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Social Media and China’s Public Diplomacy:

A Path to the Future1

Chenzhuo Gong Fudan University

Abstract: In recent years, China—perceiving itself suffering from misjudgment and deserving more respect—has been vigorously pursuing a better international image. The rapid growth of Confucius Institutes and Classrooms that promote Chinese culture overseas, the generous aid to Africa and the global expansion of its media properties are the most notable efforts. However, scholars point out that the reluctance to develop social media tools for its public diplomacy limits the Chinese government’s capacity to directly engage a foreign public, a formula which in recent years has shown positive effects for other countries. This paper reviews the Bureau of International Information Programs of the United States and explores the possibility for Chinese authorities to include social media into its PD arsenal.

Keywords: Social Media, Public Diplomacy, Bureau of International Informational Programs, Confucius Institutes

1. Introduction

Currently on the international stage, there are two parallel trends transforming the

landscape of public diplomacy (PD)2: the flourishing of social media and the rise of China.

A burgeoning phenomenon since the beginning of 21st century, social media 3 is

everywhere nowadays. Nearly one in four people in the world use social networks in 2013

(eMarketer 2013).4 This suggests that if “the social media empire” were a country, it already

boasts the world’s largest population. Beyond its extensive reach, social media is revolutionizing

the way people think, empowering the marginalized and even helping to spark uprisings (Kenna

1 This paper is mainly policy-centered as it seeks to offer concrete policy prescriptions to China’s public diplomacy practitioners

concerning the use of social media. Thus, to save the space for policy recommendations and to make the paper as condensed as

possible, it does not strictly follow the academic format, deliberately skipping a systematic literature review. This can be a

limitation of this paper, but it somehow helps ensure the consistency, clarity and concision of the paper as well. 2As an essential element of effective diplomacy, public diplomacy, often used interchangeably with “strategic communication” or

“outreach” (United States Government Accountability Office 2009, 1), means the efforts to communicate with global audience to

help advance the nation’s policies, interests, and values, increase its favorability in the short run, while to increase the nation’s

influence by sustaining long-term relationship with foreign publics in the long run. This definition, presented by the author, is a

brief summary to a great variety of relevant interpretations(For example, Cowan and Cull 2008, 6; Matwiczak 2010, 27; Nye

2008, 101;Ross 2002, 77-82; State Department 2010, 60; Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs 2014; United

States Government Accountability Office 2009, 6; Wallin 2012, 3) 3 This paper defines social media as “highly interactive platforms via which individuals and communities share, co-create,

discuss, and modify user-generated content” ( (Jan H. Kietzmann 2011, 241). Amidst the literally hundreds of different social

media platforms, the major platforms in social media including blogs, the crowd-sourced user-generated encyclopedia sites like

Wikipedia, and social media sites including Facebook, file-sharing sites like YouTube. When mentioning about social media, this

paper usually refers to, in specific, Facebook or Twitter, the two most dominant tools used by public diplomacy officers. 4 The percentage seems to be moderate, but regarding the Internet penetration rate of a mere 35 percent worldwide, a quarter is

not trivial. For more detailed statistics on the Internet Penetration Rate, see http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm

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2011, 3). The pervasive influence of social media unavoidably affects the sphere of PD, as

practitioners and scholars alike manifest profound interest in the “game-changer” (McHale

2009). PD scholar Matt Armstrong commented that, “In this age of mass information and

precision-guided media, ignoring social media is surrendering the high ground in the enduring

battle to influence minds around the world” (Amstrong 2009).

At the other end of the spectrum, China is flexing its soft power through a wide range of

PD channels, which span from culture, to foreign aid and international broadcasting. The

traditional balance of power in the “war of ideas” has been challenged by the rise of “the Middle

Kingdom”. Whether China poses a tangible threat to the western hegemony remains a question,

its PD campaign has, at least, touched on a nerve in the U.S. The labels of charm-offensive,

assertive or aggressive often go hand-in-hand with every move of China’s PD program (For

example, Dale 2010; Powell III 2012; Shambaugh 2010; The Woodrow Wilson Center for

International Scholars 2012). The high-profile narrative “going out” and the new Office of Public

Diplomacy established in 2010 are further evidences of China’s “assertiveness”.

The two threads---one exogenous to the PD arena, the other endogenous---have yet to

converge. The usual “second adopter” (Gregory 2011, 362)---the U.S. government---has already

tapped into the potential of social media diplomacy. However, the risk-averse Chinese authorities

are still lingering around the gate of social media, with virtually no official presence on either

Facebook or Twitter.5 This paper will explore the possibility for China to capitalize on the

popularity of social media.

2. Review of China’s Public Diplomacy

When it comes to evaluating PD, two main roads diverge (Matwiczak 2010, 16). One is

to measure the output of PD effort, for example how many foreign students have enrolled in

Confucius Institutes6; the other goes beyond the activity per se and seeks to assess its outcome,

often at an epistemological level. In the case of Confucius Institutes, a positive outcome would

be participants’ increased understanding and favorability towards China, or more fundamentally,

whether the presence of Confucius Institutes improves China’s favorability in surrounding

communities.

The output approach is easier to quantify and track, often adopted by practitioners to

justify funding. However, a high output does not necessarily bring forth positive PD outcomes;

the soaring number of students does not lead to an indisputable victory in the battlefield of PD.

The outcome approach, which “gets to the heart of assessing the effectiveness of public

diplomacy” (Matwiczak 2010, 13), is more reliable in this regard.

In terms of its output, China’s PD program appears to be a booming success. Confucius

Institutes and Classrooms, in a mere nine years, have swept across 117 countries, with a

staggering number of 435 Institutes and 644 Classrooms (Confucius Institute Online 2013).

Beijing pledged worldwide $189 billion for foreign aid and government-sponsored investment

activities in 2011 (Charles, Xiao and Eric 2013, 70), investing $75 billion on aid and projects in

Africa alone from 2000 to 2011 (Austin, et al. 2013). China’s media property CCTV boasts three

major global offices in Beijing, Washington, and Nairobi, and more than 70 additional

5 The only exception is the Facebook account of Chinese Embassy in Myanmar. 6 Confucius Institutes, led and funded by the Office of Chinese Language Council International (in Chinese, Hanban), send out

Chinese language teachers to hundreds of branches around the world (Wang 2008, 264-265). The aim of Confucius Institutes is

explained as promoting Chinese language and culture.

