement benefits which, as directed by the Executive Labor Arbiter, should be computed in accordance with the latest Collective Bargaining Agreement prior to his termination. Coca-Cola explains that the amount of the retirement benefits has not been determined and there is a need to compute the same on appeal. x x x.37It is patent that the statements made by Coca-Cola were in light of ELA Magbanuas ruling that Daabay was illegally dismissed. Furthermore, any admission was only for the purpose of explaining the non-inclusion of the amount of retirement benefits in the computation of the appeal bond posted with the NLRC. Coca-Colas statements should be taken in such context, and could not be deemed to bind the company even after the NLRC had reversed the finding of illegal dismissal. And although retirement benefits, where not mandated by law, may still be granted by agreement of the employees and their employer or as a voluntary act of the employer,38there is no proof that any of these incidents attends the instant case.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 24, 2011 and Resolution dated December 9, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03369-MIN are AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.BIENVENIDO L. REYESAssociate JusticeWE CONCUR:MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENOChief JusticeChairpersonTERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTROAssociate JusticeLUCAS P. BERSAMINAssociate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA*Associate JusticeC E R T I F I C A T I O NPursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENOChief Justice

Footnotes*Acting Member per Special Order No. 1502 dated August 8, 2013.1Rollo, pp. 3-38.2Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, with Associate Justices Abraham B. Borreta and Melchor Quirino C. Sadang, concurring; id. at 39-48.3Id. at 49-53.4Id. at 41.5Id. at 81.6Id. at 40.7Id.8Id. at 40, 54.9Id. at 40-41.10Id.11Id. at 81.12Id. at 54-79.13Id. at 79.14Id. at 80-91.15Id. at 89-90.16Id. at 86-87.17Id. at 88.18Id. at 91.19Id. at 92-94.20Id. at 93.21Id.22Id. at 11, 42.23Id. at 46.24Id. at 48.25Id. at 49-53.26502 Phil. 151 (2005).27Id. at 159, citing Policarpio v. CA, 336 Phil. 329, 341 (1997).28G.R. No. 186640, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 347.29Id. at 358.30Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Maria Ruby M. Rivera, G.R. No. 201701, June 3, 2013.31G.R. No. 123294, October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA 18.32Id. at 44-46; See also Aquino v. NLRC, 283 Phil. 118 (1992).33Rollo, p. 93.34Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., and/or Chiongbian v. Sedan, 521 Phil. 61, 71 (2006); San Miguel Corporation v. Lao, 433 Phil. 890, 898-899 (2002); Eastern Paper Mills, Inc. v. NLRC, 252 Phil. 618, 620 (1989).35247 Phil. 641 (1988).36Id. at 649.37Rollo, pp. 83-84.38Aquino v. NLRC, G.R. No. 87653, February 11, 1992, 206 SCRA 118.