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international bureaus. Its program claims a reach of millions in 137 countries (Nelson 2013). In

an era when Voice of America and BBC World Service budgets are battered by funding cutbacks,

CCTV’s output is staggering.

However, when it comes to the outcome of China’s PD, the result may be more

disturbing than reassuring. Unlike its western counterparts, China’s PD practitioners have paid

greater attention to improving their image. In an online exchange in 2013, Qin Gang, China’s

Director General of Information Department, explained public diplomacy as “an important

means to introduce China and improve national image”.7 And the Public Diplomacy Forums in

2011 and 2013 also revolved around the concept of image.8 Nevertheless, through a cross-year

analysis, this paper finds that China’s favorability in 16 sample countries was in flux from 2007

to 2013. The image of China is in an embarrassing situation, compared to the country's booming

economic power and the reputation it attempts to shape.

In 2008, favorability towards China plummeted to the lowest point in the sample period,

from a median favorability rate of 44.5 percent in 2007 to 38 percent. After 2008, there was an

incremental increase in favorability in most of the sample countries, with the median reaching its

peak of 55 percent in 2011. In the past two years, the favorability rate sees a clear pattern of

recession. Among the 16 sample countries, only Mexico, Indonesia and Turkey exhibit a positive

trend with an average 6 percent increase.9 In another survey conducted by the BBC, of the 25

countries surveyed in 2013, 12 hold positive views of China, 13 negative views. China’s

“performance” remains strong in Africa and BRIC countries with strongly positive views in

general. However, in the EU, the U.S., Canada, as well as neighboring countries like Japan and

Korea, China suffers from an “extremely negative view” (BBC 2013).

The flux of favorability partly points to a PD campaign that has yet to claim success. The

high outputs in cultural diplomacy, foreign aid and international broadcasting have not been

translated into any tangible outcome in terms of a more positive image, which China has

arguably put the most weight on. Even though China has been scrambling to improve its

tarnished image, the outcome remains, at best, unclear. 10

3. Facebook Outreach: a Case Study of IIP

3.1. IIP’s Achievement against the Historic Backdrop

IIP, the Bureau of International Information Programs, is one of three bureaus that fall

under the authority of the U.S. Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. It

consists of over three hundred tech-savvy staff including myriad contractors (OIG Report 2013,

29). Its mission is to keep a finger on the pulse of the latest trends in technology and become the

creative engine of PD. To better understand the role and limits of IIP necessitates placing it

against the historic backdrop. The functions of IIP sit at the confluence of several narratives:

most notably, the wax and wane of PD in the U.S., the surge of New Public Diplomacy and the

7 Available online at: http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2013/02-22/4588352.shtml 8 The topic for the 2013 Forum was set as “Advocacy and Dialogue: China’s stories and image in the Public Diplomacy era” And

the focus of the forum was heavily steered towards “how to use public diplomacy to improve China’s image”. Available online

at: http://gb.cri.cn/42071/2013/06/26/6611s4161486.htm. 9 See Table 1 in the Appendix. 10 There are certain limitations to the method of poll data in PD evaluation: a) opinion is inherently variable and may only reflect

how an individual is feeling at a given point in time. b) The margin of error cannot be avoided. c) The change of favorability is

not solely determined by public diplomacy efforts, but influenced by a number of other variables. Poll data of favorability cannot

precisely evaluate public diplomacy due to the existence of mixed variables.

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advancement of technological frontiers.

Under the iron veil of the Cold War, PD had been the central pillar of U.S. foreign

policies. The U.S. Information Agency played a significant role to “win the hearts and minds” in

the era marked by containment and ideological confrontations. However, the demise of the

Soviet Union has shaken the very foundation where the USIA, anti-Soviet “propaganda

machine” (Neal and Neal 2013, 2, Richards 2001), gained its premier legitimacy. The fate of the

agency was already sealed (Cull 2013, 129). In 1999, as PD receded to the backstage, the major

elements of the USIA were folded into the State Department (Cull 2012). The turning point for

PD came on the tragedy of 9/11 (Kohut 2003). Deteriorating favorability in the Middle East had

created a natural haven for terrorists; U.S. national security was at stake. To make up for a

decade of complacency, Washington attempted to reinvigorate America’s underutilized soft

power. It urged “effective public diplomacy”---“a different and more comprehensive approach”

in “a war of ideas to win the battle against international terrorism.” (The White House 2002, 31),

renewing significant resources devoted to PD (Neal and Neal 2013, 1). However, the meta-

narrative of the “war on terror” dwarfed the minor outcome PD is able to deliver. The U.S. image

was precipitously declining abroad (Ham 2008, 141).11 The depth of hostility in the Muslim

World provided a wonderful stage for PD practitioners. IIP is one of the beneficiaries. Its budget

almost doubled from to 2008 to 2010, reaching more than $102 million in 2010. The momentum

of growth, though constrained by a stringent economy, has remained strong in recent years (U.S.

Department of State 2013, 293).

Another narrative shaping IIP is the sunrise of the New Public Diplomacy. Instead of

“peddling information to foreigners” (Melissen 2005, 9), states are looking towards engaging

with foreign citizens. A radical departure from the Cold War doctrine that features state-to-people

communication, the New Public Diplomacy emphasizes the people-to-people relationship.

Meanwhile, the government no longer has a monopoly in engaging with foreign audiences; a

broad variety of actors, such as non-governmental organizations, private companies and citizens

are springing up. Facing the threat, PD practitioners are looking to new thinking and methods.

IIP, the innovation hub in the State Department, wins greater attention.

Apart from the resurgence of PD in the national strategy and the emergence of New

Public Diplomacy, technology advancement also favors IIP. With the advent of Web 2.0, viral

communication, social media and consumer-driven content have overtaken their predecessors---

email and websites---to become the defining characteristics of the Internet. In 2008, the Obama

administration gave social media high priority after witnessing their utility in his presidential

campaign. IIP, with its technical expertise, came across a historic opportunity.

Driven by the positive environment, IIP began to hit the fast lane. 12 Now, IIP claims an

extensive social media presence with a reach of 1.4 billion. 209 out of 294 U.S Embassies and

Consulates have been on Facebook, 122 of them on Twitter (U.S. Department of State 2013).

And IIP, as the central coordinating body and the arsenal of PD materials, sends out its best items

in a daily social media feed, while each Embassy or Consulate also produces their own messages

that are tailored to the taste of the local audience.

In the case of the Embassy in Jakarta, it has skillfully incorporated FB into its PD efforts

by relating it to offline events. For example, the Embassy has attracted a large local audience by

providing tangible rewards donated by Microsoft and Starbucks. Specifically, in a contest that 11 In 2007, only 9 percent of Turks and 30 percent of Germans had a positive view of the United States, according to Pew

Research Global Attitudes Project. 12 It is noteworthy that IIP provides a great variety of functions other than Facebook outreach, including the maintenance of

embassy websites, the promotion of American Corners and U.S. Speaker/Expert Program.

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offered trips to the U.S., the fan count doubled to more than 60,000 in a month (Ciolek 2010,

16).

3.2. The Problems Haunting IIP and its Facebook Outreach

With effective use of FB along with other social media, IIP has made significant

contributions to the State Department’s digital diplomacy outreach efforts. However, the utility

of this approach was questioned in an official inspection of IIP in 2013. There are a multitude of

problems haunting IIP’s FB outreach (OIG Report 2013), including a slow response time

constrained by security clearance, the antithesis between policy dissemination and audience

tastes, the stagnation in designing reliable metrics to evaluate FB outreach, an over-emphasis on

the raw numbers of fans with an engagement rate of just over 2 percent, as well as an opaque

group of audience.

At the same time, IIP, as a whole, is circumscribed by, among other things, the problems

of functional overlap with other agencies, the lack of management over contractors that

constitute 45 percent of total staffing, a lack in leadership and strategic vision, and limited

interagency cooperation characterized by “tribal cultures” (Gregory 2011, 14).

To provide a clearer picture to the problems faced by IIP, this paper provides a threefold

classification to the problems: institutional problems, strategic problems and inherent problems.13

The first two can be resolved with institutional surgeries or clarifications at the strategic level,

but the last type of problem is rooted in inherent tensions. Security clearance cannot be

surrendered for the sake of response time; policy dissemination lingers as determined by the

nature of PD; and “the long-term nature of PD work” (OIG Report 2013, 18) defies any accurate

evaluation. Another inherent problem that was not mentioned in the inspection report is

“sustainability”. The essence of New Public Diplomacy is “building quality and sustainable

relationships with foreign publics as an end in itself.” (Zaharna 2007, 217) However, in the fast-

paced world of social media, to sustain interest and relationships is exceptionally challenging.

The new media campaign unleashed during Obama’s visit to Brazil in 2011 produced only a

short-lived focus (Ali and David 2011, 6). And based on this paper’s study, the number of people

interacting with the FB page of the Embassy in Jakarta is almost the same as the number three

years ago, despite the fan base multiplying five times. The average engagement rate is even

lower. 14

Facing the controversy, it might be the time to re-evaluate social media as a tool of PD: Is

it a hype or hope for PD? To provide a clearer evaluation of social media, this paper, referring to

a two-way communication model, conducts a systematic analysis to the pros and cons of FB in

the realm of PD.15 The result appears to be mixed, as FB exhibits almost equal numbers of

advantages and disadvantages when employed in PD.

4. Why Chinese Embassies Should not Follow the Trend

The war of ideas is not new. Thousands of years ago, the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu

pointed out that a complete and lasting triumph comes only through a sophisticated strategy, one

that acts persuasively on the mind of the opponent. Suppose Chinese authorities cast social

13 See Tale 2 in the appendix for more information. 14 See Figure 3, 4 and 5 in the appendix for more information. 15 See Figure 6 and Table 3 in the appendix for more information.

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media aside, it risks ceding the high ground in the global battle of ideas. However, based on the

case study of IIP, the author proposes that it would be inadvisable for Chinese Embassies to

capitalize on the potential of FB. There are five inherent problems when it comes to applying FB

diplomacy to Embassies: the absence of suitable organizational culture, the liability of security

clearance, the incapacity to be personable, the potential backfire and the burden of an enormous

fan base.

4.1. Lack of Organizational Culture that Values Social Media

All bureaucracies---and the Chinese Embassy is no exception---tend to be risk averse

(Beetham 2013; Bardos 2001, 437). The conservative nature impedes Embassies from keeping

up with trends, which more often than not involve risks. In the case of social media, its open-

ended and real-time characters often make “staying inside the bureaucratic cocoon” the most

rational choice for Embassies; the stakes to go out are too high. Even in the U.S., the most active

government (Crouch 2012) in using social media as diplomacy tools (Lichtenstein 2010), the

resistance in organizational culture still lingers.16 Proposals existed as early as 2004 that the

senior position of IIP should be designated as an assistant secretary, “given the size of the bureau

and the responsibilities of the coordinator” (OIG Report 2013, 2). However, after almost a

decade, the much-anticipated promotion has yet to come. This can be interpreted as an

insufficiency of recognition in the Congress and the Department.

Akin to the situation in the U.S., China’s FB outreach program, if located in Embassies,

may be marginalized in the greater organizational structure. One direct consequence is that the

bright brains will shun the social media posts, leaving the quality of FB outreach discounted.

4.2. The Inherent Tensions between Security and Engagement

In FB Diplomacy, the nature of real-time communication demands a freer mandate for

the PD practitioners. Otherwise, constrained by security checks, the quality of engagement will

be discounted. However, if the message check is bypassed, an inaccurate message can go viral17

and cause catastrophic consequences.

Indeed, the antithesis between security and engagement is deeply rooted in the structural

tensions between the government and social media. A hierarchical structure of top-down

messaging represented by the government is inherently incompatible to the horizontal network of

social media. Hierarchies have their place. But social media now favors horizontal structures and

agile practitioners. To force a bureaucratic structure into FB, that is slow and ill-equipped to new

media, would generate more cost than benefit.

Success in FB Diplomacy presupposes a quick and accurate response, something Chinese

authorities cannot deliver for the moment.

4.3. A Politicized Organ in a Depoliticized Sphere

In the world of social media, being personal is the key to success. Many scholars

reinforce that connections are best made online when organizations converse in a less-official

tone, making them appear more personable and approachable (Dale 2009, 8;Wallin 2013, 5).

Indeed, in the top three hundred FB pages ranked by fan counts, U.S. President Barack Obama is

17 The author gained the inspiration from a personal conversation with Matthew Wallin, a senior fellow in the American Security

Project, also an expert in PD.

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the lonely island of a politician in a sea of actors, musicians, athletes and brands

(Fanpagelist.com 2013).

If Chinese Embassies seek to tap the full potential of FB, a refurbishment of the political

jargon is a must. However, to adopt a less obviously governmental style is easier said than done.

In the case of China, consistency lies at the core of foreign policy. Every diplomatic actor, from

Foreign Ministry Spokesman to the People’s Daily, must strictly stick to a uniform tone.

Consistency can be a great advantage in traditional diplomacy. However, in FB diplomacy, it

means much less leeway for Chinese Embassies to become personable. From the perspective of

agency theory, Embassies, the PD “agents,” can hardly adopt a personable approach without an

overhaul of thinking and strategy from their “principals.” The detached and impersonal tone,

which permeates Chinese authorities, is expected to persist in the Embassies’ FB pages.

A more fundamental problem is the question of credibility. As Walter Lippmann wrote

nearly a century ago, most people don’t choose between true and false messages, they choose

between trustworthy and untrustworthy messengers (Lippmann 1922, 223). In “a contest of

competitive credibility” (Nye, The Pros and Cons of Citizen Diplomacy 2010), any official

mouthpiece is never fully trusted (Stead and Smewing 2002, 54), even less when it belongs to the

communist faction. 18

Worse still, Chinese Embassies, like its U.S. counterpart, will face the tensions between

policy dissemination and audience preferences. Few audiences go to FB in the morning to read

the latest Chinese foreign policies. In the essentially depoliticized social media community, a

politicized body, that occasionally circulates political propaganda, is doomed to be an

anachronism.

4.4. A Public Diplomacy Practice that Might Backfire

The advent of global real-time media has drastically increased the transparency of

international politics (Livingston 2002). In light of the not-so-positive image of China in many

regions, a FB campaign unleashed by China may backfire in the open marketplace of ideas. At

any rate, without the umbrella of censorship to protect itself, Chinese diplomats will be exposed

to the strong bastion of anti-Chinese sentiment.

More importantly, as China has not revealed any intention to unblock Facebook and

Twitter, any official presence on the two platforms will possibility spur a flurry of critiques from

both home and abroad. The cost, though indeterminate, is sure to be incurred.

4.5. “Engagement” With Tens of Thousands of Fans: Forget about It

Despite the vague definition of “engagement”, it presumes an interactive and approach,

which can be costly. A simple click of a “like” button cannot be defined as engagement in a

strict sense; it is too weak to be taken into account. Only a series of “likes,” “comments” and,

“sharing” are strong enough to breed substantive changes in people’s minds.

The controversy is that the governing logic of any social media site is “weak ties.” As

Gladwell illustrated, “Twitter is a way of following (or being followed by) people you may never

have met. FB is a tool for efficiently managing your acquaintances, for keeping up with the

people you would not otherwise be able to stay in touch with. That’s why you can have a

thousand ‘friends’ on FB, as you never could in real life.” (Gladwell 2010, 3) 19 However, what

18 Regarding the thick skepticism towards government permeating across Western neighborhoods, think about Ronald Reagan’s

remark---“government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem”. 19 The number of strong ties on Twitter is limited. See Figure 5 in the Appendix for more information.

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PD evangelists anticipate from social media is sowing changes at a cognitive level (e.g. the shift

of attitude), or even at a behavioral level (e.g. social movement). This demands strong ties, not

the weak ties that prevail in social media. For many, pressing a “like” button on FB is no more

than an act of philanthropy, meaning “I have come to the page.”

In this way, the grand scale of the Embassies will be an obstacle, instead of an asset, for

substantial engagement. On one hand, utterly outnumbered, a stray staff or two working to

maintain FB pages in the Embassies cannot realize a total engagement with the foreign audience.

On the other hand, as staff being preoccupied by providing decent feedback to the audience, the

burden of customer service might lead to a deteriorating quality of the news feeds, thus

perpetuating a vicious circle. When failing to accommodate the demands of the audience, the

supposed engagement tools like FB may retrogress into old-fashioned press conferences. The

news feeds are tedious. The engagement rate is pathetically small. And after FB revised its edge

rank, the lack of engagement will lead to dwindling fans able to see the news feeds in the first

place. Worse still, facing a large pool of fans that is appallingly dynamic and hybrid, it is almost

impossible to provide tailored messages only to the relevant audience. Imagine you are intrigued

by the Chinese language, but the news feeds you receive every day are about Chinese food,

something you happen to frown on. The page is unlikely to create positive change in your mind

which “engagement” is supposed to bring. This is a fundamental problem facing IIP, which

brought the agency to halt its FB advertising during the 2013 inspection (OIG Report 2013, 22).

However, considering the burden of the sheer number of fan count, it is questionable how well-

targeted IIP can become with a stringent budget.

Indeed, for all of its rhetorical emphasis on engagement, or strengthening relationships,

the Obama administration paid little more than lip service to engagement claims. It still prefers

the number of engagement over the genuine quality of engagement, and emphasize short-term

advocacy20 over the long-term relation-building aspect of PD. The “fan campaign” is one piece

of evidence. It can be interpreted as a legacy of the Modus Oprandi in the Cold War, when

audience reach constituted the predominant criteria for success. The age of mass communication

championed number rather than quality. However, in social media, quality is king. 21

At any rate, engagement is not an end in itself. As diplomats swarming to platforms for

the sake of swarming to platforms, it is healthy to note that engagement is no more than a tool. If

engagement does not favor the ultimate goal, or at least has not reached its full potential, it may

be the time to re-evaluate the “engagement campaign”.

5. Why Confucius Institutes can be a Great Stage for FB Outreach

By comparison, incorporating Facebook into Confucius Institutes will provide the

following comparative advantages over applying it to Chinese Embassies. The inherent problems

haunting either IIP or possibly Chinese Embassies can be resolved to a great extent:

• The partnership structure of Confucius Institutes with foreign universities means that their 20 Professor Nicholas Cull classified PD into five general types: (1) listening, (2) advocacy, (3) cultural diplomacy, (4) exchange,

and (5) international broadcasting. Among them, advocacy mainly refers to an actor’s attempt to manage the international

environment by “undertaking an international communication activity to actively promote a particular policy, idea, or that actor’s

general interests in the minds of a foreign public” (Cull 2008, 31-32). This appears to be the core duty of social media diplomacy

for the moment, at least in the case of IIP. 21 The problem of the over-emphasis on numbers can also be interpreted from the angle of “perform-control model”. With the

advent of New Public Management reform, State Department has pursued accurate measurement to the performance of different

functional cones. This may steer social media practitioners to more numerical parameters, attempting to meet the expectations

from the Congress and the senior leadership in the State.

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remarks cannot be interpreted as official standpoints. With a less stringent demand on

message accuracy, the tensions between security and engagement can be largely alleviated.

• The non-profit, unofficial status of Confucius Institutes, offers the space to pursue a more

personable approach. At the same time, Confucius Institutes can win more credibility on FB

vis-à-vis Embassies, by keeping an arm’s length from the government.

• Despite an undeniable political background, Confucius Institutes are cultural entities in

nature. Confucius Institutes will not become politically charged and risk alienating fans.

• 63 Confucius Institutes22 (almost half of them in the U.S.) already have FB pages with a

median fan count of 105. There has been little, if any, public backlash over the move. The

potential consequence of “backfire” is minuscule.

• An Embassy FB page needs to address millions of people. The FB pages of a Confucius

Institute, however, would target only thousands of people in the located community. The

relatively small size of its audience, compared to Embassies, provides the opportunities for

substantial engagement. The quality of engagement can be guaranteed.

6. A Path to the Future: Preliminary Recommendations

• Recommendation #1: Establish the central nervous system of the FB accounts of

Confucius Institutes. In reference to the structure of IIP,23 a Social Media Center, with an

initial staff of 1624, should be placed under the China Public Diplomacy Association, an

NGO outside governmental bureaucracies.25 The Center, in cooperation with Confucius

Institutes, will form a Board of Directors that includes people from Foreign Service,

Confucius Institutes, Private companies and academia. 26 Paramount is that the Board

should articulate a tailored strategy for Confucius Institutes' outreach on FB.

• Recommendation #2: The pilot program, or Phase One, will focus on the establishment of

the central coordinating body---the Social Media Center. The Social Media Center will

consist of five offices: Front Office, Office of Content Development, Office of Platform

Management, Office of Training and Office of Strategic Planning and Evaluation.

• Recommendation #3: In the Office of Content Development, a content strategist officer

will produce thematic packages under a well-planned annual publication plan. The

recommended themes are Chinese food, Chinese tourism, Chinese exchange opportunities

and Chinese e-journals.27 It should also explore ways to leverage civil society’s knowledge,

skills and creativity through the means of contracts. Possible partners include Lenovo28,

Guokr.com, 163.com and Hua Yi Media. Info graphics and pictures are highly preferred

compared to plain text.

22 For the full list of the Confucius Institutes and Classrooms that have Facebook accounts. See Table 4 in the appendix for more

information. 23 For detailed IIP organizational structure, see Figure 6 in the appendix for more information. 24 For the proposed initial staff composition, see Table 5 in the appendix for more information. 25 For the proposed organizational structure, see Figure 7 in the appendix for more information. 26 For the proposed composition of the Board, See Table 6 in the appendix for more information. 27 Chinese e-journals are mainly about influential academic theses and reports recently published in China. 28 Lenovo has been exceptionally successful on Facebook. It boasts more than a hundred thousand active fans. More importantly,

many of its posts were able to go viral online. For one example, see

https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10151892141059635&set=a.391943844634.169881.27678194634&type=1&theater

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• Recommendation #4: In the Office of Platform Management, the top priority is to set up

a centralized PD digital platform, providing access to thousands of PD resources. The

platform will be open to only Chinese diplomatic actors; public access is restricted. When

completed, it will provide important materials to the operation of Confucius Institutes’ FB

pages and others concerned.

• Recommendation #5: In the Office of Training, the central task is to develop a how-to

manual to guide the FB outreach of Confucius Institutes. When designing the manual, the

Office should draw lessons from similar institutions including Instituto Cervantes, Goethe

Institut and British Council.29 In an effort to exploit the viral nature of FB, the Office

should compile a list of means to raise the number of “sharing”. Actively monitoring the

successful cases in the institutes above will be a short-cut forward. Apart from the manual,

the office is also responsible for organizing systematic online training. Only officers who

pass the training will be permitted to operate the FB pages.

• Recommendation #6: In the Office of Strategic Planning and Evaluation, the Social

Media Center should design metrics to quantify the performance of each social media

officer. The metrics should pay more emphasis to the quality of engagement. Possible

criteria include a questionnaire sent out to FB fans that provides reliable feedback on the

FB Page and average response time to each question received. The metrics are expected to

differentiate different kinds of engagement. “Sharing” deserves more weight than “likes”

and “comments”.

• Recommendation #7: Phase One is due to last for one year. Five main goals in the Phase

One are the establishment of the Center, the formulation of a development strategy, the

construction of a cloud-sharing platform, the completion of a how-to manual, and the

designing of social media training courses. Once completed, the Center should step into

Phase Two and roll out its social media expertise to Confucius Institutes across the world.

Ten institutes that already have FB accounts will be selected as the sample, five in the U.S.,

three in Europe, one in Asia and one in Africa. Each partnering institute will employ two

full-time social media officers, one Chinese, one local resident. Digital literacy and

marketing expertise will be the principal criteria in the selection process. The salary

structure of the social media officers will encompass a limited regular wage and a bonus

based on their performance. The highlight of the program will be an audience research

officer who will conduct precise surveys of the fans to determine which thematic package

should be delivered. Phase Two will run for one year as well. If the response from the local

community is positive and an improved engagement is visible on the FB pages, the Center

should step to Phase Three by adding an appropriate number of institutes into the program.

• Recommendation #8: During the operation of FB pages, a personalized tone should be

adopted, avoiding anything that would give the impression of an official tone. FB pages

should include perspectives that not entirely favor the Chinese government. Meanwhile,

29 Some of their FB pages have achieved phenomenal success in involving fans into the dialogue. In a “free trip” campaign

promulgated by Goethe Institut, the number of “people talking about” one of its FB pages increased fivefold, from a little over

2000 before the program to more than ten thousand.

Gong 11

provide tangible prizes that are sponsored by Chinese companies (private companies are

preferred) to promote the pages, for instance, Lenovo and Huawei.

7. Conclusion

For PD practitioners, the allure of social media is evident. 44 percent of the world’s

population is under 25 (Gregory 2008, 4) and the majority of them are now in social media. 30

The dramatic rise in youth population throughout the world who has limited engagement with

China poses a challenge; the key to resolve the challenge and bridge the gap lies in social media.

Looking into the future, the importance of social media will only grow, but the inertia of

bureaucracy demands years to ramp up the staff, know-how and funding. At the same time, if

China attempts to tap the full potential of social media, the inherent challenges that have been

constraining IIP need to addressed. The Social Media Center approach, that steers clear of these

challenges thorough a synergy among government, NGO, private companies and academia, can

be a viable path to the future. Social media, if employed appropriately and strategically, will

become a “force multiplier” for the entrenched PD campaign of China.

30 For the precise data, see Table 7 and Table 8 for more information.

Gong 12

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Gong 15

9. Appendix

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Britain 49 47 52 46 59 49 48

Egypt 65 59 52 52 57 52 45

France 47 28 41 41 51 40 42

Germany 34 26 29 30 34 29 28

Indonesia 65 58 59 58 67 - 70

Japan 29 14 26 26 34 15 5

Jordan 46 44 50 53 44 47 40

Lebanon 46 50 53 56 59 59 56

Mexico 43 38 39 39 39 40 45

Pakistan 79 76 84 85 82 85 81

Poland 39 33 43 46 51 50 43

Russia 60 60 58 60 63 62 62

South Korea 52 48 41 38 - - 46

Spain 39 31 40 47 55 49 48

Turkey 25 24 16 20 18 22 27

United States 42 39 50 49 51 40 37

Average 47.5 42.2 45.8 46.6 50.9 45.6 45.2

Median 46.0 41.5 46.5 46.5 51.0 48.0 45.0

Table 1. Percentage responding favorable in 16 countries from 2007 to 2013

Source: The Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Project database

Institutional Problems Strategic Problems Inherent Problems

Functional overlap Lack of metrics for evaluation Security clearance vs. the quality

of engagement

Lack of interagency supports Over-emphasis on fan numbers Policy dissemination vs. audience

Preference

Lack of management to contractor Lack of clarification of the targeted

audience

Not sustainable

No department wide PD strategy

Table 2. Problems facing IIP: a threefold classification

31 One positive application is that Embassy Bangkok used Facebook and Twitter to keep American citizens and the public at large

informed about the volatile security situation during the political crisis in Thailand in 2010.

Advantages Disadvantages

Content Multimedia, interactive content available Generally not used to disseminate

information about complex policy

issues (Ciolek 2010)

Real-time delivered to the

Audience31

Rumors and errors travel fast as well

Gong 16

Table 3．The advantages and disadvantages of Facebook

Name of the Institutes Country Like People

Talking

About

Ratio

Oceania UWA Confucius Institute Australia 169 1 0.01

Confucius Institute in Auckland New Zealand 130 1 0.01

Confucius Institute University of Melbourne Australia 66 0 0.00

Tourism Confucius Institute at Griffith University Australia 44 16 0.36

Sydney Confucius Classroom Australia 36 0 0.00

Africa Confucius Madagascar :: Institut du groupe

Hanban

Madagascar 525 8 0.02

Confucius Institute at the University of Botswana Botswana 228 73 0.32

Confucius Institute, Unilag Nigeria Nigeria 34 2 0.06

Confucius Institute, Unilag Nigeria Nigeria 34 2 0.06

Confucius Institute at Egerton University Kenya 29 0 0.00

Asia Confucius Institute at the Ateneo de Manila

University

Philippine 1346 20 0.01

Confucius Institute NTU Singapore Singapore 1101 11 0.01

Confucius Institute at Prince of Songkla

University

Thailand 330 32 0.10

TAG Confucius Institute Jorden 299 34 0.11

Confucius Institute at NSU Bangladesh 205 3 0.01

Confucius Institute at Kathmandu University Nepal 63 0 0.00

Europe Китайский язык каллиграфия гохуа ушу чай

Институт Конфуция

Russia 1674 35 0.02

Confucius Institute at YSLU after V.Brusov Armenia 406 11 0.03

32 Take the U.S. Embassy Belgrade for example, among its approximately 160,000 fans in 2013 October, only 88.4 percent of

them are from Belgrade, the supposed targeting country. While, as suggested by Matthew Wallin, after such breakdown, the

number of the fans remain inaccurate considering the variables of VPN (domestic users from Serbia might us a U.S. domain to

log in, then they will be classified as U.S users) , foreign fans living in Serbia (they will be defined as Serbia users. (Wallin 2013) 33 “OIG inspectors found that the use of social media is extensive, but labor-intensive. Many embassies required

additional staff or had to reprogram an existing position in order to use social media in an active way…”Review of the Use of

Social Media by the Department of State, Office of Inspection, Report Number ISP-I-11-10, February 2011

Dissemination Overcome the geographical barriers Will be delivered only to a portion of

fans, determined by the Page Rank of

the content

May be drown amidst the great number

of feeds

Audience Connect to educated youth in cities Cannot connect to people who are

unable or unwilling to use Facebook

Facebook Insight allows in-depth

audience analysis

The analysis can be questionable32

Follow-up Realize the potential of a total

engagement approach

May be labor-intensive facing piles of

messages33

Able to provide fast feedback Might churn out troubles if the

message is problematic

Gong 17

Institut Confucius des Pays de la Loire d'Angers France 334 18 0.05

METU Confucius Institute Turkey 243 2 0.01

Groningen Confucius Institute Netherland 197 2 0.01

Confucius Institute at UBB Romania 195 7 0.04

Confucius Institute in the Republic of Moldova Moldova 166 34 0.20

The Confucius Institute at the University of

Manchester

United

Kingdom

139 3 0.02

Confucius Institute at Trinity Saint David United

Kingdom

102 4 0.04

Music Confucius Institute Denmark 88 18 0.20

Confucius Institute at Leiden University Netherland 88 2 0.02

Copenhagen Business Confucius Institute Denmark 57 0 0.00

Liverpool Confucius Institute United

Kingdom

47 3 0.06

Confucius Institute for Scotland Scotland 25 1 0.04

UCC - School of Asian Studies and Confucius

Institute

Ireland 13 0 0.00

America Confucius Institute at Michigan State University United States 512 27 0.05

Confucius Institute University of Memphis United States 442 2 0.00

Confucius Institute at Texas A&M University United States 433 13 0.03

Confucius Institute Webster University United States 350 5 0.01

Confucius Institute at The University of Kansas United States 336 1 0.00

Confucius Institute at Western Kentucky

University

United States 325 0 0.00

NC State CI United States 267 1 0.00

North Carolina State University Confucius

Institute

United States 259 22 0.08

Confucius Institute at the University of Minnesota United States 258 38 0.15

Confucius Institute at San Diego State University United States 235 7 0.03

Pfeiffer Confucius Institute United States 217 1 0.00

Confucius Institute at the University of Kentucky United States 210 1 0.00

Confucius Institute at UD United States 141 2 0.01

UCA Confucius Institute United States 127 7 0.06

GW Confucius Institute United States 118 22 0.19

Confucius Institute at Pace University United States 113 5 0.04

Confucius Institute at The University of Toledo United States 109 3 0.03

The Confucius Institute at Stony Brook University United States 109 8 0.07

Confucius Institute at the University of Arizona United States 105 1 0.01

UW-Platteville Confucius Institute United States 89 0 0.00

The Confucius Institute at the University of

Michigan

United States 84 10 0.12

Confucius Institute at Georgia State United States 71 0 0.00

Confucius Institute at Saint Mary's University United States 55 1 0.02

Confucius Institute at Miami Dade College United States 46 0 0.00

University of Massachusetts Confucius Institute at

Boston

United States 43 0 0.00

Gong 18

Confucius Institute at USC United States 37 0 0.00

Confucius Institute-University of Akron United States 22 1 0.05

Confucius Institute at Wesleyan College United States 22 0 0.00

The University of Utah Confucius Institute United States 21 0 0.00

The Confucius Institute at the University of Texas

at Dallas - UT Dallas

United States 20 3 0.15

Confucius Institute of Rutgers University - CIRU United States 12 1 0.08

Confucius Institute at the University of Oregon United States 9 1 0.11

Mean 111.00 1.00 0.05

Average 216.00 8.35 0.01

Table 4. The list of Confucius Institutes and Classrooms that already have Facebook pages by 2013/11/26;

Ratio= People Talking About/ Fan Count.

Source: Facebook

Front Office(4) Office of Strategic

Planning and

Evaluation(4)

Office of Content

Development(3)

Office of

Platform

Management(3)

Office of Training(2)

Confucius Institute

Liaison (Experiences

in Confucius

Institutes preferred)

Strategic Planning

Manager

Content Strategist

(Experiences in

Confucius

Institutes

preferred)

Platform Manager Training Program

Manager

Partnership Manager

(Experience in

Confucius Institutes

preferred)

Strategic Planning

Manager

Translation

Strategist

IT Support Officer Training Program

Manager

Partnership Assistant Evaluation Manager Contract Manager Contract Manager Social Media Outreach

Specialist

Evaluation Assistant

Table 5. The proposed initial staff composition of Social Media Center

Projected Expenses YR1 YR2 Note

Content development ¥500,000 ¥700,000

Training Program ¥500,000 ¥100,000 Designed in YR1 with operation cost in

YR2

Platform Development ¥1,500,000 ¥0 platform will be completed in YR1

Operations

Personnel ¥2,176,000 ¥6,816,000

G&A ¥792,000 ¥871,200

Total Operations ¥2,968,000 ¥7,687,200

TOTAL EXPENSE ¥8,436,000 ¥8,487,200

Gong 19

Personnel FY1 FY2 Growth

Rate

Notes

Employee Payroll

Front Office

Executive Director ¥250,000 ¥262,500 5%

Confucius Institute Liaison ¥70,000 ¥73,500 5%

Partnership Manager ¥100,000 ¥105,000 5%

Partnership Assistant ¥50,000 ¥52,500 5%

Office of Strategic Planning and Evaluation

Strategic Planning Manager(2) ¥200,000 ¥210,000 5%

Evaluation Manager ¥100,000 ¥105,000 5%

Evaluation Assistant ¥50,000 ¥52,500 5%

Office of Content Development

Content Strategist ¥110,000 ¥115,500 5%

Translation Strategist ¥90,000 ¥94,500 5%

Contract Manager ¥110,000 ¥115,500 5%

Office of Platform Management

Platform Manager ¥120,000 ¥126,000 5%

IT Support Officer ¥80,000 ¥84,000 5%

Contract Manager ¥100,000 ¥105,000 5%

Office of Training

Training Program Manager ¥120,000 ¥126,000 5%

Social Media Outreach Specialist ¥150,000 ¥157,500 5%

Social Media Officers Abroad

Africa(1*2) ¥120,000 5% begins from FY2

Asia (2*2) ¥300,000 5% begins from FY2

Europe, U.S. (13*2) ¥3,120,000 5% begins from FY2

PAYROLL TOTAL ¥1,700,000 ¥5,325,000

Taxes & Benefits (28%) ¥476,000 ¥1,491,000

TOTAL PERSONNEL ¥2,176,000 ¥6,816,000

General & Administration FY1 FY2 Growth

Rate

Notes

G&A

Board Expense ¥400,000 ¥440,000 10% board travel, expenses & per

diem

Meetings/ Conference ¥200,000 ¥220,000 10% staff Meeting & Travel

Travel ¥100,000 ¥110,000 10% travel for finding partnership

Facilities

Rent ¥0 ¥0 Provided by China Public

Diplomacy Association

Gong 20

Telephone ¥10,000 ¥11,000 10% includes office phones, cell,

internet

Office Supplies ¥10,000 ¥11,000 10% various supplies and

equipment

Insurance ¥10,000 ¥11,000 10%

Equipment ¥60,000 ¥66,000 10% computers and some

audiovisual equipment

Postage & Delivery ¥2,000 ¥2,200 10% includes postage, overnight

delivery and courier

TOTAL ¥792,000 ¥871,200

Note: Legal and Accounting will be merged to China Public Diplomacy Association

Table 6. Budget plan for FY1 and FY2

Board of Directors Number Notes

Confucius Institutes 3 High-level directors in promotion and strategic planning ;

Social media literacy preferred

Foreign Ministry 3 Members of Public Diplomacy Office or Public Diplomacy

Counseling Committee; Social media literacy preferred

Private Companies 2 High-level managers of partnership companies (Lenovo or

163.com); Social media literacy highly preferred

China Public Diplomacy

Association

2 High-level director; Social media literacy preferred

Academia 2 PD Professors in Top 10 Colleges; Social Media Literacy

Required

12

Table 7. Composition of Board of Directors

2011 2012

Facebook 93% 94%

Twitter 12 26

Instagram n/a 11

MySpace 24 7

YouTube 6 7

Tumblr 2 5

Google Plus n/a 3

Yahoo(Unspecified) 7 2

Table 7. Percentage that uses social networking in the U.S. (based on total)

Source: Pew Research Center Q79, Global Attitudes Project 2012

18-29(%) 30-49(%) 50+ (%) Youngest Gap

U.S. 80 59 28 -52

Italy 91 52 13 -78

Poland 82 53 8 -74

Britain 94 66 22 -72

Greece 74 35 4 -70

Spain 91 58 24 -67

France 81 47 17 -64

Czech Rep. 87 57 25 -62

Gong 21

Germany 69 42 16 -53

Russia 84 59 20 -64

Lebanon 66 28 4 -62

Turkey 69 31 7 -62

Tunisia 64 25 7 -57

Egypt 50 22 18 -32

Jordan 35 35 6 -29

Pakistan 4 2 0 -4

Japan 71 41 10 -61

China 61 26 8 -53

India 12 3 1 -11

Mexico 63 29 7 -56

Brazil 62 43 12 -50

Table 8. Percentage of teen social media users who use the sites above.

Source: The Pew Research Center’s Internet & American Life Teen-Parent survey, July 26-September 30,

2012, n=802 for teens 12-17 and parents, including oversample of minority families.

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Figure 1. Average engagement rate from 19 Sep 13 to 29 Oct13, U.S. Embassy Jakarta, Pakistan and Belgrade

Source: Social Bakers Statistics, generated by the author

Figure 2: Fan count of the top three U.S. Embassies Facebook Pages, from April 08, 2010 to Dec 01, 2014

Source: Google Wildfire Monitor

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Figure 3. Average engagement rate from 19 Sep 13 to 29 Oct13, U.S. Embassy Jakarta, Pakistan and Belgrade

Source: Facebook insights

Figure 4. A Conceptual Model for analyzing Facebook Diplomacy 34

34 The limitation in adopting two-communication model is that communication happens not only vertically from communicators

to people, but also horizontally among the members of the public who start exchanging opinions about the messages they receive.

Peer review is a strong argument, which cannot be reflected in the model.

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Under Secretary for

Public Diplomacy

and Public Affairs

Education and Cultural

Affairs

International

Information Programs

(IIP)

coordinator

Front Office

Office of Audience Research and

Evaluation

Office of Policy and Outreach

Regional Coordination and American

Spaces

Content Development

Office of Written Content

Office of Video Prodocution and

Acquisition

Office of Translation Services

Platform Management

Office of Innovative Engagement

Office of Web Engagement

Office of CO.NX/DVC

Content Support Services

Office of Content Management

Systems

Office of IT Operation

Public Affairs

Figure 5. The total number of a user’s strong ties (defined by multiple directed messages as a function of the

number of followers he or she has on Twitter.

Source: Bernardo A. Huberman, Daniel M. Romero, and Fang Wu. Social networks that matter: Twitter under

the microscope. First Monday, 14(1), January 2009.

Figure 6. The organization chart of IIP after the latest adjustment

Source: OIG Report 2013

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Social Media Center

Office of Strategic Planning and Evaluation

Elaborate the strategy framework formulated by

the Board of Directors

Design the metrics to evaluate performance of each social media officer

Office of Content Development

Draft the weekly production schdeule

Produce the thematic packages based on the

schedule

Translate the already-made graphs, videos or weibo

commentsin China

Office of Platform Development

Run the cloud-sharing platfrom

Provide IT support

Office of Training

Develop the social media guideline and online

courses

Conduct trainings through online courses

Front office

Establish and remain contact with foreign

Embassies

Organize the weekly staff meeting and

quarterly interagency discussion

Outreach potential partners

Figure 7: The proposed organizational structure of the Social Media Center